A Contemporary Irish Response to Locke\'s Essay.

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Abstract: William King, Archbishop of Dublin, (1650-1729) has been characterized as a Lockean from after his death to the present time. However, the premise of this categorization stems from an initial misconception popularized shortly after the prelates' death. The following analysis of King's works and his responses to Locke's Essay will illustrate the erroneous and redundant notion of King's Lockeanism. Beginning with Edmund Law's translation of King's greatest work De Origine Mali, a steady tradition has developed between the identification of King with Locke. From this initial specious premise other authors up to modern times have followed suit and accepted this assumption. This discussion seeks to justify William King's philosophical originality and focus on his own rejection of fundamental Lockean principles.
A Contemporary Irish Response to Locke's Essay.
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding entered public awareness in 1690. There is little doubt that it was one of the most influential treatises of the time. This essay will address an Irish contemporary of Locke, Archbishop William King and his response to the famous work. King has wrongly been treated as a Lockean even up until recently. This article will argue that King was not in fact a Lockean but was significantly opposed to Locke on fundamental issues. Furthermore, this discussion will provide evidence for this by examining King's views on Locke's Essay and situating them within his broader philosophical work. This article differs from other studies on King as it underlines his philosophical originality. Firstly it will be necessary to define the tradition of Lockeanism that King has been placed in. Secondly I will examine how King became associated with this Lockeanism and how it has persevered until recently.
William King is mainly remembered as a stalwart of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Church of Ireland. However, thanks to recent research into the prelate other facets of his persona have come to light. Scholarship on King is fragmented but there are a number of biographies that deal with his life. As well as more recent biographies, mention must be made of G.T. Stokes. His series of lectures were compiled and published by Hugh Jackson Lawlor as Some Worthies of the Irish Church (1900). Stokes honoured others throughout the history of the Church of Ireland but King was by far the most detailed. He offered a brief narrative of King's life taken from his autobiography and commented that it 'gives us a vivid picture of the confused state of Ireland about 1660- no schools, no education, no religion either public or private.' Stokes proposed to clear away the previous mistakes in the study of King and present his 'conduct and character in their true light.' He concluded that King learned more through his own unaided efforts than he did by instruction from schoolmasters or teachers. King's account of his early life was an invaluable tool in discerning what life was like in Ireland immediately following the Cromwellian invasion and Stokes attested to this. The Philip O'Regan publication Archbishop William King of Dublin (1650–1729) and the Constitution in Church and State (2000) produced substantial insight into King's ecclesiastical and political career. It was also far more factually accurate than the aforementioned Stokes work. There were some chapters and events mentioned that questioned the success of King but the style of O'Regan's work never really left the bitter taste of failure that was associated with King in other works. O'Regan followed a temporal analytical structure where he began at the start of King's life and detailed his political and ecclesiastical career stalwartly until his death in 1729.
O'Regan relied heavily on the letters of King and this provides the reader a very personal view of the prelate. At the time the Church of Ireland enjoyed a 'Trinity of intellectuals of enduring importance both to its own history and the history of ideas- Archbishop James Ussher, Bishop George Berkeley and Archbishop William King.' Berkeley, the advocate of immaterialism is the only one who has remained well known beyond the confines of the academy. O'Regan's work does not however delve deeply into his philosophical and theological works. Joseph Richardson remarked that O'Regan omits King's career as a member of the European republic of letters, however it was a worthy and comprehensive exposition of King's ecclesiastical career. This omission of O'Regan was partially explained by him in the introduction. He explained the volume of material in the archives relating to King was immense, and recalled Sean Connolly's view that King was probably the best documented individual in early eighteenth-century Ireland and that this fact had intimidated would be biographers. King had also accomplished so much in many different disciplines and careers: politician, bishop, theologian, philosopher, historian, controversialist, astronomer, bibliophile among others. O'Regan emphasized King's longevity and how he was involved in so many intricate chapters in Ireland's history, 'Born in 1650 while Cromwell was still campaigning in Ireland, he died in 1729 in his eightieth year, having survived several monarchs, the demise of the Stuart regime, and the Glorious Revolution.'
Christopher Fauske also recently completed A Political Biography of William King (2011). As the title indicates, this was a political account and a culmination of the trend of the historical treatment of King. Fauskes work was innovative in its concern with King's relationships with others and presents an excellent contextualisation for any study on the learned prelate. Fauske does not seem to rely too heavily on previous scholars of King apart from O'Regan and used other authors to form a context of the time rather than their analysis of King. The title of political biography may lead the reader to question the content as two chapters are in essence examination of King's theology and philosophy, although not the intricacies of his involvement with the Dublin Philosophical Society. However Fauske linked King's writings in an imaginative way to his political career. The chapters titled 'Progress' and 'Success' advance an analysis of some of King's most controversial and influential works but these could also be associated with dampening his attention to parliamentary concerns. Nevertheless Fauske afforded a significant amount of the biography to King's writings which was profoundly different to O'Regan's earlier effort. These works mentioned are the main biographies of King. While they do offer insight into his ecclesiastical and political career they fall short of discussing his foray into natural philosophy. Small mention is made of King in the Dublin Philosophical Society by Fauske but not to a significant extent. As Susan Reilly has recently commented, 'Much work remains to be done to bring King's work more fully into focus, and, indeed, even back into print.' K.T. Hoppen in The Common Scientist in the Seventeenth Century (1970) introduced the lesser known idea of William King and others as natural philosophers. He stated that, 'King concerned himself with the more specialized problem of land drainage which was of course of particular relevance to the Irish situation. It is certainly a good example of seventeenth-century practical research at its best.' Hoppen also postulated that King maintained a lifelong interest in natural philosophy and offered a plethora of references to King's participation in the Dublin Philosophical Society.

So why was King classed as a Lockean? The popularisation of King's philosophy initially came after his death. His most famous original work of philosophy, De Origine Mali was first published in 1702 in Latin. His later works on Christian Humility (1705) and Sermon on Predestination and Divine-Foreknowledge (1709) were less well known and did not reach the heights of the 1702 theodicy. Arthur O Lovejoy referred to King's De Origine Mali as 'an analysis of the argument in its logical sequence.' Lovejoy asserted that the original Latin version did not have wide readership until 1731, when Edmund Law's translation, titled An Essay on the Origin of Evil with notes and explanations was released. Law was an ardent Lockean and the inclusion of his accompanying notes contributed to the perspective of King as a Lockean. The work also contained an important short essay in Lockean moral theory, 'Preliminary dissertation concerning the fundamental principle of virtue or morality', which had been provided for Law by John Gay, a fellow of Sidney Sussex College. Law remarked at the outset of his translation:
At my first entrance on the study of Philosophy, of morals in particular, it was my principal endeavour to get a competent knowledge of the several systems then in vogue, as well as of the general powers, and properties of human nature, and the rules by which they ought to be directed; taking Mr. Locke for one of my chief guides in such enquiries.
However, Law admitted that he omitted King's later work, Sermon on Predestination and Divine-Foreknowledge (1709) as well as some remarks from King against Dr Clarke's philosophy. By his own admission Law stated, 'tis barely literal; I endeavor'd to keep close to the author's sense, and generally to his very words: so that the reader may be very sure of finding Dr. King here at least.' Law may have chosen King's work because of his wife, Mary Christian, daughter of John Christian of Unerigg who was a relative of another John Christian; one of King's early tutor's at Trinity College, Dublin. There is little doubt that Law's work on King placed King in a tradition of Lockeanism. Kings' works appear again in the nineteenth century, however the Lockeanism is either taken for granted or not mentioned.
King's Sermon on Predestination garnered some renewed prominence from its treatment by Edward Copleston (1776–1849) who used it as an example of a 'Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination.' Copleston used King's sermon to compliment his own theories in An Inquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination (1821). This interest by Copleston led his friend Richard Whately (1787–1863) to republish King's Sermon on Predestination (1821) in its entirety. Subsequently Whately was made Archbishop of Dublin in a surprise move by Lord Grey (1764–1845) in 1831. Whately presented the Sermon with some insertions on the earlier comments made by Copleston. Whately and Copleston were operating around the time that William Paley (1743–1805) had published Natural Theology or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity (1802). Paley's works were used in syllabuses in Cambridge which retained its usage until 1920. Charles Darwin in a letter to John Lubbock in 1859 wrote 'I do not think I hardly ever admired a book more than Paley's Natural Theology: I could almost formerly have said it by Heart.' Paley used anatomy and natural history through metaphor and analogy in reasoning reminiscent of King's methodology. Paley would certainly have been familiar with the writings of King having written a short memoir of Edmund Law.
While the classification of King as a Lockean is not universal, he has been placed in this tradition by a number of recent authors, notably David Berman and Joseph Richardson. Berman placed a plethora of philosophers about this time into groups of left and right-wing Lockeans. These groups were part of the early counter-enlightenment in Ireland and the right-wing faction was 'dominated by William King.' The principle reason that King was grouped into the Lockean following was his De Origine Mali. Richardson emphatically stated that King used Lockean epistemology to prove his thesis and postulated that King's strategy for the work was simple, that he used the most widely-accepted contemporary philosophical and scientific methods in three elements. 'King built his natural law foundations on Lockean epistemology, constructed his argument on Newtonian cosmology and set out to eviscerate his opposition by means of the new rhetoric of science.'
There were a number of questionable premises that Richardson asserted. He argued that King used Locke's own epistemology to argue against Locke himself, but did not elaborate on this. Richardson also argued that King used Lockean theory to show up Bayle, 'as the purveyor of a redundant project'; and that with the use of Lockean epistemology King stood on solid ground which commanded almost universal acceptance. Richardson stated that King, using Lockean epistemology defined God in three steps. First King established the reality of mankind's knowledge of the world and held that space, matter, and motion characterised it. King subsequently demonstrated that each of these characteristics depended upon some anterior cause. King thus proved the existence of God. Richardson also explained the significance of Edmund Law translating King's work and mentioned that Law as an ardent Lockean refuted The Existence and Unity of God Proved from His Nature and Attributes by John Jackson (1686–1763) with the Enquiry into the Ideas of Space and Time in 1734. This would have been contrary to King's Sermon on Predestination and Divine-Foreknowledge where King used the divine attributes to prove his thesis. For Richardson, Law ultimately attributed the Lockean perspective that he claimed was inherent in King's work to the combination of an empirical epistemology with at least the outlines of an empirical ethical theory, which was a phrase borrowed from John Stevens.
This Lockean perspective was elaborated by Richardson but not to the extent where the argument would stand up to revised criticism. Notably his reading of Lockeanism in King was based almost exclusively on The Origin of Evil. While it was his most famous work there were other writings by King which do not conform to this Lockean model. Regardless of this some of the main problems with this characterisation were apparent. Richardson grounded his Lockean view of King in the works of A.A. Luce and John Yolton as well as the Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment (1991) which described King's work as, 'a Lockean attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with an omnipotent and beneficent God.' Luce and Yolton stated that King accepted the Lockean theory of sense perception, which is incorrect. Richardson also stated that the continental reaction to the work consisted of mainly the criticism of Bayle and the qualified support of Leibniz. He seems to have ignored that Leibniz actually only agrees with the first four chapters of King's work and disagrees with the last chapter which was almost as long as the first four chapters. Richardson summed up King's work as follows,
Stated at its briefest, William King's thesis in the De Origine Mali held that a good omniscient, omnipotent God created the worlds and gave men freewill. Through revelation God allowed men to navigate the difficult course between the use of freewill and the dictates of providence. King's system allowed the maximum power to both free mankind and a God whose providence ordered the universe.
Ultimately Richardson concluded that King used Lockean epistemology to argue against Locke himself, then stated that the use of this methodology gave King solid ground to stand on which commanded almost universal acceptance in terms of a theory of knowledge. If this was the case then why argue against it?

The fundamental problem with classing King as a Lockean was that he disagreed with Locke on elementary questions. This is not to say that King was in opposition to Locke at every turn. King did agree with Locke on certain issues; so the discussion here is concerned with the confusion of classing King as a Lockean. Locke was open to religious equality in a fashion contrary to King. 'The Sum of all we drive at is, That every Man may enjoy the same Rights that are granted to others.' Furthermore Locke wrote,
Can you allow of the Presbyterian Discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like? Ecclesiastical Authority, whether it be administered by the Hands of a single Person, or many, is everywhere the same; and neither has any Jurisdiction in things Civil, nor any manner of Power of Compulsion.
It seems that Locke was only referring to Protestants and was not an advocate of religious toleration in the same vein as Spinoza. King vehemently opposed the concessions of state recognition to dissenters. Locke also denied that religious institutions should be allowed to punish according to the law. This was reserved for the state and that ultimately any punishment for spiritual offences would be carried out by God. This position by Locke directly condemned King's involvement in the Thomas Emlyn case. Emlyn was privately anti-Trinitarian and this became public in 1702. The theological question that Emlyn posed was 'Whether God and the Man Christ Jesus should be one and the same person?' Emlyn published his sentiments in 1702 in A Humble Inquiry into the Scriptural Account of Jesus Christ which was a sustained argument against the doctrine of the Trinity. One of the main points of Emlyn's Humble Inquiry was the denial of the divine nature of Jesus Christ and he accused his critics of having betrayed the Protestant Reformation. He was subsequently arrested on the order of the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, Sir Richard Pine. The Blasphemy Act of 1698 had subjected Unitarian beliefs to prosecution and his trial was considered by some to be a 'farce.' At least half a dozen Anglican bishops attended his trail; King and Boulter were the leaders and took the bench with Pine. The prosecution failed to prove that Emlyn wrote the blasphemous book and argued instead that strong presumption was as good as evidence.
Emlyn had in fact written the book but the verdict was decided without evidence of this. He was sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of £1,000. The vehement disapproval of Pine and the presence of Boulter and King influenced the jury. 'The jury, awed by their presence [King and Boulter] and intimidated by the judge, delivered a verdict contrary to evidence, to law, and probably to their own conviction.' The affair was considered a result of Toland's escapade, 'Toland waved the red flag in 1697 and five years later poor Emlyn was gored.' Emlyn stated his case in a later publication explaining his view on what had happened: A True Narrative (1719).
Locke's rejection of innate ideas was found in Book I of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke argued that, 'we have no innate knowledge, so, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes.' Moreover;
It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, koinai ennoiai, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of the Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural facilities, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles.
While King agreed that the senses provided experience he argued, particularly in the Sermon on Predestination and Divine-Foreknowledge that the sense experience of the perfect order of nature contributed to knowledge of the divine. This knowledge could not be fully understood by the individual but could be reasoned by analogy. The very fact that this was a possibility implied an ability instilled by God in man. Susan Keating argued that King's interpretation of innate ideas was not of an idea brought to mind fully formed but instead a mental disposition or a type of reasoning that was strange to man, created by God and nature. Keating reckons that King's reasoning was similar to Augustine's notion that God endows man with a conscience so that he may apprehend the moral law. King's philosophical position seemed to be influenced by both an empiricist and a rationalist doctrine however the rationalist tradition had more importance for King.
Incidentally Law made no mention of King's earlier comments on Locke's Essay. King composed these short remarks sometime before Saturday 25 October 1692 in a letter to William Molyneaux. Evidence for King's opposition to Locke's notion of innate ideas can be found here. King called Locke's chapter on the subject, 'a meer jangle', and his initial quandary was sematic, grounding his retorts in natural analogy and reason. King reasoned that Locke's explanation on the matter confounded the observation of principles with the use of their terms. Some of the terms used by Locke had not been properly classified and so a proper notion of them was not inherently understood. This was a similar quagmire to Descartes ambiguity on not only innate ideas but on the semantics of 'idea' and 'innate.' King considered that it was contrary to reason to accept that innate ideas are not present in the mind. Although King admitted that we cannot tell when we initially observe something but there are certain instances where it is impossible to argue against innateness coming from nature. The action of avoidance of inconvenience for an individual commences as his reason begins to act. This is called an innate principle of morality. A problem arises here however which can seem to cause this innate principle to be overruled in certain conditions. It can be argued that some good can be obtained from enduring the evil immediately consequent of an action. However the good potentially obtained can exist as an innate idea itself. King deduced that 'but to argu from thence that this is not from an innate principle because it may be conquered is as good a conclusion as to say that the stone doth not naturally tend down wards because a pully may raise it.' Moreover King stated:
Let him [Locke] but put the youngest childs finger in the fire, and he will find the child has by nature as good an idea of heat. And is as well principled to avoid it, as he is with all his philosophy and I wou'd fain have him tell whence, if not from nature, the child, the very first time, had idea of heat and the principle to avoid it. I humbly conceive the fire it self has no idea of heat to communicate nor principle of aversion to lend the child.
King seems to be taking a Cartesian viewpoint in the tradition dating back to Plato. Even our sensory ideas involve innate concepts and ideas are innate insofar as their content derives from the nature of the mind alone, as opposed to deriving from sense experience. King was most certainly conforming with the tradition of Christianizing the Platonic ideas of forms espoused with Descartes and Malebranche. The idea here was that certain ideas are innate and part of the mind placed there by God. King ultimately concluded that notions 'may be said to be innate because God has so framed the nature of man and placed him in such circumstances that he cannot, without violence to his mind, reject or dissent from then or so much as miss them.'
King's remarks on Book II Chapter 13 of the Essay are particularly important as they are formed here and subsequently developed later on in De Origine Mali. King took exception to Locke on his notions of extension and substance.
The quarrel against the definition of extension is unjust. For haber partes extra partes divides the idea of extension and presents the distinct parts of the though with much clearness which is all the use of a definition. Tis tru it recurres to this that extension is extension. But that is no fault, if it did not, it were no definition. He has abused it by translation.
The Lockean model of definition of substance was for King 'very trifling.' In his remarks he explains a notion of substance that developed into his formal notion in De Origine Mali. King's notion of substance is found at the outset of the work and found relative concession from Leibniz. Substance for King is a thing which the mind can conceive by itself as distinct and separate from all others, so the thing does not need another thing in order to determine that it is itself a distinct substance.
Per Substantiam hic intelligo rem, quae per se a mente concipi potest, tanquam distincta & divisa ab omni alia: res enim cujus conceptus ab alia non dependet, nec aliam includit aut supponit, nobis substantia est, eamque eo nomine appellamus: modum vero, seu accidens dicimus quod in conceptu suo dependentiam involvit.
King enquired into the nature of a substance and used the Aristotelian model of wax to explain this.
For the wax takes a likeness of the gold seal in respect of the image, but not in respect of the seal's intrinsic disposition to be a gold seal. Likewise the sense is affected by the sense-object with a colour or taste or flavour or sound, not in respect of what each is called as a particular thing.
King gave the physical example of the eye representing to the mind burning wax which was a thing that was hard, round, capable of being melted in the fire, red, and when softened changeable in a shape and also resolvable into smoke. The eye attributes all these properties by viewing the wax almost at one glance but the understanding of the wax's essence determined that the properties of the wax are changeable but that which continues under all these changes is known as its nature and substance. Matter then is the thing in the substance that remains through all the changes that a substance can go through. 'Quid igitur secum fert per omnes mutationes? Scilcet semper extensa est, motus & quietis capax; semper partes separabiles habet & quae se mutuo ex eodem loco excludunt. Substantiam igitur quae secum fert has qualitates seu proprietates materiam appellamus.'
If all matter is removed from a thing then, King suggested, that there only remains space and the possibility of matter. Therefore space and matter are distinct from each other and matter is not the cause of matter. Motion, for King, is action and different to matter and space. There must be something besides motion and matter that is the cause of motion. Motion, matter and space are judged by King as our only primary conceptions, and even thoughts have no cause for their existence. 'Non enim aliter de rebus quam e conceptibus Judicare possumus.'
Ne cogitatione quidem ab existentia separentur, diecndum est exseipis illa esse nec causam existendi postulare, at si concipere possumus haec aliquando non fuisse, coepisse, aut in nihum redigi posse, patent existentiam necessariam iis non compete, nec ex se esse, aliunde ergo erunt.
However, our conceptions must have a cause, and there must be a cause of our understanding of matter, space and motion,
Respondeo nos conscios esse, quod ex nobis ipsis non sumus, dum igitur nos ipsoset operationes intellectuales contemplamur, neccessario ad aliquam causam serimur certi ab alio nos esse non a seipsis, non possumus igitur vel unum intelligendi actum exerere, quin necessario connexionem cum causa a nobis distincta habeat.
This cause is God. To illustrate this point King used the notion of the sun nourishing the earth. By virtue of effect this required a cause. King did not judge that the sun was eternal but the dependency of the effect of the sun was eternal. This dependency stemmed from a cause. King ultimately reasons first cause as being rational, 'at nihil possibile esse potest, cui non potentia aliqua respondet, quae ipsum actu effiat; cum igitur possibilia terminari non possunt, erit etiam causa infinite potens.'
Writers on liberty, for King did not afford a sufficient explanation of chief good which is the embodiment of liberty. This included Locke's Essay. Book II Chapter 23 Subsection 23 of the Essay deals with Locke's notion of man's will and any answer presented to this notion was for King paradoxical; akin to arguing against Zeno's argument for motion. King suggested that divine will was the cause of goodness and liberty but that this will does not necessarily determine the will of an individual. The choice to act in accordance to divine will was what led to liberty. In these choices man has free will and he ought to act for the highest good; if he does not then this is where evil festers. Evil being the choices that contradict the divine will. Happiness lies solely in this choice or election for King, 'in electione sola aut praecipue sit beatitud.' This election was the choosing of an act in accordance with the divine will. Ultimately King was advocating man's free-will consistent with an omniscient God. He furthered this idea in his later Sermon on Predestination and Divine-Foreknowledge.
Ultimately to class King as a Lockean is to ignore the fundamental differences in the two philosopher's works. Perhaps it was down to Edmund Law originally translating De Origine Mali and himself being associated so much with Locke. It is easy to take for granted what A.A. Luce and John Yoltan state about King's methodology in De Origine Mali. However, with more scrutiny into King's actual works and his remarks on Locke's Essay it is much more viable to conclude that his work was original and not simply lost in a tradition of Lockeanism. The initial classification by Edmund Law and his translation of King's work was enough for King to be placed in a tradition of Lockeanism. His King was first and foremost an advocate of the Church of Ireland and maintaining the power politically that the church had. Locke had stated that religious institutions should not have the power to punish in the same vein as the state. The example of the Thomas Emlyn case was evidence that King strongly disagreed with this premise.




Some philosophers are simply forgotten or assigned into a peripheral role, that of the influential forerunner. Alternatively they may have achieved more in certain other areas than philosophy. King can be said to be placed in the former and the latter of these distinctions. However the generally accepted view that King was in fact a Lockean, I hope, will now be brought into question. The best way to situate King philosophically is to place him in a tradition of reformed scholasticism and not an early enlightenment Lockean. Thusly some of his work can be considered in an Irish perspective as an example of a contemporary Irish response to Locke.




Hugh Jackson Lawlor (ed), Some Worthies of the Irish Church. Lectures Delivered in the Divinity School of the University of Dublin by the late George Thomas Stokes, D.D., London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1900.
Ibid, p. 148.
Ibid, p. 145.
Ibid.
Philip O'Regan, Archbishop William King of Dublin, 1650–1729 and the Constitution in Church and State, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000.
Lawlor inserted additional notes to correct inaccuracies. One such occasion was when Stokes curiously referred to King, during the crisis between James II and William III, as a 'high Tory and all for non-resistance.' This point was one that the editor took exception to, lamenting that if Stokes had more information or at least the evidence that subsequently was unearthed that he would have modified his claim or rejected it altogether. Stokes, Some Worthies, p. 163.
See Patrick Kelly, 'Archbishop William King, 1650–1729 and Colonial Nationalism', in Ciaran Brady (ed), Worsted in the Game Losers in Irish history, Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1989.
Joseph Richardson, 'Review of Archbishop William King, 1650–1729 and the Constitution in Church and State by Philip O'Regan', Eighteenth-Century Ireland, vol. 17, 2002, p. 180.
Ibid.
O'Regan, Archbishop William King of Dublin, p. 1.
Ibid.
Christopher Fauske, A Political Biography of William King, London: Pickering and Chatto, 2011.
Susan Reilly, 'William King and the Idea of Improvement', in Christopher Fauske (ed), Archbishop William King and Anglican Irish Context 1688-1729, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004, p. 148.
K.T. Hoppen, The Common Scientist in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Dublin Philosophical Society 1683–1708, London: Routledge, 1970.
Ibid, p. 153.
Ibid, p. 43.
Arthur O' Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Harvard, Harvard university Press, 1936), 211.
Ibid, 212.
William King, An Essay on the Origin of Evil, trans. Edmund Law (Cambridge, 1781), preface, xvi.
This was most likely Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), theologian and philosopher; he had various publications on natural philosophy, the divine attributes and worship practises for church goers. These were areas that King was directly involved in writing about so it was natural for the two authors to clash on certain matters.
King, An Essay on the Origin of Evil, preface, xvi.
A native of the Isle of Man, Fellow, March 14, 1666, C.S. King who published a biography of King in 1908 believed that John Christian's grandson, John Christian of Unerigg in Cumberland had a daughter Mary Christian who married Edmund Law. According to the Curwen Family Workington Hall records, the Christian family were an ancient family prominent in the Isle of Man and held the hereditary office of deemster there. Deemster being a Judge in the Isle of Man. In the late seventeenth century they moved to Unerigg, hence the name of apparently John Christian's relative, presumably grandson as John Christian of Unerigg. Edmund Law married Mary Christian (1722–1762) in 1737 his daughter and great granddaughter of this John Christian of Trinity College, Dublin. See, Collection of the Curwen Family of Workington Hall, 1358–1939, held at the Cumbria Record Office and Local Studies Library, Whitehaven, reference D Cu. (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/a2a/records.aspx?cat=1831-dcu#0) (accessed, 16 Jan. 2014).
Edward Copleston, An Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination (London, 1821), x.
Whately was a student of Copleston at Oxford and in his memoir's Copleston wrote of Whately; 'When his character is understood, he will, I think, acquire more influence with the Irish than he would with the English.' William James Copleston, Memoir of Edward Copleston, Bishop of Llandaff: with selections from his Diary and Correspondence, etc (London, 1851), 101.
See, Donald H. Akenson, A Protestant in Purgatory: Richard Whately, Archbishop of Dublin (Hamden, Conference on British Studies and Indiana University at South Bend, 1981).
Richard Whately, The Right Method of Interpreting Scripture, in What Relates to the Nature of the Deity, and His Dealings with Mankind, Illustrated in a Discourse on Predestination by Dr. King, Late Lord Archbishop of Dublin (London, 1821).
William Paley, Natural Theology or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity (Philadelphia, 1802).
Charles Darwin to John Lubbock, 19 November 1859, Darwin Correspondence Project (www.darwinproject.ac.ukentry-2532) (accessed 8 Jan. 2014).
See, Robert Lynam, The Works of William Paley, D.D. with Extracts from His Correspondence: and a Life of the Author (London, 5 vols., 1823).
See, Anonymous, A Short Memoir of the Life of Edmund Law by William Paley, D.D. (Extracted from 'Hutchinson's History of Cumberland,') Re-printed with notes (London, 1800).
David Berman and Patricia O'Riordan (eds), The Irish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (Bristol, 3 vols, Thoemmes Press, 2002). Illustration depicting individuals.
Joseph McMinn, Jonathan Swift and the Arts (Cranbury, University of Delaware, 2010), 26.
Joseph Richardson, 'William King: Man of Faith and Reason' (unpublished PhD thesis, Maynooth, 1998), 7, 3.
Ibid.
Ibid, 7, 4. This was no doubt a reference to Bayle's arguments that no available account of God's casual relation to sin and suffering answers the problem of evil.
Ibid 7, 6.
Ibid, 7, 20.
John Stephens, 'Edmund Law and his Circle at Cambridge. Some Philosophical Activity of the 1730s' in G.A.J. Rogers and Sylvanna Tomasselli, The Philosophical Cannon of the Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Centuries. (Essays in honour of John Yolton) (Rochester, Rochester University Press, 1996), 165.
John Yolton, et al, The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment (Oxford, 1991), 263.
A.A. Luce, The Life of George Berkeley (Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949), 31 and John Yolton, Locke and the Way of Ideas (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), 50.
Richardson, 'Man of Faith', 7, 2.
The first four chapters were according to Leibniz in accordance with his thinking, for the most part, 'I have observed that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general and of physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save for a few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with force and eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle had not placed emphasis upon them.' G.W. Leibniz, The Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy: Theodicy Essays of the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil (www.gutenburg.org/files/17147-h) (accessed, 17 June 2012), 406
Richardson, 'Man of Faith', 7, 3.
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (London, 1689), 52–53.
For this argument see Lee Ward, John Locke and Modern Life (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010), 209.
See, David Wootton, Locke: Political Writings (Indianapolis, Hackett, 1993), 98.
Leonard W. Levy, Blasphemy: Verbal Offence Against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie (North Carolina, UNC Press, 1995), 272.
Thomas Duddy, Dictionary of Irish Philosophers (Bristol, Thoemmes Continuum 2004), 117.
Levy, Blasphemy, 273.
Thomas Belsham, The Sufferings of Unitarians in Former Times, Urged as a Ground of Thankfulness for their Recovered Liberties: A Discourse (London, 1813), 27.
David Berman, Berkeley and Irish Philosophy (London, Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2009), 85.
Thomas Emlyn, A True Narrative of the Proceedings of the Dissenting Ministers of Dublin Against Mr. Thomas Emlyn; And of his Prosecution (at Some of the Dissenters Instigation) in the Secular Court, and his Sufferings Thereupon, for his Humble Inquiry into the Scripture Account of the Lord Jesus Christ (London, 1702) (http://find.galegroucom/ecco) (accessed, 31 Nov. 2013)
Willaim Uzgalis, 'John Locke', The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Fall, 2012) (www.plato.stanford) (accessed, 31 Nov. 2013).
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter Hardold Niddich (ed) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975), I, 2, 1.
Susan Keating, 'Archbishop William King: Philosopher and Pillar of the Church of Ireland', unpublished Mphil thesis (Trinity College, Dublin, 1999/2000), 48.
William King, 'Remarks on Locke's Essay prior to Saturday, 25 October 1692', MS. Locke C. 28, ff. 99-106, Bodleian Library, Oxford University,
See, Deborah A. Boyle, Descartes on Innate Ideas (London, Continuum, 2009), 1 and Robert M. Admas, 'The Locke-Leibniz Debate', in Stephen Stich, Innate Ideas (Berkeley, University of California, 1975), 37-70.
King, 'Remarks', f 9.
Ibid.
See Lex Newman, 'Descartes Epistemology', The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter, 2014).
King 'Remarks', f 9.
Ibid, f 3.
'By substance is used here to mean the thing that they would have conceived in the mind, as it were a distinct and divided from all other things: for things whose concept includes, or by another does not depend on nor any other idea supposes, to us in substance we call by that name, it is: the mode of truth, or an accident It is said that in the its dependence on the concept.' Ibid, 2.
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, trans. Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951), 2, 12; 554.
King, De Origine Mali, 3.
'What, then, with worn out by all the Changes? Always extended to spur movement and quiet comprehensive and mutually from the same place it has always been part of several Changes. Therefore, these qualities or Characteristics of the material substance are called matter.' Ibid, 2.
Ibid, 20–24.
'For it not out of the concepts of things in any other way they can judge.' Ibid, 14.
'Do not separate even in thought the existence of , or the cause of existence of those Charges who underwent it from his own sake to ask, but if we can conceive of these things at any time, do not exist, have begun to , or to be able to be reduced to nothing , are open to the necessity of the existence of those do not apply to , and not from himself, from other sources, hence there will be .
Ibid,18.
'We are conscious of being, which. from our very selves we are not, as long as we contemplate, then, let us entrust ourselves, and of the intellectual operations, of necessity, seduced by another to any legal case that we are not by themselves seriously, we cannot, therefore, exert even a single act of understanding, but from us a necessary connection with the cause of distinct Character.' Ibid, 32.
Ibid 24.
'But there can be no possibility in which. there is no power corresponding to what is it actually is, since therefore there cannot be possibility to be terminated, it will be also the cause of the infinitely powerful.' Ibid, 41.
Ibid, 168.
See Craig Dillworth, Simplicity (Plymouth, Lexington, 2013), 73-4.
King, De Origine Mali, 190.
Ibid, 242–245.
'Happiness is especially or solely with the election.' Ibid, 280.
See R.M. Whelan. 'An Irish Scholastic? The Public Identity of Archbishop William King (1650-1729)' (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Aberdeen, 2015).

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