A Prospective Deal: U.S Success, Iran Maximal Gains

What is Iran’s position (over its nuclear policy) in negotiations with the P5+1 group and what explains it? !

! !

A Prospective Deal: U.S Success, Iran maximal gains.!


 
 As the negotiations are coming to an end, Iran’s compromise on its nuclear progress opens the doors to world of opportunity to advance their interest on all fronts, some of which coincide with western concerns. !

! !

! Over the last 4 decades, tensions between Iran and various

international actors including the P5+1, Israel and a number of the gulf states have reached a level of urgency. The Middle-East is in turmoil - with a chaotic mix of extreme nationalist identities, sectarian conflicts dating back a millennia and a modern struggle for regional supremacy moderated by the West. Since the Iranian revolution (1979) and the siege of the American Embassy in Tehran1, the United States, backed by the UN Security Council2, has isolated Iran with a number of heavy economic sanctions to contain their growing nuclear capabilities. Being one of the most powerful nations in the region, and an alleged state sponsor of terrorism3, the threat posed 1 Brian M Jenkins on Militants in Iran in ‘Embassies Under Siege’ 2005. 2 The P5+1 represents the 5 permanent members of the UN security council, namely: China,

France, U.S., Russia and China, plus Germany who joined in 2006 in an effort to establish an agreement with Iran over its nuclear policies. It is also referred to as the E3+3: European three plus three. 3 Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, Facts sheets and brief by Kelsey Davenport 2015,

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/timeline-of-nuclear-diplomacy-with-Iran

Page 1! of 11 !

by Iran is assessed as extreme, so much so that the main focus of the negotiations has been to to reduce all perceived threats as soon as possible. As a result, the prolonged talks between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 over its nuclear policy have reached an interim agreement4. Whilst the focus was indeed on addressing the posed nuclear threat, the complex milieu surrounding the deal have been overlooked. This essay seeks to address the topic of Iranian interests isolated from their capabilities for nuclear armament. The question needs be asked, to what extent was Iran in a position of strength to advance their interest at home, in the region and on the international stage in the negotiations with the P5+1, prior to the aforementioned agreement? We should seek to uncover how Iran’s newly established leadership has allowed them to skilfully manoeuvre maximal gains and capitalise on the international need for nuclear insurance. On a domestic level, the periodic lifting of economic sanctions will unburden Iran to stabilise its economy and strengthen the ties between its people and government. This will to galvanise Iran’s influence in the region and consequently improve its ability to support its Shi’a allies5. Finally, Iran will be able to reform its image on the in-

4 “On april 2, 2015 the EU and Iran reached an agreement on the “key parameters” for a

comprehensive nuclear deal”, ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2015 5 Tim Lister reports on Iranian and Syrian ties in regards to Iranian interests in the region.

Iran’s support of the Al-Assad regime is reflective of their shared common enemy: Israel, and evidence of Iran initiative to maintain a Shi’a ally in the region - in ‘What does Iran get for supporting al-Assad?’, CNN, August 14 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/08/ world/syria-iran-analysis/

Page 2 ! of !11

ternational stage and create new ties with the West whilst reducing U.S influence in the region. Iran’s demands in the negotiations: Domestic Goals.

!




Over the 35 years of minimal communication between

Iran and its international counterparts, Iran has developed a strong national identity around its independence, unadulterated culture, stable religious government and Shi’a identity. The construction of a number of nuclear reactors and research facilities has progressed Iran’s nuclear capabilities to the point at which they are now able to create a nuclear bomb within a matter of months6. As Robert J. Reardon states, regardless of international efforts to suppress Iran’s capabilities, if Iranian authorities decided to produce enough weapon grade uranium, there would be no stopping nuclear armament7. Iran agreed to nuclear policy discussions despite being located in the middle of the world’s most belligerent region, surrounded by the Syrian civil war, the rise of ISIL and Israel - a known possessor of the nuclear armaments. The predecessor to the current president, Dr Hassan Rouhani, was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a conservative who publicly expressed his controversial views on Western influence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which, perhaps unintentionally, sabotaged

6 Peter Jenkins and Richard Dalton, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Future’, 2014, http://www.chatham-

house.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140904IransNuclearFutureJenkinsDalton.pdf 7 Robert J. Reardon, ‘Containing Iran’, Rand Corporation, September 2012

Page 3 ! of 11 !

Iran’s hopes of sanctions relief8. Today’s Iranian leadership adopted a moderate approach to their international relations, and was more open to diplomacy. This is a result of a promise made to the iranian people to improve their socio-economic standards, a promise that if kept will strengthen the iranian elite or, if unfulfilled, will likely throw the nation back into conservative hardline politics9. This focus on stabilising domestic politics demonstrates why “Iran wants maximum sanctions relief A.S.A.P.”10. The threat Iran has posed to the international community is based on the short time it would take for Iran to develop a single nuclear weapon. Barack Obama believes that the most effective way of mitigating Iran’s nuclear munition development is through diplomatic efforts11. To engage in diplomatic dialogue is to recognise the sovereignty of the interlocutor opposite. Despite this, the U.S. and other powers have one established edge: Sanctions. Interestingly, this gives Iran traction when negotiating with the P5+1. By aligning the interim agreement with its geopolitical goals, Iran will reverse UN-imposed sanctions and produce economic growth at the highest rates since the revolution, and develop un8 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, ‘Why Iran Takes Issue With the Holocaust’, BBC News, 9 October

2013: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24442723 9 “Iran’s current president […] was elected on the promise of providing a better economic

future for ordinary iranians” Rodger Shanahan, ‘Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani’, Lowy Institute, February 2015. 10 Peter Jenkins and Richard Dalton, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Future’, 2014, http://www.chatham-

house.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140904IransNuclearFutureJenkinsDalton.pdf 11 Barack Obama, The Telegraph, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?

vlpX9k_YhUTQ&spfreload=10

Page 4 ! of !11

precedented trust between the people and its government. This will in turn strengthen the governments credibility as well as improve the state’s appearance as one of the most stable nations in the Middle East.

! The regional ramifications of a deal: Iran on the move.

! !

The regional landscape is treacherous. Iran is surrounded

by conflict and tension. It is rivalled by the largest, most powerful, Sunni majority state: Saudi Arabia. Iran is interested in leading the islamic awakening12 amongst arab states as well as aiding and empowering its Shi’a allies in the region. Iran is one of the very few states on the planet who have a religious government supervised by a supreme leader, the Ayatollah13, who is guided by faith and unquestioned in his views, beliefs and decisions. Iran is also known to financially aid other Shi’a minorities in the region. This support has been resisted by the the Saudi regime through proxy wars currently taking place in the region14. Since the invasion of Iraq by the United States (2003), Iraq has gone from a Sunni to shi’a leadership, a reality Iran

12 “Zarif Claimed that the nuclear issue had created a number of obstacles for Iran in realis-

ing “its true role in the region” Brandon Friedman, ‘The geopolitics of the nuclear negotiations with Iran’, Foreign Policy Institute, April 2015 13 A title given to highly advanced scholars of the Islamic Law in the Shi’a muslim sect, cur-

rently in Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ayatollah 14 Peter Salisbury, ‘Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’, Chatham House, february

2015, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/ 20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf

Page 5 ! of 11 !

is working carefully to upkeep. Elsewhere Iran is supporting governments and minorities such as the ‘Alawi’ Assad government in Syria, a smaller group within the Shi’a sect, Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthis, and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement. Iran not only faced diplomatic discussions determined to attain a deal regarding its nuclear policy but also from a vantage point with the premises made by Ayatollah Khomeini: that Iran had no intentions to engage in talks unrelated to their nuclear policy15. Iran made such preconditions to avoid compromise on its regional interests, essentially using its nuclear policy as bait for regional leverage. This has consequences for the current tensions between the majority of states in the region and Israel. Israel was and still is highly opposed to a nuclear deal. This opposition is focused on the threat that Iran, arguably Israel’s most hostile opponent (apart from Palestine), could arm itself with nuclear weapons. However, as Brandon Friedman states, “In the aftermath of the announced deal, the economic constraints on Iran’s ability to project power in the region will be removed”. This should be seen as a more substantial threat, as a more influential Iran could organise a unified anti-Israel coalition. A nuclearised and volatile Iran would have been vehemently opposed by Israel, the whole of the P5+1 and many of the Gulf States16. However, without nuclear muni-

15 “Iran has no intentions of discussing regional issues with the U.S.” Brandon Friedman,

‘The geopolitics of the nuclear negotiations with Iran’, Foreign Policy Institute, April 2015 16 “a number [of the gulf states] have concerns about any nuclear deal with Iran” Rodger

Shanahan, ‘Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani’, Lowy Institute, February 2015.

Page 6 ! of !11

tions, Iran will be construed as a lesser threat, a minor enemy backed by a number of weak allies, should a Israeli-Iranian conflict break out. In this circumstance, Iran is advantaged on the regional level, in the negotiations with the P5+1, and therefore closer to achieving the level of geopolitical influence they desire. With such influence in the region, Iran will gain more attention on the international level and transform their image from a terrorist exporter to a moderate actor. 
 Iran seen with new eyes: The international landscape is changing.


!

To fully capitalise on sanctions relief, Iran will need to

dramatically improve their image in the eyes of the international community. Since the 80s, Iran’s relations with the west have been progressively deteriorating due to accusations of terrorist sponsoring as well as nuclear non-transparency and ‘misbehaviour’17. However, Hassan Rouhani’s government is putting in place a new approach to the west by rejoining at the negotiation table with relative diplomatic openness. An Iranian negotiating party ready to compromise on the nuclear freedom so doggedly pursued by their ‘Anti-West’ predecessors is a sign of a wiser, more moderate leadership. All of this still needs to be approved by the Supreme Leader, who himself has stated that Iran does not intend to acquire nuclear weapons, as it is against

17 Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, Facts sheets and brief by Kelsey Davenport

2015, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/timeline-of-nuclear-diplomacy-with-Iran

Page !7 of 11 !

Islamic Law18. This less extremist Iran will attract foreign investment vital to the economic growth that would be spurred by economic sanctions relief. On the parallel, Iran also faces the imminent threat by ISIL19, currently invading Iraq, a vital ally. The extremist movement is a source of destabilisation in the region generally and also a threat to Iran’s interest in the region, which is to disperse the Shi’a sect. Iraq since the invasion is now a shi’a lead country, but ISIL is a sunni movement. The Islamic State problem represents an opportunity for unprecedented cooperation between the West and Iran. This common enemy may help accelerate the reformation of the Iranian image by forcing Iranian and U.S. cooperation20. Although Iran poses a very real threat, the P5+1 insist on a diplomatic solution which will give them enough time to react should Iran acquire a bomb and also allow them to push Iran to moderate and take part in the international community. Involving Iran may reduce not only its appearance as a extremist nation but modernise it and permanently eliminate the threat currently felt. If Iran forsakes the deal it will forsake the opportunity to progress in power and influence.

! 18 Gareth Porter, ‘When the Ayatollah said no to nukes’ Foreign Policy, October 2014.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/ 19 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 20 “ Both countries share some common interests including the threat posed by radical sun-

ni extremists” Rodger Shanahan, ‘Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani’, Lowy Institute, February 2015.

Page 8 ! of !11

Overall, the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, whilst being a conversation about nuclear policy, are indirectly reshaping the regional landscape. Iran’s conduct in the negotiations are of utmost importance and could mark a new era of Iranian influence and foreign policy. Iran’s domestic situation has been unstable and shaken by economic disadvantage and a decline of trust in the religious leadership since the overthrow of the Shah. Iran suffered during the war against Saddam’s Iraq and more so by the western stereotypes created by that very conflict. Rouhani’s government, by accepting to engage in negotiations has proven that Iran is no longer the extremist, untrustworthy state but instead a new actor, willing to cooperate in its own moderation and peacemaking. Iran understands that the negotiations with the P5+1 will positively impact the image and influence of itself, the region and the international community in Middle Eastern affairs. Whilst economic sanctions relief will facilitate Iran’s economic flourishing, it will also enable them to affect the balance of power in the region. Although many Gulf States are wary of decreasing American influence and military presence in the region, the West is confident that continuous monitoring and a roll back of Iran’s nuclear capabilities is the best solution in dealing with the current threat. Finally, a deal, specifically involving the U.S. and Iran, may encourage Iran to moderate further and become a good standing member of the international community. This will catalyse cooperation between the future Iran, surrounding states and the West in

Page 9 ! of !11

dealing with common issues such as ISIL. Clearly, Iran has the upper hand in these talks, the Islamic Republic is in a position of strength to maximise their interests on all fronts. 
 
 Amine Allali, ‘A Prospective Deal’, University of Sydney, May 2015

! 
 
 


!

! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Page !10 of 11 !

! ! ! 
 


Bibliography 
 


!Barack Obama, The Telegraph, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch? vlpX9k_YhUTQ&spfreload=10 


Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, ‘Why Iran Takes Issue With the Holocaust’, BBC News, 9 October 2013: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-24442723

!‘Containing Iran’, Robert J. Reardon, Rand Corporation, September 2012 !‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal’, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2015 


‘Embassies under Siege’, Brian M Jenkins, Rand Corporation, 2015. http:// www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2651.pdf'


!‘The geopolitics of the nuclear negotiations with Iran’, Brandon Friedman, Foreign Policy Institute, April 2015
 


‘Iran’s Nuclear Future’, Peter Jenkins and Richard Dalton, Chatham House, 2014. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/ field_document/20140904IransNuclearFutureJenkinsDalton.pdf

!‘Iranian foreign policy under Rouhani’, Rodger Shanahan, Lowy Institute, February 2015. 


Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, Facts sheets and brief by Kelsey Davenport 2015, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/timeline-of-nuclear-diplomacy-with-Iran
 


‘What does Iran get for supporting al-Assad?’, Tim Lister, CNN, August 14 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/08/world/syria-iran-analysis/
 


‘When the Ayatollah said no to nukes’ Gareth Porter, Foreign Policy, October 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-saidno-to-nukes/





‘Yemen and the Saudi-Iranian ‘Cold War’’, Peter Salisbury, Chatham House, february 2015, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/ field/field_document/20150218YemenIranSaudi.pdf

Page 11 ! of 11 !