IS-DOSSIER
WWW.ALSHARQ.DE
JUNI 2015
Editorial Dieses Dossier widmet sich dem selbst ernannten „Islamischen Staat“, auch bekannt unter seinem arabischen Akronym Daesh. Bereits der Name impliziert einen Anspruch und ein Ziel: Die Etablierung eines funktionierenden Staatswesens, der die gesamte muslimische Welt umfassen soll und in dem islamische Gesetze das Miteinander regeln sollen. Ein vermeintlicher Gegenentwurf zum „moralisch verkommenen Westen“ und seinen „unislamischen Nationalstaaten“. Ein radikaler „Mit-Uns oder Gegen-Uns“-Narrativ wird geschaffen. Diese vom „IS“ gewünschte Schwarz-Weiß-Zeichnung spiegelt sich in der eigenen Berichterstattung wider. Die lange Zeit fast ausschließlich auf die Gräuel fokussierende amerikanische und europäische Berichterstattung tat ihr übriges, um einen differenzierten Diskurs über die Handlungsmöglichkeiten im Umgang mit dem „IS“ zu verengen. Profiteure dieser vereinfachten Schwarz-Weiß-Zeichnungen sind Despoten wie Bashar Assad, der sich als „Retter Syriens“ generieren möchte, während durch seinen Befehl Abertausende zu Tote kommen. Auch im Irak findet sich - unter anderen Vorzeichen - ein solcher Mechanismus. Nachdem der „IS(IS)“ zwischen 2013 und 2014 die Schlagzeilen der meisten Nachrichtenstationen weltweit dominierte, flaute die Aufmerksamkeit 2015 ein wenig ab. Der „IS“ kontrolliert weiterhin ein Territorium größer als Großbritanien und versucht sich auszuweiten, auch wenn er in diesem Jahr einige Niederlagen hinnehmen musste. Alsharq versucht in seinen Artikeln abseites der von Flaggen, vermummten Glaubenskämpfern und roher Gewalt dominierten Berichterstattung Grautöne zu finden. Deshalb gehen einige der Artikel auch über den Fokus „IS“ hinaus und berichten über die (zivil)gesellschaftlichen Hintergründe in Syrien und Irak. Zudem berichteten unsere Gastautoren vom Alltag aus Städten des „Islamischen Staates“. Dieses Dossier stellt eine Zusammenstellung bisheriger Alsharq-Artikel zum „IS“ dar, bietet damit eine Rückschau, doch möchte vor allem einen erneuten Anstoß geben, sich mit den Ereignissen in Irak, Syrien, Libanon und dem „Islamischen Staat“ auseinander zu setzen. Wir freuen uns auf über Rückmeldungen - und Artikel zu dem Thema. Setzt Euch mit uns in Kontakt. Wir brauchen immer Unterstützung. Das Alsharq-Team Ihr habt Anregungen, Fragen oder Kritik? Dann schreibt uns doch eine E-Mail:
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Inhalt The Tangled Natur of Iraq‘s Fight against the „Islamic State“ von David Jordan
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„Syrian Salafis got much more conservative“ - Interview with Thomas Pierret von Ansar jasim
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Syrien: Gewalt gegen Journalisten 2013 erneut verschärft von Bodo Straub
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Zwischen Pest und Cholera? Der Syrienkonflikt im Blick der deutschen Medien von Ilyas Saliba und Thomas Claes
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Syrien: Die kurdische Expansion hat ihren Preis von Nils Metzger
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Bericht: Leben mit der (Bedrohung) IS: Alsharq-Veranstaltung von Bodo Straub
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Salafismus und „IS“: Alpträume des Islams oder Symptome des Westens? von Mohamed Lamrabet
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Leben unter dem „Islamischen Staat“ - eine Stimme aus Mohassan von Simon Welte
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Zweifelhafte Hilfe für Kobane: Radikale Salafisten gegen IS ? von Fabian Schmidmeier
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Bashar al-Assad als Verbündeter im Kampf gegen ISIS? von Haid Haid
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Geiseldrama im Libanon - der „Islamische Staat“ ist nicht weit von Livia Gerster
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Der „Islamische Staat“ und die angebliche Alternativlosigkeit in Syrien von Jan Wilkens
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„Der ‚Islamische Staat‘ steht unter Druck, aber implodiert nicht“ ein Interview von Lea Frehse mit Patrick Cockburn
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Impressum
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Alsharq IS-Reader - April 2015
The Tangled Nature of Iraq’s Fight against the “Islamic State”
Its never-ending cruelties overshadow the causes that made the “Islamic State” emerge in Iraq in the first place; the systematic social and political marginalization of the Sunni population. Even after the rise of “IS” Shi’i militias allied with the Iraqi government are still involved in large-scale atrocities against Sunni civilians.
(22.12. 2014 ) It comes as no surprise that one of the most central factors that facilitated the growth of “IS” is political instability. In Syria, civil war is raging since 2011; Iraq is disintegrating since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. “IS” accordingly gained ground successfully only in those areas in the West and Northwest of Iraq, over which the government had already lost control months before. The Iraqi government’s subsequent inability to regain those areas and strike “IS” a serious blow even with U.S. support reflects deep rifts inside the Iraqi political landscape. These rifts are perpetuated and exploited by various insurgency groups fighting along various frontlines throughout the country. The basic frame that contributes to these rifts is the steadily grown and still growing alienation of the Sunni Iraqi population from the Shi’i dominated government. This constitutes a serious obstacle to any attempt of closing ranks against “IS”. From a Sunni perspective, the Iraqi government deliberately widens these rifts with its current operations against “IS” as these attacks are perceived as targeting the Sunni population at large.
Signposts into chaos: the political marginalization of the Sunni community before “IS” Aside from the historical and theological dimension of the Sunna-Shi’a schism, the current aversion of the Sunni Arab population in Iraq against the Shi’i dominated government is essentially the result of governmental policies over the last years: Many Sunnis have been systematically alienated from the political process through the abuse of anti-terrorism and de-Ba’thification laws. Regular arrests, kidnappings, and even killings of Sunni citizens by Shi’i militias are the result of these policies over the past years. Many Sunnis consider in particular the deBa’thification (that is, the elimination of all former Ba’th Party structures in the Iraqi civil administration and politics) at the hands of the so called Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) a sectarian policy better labeled de-Sunnification. In fact, the leadership of AJC was dominated by Shi’is, who were themselves electoral candidates in 2005 and 2010 and used their position to influence election results. Another key event alienating large segments
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The Tangled Natur of Iraq‘s Fight against the „Islamic State“ of the Sunni population was the the parliamentary election of 2010. In this election, the Iraqi National Movement (known as al-Iraqiyya), a Sunni-Shi’i coalition led by Iyad Allawi, officially won with 91 seats over the State of Law coalition of then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki (89 seats). The AJC, however, threatened to dismiss several dozens of candidates, including eight from al-Iraqiyya, thereby effectively challenging election results (already before the election, the AJC had dismissed over 500 candidates due to alleged Baath Party affiliations). Consequently, it took months of negotiations until a new government could be formed in November 2010. Even though no candidate was disqualified in the end, Maliki won the new candidacy through an impromptu Shi’i coalition building. This resulted in major disappointment and deep frustration among the Sunni community over the whole political process. Sunni protests 2011 to 2013 In the wake of the “Arab Spring”, first protests then followed throughout Iraq in 2011. They mainly concerned the improvement of public services as well as the fight against corruption. The protests were not only confined to the Sunni community. But the situation changed in December 2012 when ten bodyguards of the Sunni Minister of Finance and
al-Iraqiyya member, Rafi’ al-Isawi, were arrested on charges of terrorist activities. Only one year before, the founder of al-Iraqiyya, Tariq al-Hashimi, had been sentenced to death in absentia on the same charges after he had fled to Turkey. For most Sunnis, such accusations were only a pretence for an attack against al-Iraqiyya as a political opponent. They triggered a wave of mass demonstrations that started in Anbar province and spread to the Northern Iraqi governorates Ninawa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Diyala. The protestors primarily demanded the release of Sunni prisoners, a reform of the antiterrorism and de-Ba’thification laws, i.e. an end to Sunni marginalization, as well as the resignation of Prime Minister Maliki. They even achieved support by the infamous Shi’i cleric and political enemy of Maliki, Muqtada al-Sadr. After months of peaceful mass protests, confrontations turned violent during a sit-in in the city Hawija on 23 April 2013. Government forces stormed the protest camp, leaving 50 protestors dead and 120 wounded. Human Rights Watch (HRW) heavily condemned the incident as contradictory narratives about the killings began to surface. According to government representatives, insurgents of al-Qa’ida and the Naqshbandi Army (an amalgam of Sufi affiliates and former members of the Ba’th Party) had infiltrated the protest camp and opened
Tomb of Saddam Hussein in the south of Tikrit.
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The Tangled Natur of Iraq‘s Fight against the „Islamic State“
Gathering at the tomb of Saddam Hussein.
fire on government forces killing three soldiers. In contrast, local eye witnesses claimed that the protesters were armed only with sticks and that the government forces immediately opened fire after they had sprayed the camp with hot water. Following this incident, many tribal protesters as well as militants of al-Qa’ida and the Naqshbandi Army took up arms and clashed with the security forces throughout Northern Iraq. After these violent outbursts, the Sunni protests slowly narrowed down to their place of origin in Anbar province, namely to the cities of Ramadi and Falluja. However, in December 2013 the situation escalated again. “IS” successfully infiltrated the protest camps along the Iraqi-Syrian border, long considered a hotbed for al-Qa’ida, and conducted several deadly attacks against government forces. On 22 December, the Iraqi army started an “anti-terrorist military operation” during which it forcefully dissolved the protest camp in Ramadi. Moreover, on 28 December, the army arrested another Sunni al-Iraqiyya Member of Parliament, and killed his brother and several of his bodyguards in a gunfight. In response to this provocation, the protesting tribal
leaders in Anbar called their men to arms against the government. This, finally, marked the beginning of heavy fighting, a government blockade and full-scale bombing of Ramadi and Falluja including civilian areas over months. This political chaos and its sectarian implications paved the way for “IS” to gain ground in West- and Northwest Iraq. “IS”, among other militias, successfully entered the battlefields in Anbar and popped up at the same time with minor attacks in several Iraqi provinces such as Salah al-Din and Diyala. It even managed to build up a huge following in Ninawa’s provincial capital Mosul, which was formerly known as a Ba’th Party stronghold. Thus, for the Maliki government, this battle soon became one against extremists of al-Qa’ida and Ba’thists while it simultaneously aimed to target the Sunni community at large. On the Sunni side, only the tribal Sahwa forces of Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, originally founded a few years earlier as a support force to counter terrorism, announced their fight against al-Qa’ida in most Anbari cities. In contrast, leading figures of the preceding protests like the Grand Mufti of Iraq, Rafi Taha al-Rifai, or tribal
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The Tangled Natur of Iraq‘s Fight against the „Islamic State“
Shi‘i Iraqi soldiers burn and shell the tomb site with bazookas, August 2014.
leader Ali Hatim Sulayman insisted that the whole conflict was only a battle between Sunni tribes and the Maliki government. Even after “IS” had captured the city of Mosul, they still downplayed their importance and claimed that all violence was sponsored by Iran. The conflict was portrayed as Sunni resistance against oppresion: The citizens of Mosul accordingly welcomed “IS” as some sort of liberators whereas they attacked Iraqi forces with stones. Since “IS” has proclaimed its caliphate encompassing Iraq’s Northwest, the pattern of the whole conflict has remained the same: Despite the need to build alliances with them, the Iraqi government and its allies still target large parts of the Sunni population during their offensives. According to HRW, in July alone, government forces launched 17 air strikes targeting mosques, official buildings, hospitals as well as power and water stations in Northern and Western Iraq. At least 75 civilians were killed and hundreds wounded. At times, following the example of the Assad regime in Syria, even barrel bombs were used. Moreover, on September 1, Iraqi government forces attacked a school building in the North of Takrit, which was housing about 70 members of the extended al-Bu Nasir tribe of former president Saddam Hussein. These families had become displaced following the conquest of Takrit through “IS”. The attack killed 31 civilians including 24 children and wounded 41 other members of the 7
tribe. According to several accounts there were no “IS” fighters present during the air strike. The systematic displacement and murder of Sunni families Meanwhile, pro-government Shi’i militias like the famous Badr Brigades or the relatively young Saraya al-Khorasani Brigades use the pretext of the conflict with “IS” to systematically raid and destroy Sunni villages throughout Iraq and prevent the displaced families from returning to their homes. These militias play a prominent role among Iraq’s security forces. They receive their equipment from the Iraqi central government who, in turn, is awarded huge amounts of military and financial support from international allies like the U.S. for their fight against “IS”. Against this backdrop, it does not come as a surprise that members of the different militias were involved in several atrocities against the Sunni population including kidnappings and summary executions of Sunni prisoners (at least 255 prisoners in six cities). On August 22, members of the Shi’i militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous) entered the Sunni Musab Bin Omair mosque in the village Imam Weiss, 50 kilometers northeast of the city Baaqubah in Diyala province and shot 32 men, one woman, and a 17-year-old boy who were attending the Friday prayer. The attack was said to have been a revenge for an IED explosion that killed several
Alsharq IS-Dossier - Juni 2015
The Tangled Natur of Iraq‘s Fight against the „Islamic State“ volunteer fighters of the militia in the morning of the same day. Another episode emblematic of the old patterns of revenge along the Sunni or Ba’thist-Shi’i line is the case of Saddam Hussein’s tomb. In fact, upon his execution, a mausoleum was built for Saddam Hussein and his sons in his birthplace south of Takrit. As the place had become popular among visitors during the last years, it attracted the government’s attention, which suspected it to become a shrine for Ba’thist sympathizers. Fearing desecration, some members of Saddam’s tribe in turn removed his corpse to an unknown place at the beginning of this year. On 4 August 2014 then, Reuters reported that Shi’i militias who were positioned in Takrit to fight “IS” insurgents entered the tomb, smashed everything inside and set the monument on fire. Video footage actually shows the insurgents inside the tomb celebrating their victory over “IS” and Baathists. Later on, mobile phone videos document how they set the building on fire, shell it with bazookas and praise Shi’i saints with slogans such as “Oh Ali, oh Husayn, oh Zahra’!” As long as such fragmentation and hostility prevails in Iraqi society, where Sunni tribes, Salafist, Ba’thist, and Shi’i militias as well as the government forces fight on several fronts against each other, the ranks against “IS” cannot be closed. Against simplistic media accounts, the conflict in Iraq is
not only about a powerful radical Islamist group of international composition and a weak Iraqi central government. Rather, it follows a pattern of enmity and revenge that originated under the late Ba’thist rule of Saddam Hussein. Western governments should, therefore, closely reconsider their decisions to send military equipment to forces related to the Iraqi government. Given the ensuing sectarian tensions, this only adds more fuel to the fire.
Lesen Sie diesen Artikel mit weiteren Quellenlinks hier online. 22.12. 2014, David Jordan
Iraqi soldiers are posing in front of the smashed furniture of the tomb.
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„Syrian Salafis got much more conservative” Interview with Thomas Pierret
Raqqa, April 2013: with the increasing military gains of Islamist groups, white and black flags appear now more often next to the flag of the Revolution in public space.3KRWR FF%HVKURIÁLQHÁLFNU
The Salafi movement is not new to Syria and has a long history of anti-authoritarian struggle- against religious elites, the French occupation and recently against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Alsharq met Thomas Pierret to discuss how the movement has changed and in what sense it was influenced by the policies of the Assad-regime.
Thomas Pierret is a Lecturer at Edinburgh University. He holds a PhD in Political and Social Sciences at Sciences Po Paris and the Catholic University of Louvain (2009). His special research interests are religious authorities, Islamic activism, state policies in the realm of religion, education, and the media. Amongst his latest publications is: Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
found the manuscripts, published them and started to discuss them. That trend met another one, which we could call “Islamic modernism”. This trend was supported by people who wanted to modernize society, teaching and the political system, in the sense of getting rid of authoritarianism or certain forms of despotism.
&DQZHXQGHUVWDQGWKH6DODÀ\\DLQ6\ULDDVD PRYHPHQWWKDWVRXJKWWRFKDOOHQJHWKHHVWDEOLV $OVKDUT 7KHGLVFRXUVHRQ6DODÀVPLQ KHGV\VWHPIURPWKHEHJLQQLQJ" 6\ULDLQWKH:HVWHUQPHGLDOHDGVWRWKHLPSUHV- Yes, basically there were these two mentioned VLRQ WKDW LW LV D YHU\UHFHQWDQG PRUH FRQFUHWH trends. People consenting with Ibn Taymiyya and H[FOXVLYHO\UDGLFDODQGDUHDFWLRQDU\SKHQRPH- his students, the current which was called by schoQRQ7RFRXQWHUWKLVSHUFHSWLRQ,ZRXOGOLNH\RX lars the neo-Hanbali school. They could use it to WRJLYHXVDEULHIKLVWRULFDORYHUYLHZRYHU6DODÀ challenge the religious establishment at that time, JURXSVDQGWKHLUHYROXWLRQLQ6\ULD which was of course supportive of the Ottoman Thomas Pierret: Historically everything started state and very conservative. So interestingly today in the late 19th century when some people were when you speak of Ibn Taymiyya everyone will discovering some of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya think of a super-reactionary thinker and backward which had been banned under the Ottomans. So they scholar. But back then he was used in order to un9
Alsharq IS-Dossier - Juni 2015
„Syrian Safalis got much more conservative“ - Interview with Thomas Pierret dermine the religious establishment. It remained like that throughout the first half of the 20th century and even beyond. At first you were speaking of very small groups because at that time there were not many people who read. But then between the two world wars you have a rapid extension of education, therefore you had a new public for that new kind of discourse. And of course – especially when these young people were trained in “modern” or “Western European” schools – they received a secular education. Usually they feel uncomfortable with the interpretation of religion that is promoted by conservative scholars. Therefore the Salafi discourse is appealing to them. And that´s why interestingly- at least in Syria- the main figures of the Salafi trend in the middle of the 20th century were very educated people from very privileged backgrounds. &DQ\RXJLYHDQH[DPSOHIRUVXFKDÀJXUH" One of the founders of the Syrian Muslim Brothers was Salafi – of course this is complicated, because Muslim Brothers are not necessarily Salafis. You have traditional Sufis among their founders in Syria. But at least in Damascus several key figures were Salafi, real followers of the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya. Muhammad al-Mubaraki for example was one of the two main figures of the first generation- and he was really a fan of Ibn Taymiyya. He was of a very privileged background, he studied in Paris, which was only for the elite back then. You find Salafi ideas among the Muslim Brotherhood, but you have also another Salafi association in Damascus called at-Tamaddun al-Islami, the “Islamic (modern) Civilization” or the “Islamic Civility”, which is very upper class. :KDWZDVWKHLUSROLF\DOVRLQUHIHUHQFHWRRXU HQFRXQWHUV ZLWK ZULWLQJV RQ 6DODÀVP WRGD\ ZKHUH LW LV DOZD\V FODLPHG WKDW 6DODÀVP LV DERXW WUDQVIRUPLQJ WKH VRFLHW\ DQG RQO\ RQ D ODWHU VWDJH EULQJLQJ IRUZDUG D QRQOLEHUDO ,VODPLFVWDWH" In the late 1930s, the main issue of the Muslim Brotherhood and at-Tamaddun al-Islami is not secular versus Islamist. Rather it is: “Let´s get rid of the French”. Of course the French were also encouraging forces of secularization and these people didn´t like that. But at the same time, they were very
much influenced by European ideas. Like the mentioned al-Mubarak who studied in Paris. For today’s Salafism those are very surprising phenomena: AtTamaddun al-Islami for example had a school where they were teaching music and painting; all those activities that are now not very popular among Salafis. +DVWKLVJURXSDQ\UHOHYDQFHQRZDGD\V" I mention at-Tamaddun al-Islami on purpose: the last president of it before the Syrian uprising was no one else than Moaz Al-Khatib, the former president of the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces” and former preacher at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. He really tried to revive the reformist dimension of at-Tamaddun alIslami by putting forward what he calls “authentic Syrian Salafism”. This is of course- and that is what al-Khatib makes clear- very different from the Saudi version of Salafism. They are more flexible, more liberal and more open-minded. &DQZHVD\WKDWWKLVH[DPSOHDOVRSRLQWVWRWKH GLIIHUHQWFRQQRWDWLRQVRIWKHWHUP6DODÀVP"$V RSSRVHG WR WKH ´:HVWµ WKH WHUP LV QRZDGD\V SRVLWLYHO\FRQQRWHGLQ$UDELFLVQWLW" In a way, however I would not overstate it. An organization like at-Tamuddun al-Islami is actually not well known. That´s why Moaz Al-Khatib tried to undertake the revival of its memory. Let´s say from the 1980s until the early 2000s, when he became the president, it had lost any kind of cultural-intellectual dimension. This was due to state repression which prevented it from doing more than charity work. But in Damascus,the most prominent Salafi Sheikh in the late 20th century is called Abdal Qadr al-Arnaout. He was from Kosovo originally. He was very different from the typical Salafi Sheikh in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Also because the Egyptian Salafis are pretty much influenced by the Saudi model. But many people consider al-Arnaout very open-minded and flexible. And many open-minded Muslim intellectuals consider him their master, including Moaz Al-Khatib, who was his student. Of course you also have other schools. One of the most prominent figures of Salafism in Syria was Nasir alDin al-Albani, from Albania.
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„Syrian Safalis got much more conservative“ - Interview with Thomas Pierret 7KHWZRPDMRUÀJXUHVRI6DODÀVPLQ6\ULDZHUH QRWHYHQ6\ULDQV"/LQDDO.KDWLEDFWXDOO\ZULWHVWKDWWKH6DODÀFXUUHQWLQ6\ULDZDVLPSRUWHG IURPWKH*XOILQWKH V I don´t think that is true. I think there is something indigenous to the Salafi current in Syria. However they got support from Saudi Arabia quite early on. But it is not imported from there, it really developed in the Damascene surrounding. Even al-Albani is not a Wahhabi; he rather had his own understanding of Salafism. +RZ FDQ KH EH VLWXDWHG LQ WKH 6\ULDQ 6DODÀ VFHQH" He was a good friend of al-Mubarak and he had also good relations with the Syrian Muslim Brothers. He started writing in the journal of at-Tamaddun alIslami. He was certainly working with these modernists for the simple reason that he was completely ostracized by the conservative scholars. The latter even organized in the 1950s a private court to trial him. But he was not at all concerned with the state or with modernizing society. He was reproaching the Muslim Brothers for being obsessed with these goals. In his view the most important was that people would have the correct belief and religious practices. His visions were really narrowed down on ritual practices. He was encouraged to think that way because he was in Syria, in a highly repressive country, he was not only confronted with the hostility of the regime but also with the hostility of the religious establishment. He later left Syria in 1980, during the previous uprising, although he wasn´t involved in that. He relocated to Jordan and was immensely influential there and also in Saudi Arabia. Al-Albani was saying we should not follow any school of law, a problematic stance in Saudi Arabia which follows the Hanbali school. He said, we don´t need schools which are a set of rules through which you interpret the Quran and Hadith. His position was that we should just read Hadith and implement it.
the religious sphere. It is very revolutionary in epistemology. Therefore it caused so much trouble to the Saudi tenets. But still it is a very complicated issue. Because at the same time figures like al-Albani were integrated into the global network of Salafism which are very much funded by Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. He even became a major reference for them and then he also became acceptable for the Wahhabi Saudi Salafis context.
