Conflict Assessment: Syria

Share Embed


Descrição do Produto

Bethany Davis, 1011507


Conflict assessment: Syria

Introduction
Conflict in Syria has been the cause of immense distress for the Syrian people over the last four years. Since the outbreak of civil war in 2011 over 2.4 million people have fled the country and an additional 6.5 million have been internally displaced. These numbers are from a country whose total population is around 22.5 million people, signifying that the conflict has had a destructive impact on the lives of nearly half of Syria's inhabitants. The conflict is becoming increasingly complex with a range of anti-government insurgents, pro-Assad forces and allies, and the involvement of jihadi groups such as the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL or ISIS). It is not as simple as pro-Assad verses anti-Assad; divisions have arisen even within the anti-Assad forces over strategies and long term political goals for Syria. Additionally, the Islamic State who control large areas in the northeast of the country continue to clash with forces from both the rebels and the government/pro-government allies. A large number of the armed opposition aim to establish a state ruled according to Sunni law in place of Assad's government, which non-Sunni minority groups, as we would expect, oppose. In this conflict assessment I will focus particularly on religion; a significant driver for many of the oppositional forces in the uprising.
The framework for this essay comes from Levinger's (2013) four step conflict assessment process. This draws on the concepts from governmental and non-governmental conflict assessment frameworks to identify four key points in understanding conflict. I shall limit my use of Levinger's assessment points to his second step actors, though applying the remaining three steps to the conflict in Syria would be beneficial for a wider analysis.

(Kaplan, 2012)

Context
In 2011 a liberation movement emerged with the goal of overthrowing Assad's Alawite government. President Bashar al-Assad, the son of Hafez al-Assad who 'ruled with an iron fist,' was familiar with the west, had a high level of education, and at first showed potential to be a reformer in place of his father. However, Bashar al-Assad failed in being the reformer that many hoped him to be and a number of Syrians still believed the government to be illegitimate. Tensions between many of the Sunni population, the majority religion, and the pan-Arab nationalism and socialist movement, the Alawite Baathist regime, emerged from the very beginning of the latter's journey to political power. The Alawite Baathist party gained significant support from religious minorities and those in favour of secularism and equality for non-Sunni's. Control of the army and political life, however, was won in the 1960's when, as a result of their dominance in the military, the Alawites eliminated all other Muslim groups from power, leaving the Sunni majority in a subordinate position. As a result, many believed the Alawite government to be 'illegitimate, oppressive and anti-Islamic.'
The demonstrations against Assad in 2011 soon shifted from protesting to armed attacks as the number of oppositional groups increased, but the uprising lacks cohesive leadership and unity, and insurgency groups often fight among themselves. Peaceful protests became difficult as Assad's government 'mercilessly', according to Ehrlich, cracked down on them. Though Syria was a secular dictatorship with torture and jail facing those who criticized Assad, most Syrian people had lived peacefully with one another for years. As depicted in figure 1, the Alawites constitute just 12 percent of the population whereas Sunni Muslims make up for almost three quarters. After the brutal repression of Shia Muslims under the control of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, it has been assumed by many in the west that Assad similarly represses the Sunni Muslim majority. But despite being a minority, the Alawite Baath party established a secular ideology in which all Arabs are equal regardless of religion. According to Ehrlich, and with the exception of some Sunni Islamists who rejected the Alawite government, people had largely ignored religious differences. However, as a result of the uprising, the role of religion has increased in significance as it is utilized by leaders from both sides to 'rally their troops.' Assad appealed to minorities such as the Druze, Alawite and Christian groups who benefit from a secular government, and the rebels relied on the Sunni Muslim majority.
Assessment
In Step 2 of Levinger's 4 step assessment framework we explore the actors and ask: who is helping build peace, and who is contributing to the conflict? Levinger describes actors as 'the cast of characters that drive the drama of conflict – each one with its own histories, motives, resources, and relationships with other members of the cast.' This is a useful way to approach the Syrian conflict; we need to understand the actors as characters driving a conflict, each with their own backgrounds and motives, whether they are an individual, institution, or a group such as the Islamic State.
There are a number of points to consider in analysing the actors and their relationships, and they are:
Who are the primary actors in the conflict
Who are the secondary actors
Who else has influence over events
What are the resources and capacities of each actor
What are the existing relationships and channels of communication within and among the rival groups
An important question to examine then is who are the primary actors? As Levinger acknowledges, the distinction between primary and secondary actors will not always be clear, but it is necessary to look at who significantly influences the outcome of the conflict. First then: the Assad government. In an article on foreignpolicy.com David Miller argues that Bashar Assad's DNA 'doomed' him; that whether or not he had plans for reformation he would never have the support he desired. Though, as mentioned, it has been beneficial for many to have a secular government as oppose to establishing a state according to Sunni law, as oppositional forces such as the Islamic State and the Islamic Front would, Assad can be seen as having had a detrimental impact on peace in Syria. What started out as peaceful protests has escalated to armed conflict as a result of the government's violent response. In cities such as Homs and Hama demonstrations have been suppressed and civilians have allegedly often been the target of the government's violent force. But Assad has received a lot of support from Syrians, on top of the support from Russia Iran and Hezbollah. Anderson states that in Syria, Assad is seen as 'soft hearted' and that, though the government have probably committed crimes, Assad may not be as lethal as western media suggests. Western perceptions of Assad have portrayed him in a negative light and many rumours of violent attacks have emerged in the media. It is difficult as outsiders to acquire an unbiased understanding of all actors and how damaging they are to society. This is important to acknowledge when third parties consider intervening, for acting on false information on actors in a conflict can escalate the situation or give power to the wrong people, as was the case in Iraq, for instance.
While some actors, such as Assad, may not fit easily into either category of what Levinger calls 'spoilers' and 'peacebuilders', many of the actors can be seen as either detrimental to peace or helping to establish peace. Spoilers are those who benefit from the continuation of conflict and, as Levinger explains, they can include extremists or criminal networks able to operate more easily in a chaotic environment. The Islamic State have become the most powerful force among the opposition to the Assad government. The armed Islamist insurgent and terrorist group have violently asserted control over large areas of Syria and Iraq including the province of Al Raqqah and Dayr az Zawr in Syria and the Iraqi cities of Fallujah and Ramadi. One tactic the Islamic State are using in northern Syria to recruit followers is to enforce their ideologies upon children; they have reportedly attempted to control the curriculum in schools and have set up Islamic schools in which children are indoctrinated to fight for jihad. As for funding, according to a report by the Council of Foreign Relations, the majority of the Islamic State's financing comes from sources such as smuggling, extortion, and other crime.' Therefore, we can understand why the Islamic State would benefit from the country remaining in a state of chaos as it is now: to continue the criminal activity that funds them.
We have looked at the resources and capacities of the Islamic state so now we shall look at their relationships and channels of communication among other groups (point 5 of Leivnger's points to consider). There seems to be, as an article by Abouzeid describes it, an 'uprising within and uprising' against the Islamic State. They may fight for the shared goal of overthrowing the Assad government alongside the other insurgency groups, but they antagonise or oppose most of them, including other conservative Islamist groups. The United States, who believes Syrian-based extremists to pose a terrorist threat to their country, together with regional allies has launched military strikes against the Islamic State's positions in Syria. These acts against the Islamic State are with the aim of counter-terrorism rather than regime change, the original cause of the Syrian uprising. To summarize, the Islamic state are perceived both nationally and international as the immediate threat.
Another actor important to mention is the 'Free Syrian Army' who's name is used to describe a number of armed insurgency groups including both secularists and Sunni Muslims, willing to work with secular groups. They had some success to begin with, with captured towns in northeast Syria by affiliated militias, however, with lack of leadership and unity they began to decline in strength as the ultra-conservative groups grew. To secure funding from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, many people from the Free Syrian Army have used tactics such as growing beards, praying five times a day and observing Ramadan in order to appear devout Muslims to get their approval. Saudi Arabia have also been funding groups that follow a strong Islamist ideology such as the al-Nusra Front; an Al Qaeda-affiliated militia and U.S. designated foreign terrorist organisation.
Having discussed a few key actors in the Syrian conflict, and though there are many more to examine another time, we will now look more into third party interventions. First, Russia have arguably had a role in being in Levinger's category of 'peacebuilders'. After accusations of chemical attacks came to light in western media, they demanded military intervention. What Anderson describes as a potential 'major escalation of the war' was defused by Russian intervention; they proposed that Syria hand over its chemical weapons, though the government maintained they had never been used. Secondly, by 2012, year after the uprising began, foreign powers were arming the rebels, each with the intention to carry out their own political goals in post-Assad Syria. Though specific public information is lacking about sources of weaponry and who may have access to U.S.-origin weaponry, in August, the Islamist militia coalition known as the Ansar al Islam Front posted videos that supposedly show their personnel firing U.S.-origin anti-tank weapons.' Ehrlich writes of an interview with a member of the Free Syrian Army, Abdul Salman, who complains about the lack of support from the U.S. in terms of arms. He argued that had received such aid, Assad would have fallen by now. However the CIA refused to provide such weapons in fear they would fall into the hands of extremists. Ehrlich continues by explaining how many Syrians of the opposition want the U.S. to support them in their cause but their plans for Syria's future differ significantly. This has often been the cause of the lack of unity in the Syrian uprising, many groups differ in their future plans for Syria should they be successful in overthrowing Assad.
In the Geneva communique led by the UN are guidelines for a Syrian-led transition that include offering a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in Syria, and that can be implemented in a climate of safety and stability. They propose that Syria becomes 'genuinely democratic and pluralist' whilst ridding the country of its current sectarianism which provokes religious and ethnic discrimination. Should the UN be successful in implementing these objectives into Syrian politics they would be a significant peacebuilding actor.
The last issue I would like to briefly draw attention to is the impact of the Syrian conflict on surrounding regions; the crisis has not just affected the stability of the country itself, but of neighbouring countries too. A report by the UN describes how the conflicts in Syria and Iraq have caused distress for countries surrounding them; Lebanon, for example, a country with a population of just 4.5 million has taken in 1.8 million refugees. These countries can be described as actors too, though they are not directly influencing the conflict, they are aiding Syrian civilians significantly.
Conclusion
One significant barrier to building peace in Syria is that many of the actors involved want different things for the country, therefore overthrowing Assad would not necessarily cause an end to the conflict; it may in fact be the cause of more fighting. Many Syrians may want a democratic state that acknowledges the Islamic roots of the majority population, but groups such as the Islamic State and the Islamic Front, seek to enforce varying degrees of Sunni Islamic law on Syrian people.
In this essay I have attempted an assessment of some of the actors involved in the Syrian conflict. Though there has not been enough space to examine some of the other key groups such as the Kurds, it has been useful to assess the roles and significance of a few of the most prominent actors in the conflict: Assad's government, the Islamic State and the Free Syrian Army. Lack of unity among the opposition has caused a barrier for achieving the goal of overthrowing the government. Not only is there a lack of unity within anti-Assad insurgency groups, but there is now an 'uprising within an uprising' to get rid of the Islamic State whose brutality is perceived as the most immediate threat.







Bibliography
Religious Causes of Discrimination against
Ethno-Religious Minorities
Religious Causes of Discrimination against
Ethno-Religious Minorities
Religious Causes of Discrimination against
Ethno-Religious Minorities
Religious Causes of Discrimination against
Ethno-Religious Minorities
(2012). 'Action group for Syria, final communique' From the Geneva Communique, available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf, last accessed: 08/01/15.

(2014). 'Regional situation report for Syria crisis',UNFPA issue no. 27, available at: http://syria.unocha.org/content/unfpa-regional-situation-report-syria-crisis-issue-no27-period-covered-1-%E2%80%93-30-november, last accessed: 09/01/15.

Abouzied, R., (2014). 'Syria's uprising within an uprising', European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syrias_uprising_within_an_uprising238, last accessed: 10/01/15.

Barnes-Dacey, J., (2014). 'The Islamic State and the struggle for control in Syria', European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_islamic_state_and_the_struggle_for_control_in_syria325, last accessed: 10/01/15.

Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014). 'Armed conflict in Syria: overview and U.S. response', Congressional Research Service, available at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf, last accessed: 08/01/15.

Erlich, R., (2014). Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, Promethus books: New York.

Fildis, A., (2012). 'Roots of Alawite-Sunni rivalry in Syria', Middle East Policy Council, vol. 19, no. 2.

Kaplan, S. (2012). 'Syria's Ethnic and Religious Divisions', Fragile States, available at: http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/02/20/syrias-ethnic-and-religious-divides/, last accessed: 07/12/14.
Laub, Z., (2014). 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria', Council of Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811, last accessed: 10/01/15.

Levinger, M., (2013). Conflict analysis: understanding causes, unlocking solutions, United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC.

McHugo, J., (2014). Syria: from the great war to civil war, Saqi: London.

Miller, A., (2012). 'The winners and losers of Syria's civil war: and how the united states can still come out ahead', Foreign policy, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/08/the-winners-and-losers-of-syrias-civil-war/, last accessed: 10/01/15.

O'Bagy, E., (2012). 'Jihad in Syria', Middle East Security Report 6.

Tokmajyan, A. (2014). 'Religion, religious leaders, and violence in the conflict in Syria –

Armenak Tokmajyan', Fragile States, available at: http://www.fragilestates.org/2014/09/28/religion-religious-leaders-violence-conflict-syria-armenak-tokmajyan/, last accessed: 07/12/14.

Montgomery, K., (2014). ISIS sets a 'new paradign' for child soldiers: ideology, combat and forced marriage', Syria Deeply, available at: http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/11/6433/isis-sets-new-paradigm-child-soldiers-ideology-combat-forced-marriage/, last accessed: 10/01/15.

(2014). 'Syria Backgrounder', United to End Genocide, available at: http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/syria-backgrounder/, last accessed, 10/01/15.

Anderson, T., (2014). 'Why Syrians support Bashar al Assad', Global Research, available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-syrians-support-bashar-al-assad/5405208, last accessed: 10/01/15.
2



McHugo, J., (2014). Syria: from the great war to civil war, Saqi: London, p.25.
McHugo, (2014). p.25.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014), 'Summary' in Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014), p.1.
Levinger, M., (2013). Conflict analysis: understanding causes, unlocking solutions, United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC, p.95.
O'Bagy, E., (2012). 'Jihad in Syria', Middle East Security Report 6, p. 6.
Erlich, R., (2014). Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, Promethus books: New York, p. 20.
Fildis, A., (2012). 'Roots of Alawite-Sunni rivalry in Syria', Middle East Policy Council, vol. 19, no. 2, p.4.
Fildis, (2012). p..5.
Ehrlich, (2014). p. 16.
Erlich, (2014). p.83.
Fildis, (2012). 'Roots of Alawite-Sunni rivalry in Syria', Middle East Policy Council, vol. 19, no. 2, p.3.
Ehrlich, (2014). p. 18.
Ehrlich, (2014). p.18.
Levinger, (2013). p.100.
Levinger, (2013). p.100.
Miller, A., (2012). 'The winners and losers of Syria's civil war: and how the united states can still come out ahead', Foreign policy, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/08/the-winners-and-losers-of-syrias-civil-war/, last accessed: 10/01/15.
(2014). 'Syria Backgrounder', United to End Genocide, available at: http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/syria/syria-backgrounder/, last accessed, 10/01/15.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M.,(2014). p.1.
Levinger, (2013). p.102.
Barnes-Dacey, J., (2014). 'The Islamic State and the struggle for control in Syria', European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_islamic_state_and_the_struggle_for_control_in_syria325, last accessed: 10/01/15.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014). p. 10.
UN report http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/627/07/PDF/N1362707.pdf?OpenElement. For more on this look at: Montgomery, K., (2014). ISIS sets a 'new paradign' for child soldiers: ideology, combat and forced marriage', Syria Deeply, available at: http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/11/6433/isis-sets-new-paradigm-child-soldiers-ideology-combat-forced-marriage/, last accessed: 10/01/15.
Laub, Z., (2014). 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria', Council of Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state-iraq-syria/p14811, last accessed: 10/01/15.
Abouzied, R., (2014). 'Syria's uprising within an uprising', European Council on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_syrias_uprising_within_an_uprising238, last accessed: 10/01/15.
As is reported in Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (particularly pp.8-9).
Barnes-Dacey, (2014).
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014). p. 5.
Ehrlich, (2014). p.94.
Ehrlich, (2014). p.17.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014). p. 7.
Anderson, T., (2014). 'Why Syrians support Bashar al Assad', Global Research, available at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-syrians-support-bashar-al-assad/5405208, last accessed: 10/01/15.
Ehrlich, p. 16.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014), 'Summary' in Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response.
Erlich, (2014). p. 17.
Erlich, (2014). p. 94.
(2012). 'Action group for Syria, final communique' From the Geneva Communique, available at: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf, last accessed: 08/01/15, p. 2.
(2012). 'Action group for Syria, final communique' From the Geneva Communique, p. 3.
(2014). 'Regional situation report for Syria crisis',UNFPA issue no. 27, available at: http://syria.unocha.org/content/unfpa-regional-situation-report-syria-crisis-issue-no27-period-covered-1-%E2%80%93-30-november, last accessed: 09/01/15, p.2.
Blanchard, C., Humud, C., Nikitin, M., (2014). p.3.

Lihat lebih banyak...

Comentários

Copyright © 2017 DADOSPDF Inc.