Davidson\'s paratactic analysis of mood

May 27, 2017 | Autor: Seumas Miller | Categoria: Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Pragmatics, Linguistics
Share Embed


Descrição do Produto

Journal of Pragmalics 15 ( 1991) f -10 North-Holland

Accordq t;. ~%vicim‘s paratactic analysis of mood an uttered sentence in a non-indicative mooa chouid be thougnt of as two utterances: an utterance of the corresponding indicative sentence, and an utterance of what he terms the moodsetter. T!x moodsetter of, for examp!e. an imperative, is impressible by the sentence ‘That utterance is a command’. There are a number of problems with this analysis. Firstly. the fact that it derives two speech acts from the utterance of every sen?ence makes the matter of determ~njng the force of any given uttered sentence an unworkably complex affair. Secondly, in giving mood a purely semantic characterisation it unacceptably weakens the connection between mood and force.

In his paper entitled ‘Moods and performances’ {Davidson 1982) Donald Davidson presents his paratactic analysis of mood. I want to try and show that his analysis is incorrect. According to Davidscm’s analysis of mood the uttelcd sentence, ‘Put on your hat’, a sentence in the imperative mood, should be thought of as two utterances which are produced simultaneously. Each of these utterances has a particular truth-conditions, The first utterance has the truth-condition of the indicative sentence ‘You will put on your hat’. The second utterance has the truth-condition of the indicative sentence ‘That .!tterance is a command’. Here ‘that utterance’ refers to the first utterance. But vhile an utterance of a nonindicative sentence consists. in reality of two utterances with the above mentioned truth-conditions, the non-indicative sentence is not analysed into two indicatives. Rather that sentence consists of an indicative sentence (termed its indicative core) and ariothsr expression termed a moodsetter. It is the utterance of the moodsetter that has the truth-condition of the indicative sentence. ‘That utterance is a command’. f * Author’s address: S. Miller. School of Communication, Canberra University, Belconnen. ACT., Australia 2616. ’ Throughout this paper 1 follow Davidson (Davidson 1982: 18) in talking of an ‘uttered moodsetter’. 1 do this notwithstanding the fact that the term “uttered moodsetter’ seems infelicitous; moodsetters while semantically characterisable are not properly speaking sentences. and are not obviously spy other kind of utterable expression. Nevertheless Davidson is committed to a sentence which (a) has two components (moodsetter and core) and (b) is actually composed ~378-216619~iS~~.50Q I990 -

Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Hoi~and)

There are a number of points to be noted about Davidson’s analysis. Firstly, the paratactic analysis is an analysis of ira~-~&c~~:jrt. moods on!y. Indicatives are unanalysed, and are simply construed as expressions conventionally connected with a meaning but not with any illocutionary force type. Secondly. the force of an utterance of the indicative core is not direct/v represented by some indicating component of the core. (The indicative mood as we saw above, is not conventionally connected with any force type.) Rather, one expression, the moodsetter, has as its meaning that moth expression, the indicative core sentence, has such and such force. Thirdly, the force represented by the uttered moodsetter as attaching to the uttered core actually attaches simply to the uttered core and not to the combination of utterances, i.e. not to the uttered core plus uttered moodsetter. Force will have to attach to the uttered core alone, and not to the conjunct of uttered moodsetter and uttered core, since the conjunct is not a truth-functional conjunction, as Davidson points out in another connection (Davidson 1982: 20). There are really two logically distinct utterances, and the conjunct cannot therefore have force attached to it. Fourthly,‘it is a presupposition of Davidson’s view that there is such a thing as forcelessly saying what is true or false, and that the linguistic characterisation of this is the indicative sentence. A speaker forcelessly says, when he utters a sentence in the indicative, yet does so without committing himself to the truth of that sentence. At the same time forceless saying is a form of saying, i.e. it is more than mere parrot-like production of sounds. So much then, for the exposition of Davidson’s paratactic analysis of mood. I now want to introduce some distinctions that I will employ in constructing objections to Davidson’s theory. We should distinguish between what I’ll call direct and indirect indicators. An utterance of a sentence does not on Davidson’s view display its own force. Rather to the extent that that force is indicated by linguistic form, it is done so by another utterance. Further, that other utterance (the utterance of the moodsetter) to the extent that it contributes to indicating the force of the first (the uttered indicative core) does so in virtue of its (the uttered moodsetter’s) meaning. Linguistic form, then, on the Davidsonian view, never directly indicates force, but only indirectly via meaning. The standard alternative view (Dummett 1973: 3 15-3 16; Searle 1979: 30-57) to Davidson’s is that linguistic

(when uttered) of two utterances each with their own truth-conditions. It is the utterance with the truth-conditions of the sentence which characterises the truth-conditions of the moodsetter which I and Davidson are terming the uttered moodsetter. So what the term ‘uttered moodsetter’ refers to is clear and unproblematic (insofar as Davidson’s analysis is unproblematic). My arguments in the first part of this paper are in part concerned with the illocutionary force that may or may not attach to that utterance postulated by the paratactic analysis and referred to both by Davidson and myself as the ‘uttered moodsetter’.

rm can and does Ilirecllr indicate force; a sentence displays its ort’il force (as eli as Its meaning). Seccndly, let us ,distinguish between strong and weak indicators. For avidson mood does not indicate force in the full-blooded way it does on the ternative view. On the alternative view the utterance of a sentence in a rtain mood, say the imperative mood, conventionally indicates that the tered sentence is a command. The utterer, in virtue of b+ng a party to this Invention, commits him- or herself to having uttered a sentence with the rce of a command. He or she is presumed to have commanded. (This is not say that he or she must necessarily, in virtue of his or her conformity to the bnvention, have commanded.) Now it may well be that this presumption buld be overridden, nevertheless there is a presumption on this view. Let us y that the utterer strongly indicates (s-indicates) the force of his or her terance. On Davidson’s view, by contrast, the speaker simply in virtue of tering the moodsetter does not create such a presumption. There is no Invention tying mood to force on Davidson’s view. But in that case there is I speaker commitment, and hence no presumption. On Davidson’s account en, mood is not an s-indicator of force. It might be argued that although on Davidson’s view there is no convention eating a presumption in favour of, say, an uttered imperative being a lmmand, nevertheless the uttered moodsetter does create a presumption of rts in virtue of its meaning, viz. that the core has such and such a force. 7is however is incorrect. In so far as one utters a sentence with a moodsetter re mere:yforcelessly says something about the force of the uttered indicative Ire. But it is precisely the point of forceless sayings that one does not even ima facie commit oneself in any way to the truth of what is forcelessly said. ne may assert the rebL
Lihat lebih banyak...

Comentários

Copyright © 2017 DADOSPDF Inc.