Eisenhower: Peace or Propaganda

October 8, 2017 | Autor: Sean Flaherty | Categoria: Propaganda, US Information Agency, Eisenhower
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Vandercook, W.M. Making the Very Best of the Very Worst: The Human Effects of the Nuclear Weapons Report of 1956. 186.
Voice of America began in 1942 and served as a means to inform people in war torn areas of Europe. It expanded to include nearly every language in Europe and Asia. Today the Voice of America continues to broadcast around the world in a multitude of languages. The Advertising Council was created in 1942 with Theodore Repplier, serving as the first president. The work of the Advertising Council is well known, from Smokey the Bear preventing forest fires, saving bonds works, or the "Loose Lips Sink Ships" to name a few programs.
Cull, 54.
Cull, 56.
Cull, 57.
Cull, 57.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the State of the Nation," April 5, 1954.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10201.
Vandercook, 186.
Kenneth Osgood. Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 57.
Nicholas J. Cull. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 52.
Cull, 52.
Osgood, 56.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-99, "Estimate of the World Situation Through 1955," October 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-54. Accessed online via U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.
Osgood, 62.
Osgood, 62.
Osgood, 59; and in the presidential directive by Harry Truman in 1951. "There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort." Found at: Harry S. Truman: "Directive Establishing the Psychological Strategy Board," June 20, 1951. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13808.
Cull, 90.
Miller Center: University of Virginia. American President: A Reference Resource: Dwight David Eisenhower. http://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/essays/biography/5, accessed March 12, 2014.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City.," December 8, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774.
Operations Coordinating Board, Washington D.C. "A Program to Exploit the A-Bank Proposals in the Presidents UN Speech of December 8, 1953, in Domestic and International Public Opinion Fields", February 4, 1954.
United States Atomic Energy Commission, Memorandum For the President, 17 September, 1953.
Chi-Jen Yang. Belief-based Energy Technology Development in the United States: A Comparative Study of Nuclear Power and Synthetic Fuel Policies. Cambria Press, Google EBook, 2009. 87.
Osgood, 216.
Robert Griffith, "The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942-1960." Business History Review (Pre-1986) 57, no. 000003 (Autumn, 1983): 388. http://search.proquest.com/docview/205513049?accountid=29121. 392.
Griffith, The Selling of America, 391.
Theordore S. Repplier. Memorandum from Theodore Repplier, Advertising Council, August 3, 1955 [DDE's Papers as President, Administration Series, Box 30, Nelson Rockefeller 1952-55. 
Osgood, 189.
In the video, there is a short text that sets the stage. "In July 1955 at Geneva, Switzerland, President Eisenhower proposed to the world a plan for controlled disarmament and peace. As a first step toward disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union would exchange information on military establishments, and verify this information by means of aerial inspection. The validity of aerial inspection was tested successfully by the Italian Air Forces in 1956. Located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIGJw-h0F-U on 5/5/2014.
Cull, 106.
Osgood, 194.
Osgood, 203.
Osgood, 207.
Osgood, 208.


21





Eisenhower: Win the Peace or Win the Propaganda War?








Sean Flaherty
May 13, 2014


President Eisenhower was one of the most popular presidents in the 20th century, leading the nation into a completely new and uncharted era both for the nation and the world. In a global sense, the damage caused by World War II as well as the dramatic changes in the global balance of power was fully realized. Third world nations were aligning with one of the two theoretical perspectives of power: the free market capitalism of the west or the communist structures of the east. Back in the United States, major changes were taking place. The homefront had to adjust to the end of the largest mobilization of troops in history, a beginning to the civil rights movement, and Communism and the threat of nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower who came to office in 1953 needed to reassert a sense of calm for the American populace. Eisenhower had to focus the energies of the country toward accepting its new role in the world, and in accepting the new threats Communism and nuclear weapons posed.
When historians address President Eisenhower, they have taken several angles to his leadership of the nation and his role in the world stage. Historians such as Robert Griffith argued that President Eisenhower was a well read and intellectual man who sought to limit the greed of American enterprises because unrestrained business practices would lead the U.S. to fall into a socialist revolution. Griffith suggests Eisenhower was a strong leader who took charge of domestic programs. He is complimented by Fred Greenstein who approaches Eisenhower's presidency through the lens of an instrumental revisionist. Greenstein proposes that Eisenhower was an active president fully in the loop and heavily involved in the running of the government. Another angle often argued is that President Eisenhower took a back-seat in his role as leader. David Tal addresses negotiations between the United States and Russia regarding nuclear disarmament. Tal shows how Harold Stassen, the Secretary of Peace promoted partial agreements on disarmament versus John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, who originally sought an "all-or-nothing" approach, but grew to accept and promote Stassen's views. Eisenhower, Tal would suggest, was heavily influenced by Dulles. This essay in line with promoting Eisenhower as a strong leader who guided domestic policy and sought to control worldwide opinions of the United States and Russia through media and propaganda campaigns.
The perception in the United States that there were real threats to world peace required leaders capable of containing those threats to maintain a sense of calm. The greatest asset to the president was the idea of Communism. Communism would serve the president in two folds: one, the president could enhance the image of the United States around the world as a world power fighting for the rights of all nations. In this area, Eisenhower attempted to guide the international discussion and he showed his leadership skills. Controlling the message Eisenhower wanted repeated around the globe was a challenging arena for the president, as Russia would undermine Eisenhower with gestures of peace or offers to limit the nuclear threats, or in simple cultural fairs that expanded the ideas of Communism. The United States and Russia rapidly learned how to harness the media for their own ambitions, but they also needed to learn how to rapidly and appropriately react to the unanticipated actions and words of the opposing power. Eisenhower would repeatedly alter his messages to maintain the image as the leader of peaceful negotiations.
The threat of Communism at home also aided the President in rallying the support of the American citizenry. This was a much easier situation for the President to regulate and control. The President had the support of the Advertising Council, a conglomerate of media moguls who controlled the nation's media sources and advertising centers. Their support of the President was significant in promoting the idea of a strong economy, anti-communist messages and the president's leadership through the changes to the new world order. President Eisenhower is said to have used two approaches to lead the nation against Communism. The first was "an emotional appeal advocating disarmament and decrying the arms race. The second was a ritualistic affirmation of the true virtues of American traditional values, our spiritual strength, our devotion to peace, our frontier heritage of resolute heroism." To address the threat of Communism outside U.S. borders, Eisenhower would use the Voice of America to promote the image of the United States as a supportive friend, while at home he would use the Advertising Council to promote a strong unified nation.
Rallying the American populace was best accomplished through grassroots, private organizations. The Advertising Council was successful at rallying groups of Americans. When North Korea invaded the south in 1950, the United States ramped up propaganda efforts under NSC-68. NSC-68 illustrated the reprioritization of U.S. military engagements, with propaganda being promoted to the same importance as military, economic and diplomatic engagements. Under Truman, the USIA (United States Information Agency) created a system that used United States based charities, private corporations, and publishers to compile and disseminate propaganda around the world. The incorporation of the public sphere of propaganda into the military sphere enhanced the depth and reach of U.S. propaganda. Publishers donated over 134,000 books that promoted a positive image of the United States for other countries to consume. Public organizations such as Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis and Lions Clubs were asked to aid in disseminating knowledge to Americans. One program that was promoted was the "Adopt a Foreign town" in which 128 U.S. communities would promise to provide aid and knowledge about the American way of life.
The "Adopt a Town" line of thinking was in the same vain as the total war concept of World War II, where each member of society was recruited to show the real America to other nations. This was coupled with the Letter from America Campaign which used the "first and second-generation immigrant community (around thirty-five million people)" writing over a billion letters promoting a positive aspect of America to people around the world. The United States under President Truman created a complete system of promoting American ideals overseas and in rallying Americans to support the government.
The systems set in place by Truman and expanded by Eisenhower were all directed to win the hearts and minds of Americans and the world community. When town's names were shared on national radio broadcasts, it empowered those already working for the collective good of the nation, and it inspired other communities to join the movement. Sending letters also had the purpose of sharing with the world the positive attributes of the United States. Both were effective campaigns, but to two different audiences. The letters helped other nations interpret the U.S. as a center of freedom and a place for opportunity. This would lead people to work within their nation to strengthen and support capitalism, democracy and to align with the United States for future economic opportunities. Within the United States however, the "Adopt a Town" was means of incorporating all aspects of daily life into the government's plans of indoctrination and education. The administration did not need to speak daily or even weekly about the threat of Communism, McCarthy had accomplished that. The administrations did not need to expend vast sums of money promoting capitalist ideas, the Advertising Council accomplished that. What the administration needed to do was organize the different groups and ensure that those who wanted to play ball towed the line that Eisenhower dictated.
The many issues Eisenhower faced, he did so with what appeared to be, a sense of calm. His speeches rallied the nation to take ownership of the future. The president projected through his speeches the ideal he wanted the American citizenry to live by. In the famous "Fear Speech" in 1954 in which President Eisenhower addressed the nuclear dangers facing the world, he ended with:
There are risks, if we are not vigilant. But we do not have to be hysterical. We can be vigilant. We can be Americans. We can stand up and hold up our heads and say: America is the greatest force that God has ever allowed to exist on His footstool.

The president allowed the nation to be fearful, but he also, and eloquently suggested the notion that as Americans, they are a member of the greatest nation. The president maintained his "ritualistic affirmation" of the country and promoted the excessive nationalism that he should be known for. It would take the skills of leader to build up the confidence of a nation that was undergoing significant changes and facing threats of a communist menace.
When Eisenhower took office, the opportunities for peace between the United States and Russia looked bleak. Stalin was Chairman of the Council of Ministers and leader of the Soviet Union, and there was little notion that the two powers could work together. Stalin had been the target of propaganda for years within the United States. He was portrayed "as the evil figure in the Kremlin pulling strings behind every evil happening in the world." In 1950, Stalin had spent the equivalent of 2% of the Soviet national income, or 1.5$Billion, which equated to sixty times the U.S. propaganda budget. In 1950, Stalin also initiated a "Hate America" campaign which spread anti-capitalist and anti-American messages throughout Europe. The term "Coca-Colonization" can be traced to Stalin's propaganda machines in France back to 1949, where the messages was of a United States attempting to colonize the world. Stalin had been an enigmatic figure, the focus of much hate and vitriol, and with his passing in 1953, six weeks after President Eisenhower took office, the president was offered a significant opportunity to take the reins and exploit the potential Russian transition. It was during 1953 where we see the most interesting documentation from the Oval Office regarding US-Soviet negotiations. One may surmise this is due to the rapid U.S. actions to take advantage of the transition, as well as Eisenhower's attempt to strike a strong stance in the world and to show his leadership style to the nation.
The need to retool the information campaign was heightened when Georgeii Malenkov, Stalin's heir apparent, appealed to the Soviet leadership to begin peace negotiations and they accepted the idea. The idea was broadcast to the world under the premise of "Peaceful Coexistence." Within five months, the Soviets returned parts of Turkey, established communications with Israel, negotiated with the U.S. over the Korean War and expanded discussions with Greece and Yugoslavia. There were intelligent and thoughtful words offering peace, and significant actions being made by the Soviets. Eisenhower, however, was not moved. He warned the American citizenry not to accept Soviet peace overtures too eagerly, that the Soviets would have to make more sincere and lasting peace signs to the world.
Many European nations jumped at the offer to limit the posturing of the nuclear powers. This was seen by many as the opening for the beginning of a new and peaceful era. Eisenhower and the Central Intelligence Agency however, exhibited a high level of contempt for the Soviet peace overtures. In a National Intelligence Estimate dated October 1953, the CIA reported:
at present the Kremlin seems to be trying to give the impression that it has adopted a more conciliatory policy than that followed in Stalin's later years. The Kremlin may hope by such tactics to relax the vigilance of some Western States, to encourage dissension between the US and its allies, and to delay progress of Western Rearmament…we believe that harsh courses of action similar to those pursued by the Kremlin in the past will reappear whenever the Kremlin deems them advantageous.

The estimate promoted a belief that the nuclear overtures were nothing more than an attempt to break the relationship between the U.S. and her allies, and to delay the U.S. manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower interpreted the Soviet overtures as an attempt to promote the Soviets as the leaders of a peaceful world, not the United States. In order to regain the edge of being the peaceful leaders of the world and to denigrate the Soviets as the occident seeking to destroy the world, Eisenhower and his administration created propaganda campaigns to enlighten the world as to who were the real leaders of peace.
For the Soviets, they were breaking with their past Stalinist programs, one state department official stated: "this startling event, perhaps more than any other, provides the most concrete evidence thus far of the present regimes break with Stalinism." Yet another state department official is quoted stating "it is necessary to assume that the peace offensive is a treacherous stratagem of as yet indiscernible proportions." The American leadership was at a loss as to the direction to move the nation. Members of the Administration were forced to address the reality of the Soviet overtures. If the Soviets were genuine and the U.S. ignored the requests for peace, then they could look like the "bad guys" in the world. This could have pushed nations reaching out into the folds of the Soviet's sphere of influence, and thus natural resources would leave the U.S. sphere. The administration also had to contemplate whether the gestures were a trap. If the Soviets made overtures and the U.S. refused to acknowledge or support the moves, then the U.S. would again look bad in world discussions and at home.
The first in a series of campaigns created by the Eisenhower Administration in reaction to the Soviet overtures was called the "Chance for Peace." In this propaganda campaign, the U.S. sought to retake the reigns of peaceful negotiations. Eisenhower used his role as leader to retake the high ground and offer peace, but with requirements of the Soviets that many felt would never be achieved. This placed the burden on the Soviets to fail. The "Chance for Peace" program was the U.S. version of a peace counteroffensive. Immediately after the Soviet overtures though, the U.S. gave the PSB (Psychological Strategy Board) "Carte blanche to pursue subversive propaganda activities" and retake the phrase "peace" from the Soviets. The PSB would print and distribute three million copies of the "Chance for Peace" speech and create a film called "Path to Peace."
With the creation of a counter-offensive program and a full assault in print and film, Eisenhower was able to challenge the Soviets propaganda machine. The Soviet overtures for peace and Eisenhower's refusal to even address the attempts can be viewed as a failure on his part. His inability to even consider the Soviet offers for peace guaranteed years of hostility. But, as already addressed, the CIA and other administration officials did not view the overtures as real, and Eisenhower in one quote to his British counterpart Winston Churchill gave his real opinion of the Soviet peace offer: "Russia was …..a woman of the streets and whether her dress was new, or just the old one patched, there was the same whore underneath." Nothing the Soviets could do would essentially alleviate the disdain Eisenhower held for their system of government. This statement can be the lens through which the sincerity of Eisenhower administrations negotiations were held.
In December 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the United Nations. This speech was directed at the world, but also the American public and covered peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this address, President Eisenhower spoke of how the great nuclear powers of the world could now work together to convert the destructive power of nuclear weapons into a constructive, peaceful purpose. In this meeting, the President offered the idea of an "Atomic Bank" in which nations would deposit destructive nuclear products which would be converted into positive and peaceful products for use in education and research. The UN address was Eisenhower's opportunity to project the United States as a nation "Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace."
Immediately however, the Operations Coordinating Board, created a classified draft document to follow-up on the Atomic Bank proposals. The document stated "the President's speech was not intended to suggest solutions to problems in the disarmament field but sought to "open up a new channel for peaceful discussion" and to "Initiate at least a new approach" to the difficult questions of disarmament." The discussion had been initiated already by the Soviets, the U.S. however was not interested in total disarmament, the U.S. simply wanted to lead the discussion. The Atomic Bank proposal had a catch that each power would have to allow foreign inspectors to confirm the removal of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower and members of his administration knew that the Soviets would not agree to international inspections, and that is why the proposal was perfect. Even members of Eisenhower's administration failed to believe in the idea promoted by the president. In a memorandum to the President from the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss, the head of the commission stated "The proposal is novel and might have value for propaganda purposes. It has doubtful value as a practical move." The U.S. offered a significant opportunity to disarm the two powers, but the caveat of inspections created a hostility the Soviets would not accept. It is situations such as this that demonstrate the intent of Eisenhower. He was not seeking the most rapid and peaceful solution to Soviet overtures, but to maintain the upper hand in controlling the message and international opinion that Americans were leading the world for peace.
The Soviets did refuse the American plan. The Soviet reaction to the President's message was simple: "Eisenhower's plan, 'would fail to assist the reaching of an agreement on the banning of atomic weapons' and would lead 'to the production of more and more destructive atomic weapons' by lessening the 'vigilance of the peoples regarding the problem of atomic weapons." The Soviets replayed this message throughout their sphere of influence, trying to gain the upper hand in worldwide opinions.
While the "Chance for Peace" was designed for the domestic audience, the Soviets were heavily investing and expanding their propaganda efforts around the world. Russia had used Cultural Fairs in their satellite nations to maintain support for the overall program and goals of the communist system. President Eisenhower must have presented a threat to the Soviet system, from 1953 to 1954, the Soviet government expanded trade fairs from twelve to over sixty, and by 1955, there were 170 fairs in 45 countries. Soviet trade fairs addressed the use of nuclear power, they addressed the positive aspects of Communism and laid out arguments against the United States systems. With the rapid expansion, Eisenhower was backed into a corner and he approached Congress requesting emergency funds in 1954 of $5 million to bolster the United States trade fairs. In 1955, Congress passed the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Act guaranteeing a steady budget and program to promote the United States around the world. The Soviet expansion of cultural trade fairs was seen by the administration as an attempt to undermine capitalism, when in fact, there is strong reason to believe the Soviets were trying to simply maintain their base or to counteract the U.S. led Adopt a Town or Letter from America campaigns or the constant bombardment of Voice of America signals infiltrating Soviet lands. These cultural fairs on both sides initially addressed positive aspects of each system of government, but they grew rapidly to address the political issues of the time, with the United States using the fairs to sell their views about nuclear disarmament, or other Eisenhower proposals at peace.
What has yet to be addressed in this essay is the relationship between the President and the Advertising Council. The Advertising Council began as the WAC (War Advertising Council) that ran all propaganda efforts for the United States government during WWII. This was a lucrative time for the members of the media that participated in the effort but, with the closure of the war, the WAC was ended and the members chose to use their talents and experiences by starting the Advertising Council as a private enterprise. The Advertising Council would support President Eisenhower and his bid for the White House for several reasons, primarily due to his opposition to the New Deal, opposition to Communism and Eisenhower's vast support for propaganda and capitalism. Eisenhower would use the Advertising Council as a "private vehicle for public information," and his right hand man in this operation was Theodore Repplier who ran the Advertising Council. Repplier often offered ideas and potential avenues to address topics such as how to advance the cause of fighting Communism. A Confidential Memorandum from Theodore S. Repplier who led the Advertising Council in 1955, suggested that the President lead a "Crusade" and for the president to take advantage of the times. Repplier stated: "We cannot be merely against Communism; we suffer from a lack of a positive crusade. We need to focus on a moralistic idea with the power to stir men's imagination." It was not only the President who sought to lead the nation in a moralistic agenda, all the people surrounding him had the same desire.
The Administration was consistently altering the talking points. Eisenhower was opposed to total nuclear disarmament due to the Soviets conventional weapons capacity, but in 1955, after years of pressure from Britain, France and from members of the United States Senate, Eisenhower finally accepted an offer to sit face to face with his Russian counterpart. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were both reluctant to entertain the meeting, but worldwide opinion of the United States as a trigger happy nation was growing and Eisenhower wanted to control the international arena of propaganda. To retake the lead in public opinion, the Administration created the "Open Skies" program. This proposal was introduced to the Soviets at the Geneva Summit in July 1955. Essentially, Open Skies was not a disarmament program, but was a means of inspecting the other powers military installations to create an atmosphere of peace, to protect against a surprise attack, provide intelligence about the opposing power and to help the United States break down the Iron Curtain. When President Eisenhower introduced the plan, he not only informed Khrushchev, but his systems in the Advertising Council went on a public relations blitz. Eisenhower was hardly surprised when Khrushchev soundly rejected the plan, but since it was the first concrete plan toward addressing Nuclear weapons, the United States had taken the upper hand and promoted themselves as the leader for peace. Khrushchev's refusal also showed the world that Soviet overtures for peace were insincere. This was a major victory for President Eisenhower in terms of public relations.
It must again be asked, why was the administration hell bent on winning the propaganda war? By showing the world that the United States was leader of the modern world, and was a leader in making the world safer for peace, the administration was able to gain support from third-world nations, gain friendly relations from nations with natural resources the U.S. wanted and offered the U.S. markets to sell goods. Each positive aspect for the United States also meant that the Soviets were unable to attain those resources or have markets for their products, thus ensuring the growth of capitalism and a detrimental impact on Communism. There was another issue that the United States had to address regarding nuclear weapons. The U.S. had far more advanced and a much larger stockpile of nuclear weapons then their Soviet counterpart therefore the Soviets would be more inclined to end nuclear weapon manufacturing, but the Soviets had a far grander stockpile of conventional weaponry, meaning the United States would require that to be limited if nuclear weapons were to be limited. The size and type of weaponry required the opposing nation to enter negotiations with different needs.
In 1955, there were a multitude of propaganda programs working to enhance the image of the United States as well as denigrate communist theories. The "Atoms for Peace" initiative promoted using atomic knowledge to enhance scientific advances. Atoms for Peace as well as Open Skies were both promoted in video, pamphlets, feature stories in magazines and newspapers and community organizations. The United States Information Agency, the governmental organization that oversaw all information programs, "arranged for 266 U.S. firms to distribute 300,000 translations of Eisenhower's speech" along with a dramatic increase in films supporting "Atoms for Peace." The information war was complex and the message supported the United States, and this was needed after a poll from before and after the Geneva Summit found that Western Europeans opinions of the USSR as "bad" or "very bad" declined from 54% to 37%. While in the U.S. the public relations blitz was working efficiently, it had actually worked for the Soviets better in Western Europe. The multitude of programs did portray the United States as willing to work for peace, and the only nation offering real proposals to end the nuclear issue.
In 1957, the chance for peace was as close as ever. In 1955, Eisenhower appointed Harold Stassen, a former governor as a special assistant on Disarmament policy. Stassen was dubbed the Secretary of Peace, and worked often times as a voice against Secretary of State, Dulles. In 1957, Stassen ventured beyond his authorized mandate from the President and nearly negotiated a deal to end the deadlock over nuclear disarmament. The Soviets stated they were finally close to an agreement with the United States. Eisenhower was forced to scuttle the plans by adding some wording that forced the Russians to withdraw. The potential agreement angered the British because it would limit nuclear weapons manufacturing worldwide, meaning the British, who were not as far along as the Americans and Soviets, would have to cease their programs.
Outside of Eisenhower's control was international opinion. After two U.S. led nuclear tests in 1957 that left many people sick from radioactive fallout, worldwide opinion changed and calls grew demanding an end to all nuclear testing. 1957 also saw the success of the launch of Sputnik, the Russian orbiter. The Soviet propaganda apparatus expanded significantly. The Soviets unilaterally offered to reduce their military size to 300,000 troops, they offered to suspend all nuclear tests for two years and to again open dialogue to disarm the major powers of the world. The United States was unable to keep up with the Soviet overtures and was often caught agreeing with the quality of the offers, but unable to agree to the offers. Eisenhower and his administration however did not want total disarmament due to the conventional warfare capabilities of the Soviets. He therefore expanded the budget of the United States Information Agency, the international wing of the Advertising Council to promote the American negotiating programs that in his view, were the "surest road to durable peace" By March 31, the Soviets had publicly announced a unilateral ban on all nuclear testing. Again, the Soviets were leading the discussion about who was actually invested in a peaceful future for the world.
After months of internal discussions, and calls around the world for a moratorium on nuclear tests, the administration finally agreed on August 22 to suspend nuclear testing for one year. The ban was not to go into effect until October 31, and in the time between the call to ban and the implantation of the test ban, the U.S., British and Russians all detonated massive amounts of nuclear weapons, with the British and American testing thirty-seven bombs and the Russians testing fourteen. All the tests had significant implications on the health of people around the world. In 1959, the magazine Consumer reports covered a story that addressed heavy doses of strontium-90 in milk. This led to a panic across the United States, but Eisenhower who initially was listening to the calls to end all testing chose instead to limit testing in the Atmosphere and underground.
Negotiations were going forward with a significant chance at success, but in the weeks before the Paris Summit to finalize plans for a nuclear test freeze, the Soviets shot down the United States U-2 spy plane. When President Eisenhower refused to apologize to the Soviet for violating their airspace and for trying to cover up the plans, the summit ended without any accomplishment. It would be 1963 before there would be a ban on underground nuclear testing, and not until 1968 would an agreement be reached that set out a roadmap for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.
While the president was in office for eight years, there were really only a few significant opportunities for securing a treaty limiting nuclear weapons; one in 1953 after Stalin died, a second opportunity with Harold Stassen's negotiations and the other in 1959 to limit nuclear testing in the atmosphere. In these instances, it was Eisenhower that failed to complete the deal. Eisenhower was always willing to use the Voice of America and the Adverting Council to promote the United States as the leader of peace, but his actions do not support his sincerity. In Eisenhower's farewell address he warned the nation against allowing corporations to gain too much power in the military realm of the nation, but evidence would suggest that Eisenhower was a leading cause for the required expansion of the military industrial complex. It was Eisenhower that helped build up the Soviets as a menace to the world and nation, and it was Eisenhower who escalated the tensions with the Soviets in terms of propaganda. The U.S. military complex had to have physical systems to support or back up the actions of the president. The President wanted to appear as a leader of the free world, to show the strength of the U.S. economic system and the strength of democracy. Eisenhower escalated the stalemate between the United States and Russia when he could have used his strong leadership abilities to end or at least draw down the Cold War.
In the future, historians will need greater access to Soviet era documents to complete the picture of Eisenhower's presidency. Questions to answer are how sincere were the Soviets in their overtures for peace? While they spent large sums of money on propaganda, were they doing so to spread their ideology or was the cultural fairs and peace overtures tools to promote the Soviets as the leaders of peace negotiations the way Eisenhower wanted to be viewed? The propaganda programs such as Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, Chance for Peace, or the Voice of America broadcasting into nations around the world, the millions of leaflets and movie screenings, the letter writing campaigns or the adopt a town programs, the cultural fairs all had a goal of spreading the strengths of the United States as a leader in the world. Yet with all those programs, the President could have achieved more by negotiating with the Soviets. Eisenhower did not appear to be sincere in negotiating until 1959, his final year in office as a lame duck president. It is hard to believe he was sincere then as well. Eisenhower did not win the Cold War, he did not win the propaganda war, he did not help the world with nuclear negotiations or in deescalating tensions, but he did rally the nation to accept their role in the world, to accept an era of nuclear weapons and nuclear energies, and the nation did not succumb to the McCarthy fear campaigns of communists taking over the nation.


BIBLIOGRPAHY

Primary Sources


National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-99, "Estimate of the World Situation Through 1955," October 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-54. Online by U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d96.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: "Joint Statement Following the First Discussions With Chairman Khrushchev.," September 15, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11510.

--- "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City.," December 8, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774.

--- "Toasts of the President and Chairman Khrushchev.," September 15, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11511.

--- "Address "The Chance for Peace" Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.," April 16, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9819.

--- "Special Message to the Congress on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs.," June 1, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9861.

--- "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program.," May 5, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9836.

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