Elsevier Editorial System(tm) for Forest Policy and Economics Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: FORPOL1231R4 Title: Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France Article Type: Special Issue: Ecosystem Service Payment Keywords: ecosystem services, payment for environmental services, norms, policy transfer, NGOs, States Corresponding Author: researcher hrabanski marie, Corresponding Author's Institution: cirad First Author: hrabanski marie, Phd Order of Authors: hrabanski marie, Phd; Hrabanski Marie; Bidaud Cécile; Le Coq Jean -François; meral philippe Manuscript Region of Origin: FRANCE Abstract: Market based instruments for ecosystem services have become the norm since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment advanced the concept of "ecosystem services" as an international reference in global governance. In this way, Market based instruments for ecosystem services have increasingly been implemented within nation States. In this paper we analyse the role of environmental non governmental organisations (NGOs) in spreading Market based instruments for ecosystem services. We put forward the hypothesis that : when a State cannot adequately defend its political and economic sovereignty to produce its own public policies, then the environmental NGOs are strong policy entrepreneurs, that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments. When a State is more politically and economically capable, the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs is more limited. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the diffusion of market based instruments for ecosystem services in three contrasted countries regarding State and NGOs' respective strength: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France. A comparison and analysis of the dissemination of the market based instruments for ecosystem services in different countries therefore seems highly relevant for analysing such transfers of international standards and policy instruments.
Responses to Reviewers
Marie Hrabanski, (UMR ARTDEV, CIRAD) Cécile Bidaud (IRD, UMR GRED) Jean-François Le Coq (UMR ART-Dev, CIRAD, CINPE, UNA), Philippe Méral (IRD, UMR GRED)
Cover letter 4 for the article « Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France”
Dear colleagues,
We have taken into account your last suggestions and criticisms. We will now describe and justify the changes made in our article. 1-The Editor’s comments suggested no to use abbreviations and references in the abstract. We removed MBI and ES in the abstract and the reference. 2. Editor’s comments suggested to start the first chapter by the header “intr oduction”, that’s what we did.
3-The Editors' comments suggested to abbreviate the abstract Abstract reduced from 309 to 175 words.
4-Editors' comments suggested to make a last spell checking The following change has been done Page 1: Add to Endnote 1: This research was financed thanks to the SERENA program, a project founded by the French Agence nationale pour la recherche, reference ANR-08-STRA-13 Remove to Endnote2 : The carbon PES are have been developed on a large scale in forests Page 2: Change the State's ability to design & implement its policies the State's ability to design and implement its policies
It shows that policy entrepreneurs are “public entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal government, introduce, translate and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts and King 1991) p147 Remove strong policy entrepreneurs, that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments Change To test these hypothesis To test these hypotheses Page 3: Add . The role of NGOs in policy transfer has been addressed more or less directly in different types of studies. Add ...NGOs through their INGO become international actors” (Reinalda 2001) p12 Page 4: Capabilities "include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined ways. From an analysis of public policy and sociology of State literature migdal p4
Remove Genschel, P., & Zang Add Zangl Page 6: Remove Within this economic context, the Malagasy State has not had Remove Since the initiation of it’s Change whereas CI focuses more of its activities in support of corridors whereas CI focuses more on its activities in support of corridors Add space (Nicoll and Lagrand1989) (Nicoll and Lagrand 1989) Add
definition of priority actions, logical framework, monitoring, evaluations definition of priority actions, logical framework, monitoring, and evaluations Page 7: Add (Carrière and Bidaud 2012); Remove (Neumann 1998) wilderness approach of “pristine” forests and endemic fauna species like lemurs (Carrière and Bidaud 2012) Add actual monetary compensation to bring them to the table around such an important issue (Bidaud 2012) Remove Thus, the conservation-oriented NGOs, that have not been affected by Page 8: Add Durrell Page 10 Add started helping to fund the PESP through loans and grants Remove as a one of the motors for the development of the country Remove the Costa Rican State remains the his decision-making power and his organisational powers. Remove the dissemination of the Costa Rican experience and fame in international forums Page 11: Change aided by the introduction of political structures open to ONGs aided by the introduction of political structures open to NGOs Remove but it didn't incorporate radically new ideas under the ultimate tutelage of of the State and the Ministry Remove on their budgetary consequences which places an emphasis on State services Change the sole and only actor which are able the sole and only actor which is able
Page 12 Add Until the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) Page 13 Add has more recently moved to incorporate those concepts. Change centers Centres Page 14 Remove 2) in an international “expert” form where Add of MBIs for ES through the creation of its national PES program. Change The ONGs studied are established The NGOs studied are established Change Madagascar like France is in contrast to countries which Madagascar and France are in contrast two countries which Page 15 Add of the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Add the options which it wields on its own territory Change centers Centres Page 16 Change for doctorate programs on the development of SE for doctorate programs on the development of ES
Page 17
But, when the State is weak, as in the case of Madagascar, the environmental NGOs can be some powerful policy entrepreneurs. But, when the State is weak, as in Madagascar, the environmental NGOs can be some powerful policy entrepreneurs. Change Millennium ecosystem assessment Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
Remove (234) In this way, Change We can not We cannot Page 18-21: Review of reference formatting
*Title Page with Author Identifiers
Title page : Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France Authors: Marie Hrabanski (ART-Dev, CIRAD), Cécile Bidaud (IRD, UMR GRED), Jean-François Le Coq (ART-Dev, CIRAD, CINPE, UNA), Philippe Méral (IRD, UMR GRED). Corresponding author: Marie Hrabanski, Researcher in polical sociology, ART DEV-CIRAD,
[email protected] Adress: TA C-88/15 73 rue Jean-François Breton 34398 Montpellier cedex 5, France Tel 33(0)4 67 61 57 31 Fax 33 (0)4 67 61 44 15
*Title Page
Title page : Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France
*Abstract Click here to download Abstract: Abstract_Forpol.docx
Abstract
Market based instruments for ecosystem services have become the norm since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment advanced the concept of “ecosystem services” as an international reference in global governance. In this way, Market based instruments for ecosystem services have increasingly been implemented within nation States. In this paper we analyse the role of environmental non governmental organisations (NGOs) in spreading Market based instruments for ecosystem services. We put forward the hypothesis that : when a State cannot adequately defend its political and economic sovereignty to produce its own public policies, then the environmental NGOs are strong policy entrepreneurs, that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments. When a State is more politically and economically capable, the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs is more limited. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the diffusion of market based instruments for ecosystem services in three contrasted countries regarding State and NGOs’ respective strength: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France. A comparison and analysis of the dissemination of the market based instruments for ecosystem services in different countries therefore seems highly relevant for analysing such transfers of international standards and policy instruments.
*Highlights (for review)
The paper shows that Costa Rica is, above all, in a position of transmitter in the sense that it is a pioneering country in the installation of MBIs for ES through the creation its national PES program. The environmental NGOs did not participate in the establishment of the PES program in Costa Rica, but participated principally in the diffusion of this instrument in other countries. Madagascar and France are by contrast in the position of receptors. The environmental NGOs have played a major role in Madagascar, where the abilities of the State were limited, but in France their influence has been more moderated. In Costa Rica, NGOs had an extremely limited role in the conception of PES during the 1990s. However they drew much inspiration from success of the Costa Rican program to promote MBIs for ES in other areas of the world. The NGOs have advocated the efficiency of this type of instrument, and its advantages, and helped legitimize its diffusion in other countries. The ONGs studied are established in several dozen countries. With the advantage of their international structure, they have been able to facilitate the diffusion of the experience of Costa Rica in numerous other national situations through their local agencies. Drawing on the Costa Rican example, the environmental NGOs were able to spread not only the ideas of MBIs for ES, but also promote the institutional dimensions and techniques of this type of instrument. Aside from the channel of the large environmental NGOs that have used the Costa Rican PES as a reference in numerous countries of intervention, we can identify two other channels. Firstly, we can identify a "South – North – South" channel, that can take two forms: 1) an academic form, where information is broadcast through the articles published in international journals presenting or discussing the specific results of the Costa Rican PESP (Castro et al. 2000, Zbinden and Lee 2005, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Pagiola 2008, Locatelli, Rojas and Salinas 2008, Daniels et al. 2010) or a transversal analysis of PES mechanisms integrating the Costa Rican PES (Wunder 2005, Wunder 2007, Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008, Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 2008, Muradian et al. 2010) 2) in an international “expert” form where information on the PESP is presented and broadcast by international cooperation organizations, such as the World Bank (Chomitz, Brenes and Constantino 1998, Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-Mills 2002, Pagiola and Platais 2002a) or international consultancy agencies, such as IIED (Rojas and Aylward 2003). These two forms can be linked, as some actors may work for international organizations, and take part in publishing academic journals. Secondly, we can identify a “South – South” channel of transmission, through direct exchange between civil servants of ministries of southern countries and FONAFIFO staff, either through visits to Costa Rica, or through missions by Costa Rican staff. Madagascar like France is in contrast to countries which are in a position to receive a recipe for public policy. The analysis shows that the ability of the Malagasy State to conceive and install its own conservation policy has been extremely limited. The environmental NGOs, in partnership with sponsors and universities, have in large part transmitted and installed the standards and instruments of Madagascar's existing conservation policy. Nevertheless, the transfer of these instruments to Madagascar has neither been imposed nor forced on the Malagasy government: the government agencies and politicians validate the initiatives proposed by the NGOs and their sponsors, and can benefit from their organizational and political advantages. We note even so that the benefit of financing offered by the NGOs in the framework conservation policy places the Malagasy State in a situation of dependence. The Malagasy State's options in this scenario are extremely limited. It is neither in a position to determine its own conservation policies nor to refuse those proposed. In a weak State
such as Madagascar, the essential role played by large environmental NGOs in the dissemination and implementation of a public policy reference does not go without questioning the NGOs’s legitimacy. The analysis in Madagascar showed that large environmental NGOs play a major role, and even an exclusive role, in the environmental policy on the island. In France, large environmental NGOs' influence over environmental policies is moderate. Even if these NGOs, along with certain industries, were the first actors able to boast an expertise on MBIs for ES at the time of the publication of the MA (Hrabanski and Valette 2012), the French decision makers, under pressure from the EU and international benchmarking, quickly moved to recapture the dynamic and conserve their ability to develop national environmental policy. We should also note that even if the French State was to depend on the direction from Brussels, the options which it wields on its on territory allow the Ministry of the environment and the Ministry of agriculture to keep a hand on the agroenvironmental policies. The NGOs can offer their expertise, but the French State hasn't signed up for a strong dependent relationship with regard to the environmental NGOs like the case in Madagascar. The political strength of the French State, although shared with the EU, rests complete and permits it to fully decide on the direction of environmental policies, and their implementation on its own territory. This paper shows that although large environmental NGOs develop international strategies for ES and PES-instruments, the dissemination of those strategies depends primarily on the national and local contexts. The history of environmental policies and the role of States are essential for understanding how the ES concept and related instruments will evolve. Similarly, the status that the political system gives to large environmental NGOs is decisive. In this perspective, we have shown that in Costa Rica, which appears as a laboratory for environmental policies, large environmental NGOs were not at the origin of PES-instruments, but have played a central role in disseminating the model. In Madagascar, where the State can be considered weak, and the abilities of the State to develop its own environmental policies extremely limited, MBIs for ES have primarily been developed by large environmental NGOs working to provide sustainable finances for conservation. In France, the State has conserved it capabilities for the development and implementation of environmental policies, and the influence of the NGOs is limited, even if their transnationalism has allowed them to be the first to claim expertise on the subject. In the process of dissemination, like the case in Costa Rica, the environmental NGOs along with other actors (scientists, national and international government officials…) are powerful agents of transfer. On the receiving side of the transaction, the influence of the environmental NGOs on policies is limited with respect to the strength of the State, as is the case in France. But when the State is weak, as in the case of Madagascar, the environmental NGOs can be a powerful policy entrepreneur.
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Title: Environmental NGOs, policy entrepreneurs of market-based instruments for ecosystem services? A comparison of Costa Rica, Madagascar and France Market-based instruments (MBIs) for ecosystem services (ES) consist in a large array of policy instruments designed to modify the behaviour of land users or natural resource managers (Pirard 2012) in ways that maintain or promote ecosystem services (i.e., ‘the benefits that humans derive from ecosystems’,(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). One of the more prevalent examples of MBIs for ES are Payments for Environmental Services (PES). PES were originally conceptualized as market transactions (Wunder 2005), but their definition has expanded as transfers of resources between social actors for the purpose of creating incentives to align land use decisions with social interest in natural resource management (Muradian et al. 2010). Since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) advanced the concept of ecosystem services as an international reference in global governance (Pesche et al. 2013), MBIs for ES, have become the norm among natural resource management tools. Along with this development, there has been a progressive increase in the implementation of MBIs for ES within nation states (Antona et al. 2012), and we believe a comparison and analysis of the dissemination of these instruments in different countries provides a highly relevant means to study the transfers of international standards and policy instruments. We identified three contrasting contexts involving the diffusion of the MBIs for ES: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France 1. In Costa Rica, the development of a PES program occurred early (1996), and was the result of proactive State policy, and promotion by national actors to achieve national and sectoral (forestry) objectives (Le Coq et al. 2010, Le Coq et al. 2012, Legrand et al. 2010). Derived from the former forestry incentive system, the PES Program finance the private forest owners of Costa Rica for conservation, reforestation, or sustainable management practices (Pagiola 2008). But in Madagascar, PES programs (carbon and watershed) have been developed only recently, and primarily by NGOs in an effort to supplant older tools that suffered from unstable funding (Froger and Meral 2012, Bidaud et al. 2013)2. Finally, in France, the development of the ES concept arose much later, appearing 1 This research was financed thanks to the SERENA program, a project founded by the French Agence nationale pour la recherche, reference ANR-08-STRA-13. 2 The different PES schemes developed (or under development) in Madagascar are biodiversity, carbon and watershed PES schemes (Froger and Meral, 2012 ; Bidaud et al., 2013). The biodiversity PES schemes were created through conservation agreements and participatory ecological monitoring. Conservation agreements were initiated by Conservation International in the Centre-East of the country. The participatory ecological monitoring, launched by the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust in the West and Centre-East regions, are intended to remunerate local communities that preserve certain target species. The carbon PES have been developed on a large scale in forests of the East and run by CI, WWF and WCS. The marketing of carbon-credits on the Voluntary Carbon Markets is the main source of funding. The third kind of PES sche mes concerns watersheds. Still at an early stage of development, these schemes projects are being run jointly by the WWF and the World Mountain People Association (WMPA). The common point of most of these PES schemes is that they seek the involvement of the national water and electricity distribution company. 1
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after the MA report of 2005 (Valette et al. 2012), but offering new opportunities for increasing NGOs participation in the public policies of new sectors such as agriculture. This article undertakes a more thorough analysis of the role of large environmental NGOs in the growth of MBIs for ES in these three countries. The current literature on global environmental politics largely considers NGO influence to be implicit and unproblematic (Betsill and Corell 2001). For Keck and Sikkink (Keck and Sikkink 1998), advocacy coalitions foster the implementation of standards and instruments by putting pressure on actors to adopt new policies. From their point of view, non-State actors, performing as brokers and translators, play a crucial role in the internationalization of standards. However, these approaches pass over the importance of national contexts (social, economic and political). Furthermore, the emergence of new international standards and instruments is not only the result of NGO strategies, but also the result of a balance of power between foreign actors (bilateral or multilateral donors and NGOs) and States. Responding to several weaknesses in this literature (Betsill and Corell 2001), we have drawn on the work of Policy Transfer Studies (PTS). It shows that policy entrepreneurs are “public entrepreneurs who, from outside the formal government, introduce, translate and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts and King 1991)p.147, and that they can intervene at both national and international levels (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, Dolowitz and Marsh 2001). Following this vein, we propose to analyse the role of environmental NGOs in spreading MBIs for ES. Are environmental NGOs policy entrepreneurs? The main hypothesis is that 1) environmental NGOs may act as policy entrepreneurs by importing solutions that were developed elsewhere, 2) the ability of environmental NGOs to act as policy entrepreneurs is shaped by the domestic political context, i.e. the State's ability to design and implement its policies. We argue that when a State cannot adequately defend its political and economic sovereignty to produce its own public policies, then the environmental NGOs are strong policy entrepreneurs that are able to diffuse standards and policy instruments. When a State is more politically and economically capable, the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs is more limited. To test these hypotheses, we analyse the diffusion of MBIs for ES regarding State and NGOs’ respective strength in three contrasted countries: Costa Rica, Madagascar and France. This article complements existing analyses of the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs by focusing on the key part played by the State in environmental policymaking. In the following, the argument regarding the role of NGOs in the diffusion of MBIs for ES unfolds in four steps. The first part deals with the state of the art on policy transfer and NGOs’ role. In the next section, we present our methodological framework. In a third part, we propose a historical analysis of the relationship between environmental NGOs and State in each country, and the dynamic of introduction and development of MBIs for ES. In the last part, we compare theses dynamics to reach a conclusion about the role of environmental NGOS in policy transfers.
1- Introduction: Policy transfer studies and environmental NGOs
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The literature on policy transfer studies (PTS) enables us to analyse the role of environmental NGOs as policy entrepreneurs. PTS developed as an effort to analyse the dynamics of the transfer of public policies from one country to another, or from international to national levels within the context of increasing globalization (Delpeuch 2009). They place an emphasis on the actors that enable, facilitate or implement the transfer, as well as the reception of the transfer. PTS show that the non-state actors aiming to impose, promote or facilitate the importexport of specific solutions can be supranational structures such as the European Union (EU), international organizations (international financial institutions, Organization of United Nations), transnational enterprises (banks in particular), consultancy agencies, or NGOs ((Evans 2004). There are also collective actors less institutionalized, but structured in networks such as epistemic communities (Haas 1992), advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or global public policy networks (Stone 2008). The role of NGOs in policy transfer has been addressed more or less directly in different types of studies. Parts of these studies, are related to global governance and the role of nonstate actors in environmental policies (Betsill and Corell 2001, Corell and Betsill 2001, Arts 2005). Reinalda, who analyzed the importance of NGOs in global governance, proposed the following definition: “NGOs are domestic actors when they confine their activities to their national political systems. They become transnational actors as soon as they operate across national boundaries, for instance by establishing a relationship with a similar NGO in another country. When various NGOs from three or more countries establish an international nongovernmental organization (INGO) to serve as a mechanism for co-operation among national NGOs in international affairs, NGOs through their INGO become international actors” (Reinalda 2001)p12. The definition of Reinalda is particularly relevant because it stresses the national anchorage of the NGO and the process of transnationalization and internationalization that characterizes them. However, Reinalda’s studies are not focused on NGOs as agents of transfer at the international level. Other scholars deal with environmental policy transfers, but are not focused on NGOs (Jörgens 2004, Kern, Jörgens and Jänicke 2001). In our research, the PTS approach has allowed us to examine NGOs as agents of transfer in environmental policies in several countries and to make conclusions about the role of NGOs in environmental global governance. As Dolowitz and Marsh wrote: “NGOs, unlike most categories of actors involved in the policy transfer process, act as agents of both voluntary and coercive transfer. More important, both can be used by other actors to help in their efforts to transfer, or force others to transfer, policies. Thus, the activities of these institutions greatly complicate the policy transfer process, particularly if we look at transfer across time, within a political system, or across space, between several political systems”(11) (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000).
The second main question addressed by the PTS concerns the reception of what has been transferred. The PTS characterize the transfers and classify them from voluntary to imposed. The concept of "lesson drawing" characterizes situations where the decision to take inspiration from a foreign example is made by the importing system outside of all exterior constraints (Rose 1991). In this case the entrepreneurs search out foreign or external intellectual resources with the idea of importing the best responses to the problems within 3
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their jurisdiction. At the other extreme are situations where the transfers are imposed by an external power, for example when a conquered or colonized country is forced to adopt standards similar to those of the imposing government. But in most cases, the importing system benefits from a relative autonomy, and the external elements are transferred within the framework of a voluntary exchange with the exporter. Furthermore the literature on policy instruments shows that instrumental innovation, policy transfer is more likely to happen during the implementation phase while such innovations might be resisted by veto players during the elaboration phase (Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2003, Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004, Saurruger and Surel 2006). Therefore we need to analyse the history of the relationship between the transfer entreprene urs, in our case environmental NGOs, and the importing systems, here represented by the Malagasy, Costa Rican, and French states. A country is particularly susceptible to external influences when it is less able to defend its independence in developing or evaluating its own public policy. Some peripheral countries are completely dependent on external experts for determining whether their existing standards and practices are viable or need reform (Evans and Davies 1999). The variance in the ability of States to defend their independence in developing public policy is represented in the major work of Migdal in which the author distinguishes between strong States and weak States, as a function of these capabilities (Migdal 1988). Capabilities "include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (Migdal 1988, p4). From an analysis of public policy and sociology of State literature (King and Le Galès 2011), Genschel & Zangl attempt to clarify the issue of "capabilities" by introducing the distinction between decisionmaking powers, organizational powers and organizational legitimacy (Genschel and Zangl 2011). We have followed this approach in order to analyse the capability of the three States, Costa Rica, Madagascar, and France, to independently conceive and put into practice environmental policies. 2. Methodological framework to compare environmental NGOs in three countries 2.1 Methodological issues of international NGOS We focus here on a specific type of NGO: the main international NGOs specialized in conservation. Since the 1990s, the establishment of nature reserves in the world has taken place primarily under the leadership of members of an oligopoly (Adams 2004) composed of IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), World Wide Fund (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Conservation International (CI). We selected these 5 organizations to study because they are known as the most active in the global environmental arena (Aubertin 2005, Hudson 2001, Meyer 1995, Nelson 1996). Smaller, local NGOs with little influence on policy transfer were not included, and research concentrated on these larger environmental NGOs capable of addressing different venues simultaneously and operating on national and international levels. However, in choosing to focus on CI, TNC, WCS, IUCN and WWF we are not suggesting that there is any particular uniformity among these five organizations. They differ not only in their location, but also in the historical context of their creation, and in their ideological foundations. Nevertheless, their organizational structures are similar; all five are part of the conservation movement, 4
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and they are partner organizations of the United Nations. They are therefore involved in reformist dynamics. Furthermore, it should be noted that these five environmental NGOs may interact with other conservation organizations, research centres, think tanks, or hybrid organizations which are not decisive in our analysis, but which have also participated in spreading the MBIs for ES. Another issue concerns the scale of the analysis. Since the large environmental NGOs studied operate on several levels (international, national, local), we recognize that a political scientist who analyses the role of WWF in international forums will not necessarily reach the same conclusions as an anthropologist observing the actions of the same NGO on the ground. So we have chosen a different approach to overcome these difficulties by adopting a vision of multi-level strategies of NGOs at international and national levels. The purpose here is not to compare the discourse of international NGOs and their local practices, but to understand how their implementation at different levels affords them different roles as public policy entrepreneurs. 2.2 An empirical framework This paper draws on field work and interviews with key stakeholders representing NGOs, the State, and scientists in Costa Rica, Madagascar, and France. With a focus on actors’ strategies and interests, the interviews deal with 5 themes: the actors’ interpretation of ecosystem services, the history of the use of this concept, its implementation in projects or public policies, and the role of key actors in the design and implementation of those projects or public policies. Between 2009 and 2011, forty-five interviews were conducted in Costa Rica, seventy in Madagascar and sixty-two in France. All interviews were semi-structured, and took advantage of direct involvement by the researcher, thus providing a first-hand view of the field and qualitative data that further enabled the identification of issues often missed in public policy analysis. After conducting the interview, a comprehensive analysis was prepared. Interviews were complemented by observation and participation in national meetings on ecosystem services that brought together all interested stakeholders. In addition to the interviews and observations, we studied the official literature of the States and NGOs as an aid to understanding the key stakeholders’ positions on ecosystem services . Finally, the results of the three countries have been compared through two interrelated variables: the NGO/State relationship, and the strength and degree of independence of the State.
3. Environmental NGOs in Costa Rica, Madagascar and France: their influence over environmental policies Large environmental NGOs’ influence over policy-making and implementation of environmental policies varies in the three countries studied. For each country case, we present the characteristics of the State regarding its capacity and independence in defining environmental public policies, and then examine the emergence and development process of MBIs for ES initiatives, and the specific role that the large NGOs have played in that process.
3.1 Malagasy case: Weak State, strong NGOs 5
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Madagascar is a country with high biodiversity like Costa Rica, however in contrast to Costa Rica, Madagascar is characterized by a low GDP that was only 495 US$ per inhabitant in 2008 (Morisset 2010). The Malagasy State budget is thus limited by its tax revenue, which at approximately 11 %, is one of the world’s lowest, and presents scarce financial resources to maintain biodiversity. In addition, these minimal resources must be oriented towards more stringent problems such as health, food, security, and education to be in accordance with the objectives of the Millennium Goal Development. As a result, the budget of the Ministry of environment represents only 0.3% of the total expenditure dedicated to public administration (in comparison with 6-8% for the ministry of health, around 10% for the Ministry of national education). Within this economic context, the Malagasy State has not the organizational and financial capacity to monitor its environmental policy. Since the initiation of its Environmental Plan, policy has been guided by a donors' consortium, both in terms of strategic orientation and support to environmental administration, leading to a low level of commitment to the instruments of environmental policy by the civil servants and officers of the national public administration. This lack of commitment has been further weakened by frequent institutional changes (dismantling of institutions, evolution of their prerogatives) following donors’ evaluations (Andriamahefazafy, Méral and Rakotoarijaona 2007). Moreover, the current period of political instability has been weakening the State, and diverting resources toward the support of constitutional organisms such as the senate, and internal security. The frequent replacement of the environmental Minister (6 within the last 3 years) has also reduced the state capacity to act on environmental matters. Nevertheless, due to Madagascar’s important biodiversity, international actors, especially international conservation NGOs like WWF, CI, and WCS, have been very proactive in developing an environmental policy. WWF has been present here since 1963, and its state of the art biodiversity work (Nicoll and Lagrand1989) has driven the actual Malagasy environmental policy. WWF has implemented and supported many initiatives, such as the international conference on nature and resources held in Madagascar in 1970 and in 1985 3, which led to the creation of environmental policy at the end of 1980s. Since the implementation of the Environmental Plan of Action (EPA) in 1990, the first in Africa (Falloux and Talbot 1992), the influence of these NGOs has been tremendous and multifaceted. Firstly, the environmental policy is funded by a consortium of donors, lead by the World Bank and USAID. Its steering (definition of priority actions, logical framework, monitoring, and evaluations) is jointly administered between the Malagasy administration, the donors, and the NGOs (Andriamahefazafy et al. 2007, Duffy 2006). These organizations exert their influence directly through their participation in working groups or the lobbying of mass media for donors. Secondly, these NGOs are involved directly in field activities. These actions can be in line with national planning (for example, the decentralized management or promotion of the biodiversity commodity chains or biodiversity channel). But NGOs also develop their own dynamic, independently from the overall framework of the policy. So in line with its own international strategy, WWF applies its concept of ecoregion, whereas CI focuses more on its activities in support of corridors, and more recently on carbon, in 3
During this conference, prince Philip of England, co-founder of WWF, used the phrase « your nation is committing environmental suicide » in the discussions with president Didier Ratsiraka (Kull, 1996, p.61) 6
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accordance with its program, Conservation International’s Carbon Fund, developed in 2009 in 12 countries. The financial contribution of these NGOs gives them strength inside the donors’ consortium 4. Thirdly, the NGOs also act at the international level in order to plead for Malagasy biodiversity. They act through direct lobbying on donors (Duffy, 2006), or by supporting the Malagasy delegation in international conferences 5. Thus contrasted against the contributions of the donor’s consortium and the NGOs, the Malagasy State itself has limited decision-making or organizational power, and a precarious legitimacy. MBIs for ES change focus Since the first creation of nature reserves in 1927, the focus of conservation activities have leaned primarily towards a wilderness approach of “pristine” forests and endemic fauna species like lemurs (Carrière and Bidaud 2012). ES rhetoric has long been used in Malagasy policies as a line of argument for forest conservation, and for awareness raising, even if no biophysical evidence was demonstrated (Serpantié et al. 2009). If the idea that forests provide services to human well-being was broadly admitted, the transition toward payment for environmental services, which belongs to the main category of MBIs for ES, has been a long process and a shift of representation, from the intrinsic to the extrinsic value of ecosystems. This idea of remuneration for nature conservation was first discussed in 1997 and the first studies on quantification of carbon and water were done around 2000. But the concept was an abrupt departure from traditional perspectives of the intrinsic value of nature, and shocking to many who had difficulty accepting that individuals or organizations need actual monetary compensation to bring them to the table around such an important issue (Bidaud 2012). Facing critical problems to find sustainable financing for biodiversity conservation, this idea of payment for environmental services was finally accepted by the Malagasy actors of conservation, broadened further with NGOs initiatives, and is now advanced through international initiatives like FCPF6 application or WAVES 7 implementation. Following this strong incentive, the Malagasy government and its national agencies (like Madagascar National Parks) now focus on PES in order to find a sustainable way of financing their activities. The period of political instability since 2009 has also led to the withdrawal of donors’ bilateral support. Thus, the conservation-oriented NGOs that have not been affected by these diplomatic considerations remain the only partner of the World Bank and the Malagasy State. Without bilateral cooperation, the Malagasy State has become very interested in alternative funding sources, such as iron-ore royalties received from a Chinese 4
For instance, WWF was the 5th biggest contributor in the first period of EAP – Environmental Action Plan - (1990-1996). 5 For instance, of the 15 representatives in the Madagascar delegation in the COP 15 of the CCNUCC in Copenhagen, 5 were civil servants of different Ministries, 3 came from para-public organisms , 3 from NGOs (WWF and CI) , 3 from cooperation agencies, and 2 from national organizations (a national university and a foundation). 6 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (World Bank and international donors give funds to governments of developing countries to prepare REDD+ national policy). 7 Global Partnership for Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services, initiative responding to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 7
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consortium (Wisco) in 2010, or funding through PES or more generally from a REDD+ mechanism. The development of PES in Madagascar can thus be explained by the strategic position of international NGO’s working in Madagascar, and their connection to the global arena. Their influence can be noted in two different ways: (1) participation in networks of national and international environmental economists dealing with monetary valuation of biodiversity and (2) research of sustainable funds (at international level) for environmental policy. Firstly, the influence of NGOs in the promotion of PES in Madagascar is the result of a long tradition of collaborations with foreign universities (mainly European and North-American universities), the Environment Department of the World Bank, and the USAID. During the 1990s, they tried to estimate total economic value through several case studies related to protected areas in Madagascar (Ferraro 2002, Kramer 1994). Gradually, the idea of services supplied by ecosystems was developing. Direct payments for biodiversity conservation appeared through a program developed by the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust. The Durrell’s experience of “conservation contracts” is viewed by the World bank and International NGOs as the first Malagasy direct payments for biodiversity conservation, and the first alternative scheme to Integrated Conservation and Development Projects developed so far (Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Pagiola and Platais 2002a). Secondly, connected to several networks in the northern countries, the international NGOs are in a very strategic position to capture new funds for Madagascar conservation activities. Corson (2008) has shown how these NGOs helped USAID (in 2003) maintain the financial support of the American Congress for biodiversity conservation in Madagascar. More particularly, CI became in 2003 one of the most important NGOs in Madagascar, due to its lobbying activities in USA. It created its own foundation “International Conservation Caucus Foundation”, developed closed relations with Global Environment Fund and World Bank through the Critical Ecosystems Partnership Fund, and is linked to several foundations (Mc Arthur, Moore, etc.) and international companies (for instance through the CCBA with WCS and TNC, BP, Hyundai, Intel, Kraft, etc.). In the space of a few years, CI became one of the main actors of the environmental policy in Madagascar.
3.2 Costa Rica, State leadership in environmental image and policies, and support for NGOs diffusion of the PES concept worldwide The degree of influence of large environmental NGOs is also due to the nature of the State and its administration. Costa Rica is characterized by a stable democratic regime that allowed the development of a functional public administration. These characteristics are rooted in a republican history marked by some singular choices such as the abolition of the army in 1947 and the orientation of the public budget toward education and health. Despite the adjustment plan of the late 1980s to early 1990s, the public administration is still quite developed. In particular, it can be seen that in the context of the adjustment plan, the State decided to develop a “green” image for the country and reinforced the public administration in charge of environmental issues. It decided to create MIRENEM (ministry of natural resources, energy and mines) that brought together the existing forestry department, 8
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national park service and wildlife administration with the energy and mining sector, creating a powerful and autonomous ministry (since it brings together the management of environmental activity, currently seen as a budget expense, and the productive sector, currently seen as a financial resource generator). The continuity of the commitment of the Costa Rican government toward environment can also be seen with the country’s positioning in the international arena, evidenced by the ratification of the major international agreements, and the declaration of the national objective to be one of the first carbon neutral countries in 2021. Finally, Costa Rica has been undergoing rapid economic development since the 1990s thanks to the diversification of its economy toward services. With a GDP of 5627 US$ per inhabitant and a developed urban middle class, Costa Rica has the capacity to finance its own policies and incentives . Diffusion of MBIs for ES by environmental NGOs originating outside Costa Rica In Costa Rica, the notion of ES was mobilized very early by actors in the forestry sectors, as well as government representatives (Ministry of the Environment) to justify the permanence of existing economic incentives for the forestry sector. In particular, in the context of a gradual reduction of the State budget in the 1990s, and where existing incentives considered as subsidies were in danger due to trade negotiation agreements, the ES notion and PES mechanism were mobilized to change the paradigm of justification from a subsidy to a market mechanism (Le Coq et al. 2010, Legrand et al. 2010). The definition of the ES concept and its recognition in forestry law, and the definition of the basis for PESP implementation, were enshrined simultaneously in the forestry law of 1996 within a policy window where public policy entrepreneurs played a determinant role (Le Coq et al. 2012). Since its beginning, the program of Payment for Environmental Services (PESP) has mainly been financed by a share of the tax on hydrocarbons paid by national fuel consumers. When PESP implementation began in 1997, knowledge of ES and PES was still limited to some forestry actors, and national scholars; at the time, only some studies on the monetary evaluation of ES provided by forests had been carried out in Costa Rica (Legrand et al. 2010), and the concept was still relatively unknown at international levels (Méral 2012). While the ES concept and PES mechanism were seen as a way of attracting new funding sources (especially through the carbon market), the experience has been disappointing, since the Costa Rican PESP does not fit in with the conditions defined in the Kyoto protocol. Nevertheless, the PES mechanism has been very attractive in raising additional resources through international funders, especially in a context of Costa Rica's non-eligibility for international cooperation funds due to its level of development. Like many developing countries, Costa Rica benefited from the support of international cooperation, especially in the 1970s-1980s. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, as the Costa Rican economy was growing and regional wars were ending, the support from international donors and NGOs began to fade. Even though this support has been concentrated on environmental issues since then, the direct influence of international cooperation and international NGOs in policy design has been very limited. An analysis of how the Payment for Environmental Services program (PESP) came about shows that it was led by national actors (Le Coq et al. 2010). The large environmental NGOs were not involved in creating the PESP, instead being more involved in other conservation tools, such as support to parks and natural reserves. In terms of expertise, large NGOs have only had a marginal role in environmental issues. The history of environmental policies shows the importance of the construction of national institutions and 9
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national expertise in various disciplines developed in national academies 8, certain national associations, and research centres 9 where the introduction of new concepts or ideas mainly occurred through personal relationships between Costa Rican and international scholars (Evans 1999, Steinberg 2001). In the early 2000s, the World Bank, the Global Environmental Fund, and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) started helping to fund the PESP through loans and grants. The commitment of the State of Costa Rica to the PESP has been considerable, consenting to mobilize public resources (tax on hydrocarbons) and also standing as a guarantor for World Bank loans. PESP is recognized as a pioneer programme at the international level and contributes to the green image that Costa Rica wants to develop on the international scene. This green image justified by Costa Rican biodiversity (5% of international biodiversity) and the extent of conservation parks and reserves (28% of the national territories) has been considered by politicians since the late 1990s as one of the motors for the development of the country, and as a source of competitiveness to sell its products and services, such as tourism, which is a main source of jobs and currency in the country. Even if some international actors (World Bank, GEF etc.) are involved in the implementation and founding of PESP programme, the Costa Rican State remains his decision-making power and his organisational powers. Using the experience of Costa Rica as one important reference, large environmental NGOs such as CI or WWF have promoted PES as an approach in other Central American regions, and more widely in Latin America and beyond through international deliberations. For example, since 2005, CI has been promoting local projects to implement PES in Guatemala , and WWF promoted PES for hydraulic resources as part of a multi-country project (Guatemala, Peru, and Indonesia). While these environmental NGOs have promoted PES schemes in different countries, Costa Rica has not been a priority for these NGOs for investment or intervention. But given its pioneering nature and implementation trajectory, Costa Rica is seen as a laboratory for testing new solutions. Therefore, in 2011, CI negotiated an agreement to support the newly created “National Fund for Biodiversity” in charge of funding payments for Biodiversity PES in the biodiversity hot spot of the country, the Osa region. This new fund will be used to develop long term PES contracts. Costa Rica's experience is also utilized as a symbol of a successful PES programme to provide lessons in terms of institutions and policy design. Thus, in line with this logic, CI appointed the former Costa Rican minister of the environment, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, who participates in developing and consolidating the PESP, as vice president in charge of policies. With his knowledge of PES, he particularly contributes to the dissemination of the Costa Rican experience in international forums and in the other countries where CI is present.
3.3 France : A sovereign state open to NGO participation in environmental policies 8
In the environmental and forestry sector, we can especially mention the role of the following faculties: Biology and Law at the University of Costa Rica, Biology and Ecological Economics at the National University of Costa Rica, Forestry Engineering at the Technological Institute. 9 We can highlight the role of OTS (Organization of Tropical Studies) and CATIE (Centro Agronomia Tropical Investigation y Ensenanza) in the production of studies on environmental issues in Costa Rica. 10
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France is traditionally presented as being a particularly interventionist state, which has the financial, organizational, political, and technical resources to develop and implement public policy. France's interventionism manifests through a system of intermediation which enables different strategies for engaging stakeholders in public policy. Like elsewhere in Europe, the French environmental sector became organized towards the end of the 1960s (Charvelin 2003), and by 1971, despite strong resistance from traditional sectors afraid of losing their prerogatives, the government created a Ministry of the Environment. Charvelin also emphasized that the cognitive structures employed by developers of environmental concepts were shaped around an essentially technical model of the environment. With the creation of the Ministry of the Environment, environmental groups became involved in areas of technical expertise, responding in part to the new Ministry's efforts to establish and stabilize new public environmental action within a context of expertise and knowledge (Berny 2009, Lascoumes 1993, Spanou 1991). This political background offered and has continued to provide a strategic position for environmental organizations. Environmental organizations are part of a "political representation" rather than a "political mobilizati on" (Berny 2008). In France, large environmental NGOs such as IUCN or WWF are just one of the actors that have the expertise. Some national associations, such as FNE (France Nature Environnement) or FNH (Fondation Nicolas Hulot) have been able to propose their own framework of environmental issues. Of course, some cooperation existed and still exists between them. All, including large environmental NGOs such as WWF and IUCN, have incorporated the government’s expectations and institutional logic of national public decision, in an effort to gain more influence over it. As a result, national environmental organizations and large environmental NGOs have routine access to the Ministry of the Environment. This dependency on exterior expertise, sometimes considered a weakness of the Ministry (Charvelin 2003) does not however translate into the NGOs’ ability to determine environmental policy in France. The state systematically keeps a hand on the decision making process in the environmental sector. As noted by Daniel Boy during the "Grenelle de l'environnement" of 2007, environmental policy in France strongly advanced in the decade after 2000, aided by the introduction of political structures open to NGOs, but it didn't incorporate radically new ideas under the ultimate tutelage of the State and the Ministry (Boy 2010). It is in effect the State that exercises the power of arbitration between positions held by different stakeholders, because it is the State that finances, puts in place, and manages new instruments of environmental policy. Furthermore, the instruments favoured for environmental policy in France are principally based on their budgetary consequences which place an emphasis on State services (Sainteny 2010). Even if the participation of environmental NGOs is encouraged, and if the State shared a part of his decision making power with European Union, the French State remains the main decision maker and the sole and only actor which is able to implement the environmental policy instruments. Furthermore, the influence of environmental NGOs has faced the hegemony of farming organizations in the field of agricultural and rural policies. Since the end of World War II, farming organizations have been involved in a co-management system with the government and the Ministry of Agriculture. Until very recently, the logic of co-management of the agricultural sector continued to exclude environmental organizations from agricultural issues. In an attempt to overcome this division, environmental organizations relied on
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European influence. The European Union (EU) and environmental NGOs were key players in the legal and political integration of the ES concept in France. Emergence of MBIs for ES in France, a policy window for environmental NGOs? Until the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), the ES concept was absent from the French political scene and scientific fields, except in some confidential circles, such as the National Museum of Natural History, or certain large environmental NGOs. Scientists, as well as French scientific research policy, were not very supportive of an involvement of French representatives in the MA. Therefore, the WWF and IUCN representatives were directly involved in the political-scientific process of the MA drafted between 2001 and 2005. Contacts between international and French representatives of WWF and IUCN explain in part the dissemination of international standards and concepts developed in the MA. From this perspective, large environmental NGOs appear to have been at the forefront of the debate in France. Representatives from large environmental NGOs developed three strategies to disseminate the ES approach in France. Firstly, they decided to develop the ES approach in scientific networks, such as FRB, to encourage more scientific studies on this subject in France. Large environmental NGOs also maintained close relations with the scientific world, integrating leading researchers on their scientific committees, which allowed them to circulate the Millennium results among French scientists (Hrabanski 2013), thereby enabling them to formulate the outcomes within the French context. Secondly, they became involved in decision-making at national and European level. At the national level, they urged agricultural and environment ministries to develop the ES approach and create a French Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Consequently, numerous reports have emerged in which large environmental NGOs were indirectly involved (Centre d’Analyse Stratégique 2009, CREDOC 2009, SEEIDD and CGDD 2010). They also intervened at the European level and have played a key role in recent and ongoing changes (e.g. Water Framework Directive, Common Agricultural Policy, Rural and Regional development policy, the Eastern enlargement of the EU, as well as the European Neighbourhood Programme) which opened a window of opportunity to mainstream PES as a major conservation tool at the European level and consequently at the French level as well. Thirdly, WWF and IUCN are at the interface between two decision-making bodies, the scientific and business sectors. Since the 2000s, most of the WWF’s offices in France have established partnerships with private industry in order to define, implement and enforce new environmental standards (Bendell 2000), and in the process, promoting the MBIs for ES approach. From the perspective of environmental NGOs, the ES approach enables in-depth renewal of the global framing of environmental issues, followed by the development of policy instruments. Until 2005 in France, the responses of the French government in dealing with biodiversity "problems" existed exclusively in terms of the multifunctionality of agriculture and natural 12
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assets, which inspired the creation of natural parks 10 and measures such as Natura 2000. Since the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2005, the concepts of ecosystem services, ecological services, environmental services (ES) and payments for environmental services (PES) have gradually become the main world reference for environmental policies. Consequently the French Ministry of the Environment (also under pressure from NGOs, European, and international organizations) has more recently moved to incorporate those concepts. The ES approach allows the Ministry of the Environment to intervene in issues that were previously only the field of the Ministry of Agriculture. The latter, like professional agricultural organizations, has been particularly reticent when it comes to market based instruments for ecosystem services, and according to professional agricultural organizations, controversies remain about the legitimacy, effectiveness and fairness of this type of instrument. Today, even if there is no explicit reference to ES and PES in the texts of laws and current agri-environmental policies, the concept of ES was introduced at the “Grenelle of the environment”, a French environmental conference, and the ideas figure prominently in discussions for reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in 2013. Furthermore, some French agricultural policy instruments (agri-environmental measures) can be considered as PES-like instruments (Aznar, Guérin and Perrier-Cornet 2007, Aznar and Perrier-Cornet 2004). Similarly, some companies and large environmental NGOs are developing ES approaches. Now, after initial reluctance, and despite controversies that remain, the monetary approach to biodiversity is becoming the essential concept in France and in Europe, as shown by the report of the Centre for Strategic Analysis (Centre d’Analyse Stratégique 2009) and the TEEB reports across the EU (TEEB 2010), and supported by environmental NGOS studied. Facing critical problems in sustainable financing for agrienvironmental policies, the French government and ministries have finally accepted this idea of market based instruments for ecosystem services . 4. Discussion The analysis of the relationship between environmental NGOs, and the State, and the ability of governments to produce their own environmental policy, highlights three contrasting situations. The first part of the discussion centres on the orientation, as "trans mitter" or "receiver," of the States that promote a position differentiated from that of NGOs in their role as transfer agent. The second part follows the idea that behind the NGOs, individuals mobilize and circulate from one organization to another, facilitating the transfer of public policies. Finally, the discussion ends by highlighting that transfers are integrated into a particular historical setting, and that when they are appropriate, the MBIs for ES have provided a new source of financing for the policies of conservation.
10
A national park is a reserve of natural or semi-natural land, declared or owned by a government, that is restricted from most development and is set aside for human recreation and environmental protection 13
4.1 States as Transmitter or Receiver: what place for NGOs? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Costa Rica is, above all, in a position of transmitter in the sense that it is a pioneering country in the installation of MBIs for ES through the creation of its national PES program. The environmental NGOs did not participate in the establishment of the PES program in Costa Rica, but participated principally in the diffusion of this instrument in other countries. Madagascar and France are by contrast in the position of receptors. The environmental NGOs have played a major role in Madagascar, where the abilities of the State were limited, but in France their influence has been more moderated. In Costa Rica, NGOs had an extremely limited role in the conception of PES during the 1990s. However they drew much inspiration from success of the Costa Rican program to promote MBIs for ES in other areas of the world. The NGOs have advocated the feasibility and advantages of this type of instrument, and helped legitimize its diffusion in other countries. The NGOs studied are established in several dozen countries. With the advantage of their international structure, they have been able to facilitate the diffusion of the experience of Costa Rica in numerous other national situations through their local agencies. Drawing on the Costa Rican example, the environmental NGOs were able to spread not only the ideas of MBIs for ES, but also promote the institutional dimensions and techniques of this type of instrument. Aside from the channel of the large environmental NGOs that have used the Costa Rican PES as a reference in numerous countries of intervention, we can identify two other channels. Firstly, we can identify a "South – North – South" channel, that can take two forms: 1) an academic form, where information is broadcast through the articles published in international journals presenting or discussing the specific results of the Costa Rican PESP (Castro et al. 2000, Zbinden and Lee 2005, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Pagiola 2008, Locatelli, Rojas and Salinas 2008, Daniels et al. 2010) or a transversal analysis of PES mechanisms integrating the Costa Rican PES (Wunder 2005, Wunder 2007, Engel, Pagiola and Wunder 2008, Wunder, Engel and Pagiola 2008) 2) an international “expert” form where information on the PESP is presented and broadcast by international cooperation organizations, such as the World Bank (Chomitz, Brenes and Constantino 1998, Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-Mills 2002, Pagiola and Platais 2002b) or international consultancy agencies, such as IIED (Rojas and Aylward 2003). These two forms can be linked, as some actors may work for international organizations, and take part in publishing academic journals. Secondly, we can identify a “South – South” channel of transmission, through direct exchange between civil servants of ministries of southern countries and FONAFIFO staff, either through visits to Costa Rica, or through missions by Costa Rican staff. Madagascar and France are in contrast two countries which are in a position to receive a recipe for public policy. The analysis shows that the ability of the Malagasy State to conceive and install (decision-making powers and organizational powers) its own conservation policy has been extremely limited. The environmental NGOs, in partnership with sponsors and universities, have in large part transmitted and installed the standards and instruments of Madagascar's existing conservation policy. Nevertheless, the transfer of these instruments to Madagascar has neither been imposed nor forced on the Malagasy government: the government agencies and politicians validate the initiatives proposed by the NGOs and their sponsors, and can benefit from their organizational and political advantages. We note however, that the benefit of financing offered by the NGOs in the framework of conservation policy places the Malagasy State in a situation of dependence. The Malagasy 14
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State's options in this scenario are extremely limited. It is neither in a position to determine its own conservation policies nor to refuse those proposed. In a weak State such as Madagascar, the essential role played by large environmental NGOs in the dissemination and implementation of a public policy reference cannot be recognized without questioning the legitimacy of the NGOs’ influence. The analysis in Madagascar showed that large environmental NGOs play a major role, perhaps even an exclusive role, in the environmental policy on the island. In France, large environmental NGOs' influence over environmental policies is moderate. Even if these NGOs, along with certain industries, were the first actors able to boast an expertise on MBIs for ES at the time of the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Hrabanski and Valette 2012), the French decision makers, under pressure from the EU and international bench-marking, quickly moved to recapture the dynamic and conserve their ability to develop national environmental policy. We should also note that even if the French State was to depend on the direction from Brussels, the options which it wields on its own territory allow the Ministry of the environment and the Ministry of agriculture to keep a hand on the agro-environmental policies. The NGOs can offer their expertise, but the French State hasn't signed up for a strong dependent relationship with regard to the environmental NGOs like the case in Madagascar. The political strength of the French State, although shared with the EU, rests complete and permits it to fully decide on the direction of environmental policies, and their implementation on its own territory.
4.2 Representatives from NGOs such as brokers of MBIs for ES In our analysis, we considered the NGOs as homogeneous entities; however, it needs to be said that the NGOs engaged in the dissemination of standards and instruments of public policy are composed of individuals with different backgrounds. The analysis also indicated that the circulation of public policy standards and instruments was embodied in individuals who can move between different institutions and who are brokers of such international references. In Madagascar and Costa Rica, large environmental NGOs welcomed former members of national governments, international organizations and even private industry, who then became involved in disseminating policy instruments. In Costa Rica, the circulation of actors occurs between academic research centres, the State apparatus, and NGOs. The ex-minister of the environment who worked previously at CATIE (Teaching and Agro-Forestry Research Centre), and developed numerous networks in international research, today works for CI, in charge of policy questions. At the same time we can note the significant importance of interpersonal networks between the national and international academic spheres, and between national and international NGOs over the course of the years that preceded the implementation of PES in Costa Rica (Le Coq and Méral 2011). In Madagascar, this phenomenon of circulation between one institution and another is equally remarkable. In addition to the transfer of policies already designed at the international level, the two decades of Environmental Action Plans have transformed environmental policy elite in the country. They are now full participants in the development and implementation of environmental systems, working for the large environmental NGOs, 15
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through administration or bilateral cooperation. By switching from one institution to another, they have built a strong network that has the capacities to understand, integrate and implement new concepts, new instruments and, ultimately, new policies tailored to the international level or for another country such as Costa Rica. In France, there has been relatively little development of circulation between actors from one institution to another, even if at the European level, the NGOs ’ representatives occasionally include the Directorate-General for the Environment (DG). What can be seen however is the appearance of formal or informal coalitions in which actors involved in a particular subject, such as MBIs for ES, come together and attempt to circulate information among mixed groups. The scientists specialized in ES are invited to be part of the scienti fic committees of the environmental NGOs. The environmental NGOs, the scientists, and the officials of the Environmental Ministry may make up part of pilot groups for initiatives conducted by the private sector on ecologic compatibility, or the private sec tor may finance scholarships for doctorate programs on the development of ES. The introductions between different actors facilitate the dissemination of ideas from one group to another. Outside of a strictly organizational analysis of the NGOs, our analysi s points out the need for a micro-sociological study of the NGOs and their partners, to complete the research on the transfers of public policies.
4.3 MBIs for ES, a way to capture new sources of funding for biodiversity conservation More broadly, the approach involving MBIs for ES is a way for every NGO, wherever they are operating, to secure new sources of funding for biodiversity conservation. This new strategy in terms of MBI for ES does not replace the measures that already existed. Measures overlap and create environmental policies that hybridize several types of instruments. So it is a combination of instruments that characterizes environmental policies , and not necessarily the emergence of new instruments. For example, in France, debates on MBIs for ES are particularly integrated in the history of the CAP. CAP worked until the end of 2000 with several types of instruments including agri-environmental measures based on public funds. MBIs for ES are adapted to national and regional contexts. A similar context exists in Costa Rica: the notion of ES was mobilized very early by actors in the forestry sectors, as well as government representatives (Ministry of the Environment) to justify the permanence of existing economic incentives for the forestry sector. In the light of a gradual reduction of the State budget in the 1990s, where existing incentives considered as subsidies were in danger due to trade negotiation agreements, the ES concept and PES mechanism were mobilized to change the paradigm of justification from a subsidy to a market mechanism (Le Coq et al. 2010, Legrand et al. 2010). In Madagascar, facing critical problems to sustainably finance biodiversity conservation, the idea of payment for environmental services was easily accepted by the Malagasy actors of conservation, and broadened with NGOs initiatives.
Conclusion This paper shows that although large environmental NGOs develop international strategies for ES and PES-instruments, the dissemination of those strategies depends primarily on the 16
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national and local contexts. The history of environmental policies and the role of States are essential for understanding how the ES concept and related instruments will evolve. Similarly, the status that the political system gives to large environmental NGOs is decisive. In this perspective, we have shown that in Costa Rica, which appears as a laboratory for environmental policies, large environmental NGOs were not at the origin of PES instruments, but have played a central role in disseminating the model. In Madagascar, where the State can be considered weak because of its limited decision-making and organizational powers, the abilities of the State to develop its own environmental policies is also extremely limited, and MBIs for ES have primarily been developed by large environmental NGOs working to provide sustainable finances for conservation. In France, the State shared a part of its decision making power with European Union, but the French State has conserved his organizational power for the implementation of environmental policies, and the influence of the NGOs is limited, even if their transnationalism has allowed the m to be the first to claim expertise on the subject. In the process of dissemination, like the case in Costa Rica, the environmental NGOs along with other actors (scientists, national and international government officials, donors…) are powerful agents of transfer. On the receiving side of the transfer, the influence of the environmental NGOs on policies is limited with respect to the strength of the State, as is the case in France. But, when the State is weak, as in Madagascar, the environmental NGOs can be some powerful policy entrepreneurs. More broadly, the analysis of the diffusion process of MBIs for ES enabled us to show how this dissemination is governed neither by top/down dynamics (international/national) nor by simple North/South dynamics, but is a result of interactions between private (NGOs) and state actors, though networks that create a multidimensional circulation of standards and policy tools (from local to international, or south/south transfers). Finally, it seems that the concept of “venue” shopping can be extremely valuable to continue the analysis. The theory of venue shopping is laid out in Baumgartner and Jones (Baumgartner and Jones 1991), but Sarah Pralle presents a more thorough analysis of its practice than most empirical studies to date. Sarah Pralle describes venue shopping as follows: “Advocacy groups or policymakers who want to change policy are often frustrated by biases within institutional venues where key decisions about a policy are made. One strategy for overcoming such biases is to shop for an alternative venue and attempt to move decision-making authority to a new policy arena. If successful, a change in venue can lead to substantive policy change, due in part to the participation of new actors, the adoption of new rules, and the promotion of new policy images, or understandings, of an issue. Venue shopping strategies are important to understand, then, because of their impact on processes of policy change.” (234)(Pralle 2003). According to the theory of venue shopping, we could say that in developing payments for environmental services in a new policy arena such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the following biodiversity political arenas, advocacy groups such as big NGOs and some policy-makers shopped for an alternative venue and attempt to move decision-making authority to a new arena. Pralle also shows that it can often be an experimental process, rather than a calculated, deliberate, and strategic decision. However, environmental policy changes are confronted with a phenomenon of path dependency (Pierson 1993) in each country (less in Madagascar), and therefore local and national resistance cannot be avoided simply by a change of the hierarchy. Lastly, she suggests that advocacy groups choose venues not only for short-term strategic reasons, but in response to the shaping of new understanding of the nature of a policy problem. In this 17
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way, the problem of conservation would therefore move from a nature heritage to the idea that we cannot protect what we do not measure. However, although the approach known as MBIs seems to have been crowned with a degree of success in recent years, these instruments do not develop uniformly in different territories, or among various environmental issues.
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