EU as a Global Player?
Descrição do Produto
"The European Union has evolved from being primarily concerned with economic issues to becoming a dominant foreign policy actor in international politics". A Discussion
Introduction
Drawing upon the broader literature on the European Union would not provide a clear answer on to the question whether it can be regarded as a global player in world politics. On the one hand, it is perceived as a major economic power, and, on the other hand, it plays an increasingly important role of a foreign policy actor equipped with strong economic tools but limited political power on the global stage (Mix 2011, 373). In fact, it seems to be a difficult venture to assess the global political Actorness of the European Union. At this point, a further historical perspective should be examined, namely, from establishing the Union until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states to understanding its role in global politics.
In this context, the first attempt to create the elements of the external policy, specifically, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), should be considered as an answer on that "annoying telephone call" from Henry Kissinger, which "did not make through" because of the "absence of the respondent". The evolution of this framework corresponds with the idea of having the common diplomatic, political and security action capacity. Since it is believed that the greatness in the foreign tribune of the Union highly depends on its capability to act as one. According to some analysts, the member states undergo the process of military integration, which so far has not been successful (Mix 2011, 374). However, some common external actions such as the international humanitarian aid, development support, enlargement, and particularly the neighbourhood policy have been relatively effective. The establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which will be comprehensively discussed in the following, fulfils the idea of building a ring of well-governed neighbouring states.
Accordingly, it is particularly noteworthy to take a closer look at the evolution of the European Union with the lenses of the historical perspective. In this framework, the foundation of the Union in the 1950s was mostly regarded as an economical forum for integration and cooperation. NATO, on the other hand, was considered as a forum for strong political action in terms of defence and security where the founding EU members pledged an alliance reflecting the necessity to respond to the threat of the Cold War. However, the situation on the ground changed considerably due to the collapse of the Soviet Union resulting in new debates "of developing a stronger foreign policy identity" (Mix 2011, 378).
In order to address the main purpose of this paper which analyses the assessment and evaluation of the role of the European Union in global politics, it is particularly important to examine the EU treaty, namely, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as a quasi response to the emerging Balkan Conflict. This development paved the way to the formation of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and the recent amendment of the Lisbon Treaty which represents a solid foundation of the relatively new EU unit for foreign policy. This unit was officially launched in 2010. Significantly, the foundation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) is a crucial response to the demands that the Union should coherently speak and act as one. For understanding the fundamental philosophy of the Union's foreign policy, paper underlines several important principals of its actions which is ultimately designed to "safeguard its European values, security, independence and integrity" as well as the support of the democratisation process, strength the rule of law and international human rights.
In this regard, the paper stresses some primary strategic goals, which were highlighted in the ESS:
"The EU should take necessary action to address a considerable list of global challenges and security threats, including regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state failure, organised crime, disease, and destabilising poverty;"
"The EU should focus particularly on building regional security in its neighbourhood: the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean region, and the Middle East" (Mix 2011, 380).
These far reaching principals of the Union emphasise the importance of peace building reflecting European values and that it has nurtured to become a "normative power" in the world. The need to promote peace in Europe and elsewhere is derived from the historical bloody experience within Europe and also "certified" by the Nobel Prize committee at the end of 2012 for its contribution "to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe" (Dolghi 2013, 15). The unity in diversity and respect for common values has made Europe an "attractive dock to ship in" which is predominantly highlighted by two enlargement endeavours in 2004 and in 2007 where it welcomed additional 12 east member states (Croatia in 2013). According to Dolghi, the desire to join the west originated not primarily from a military threat but moreover from the strong commitments toward democracy, the rule of law, liberal economy and respect for human rights. "The rationale was that if these conditions will be attained, security would follow" (Dolghi 2013, 16). Therefore, many Scholars define the EU as a soft and mainly economic power. That is particularly true due to the fact that the EU does not comprise a state with full defence political structure to stand its ground against a potential territorial threat. It is argued that the military presence of NATO, in fact, guarantees security of EU. This is also underlined by the role of the NATO in the European enlargement process, and by no accident, that before accessing a state to the EU, it first became a NATO member (Dolghi 2013, 19).
In this context, it would be particularly interesting to look at the idea of the Common European Foreign and Security Policy and the establishment of the European External Action Service that would allow a better understanding of its actorness in world politics. Having in mind that the security issues do not primarily intimidate the countries of west alliance but rather the neighbouring states, the main accent in the ESS was set accordingly. Several frozen conflicts in the immediate neighbourhood, namely, in Moldova, Caucasus and in the recent Syria shifted some new security variables for the EU, which inevitably comprises the involvement of Russia and the USA. "Inevitably, there will be US and Russia, within the framework of UN norms, which will agree and act upon the conflict resolution, placing EU in the shadow of inefficiency", without to mention the energy interdependency and thereby the power hegemony of Russia (Dolghi 2013, 21).
Therefore, the next section will examine the evolution of the EEAS in regard of its effectiveness and incoherence, having in mind the two above-mentioned principals of the security strategy.
The European External Action Service
Despite the hazard character of the bipolar world, which was largely accompanied by arms race between two military alliances, there were remarkably strong restrains of violent outbreaks. This was mainly true because of the prevailing power balance where the European Community entailed a role of America's junior partner. Hence, many scholars try to address the question of the new role of the Community after the "Perestroika" which was definitely shifted in an unknown way. In fact, according to Hanns W. Maull EU became more a "civilian power" trying to pursue its interests in an alternative way rather than by military means. The author clearly speaks about the constructivist power of the EU, arguing that by civilising and developing itself it would influence and even inspire the rest of the world. "As a post-modern force, rather than as a modern power, the EU exercises influence and shapes its environment through what it is, rather than through what it does" (Maull 2005, 778).
Hereby, Maull concludes that the effectiveness of that force still depends on its capability to set the common rules for own members and communicate them within and beyond its borders. In other words, a good multinational governance, economical development, the rule of law and the prosperity and above the ability to speak as one would determine the European foreign policy. " A good European foreign policy will have to begin at home, now more than ever" (Maull 2005, 796). The mission is so far very difficult because of not only the fact that some EU member state leaders are for several reasons quite sceptic of the future of the EU (Duna 2010, 22).
Furthermore, Duna even admits that the EU acted so far as a "security consumer" rather than provider and, therefore, underlines the importance for the creation of the Common Security and Foreign policy. The ESS (The Solana Document) is an important millstone toward the building of the EU's defence capacity and unity. In this context, the Ex-Secretary General of the Council of the European Union Javier Solana admitted:
"It is clear that a self-confident and capable EU has a real contribution to make in building a safer neighbourhood and a better world. Both our citizens and our international partners want and expect a stronger European presence on the international stage. If we seize the opportunities that present themselves, we can heed this call and deliver an EU foreign policy which is pro-active, coherent and hence effective. And if we did, both the citizens of Europe and the rest of the World be better off as a result" (quoted in Duna 2010, 27).
Hence, the formation of the Lisbon Treaty seems to gain even more importance which will allow the Union to speak as one, a necessity, which will reinforce the institutional building and the ESS. The Treaty also indicated the idea that " Europe has a telephone number that responds to the question once put by Henry Kissinger" (Duna 2010, 31).
The evolution of the European External Action Service that has been launched in 1 December 2009 is the most extensive venture toward the reform of Europe's foreign policy. The formal establishment of this Institution is also accomplished by the assignment of a newly founded position of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is particularly in charge of the mentioned body. In this framework, Michael E. Smith states that the establishment of this new institution triggered several political conflicts regarding the internal bureaucracy and decision-making. Firstly, it is the intergovernmental dispute around the structure and senior manager position of the EEAS. Secondly, the conflict evolves between two key institutions, namely, the European Commission and the EEAS, both involved in the Foreign Policy decision-making process. And finally, the third conflict implicates the dispute on the framework and the issue-area of the EEAS (Smith 2013, 1301). In addition to these factors, the situation became even more complicated by enhancing the areal of representatives claiming the right to speak for the Union. These are, specifically, the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council, the EU Presidency holder and the High Representative (Smith 2013, 1303).
The importance of the cooperation and effectiveness of the European institutions is also handled by Daniel C. Thomas who states that regarding the population, economical power and military capacities as well as the membership in
International Organisations the EU has a great potential to be one of the leading actors in world politics, though, depending its ability to act coherently (Thomas 2012, 457). "EU foreign policy coherence is best defined simply as the adoption of determinate common policies and the pursuit of those policies by EU member states and institutions" (Thomas 2012, 458). In this context, there are two principals to mention: the "policy determinacy" and the "political cohesion" which crucially determine the cohesion and therefore the effectiveness of the foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty officially addresses these tasks:
"The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies";
"The member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's actions in this area". (quoted in Thomas 2012, 459).
According to those principals, the effectiveness of the Union's foreign policy will depend on its ability to impact the international realm in accordance with European values and goals. The goals could be, for example, environmental or economical, and promotional of certain ideals. In many cases, the Union supports particular states in terms of development and conflict resolution. In this framework, the EU promotes these objectives through "the use of traditional policy instruments such as sanctions" or persuasion without to mention its normative power (Thomas 2012, 460).
The European Union is one of the leading internal markets without to mention its demographic number that would be over 550 million if Turkey gains the membership. Though, the history of last decades have shown that the number of candidates in the bipolar world claiming the status of a global player is constantly growing, thus, increasing the source of interest conflicts. Therefore, it is fundamental that the Union develops its strength and common strategy to "claim to fame" (Prisacaru 2007, 10). The question whether it manages to do so since the creation of EEAS will be assessed in the next two following sections, on the one hand, regarding its policy toward Iran and Syria and, on the other hand, by considering its ENP implementation and the Russian factor.
EU Foreign Policy toward the Middle East
The Syrian conflict and Iran's nuclear ambition are two major issues in present world affairs. Over 100.000 people died in the on-going Syrian civil war so far. At the time of the writing this essay UN organises peace talks in Geneva to bring the conflict to an end which lasted for almost three years, and which has caused so many deaths among the civilian population. In this context, one might ask how the EU acts.
It is quite early to speak about the outcome of these talks but it is quite thinkable to look at the European engagement in this conflict as the Union a little closer. An article, "A post-war continent", in The Economist admits that the European response on the gassing of civilians in Syria had just a formal character (The Economist 2013). The parliamentary votes held in France and in Britain regarding the use of the chemical weapons on 21st of August against the civilians have shown that even ones so martial states could become even less warlike, legitimating the decision by insufficient information. Furthermore, the emergency meeting in Brussels revealed the weakness of the Union to act as one responsible entity. Though, France and Britain have the only capacity of far reaching cruise missiles there were no common engagement spoken out. In this context the article acknowledges - "yet still the Europeans havered", also citing the director of Carnegie Europe that - "the Europeans have never been able to get out of the passenger seat to become the driver- and silently they are quite happy with that". Moreover, it concludes, "for decades the middle east has been a region where, as an old cliché puts it, 'America plays, Europe pays' " (The Economist 2013).
The indisposition of military intervention in Syria is a focus of the article, "The Limits of European Involvement in a Syria Intervention", in the Stratfor Analyses, which clearly exposes how the reluctance of French, German and British populations restrain their respective governments to seek the partnership of the US led initiative to remove the Syrian government. "Then years after the military intervention in Iraq, the shadow of political consequences of an unpopular military action in the Middle East still lingers over Europe. Most EU members have decided to either remain silent on the issue or to propose more diplomatic pressure. The lingering economic, social and political crises in the Continent is limiting most governments' room for action, making it increasingly difficult for EU members to get involved in military activities abroad" (Stratfor Analyses 2013). A similar verdict is prescribed by Richard Whitman, arguing that the absence of the collective action toward the Middle East, on the one hand, and the pursue the transformation of the regime in Syria through the means of soft power, on the other hand, have not yet really contributed to a shift in the conflict. "The EU's European External Action Service and High Representative currently lack the political muscle to play determining in security policy debate"(Whitman 2013, 26).
Another "trouble-maker" in this region is Iran, which supposedly has significant nuclear ambitions, claiming the legitimate civilian use of nuclear energy and considerably supports the Syrian government. However, the West, particularly USA and EU, has some substantial doubts and continue to accuse Iran of building on an atom bomb. If taken in consideration the fact that the US-Iran relationship lies on ice for the last thirty years and that the EU identifies the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as one of the major threats (European Council, ESS, 2003), there was a momentous need of unity in the Union to address this particular issue. The notion of common non-proliferation policy became "the top priority for the EU" (Kienzle 2013, 1143) which was truly triggered and initiated by the unilaterally US led intervention in Iraq.
After several hindrances the Union finally agreed to introduce three rounds of comprehensive and mainly economic sanctions. The first round that was announced on 26th of July 2010 comprised the prohibition of any kind of European investments in Iranian oil and gas production industry. The second round dated from 23th of January 2012 prohibited the import and transport of Iranian oil and petrochemical products by European states. And finally, the third round in the end of 2012 imposed sanction on import and transport of Iranian gas. Moreover, the Union disconnected 25 Iranian banks from SWIFT, the major financial messaging system, thus, "further impending the ability of other countries to do business with Iran" (Patterson 2013, 135f).
According to Patterson, the real shift toward the common European action was an external perspective as " EU officials appear to be concerned that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon or the capacity to produce nuclear weapons could spark a destabilizing nuclear arms race and possibly even a nuclear war in a region that holds the bulk of global oil reserves. The bloc also fears that failure to block Iranian process could also lead to an Israeli military strike against Iran, potentially precipitating a regional conflict with damaging consequences for the global economy" (Patterson 2013, 138).
In the Iranian context, the European Union made some important steps toward Realpolitik that is particularly true in form of EU/E3, namely France, Britain and Germany, uploading the issue later on the common European level. The involvement of the High Representatives Javier Solana, and later, Katharine Ashton for the last ten years introduced the notion of unity and full responsibility in world politics. In this framework, first, the European engagement particularly emphasised that it has avoided the escalation of tensions by maintaining some diplomatic channels between Iran and the international community. And second, the EU has demonstrated its capability of taking unilateral action in "high-profile cases" by introducing a comprehensive economic sanction without any UN mandate (Kienzle 2013, 1152).
ENP and Russia
For a long time the EU has literally ignored the Black Sea region, for several reasons, concretely, the preoccupancy with more unstable Balkan Conflict, the tremendous presence of Russia in the region where it claims some 'privileged interests', complexities of Turkish relations with the EU and the lack of 'Brussels lobby ' (Tassinari 2011, 231). However, the historic enlargement of the Union to the east that included ten ex-soviet countries truly triggered off the shift of the European foreign policy interests. This shift is widely reflected in the declaration of ESS and the Lisbon Treaty as mentioned above, not to state the emergence of the European Neighbouring Policy. In this context, the EU has deployed several contractual instruments to promote peace and stability in the associated member states of ENP and Eastern Partnership (EaP), namely, Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. By doing so the EU provides diverse forms of integration and cooperation that includes the looser arrangements of association foreseeing certain generous political, economic and social cooperation with the EU (Tocci 2013, 29).
The aim of the ENP is to build a ring of economically and politically stable counties by means of encouragement. "The interpretation is informed by a constructivist epistemology of power in international relations which takes the notion of region-building as the motivation behind the key EU policy choices of the past five years" (Tassinari 2011, 228). In this context, numerous frozen conflicts in the neighbouring countries like Moldova and Georgia attracted the European policy-makers' rising attention. The potential of overreaching threat of session wars, fragile states and economic stagnation has dramatically grown after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several Ex-Soviet states re-gained their so dreamed independence while an increased nationalism generated an internal political stagnation. This is especially true in Georgian-Abkhaz case where the cancelation of Abkhazian autonomy caused ethno-politically full-scaled military confrontation and the unilateral declaration of independence of Abkhazia dated from the 30th of September 1993. Albeit international attempts to resolve the conflict it became frozen until present (Popescu 2011, 190).
The vulnerability of the region is once again highlighted in the Russian-Georgian war from August of 2008 and the deployment of European Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM). In this framework, the author remarkably admits that the reaction of the Union was not primarily determined only by humanitarian need and the strong commitment for building stability in the neighbouring periphery but also by the fact that Georgia "is a country with energy transit potential and represents a barrier against a possible wave of terrorism (Popescu 2011, 194). Certainly, this significant act undermines the `privileged interest' of Russia in this region and the Russian energy hegemony as a whole.
Nevertheless, the deployment of the EUMM in Georgia emphasises the broad context of the European commitment to build stability by more direct contribution in conflict management combined with democratic reforms and development assistance. The EU significantly addressed Georgian requisite of security, and hence, became a security provider in Georgia. But the situation on ground should be emphasised much more closely in regard with external players, those who "hinder or promote the EU's stabilization role and grant it recognition and legitimacy to act. In this context, "the study of the involvement of Russia is unavoidable for a thorough analysis of the EU's security actorness in Georgia and its neighbouring areas" (Freire and Simão 2013, 465).
In order to put an end to the conflict, the previous President Sarkozy who had been representing the EU at that time negotiated on the 12th of August 2008 two major ceasefire agreements with Georgian and Russian authorities. The first entailed the termination of the military action and the creation of the Administrative Boundary Line (ALB) between the Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia (which was supported by Russia) and the "rest" of Georgia. The second agreement comprised the 'Geneva Talks' about the conflict dispute between the conflicting parties and the deployment of the unarmed, mostly civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) which basically focuses on stabilisation and confidence-building (Lewington 2013 51). According to the ex-British diplomat Richard Lewington who was actively involved in the EUMM, the mission was largely successful because of the clear signs of normalisation "on both sites of the ALB". People largely returned to their villages. But he also acknowledges the reality on the ground:
"For myself, I have to say that the construction by Russia of highly visible border guards' infrastructure among the ABL in South Ossetia, the spread of fencing which constitutes an implement to freedom of movement, and – paradoxically – the willingness of the Russians to support the IPRM (Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism) process all imply that Russia sees itself as there to stay for the long term. Georgians may have to accept that their political geography has changed for decades to come. And that will impact on the future of the EUMM" (Lewington 2013, 68).
Furthermore, Russia continues to be the most divisive aspect among the member states of the Union. Apparently, a fundamental concern is the indisposition to antagonise Russia by supporting a profound change in the status quo (Freire and Simão 2013, 469). According to the EU officials, Russia truly exploits the disparities between the member states and European institutions, and hence, obtains significant political influence. The EU is a multilateral organisation of 28 member states with quite different interests at some level and, therefore, the decision-making process in terms of the coherence is highly intense and challenging. In addition, the EU member states quite differ from each other by political, economic, cultural, historical and religious background settings in regard with Russia. In this context, their economies particularly are highly sensitive considering their trade links with Russia and the vast demand of raw materials (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008, 170). Hence, the policies of these countries are determined by caution toward Russia and how Russia reacts toward them. Furthermore, Russia has due to its rich markets the capacity to suppress those countries by embargos and cuts off of the energy supplies (with current reference to Ukraine's and the EU's crisis), and hence, the ability to exert significant political pressure. Therefore, reliant states in the EU are highly interested in protection of the prevailing bilateral deals with Russia to ensure on-going and uninterrupted affluent trade affairs and energy supplies (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008, 178). The author also supports the view that "what all states share is a concern for the protection of their vital national interests, which they pursue regardless of the impact on the EU's credibility as an international actor and the cost of to other member states" (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008, 181). This means actually that in the most critical case there is no common response or action when it comes to Russia.
Russia itself perceives the ENP as ominous and intrusive, especially because of the European claim for normative hegemony. In this context, Russia seeks to maintain the relation with the EU by maintaining its own strategic positions. "This has manifested itself in the need to cultivate bilateral links with certain EU member states that cut across and undermine common EU policy" (Haukkala 2008, 45). In fact, the latest dispute between Russia and the EU is based over their shared neighbours that is clearly emphasised by the words of Putin's adviser comparing " the attempted European integration of Ukraine through the Eastern Partnership to a 'fascist occupation'" (Popescu 2014, 3). In this context, the Russian reaction, which implies modernising and upgrading its military presence in the breakaway regions Abkhazia and Transnistria, is logical.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the essay emphasises that the European Union has not completely developed to a significant global player and that it remains a long-term perspective to reach this goal.
But to be sure, The EU has significantly gained the economic power in terms of customs and trade as a huge market for goods which is also emphasised by the mentioned Iranian case by so rarely coherent and common European action. In this context, the declared and common European voice regarding Iranian nuclear ambition has a potential of a significant positive impact on the dispute resolution, and thus avoid the farther escalation of conflict, which can have a devastating effect on the world's economy and stability in the respective region.
Nevertheless, a genuine political actorness also requires capabilities of independent actions in the areas of traditional power politics. Therefore, "Europe would have to hold together in stormy political times and on matters of the highest stakes. It is exactly in these policy areas that Europe's capacity to act as a unit has remained the weakest and least developed" (Krotz 2009, 557). In this framework, the EU has truly failed which is clearly described by Syrian case where the Union was not able or willing to act in an appropriate manner to avoid the killing of thousands of civilians. Furthermore, the EEAS and its foreign policy relating to the ENP and particularly EaP revealed the whole density of "Achilles heel" which was broadly highlighted by its reaction on the Russian occupation of Eastern Partnership countries and the notion of economic interests.
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