Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: Criticisms addressed

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10/15/2015 12:30 AM

Copyright © 2015 by Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research Institute. All rights reserved. Author’s permission is needed for re-producing and/or quoting any portion (except the quotes from other authors). For referring, the following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2015). Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: Criticisms addressed. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2015-Vimal-eDAMCriticisms-Addressed-LVCR-7-4.pdf ], 7(4), 1-26. Added to Academia and Research Gate: Added: 2015-10-15 T 04:29:16 UTC. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4292.6806. [Recent update: Thursday, October 15, 2015, 12:30 AM]. This article started in 2014. Comments and suggestions are most welcome and should be emailed to [email protected] .

Extended Dual-Aspect Monism framework: Criticisms addressed Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA

Running head: Discussion of criticisms against eDAM framework

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Abstract Previously, we proposed an extended version of dual-aspect monism (eDAM) framework for consciousness. Here, consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of brainsystem or brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function from the first person perspective. The eDAM framework has five components: (I) Dual-aspect monism, where each entity-state has inseparable physical and qualitative/mental aspects and the potentiality of primary irreducible subjective experiences (SEs) pre-exists in Nature. (II) Dual-mode: There is a conjugate matching between stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-mode and cognitive-feedbacksignals-related-mode and then the selection of a specific SE by the self. (III) Varying degrees of manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts. (IV) The necessary conditions of consciousness, such as the formation of neural-networks, wakefulness, reentry, attention, information integration, working memory, and so on. (V) The segregation and integration of dual-aspect information. The eDAM framework: (i) has the least number of problems, (ii) supports conscious artifacts, (iii) attempts to address the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness (how SEs arise), (iv) is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and physical laws, (v) addresses the objections raised in Biological Naturalism by traditional views (dualism and materialism), (vi) is parsimonious; and (vii) can be tested scientifically. In this article, the possible criticisms against the eDAM framework are addressed rigorously.

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1. Introduction There are about forty meanings attributed to the term ‘consciousness’, which were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience (Vimal, 2009). An immediate advantage of this categorization is that it makes clear what materialism can do and what it cannot do. Materialism may explain 1

Keywords: Easy and hard problems of consciousness, functional and experiential aspects of consciousness, materialism, Biological Naturalism, dual-aspect monism, segregation and integration (or binding) of information, emergence, functional integration, access and phenomenal consciousness, necessary conditions of consciousness, reentry, attention, memory and neural correlates of consciousness

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functions but cannot explain experiences. In other words, this categorization sets the clearcut limit for materialism. The optimal definition (that has the least number of problems) of consciousness is: consciousness is the mental aspect of a state of the brain-system or a brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function (Vimal, 2010b). In other words, consciousness (a) has functional and experiential aspects and (b) includes functions and subjective experiences (SEs) (including feelings, emotionand thought-related experiences).

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1.1. The first component of the eDAM framework: Dual-Aspect Monism This component is detailed in (Vimal, 2008b). Concisely, it was hypothesized that a state of an entity (from an elementary particle to human brain to whole universe) has two 6 aspects: (i) mental aspect such as SEs from the first person perspective (1pp) for living systems or qualitative aspect for both living and non-living systems, and (ii) objective physical aspect such as neural-network and its activities from the third person perspective (3pp). Moreover, the eDAM framework proposes that the potentiality of primary irreducible SEs pre-exists in Nature. The 3pp-physical aspect of an entity-state is manifested in both living and non-living systems. Our hypothesis is that the superposition of relevant potential experiential eigen-states is a mental-state, which is a part of the mental aspect of a state of a living system or the qualitative aspect of state of a living/non-living system.

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1.2. The second component of the eDAM framework: the dual mode and conjugate matching and selection mechanisms This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2010a). Concisely, the potentialities (possibilities) of SEs are actualized when neural-networks are formed, and a specific SE is selected by the self via a matching process through the interactions of two dual-aspect modes. These two modes are: (1) the non-tilde mode that has the inseparable qualitative/mental aspect and the physical aspect of a state of feedback signals related to cognition (such as memory and attention) and the self in a neural-network (that includes self-related brain-areas such as cortical midline structures), which is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; and (2) the tilde mode that has the inseparable qualitative/mental aspect and the physical aspect of a state of the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and/or internal endogenous input, which is approaching towards present (or will become present) and is a entropy/time reversed representation of the non-tilde mode. Furthermore, one could argue that there are quantum (such as dendritic-dendritic microtubule) sub-pathway and non-quantum (such as classical axonal-dendritic neural and astroglial) sub-pathway in the feed forward pathway and the feedback pathway for information processing and transfer in the brain dynamics. We propose that: (i) the quantum conjugate matching (between experiences in the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of signal in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode) is related more to the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of the quantum subpathway and less to that of the non-quantum sub-pathways. And (ii) the classical matching between experiences in the qualitative/mental aspect of a state in the tilde mode and that of the non-tilde mode is related to the qualitative/mental aspect of a state in the nonquantum sub-pathways. In all cases, a specific SE is selected by the self (not by any homunculus) (a) when the tilde mode interacts with the non-tilde mode to match for a specific SE, and (b) when the necessary conditions of SEs (Section 1.4) are satisfied. When the conjugate match is made between the two modes, the world-presence (Now) is disclosed; its content is the SE of subject (self), the SE of objects, and the content of SEs. The self is the 1pp-mental aspect of 2

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a state of self-related neural network (such as cortical midline structures) and its activities that is a part of reentrant feedback signals during wakefulness (and to the some extent during dream). The physical aspects in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode are matched to link structure with function, whereas the qualitative/mental aspect in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode are matched to link experience with structure and function. In all cases, the inseparability between aspects and the 1-1-1 relationship among structure-function-experience are maintained during the experience and related function. The concept of functional field is used in (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). In consciousness electromagnetic information field (Cemi field) theory, experiences are presumably from the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of dual-aspect electromagnetic (em) field: “what Chalmers terms experience [(Chalmers, 1995).p.201] … is what complex information encoded in em fields feels like from the inside” (McFadden, 2002). These fields may have many potential states related to experiences in superposed form embedded in the field. In that case, it would still be non-conscious processing and then gap remains. However, if these frameworks use the essential matching and selection mechanisms of the eDAM framework to select one specific SE after matching along with necessary conditions of consciousness to be satisfied (Section 1.4), then the gap will be closed.

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1.3. The third component of the eDAM framework: the concept of the varying degrees of the manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts This is discussed in (Vimal, 2013). Concisely, the third component is the varying degrees of the manifestation of physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect depending on the levels of entities and contexts. In inert (nonliving) entities at classical level, such as a molecule, the physical aspect of its state is from the objective 3pp and the degree of its manifestation is high. The qualitative/mental aspect includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and nonliving systems as qualitative aspect (Pereira Jr., Vimal, & Pregnolato, 2015), and (b) superposed potential eigen-states related to SEs for living-system. The mental aspect of a state of a living-system is from the 1pp and the physical aspect is from the objective 3pp. This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such as forms and patterns, can be perceived or implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mental aspect of a state of a non-living system is ‘latent’ to us from 3pp. This does not mean that nonliving systems have consciousness like us that is hidden; rather, the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving entity carries potential proto-experiences (PEs) in superposed form as a Nature’s mechanism for the pre-existence of potential SEs. We perceive the form, pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) related to an inert entity, which indicates the existence of its qualitative aspect; so, it is better to use the term ‘qualitative aspect’ (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) in place of ‘mental aspect’ for non-living systems to avoid confusion; for the same reason, we use ‘1pp-mental aspect’ for conscious states and ‘mental aspect’ for non-conscious states. Both physical and qualitative/mental aspects of the states of nonliving systems (such as strings, elementary particles, atoms, molecules etc.) need to co-evolve to attain our brainmind system. Biological organisms can be conscious if the organism’s evolutionary development is sufficiently developed or complex and necessary conditions of consciousness are satisfied (Section 1.4). In living systems, at human level, when we are awake and conscious, both aspects are present with high degree of manifestation. In other words, inert nonliving matter, proteins, neurotransmitters and neuromodulators including all those levels which do not satisfy the necessary conditions of consciousness will not be 3

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conscious. This does not mean that the eDAM is not sympathetic to quantum consciousness. In quantum dendritic-dendritic mechanism, quantum Orch OR is hypothesized to occur in microtubule-network (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014), where a specific SE say redness is selected from potential SEs embedded in brain’s spacetime geometry by objective reduction (collapse) of potential SEs superposed in the qualitative/mental aspect of a state of neural-network. It is only at the neural-network (NN) level (in living systems), a specific SE will be realized (experienced) in a specific NN (such as redness will be actualized in the red-green V8/V4/VO-neural-network) when (a) the necessary conditions of consciousness (including biological laws, see Section 1.4) are satisfied and (b) a specific SE (such as redness) is selected by the self via the matching process. Even the retina is not privileged to have SEs because it does not satisfy the essential conditions of consciousness, although retina is essential for vision. The retinal opponent and non-opponent neural-networks (such as red-green and yellow-blue opponent cells and luminance non-opponent cells and related visual channels), however, will have higher specificity for potential experiences (mental aspect) than cones and rods, which in turn will have higher specificity than molecules, atoms, and electrons. Let us start examining aspects from humans to classical inert entities to quantum entities to sub-quantum strings. If we assume that a state of ‘entity-in-itself’ has inseparable dual (qualitative/mental and physical) aspects, then a state of ‘human-inherself’ has physical aspect (such as body-brain system and its activities) and mental aspect (such as SEs, intentions, self, attention, functions, and other cognitions). The states of animals and birds have physical aspects (such as body-brain system and its activities) with high degree of manifestation, but their mental aspects seem to be of different degree (đ) of manifestation compared to humans. The states of plants have physical aspects such as their roots to branches and activities, and their qualitative/mental aspects in term of functions; it is unclear if they have experiences, self, attention, and other human-like cognitions; they may have plant-type PEs, but they are latent to us. The states of dead bodies (of human, animals, birds, and plants), inert entities, and other classical macro, micro (such as elementary particles), and ultra-micro (strings) entities have the physical aspects with high degree of manifestation; they have certain forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations (qualitative aspect) (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015); but, their mental aspects are latent. By the term ‘latent’, we mean that the aspect is hidden, unexpressed, ‘invisible’, recessive (in analogy to recessive gene), or unmanifested. For quantum and sub-quantum entities, the manifestation of aspects needs further clarification: we are puzzled on the 3pp as we are unable to visualize and we depend on our models and indirect effects. The qualitative aspect of a state of a quantum or a subquantum (such as string) entity is presumably its form and/or patterns of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015). Therefore, we propose that a state of a quantum entity has physical aspect with high degree of manifestation; and qualitative/mental aspect similar to classical inert objects. However, quantum latent mental aspect is not like human mind; rather, Stapp (Stapp, 2001, 2007; Stapp, 2009) has proposed that quantum entities are mindlike. We propose that the quantum or sub-quantum mindlike qualitative aspect (form and/or patterns (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) has to co-evolve with its inseparable physical aspect over billions of years, and the end product is human mind (mental aspect) and inseparable human brain (physical aspect), respectively. The above clearly elaborates the difference between living and nonliving systems.

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1.4. The fourth component of the eDAM framework: necessary conditions of consciousness The necessary conditions of consciousness are developed in (Vimal, 2015b). Consciousness can be either phenomenal (non-reportable) or access (reportable) consciousness (Block, 2005; Lamme, 2003). For access (reportable) consciousness, the interactions are between feed forward stimulus dependent signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. The necessary conditions for access consciousness are (i) formation of neural-networks, (ii) wakefulness, (iii) reentrant interactions among neural populations, (iv) fronto-parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate consciousness, (v) information integration in ‘complex’ of neural-network, such as thalamocortical complexes with critical spatiotemporal ‘grain-size’ (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) as summarized in (Vimal, 2015a), (vi) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (vii) stimulus contrast at or above threshold level, and (viii) neural-network PEs that are superposed potential SEs embedded in a neural-network as pre-cursors of SEs. Certain neural-network or brain complex, such as thalamocortical ‘complex’, comparatively has very high integrated information (Φ), so it is a privileged area for consciousness. The criterion for the selection of necessary conditions is that if any of them is missing, we will not have consciousness.

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1.5. The fifth component of the eDAM framework: segregation and integration of dual-aspect information This is elaborated in (Vimal, 2015a) in detail. Concisely, there are two stages: (i) the segregation of information for the analysis of specific stimulus attribute and then (ii) the integration of information for the synthesis of all attributes (related to dimension, submode, and mode), which results unified consciousness. In other words, the first stage of processing is the segregation of information (such as the information related to physical and conceptual attributes), which are analyzed and processed for preciseness and specificity in different specialized neurons of related brain areas. Then, the second stage of processing is the integration of information (or binding of attributes) (related to different functions, concepts, experiences and so on) in various neural-network-complexes, which results unified consciousness. The integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) is based on the materialistic identity theory (consciousness is integrated information). However, materialism metaphysics has serious problems (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). Therefore, IIT needs to be interpreted in terms of better metaphysics, such as the eDAM framework; this has the least number of problems; here, information is a dualaspect entity. In the eDAM framework, consciousness (both experiential aspect such as SEs including feelings, emotion- and thought-related experiences and functional aspect such as related functions) is the 1pp-mental aspect of a state of related neural network (neural-network: such as thalamocortical main complex) that has high amount of integrated mentalinformation Φmental. The 3pp-physical aspect of this state is this neural-network and its activity as its neural substrate that has high amount of integrated physical-information Φphysical, which is close to the term ‘integrated information’ Φ used in (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) and (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009). Since 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects are inseparable, ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ information related to the same brain-mind state are also inseparable. 5

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Furthermore, the quality of consciousness is determined by the set of all the informational relationships generated by the matching and selection mechanisms of the eDAM framework. The quantity of unified consciousness as a whole (a) is above and beyond its parts and (b) is related to the amount of information integrated through the matching mechanism (Section 1.2) (that involve interaction between feed forward and feedback signals) in a complex of elements.

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2. Models, Results, and Discussion

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2.1. Quantum superposition, nature of consciousness, pre-Big Bang hypothesis, and the degree of manifestation of aspects [1]. Critique could argue that there is no motivation or explanation as to what quantum superpositions have to do with experiential states and how they would explain anything about the nature of consciousness. This can be addressed as follows: A state related to the fundamental irreducible SE (such as redness: a primary color experience) is a basis or an eigen-state. The superposition of multiple possible experiential states is motivated by the hypothesis ‘the mental or qualitative aspect of wave-state is wave-like/mind-like (Bohm, 1990; Stapp, 2009) and is a function of potential (proto-)experiences’, which is based on the hypothesis that a state of matter (wave/particle) has inseparable physical and qualitative/mental aspects. According to the principle of superposition, ψ = Σi ai φi, where ψ is a state of an entity and ai is the probability amplitude of ith basis or eigen-state φi. In other words, this is how the preexistence of the potentiality of SEs in Nature is implemented and transmitted across all manifestations of unmanifested primal entity. In living system (such as our brain-mind system), the 1pp-mental aspect of an awake conscious brain-mind state is manifested with high degree (đ) of the manifestation because we have conscious SEs. However, in non-living system (such as elementary particles) that has qualitative aspect (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) in the eDAM framework, the mental aspect of a state of an entity-state is latent (or unmanifested) to the extent that materialists assume matter is the only fundamental reality, which eventually leads to serious problems such as the well-known explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983). The gap cannot be closed unless we accept the potentiality of experiences pre-exist in Nature. The living and nonliving systems are all parts of Nature, so this potentiality of experiences must pre-exist in each of them. If non-living matter does not have qualitative aspect even in latent/unmanifested form (not a single trace of it in proto-form or not even a potential for experiences), then it is unclear from where, how, and when living organisms will acquire the high degree (đ) of the manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect when they are awake and active. Furthermore, the development of specificity of a SE in a specific neural network (such as color in V8/V4/VO area) is detailed in (Vimal, 2008b).

In the eDAM framework (Sections 1.1-1.5), (i) the process of observing involves the matching and selection mechanisms, (ii) the observer (the self or SE of subject (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007)) is the 1pp-mental aspect of the state of self-related integrated information, and (iii) the observed (SE of object) is the 1pp-mental aspect of the state of object-related integrated information. Furthermore, the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness is clearly addressed in (Vimal, 2015a) using all five components of eDAM framework.

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[2]. My working hypothesis is as follows: (A) The unmanifested state of Nature (primal entity) had both inseparable (physical and qualitative/mental) aspects latent before Big Bang in pre-Big Bang cosmology. However, critiques could argue that according to the standard theory of the Big Bang, there is no time before the Big Bang, as time itself started with the Big Bang (about 13.72 billion years ago (Krauss, 2012)). To address this critique, the following justifications are given for the hypothesis of preBig Bang cosmology: (i) As per Healy, “Wheeler [((Wheeler, 1979): p.440)] stresses that in the quantum domain, spacetime, and hence time itself, cease to exist, except as an [classical] approximation” (Healy, 1984).1 This seems to imply that we need to reconsider the onset of time. (ii) In relativity, time can vary from –∞ to +∞ similar to spatial dimensions (x, y, z). This justifies time before Big Bang, where time is assumed to start (t=0) at Big Bang; this assumption is inserted by ‘hand’ for our convenience, i.e., it is not from the first principle. (iii) One could argue (Vimal, 2010e) that universe is cyclic from quantum BigBounce cyclic universe model (Ashtekar, Pawlowski, & Singh, 2006; Bojowald, Kagan, Singh, Hernandez, & Skirzewski, 2007; Corichi & Singh, 2008) and may have memory as some cosmologists hypothesize (Corichi & Singh, 2008), implying for the multiple cycles of little Big-Bangs, and hence the notion of pre-Big Bang cosmology is justified. (iv) There are significant recent researches on pre-Big Bang cosmology, such as (Gasperini & Veneziano, 2007; Veneziano, 1998) and references therein. As per Veneziano, “Time did not have its beginning with the big bang and some pre-big bang physics cooked up a ‘good’ big bang from a more generic (less fine-tuned) initial state. This is the attitude one takes in the so-called pre-big bang scenario. […] The Universe started its evolution from the most simple initial state conceivable in string theory, its perturbative vacuum. This corresponds to an (almost) EMPTY, COLD, FLAT, FREE Universe as opposed to the standard DENSE, HOT, HIGHLY-CURVED initial state of conventional cosmology. For this assumption to make sense I will have to argue that the new initial conditions are able to provide, at later times, a hot big bang with the desired characteristics thanks to a long pre-big bang inflationary phase” (Veneziano, 1998). Thus, the hypothesis of ‘latent’ physical and mental aspects of unmanifested state of Nature before Big Bang, and then the manifestations of aspects starting from the Big Bang are justified. (B) At the moment of Big Bang, first, the physical aspect of entity-state was manifested along with its qualitative aspect (that includes form, pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) via co-evolution of aspects. The qualitative aspect refers to inert non-living or living system, from which 1pp-mental aspect in living system evolved when consciousness arose (become manifested) in the course of evolution. Therefore, we argue that the 1pp-mental aspect related to the living system was initially not manifested because living systems were not present. This means that the mental aspect was latent in qualitative aspect, i.e., the degree đ of manifestation (or presence) of 1pp-mental aspect was 0 at the time of Big Bang until life appeared around Cambrian Explosion (~540 million years ago (MYA)). The physical and qualitative aspects co-evolved and become manifested as needed by evolution, natural selection and adaptation; at the same time, but extremely slowly, the 1pp-mental aspect, the part of qualitative aspect, co-evolved with its physical aspect (i.e., the degree đ of the manifestation of the mental aspect slowly increased from 0): initially the qualitative aspect 7

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(that includes form, the pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or the pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015)) from string level to macro-inert level because all entities from string to quantum to classical levels have forms and patterns (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) and eventually the 1pp-mental aspect in living systems become manifested (đ ≤ 1) such as in us when we are conscious (see Section 1.3 for further detail for the varying degree of the manifestation of 1pp-mental aspect).

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2.2. Biology: structure, function, experience, and the doctrine of inseparability between 3pp-aspect and 1pp-aspect Biologist can ask the following questions: (i) how is the structure and function of biology related to the 3pp-physical aspect (simply 3pp-aspect) and 1pp-mental aspect (simply 1ppaspect) of the eDAM framework, respectively? And (ii) how can the ecological requirement of separability between structure and function be consistent with the doctrine of inseparability between 3pp-aspect and 1pp-aspect? To address these interesting questions, let us take a few concrete examples: (i) Hand is a structure that has many functions: picking, destroying, creating, massaging, writing, cutting, pushing, drawing, and so on: one structure and many functions. These functions are related to motor action controlled by brain. (ii) On sensory side, for example, the functions of V5-neural-network (many areas and many cells are involved) are the detection and discrimination of motion; the functions of V8-neural-network are the detection of long wavelength light and its discrimination from other wavelength lights: one structure and two functions. And (iii) on both perception and motor action together: (a) the function of Wernicke's area (BA22, posterior section of the superior temporal gyrus in the dominant cerebral hemisphere) is the understanding of written and spoken language: one structure and one function. (b) The function of Broca area (BA44 and BA45 or inferior frontal gyrus in the dominant cerebral hemisphere) is speech production: two structures and one function. A brain has a large number of functions. Thus in general, structure (brain areas) to function relationship seems to be one-to-many, one-to-one, many-to-one (and perhaps also many-to-many 2) relationship. Furthermore, although it is unclear, but one could argue for 1-1 relationship for structure-function relationship if a neural-network is considered (instead of areas) as a structure (that contains one or more brain areas) for a specific state at specific simultaneous moment. To make the doctrine of inseparability clearer, consider one worst case example related to biological function that is known to be separable from its neural correlates because of the lack of 1-1 relationship and has 1-many relationship (one structure and many functions as elaborated above in (i)). Consider the function of ‘hand’ for the function

[3]. Critiques could argue that this is a completely ad hoc stipulation. There is no reason given why the degree of manifestation (or presence) of one aspect grows. What is the explanatory gain here? I argue that this stipulation is motivated by an empirical fact of evolution of our universe from Big Bang to over billions of years: one could argue for the co-evolution of qualitative aspect for inert non-living systems over billions of years, but there is no evidence of 1ppmental aspect for living system until around Cambrian Explosion, which is about 540 MYA (Hameroff, 1998). The qualitative aspect and the 1pp-mental aspect are related, i.e., the 1pp-mental aspect is the subset of and evolved from qualitative aspect, both co-evolved with the related physical aspect. The explanatory gain is that it explains how our 1ppmental aspect of mind-brain state co-evolved with its physical aspect and manifested from the qualitative aspects of states of inert-entities along with their physical aspects.

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‘picking up a coffee cup’. Once this function creates a brain-mind state then the 1pp-aspect (picking up function) and 3pp-aspect (its neural correlates) must remain inseparable until the function is completed. If we disturb the link, physically, we will never able to pick up the coffee cup. In other words, the inseparability doctrine is for a specific state of the brainmind state and for the critical time interval needed to complete the required function. During this interval, the integrity between 1pp and 3pp aspects must be maintained, otherwise function cannot be completed. In other words, a structure such as a hand can have many functions, but for a specific function, there is just one specific neural correlate(s) of function (NCF); this specific NCF (3pp-physical aspect) and related function (1pp-mental aspect) must remain inseparable, otherwise the function will never be completed. On perception side, if detection or discrimination function is considered from 1pp, then one could argue for perceptual-functional-aspect being a subset of 1pp-aspect, with related NCF as its 3pp-aspect. In that case, can we say, structure and function (related to perception) are inseparable for a specific state at specific simultaneous moment? The answer is yes because a specific function must have its specific NCF that must be tightly linked; otherwise this specific function will not be completed; and hence in this sense the 1pp and 3pp aspects are inseparable. The ecological requirement of separability between structure and function is to make the function ‘latent’ from the structure as if it appears separate and let ecology to try another function with that structure to find if it fits better; this can be done when a structure is not engaged in performing a specific function. Ecology does not require separating function from structure, otherwise function and structure will become two independently existing entities and ecology then has to solve major association problem of the interactive substance dualism: how to associate innumerable functions with innumerable structures? On other hand, for the experiential aspect of consciousness, the 3pp-aspect and 1ppaspect of a state of brain-mind system related to experiences are always in 1-1 relationship for a specific brain-mind state at specific simultaneous moment, where the 3pp is now neural-network that involves many areas active as NCC related to the specific 1pp-aspect (such as experience ‘redness’). Since we cannot find any method to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect, they are inseparable. Thus, we can write: There is a strong 1-1 relationship between 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect

(1)

There is no empirical method to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect

(2)

Thus, Eqs. (1) and (2) hold for both experiences and functions. Furthermore, a higher level function can be considered as the integration of information related to lower level functions. For example, the detection of ‘moving red ball’ can be considered as integration of information related to the functions such as the detection of motion, the detection of color, and the detection of shape i.e., integrated information related to ‘micro-functions’ (Φf like Tononi’s Φ). Similarly, one could argue for the unified experience of ‘moving red ball’ can be considered as the integrated information related to the ‘micro-experiences’ (Φe) such as the experience of motion, the experience of color (redness), and the experience of shape (roundness). One could argue that the unified experience may not be the integration of micro-experiences, rather it is the integration of information related to micro-experiences: try hard to imagine unifying the micro-experiences. To sum up, (i) 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect of a specific state for experiences and functions are inseparable because of clear 1-1 relationship; (ii) it is possible to categorize 9

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1pp-aspect (consciousness) in two sub-aspects: perceptual-function (such as the detection of long wave-length light) and experience (such as redness); (iii) the unified perceptualfunctional aspect of consciousness can be considered as the integrated information (Φf) related to ‘micro-functions’; and (iv) the unified experiential aspect of consciousness can be considered as integrated information (Φe) related to the ‘micro-experiences’. We can compare biological function and structural aspects with 1pp and 3pp as follows:

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2.3. Conceptual Analysis of 1pp and 3pp We propose a conceptual (CA) analysis to prove precisely the inseparability of 1pp-aspect (= 1pp-mental aspect in the eDAM framework as per Eq. (4)) and 3pp-aspect (= 3ppphysical aspect in the eDAM framework as per Eq. (6)) in terms of following premises: (1). A structure such as brain can have many states. However, at any particular moment, brain will have a single specific state. (2). Information in the 1pp and the 3pp is conserved; it is the same information expressed (‘viewed’) in two different perspectives (in analogy to the same information interpreted in two different languages). (3). From Eq. (1), there is a tight and strong 1-1 relationship between 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect. (4). From Eq. (2), there is no empirical method to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect.

Biological function = (1pp perceptual function) + (motor action function)

(3)

1pp aspect = (1pp experiential sub-aspect) + (1pp perceptual functional sub-aspect) = ‘1pp-mental aspect’ in the eDAM framework (4) Biological aspect = (1pp aspect) + (motor action functional aspect)

(5)

Structural aspect = (3pp aspect) = ‘3pp-physical aspect’ in the eDAM framework

(6)

Some biologists do not like to use the term ‘mental aspect’, especially for non-living system. Therefore, instead, they can use ‘biological aspect’ as in Eq. (5) for living systems and ‘qualitative aspect’ for all systems. In other words, the first component of eDAM can hypothesize that: (i) the biological 1pp-aspect of a state of an entity is inseparable from the related 3pp-physical aspect and (ii) SEs potentially pre-exist in Nature. A biological aspect includes functional and experiential sub-aspects from the 1pp in addition to motor-action functional aspect; and the related physical aspect is a brain-structure (neural-network) and its neural activities from the 3pp. Consciousness is defined as the biological 1pp-aspect of a state of brain-system or brain-process, which has conscious functional and conscious experiential sub-aspects from 1pp. An aspect represents a concept. Functional concepts weakly emerge and subjective concepts strongly emerge (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) from the above interactions. Moreover, (strong) emergence has been unpacked in terms of the matching and selection mechanisms of the eDAM framework in (Vimal, 2013). The process of matching involves the interaction of bottom-up feed forward signals with top-down reentrant cognitive feedback signals; once the matching is accomplished, the self via the selection process of the eDAM framework selects a specific SE from all potential experiences embedded in the correlated neural network; these two processes unpack the mysterious (strong) emergence. The process of embedding is accomplished through co-evolution, codevelopment, co-tuning between the biological and physical aspects along with neural Darwinism.

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(5). Each state can be ‘viewed’ in two perspectives (1pp and 3pp) with the same information expressed in two different perspectives. Let me make clearer by taking a concrete example: When I see ripe-tomato, I experience ‘redness’ in my 1pp. At the same time, let us suppose that you are measuring my brain-activities in the redness-related neural-network (NN) specifically area V8 (say using fMRI), which is my 3pp-aspect of the same redness-related state of my brain. In other words, the 1pp-aspect is redness and the 3pp-aspect is its NCC at a specific moment and at the specific state. From CA-premise (4), it is not possible to separate these two perspectives 1pp and 3pp, which are for the same brain-mind state at the same specific moment (1pp and 3pp exist simultaneously). Ecology (brain-environment interactions) does not separate 1pp and 3pp aspects of a specific brainmind state because it is not needed and these aspects are co-evolved and tightly linked thorough brain-environment interactions. If we suppose that somehow one is able to separate, then it would entail two different substances leading to dualism. (6). If 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect of a specific brain-mind state at a specific moment are separated, then association problem arises: how to associate 1pp-experiences with the correct 3pp-NN, whereas there are many 3pp-NNs. The ecosystem ecology must have solved the huge problem of association by not separating the aspects of a specific brain-mind state at a specific moment and by doing its job when a structure is not engaged in performing any of its functions. (7). Conclusion: from CA-premises (1)-(6), 1pp and 3pp are inseparable.

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2.4. Conceptual (Qualia) space in the eDAM framework As per Pereira Jr. & Almada (Pereira Jr. & Almada, 2011), conceptual spaces: (i) are constructed from empirical data, (ii) represent the universe of mental states, (iii) are semantic structures, (iv) characterize “a universal state space of human consciousness, where all possible kinds of human conscious states could be mapped” (Pereira Jr. & Almada, 2011), (v) provide correlations between dimensions (Gärdenfors, 2000), implying coherent patterns of brain-activity, (vi) are defined as “theoretical entities that can be used to explain and predict various empirical phenomena concerning concept formation”

Remarks: (i) In this conceptual analysis, the inseparability between 1pp-aspect and 3ppaspect is for a specific moment and for specific brain-mind state. If we compare the 1ppaspect of brain-mind state A with the 3pp-aspect of brain-mind state B at different times, then 1pp-A and 3pp-B can be separated. (ii) Hard problem is how to explain 1pp-experiences. (iii) Ecology is the study of interactions among organisms and their environment scientifically; for example, the study related to organisms having interactions with each other and with their abiotic environment. Ecology does not need to separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect; rather, it promotes inseparability as useful doctrine. In other words, since 1ppaspect and 3pp-aspect are for the same specific brain-mind state and for the same simultaneous moment, ecology does not separate 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect. Ecology takes time to change 3pp-structure depending on the interaction between organism (such as brain) and the environment. But then 1pp-aspect co-evolves, co-develops, and co-tunes with its 3pp-structure, while maintaining the integrity of 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect to solve the association problem and makes sure that 1pp-aspect and 3pp-aspect are tightly associated for a specific brain-mind state at a specific moment, otherwise, these evolution and ecological processes would be unreliable and useless. (iv) The biological term ‘function’ is equivalent to the philosophical term ‘1pp-mental’ or ‘1pp’ in above conceptual analysis and ‘structure’ is equivalent to ‘3pp-physical’ or ‘3pp’.

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((Gärdenfors, 2000) p. 31), and (vii) are prepared by the concepts of lived experiences. In addition, (viii) the properties of objects are regarded as perceptual invariances that are located in conceptual spaces, and (ix) neuro-astroglial interactions are proposed as the neural basis of information integration (Pereira Jr. & Almada, 2011). Moreover, (x) as per Tononi (Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012), each ‘quale’ corresponds to an activation of the qualia-space by causal brain mechanisms, i.e., SEs are constructed from brain activities. This seems to contradict the hypothesis of the pre-existence of potentialities of all possible experiences (related to brains of all humans, all animals, conscious robots and so on) in qualia-space (Q) (Stanley, 1999), as also elaborated in the eDAM framework (Section 1.5 and (Vimal, 2015a, 2015c)). As per Stanley (Stanley, 1999): (xi) “the fact that our physical universe U is itself a topological space strongly suggests that Q will also be a topological space” (Stanley, 1999). (xii) Qualia-space is connected with respect to the variation of intensity from 0 to maximum for a specific experience. (xiii) Linearity holds in qualia-space to some extent. (xiv) Any “physical phenomenon has an experiential counterpart” (Stanley, 1999). (xv) Qualia-space has innumerable (uncountably infinite) dimensions/coordinates. (xvi) Qualia-space is separable; brain-space is also separable; in other words, the points in each space are separable. (xvii) If two points (conscious mind-states related to redness vs. painfulness) are of different phenomenal type, they are orthogonal; but redness and blueness (same color phenomenal type) are not orthogonal although they are linearly independent. (xviii) The dimension of a space is the minimum number of parameters or coordinates necessary to specify a point (equivalently, the maximum number of linearly independent elements) in the space. (xix) Qualia-space has “the structure of a closed pointed cone in an infinitedimensional separable real topological vector space” (Stanley, 1999). Furthermore, (xx) one could argue that the International Commission on Illumination (CIE) 1931 RGB (Vimal, Pokorny, & Smith, 1987) or CIE 1931 XYZ color space for color vision is a ‘color subspace’ of qualia-space. In the eDAM framework, there are two inseparable aspects of a state of an entity (such as brain-mind system) and hence there are two kinds of spaces, each with a set of coordinates: first set is related to 3pp-physical aspect in brain-space B of all possible brains (Stanley, 1999) and second set is for 1pp-mental aspect in qualia-space Q. In other words, there are two types of conceptual spaces: brain-space and qualia-space. Similarly, a brainmind state has inseparable brain-state and mind-state. Furthermore, (i) the coordinates for 3pp-physical aspect (call it brain-state) in brain-space B are: x, y, z, t; physical properties (such as mass, charge, spin); frequency, amplitude, and the phase of physical information related to the 3pp-physical aspect of a state of brain fields (such as electromagnetic and dendritic fields); neural networks and their activities; and so on. In other words, a point in brain-space is the 3pp-physical aspect of a brain-mind state, such as a specific neuralnetwork and its activities, which is the NCC of a specific SE. (ii) The coordinates for 1ppmental aspect (call it mind-state) in qualia-space Q are: SEs such as primary color experiences (redness, greenness, blueness); feelings such as emotional feelings (happiness, sadness etc.), and so on. In other words, a point in qualia-space is the inseparable 1ppmental aspect of the brain-mind state, such as a specific SE. Since these aspects are inseparable, the mapping B ↔ Q is isomorphic, i.e., 1-1 relationship from brain-space B to qualia-space Q and vice-versa (see also Appendix 1 of (Stanley, 1999)). For example, in ‘rightward moving red ball’, the dual-aspect brain-mind state has two inseparable aspects: 3pp-physcial aspect (brain-state) and 1pp-mental aspect (mind-state); each of them has their own space: (i) The coordinates of the brain-state located as a point in brain-space are: the cortical representation of x, y, z, t, and the mass of ball in color, 12

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motion, and shape related neural networks as the 3pp-physical aspect of the brain-mind state in brain-space B. (ii) The coordinates of the mind-state located as a point in qualiaspace as the inseparable 1pp-mental aspect of the same brain-mind state are: SEs redness, rightward motion, and roundness of ball in qualia-space Q. There is 1-1 isomorphic relationship between 3pp-physical aspect (neural-network and its activities) and inseparable 1pp-mental aspect (the related unified experience). In other words, there are two kinds of spaces: (i) A brain space contains all different brain-states (each brain-state has a neural-network and related activities as the 3ppphysical aspect of a brain-mind state). A brain is considered simply as a finite collection of particles with specified positions and momenta; the position and momentum of these particles can be described as a single point in a configuration space (Appendix 1 of (Stanley, 1999)); this represents a brain-state in the brain-space. (ii) A qualia-space is a quotient space and contains all experiences (mind-states: each is the 1pp-mental aspect of the same brain-mind state); this represents a mind-state in the qualia-space. There is 1-1 relationship between the elements of these spaces, i.e., 1-1 relationship between a brainstate and related mind-state; brain-state and mind-state are inseparable 3pp-physical and 1pp-mental aspects of the same brain-mind state, respectively. This entails that two brainstates are equivalent if their SEs (mind-states) are identical. One could argue that the brain-state is composed of sub-states (such as related to neural-networks for color, motion, and shape); each sub-state corresponds to a point in the brain-space. Therefore, the state of the brain corresponds to a volume in the brain-space. Each point of the brain-space represents one and only one sub-state of the brain. Similarly, one can argue for the mind-state related to unified experience in qualia-space. This critique is addressed as follows: A macro-brain state can be considered as the superposition of many potential sub-states (basis- or eigen-states), such as, related to motion, color, and shape in an example of ‘moving red ball’. Even a sub- or eigen-state (such as related to color experience redness from 1pp) has NCC (such as redness-related V8-neural-network and its activities from 3pp) and must have its inseparable 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects. There are two pertinent cases: the information related to eigen-experiences is integrated for a single unified experience, which is (a) irreducible if components coincide in spacetime; otherwise, (b) it may be reducible to its components if objects are at different locations in the visual field. In case (a), the volume in the brain-space has three sub-states (related to motion, color, and shape) (3pp-physical aspect), but the experience is a single unified irreducible experience of ‘moving red ball’ (1pp-mental aspect). This is related to a macro brain-mind state, which has (i) macro brain-state located at a separate point in the brain-space and (ii) inseparable unified experience or macro mind-state located at a separate point in qualiaspace, which may not be reducible to its three components. In other words, the mind-state for unified experience is also a point in qualia-space, which has its own NCC; i.e., a unique brain-mind state with 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect because a unified experience is an irreducible experience. In case (b), if unified experience is reducible into its components (such as objects being at different locations in the visual field), the macro brain-mind state is consistent with (b). A region of a conceptual space (brain-space or qualia-space) is a volume corresponding to an n-tuple of values for the coordinates. The unified experience is linear sum of its components in qualia-space; and the macro brain-state is linear sum of its sub-states in brain-space; the macro brain-state corresponds to a volume in brain-space; and the related unified experience corresponds to a volume in qualia-space. 13

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2.5. Non-conscious and conscious processing and the doctrine of inseparability One could argue that it is unclear how the eDAM framework distinguishes the nonconscious and conscious processing. Non-conscious processing in a brain related to non-conscious functions and experiences is a major processing and the consciousness is just a tip of the iceberg. During nonconscious processing, a specific neural network related to a specific function or for a specific experience is still not yet completely formed; the needed collection or assembly of various neurons in global workspace (Baars, 2005; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998) is still going on; it is not completed yet; the related information integration is still in the process. When information integration and matching and selection processes are completed, a conscious brain-mind state is created. Once this state is created then the inseparability doctrine certainly holds; after that we cannot separate conscious function or conscious experience from its neural correlates. The issue of inseparability-separability during non-conscious processing can be addressed as follows: The mental and physical aspects of each entity-state are inseparable in the eDAM framework, although the degree of manifestation đ of the mental aspect varies with the level of entity or entity-state; qualitative aspect includes form, pattern of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or pattern of vibration (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015) and mental aspect; the mental aspect of an inert entity-state is latent to us from 3pp. The degree of manifestation đ of mental aspect of a state in non-conscious entity may vary with its level: when we are not conscious during deep sleep, the đ for the related mental aspect of the brain-mind state is lower compared to the đ for a dream-state; the đ for the dream-state is lower than that for an active conscious state. In the non-conscious brain-mind state of a dynamic neural-network at a given moment should also have inseparable mental and physical aspects, although in the next moment new neurons may associate to or dissociate from this dynamic unstable network. After all, a state of each of the components of this network (such as inert electrons and neurotransmitters) has inseparable qualitative/mental and physical aspect at a given moment. The hard problem is not present during non-conscious processing; the hard problem of consciousness arises when we are conscious. In other words, since a specific conscious state and related neural-network is in the process of formation during non-conscious processing, neurons come and go in working memory (global workspace) until the matching of stimulus-dependent feed forward signals with cognitive feedback signals and then the selection of a specific SE by the self are completed. This is a part of non-conscious mental aspect-2 of the Triple-Aspect Monism (TAM)3 (Pereira Jr., 2013, 2014), which, in the eDAM framework, can be considered as the mental aspect of the non-conscious state of mind-brain system with đ < 1. There is no need to postulate it as a separate parameter in a framework (such as in triple aspect frameworks) because it unnecessarily decreases the degree of parsimony as per Occam’s razor. This is where the eDAM framework differs from the TAM: the TAM has three separate aspects; whereas, the eDAM framework has accommodated them in two aspects. It is just matter of opinion and terminology in my view. Otherwise, both frameworks are complementary to each other. The major point is the introduction of a novel feature, such as the potentiality of experience, in Nature, which traditional sciences (including biology) have missed that caused the hard problem. To sum up, the eDAM can easily distinguish between conscious and non-conscious mental activities as follows: (i) As per eDAM, a conscious brain-mind state has inseparable qualitative/mental aspect (such as conscious experience redness from 1pp) and 3ppphysical aspect (such as its NCC: V8-neural net); both aspects are manifested. This is 14

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based on our observation in fMRI experiment, where a subject consciously look at visual pattern from the 1pp and we, as experimenters, view and record fMRI activations in various brain areas from the 3pp simultaneously. (ii) A non-conscious brain-mind state also has inseparable physical aspect and qualitative/mental aspect. The physical aspect is manifested but the degree đ of manifestation of its mental aspect varies (degree of manifestation đ varies between zero and 1) depending on the levels/states of brain. For example, in deep sleep, we are mostly unconscious so the degree of manifestation đ of mental aspect is lower than that in dream, which is lower than that in wakefulness. This is based on EEG experiments. At the highest state of consciousness (such as samadhi-state) đ = 1.

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2.6. Functional integration Traditional biologists’ view: Since traditional biology deals only with structure and function, some biologists can hypothesize that functions or integration of functions are experiences because they may think that both (functions such as the detection of long wavelength light) and SEs (such as redness) are functions of the related structures. Poznanski (personal communication) agrees this traditional view but he proposes that biology cannot explain SE per se through the standard ‘structure and function’ dichotomy. What is required is a mathematical or abstract link. This link is based on the idea that SE is a ‘functional field’ (with matching and selection mechanisms: Section 1.2), i.e., SE is not a function. Alternatively, both the eDAM and TAM frameworks propose a novel feature that the potentiality of primary irreducible SEs pre-exists in Nature. Currently, this feature is missing in biology and that is why biology cannot address the hard problem to the satisfaction of everybody. The mathematical link/separation seems equivalent to the mental aspect being latent and the physical aspect manifested with high degree of manifestation for non-living and non-conscious systems in the eDAM framework. Furthermore, a function or functional integration can create only functions, but it cannot create an experience. This is because primary experiences are not derived entities; they are primary irreducible entities; they are realized from the potentiality of SEs that preexist in Nature through the matching and selection mechanisms (Section 1.2). For example, the function such as the detection of a wavelength of light can be accomplished at photoreceptor level in retina (Vimal, Pokorny, Smith, & Shevell, 1989). We know that retina does not experience color. Color experience is accomplished at higher cortical level such as visual area V8 (Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale, Cavanagh, & Tootell, 1998). Thus, different neural correlates may be involved for a function and for the related experience; this implies that the detection-function is not going to create the related experience. In other words, retina can integrate the information related to function such as detection of lights (such as long wavelength light); this function ‘detection’ does not create experience (such as redness) in retina. This is because retina does not satisfy all the necessary conditions of consciousness (Section 1.4). Moreover, there is a contradiction in the hypothesis that a function or the integration of functions can create experiences: for example, retinal cells (such as +L-M ganglion cells) can integrate information embedded in neural signals related to functions (such as detections of long wavelength (L) and middle wavelength (M) lights by L and M retinal cones) but cannot create experiences (such as redness or greenness) in the retina. Moreover, one could argue the functions such as detection and discrimination are accomplished at cortical level depending on the functions; for example, orientation selective cells are at cortical level (Gur, Kagan, & Snodderly, 2005; Vimal, 1997), but the related 15

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experience may involve different mechanisms, such as matching and selection mechanisms (Section 1.2). Biologists can argue that we all know that the brain creates experiences not the retina. However, if an experience is the integration of related function, it should be true anywhere in biological system unless one agrees that necessary conditions of consciousness (Section 1.4) need to be satisfied as well. I am just trying to make a point that materialistic nonreductive functionalism (an experience is the related functional integration, where matter is assumed to be non-experiential) has serious problem unless we interpret it in dual-aspect or triple-aspect frameworks such as in the eDAM or in the TAM frameworks. One needs to understand that our frameworks (such as eDAM and TAM) assume the potentiality of experiences in Nature, i.e., in the mental aspect of an entity-state in the eDAM framework or in the non-conscious and conscious mental aspects in the TAM. This is something novel we are trying to introduce that is not present in the traditional biology, chemistry and physics. This fact should be taken seriously then only we will be able to address the hard problem of consciousness. Let us unpack functional integration with an example. It seems that there are many micro-functions and we want to integrate them to get a unified macro-function. For example, the detection functional task of ‘moving red ball’ has three micro-functions (motion, color, and shape) each with its own neural-network (NN). Our goal is integrate these three functions to detect the unified function of ‘moving red ball’. How do we integrate these three functions? It seems that integrating functions does not make much sense. It is the dual-aspect information that needs to be integrated: for example, the dynamic physical information for functions related to color, motion, and shape in neural signals need to be integrated. The mental aspect of information carries information related to the potentiality of 1pp-SEs. The physical aspect of information is carried by neural signals, which is integrated through neural signal interactions. In IIT (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2008), the system is functionally integrated if it does not decompose into weakly connected modules or into disconnected pieces and the elements are tightly and optimally bound by the recurrent architecture with multiple feedback loops embedded in the system; architectures that balance functional specialization with functional integration generate complex dynamics for high information integration. Furthermore, both aspects co-evolve, co-develop, and co-tune to keep inseparability intact. In other words, the neural signals from neural-networks of color, motion, and shape need to interact in reentrant manner until the integrated information (Tononi’s Φf for function) related to this detection function is above critical threshold value. This is what I mean when I say it is the information in neural signals related to functions needs to be integrated, not functions themselves. Since we cannot integrate consciousness, we cannot integrate functional and experiential sub-aspects of consciousness either. Integrating functional interactions may create only a unified function, but not an experience. The story is same for experiences. I distinguish functions from experiences because I believe that science needs to include the novel feature of potentiality of experience in Nature. Traditional biology has only structure and function, but does not have experiences. Poznanski is also moving beyond the traditional biologist viewpoint and he calls it integrationist view point that uses ‘functional field’ with matching and selection mechanisms (Section 1.2), which involves the integration of functional interactions ((Cacha & Poznanski, 2014)). We, however, propose that biologists should consider the pre-existing potentiality of SEs in Nature: this is the major proposal of both the eDAM and the TAM frameworks. Without this proposal and without inseparability doctrine for conscious brain-mind state, it is not possible to address the hard problem because the gap will never be closed. 16

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2.7. The eDAM framework for both non-living and living systems, and the doctrine of inseparability Some biologists could comment that the eDAM framework applies only to nonliving matter because the qualitative/mental and physical aspects are inseparable. This is because the aspects need to be separable in living matter (for ecology ecosystem); and in nonliving matter the dual-aspect is non-existent because (a) we do not ‘feel’ its mental aspect in non-living systems as we do for living systems and (b) structure and function are inseparable in non-living systems; so the eDAM framework is pure mysticism to a biologist. This is incorrect. Let me ask: when we are awake and conscious, can we separate the 1pp-mental aspect (such as SE ‘redness’) from its 3pp-physical aspect (its NCC: ‘redness related V8/V4/VO color neural-network and its activities’) of a state of color neuralnetwork? The answer is certainly ‘NO’. The physical and qualitative/mental aspects are inseparable in both living and nonliving systems. To avoid criticism from biology and physics, the terms ‘mental aspect’ is used for living systems, ‘1pp-mental aspect’ when the living system is conscious, ‘mental aspect’ when the living system is non-conscious, and ‘qualitative aspect’ instead of ‘mental aspect’ is used for nonliving systems. The physical and qualitative/mental aspects are for ‘looking’ the same information in two different perspectives: 1pp and 3pp. For example, while I experience the ‘redness’ of ripe-tomato in 1pp, if you open up my brain or if you do fMRI you will ‘see’ my V8/V4/VO color neuralnetwork and its activities in 3pp, but you will never ‘see’ the ripe-tomato or its redness in my brain. How can you separate them out? This is impossible. The mental aspect, in nonliving system, is latent. The meaning of ‘latent’ is hidden (that is why it may be mysterious to those who do not understand the eDAM framework fully), in analogy to ‘recessive’ gene is hidden when it is not expressed; when it becomes manifested then its related trait is ‘visible’; we can only perceive qualitative forms/patterns of nonliving systems in 3pp. There should be consistency between nonliving and living entities as in evolution. For this, we use an index đ related to the degree of the manifestation of aspects, which varies with the levels of entities and contexts (Section 1.3). We propose that the mental aspect is latent in nonliving entities and manifested when we are awake and conscious. The variation of the degree of manifestation đ of mental aspect from latent in nonliving systems to high degree of manifestation in conscious living systems shows continuity between entities as expected in evolution. The latent qualitative/mental aspect of a state of a nonliving system carries essential information: it carries the eigen-states and eigen-values related to potential PEs/feelings, and proto-cognitions (that are precursors of real primary SEs/feelings, and real primary cognitions, respectively) in superposed form; without these indispensable information, we cannot have consciousness. Some biologists may argue: since structures (such as brain-neural-networks and their activities) are matter, they follow physical laws; whereas their related functions are biological so functions obey biological laws; therefore, a structure and the related function are separable based on obeying different laws. However, this is different from the doctrine of inseparability, where both a brain-structure and the related function follow biological laws because they are correlated and tightly linked over billion years of co-evolution, so 1pp-function and 3pp-structure of the same brain-mind state within critical temporal interval are inseparable. In other words, a brain-mind state at any moment has two perspectives or aspects: 1pp-mental and 3pp-physical aspects; these two aspects are inseparable because the 1pp-mental aspect must be inseparably linked to 3pp-physcial activities (3pp-physical aspect) in a brain for proper brain-functioning. This is achieved 17

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through co-evolution, neural Darwinism, sensory-motor interaction with environment during development; they better be inseparable; otherwise, all these evolutionary and developmental processes will be unreliable.

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2.8. Materialistic emergence framework vs. eDAM framework As per materialistic emergence framework (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010; LaRock, 2013), the experiential aspect of consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, closer to neuroscience, which is “the result of dynamic interactions between widely distributed neuronal groups” in thalamocortical neural-networks (Edelman, 2003). One could also argue that consciousness is simply neural activity or integrated information (identity framework), so mysterious emergent phenomenon is not needed. However, both these materialistic frameworks have the problem of explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): how experience can emerge from or identical with non-experiential matter such as brain and its activities, processing, or integrated information. Furthermore, in materialistic emergentism (Fingelkurts et al., 2010; LaRock, 2013), the hypothesis is that SEs somehow emerge in neural-networks (Vimal, 2008a); but, precisely how SEs emerge is not clear. We have tried to unpack ‘emergence’ in the eDAM framework in (Vimal, 2013), which hypothesizes that a specific SE does not really emerge from nonexperiential matter such as brain; rather, it is selected from the potential SEs embedded in a specific neural-network (as memory traces formed during neural Darwinism) by the self during the interaction between feed-forward and feedback signals in the neural-network by the matching process (Section 1.2) and experienced by the self. This is extended in terms of information integration (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012) in a ‘complex’ of neural-network, where the measure or degree of integration (Φ) is higher than critical threshold for consciousness as summarized in (Vimal, 2015a).

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2.9. Information integration for linking structure, function, and experience One could argue that although consciousness is unified it is not a process and so consciousness as a biological phenomenon cannot be integrated. To address this critique, we need to be clear about the term ‘integration’. In my view, we have many brain-areas, many signals related to many attributes of stimuli, many representations in many brain-areas, many sensory modes (such as visual, auditory, and so on), many sub-modes (such as color, motion in visual mode) in a mode, and many dimensions (such as red, green in color) in a sub-mode; they all need to interact for spatialtemporal-modal unification; these interactions entails the ‘integration’ of related information. If we turn our eyes around, we see many features in our visual field in space and time, which have representations in many areas; they all need to be integrated for

Furthermore, some investigators criticize that aspects in dual-aspect monism framework are context dependent and hence they could be infinite: “the aspects in dual-aspect monism are not a priori given, but depend on epistemic issues and contexts. Distinctions of aspects are generated by ‘epistemic splits’ of the distinction-free, unseparated domain, and there are as many aspects as there are contexts. … It should also be mentioned that the restriction to two aspects is a matter of simplicity rather than canonical. For instance, for Spinoza the number of possible aspects is infinite” (Atmanspacher, 2012). In the eDAM framework, this problem is addressed by eDAM-component (III) (Vimal, 2013): the degrees of manifestation of aspects varies depending on the levels of entities and contexts; however, the number of aspects in a specific entity and a specific context always remains two, and both qualitative/mental and physical aspects are inseparable.

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unified conscious SEs and functions. This also includes the first-person experience of time or phenomenal time and its biological correlates that are elaborated in (Vimal & Davia, 2008, 2010). In this sense, the information related to functional and experiential aspects of consciousness (Section 1; see also (Vimal, 2009, 2010b)) are integrated in the brainstructure (Vimal, 2015a) for proper linking of the triad: structure, function, and experience. Some biologists can argue that only biological organisms (not robots) can be conscious (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014) because it is the evolutionary development of biological organism that is sufficiently developed or complex. Let us look at this claim more closely. By consciousness, we mean SEs (including feelings, emotion- and thought-related experiences) and functions. As per materialism based functional integration hypothesis, biological organisms evolved from non-experiential matter that does not even have potential for experiences. So how can these biological organisms have experiences? It will be gross violation of the fundamental assumption of materialism. Therefore, we need to reject all materialism-based frameworks. If we assume matter has potential for experiences (such as in ‘consciousness as functional integration’) then we are implicitly accepting dual-aspect monism. Some biologists can then further argue: how can these biological organisms have experiences through functional interactions, where functional interactions represent the ontological embodiment of epistemological aspects of complex adaptive systems like our brains? My reply is: if we interpret functional interactions and integration in terms of the eDAM framework then biological organisms can have experiences without any problem as elaborated in Section 2.6. If we consider consciousness as independent entity and brain another independent entity (as in interactive substance dualism metaphysics), then again the integration of information is needed, but leads to serious ‘association problem’ as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010b, 2013). Materialism also needs the integration of information embedded in physical signals and assumes that somehow experiences emerge from or identical with integrated information, but then the serious explanatory gap problem arises as discussed before. Idealism metaphysics (mind is the fundamental reality) implies mental integration of information related to many mental features in 1pp and then assumes that 3pp-physical features somehow arise from them; this has problems reverse of materialism. Only in the eDAM framework, problems do not arise because the mental aspect of a state of an entity is inseparable from the physical aspect of the same entity-state. Thus, physical integration immediately and faithfully entails mental (functional) information integration and vice versa. In other words, all types of metaphysics require information-integration. Furthermore, a complete theory of everything should also include consciousness, which can be accomplished in the eDAM framework as elaborated in (Vimal, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e).

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2.10. Quantum mechanics (QM) and consciousness Can we use wave-particle duality and other principles of QM to explain consciousness? Wave-particle duality description in QM is controversial at present time; some reject particle theory, some reject wave theory, and some use wavicle theory (wave-particle as two sub-aspects of wavicle). Pessoa Jr. (Pessoa Jr., 2001) seems reluctant to accept the hypothesis of “consciousness is an essentially quantum effect” based on materialism due to the lack of evidence. However, if it is correct, then it may be through the wave-particle duality (or collapse) criterion because the decoherence washes out entanglement of many particles, biological condensate 19

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lacks strong evidence of its existence, and quantum field theory is speculative. On the other hand, the collapse of the wave function as an “actualization of potentialities” may be useful. In my view, both wave and particle are sub-aspects of energy/matter in current QM, which is just the part of 3pp-physical aspect of a state of an entity in the eDAM framework. We are proposing to change the materialistic view of QM (Pessoa Jr., 2001) that is based on non-experiential quantum entities, by introducing the pre-existence of the potentiality of experiences in Nature (Pereira Jr. et al., 2015). The eDAM framework introduces this through the inseparable 1pp-mental aspect of the state of the same entity. The potentiality of experiences is introduced: (a) in the ‘functional field’ for the biophoton field theory (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014), (b) in the electromagnetic (em) field for Cemi field theory (McFadden, 2002), and (c) in the spacetime geometry, where local field potentials generated by dendritic–somatic membranes give rise to EEG and coherent gamma synchrony, or mitochondrial electromagnetic fields for Orch OR framework (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014). All kinds of entities are parts of Nature. It seems that different frameworks are telling (more or less) the same or similar story in different ways. The QM’s superposition principle and quantum conjugate matching are used in Section 1.2 and (Vimal, 2010a) because they are less controversial. Currently, QM has over 50 interpretations (Pessoa Jr., 2001) (based on materialism, interactive substance dualism, or idealism) and there is no consensus; however, so far, there is no interpretation based on dual-aspect monism (especially based on the eDAM framework) or triple aspect frameworks. Similarly, there are many frameworks of consciousness, which are trying their best to address the hard problem of consciousness and there is no consensus either. Since one controversy cannot be used to explain another controversy, it is unclear if QM cannot explain consciousness and vice-versa. A better strategy is: first, address the hard problem by a framework that has the least number of problems and that is scientifically parsimonious, reliable, credible, and viable (Vimal, 2015c) and also scientifically testable (Vimal, 2015a), such as the eDAM framework (Sections 1.1-1.5). Then, interpret QM based on this framework. While doing that, we may encounter problems in such framework for consciousness; then resolve those problems and try again. By this process of trial and error (going back and forth many times), we may have a better chance to understand the fundamental truth about both QM and consciousness.

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2.11. Information processing, interactionism, Tononi’s IIT, and the eDAM framework Critiques can argue that consciousness in artificial constructs based on information theory with algorithmic information processing is unlikely to occur because (i) the subcellular interactions of energy fields do not process information, (ii) biological laws are non-computational in nature, (iii) 'information processing' assumes algorithms exist that can replace interaction with computation, and (iv) IIT does not disclose how this integration comes about.4 Instead, the integration is through the interaction (⊗) between feed forward (FF) and feedback signals (FB); this interaction entails consciousness (C) as an ‘integrated’ version of FF and FB. In other words, FF⊗FB = C cannot be traced back to FF⊗FB; C takes on a new form that is integrated through interaction; this can be called interactionism (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). It does not follow that C > FF+FB (whole is greater than sum of its parts), but FF⊗FB → C where the arrow is one way. Once integrated it is not possible to get back FF or FB as it remains as a new form C. One could further argue that the framework of (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008), based on the integrated information in discrete dynamical systems, seems incompatible with the physics of consciousness (Cacha & Poznanski, 2014). For example, a continuous electrically charged 20

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flow of information is carried by the neuro-electromagnetic field across synapses and within neurons. The above critique revolves around the irreducibility of conscious SEs. The IIT of Tononi and colleagues ((Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; Tononi, 2004, 2008, 2012)) is the materialism based identity theory (integrated information is consciousness), which certainly has problems including explanatory gap problem. However, I have interpreted IIT in the eDAM framework (Vimal, 2015a), where the irreducibility of SEs is always maintained because (a) the eDAM proposes that the potentiality of primary irreducible SEs pre-exists in Nature (Section 1.1) and (b) the brain processes such as matching (involved in interactionism) and selection mechanisms further elaborate how a specific irreducible SE is matched and selected (Section 1.2). Furthermore, information is everywhere including information in subcellular interactions of energy fields, electromagnetic fields, functional fields, conscious fields, and both living and nonliving systems. Information is processed in both feed forward (FF) and feedback (FB) systems, which then matched during interaction. The interaction between FF and FB signals implies that there is information transfer and processing between FF and FB systems. In the eDAM framework, information is a dual-aspect entity; this implies physical information as its physical aspect, and mental information as its mental aspect. The matching and selection brain processes of the eDAM framework explain how C (consciousness such as a SE) arises from the interaction of FF and FB as summarized in (Vimal, 2015a) without violating any biological laws. One could argue that when brain processing becomes clearer, we are able to think better how C arises. And hence we can write a sort of flow-chart in step-by-step fashion (as done in (Vimal, 2015a)), which is a sort of algorithmic computation involving information processing. In this way, we can try making conscious robots (Vimal, 2015c) to test the framework if it is correct. The term ‘non-computational’ seems to entail strong emergence as well and has the mystery of how consciousness can occur. Once this mystery is uncovered then we can write computer program. One such mystery is the potentiality of pre-existence of experiences in Nature that was not present in previous materialistic computational theories and created controversy over computational and non-computational views. However, if all mysteries behind noncomputational are disclosed, non-computational argument can be addressed and conscious artifacts can be made as long as they satisfy the necessary conditions of consciousness (Section 1.4). One could argue that engineers do not have to worry about noncomputationality of consciousness too much because a state of a silicon chip is also a dualaspect entity, which is a part of Nature as well and hence has the potentiality of preexistence of experiences. Furthermore, (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2008)’s framework, as they seem to acknowledge, certainly needs to be extended to continuous dynamical systems. Moreover, the requirement of dynamic (temporal) continuity (analog type signal) is somewhat misleading concept because it is classical physics concept. We have quantum physics underlying classical physics, which is, by definition, quantum or digital; below quantum physics, we have Planck level physics (which is considered bottom most level), which is also digital with Planck time as the digital unit of time; below this level, time is unclear. In a brain, the temporal information processing is in msec range, which is digital unit of time. As per Persinger (personal communication), the occurrence of a discrete amount of energy (~2·1020 J) within an about 1 msec duration has stimulated the concept of ‘digital’ information within the brain. Here, the term ‘digital’ is used as an equivalent of ‘all-or-none’ characteristics of the axon potential, which can be argued to be the discrete energies of the action potential coupled to punctate vesicle release. Furthermore, temporal continuity can be approximated by digital signals with appropriate temporal interval of critical temporal 21

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grain-size (threshold); within this interval, information usefully keeps on integrating (Vimal, 2015a). Thus, the eDAM based IIT addresses the criticisms of this Section.

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3. Conclusions (1) Consciousness is defined as the mental aspect of a state of mind-brain system or brain-process, which has two sub-aspects: conscious experience and conscious function from the 1pp. (2) A materialism based framework for consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003) does not solve the hard problem, but makes the problem clearer. (3) An alternative to materialism is the eDAM based framework for subjective conscious experience, which has five components: (I) Dual-aspect monism: The qualitative/mental and the physical aspect of a state of any entity (elementary particle to neural-network to whole universe) are inseparable in dual-aspect monism (Section 1.1 and (Vimal, 2008b)). The qualitative/mental aspect of an entity-state includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and non-living systems as qualitative aspect, and (b) superposed potential eigen-states related to the potential primary irreducible SEs in superposed form as a medium for the indispensable pre-existence of the potentiality of experiences for living-system and/or conscious artifacts. (II) Dual-mode and matching and selection mechanisms: There is a conjugate matching between stimulus-dependent-feed-forward-signals-related-mode and cognitivefeedback-signals-related-mode and then the selection of a specific SE occurs and experienced by the self (Section 1.2 and (Vimal, 2010a)). (III) Varying degrees of manifestation of aspects depending on the levels of entities and contexts: The degrees of manifestation of aspects vary depending on the levels of entities (from human living system to nonliving inert entities) and contexts (Section 1.3 and (Vimal, 2013)). The qualitative/mental aspect includes (a) forms, patterns of distribution of matter/energy in space and time, and/or patterns of vibrations for both living and nonliving systems as qualitative aspect, and (b) superposed potential eigen-states related to SEs for living-system. This implies that (a) the qualitative aspect, such as forms and patterns, can be perceived or implicitly inferred from 3pp, but (b) the mental aspect of a state of a non-living system is ‘latent’ to us from 3pp. The mental aspect is from 1pp (for living systems) and the physical aspect is from the objective 3pp. (IV) The necessary conditions of consciousness: The necessary conditions for access (reportable) consciousness are: the formation of neural-networks, wakefulness, reentry, attention, information integration, working memory, stimulus contrast at or above threshold, and potential experiences embedded in neural-network (Section 1.4 and (Vimal, 2015b)). Attention is not necessary for phenomenal (non-reportable) consciousness. (V) The segregation and integration of dual-aspect information: The materialism’s identity theory based information integration theory is interpreted in terms of the eDAM framework, where information is a dual-aspect entity (Section 1.5 and (Vimal, 2015a)). (4) This eDAM framework is parsimonious and has the least number of problems compared to all other frameworks (Vimal, 2015c). (5) The eDAM framework is consistent with psychophysical, biological, and physical laws (Section 2.2). (6) The eDAM framework attempts to address the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness (how to explain SEs) (Vimal, 2015a). 22

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(7) (a) The eDAM framework can unpack Biological Naturalism’s claims (such as brain processes cause irreducible experiences, and consciousness can influence brain processes) using the matching and selection mechanisms and the doctrine of inseparability, respectively; and (b) hence it can address the objections raised in Biological Naturalism by traditional views (dualism and materialism) without making category mistake (Vimal, 2015c). (8) The eDAM framework can be scientifically tested: if we are empirically able to separate the mental aspect (such as an experience) of a conscious brain-mind state and the related physical aspect (its neural correlates) of the same conscious brain-mind state at a specific moment of time or within critical temporal integration grain-size, then the doctrine of inseparability will be rejected, and then the eDAM framework needs major modification (Vimal, 2015a).

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Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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Acknowledgments

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References

The work was supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research Institute research Fund. Author would like to thank anonymous reviewers, John R. Searle for email discussion on Biological Naturalism and traditional views, Michael A. Persinger for reviewing his information in Section 2.11, Sisir Roy for comments on information theory, Alfredo Pereira Jr., Roman R. Poznanski, Max Velmans, Nathan Faivre, Marc H.E. de Lussanet, and Pankhuri Singhal for critical comments, discussion, and suggestions. Author is also affiliated with Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, Pendra, Bilaspur, C.G. 495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata, Gorakhpur, U.P. 273001 India. URL: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home. Email: [email protected].

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Endnotes 1

As per Wheeler, “the concepts of spacetime and time itself are not primary but secondary ideas in the structure of physical theory. These concepts are valid in the classical approximation. However, they have neither meaning nor application under circumstances when quantum geometrodynamical effects become important. The one has to forego that view of Nature in which every extent past, present, or future, occupies its preordained position in a grand catalog called ‘spacetime’. There is no spacetime, there is no time, there is no before, there is no after. The question what happens ‘next’ is without meaning” ((Wheeler, 1979): p.440). 2

As per Kelso (Kelso, 2012), “Degeneracy means that at every conceivable level of description, the same outcome or function can be achieved in many ways using different components. […] The complement of degeneracy or functional equivalence is multifunctionality: the same anatomical structures can play multiple functional roles. […] 25

Degeneracy and multifunctionality imply that there is no one-to-one mapping between structure and function.” This implies that many-to-many relationship is possible. 3

The Triple Aspect Monism (TAM) has three aspects: physical aspect (aspect-1), nonconscious mental aspect (aspect-2), and conscious mental aspect (aspect-3): “At the lower level, the system can be described as an ordinary physical-chemical-biological one, ruled by causal relations that ultimately reduce to the four fundamental physical forces. At the middle level, the system can be described as an information-processing system obeying the rules of information theory. At the higher level, the system can be phenomenologically described in terms of conscious experiences or presentations, which can be symbolically represented” (Pereira Jr., 2013).(p.321-2).

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One could argue that information theory which people use in the context of biological systems raise a lot of controversy for last decade or so. Shannon measure of information is normally used but there are some serious conceptual problems, which are not solved yet. Edelman and Tononi (Edelman & Tononi, 2000) deal with mutual information. However, one should be careful before using Shannon or Fisher type of information measure in biosystems and consciousness studies.

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