Facing Up to Civic Pluralism

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Facing up to civic pluralism A friendly critique of Galston jas on scor za Fairleigh Dickinson University,Teaneck, NJ, USA

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Beginning with the publication of Liberal Purposes in 1991, William Galston has developed an appealing theory of liberal pluralism that entails strong commitments to expressive liberty, political pluralism and Berlinian value pluralism. However, given these commitments, Galston might be expected to be more open to a theory of civic pluralism, understood as recognition and toleration of multiple reasonable conceptions of good citizenship, rather than advancing (as he does) a robust but unitary view of citizenship and civic education.This article offers a modest set of arguments on behalf of civic pluralism, based in part on Galston’s own theory of liberal pluralism, in the hope of prompting him to move in this direction.

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k e y w o r d s citizenship, civic education, democracy, Galston, liberalism, pluralism

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Th e b a s i c c h a l l e n g e for liberalism has always been to reconcile rival values and accommodate competing ways of life within a single society, not to wage a war of good against evil or attempt to impose a single way of life on everyone.This is why it has long been accepted by liberals, beginning with John Locke, that a high level of religious toleration is an essential ingredient for any successful and stable liberal polity.What has not been settled, however, is whether the broad liberal toleration of religious diversity should be extended to encompass civic values and practices. That is to say, liberals still disagree as to whether a liberal polity must also accommodate civic pluralism – understood as toleration of a variety of reasonable ways of being a good citizen – and reject civic monism – the commitment to a single version or vision of good citizenship, its virtues and its competences.This question grows increasingly urgent as civic participation in many liberal democracies, by most Theory and Research in Education Copyright © 2006, sage publications, www.sagepublications.com vol 4(3) 291–311 ISSN 1477-8785 DOI: 10.1177/1477878506 069101

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accepted measures, steadily declines (Putnam, 1993, 2000). It seems to me that if we are serious about reconstituting the civic life of liberal democracies, then we should not balk at accepting and affirming a variety of reasonable ways of being a good citizen. We should be willing, in other words, to take our civic capital where we can get it, rather than arguing about which of the many quite reasonable conceptions of good citizenship is, somehow, best suited for liberalism. Therefore, in this article, I find myself forced to disagree with William Galston, who has argued that a single conception of good citizenship, based on universal service, a standard set of liberal virtues, and a moralizing approach to teaching history, can be identified for liberal democracies. Curiously, while consistently recognizing value, political and cultural pluralism as realities that theories of liberal citizenship must grapple with, Galston does not recognize pluralism as an organizing idea for teaching or practicing citizenship.1 One might say that he is an advocate of civic education for pluralism but not of pluralist civic education. However, I hope to show that Galston’s own theory of liberal pluralism, with which I generally sympathize, anticipates, and perhaps even logically entails, the acceptance of civic pluralism as the basis for liberal civic education. Then, going beyond Galston’s own arguments, I will draw upon the work of Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Rorty, 1992) to make a fuller case for preferring a civic pluralist model of civic education to any conceivable monist model. Finally, I will acknowledge and address some theoretical and practical difficulties with the theory of civic pluralism, considering (theoretically) whether civic education based on civic pluralism is an education in autonomy, and whether (practically) civic education based on civic pluralism would needlessly diminish civic unity and exacerbate civil conflict in liberal societies.

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Theories of civic pluralism are nothing new. Indeed, the most famous (or infamous) of these theories is advanced by Plato, who identifies three major types of civic character – leaders who possess wisdom, soldiers (or auxiliaries) who possess fortitude or courage, and the masses who possess a high degree of covetousness, which, when properly directed, can provide the state with a productive workforce. Machiavelli also reveals himself to be a civic pluralist when he distinguishes between three different kinds of virtú – the ability, prowess, or boldness of princes, statesmen and generals; the loyalty and courage of citizen soldiers; and the public spiritedness and incorruptibility of an entire people. The existence of civic pluralism has been observed even by some thinkers whom are critical of all but one special expression of citizenship. For [292]

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instance, Henry David Thoreau, in his essay on ‘Civil disobedience’, identifies three different kinds of citizens – those who serve the state with their bodies only, those who serve with their intellects, and those who serve with their consciences, assuming a position of critical distance from their own society. Not surprisingly, Thoreau rejects the first and second of these views, while heartily endorsing the third (Thoreau, 1965: 637–8). Even John Dewey, an early proponent of civic education for liberal citizenship, recognized that the homogenization of civic education could yield conservative, rather than progressive, results. Civic education must, by necessity, embrace the spirit of experiment or else, Dewey warned, ‘aim at the unchanged perpetuation of existing institutions . . .’ (Dewey, 1954: 200). But theories of civic pluralism are not merely historical curiosities. Civic pluralism is already as much a reality of liberal democratic life as are cultural, ethnic, racial and religious pluralism. Indeed, one can readily observe a variety of civic roles that are arguably worthy of the name ‘good citizenship’. These include the taxpayer (who is generally law abiding and productive), the volunteer (who gives time to civic or social causes), the benefactor (who gives money to these causes), the informed and engaged voter (who expresses preferences and participates in civil dialogue with fellow citizens), the activist (who is idealistically committed to the agenda of a party, movement or cause), the patriot (who defends his or her country, often under arms, whether it is right or wrong), and the pragmatist (usually a leader or office holder who recognizes the need to sometimes get his or her hands dirty).2 From the point of view of civic pluralism, conscientious objectors, patriotic soldiers and hardheaded leaders may all, reasonably, be thought to be good citizens.We would not necessarily want everyone in a society to be a conscientious objector, a patriotic soldier, or a political realist, but that is precisely the point. Any citizenry characterized by a single civic creed would be unlikely to respond effectively to the range of very real challenges confronted by liberal polities, which can include both threats by external enemies and the cynical manipulation of public emotions on behalf of unjust wars. An examination of recent liberal theories of liberal citizenship (Berkowitz, 1999; Callan, 1997; Crittenden, 2002; Gutmann, 1987, 1989; Macedo, 1990, 2000; Raz, 1986; Spragens, 1999) also suggests that there are numerous reasonable and decent ways of being a good citizen. Each of these theories makes a compelling case for a particular style of citizenship with a particular stock of civic virtues and competences. Some, most notably Raz, even argue that the civic traits most admired by Thoreau – including personal autonomy and selfcritical reflectiveness – are, in fact, the most characteristically or properly liberal virtues. However, all of these theorists, Galston included, appear to be searching for a single conception of citizenship that would better serve liberal [293]

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democracy than all others, while none seems to recognize that the true strength of the liberal polity actually might be found in a plurality of very different civic creeds. In Galston’s case, this omission is surprising, given that much of his recent work is organized around a theory of liberal pluralism. Central to this theory is the principle of ‘expressive liberty’, which is the belief that there are numerous legitimate ways of life and that the state, as much as practical, should avoid interfering with the choices and projects of individuals and groups (Galston, 2002: 3). However, Galston’s presumption in favor of expressive liberty – and his corresponding presumption against external interference – does not extend to conceptions of good citizenship, although he is willing to grant exceptions to a standard civic creed in cases of conflict with strong religious prohibitions. He would not, for example, attempt to coerce the Amish into fulfilling all standard educational requirements (Galston, 1998: 237–8). Nonetheless, Galston identifies several important exceptions to the presumption of non-interference. First, the state may involve itself in individual and group affairs in order to reduce coordination problems and avoid conflict.The state also may act to prevent and punish transgressions committed by individuals and groups against one another, and to protect the many legitimate ways of life recognized by the principle of expressive liberty against threats posed by illegitimate ways of life. Finally, the state may act ‘to secure the conditions – including cultural and civic conditions – needed to sustain public institutions over time’ (Galston, 2002: 3). Presumably, it is some combination of these exceptions which enable the state to enact its own system of civic education, even though it would not permit the government to interfere directly with civic education schemes undertaken by voluntary associations, except in extreme cases. From his account of the limitations of state action, Galston concludes that political institutions are not the sole source of political authority in a liberal polity.A second source of Galston’s theory of liberal pluralism, therefore, is the idea of ‘political pluralism’, which is ‘an understanding social life that comprises multiple sources of authority – individuals, parents, civil associations, faith-based institutions, and the state among others – no one of which is dominant in all spheres, for all purposes, on all occasions’ (Galston, 2005b: 1–2). While political institutions are important, they do not dominate in all spheres; nor do they have exclusive authority in spheres (such as civic education) where they may be presumed to have a central role and a compelling interest (Galston, 2002: 4). The last source of Galston’s theory of liberal pluralism is Isaiah Berlin’s idea of ‘value pluralism’, which he takes to be the most accurate available account [294]

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of the moral universe.3 As early as 1991, in Liberal Purposes, Galston identified value pluralism as an essential feature of human flourishing: ‘Well-being is composed of a number of heterogeneous elements that cannot be reduced to a single common measure. Nor is there a simple and unique hierarchy among these elements. Nor, finally, is there a lexical ordering among them’ (Galston, 1991: 172). Value pluralism, Galston argues, underwrites the entire liberal project of toleration of different ways of life, for only by acknowledging the existence of a universe of multiple incommensurable values can we coherently reject totalizing ideologies.4 According to Galston, three ‘broad political conclusions’ follow logically from the acceptance of the theory of liberal pluralism:‘first, that the legitimate scope of all politics, democratic politics included, is limited; second, that within the political sphere, there are alternatives to democracy that may enjoy legitimacy, at least for some purposes in some situations; and third, that democratic deliberation and decision should be guided by mutual acceptance and the quest for inclusive, rather than exclusive, policies’ (Galston, 1991: 92–3). Galston might have identified, as a fourth conclusion, the idea that a plurality of reasonable views of good citizenship can and should exist in any given liberal polity. Indeed, he briefly entertains this possibility:‘In the same way that the religious diversity of liberal society makes it impossible to reach religious consensus suitable for public endorsement, so too the moral and political diversity of the liberal polity might seem to undermine the possibility of a unitary civic pedagogy acceptable to, and binding on, all groups’ (Galston, 1991: 245). However, rather than endorsing something like civic pluralism, he instead attempts to construct a single conception of what good citizenship requires – a vision that is uniquely suited to the condition of political pluralism that characterizes the liberal polity, the reality of value pluralism and the principle of expressive liberty. Galston argues forcefully that the liberal state must act vigorously to ensure that a kind of ‘civic unity’ prevails in the liberal polity (Galston, 2002: 9–10). As he explains, ‘There is no invisible civic hand that sustains a system of liberty; such a system must be consciously reproduced. There are limits that education conducted or required by a liberal pluralist state must not breach. But within those bounds it is legitimate and necessary and must be robust’ (Galston, 2002: 10).5 In advocating for a civic monist, rather than intrinsically pluralist, scheme of civic education, Galston attempts to draw a Lockean distinction between political coercion and political persuasion. He concedes that the state may not legitimately compel an individual to believe something. It may, however, use its authority to present ‘systematic arguments for, or instruction in, that belief ’ (Galston, 1991: 249).Yet, this is not a very comforting distinction. Indeed, the tools of political indoctrination may be even more powerful – they certainly [295]

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are more insidious – than outright suppression of non-conformist beliefs through violence or threat of violence. Galston concedes that Locke expected that civic education would occur, primarily, in families, rather than ‘through state mechanisms’ (Galston, 1991, 1986). But he insists that Locke’s theory ‘leads directly to the legitimation of the conduct of such education through public means, individual conscience to the contrary notwithstanding’ (Galston, 1991: 249–50). Galston further argues that since private conscience can only be defended or exercised within a civil society, ‘individuals must be willing to surrender whatever portion of these rights must be sacrificed to the requirements of public order and institutional perpetuation’ (Galston, 1991: 250). Not only may citizens of liberal democracies not retain all of their ‘pre-social rights’, but if they resist the civic education mandated by public authorities, then they ‘would be irrationally contradicting their own self-interest, rightly understood’ (Galston, 1991: 250). Moreover, citizenship in a liberal democracy (or any state) is ‘a package of benefits and burdens shared, and accepted, by all.To be a citizen of a liberal polity is to be required to surrender so much of your private conscience as is necessary to secure the enjoyment of what remains’ (Galston, 1991: 250). If the Rousseauean overtone of these thoughts seems out of place within a liberal theory that aspires to Lockean limits, this impression is confirmed by many of the specific details of Galston’s scheme of civic education. This scheme can best be understood with reference to three elements: first, the standardization of civic virtue; second, a romantic approach to teaching history; and third, the importance of universal service. In Liberal Pluralism, Galston imagines an extensive catalog of virtues and competencies that should characterize the economic, societal and political lives of citizens of liberal polities (Galston, 1988, 1991: 213–37). Among the virtues of citizenship, he emphasizes the ability to discern and respect rights, to evaluate political candidates and officeholders, and to be moderate in making public demands. General political virtues, meant to apply to both leaders and ordinary citizens, include the capacity to engage in public discourse, to listen to different or even offensive views, and to present one’s own views intelligently and candidly, as well as the ‘disposition to narrow the gap . . . between principles and practices in a liberal society’ (Galston, 1991: 227). Galston supplements these with certain general civic virtues such as the courage to fight for one’s country, law-abidingness and loyalty, social virtues such as independence, fidelity and tolerance, and economic virtues including a work ethic, moderate delay of gratification and adaptability. Subsequently, Galston has emphasized the virtue of toleration, understood as ‘principled refusal to use coercive state power to impose one’s own views on others’ rather than [296]

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‘wishy-washiness or the propensity to doubt one’s own position’, as essential to civic education conducted in a liberal pluralist spirit (Galston, 1991: 126).6 Civic monist conceptions of citizenship, like Galston’s, cannot be too inclusive lest they break down into multiple differentiated conceptions of citizenship. And, indeed, there are signs of such fissures in Galston’s account of civic virtue. For instance, when he distinguishes between the role of the political leader and that of the ordinary citizen, he comes close to endorsing two different conceptions of citizenship (although not as close as Machiavelli does when he describes the civic roles of leaders and ordinary citizens). Nonetheless, his explicit acceptance that there are at least two different kinds of role in democratic politics, with virtues which adhere to each, opens the door to a theory of civic pluralism.7 So, too, does his recognition that different kinds of leadership role require different civic virtues and competences, including ‘optimism and energy in the executive, deliberative excellence and civility in the legislator, impartiality and interpretive skill in the judge’ (Galston, 1991: 226). If one can reasonably argue that the virtues of leadership and citizenship, and the virtues of different kinds of leadership, represent legitimate and reasonable accounts of how political actors should conduct themselves, then one could begin to imagine a multiplicity of such roles, including broad differentiation between types of civic character. In addition to describing liberal virtues, Galston presses for a romantic manner of teaching history, identifying and celebrating heroes and urging young citizens to follow their examples. Galston explains, ‘Civic education, however, requires a nobler, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions and are worthy of emulation’ (Galston, 1991: 244). And, then more darkly, ‘It is unrealistic to believe that more than a few adult citizens of liberal societies will ever move beyond the kind of civic commitment engendered by such a pedagogy’ (Galston, 1991: 244). But this educational approach is problematic to say the least. Most American ‘heroes’, it turns out, are at least somewhat controversial, and it is often this fact that makes their lives both interesting and instructive for young citizens. This is certainly the case when we consider someone like Malcolm X and his strange journey from street hustler to Nation-of-Islam mouthpiece, to independent advocate of Black Nationalism, or George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, two freedom fighters who also owned slaves. We certainly do not need a whitewashed Washington, Jefferson, or Malcolm, for their limitations and contradictions are as instructive as their contributions. Indeed, the ‘more noble, moralizing history’ that Galston recommends appears to obscure the moral complexity, difficulty and ambiguity which are essential lessons for the brand of liberal citizenship that is skeptical of rhetoric, suspicious of power and alert to public hypocrisy.This brand of citizenship is not necessarily better [297]

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than that advocated by Galston, or any of the other liberal theorists who have developed unitary conceptions of civic character; but public civic education should not be deployed in such a way as to advance one reasonable conception while hindering another equally reasonable conception. Civic monist conceptions also can not be too exclusive lest they run afoul of the many ways of life that the liberal polity must try to accommodate and the historical experiences that it must recognize as legitimate. Others have criticized Galston for failing to fully consider the implications of religious, ethnic, cultural and racial diversity for his approach to civic education. David Archard, for instance, argues that this diversity ‘undermines the simple assumption that the curriculum can be constituted by a single unproblematic history, culture, or tradition’ (Archard, 1999: 158). Rather than attempting to teach a sanitized and sentimental version of the past, Archard argues that educators should explain that the history, tradition and culture of every nation are multiple (Archard, 1999: 171; Kloppenberg, 1998: 108). This does not mean, however, that only relentlessly critical, or ‘transgressive’, views must be presented. As Eamonn Callan explains, this is a false dichotomy. Instead of choosing between these two extremes, he argues, one could identify a morally and emotionally complex approach to teaching history that is neither demeaned by sentimentality nor undermined by alienation (Callan, 1997, 107–8). Students themselves would be involved in the process of drawing conclusions from the many contested truths that make up a country’s history. For instance, a class studying the Vietnam War would consider the realpolitik perspective of the architects of America’s policy in Southeast Asia, as well as the perspectives of anti-war protestors and patriotic volunteers (for not everyone who fought in Vietnam was a draftee).This approach, which admittedly is more intellectually demanding than Galston’s (and therefore, perhaps, less realistic), also lends itself more to civic pluralism. Students who are more likely to recognize that there are multiple reasonable interpretations of history will also be more open to the possibility that there are different reasonable attitudes toward political commitment and, therefore, also toward the practice of citizenship. More recently, Galston has argued for compulsory military or civilian service for 18-year-olds. The principal justification for universal service offered by Galston is that the common experience would expose young citizens to the full diversity of the multi-racial, multi-ethnic, socio-economically stratified American polity (Galston, 2005a: 99–109). Only then, it seems, would people from the upper and middle classes really understand the experiences and struggles of the less fortunate which, in turn, would lead to a much higher level of social integration. As Galston explains, given a society ‘in which the fortunate will not willingly associate with the rest, only non-voluntary institutions [298]

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cutting across class lines can hope to provide such experiences’ (Galston, 2005a: 108).What I find ironic about this approach is that the vast cultural differences and social inequalities within liberal society are invoked by Galston as a justification for universal service, while the mechanism of universal service is, itself, aimed at standardizing the civic creed which, in turn, would likely reduce respect and toleration for citizens who dissent from that creed. In spite of his defense of a unitary civic creed, I want to suggest that Galston’s own commitments to expressive liberty, political pluralism, and value pluralism actually provide prima facie reasons to prefer civic pluralism to any monistic model of civic education. Given expressive liberty’s presumption on non-interference, the burden is on Galston to show that civic unity would be jeopardized by civic pluralism or that the civil conflicts caused by civic pluralism would be so dreadful, and represent such a overwhelming threat to peace and public safety, that we could justify overriding the civic values that might be constitutive elements of competing (i.e. non-standard) conceptions of good citizenship.This could be an almost insurmountable challenge, however, given that history is filled with far more examples of wars over religious belief than over civic belief. Galston would also need to demonstrate that a very high level of destructiveness would be produced by civic pluralism. Since Galston assumes an instrumental view of civic virtue (Galston, 1991: 220), the costs of civic pluralism would need to be shown to outweigh the benefits of preserving the option for citizens to choose from among different reasonable views of good citizenship, the most significant of which is its ability to provide a civic division of labor which guards against the danger of civic education becoming the instrument of mass conformity. It is important to recognize that Galston is devising a scheme of civic education that is suited to a background social condition of pluralism, rather than one that is intrinsically (or internally) pluralistic. Galston writes ‘Liberal democracy as I understand it is particularly sensitive to this moral diversity and to the importance of social spaces within which it may find expression. If so, I might add, liberal democratic civic education must emphasize the beliefs and virtues that enable citizens to respect the boundaries of free social spaces’ (Galston, 1991: 95). However, this free social space seems not to include the schools themselves, which might serve as incubators for a variety of good civic models, rather than a single one. At most, Galston, in deference to the fact of political pluralism, would permit students to ‘opt out’ of certain components of a standard civic education. For instance, Galston concedes,‘the government cannot rightly compel schoolchildren to join in a flag salute ceremony contrary to the dictates of their conscience. This remains the case even if the flag salute proves to be an effective means of fostering patriotism’ (Galston, 1991: 94). However, this right still implies that students are deviating [299]

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from the norm, which, in turn, invites a subtle and indirect form of coercion in the form of pressure from teachers or peers.8 Although political pluralism clearly provides reasons for the state to allow citizens to opt out of certain aspects of publicly provided civic education for reasons of personal conviction, it is not at all clear that Galston recognizes this right to extend to those whose objection is merely civic in origin, rather than religious or, at the very least, deeply concerned with authoritative commands associated with group identity (Galston, 2005b: 66–8. Limiting this right in this manner would privilege theistic and identity-based values over nontheistic and non-identity-based values. Likewise, it would exclude the claims of citizens whose objection to the standard civic practice is based on historical experience rather than conscience or religious faith or higher-order conviction. For instance, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses could decline to salute the flag on the grounds of faith, while a citizen of Native American ancestry could not do so because of the pledge’s neglect of the very real historical experiences of his or her people. A young citizen whose parents object, on purely civic grounds, to the idolization of a patriotic symbol also would have no standing. Unless we are willing to extend Locke’s prohibition on state coercion of religious belief to state coercion of civic belief, we are forced to accept the existence in liberal society of a hierarchy of belief, with religious convictions demanding higher levels of toleration and respect by the state than civic ones. However, if we accept that these civic ‘opt out’ claims do have standing, then we cannot also claim, as Galston does, that a single civic creed can be impressed upon all citizens. In other words, recognition of these claims would demand a system of civic education based on civic pluralism, or else it would require that we banish civic education from the public schools entirely. Finally, if we take as our starting place, as Galston does, an idea of a morally plural universe, the existence of an indeterminate set of reasonable but incommensurable values, and the recognition that these values may be ordered or configured in a multitude of different ways (each constituting a creed, ideology, or way of life), we must also conclude that the importance of citizenship (and, therefore, the understanding of good citizenship) will vary from one configuration to another. For instance, one ordering will place a premium on loyalty, another on protecting the weak, another on pragmatic decisionmaking etc. From the perspective of value pluralism, civic creeds are no less fundamental than religious ones. Indeed, both are constituted by value elements organized in a hierarchy which may exclude or significantly diminish the standing of other value elements. Although value pluralism, as such, does not entail moral relativism, neither does it entail civic relativism. Rather, it demands the recognition of a variety of reasonable views and practices of good [300]

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It certainly is possible to conceive of civic virtue and the practice of citizenship in pluralistic terms, as Amelie Oksenberg Rorty does, rather than in monist terms, as Galston and many other liberal political thinkers do. Four features of Rorty’s argument are of particular importance for developing a coherent theory of civic pluralism. First, she argues that ethical diversity is inevitable because some character traits tend to exclude one another (Rorty, 1992: 45). For instance patriotic loyalty may tend to exclude the capacity for toleration of difference. Similarly, the ability to test public policies against our deeper convictions may not always be compatible with ‘the willingness to fight and even die on behalf of one’s country’ (Galston, 1991: 221). Galston himself concedes that elements of liberal virtue may come into conflict. For instance, the ‘disposition to narrow the gap . . . between principles and practices in liberal society’ can come into conflict with the virtue of law-abidingness. However, Galston’s explanation that this ‘is a tension rather than a contradiction between these two liberal virtues’ is not entirely convincing (Galston, 1991: 227).What Galston describes here is actually a function of the operation of ethical diversity.The civic character needed for civil disobedience is constitutionally different from that needed for law-abidingness, even if the occasions for practicing civil disobedience are relatively few. Rorty also argues that different moral and political work is best accomplished by different ethical types. ‘Other things being equal’, Rorty explains, ‘the ideal models projected by each moral system would enter situations from different perspectives, with a historical set of salient preoccupations’ (Rorty, 1992: 47). For example, public defenders and prosecutors work at cross-purposes, with different agendas, codes of ethics, priorities, and presuppositions about individuals, communities and the law. However, social order, civil liberty and the rule of law require both. Similarly, idealistic antiwar protestors, patriotic citizen-soldiers and pragmatic political leaders often work at cross-purposes, because each has different goals, codes of ethics, etc. I suspect that the civic capital of a liberal democratic polity would be dangerously depleted by standardized civic education, much as the biological resources of an ecosystem are depleted by the replacement of biologically diverse woodlands with a single, homogenous crop. Just as biological diversity provides resistance to disease, parasites, weather, weeds, etc., civic diversity provides resistance to various political, social and economic challenges – including those created by external enemies, those posed by internal [301]

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political manipulators and those caused by unforeseen (and often unforeseeable) events. Third, Rorty persuasively argues that ethical diversity actually makes it less dangerous for each civic type to practice its own conception of good citizenship, thereby providing a kind of safety net for societies which might commit serious injustices (or passively allow injustices to stand) in the absence of rival ethical and civic understandings. As Rorty explains,‘It is safer and easier to be a full-blown consequentialist if you know that there are enough deontologists around to prevent you from doing something awful for the sake of a distant good; similarly, it is safer and easier to insist on rectitude if you know that there are enough utilitarians around to press for the distribution of basic human goods’ (Rorty, 1992: 53).This logic applies to civic character types as well. And, lastly, Rorty argues that diversity may help sustain liberal democratic states not in spite of its tendency to promote conflict, but, at least in part, because of its tendency to do so. Indeed, visible moral conflict within a community can serve as kind of civic education, reminding citizens of the validity of multiple perspectives which might otherwise be suppressed. Unfortunately, many liberals seem to think of social and cultural pluralism as a ‘rude fact’ that our political institutions and our conceptions of citizenship must, somehow, accommodate or work around, while conflict is generally viewed as something to be avoided or contained for the sake the social peace.This is why liberal theories of citizenship and civic virtue tend to focus on toleration, civility and the virtues of deliberative discourse, rather than more bellicose virtues such as courage. The former are intended to mute, soften, or altogether eliminate potential conflicts derived from religious, ethnic, racial, class and other differences within a community. Imposition of any standard model of good citizenship and civic character on citizens of a liberal democracy would be likely to downgrade or exclude some vital civic values or competences, no matter how reasonable and perfectly well-suited it is to the liberal polity. As a result, any polity that commits itself to a standardized view of civic character might very well find itself without a sufficiently diverse stock of civic competences and, as a direct consequence, find itself without sufficient patriots to manage the national defense, enough pragmatic leaders to make hard choices, enough idealists to challenge and resist the pragmatic (and often cynical) decisions of government leaders, or even enough informed voters for elections genuinely to reflect the will of the people. In contrast, civic education based on civic pluralism would seek to foster a body of citizens with a range of different understandings of what good citizenship requires, as well as the virtues and competences suited to these specific understandings. Such a scheme would introduce young citizens to several [302]

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competing, but possibly overlapping, models of good citizenship via public education, while private entities (including religious schools and civic organizations like the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts or the 4H Club) would be permitted to promote a single set of civic values, so long as these values are reasonable and constitutional (i.e. do not violate constitutional rights, promote the violent overthrow of the government, or otherwise undermine the constitutional order).9 Civic pluralism accepts modes of citizenship ranging from the predominantly passive to the militantly engaged. It accepts styles of citizenship that range from highly civil to quite uncivil. And it accepts objectives of citizenship that range from enlightened self-interest to a variety of collectivist purposes. A citizenry prepared by civic education based on civic pluralism could, as a result, respond to civic challenges in an array of very different ways – some by voting, some by organizing, some by raising money, some by petitioning, some by fighting, some by resisting conscientiously, and some, perhaps, even by condemning the entire enterprise of practical politics as ridiculous and corrupt.10 Although there may be several reasonable ways to be a good citizen of a liberal polity, liberalism cannot afford to be neutral toward ideas of good citizenship. Just as the moral life of the Aztecs is ruled out of bounds by Galston’s liberal pluralism (because of their practice of human sacrifice), certain attitudes toward politics and participation in political life are ruled out of bounds by the theory of civic pluralism (Galston, 1995: 535). It, for instance, must reject ideas of citizenship that exclude anyone from full participation on the basis of religion, gender, race or other ascriptive traits. Liberalism also must reject ideas that encourage citizens to assault the public order through extraconstitutional means (although this does not discount civil disobedience properly understood, whereby transgressors accept the legal penalties for their illegal activities). Political apathy, understood as an attitude of indifference toward politics, also is rejected by civic pluralism because it is antithetical to self-government. When citizens are indifferent to the uses of political power, they are less likely to be able to protect either individual or group liberties. However, skepticism toward the practice of politics can be a constructive attitude. Indeed, even irreverence toward politics, if undertaken in a spirit of moral improvement, can be quite healthy for political society. Practically speaking, public schools are well-positioned to introduce young citizens to a plurality of different views of good citizenship, while private schools, civic associations and political parties would be better able to work as earnest advocates for particular views of good citizenship. A diverse civil society and pluralistic model of civic education in the public schools would, in a general way, reinforce one another, with particular groups pressuring [303]

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Theory and Research in Education 4(3) schools to include their favorite model and the schools themselves seeking to give each of the reasonable models promoted by these groups their due, enabling them to be live options for young citizens. It is not the case that a robust and diverse civil society allows for a unitary model of civic education by providing supplementary and alternative norms. Rather, a unitary model of civic education in public schools is more likely to edge out alternatives and, ultimately, diminish the civic diversity of civil society.

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In this article, I have suggested that Galston should be more attentive to the plurality of reasonable ways that one might be a good citizen, rather than seeking to identify an ideal or optimum view of the virtues/competencies of liberal democratic citizenship. The main problem is not that Galston’s vision of good citizenship is dangerous or misguided. It is, rather, that no single view of good citizenship – even one informed, as Galston’s is, by a deep respect for human diversity – is equal to the civic challenges and public problems of the modern liberal polity. Attempting to force all citizens of a liberal democracy, or even a great number of them, into a single, uniform mold of what good citizenship entails is unworkable and misguided, no matter how appealing any particular vision happens to be. Admittedly, the theory of civic pluralism itself is not without difficulties. Most obviously, from a practical standpoint, it is far easier to institutionalize a single view of good citizenship than it is to instruct young citizens in the virtues and values of different views. However, the main theoretical difficulty is related to whether civic pluralism demands of citizens something like personal autonomy or critical reflection on one’s own way of life. Galston argues, reasonably, that civic education has two important purposes in any state. First, it contributes to the development of individuals who can function effectively in, and actively support, their political community. And, second, it strengthens a particular political order (in this case, a liberal democratic one which demands from citizens a high level of toleration for difference). Promoting personal autonomy, however, is not one of its purposes. Indeed, Galston departs from fellow liberals Gutmann, Macedo and Crittenden when he argues that the success of liberalism depends upon its willingness to set aside the liberal ideal of autonomy as part of a model of citizenship suitable for all citizens.11 Galston excludes this capability because it is inconsistent with some (though not all) decent ways of life which should be permissible within a liberal polity and because it goes beyond what is minimally needed to maintain such a polity. Galston distinguishes usefully between tolerating other ways of life and [304]

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critical reflection regarding one’s own way of life. ‘The heart of the tolerance a liberal society needs is the refusal to use state power to impose one’s own way of life on others. Such refusal need not be incompatible with an unreflective commitment to one’s way of life’ (Galston, 1995: 524).12 However, when Galston rejects individual autonomy and critical self-reflection on one’s own life as a possible basis for political judgment and action, he inadvertently diminishes the available potential reservoir of civic energy and commitment. Even if the autonomous and self-critical model of citizenship is not the only or even the best conception of good citizenship for liberal democracies, it is at least a reasonable and decent conception – one with many historical heroes to inspire emulation. It also bolsters liberalism’s ability to cope with certain civic challenges, including the use of propaganda by political leaders on behalf of irrational and unjust enterprises.This is not to say that all citizens of a liberal democracy must demonstrate a capacity for autonomous political judgment and action. I am in full agreement with Galston, therefore, when he insists that the state may mandate the teaching of basic civic competencies and loyalty, but ‘has no direct right to shape public education in accordance with the norms of Socratic self-examination’ (Galston, 1991: 254).13 However, just because a civic duty does not oblige all identically does not mean that it obliges no one at all. While civic pluralism recognizes the existence of a multiplicity of reasonable ways of being a good citizen of a liberal polity, and encourages young citizens to choose among them, civic education based on civic pluralism would not be education in autonomy. Instead, it would involve something like ‘political self-reliance’, which is the ability to think through possible duties to determine whether they are truly duties for oneself, as well as the ability to take stock of the abilities and resources (e.g. social, economic, political) that one can bring to bear on public problems (Scorza, 2003: 189–207). When young citizens are exposed to several competing views of good citizenship, and are urged to choose a civic creed that suits their abilities, resources and temperaments, they are not being asked to engage in critical reflection about their lives in general. Nor are they being asked to question their own values or goals.While the practice of political self-reliance urges citizens to consider their place in society as a starting place for thinking about the nature and extent of their civic duties, it does not require them to question the worth of that place (compared with other possible places). Indeed, the practice of political self-reliance would actually allow citizens take into account some largely unexamined commitments, including attachments to groups or traditional morality. Some young citizens might choose to go further, especially if they are attracted to a Socratic or Thoreauan style of citizenship. But none would be required to do so as a function of pedagogy or curriculum. [305]

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Given a system of civic education based on civic pluralism, there also is a question as to what extent private schools and associations should be permitted to teach their own distinctive understandings of civic virtue and citizenship. Leaving aside cults, the organizations most likely to run afoul of the limits of civic pluralism are entities like certain military academies (which have historically excluded women) or the Boy Scouts (which has asserted its right to exclude homosexuals from scout-master positions). Does civic pluralism oblige us to re-evaluate these cases and tolerate the visions of citizenship that these groups promote? It seems to me that civic pluralism should not trump any established constitutional right. So, if the courts decide that these practices represent unconstitutional infringements on the rights of women or homosexuals, then the matter of their exclusionary practices is closed. One need not agree morally with these organizations, or want to have anything to do with them. But, as long as they do not impose their civic ideals through coercion, or deny their members free exit, we may indeed have to tolerate them (i.e. accept their existence and right to promote their particular civic values without necessarily endorsing them or any of their policies or beliefs). Some liberals may have trouble with this conclusion, and I am not all that keen about it myself, but it may, indeed, be a consequence of accepting the logic of civic pluralism. There is also the potential problem of moral and civic incoherence. By offering a menu of different types of civic character, and different kinds of civic virtue, young citizens might very well be overwhelmed, not knowing what type to choose for themselves. Indeed, one significant cause of political apathy among liberal democratic citizens may be their sense of having too many choices and too little authoritative guidance. Luckily, civic pluralism is not the same as what Alan Wolfe has called ‘civic deregulation’ (Wolfe, 1999). While civic education based on civic pluralism might, reasonably, raise concerns about some citizens free riding on the civic labor of others, the solution to the free-rider problem is not necessarily to impose a single standard view of citizenship. This problem might also be addressed by increasing the awareness of young citizens of the wide range of genuinely beneficial civic work that needs to be done. Indeed, if multiple types of good citizenship really are needed to sustain liberal democratic political arrangements, then schools should teach civics in such a way as to enhance the ability of citizens to make intelligent choices between different models, tolerate the choices of others (without necessarily approving of their choices), and understand better how different kinds of citizenship fit into one’s own belief system and temperament, as well as the morally ambiguous history of their country. Of course, widespread political apathy would undoubtedly pose problems for any society. However, even the hatred of politics, by some citizens, could [306]

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serve a purpose, particularly if we assume that this hatred is not universal and operates in the context of a plurality of different civic types. Could hatred of politics even be understood as a reasonable, decent or acceptable view of good citizenship? It may depend on why citizens hate politics. Ignorance, boredom and fear are not good reasons. Moral disgust or feelings of indignation regarding the abuse or misuse of state power are somewhat better reasons. At the very least, the existence of a skeptical outlook toward politics, whatever its source, may serve as a valuable check on the potential excesses of any wouldbe teachers of civic virtue. A final consideration is that one can reasonably expect citizens who adhere to very different models of good citizenship to be more likely to misunderstand and misjudge one another’s actions and motives and, resultantly, also be more likely to become embroiled in conflicts leading to civic discord. If we are committed to something like ‘civic unity’, as Galston is, then we need to take this difficulty quite seriously. For example, one could easily imagine, in times of war or near war, citizens attracted to idealistic activism clashing with those who prefer pragmatic realism, or traditional patriots misunderstanding, and disliking, both the idealists and the realists. Conflicts between these groups might be even more common in a society in which civic education was used actively to promote civic pluralism. In response to this concern, Rorty would probably say that these conflicts are a small price to pay for the benefits of moral diversity. And Berlin would probably say that no decent society would or could suppress such conflicts, or their causes. I want to go further by suggesting that, in the absence of systematic interference with the ability of voluntary associations to advocate for their own visions of good citizenship, conflict and misunderstanding between adherents of different civic creeds are inevitable (Balot, 2004; Scorza, 2001). However, by exposing students to different models of good citizenship, civic education based on civic pluralism might reduce these conflicts by promoting mutual respect and tolerance for a reasonable range of different civic views. It would do so in part, I imagine, by fostering in citizens the recognition of the moral ambiguity and difficulty of politics and public affairs. I would not want to posit this recognition as a condition for every acceptable understanding of the practice of citizenship, but I would hope that it might become an integral feature of a great many decent and reasonable ones. note s 1. Galston is not alone in failing to acknowledge pluralism as an intrinsic feature, rather than an external end, of civic education. For instance, David Miller (1995: 432–40) attempts to determine whether any of the major conceptions of citizenship – liberal, libertarian and republican – are capable of dealing with

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Theory and Research in Education 4(3) the challenge of cultural pluralism, without considering whether civic pluralism itself may be viable or desirable in liberal democratic societies. Similarly, Eamonn Callan (1997: 96) has argued that the right kind of patriotism can satisfy an emotional need for citizens of liberal democratic states, and help perpetuate justice against the constant threat posed by potentially divisive social and cultural pluralism. 2. Political scientists are accustomed to analyzing ‘modes’ of participation. For instance, Lester W. Milbrath and M.L. Goel (1977: 18–22) present a fairly nuanced account of civic character types based on common forms of political participation, including: apathetic inactives, passive supporters, contact specialists, communicators, party and campaign workers, community activists and protestors.

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3. Isaiah Berlin expands upon this theory in ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (1969) and in ‘The pursuit of the ideal’, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (1990). John Gray (1996) has argued that the more seriously we take the claims of value pluralism the more uncomfortable we must be with Berlin’s apparent privileging of negative liberty and, indeed, the liberal way of life itself. Galston (1998: 242) argues, in response, that the zone of liberty protects individuals and groups from coercive interference in their chosen ways of life, but does not require that every way of life be internally regulated by liberty or autonomy.

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4. According to Charles Larmore (1994: 63), it is more likely for value pluralism to be a contested truth, and an ‘object of reasonable disagreement’ in liberal culture, than it is to be a guiding principle for liberalism.Within a liberal polity there are likely to be numerous ‘value monists’, for whom value pluralism will be an unsatisfactory starting point for settling political disagreements. It is an unnecessary assumption, Larmore concludes, even if it accurately describes the moral universe.

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5. The most important limits on state authority over civic education, according to Galston, are morally fundamental claims made by parents. But Galston (2002: 109) also recognizes the legitimacy of private or voluntary associations teaching competing civic creeds:‘An educational program based on an expansive and contestable definition of good citizenship or civic unity will not ordinarily justify the forcible suppression of expressive liberty.’

6. Even more recently, Galston (2005: 75–94) has elaborated on ‘toughness’,’or the ability to play ‘hardball’, as an instrumental virtue of political leadership in constitutional democracies. 7. At one point, Galston (2005: 4) also refers to ‘the virtues and competences that citizens need to fulfill diverse roles in a liberal pluralist, economy, society, and polity’, although he does not explicitly acknowledge that different roles may require different virtues and competences or that these roles may also suit different temperaments [italics added].

8. State-mandated civic education programs would be uniquely positioned to reduce the range of civic alternatives open to young citizens by emphasizing a single hegemonic view of good citizenship. As Joseph Raz (1986: 411–29)

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Scorza: Facing up to civic pluralism reminds us, coercion is not limited to forcing people to perform or desist from performing particular acts, but may also entail limiting the options of individuals. 9. On this point I am in agreement with Galston (1995: 239), who argues that the organizations of civil society need not mirror the prevailing constitutional order. Indeed, Galston asserts, ‘constitutional uniformity crushes social pluralism’. 10. Walt Whitman (1918: 234) once criticized the ‘litterateurs’ of his generation for mocking politics, but it is not clear to me that the effect of such mockery is exclusively corrosive.

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11. Gutmann (1989: 79), for instance, emphasizes ‘the ability to deliberate and therefore to participate in conscious social reproduction’. Similarly, Macedo (1990: 269) favors autonomy over diversity: ‘Liberal persons are distinguished by the possession of self-governing reflective capacities. Further developing these reflective capacities leads one toward the ideal of autonomy.’ Crittenden (2000: 106) develops a distinction between teaching democratic deliberation and teaching personal autonomy. He concedes that although teaching deliberation could lead students to the practice self-reflection it would not necessarily do so.

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12. Gutmann (1989: 79), however, hangs the significance of the examined life on the hook of political practice: ‘Although a democratic state permits adults to live unexamined lives as well as examined one[s], it does not support education that is neutral between these two options nor does it claim that the two ways of life are equally good. Democratic education cannot be neutral between these two options and still educate citizens (or public officials) who are capable of exercising good political judgment.’

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13. Socratic views of citizenship have been defended by several scholars, including Dana Villa (1996: 48), who writes ‘Alienated citizenship – the kind of citizenship performed by Socrates, Lessing, and Thoreau – values distance, reflection, and resistance over patriotism, will, and duty; conscience and independent judgement over shared purposes; episodic intervention over constant engagement.’ In an earlier essay (1989: 722), Galston also gestured in this direction:‘Properly understood, liberalism’s Archimedean point is neither Cartesian nor Kantian but, rather, Socratic.To have the capacity to become aware of the inner contradictions of one’s own society is precisely the kind of reflective distance required by the liberal conception of individuality.’

re fe re nce s

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Berlin, I. (1990) The Crooked Timber of Humanity. New York: Random House, Inc. Callan, E. (1997) Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Crittenden, J. (2002) Democracy’s Midwife: An Education in Deliberation. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books. Dewey, J. (1954) The Public and Its Problems [1927]. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. Galston, W. (1986) ‘Public morality and religion in the liberal state’, PS 19(4): 807–24. Galston,W. (1988) ‘Liberal virtues’,’American Political Science Review 82(4): 1277–90. Galston,W. (1989) ‘Pluralism and social unity’, Ethics 99(July): 711–26. Galston, W. (1991) Liberal Purposes: Goods,Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Galston,W. (1995) ‘Two concepts of liberalism’, Ethics 105(3): 516–34. Galston, W. (1998) ‘The legal and political implications of moral pluralism’, Maryland Law Review 57(1): 236–50. Galston,W. (2002) Liberal Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Galston, W. (2005a) ‘The Case for Universal Service’, in Will Marshall and Marc Porter Magee (eds), The AmeriCorps Experiment and the Future of National Service, 99–109.Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute. Galston, W. (2005b) The Practice of Liberal Pluralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gray, J. (1996) Isaiah Berlin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gutmann, A. (1989) ‘Undemocratic education’, in Nancy Rosenblum (ed.) Liberalism and the Moral Life, pp. 71–88. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kloppenberg, J. (1998) The Virtues of Liberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Larmore, C. (1994) ‘Pluralism and reasonable disagreement’, Social Philosophy and Policy 11(1): 61–79. Macedo, S. (1990) Liberal Virtues: Citizenship,Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Macedo, S. (2000) Democracy and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Milbrath, L.W. and Goel, M.L. (1977) Political Participation, second edition. Chicago: Rand McNally. Miller, D. (1995) ‘Citizenship and pluralism’, Political Studies 43: 432–50. Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Putnam, R. (2000) Bowling Alone:The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Raz, J. (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rorty, A.O. (1992) ‘The advantages of moral diversity’, Social Philosophy & Policy 9(2): 38–62. Scorza, J.A. (2001) ‘The ambivalence of political courage’, The Review of Politics 63(4): 638–61. Scorza, J.A. (2003) ‘Political docility and political self-reliance’, International Journal of Politics and Ethics 3(2): 189–207.

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Spragens,T. Jr (1999) Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing. Thoreau, H.D. (1965) ‘On the duty of civil disobedience’, in Walden & Other Writings of Henry David Thoreau. New York:The Modern Library. Villa, D. (1996) ‘Socrates, Lessing, and Thoreau: the image of alienated citizenship in Hannah Arendt’, in Austin Sarat and Dana Villa (eds) Liberal Modernism and Democratic Individuality: George Kateb and the Practices of Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Whitman,W. (1918) ‘Democratic vistas’, in Prose Works. Philadelphia: David McKay. Wolfe, A. (1999) ‘Civic deregulation’,’Blueprint Magazine (3). http://www.dlc.org/ ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=115&subid=172&contentid=1441. Wolfe,A. (2001) Moral Freedom:The Impossible Idea that Defines the Way We Live Today. New York:W.W. Norton & Company.

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j a s o n a . s c o r z a is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Political Science at Fairleigh Dickinson University, in Teaneck, New Jersey. He also is Director of the School of English, Philosophy & Humanities and the School of Art & Media Studies. His previous articles on aspects of liberal citizenship have appeared in Political Theory, The Review of Politics and the International Journal of Politics & Ethics. A forthcoming book, Strong Liberalism: Habits of Mind for Democratic Citizenship, is to be published by the University Press of New England. Correspondence to: Professor Jason A. Scorza, Schools of English, Philosophy & Humanities/Art & Media Studies, Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1000 River Road, Teaneck, NJ 07666, USA. [email: [email protected]]

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