Imperialism is Far Too Easy: A Deweyan Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy Shane J. Ralston Pennsylvania State University-Hazleton
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Abstract Since the attacks on the Pentagon and Twin Towers, many foreign policy scholars have interpreted the U.S. response – its so-called “war on terror” – as continuous with “longstanding claims of U.S. exceptionalism vis-à-vis the world,” “comforting narratives of our past” and an American tradition of imperialistic aggression. Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of “imperialism” as “an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion” describes much of the history—and to some extent, the current trajectory—of American foreign policy. Though Barack Obama’s foreign policy stance backed away from George W. Bush’s strong unilateralism (on display in, for instance, the invasion of Iraq) and the war on terror fizzled, doubts persist to the effect that the two policies have never been much different. A remarkably imperialist (at least on Schumpeter’s definition) approach to managing the threat of asymmetrical warfare or terrorism through interventions in the affairs of sovereign nations, nation-building and military assistance for regimes (and sometimes resistance fighters) during civil wars was witnessed throughout the Obama administration (e.g. in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria). It is still uncertain whether this approach will survive into Donald Trump’s administration. The American pragmatist John Dewey offers insight into the current international situation in his essay “Imperialism is Easy,” written more than seventy years prior to the September 11th attacks. The essay has been largely neglected, perhaps because of the perception that its relevance was constrained to the times in which it was written. Though the subject of Dewey’s essay was the scope and intentionality of American influence in Mexico during the Cristero War, the lessons it teaches its readers are timeless. For the current international situation, Dewey’s “Imperialism is Easy” offers a ground map for curbing American exceptionalism and overcoming U.S. ambitions to be an imperialist power or global hegemon. Keywords: John Dewey, imperialism, interventionism, neocolonialism, American exceptionalism, international relations, diplomacy.
Imperialism is Far Too Easy: A Deweyan Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy The status of the United States as “sole superpower” appeared unassailable. Its dominance was unquestioned and unambiguous. This was not hypernationalistic chest-thumping; it was the conventional wisdom. –Andrew J. Bacevich (2008, 2-3) A foreign policy built on pragmatist principles is neither naïve nor dangerous. In fact, it is very much what both the US and the world are currently in need of. –John Ryder (2009, 1) Since the attacks on the Pentagon and Twin Towers, many foreign policy scholars have interpreted the U.S. response – its so-called “war on terror” – as continuous with “longstanding claims of U.S. exceptionalism vis-à-vis the world,” “comforting narratives of our past” and an American tradition of imperialistic aggression (Scott 2009, 579; Kagan 2006, 21). Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of “imperialism” as “an objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion” describes much of the history—and to some extent, the current trajectory—of American foreign policy (cited in Doyle 1997, 40). Though Barack Obama’s foreign policy stance backed away from George W. Bush’s strong unilateralism (on display in, for instance, the invasion of Iraq) and the war on terror fizzled, doubts persist to the effect that the two policies have never been much different (Mann 2004; Ralston 2009). A remarkably imperialist (at least on Schumpeter’s definition) approach to managing the threat of asymmetrical warfare or terrorism through interventions in the affairs of sovereign nations, nation-building and military assistance for regimes (and sometimes resistance fighters) during civil wars was witnessed throughout the Obama administration (e.g. in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Syria). It is still uncertain whether this approach will survive into Donald Trump’s administration.
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The American pragmatist John Dewey offers insight into the current international situation in his essay “Imperialism is Easy,” written more than seventy years prior to the September 11th attacks. The essay has been largely neglected, perhaps because of the perception that its relevance was constrained to the times in which it was written. Though the subject of Dewey’s essay was the scope and intentionality of American influence in Mexico during the Cristero War, the lessons it teaches its readers are timeless. For the current international situation, Dewey’s “Imperialism is Easy” offers a ground map for curbing American exceptionalism and overcoming U.S. ambitions to be an imperialist power or global hegemon. Imperialism’s Easiness Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of ‘imperialism’ is instructive. However, contemporary definitions of ‘imperialism’ are not limited to territorial expansionism and colonialism. They encompass more flexible concepts such as hegemony (i.e., the dominance of one nation-state over others) and sphere of influence (i.e., a region within which some hegemon has immense sway over the culture, politics, economics and military activity). Some contemporary pragmatists have criticized the U.S. for its imperialist ambitions – for instance, Cornel West (2004). Harry K. Wells (1954) criticized pragmatism for encouraging America’s imperialist ambitions: “Pragmatism is the main-line philosophy of U.S. imperialism. It is the world outlook, the theory and method of the capitalist class” (187). However, Wells’ account of pragmatism’s relation to imperialism was wildly inaccurate, based on a stereotypical view promulgated during the Cold War.1 What few contemporary pragmatists have acknowledged, though, is John Dewey’s premonitions of American imperialism’s development in his essay “Imperialism is Easy.” Reflecting on observations made during a recent visit to Mexico (in 1927), Dewey (1996) notes
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that “the United States has become a kind of trustee for the business interests of other countries” and that the “average citizen of the United States has little knowledge of the extent of American business and financial interests in Mexico” (LW 3, 159-160).2 At the time, Mexico was undergoing a major social-political crisis. Once Mexican President Calles had severely restricted exercises of Catholic religious freedoms, revolts broke out over the entire country, initiated by militant Roman Catholics (called Cristeros), and continued for three years thereafter (from 1926 to 1929) despite brutal repression by the Mexican army. Many American businesses and expatriates in Mexico favored U.S. intervention to restore order, arguing that “[w]e should … set up a model of administration, multiply schools, and after we have shown the Mexicans how a state should be managed, should turn it over to them, in good running order” (LW 3, 161). President Calvin Coolidge’s administration decided not to intervene. Dewey agreed with Coolidge’s decision, though he appreciated why many Americans felt that imperialistic intervention was the more appropriate reaction. The main disadvantage of intervention, though, was that it could create long-term uncertainty and enmity between nation-states (for instance, Mexico still denies foreign nationals the legal right to own Mexican land). According to Dewey, “[i]mperialism is a result, not a purpose or plan” (LW 3, 158). Rather than a consciously intended policy, then, imperialism is a nearly inevitable consequence of less-than-favorable international circumstances. Recent Debates over Russian versus U.S. Interventionism Abroad If the anonymous U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sources are to be believed, Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, tipping the scales toward their favorite candidate and the eventual victor Donald Trump. However, even if it is true that Russia interfered in the election, and even if the American intelligence community does not like it (which it surely does
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not), the U.S. has little room to complain. America and its intelligence services, especially the CIA—the same CIA that claims Russia meddled in the U.S. presidential election—have a long history of interfering in other sovereign nations’ elections and, even worse, assassinating candidates and presidents they do not support. For instance, 1. In 1948, the U.S. assisted Italy’s centrist Christian Democrats, aiding them in their electoral victory over a coalition of left-wing parties which included a communist element. 2. In 1953, the CIA aided Ramon Magsaysay in his successful campaign for president of the Philippines. 3. In 1953, the U.S. with the help of Britain sponsored a coup to remove the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and replace him with the Shah, who promised not to nationalize Iran’s oil assets. 4. In 1954, the president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, was replaced by Washington with a series of right-wing dictators because he opposed the United Fruit Co., a U.S. corporation that control of Guatemala’s agricultural products. 5. In 1957, the U.S. government and American oil companies financially supported Christian parties in Lebanon, helping them to win several elections. 6. In 1961, the CIA helped opposition forces remove and assassinate the Congo’s first elected leader Patrice Lumumba, who they feared was controlled by the Soviet Union (even though he was not). 7. In 1964, the U.S. stopped Salvador Allende from winning the presidential election. When it could not prevent him from winning the presidency in 1970, the CIA supported General
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Pinochet’s violent overthrow of Chile’s government and helped him kill democratically elected President Allende. 8. In 1967, Sukarno, the prime minister of Indonesia, was ousted from power by American, Australian and British supported anti-communist forces for offering Communists a place in the democratic government. 9. In 2009, when Hilary Clinton was secretary of state, she refused to join the UN in condemning the military coup in Honduras that removed democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya. 10. In 2014, the U.S., not satisfied with the outcome of the Afghan election, decided the election was a tie and established an appointed leadership position, Chief Executive Officer, the occupant of which American governmental and corporate leaders could easily control. Oddly enough, many of these U.S. actions to interfere in the electoral contests and political affairs of other countries were strategic moves in the Cold War, an American-Soviet struggle for geopolitical supremacy fought mainly through proxy wars, international espionage and a nuclear arms race. Consistent with the domino theory and George Kennan’s strategy of containment, the U.S. sought to counter growing Soviet Russian—yes, Russian—influence by stopping states from becoming Communist (Korea, Vietnam, etc.). Otherwise, they would all eventually fall to Communism like dominoes. The sphere of Soviet influence would grow and American influence would shrink unless the Communist threat could be contained (Kissinger 1995). So, why is the U.S. government so fearful of Russia and its possible meddling in our election? One explanation is that old-timers in the American intelligence community still believe that Russia, albeit no longer Communist (the Soviet regime was dissolved in 1991), continues to extend its sphere of influence and, despite Einstein’s definition of insanity, the situation still 5
demands a policy of containment. Perhaps a better explanation is that the CIA is fearful that the U.S. will lose its coveted position as number one meddler in other countries’ political affairs to its biggest geopolitical rival: Russia. In other words, imperialism—and by extension U.S. (and Russian) interventionism abroad—is, as Dewey warned, still far too easy. Why else would the U.S. overlook the hypocrisy of its stance towards Russia? Realism and Benevolent Global Hegemony International Relations (IR) realists are more likely to appreciate the benefits of imperialism insofar as an imperialistic hegemon balances power in an otherwise anarchic international system. Sometimes referred to as the theory of benevolent hegemony (or benevolent global hegemony), it is thought that those nations forced to accept an imperialist’s dominance “could benefit from its hegemony or would even appreciate” the freedoms that dominance affords them (Kagan 1996:19; Peleg 2009:5). The time of raw or naked imperialism is over. Instead of dominant nation-states (hegemons or imperialists) forcibly expanding into the territory of weaker ones, exploiting their natural resources and dominating them militarily by, for instance, creating a permanent troop presence, building bases and installing weapons, modern-day imperialism is more insidious and less salient than it was in the past. In other words, imperialism is – as the title of Dewey’s essay suggests – far too easy because it is less noticeable today than it was when there were overt colonial powers with unapologetic imperialist ambitions. Nowadays, imperialism is one feature of the international situation, implicit in the conditions of diplomatic engagement between unequal nation-states and non-state actors. It is less coercive and more consensual. It is less threatening and more matter-of-fact. If an incoming presidential administration hopes to resist the pull toward American imperialism, then it must change the problematic conditions within the global situation – for 6
instance, by reducing the immense gap between rich and poor countries (what we now call the ‘global north’ and ‘global south’) and blocking the influence of corporate interests in directing the global hegemon’s foreign policy. How should pragmatism reflect this need to address the whole international situation that gives rise to imperialism, rather than demonize the U.S. as an imperialistic hegemon? A Pluralistic Approach to Curbing American Interventionism In the essay “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” Dewey (1996) expressed doubts whether any single moral theory can be relied upon to the exclusion of others. To virtue theorists, he responds that the cultivation of a “scheme of virtues” is only one of “three independent variables” in moral philosophy, including the imposition of duties or “demands” (deontology) and the realization of ends or “goods” (consequentialism) (LW 5, 285-6). Rather than acknowledge the utility of all three, dependent upon the specific and unique demands of emergent situations, moral philosophers “postulate one single principle as an explanation” and solution of all morally problematic situations (LW 5, 279). Their mistake lies in “reducing all the elements in moral situations to a single commensurable principle,” when the qualities of these situations tend to be so diverse and irreducibly complex as to defy such “oversimplified” or reductionist accounts (LW 5, 288). Instead, intelligent ethical inquiry demands a host of tools, an entire tool-kit – including deontological, consequentialist or virtue-based instrumentalities – to address the multitude of problematic conditions in any particular moral situation. How, then, is Dewey’s essay on ethics and moral theory relevant to assessing U.S. foreign policy as a vehicle for imperialist or interventionist ambitions abroad? IR realists indulge the identical mistake that most moral philosophers make, clinging to a single principle as the panacea for resolving morally problematic (international) situations. Imperialism is far too easy when
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benevolent hegemony is viewed as the exclusive means to restore order to a chaotic international scene. Realists conceive that scene as a site of never-ending competition between self-interested, geopolitically ambitious nation-states (a so-called Hobbesian “state of nature” or “war of all against all”). Simply stated, effective problem-solving in international affairs begs for a pluralistic approach, a virtual tool-bag of IR theories, moral principles and diplomatic strategies. As the U.S. State Department and the CIA well know, containment was a poor policy during the Cold War (and to this day)—even for a benevolent global hegemon. Realism alone is also a deficient IR theory for capturing the total complexity of relations between nation-states and nonstate actors. According to James Scott Johnston (2009), “different contexts, in which different subject-matter is under consideration, necessitate different techniques, different approaches, indeed, different use of (differing) abstract ideas” (33).
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References Bacevich, A. J. 2008. The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Dewey, J. 1996. The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Electronic Edition, L. A. Hickman, editor. Charlottesville, VA: Intelex Corporation. Johnson, J. S. 2009. Deweyan Inquiry: From Education Theory to Practice. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Kagan, R. 1996. “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs 75: 18-25 -------------. 2006. “Cowboy Nation: The Myth of American Innocence.” New Republic, October 23. Kissinger, Henry 1995. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster. Mann, J. 2004. The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking Adult. Peleg, I. 2009. The Legacy of George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy: Moving beyond Neoconservatism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ralston, S. 2009. “One the ‘Freedom Agenda’ and the George Bush Legacy: A Philosophical Inquiry.” In Perspectives on the George W. Bush Legacy, M. O. Grossman and R.E. Matthews, editors, 137-151. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Ryder, J. 2009. “American Philosophy and Foreign Policy.” In Self and Society: Central European Pragmatist Forum, vol. 4. New York: Rodopi Press. Scott, C. V. 2009. “Imagining Terror in an Era of Globalization: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Construction of Terrorism after 9/11.” Perspectives on Politics 7: 3 (September): 579-90. Sellars, R. W. 1956. “Review of Pragmatism, Philosophy of Imperialism by Harry K. Wells,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16: 559-562. Wells, H. K. 1954. Pragmatism, Philosophy of Imperialism. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press. West, C. 2004. Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight Against Imperialism. New York: Penguin Books.
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Notes 1
Wells’ allegation that Dewey’s pragmatism is imperialistic has not withstood the attacks of critics. See, for instance, Roy W. Sellars’ (1956) review.
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Citations are to Dewey (1996), following the conventional method, LW (Later Works) or MW (Middle Works) or EW (Early Works), volume:page number. For example, MW 10:354 refers to the Middle Works, volume 10, page 354.
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