ISIS Propaganda and Social Media Strategies

A Critical Analysis on ISIS Propaganda and Media Strategies

March 2015 Joanie Chung-Yin Yeung University of Salford Terrorism & Security Studies

Propaganda is far from benevolent forms of political actions but part of the ‘weaponization of information’.1

Introduction How do you inflict terror all over the Western world and channel global fear and attention to yourself within a short period of time? Answer: grab a victim, a knife and a camera. Since the summer of 2014, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, formerly known as ISIL) has shocked the world with its lightening advancements over territories in Iraq, then northern Syria and beyond, as well as its gruesome videos of executions of hostages. There are no weapons of mass destruction involved. There was no need to hijack planes, or stage large-scale bombings in the West to kill thousands. Even actual military capabilities are not their concern. In December 2014, while Western powers were contemplating the use of air strikes against ISIS, New York Times published comments by Major General Michael Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the U.S. in the Middle East, who admitted that he was still trying to understand ISIS. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.”2 This ‘idea’ partly resides in that fact that terrorism is launched, maneuvered, and magnified disproportionally in the virtual world. In other words, the main weapon is not the physical weapon itself but what is perceived and imagined by the public. Terror is in the eyes of the beholder (audience). As Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005, “We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle

1

David Miller and Rizwaan Sabir. “Propaganda and Terrorism”. Media and Terrorism: Global perspectives. Ed. Des Freedman, Daya Kishan Thussu. SAGE Publications Ltd. 2011. .p.77. 2 Graeme Wood. “What ISIS Really Wants” The Atlantic. March 15, 2015. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/#disqus_thread.

is taking place in the battlefield of the media.”3 The international fight against terrorism is, ultimately beyond its military dimension, a battle of perception and ideas – a struggle for the attention and minds of global audiences. This essay seeks to ‘understand the idea’ by deconstructing and analyzing ISIS’ media strategies. It will first demonstrate that ISIS utilizes a decentralized model of propaganda through social media platforms effectively, thus producing an extensive, highly fluid stream of information all over the Internet. Second, ISIS’ target audience is global, not only Arabic speakers with Jihadist aspirations (the ‘traditional’ audience targeted by previous Islamic groups). This includes all Muslims and non-Muslims from all cultures, or basically anyone who has Internet access. Third, the essay will analyze the ‘grand-narrative’ of a romanticized Muslim utopia and an imminent apocalypse crafted by ISIS media strategies to recruit globally by making sense of its existence under this worldview. Fourth, the essay will examine ISIS’ desperation to establish historical and religious legitimacy by amplifying its own support base and strength through the media. Finally, this essay will assess the strengths and weaknesses of ISIS’ media strategies, and suggest possible measures to counter them. Media-oriented terrorism is not new, but… Media-oriented terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Plenty of academic research has been devoted to the study of Islamic extremist propaganda, such as Al-Qaeda’s use of websites and online videos to recruit fighters, as well as Hezbollah’s news campaigns to undermine Israel’s global reputation. These studies mainly focus on television, the news press and the Worldwide Web. Very few, such as Sageman’s book Leaderless Jihad, acknowledge the need to look beyond these ‘passive’ forms of media and analyze the role of social media.4 ‘Passive’ media includes the news and websites, where the audience consciously selects what to read and

3

Simon Cottee. "Why It's So Hard to Stop ISIS Propaganda." The Atlantic. March 2, 2015. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-isispropaganda/386216/. 4 Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011.

download. Analysts and politicians alike seem to struggle in grasping the phenomenal role of social media platforms in empowering terrorist groups. These platforms, which include Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Ask.fm, are highly decentralized, interactive, fluid parts of the Internet which ISIS is fully utilizing currently. 1. Social media platforms and ‘fanboys’ As the Vietnam War is often called the “first televised war”, the ISIS crisis is perhaps the “first social media war”. 5 While many Islamic militant groups keep their materials on password-protected sites and centralized servers with caution, ISIS takes the opposite approach by encouraging its sympathizers to share and repost pro-ISIS propaganda with their personal social media accounts in platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This means millions of anonymous ‘netizens’ are simultaneously mobilized to be active agents for ISIS. The second issue of ISIS’ magazine, Dabiq, specifically instructs all Muslims around the world to “record the bay’ah [allegiance to ISIS] and then distribute them through all forms of media.”6 This is unprecedented for a terrorist organisation. This global unofficial network of ‘fanboys’ automatically circulates ISIS official propaganda, thus magnifying ISIS’ online presence and global reach. A small organization can be perceived as a gigantic global phenomenon if there are enough people sharing and reposting videos and news about it online. Often ISIS’ online presence, hence its image, is magnified by sympathizers who not only disseminate, but also produce their own pro-IS propaganda. They share their own praises of ISIS, or in some cases, real experiences of joining ISIS, and soon hundreds of ‘shares’ and ‘retweets’ will be seen by many across the globe within seconds. In September 2014, a videogame footage of ISIS-style executions Grand Theft Auto: Salil al-Sawarim (copying the ISIS violent video ‘The Clanging of the Swords’) showed players dressed as ISIS fighters

5

Erin Marie Saltman. Charlie Winter. “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism” Quilliam. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changingface-of-modern-jihadism.pdf. November 2014. p.42 6 Dabiq. Issue 2. p.3

shooting security forces. 7 Not only was the video received more than 10,000 hits within weeks, it inspired many ‘copycats’ to do the same thing and share their materials, each also has tens of thousands of hits a month. The most striking characteristic of social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, is their instant sharing capacities through one simple click. ISIS takes effort to ensure their propaganda and recruitment advertisements have high ‘share-bility’. This means unlike AlQaeda’s long sermon videos which take much patience to download and are difficult to share, ISIS’ posts are often one-line tweets,8 and small-sized videos in less than five minutes, and simple new feeds about ISIS fighters posted in real time.9 This means that propaganda is highly fluent and fluid in a range of languages, targeting specific audiences through unintimidating culturally relevant spaces online.

10

Australian Jihadist preacher Musa

Cerantonio shares his personal thoughts and travel plans through his Facebook and Twitter, connecting to his ‘fans’ as a celebrity-like persona. 11 In this way, millions of ordinary teenagers worldwide who spend hours on social media can easily accidentally stumble upon ISIS materials and be exposed to its ideology. This is especially evident in Twitter, in which people ‘follow’ anything or anyone they choose anonymously. Sultana, one of the British girls believed to have travelled to Syria to join ISIS, was following more than 70 extremists on Twitter and her account had more than 11,000 followers.12 A French reporter who disguised as a Muslim teenage girl in an online 7

Michelle Malka Grossman. "WATCH: Islamic State's Terror Video Game." The Jerusalem Post. September 21, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/IS-claims-it-created-a-terror-video-game375935. 8 "Is Islamic State Shaping Boko Haram Media?" BBC News. March 4, 2015. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31522469. 9 Erin Marie Saltman. Charlie Winter. “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism” Quilliam. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changingface-of-modern-jihadism.pdf. November 2014. p.40 10 Erin Marie Saltman & Moli Dow (Institute for Strategic Dialogue). “Islamic State: How foreigners are helped to reach Syria and Iraq.” BBC News. 24 February 2015. http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31607728. 11 Leesa Smith. "Australian Muslim Extremist Who Uses Social Media to Spread Jihad Tweets That He's off to Syria to Preach Hate." Daily Mail Online. July 2, 2014. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2677508/Australian-Muslim-hate-preacher-travelling-Syria-support-terrorists-new-Islamic-state-Iraq-Syria.html. 12 Margarette Driscoll. “A reporter’s undercover life with a terrorist” New York Post. March 7, 2015. http://nypost.com/2015/03/07/my-isis-boyfriend-a-reporters-undercover-life-with-a-terrorist/

forum watched an ISIS video and immediately received an online message from a prominent ISIS recruiter (and even got engaged to him online later).13 @ansaar999, a Twitter account affiliated with Isis, tweeted a guideline for its 23,400 followers about how to send threats to the United States in English with ready-made images and threats so followers can simply copy and paste them.14 Twitter also has the ‘hashtags’ function, under which a simple ‘#’ symbol before a keyword can categorize the post so that it is instantly searchable by anyone on the internet. Clicking on a hashtagged word reveals all other Tweets marked with that keyword. This allows immeasurable efficiency with which ISIS circulates its propaganda as ISIS can even hijack trending topics. During the football world cup, for example, hashtags like “#Brazil_2014” were used by ISIS to attach its propaganda to otherwise untouched audiences. 15 Hijacking hashtags on social media is indeed more manageable and effective than hijacking a plane. 2. Targeting a global audience, “Islamic Jihad for Dummies” style In addition to social media, ISIS’ propaganda machine invests effort and resources to various forms of media. Its main media arm, Al Ḥayat, produces films that range from threeminute beheading videos to hour-long pseudo-documentary features. Many are high-quality productions involving Hollywood-style techniques and special effects. ISIS’s military reporting came through the Islamic State News (ISN), while political reports came through the Islamic State Report (ISR), both are published mainly in English. Dabiq is ISIS’ main newsletter apparently combining both ISN and ISR and adding additional religious commentaries.16 All these productions reveal a sharp break from the propaganda produced by other prominent Islamic extremist groups: while groups such as Al-Qaeda target Arabic-speaking 13

Ibid. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-28136109 15 Erin Marie Saltman. Charlie Winter. “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism” Quilliam. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changingface-of-modern-jihadism.pdf. November 2014. p.40. 16 Harleen Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.” Backgrounder. Institute for the Study of War: (15-08). 2014. p.2. 14

Muslims who already have Jihadist aspirations, ISIS intentionally develops and channels its propaganda discourse at a global audience, including but not limited to devout Muslims, nominal Muslims, as well as non-Muslims across different continents. This means instead of recruiting people who consciously choose to visit Jihadist-affiliated sites to be fighters, ISIS are seeking to turn ordinary civilians into potential recruits. First and foremost, all ISIS’s videos, news releases (both ISR and ISN), social media posts, and periodicals (Dabiq) are published and promoted primarily in English instead of Arabic. Sometimes they also have translations into other Western languages, such as French, German, Russian, and even Albanian. Dabiq, ISIS’ official periodical, is a professionally produced English magazine with well-written argumentative essays written in academic English, decorated with stylish desktop publishing. In a Twitter campaign to intimidate the United States, the ISIS-linked Al-Battar Media Foundation sent out a tweet telling supporters that "Tweeting in English is preferred". 17 ISIS videos originally produced in Arabic are always released with clear and professionally added English subtitles, a feature unprecedented in videos officially released by other Islamist groups.

17

John Rossomando and Ravi Kumar. "Emboldened ISIS Threatens Americans." The Investigative Project on Terrorism. June 26, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.investigativeproject.org/4440/emboldenedisis-threatens-americans

Screenshot of Although the Unbelievers Dislike It, (Source: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/detailedanalysis-islamic-state-isis-video-although-unbelievers-dislike-it-story-expansion-4)

In fact, Dabiq publications are written in an ‘Islamic Jihad for Dummies’ style. ISIS clearly does not expect Dabiq’s readers to have any religious, historical or political background knowledge regarding Islamist discourse or current affairs in the Middle East. Basic Muslims terms, such as ‘bay’ah’ (allegiance), ‘iman’ (leader), ‘muwahhid’ (people who believe in one god), and ‘malahim’ (the end times) are given clear definitions in easy English. The first issue of the publication contains detailed explanations of the concept of ‘Imamah’ (leadership),18 as well as the historical background of Ibrahim (Abraham).19 The third issue appears to be reminding its readers where Constantinople and Baytul-Maqdis (Muslim name for Jerusalem) are.20 There is also a plain flowchart illustrating the steps in the end times in Islamic prophecies visually. 21 Other extremist groups rarely produce such ‘educational’ materials to guide potential sympathizers. They are expected to know when they arrive at extremist websites. In this way, ISIS ensures that millions of people around the world are digitally, linguistically, and intellectually within the reach of ISIS’ recruitment schemes. 18

Dabiq. Issue 2. pp.24-25. Dabiq. Issue 2. pp.26-27. 20 Dabiq. Issue 3. p.9. 21 Dabiq. Issue 1. p.38. 19

Another evident trait in ISIS’ media productions that exposes the group’s desire to reach out globally is their frequent emphasis on its ethnic diversity. The third issue of Dabiq proudly boasts that ISIS is the most multi-ethnic nation in world history and the most multilingual army. 22 In Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, one of ISIS’ meticulously crafted feature films featuring the beheadings of 22 Syrian soldiers, executioners perform the execution unmasked. This is a deliberate act to reveal a diversity of nationalities in ISIS: Europeans (at least a French and a Belgian were identified by authorities), Middle Easterns, Africans, South Asians and a Southeast Asian (possibly Filippino). It is also probable that the notorious ‘Jihadi John’ (Mohammed Emwazi), who executed notable Western victims including James Foley, Alan Henning and Peter Kassig, was chosen to perform the task on camera because of his British accent. Such calculated showcase of ethnic diversity is designed to both intimidate the West and to recruit fighters and sympathizers from a broader range. ISIS’ emphasis on recruiting Western teenagers possibly stems from their propaganda value in world media rather than any practical military value.

Screenshot of Although the Unbelievers Dislike It, (Source: http://www.tracimages.alturl.com/SyrianSoldierExecutions.jpg)

22

Dabiq. Issue 3. pp.5-6.

3. A romanticized utopia and apocalyptic narrative involving all humanity Facilitating this celebration of ethnic diversity and seduction of Muslims worldwide to ISIS is a carefully constructed grand narrative of a utopian Islamic kingdom. ISIS propaganda takes length to construct a grand narrative in which the Muslim world (Ummah) has been despised, attacked, then rises up heroically under a Caliphate in a final triumph in the end times. In a narrative that almost assembles Hollywood-styled fantasy genres, ISIS presents itself as the champion cause of such ‘rise,’ leading all the faithful Muslims to defeat the evil powers of the universe (the Crusaders, or the West). This narrative is continuously inculcated and reinforced throughout ISIS’ online materials, videos, and Dabiq. Terms such as ‘Malhamah al-Kubra,’ (the Last Battle before Judgement Day), ‘Malahim’ (end times) and ‘sahwah’ (awakening) are frequently used to enhance the sense of urgency for joining ISIS as it represents the ‘climax’ of the apocalyptic narrative. Photoshoped images of red stormy skies above ISIS fighters preparing for battle surely guide the readers to visualize this looming apocalypse. 23 Although apocalyptic themes are not new in terrorist discourse, no extremist group has used it as much as ISIS, which is constantly alluding to the final apocalypse in all its discourse, reinforcing the myth that current crises in Iraq and Syria are the realisation of the Malhamat al-Kubra.24

23

Dabiq. Issue 1. Erin Marie Saltman. Charlie Winter. “Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism” Quilliam. http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changingface-of-modern-jihadism.pdf. November 2014. p.32. 24

Examples of professionally edited pages from the first issue of Dabiq, published July 2014.

Themes of heroism and romanticism are also fully exploited in ISIS propaganda. The call to Jihad to fight for ISIS is romanticized and dramatized to provoke emotions. Images of Muslims hugging each other and groups of fighters putting their hands together frequently appear in ISIS publications. These create a seductive lure in which a utopian sense of community and brotherhood draw the readers to seek after. A commitment to spiritual devotion is also emphasized. Quranic verses, quotes from Hadiths, images of the Dome of Rock in Jerusalem, the Grand Mosque in Mecca, ISIS fighters devotedly studying the Quran are ubiquitous all over ISIS’ media. There are also ample examples of the ‘human’ side of ISIS fighters. Videos, such as The End of Sykes-Picot and The Flames of War, document ISIS fighters and their daily lives, humanitarian efforts and struggles in an idealistic and heroic light. Unlike anything before it, ISIS willingly gives the world access to the daily lives of its jihadists, thus humanizing the jihadist experience, lowering the threshold for potential recruits to feel comfortable and find comradery in the organization.25 Both themes involve all readers and position them in specific roles in the imminent clash between good and evil ahead. Unlike propaganda of other Islamist terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, ISIS media does not merely aim at generating sympathy for its 25

Ibid. p.43.

political cause or hostility towards Israel, but at creating a founding coherent myth in which all readers are inevitably related and involved. Like-minded Individuals are brought together by their sharing of a founding myth in which relationships can be real or imagined. 26 Therefore readers are to see their own role in ISIS’ fight against the West. This reiteration of a multicultural, romantic narrative all over ISIS online propaganda corresponds to ISIS’ desperation for more emigration of Muslims into its territories (Hijrah) in order to operate as a functional state with a population of likeminded people.27

Left: Dabiq. Issue 2. p.12.

26

Right: Back cover of Dabiq Issue 3.

Cristina Archetti. Understanding terrorism in the age of global media: a communication approach. Palgrave Macmillan. 2012. p. 64. 27 Harleen Gambhir (2014), ‘Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State’, Institute for the Study of War: Backgrounder, (15-08).p.4

Left: Dabiq. Issue 1. p.15

Right: Dabiq. Issue 3. p.16.

4. Establishing normalcy, historicity and religious legitimacy In order to sustain such coherent myths and a convincing call for Hijah, ISIS propaganda is constantly driven by a need to establish normality of its support base, as well as historical and religious legitimacy in the eyes of the viewers. ISIS propaganda regularly reports the pledges of bay’ah (allegiance) rolling in from jihadist groups across the Muslim world. 28 All issues of Dabiq report instances of tribes pledging bay’ah to ISIS and being welcomed with open arms. Photos of bay’ah ceremonies are ample in all the issues of the publication. ISIS also instructs Muslims around the world to organize local bay’ahs and publicize them “as much as possible.”29 ISIS even explicitly states that their motivation behind this request is to “normalize loyalty to ISIS” and to make bay’ah appear “so common to the average Muslim that he considers those holding back as grossly abnormal.”30 This is an integral part of ISIS’ media strategy as the organization seeks to create, together with its extreme atrocities, an atmosphere of fear that causes people to overestimate its support base. 28

Graeme Wood. "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic. March 15, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/#disqus_thread. 29 Dabiq. Issue 2. p.3. 30 Ibid.

This image of ‘normality’ is ideologically facilitated by reiterated emphasis of ISIS’ historical and religious legitimacy. This theme is central to the documentary-like film Although the Disbelievers Dislike It, which gives a history lesson of ISIS dating back to 2003, when the war against Saddam Hussein began. In the film, ISIS deliberately presents their advancements to Syria as a ‘prophecy fulfillment’ and as something planned in the early 2000s. Yet this was not the case, no matter how convenient it is to ISIS’ propaganda: it was not until when the Syrian Civil War began and created such opportunity for ISIS to do so.31 Through carefully crafted historiography, ISIS attempts to convince potential followers that ISIS is the fulfillment of a looming Islamic prophecy of the end times. The film Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun also gives a detailed historical interpretation of the group's foray into Syria, where the narrator emphasizes fighters from throughout the world pledged their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.32 To ISIS, historical legitimacy is intricately linked with religious legitimacy, and both come down to one central figure – the Caliphate himself. Dabiq is specifically produced to address this. Every Dabiq issue has apologetic essays of ISIS’ view of Islam, explaining and backing the orthodoxy of the Caliphate with copious quotations from the Quran and Hadiths. ISIS takes great care to ensure that the theological justifications for Al-Baghdadi as the prophesized Caliphate are robust. This inevitably involves wresting religious authority from rival organizations such as al-Qaeda by demonstrating that its methodology and interpretations are more compatible to the Quran.

33

Also, the term ‘Hijrah,’ which

traditionally refers to Prophet Mohammad’s epic journey from Medina to Mecca, is used synonymously to refer to the journey to join ISIS. The Caliphate is being compared to Ibrahim (Muslim name for Abraham), and joining the Caliphate is justified by various 31

“Detailed Analysis of Islamic State (ISIS) Video: Although the Unbelievers Dislike It.” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. Accessed 19 March 2015. http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/detailed-analysisislamic-state-isis-video-although-unbelievers-dislike-it-story-expansion-7 32 Kayla Ruble. “Islamic State Documentary Style Video Says the 'Flames of War' Have Just Begun.” 19 September 2014. https://news.vice.com/article/islamic-state-documentary-style-video-says-the-flames-of-warhave-just-begun 33 Harleen Gambhir. “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.” Backgrounder. Institute for the Study of War: (15-08). 2014.p.2

Hadiths to be ‘millah (path) of Ibrahim’.34 When painstakingly using hadiths to construct its theological arguments, ISIS also takes care to only use hadiths from the most trusted collections: the Sahihain.35 All these show that ISIS has set religious justifications a critical priority for ISIS in improving its religious standing in the global Muslim community. Strengths The advantages of ISIS propaganda strategies are apparent. For ISIS, using a wide range of visual and social media on various online platforms specifically means its propaganda is perpetually immune from government censorships or legislations. Governments typically rely on new legislations and filter mechanisms in countering online extremism. Corporations such as Facebook and Twitter diligently comply with the law by closing down accounts, and removing hashtags one by one. This is pointless when dozens more anonymous accounts are opened and content are posted and shared simultaneously. As soon as a post from ISIS-related accounts appears, dozens of new copies are shared with other jihadist sites within seconds, making censorship an intricate game of cat-and-mouse.36 The laissez faire approach ISIS’ propaganda machine also renders it self-sufficient and sustainable: ISIS’ vast network of ‘fanboys’ disseminate the group’s online propaganda rapidly and automatically. Censorships not only do not work, they are often counter-productive as owners of closed accounts immediately open new ones under new names and share the same content, thus making tracking and monitoring nearly impossible. Such high fluidity of propaganda materials, especially ultraviolent ones, is also an effective counter-weight to the West’s conventional military power. Although some alarmed Western politicians describe ISIS as a powerful force, ISIS, like many terrorist organizations, is militarily weak and defenseless against the potential air strikes currently pounding it. ISIS

34

Dabiq. Issue 3. p.10. Harleen Gambhir “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.” Backgrounder. Institute for the Study of War: (15-08). 2014.p.6. 36 Susan B. Glasser. Coll, Steve. "The Web as Weapon." Washington Post. August 9, 2005. Accessed March 19, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801018.html. 35

makes up for its military weakness through recurrent displays of atrocities to demolish the sense and sensitivity of its foes.37 Indeed, many psychological studies have shown that online sentiments are perceived as strongly as, or even more strongly than, offline feelings in almost every measurement.38 Using the wide range of media as a ‘force multiplier’, ISIS generates a virtual display of imagined strength globally with a vast ‘army’ of online supporters and ‘WMD’ made of graphic videos and tweets. This is to attack the psychological vulnerabilities of the adversaries, and in turn, attract recruits, coerce submission from local groups, and ultimately facilitate territorial conquests. Weaknesses exposed ISIS propaganda machine’s greatest strengths can also be its weaknesses. Altering, distorting and ridiculing ISIS messages can be done as easily as spreading them. The autumn of 2014 saw an upsurge of ISIS parodies and jokes on the same social media platforms that ISIS aim to influence (Youtube, Twitter, Facebook). Various parody videos making fun of ISIS’ hostage videos were produced by teenagers in the Middle East and went viral online, with tens of thousands of views in a few weeks.39 Often people share ISIS posts by adding their own mockery and anti-ISIS commentary, thus stripping the content from the original essence. A few Christians have hijacked ISIS-affiliated Twitter hashtags by posting Bible verses under the same hashtags, instantly turning them into evangelical channels.40 Although these may sound like child’s plays, these actions could jeopardize ISIS’ effort in spreading their ‘orthodox’ messages and are more damaging to ISIS than to other extremist groups. This is based on what can be known about the organization’s weaknesses, which ironically are exposed by ISIS’ own media strategies. ISIS’ online posts, videos and 37

Brian Michael Jenkins. “ISIS's Calculated Barbarity.” 10 February 2015. http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/02/isiss-calculated-barbarity.html 38 Marc Sageman. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. University of Pennsylvania Press. 2011.p.114-115 39 “These parody Isis videos may be the best way to mock their propaganda.” The Independent. January 2015. http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/these-parody-isis-videos-may-be-the-best-way-to-mock-theirpropaganda--lJzbun7Itg 40 “#BBCtrending: Americans scoff at ISIS Twitter threats.” BBC News. 2 July, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-28136109

publications expose ISIS’ heavy reliance upon its ability to recruit fighters and establish legitimacy to win over tribal leaders in its occupied territories. As shown above, Dabiq publications are clearly the product of this desperation. ISIS’ videos and publications reveal that the organization is still struggling very hard to establish historical and religious legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims and Jihadists around the world. Ideological attacks on ISIS on the Internet are precisely what the organization is most vulnerable to. While ISIS seeks to establish itself as an intimidating force and a champion of terror to the West, it is at the mercy of all the Internet users around the world to deliver its intended outcome. Conclusion This paper is a starting point rather than a final analysis for the understanding of ISIS media strategies. That being said, the above analysis helps to conclude that full engagements with highly fluid social media platforms, targeting a global audience, mobilizing online supporters, and reliance on a religious narrative for establishing legitimacy are defining characteristics of ISIS. These are likely to be used by ISIS and future Islamic extremist groups in years to come. There are certain actions Western governments ought to take into consideration. First, the Internet needs to be better contested and actively engaged by counterterrorist agencies. Social media specialist teams need to be established to actively monitor trends and strategically disseminate counter-narratives (solemn or humorous) to undermine the ISIS discourse. Social media allows government agencies to easily engage with the antiISIS population online to achieve this cooperatively. There is also a need for comprehensive legislations that compel Western media to cooperate with counter-terrorist efforts. This includes preventing the reporting of Westerners travelling to Syria to join ISIS in personal details, which only serves to inspire others to join. For beheading or other execution incidents, the media should only focus on the stories of the victims, not the means of execution for the same reason. There should also be an orchestrated media campaign which aims to damage the religious legitimacy and theological foundations

of ISIS. The media, for example, should repeatedly highlight the killings and prosecutions of Muslims carried out by ISIS to destroy its image as the champion cause for Muslims around the world. Nonetheless, more concerted efforts and more human resources need to be channeled into targeting social media platforms and strategic narrative-based counter-terrorist discourse.

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