Martial & Military Returns: Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of Liberal War [TTD 2015]

Martial & Military Returns: Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of Liberal War [Unpublished conference paper; please do not cite without permission.]

This humble paper considers new figures of liberal war at a time when the latest expeditionary cycle of wars waged by North Atlantic states appears to be drawing to a close, or at least entering a new phase space with new 'machinic phyla.'1 I won't discuss drone operators because Derek Gregory, Gregorie Chamayou, and Ian Shaw have and continue to do this with more intellectual acumen than I can muster. Extending some of my own work around the counterinsurgent and the sapper—the traditional figure of the military engineer—I use Deleuze to call attention to the arbitrageur and speculator, two financialized, contingency-centered, and derivative-based (i.e., Leibniz, calculus, the fold, etc.) subjects, which together play an implicit role in the operation and production of contemporary military violence. In doing so, my paper offers a point of departure for identifying the assemblage of forces and measures that seek to co-opt, coerce, and organize people and populations in a time where the jurisdictions of war, capital, and life become increasingly informal and indistinct. I focus primarily on figures of liberal war that have been called into being by the last fifteen-odd years of expeditionary warfare, among them the special forces operator, the joint-terminal attack controller, the embedded law enforcement advisor, and the all-female cultural support team, all of whom are designated as elite special forces, a military body that has grown and seen more action and application over the same period. I won't be considering the drift and cross-pollination of these figures across the smoothed-out spaces of foreign and domestic at a time when, according to military doctrine, almost anywhere can be a forward edge of battle or frontier zone. Following from what I call the speculative and collateral turn in North Atlantic military affairs—the rise of an atmospherics, environmentality, and intelligence of war indexed to making life live, or what Dillon & Reid call liberal

1

And at a time where global civil war is globalizing adversarial partisan confrontations and antagonisms if in uneven and sometimes quiet ways (c.f. Tiqqun 2010).

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 1

war waged to extend liberal rule—I think through Deleuze in order to consider a sliver of the aesthetic and conceptual equipment of contemporary liberal war.

This paper works, weakly perhaps, to return Deleuze (and Guattari) to the well-established literature around liberal war studies, which relies substantially (and very usefully) on Foucault's paradigmatic genealogy of biopower and biopolitics. While Deleuze's contributions to thinking through the ontologies, materialities, and territorializations of war are well known,2 the recourse to Deleuze has generally fallen off.3 This is notable given the existing range of insights generated by Deleuze and Guattari around war, organization, and the mobilization of affects, perceptions, and population and given the theory, doctrine, and conduct of new practices of state military violence in the context of neoliberal globalization and the expansion of liberal government and rule. These military practices, undertaken by core liberal capitalist states on the North Atlantic basin, include counterinsurgency, contingency operations, and stability operations, which mix firepower and biopower in populationcentered campaigns that produce acute and ambient types of coercion, blending different fall-outs and velocities together in atmospheric and environmental terms (c.f. Anderson 2010; Sloterdijk 2009).

I don't invoke atmosphere and environment as metaphor or analogy: literally, at the level of programing violence into very spaces of life itself—something envisioned by military planners undertaking systemic operation design, one part of today's military aesthetic equipment— these forces mediate environments with killing power and living power, restraining the former according to calculations of proportionality and necessity in order to amplify the latter as a more palatable 'benevolent' lesser evil. According to Eyal Weizman:

2

See Special Issue on Deleuze and War, Theory & Event 10 (2) (2010); see Weizman's Hollow Land (2007) and The Least of All Possible Evils (2012) for descriptions of his uptake in military circles. 3 Of course, here we should note Brian Massumi's forthcoming Ontopower.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 2

Material proportionality gives a new meaning to the concept of security…Through the idea of proportionality, differences and disagreements conflicts and contradiction become 'productive.' In processes concerning proportionality in which questions of normative moderation arise, the contradictory aims of different actors […] add to a diffuse security system that shapes the physical reality. (Weizman 2012: 78) Restraint, another lauded state military virtue, is merely indexed to this operation of proportionality. I argue that the blend or mixture of firepower and biopower, as an aggregation of force, collateralizes warfare and actually unrestricts it, rendering it increasingly less discrete and increasingly indiscriminate.

In this respect, lethal violence, while egregious and destructive, is one anchor. The less-than-lethal measures promoted by military actors as non-violent is a conceit because it fails to admit to the logic of proportionality at the centre of a system of military damage creation and damage control (c.f. Thi Ngyuen 2012 & 2014). Though military doctrine literature tends to locate tasks and measures on a spectrum of kinetic or non-kinetic operations, or direct and indirect action, it distinguishes fighting power as something discernably kinetic. Kinetic effects are also coded with gradations of intensity— for instance, low intensity war, high intensity combat operations. However, when everything is a target of opportunity and anything is available for weaponization—as a force amplifier or force multiplier, as an asset to shape and influence the environment and so territorialize specific engagements— this kinetic/non-kinetic distinction is increasingly moot. I argue that it is better, insofar as we aim to understand and critique these methods, to refer to different if overlapping and coordinated actions as kinetic because each has a material register as force, as affect, and as a persuasive missive or missile compelling targets to modify their behaviour. Some of these kinetic actions are strings of pulsations designed to punctuate space in very stark ways while others are slow and ethereal, like air. The result is what I describe as the regularization of irregular war.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 3

~ Deleuze For Operations While the A Thousand Plateaus chapter "Treatise on Nomadology" (1988) or the stand-alone Semiotexte version Nomadology: The War Machine (1986)seem like obvious points of departure for investigations of contemporary environmentalisms of military violence, war, species-life, and population-centered operations, my first Deleuzian referent is decidedly less exciting and more heuristic. So, no metallurgical materialism, no discourse on stirrups-horse-nomad assemblages, no war machine exterior to the state, though some of this will come in below. Following from Stephen Zagala's essay on Deleuze-Guattari and aesthetics (2003), Deleuze-Guattari's outline of the ontologies of art, science, and philosophy in What is Philosophy (1994) has been important for me because of the simple and useful opening it offers in relation to two military triads: military art, science, and philosophy (which are widely invoked and deployed); and the so-called levels of war comprised of the strategic, operational, and tactical. If for Deleuze philosophy thinks with concepts, science thinks with the correlation of sets, and art thinks with sensations, then we can extend these same ways of thinking to consider the military conduct of violence: how its operators think with concepts to embrace the circulation of uncertainty (fog and friction); how they think action as the correlation of sets, which I read as operational thinking and targeting that allocates munitions, missives, and means depending on desired effects; and how they distribute and deliver force as sensation (as tactics) where force is something sensed by the body, affectively, cognitively, or with the skin. Notably, when counterinsurgents describe the undertaking of pattern of life (POL) patrols in rural village environments, they speak often of reading the atmospherics, which means assessing how things feel—tingly 'Spidey sense' plus so-called gut feeling. In a connected if inverted way, the same agents carefully consider how to inject heat and friction into the systems and infrastructures of life, where fighting is an exercise in making sense sensible, either with agricultural transition initiatives, with using money as a weapons system, or with directing high-speed ballistics to kill and so persuade other targets to conduct themselves differently. Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 4

As some of you may be aware, military operational theory has flirted with and integrated Deleuze and Guattari. Eyal Weizman has been important in this regard, specifically assessing how Israeli operational planners walked into Deleuzian fantasies to walk through walls during raids in the occupied territories of Palestine (Weizman 2007).4 Operational thinking is essentially about targeting: correlating the set of ways and means with target so as to direct the correct mix of affects and sensations towards bodies, spaces, and built environments. Interestingly, I have spent much time tracing explicit references in contemporary military doctrine to Foucault and biopolitics—there are remarkably few—and I am always on the lookout for outlying thinkers who are captured and integrated for military use. Notably, Deleuze does in fact show up beyond the IDF context, invoked in contemporary American military literature on systemic operational design. Systemic operational design began as a minor science, a counter-discourse in military doctrine, favouring non-linear and effects-based approaches to planning and designing operations, which runs contrary to traditional military intent-based orders and hierarchical courses of action. In particular, the team planning the transfer of military responsibility from ISAF forces to Afghan security forces from 2011 onward explicitly operationalized the concepts of assemblage and deterritorialization (along with what they refer to as Foucault's conception of 'problematization') to augment the planning cycle, with some designers writing doctrine-based commentaries on the importance of the concepts (Zweibelson 2012 & 2013).

~Flexible War & Future Force as Arbitrage + Speculation Now, to turn to the figures of the arbitrageur and the speculator, my aim here is not to claim there is some internal capitalist bent to military violence today, though we could talk about neoliberal political economy and the financial intersection of the liberal war system, where warfare remains one of "the

4

Weizman also problematizes the attribution of importance to Deleuze by IDF military planners, which he regards as an overinvestment.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 5

only things that liberal regimes in Western zones of affluence can materially export today" (Evans 2011: 754-5). That said, at the level of design and conduct, North Atlantic iterations of flexible warfare today are imagined both in actuarial and financialized terms. I use these figures to explain how North Atlantic approaches to war—imagined as adaptive and dispersed, as persistent conflict, as ongoing contingency operations—are about mobilizing different opportunities for investment and the accumulation of material effects, built around hedging and leveraging chains of different assets to generate more opportunities to organize and order the field of military operations. Insofar as North Atlantic state military violence today is administered in increasingly non-reciprocal terms that resemble an adjudication process, we then have a model of military violence as arbitrage, an actuarial undertaking in assigning and finding value is things so as to expropriate or exploit them. Arbitrage denotes financial trading practices that take advantage of price differences across different market environments, whereby the arbitrageur can keeping her own individual risk low by keeping the capital moving and exploiting inefficiencies in different markets and thus continue to generate returns— operational effects—by pursuing opportunities on a deracinating continuum of what become fungible objects and commodities made amenable to continuous exchange, rhizomatic investment. In his analysis of the 2008 financial meltdown and the biopolitical context of foreign and domestic wars waged by North Atlantic states, Randy Martin puts forth the idea of 'derivative wars' to describe this speculative approach. Insofar as the objective of arbitrage is speculation for financial profit, the capital—like, say collateralized debt-obligations of toxic loans bundled together for trading—have to keep moving (often to the detriment of the wider economic environment, i.e., 90% of the global population).

To appreciate military action as a process like arbitrage, the operational design apparatus seeks to achieve cascading effects, keeping them moving to accumulate value and so achieve the idealized military end state. Yet, the paradox of this military system, as speculation and arbitrage, is that every Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 6

signature in the environment begins to have value, an atmosphere full different pulsing elements, which means a fog of information that speaks in an environmental pandemonium, leaving military agents scrambling to make intelligible these signals in what is a partial, incomplete, and anxious epistemological and perceptual disposition. The logistics of military perception in this respect becomes almost like a permanent state of emergency, an integration machine trying to calculate and adequate total picture for operations. The promise of developing the correct contextual intelligence for operations is ultimately an exercise coincides with what psychoanalysis describes as the pursuit of a perpetually lost object, which does not exist save for its role in structuring an impossible drive. This is exacerbated in a population centered context because, in recalling Foucault's work on the matter, population is "not a primary datum" (Foucault 1978 [2007]: 70); it is always-already a derivative, a knowledge effect enframed in the act of targeting.

~ Elite Troops The cycle of expeditionary wars waged since 2001, coincident with wider transformations in labour and capital, has demanded ever more complete, multi-skilled, and self-directed agents to prosecute and undertake military violence. These agents, as so-called sensor-shooters, are increasingly credentialized and coded as elite. In particular, the war in Afghanistan pollinated the reliance on and generation of elite troops, whether in terms of civil-military specialists, adaptive conventional forces, or clandestine special forces. Early 1960s French modern warfare doctrine, the precursor to contemporary counterinsurgency and contingency operations, described the need for omnidirectional, combined, and joint capabilities applied over a 'vast interlocking field of action' (Trinquier 1961) stretching from the informatic to the psychic to the cognitive to the corporeal. Tactical literature from the time reflecting on operations in Algeria describes the necessity of tourbillon ("whirlwind technique") and nomadisation (Durand & Manea 2012: ¶11) by which small cadres of special forces embedded in local communities and sought to develop local defence units and act on Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 7

local ways of life. In the figures of the special forces operator, the joint terminal attack controller, the law enforcement advisor, and the cultural support team, this legacy is important because of ways in which these figures, as itinerant but elite military labourers enjoying latitude to design and develop engagements, employ the Kleist's secrecy-speed-affect chain (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 9). They function as state nomads allowed to mobilize force and create the theatre of operations wherever required. At this point, there are a few choice ideas to deploy from Nomadology, and they relate to the fashioning and fabrication of weapons as consequences of desire, where desire relates to waging population-centered or so-called 'human domain' warfare from the ground up: Weapons relate to the free action model…What effectuates a free action model is not the weapons in themselves and in their physical aspect, but the 'war machine' assemblage as the formal cause of the weapons. (Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 80) Speed is in itself a 'weapons system'. (81) Weapons and tools are consequences, nothing but consequences…it is always the assemblage that constitutes the weapons system. (81-82) The idea I'm trying to foreground here is that the speed of the weapons in play are not always fast; the blend and the ratios of the mix rely on different rates of closure with different dosages.5 In connection, we should note of Friedrich Kittler's 2003 essay, "Flower of the Elite Troops," which is an interrogation of early modern special forces as mobile media technologies that intervene into battlespace environments. The elite storm troops of 1917 with linear fronts are now the elite special forces with the capacities to employ different kinetic effects to envelope and take custody of life so as to make it live or die, engineering kill sacks or life-preservation areas.

5

If the register is environmental, we have to say that it is also less toxicological and more endocrinal. Toxicology measures damage in linear terms whereas an endocrinal index foregrounds what are often disproportionate relation between dose, exposure, and effects in the context of bodies and hormones.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 8

~ Joint Terminal Attack Controller (+ Combat Control Teams) While designated to deploy ballistic rather than biopolitical munitions, the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), along with the Combat Control Teams (CCT) and Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), are special-forces-designated agents that are emblematic of a speculative approach. In coordination with ground units conducting operations, JTACs direct ordnance—close air support and indirect artillery fire—in the battlespace environment. They are conduits that network the war effort and so mediate the theatre of operations with different affects and forces, enjoying what is a rather singular kind of control to manage the intensity and rate of firepower and so leverage an asymmetric capacity. In 2011, a US Air Force publication celebrated how JTACs were able to kill 270 Taliban during an ambush of a American unit near a remote American patrol base in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan (the Battle of Do Ab). Occupying forward positions during operations, the doctrinal literature repeatedly stresses the targeting capabilities offered by JTACs, who can deliver precise and accurate fire for troops in contact and in ways that minimize civilian casualties or so-called collateral damage. JTACs are also responsible for lasing targets—'painting' targets with lasers to mark and direct munitions. Recent innovations like DARPA’s Persistent Close Air Support (PCAS) Program and the development of Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions, which have smaller blast radius due the use of metals that decelerate quickly, serve to justify the enhancement and development of these capabilities. It is the military version of the argument regarding intensity-based carbon emissions: we will cut emissions per unit but we will increase overall production. Here it, is worth noting that, according to an Amnesty International report in August 2014, over half of Afghan civilians killed by ISAF forces from 2009 to 2013 were killed by air strikes (AI 2014: 19).

~ Law Enforcement Advisor + Law Enforcement Professional [note about Battle of Marjah] Even tactical-level air strikes require legal vetting according to customary war law and international humanitarian law, which is to say that decisions to deploy ordnance have to pass through an Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 9

apparatus that determines whether the calculations of proportionality, necessity, and restraint are adequate. During a lecture in Saskatoon in 2011, then Canadian Lt.-General Andrews Leslie stressed the 'information pipeline' between commanders on the ground and legal affairs officers watching real-time feeds of engagements in tactical operations centres in forward operating bases (Balan 2011). Yet, legal adjudication and legal sanction of operations has been pushed down to the tactical level with emergence of Law Enforcement Advisors and Law Enforcement Professionals, who are typically contractors working with small platoon-sized units to determine protocols over rules of engagement and the application of military violence, especially at the lethal and high-intensity end of the spectrum. Insofar as the alibi goes, this juridical capacity at the tactical level of operations allows for units to justify their investments in legal terms and speculate on outcomes by way of what we could call, in the language of finance, regulatory capture, or in military terms, lawfare. The recourse to law is used to probe the very limits of what is regarded as legal and so speculate on deriving new value with the use of quasi-legal measures incrementally coded as such. According to Weizman again: Military experts in law describe attempts to limit the death of bystanders as a pragmatic compromise that seeks to establish the supposedly "correct" relation between a necessary attack on militant targets and the number of civilians killed. The question is what is necessary, what ratio is correct, who is to decide that and who is to judge that. (Weizman 2009: ¶8) This legal-military decision-problem is fluid and dynamic, not something static and external to military violence but internal to how its limits are constituted, probed, and set.

~ Special Forces Operator More so than Iraq, the war in Afghanistan saw the proliferation of special forces operations, which started as direct action and kill/capture missions and transitioning to what became the vaunted saving power for the population-centered counterinsurgency campaign and its field of 'human domain warfare': village stability operations (VSO). While not always lethal, VSO was deeply biopolitical and this end of warfighting continuum was and is no less kinetic, the prescribed treatment based on a mix

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 10

of custody and care to conduct the conduct of local populations. Village stability saw small ISAF special forces units penetrate remote village environments in order to fulfill the promise of providing and programing stability in what, as a rhetorical consequence, was an always-already telluric state of disorder and instability in a space where Afghans were coded as pre-insurgents possibly amenable to conversion as friends. Given over 75% of Afghans live in rural areas, ISAF operational designers regarding VSO as necessary to shape, clear, hold, and build local influence and security in what was termed by some analysts as a 'mosaic war' that had become 'precision counterinsurgency.' On one hand, VSO was an exercise in coercing local communities to come onside with the ISAF war effort in defence of central Afghan government, framed as a righteous cause; on the other, VSO was a shrewdly designed instrument to satisfy the criteria and metrics for an adequate end-state and so allow the withdrawal of North Atlantic forces. The special forces units conducting the missions enjoyed significant autonomy in designing and developing their operations depending on the contours of the biopolitical and human terrain, acting as roaming indie war machines. These units aggressively monetized local communities with contingency funds to push infrastructure projects deemed necessary to the counterinrgency effort and not necessarily for the needs of local villagers. VSO also aggressively paramilitarized local environments and exploited social and tribal antagonisms by engaging with some key leaders to raise village-level Afghan Local Police units, which were often led by local strongmen and operated with little oversight (c.f. Aikins 2014; HRW 2011ab).

Notably, one stream of the VSO doctrinal literature argues that special forces operators shouldn't merely think like venture capitalists but are in fact entrepreneurial venture capitalists who, as disruptive innovators, seek to speculate on the security of local village environments. With repeated recourse to the reliance on "economic influencers" as a crucial line of operation, the conduct of precision micro-war and the channelling of macro-economic development monies that created an economic bubble in Afghanistan converge. This logic does more than simply operationalize the Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 11

economic components of biopower in military terms; thinking with risk management to mitigate the flows of uncertainty, the special forces agent becomes an arbitrageur and derivative warrior, where one venture in a village is simply one transferable or fungible asset with which to re-capitalize the effort (Burlinghame 2012a: ¶9). Returns—village-level compliance and cooption on the part of local populations— begets more investment. Green Berets and Navy SEALS are described as angel and seed investors (Burlinghame 2012c: ¶32-33). Special forces operators should think like venture capitalists and trade in a debt-based economy, renting or loaning stability with the knowledge of creating a credit-bound debtor community locked into a bonded relationship with the militaryenabled promise of biopolitical development. In this scenario, villagers simply need assistance (from angel investors) in tapping what is a blocked reservoir of human capital to invest in their own security.

~ Cultural Support Team The last figure to note is the all-female Cultural Support Team (CST), which followed from Female Engagement Teams (CST) developed in Iraq and used extensively in Afghanistan during the American occupation of Southern Helmand Province from 2010 onward. The units were attached first to conventional units undertaking 'pattern of life' patrols to allow ISAF forces to engage with women in light of customary and religious protocols regarding contact with outsiders, namely male counterinsurgents. They were later attached to special forces units conducting VSO. CSTs and FETs were contextualized in interesting ways in relation to the performance of gender: on one hand, vis-àvis liberal (imperial) feminist arguments, they were valorized as indispensable and culturally intelligent innovations to connect the pan-Afghan woman to the provision of security, stability, and support through measures like village medical outreach (VMO); on the other, the teams were framed by some as an indication of egalitarian opportunities for women with North Atlantic forces now able to serve in operational environments.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 12

Yet, despite these types of arguments, tactical-level literature indicates that the teams are effective because they mobilized and speculated on 'female influence' as the 'correct asset' to leverage 'information and messaging capability' with local populations. The teams may be 'equal' to male counterparts but they are operationalized as women for specific purposes. They were used to breach living environments right down to the level of the qalat (compound) by exploiting gender as a "force enabling capacity" and undertaking "female networking operations" (Russo & Spann 2011). In other words, these teams territorialized an alternate theatre of operations by targeting women's lives and their caregiver roles, leveraging women and children for information and knowledge about the local operating environment. Further, given the circulation of different masculinities and the encounter between make counterinsurgents and local Afghan men, the military literature and reportage pieces cite the capacity of female counterinsurgents to tap into the discourse of men. In relation to her encounters with men, one FET member said: "Men will talk to women…This is a crucial intelligence enabling piece to exploit in the future." Instead of feminine wile, female counterinsurgents perform female masculinity in this instance, legitimate enough to 'pass' and engage with men but mild enough to not alienate or induce too much anxiety.

~ Speculation as Damage Modulation In the end, these short sketches locate liberal war as an exercise damage modulation, proportionally assessing injuries and controlling the damage done. To use a more Deleuzian turn in the spirit of ecological materials, I choose rheology, which the study of the deformation of matter. Constantly deforming matter and compelling it to endure as it decomposes is arguably an adequate way to contextualize these flows of war which kill and harm and main but which above all sap energy from the assemblage of atmosphere-environment-population.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 13

References Aikins, Matt. 23 July 2014. A U.S.-Backed Militia Runs Amok in Afghanistan. Al-Jazeera America. Amnesty International. 2014. Left in the Dark: Failures of Accountability for Civilian Casualties Caused By International Military Operations In Afghanistan. London: Amnesty International Ltd. Anderson, Ben. 2010. Population & Affective Perception: Biopolitics and Anticipatory Action in U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine. Anitpode 43(2): 205-236. Burlinghame, E.M. 6 September 2012. Irregular Warfare: Fielding and Phasing in the Venture Capital Green Beret. Small Wars Journal. ----------. 20 June 2012. Irregular Warfare and the Two Minds of the Venture Capital Green Beret. Small Wars Journal. ----------. 14 May 2012. Irregular Warfare, Village Stability Operations, and the Venture Capital Green Beret. Small Wars Journal. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 1991 [1994]. What is Philosophy? Translated by Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press. ----------. 1986. Nomadology: The War Machine. Translated by Brian Massumi. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e). ----------. 1980 [1987]. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Evans, Brad. 2011. The Liberal War Thesis: Introducing the Ten Key Principles of Twenty-FirstCentury Biopolitical Warfare. The South Atlantic Quarterly 110(3): 747-756. Foucault, Michel. 1978 [2007]. Security Territory Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78. Edited by Michel Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Human Rights Watch. 12 September 2011. Afghanistan: Rein in Abusive Militias and Afghan Local Police. Media Release. . ----------. 2011. “Just Don’t Call It a Militia”: Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police”. Brussels: HRW. Kittler, Friedrich. 2003. Flower of the Elite Troops. Body & Society 9(4): 169-189. Russo, Claire & Shannon Spann. 2011. Female Networking Operations: A Tactical Tool for Strategic Advantage. Washington: Orbis Operations LLC. Sloterdijk, Peter. 2002 [2009]. Terror From the Air. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e)/The MIT Press. Tiqqun. 2009 [2010]. Introduction to Civil War. Translated by Alexander Galloway and Sean Smith. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 14

Weizman, Eyal. 2012. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. London: Verso. ----------. 1 January 2009. Lawfare in Gaza: Legislative Attack. OpenDemocracy. ----------. 2007. Hollow Land: Israel's Architecture of Occupation. London: Verso. Zagala, Stephen. 2003. Aesthetics: A Place I've Never Seen. A Shock to Though: Expression After Deleuze and Guattari. Edited by Brian Massumi, 20-43. London: Routledge. Zweibelson, Ben, Maj. 2013. Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications. PRISM: Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 4(2): 87-104. ----------. 2012. Seven Design Theory Considerations: an Approach to Ill-Structured Problems. Military Review (November-December): 80-89.

Balan – TTD 2015 – Deleuze & Contemporary Figures of War | 15