Meta-epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defense

This  thesis is structured  around two arguments in support of what I call “meta-epistemological  scepticism”.  This  is  the  view  that  a  satisfying philosophical explanation of how knowledge of the world is possible is itself not possible. Both of  the  arguments  in support of meta-epistemological scepticism are extracted from Barry Stroud’s work. The first argument is what  I  call  “Stroud’s  puzzle”  and  the  second  argument  is  what  I  call “Stroud’s dilemma”. Stroud's puzzle expresses the dilemma that any explanation of how external-world knowledge is possible will be either anti-sceptical but objectionably revisionary, or else sceptical, and thereby objectionably revisionary. In short, it's a master argument for the thesis that any explanation of how external-world knowledge is possible will be objectionably revisionary. I argue that Stroud’s puzzle fails to provide adequate  support for meta-epistemological scepticism, taking issue with both horns of that dilemma. The second dilemma grows out of the apparent demands of philosophical epistemology. To this dilemma, I argue that the arguments against it are defective, so that meta epistemological scepticism remains a live option in epistemology.