Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer, and Clara Bravo Morando Eds. PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge

Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer, Clara Morando Bravo Eds.

PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind Routledge Publisher Order from https://www.routledge.com/products/9781138925816

Contents Preface Contributors

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Contents Preface Introduction Back to Pre-reflectivity Sofia Miguens, Clara Morando Bravo, Gerhard Preyer

I Foundation of the Mental

1 Why we should think that Self-Consciousness is non-reflective   Manfred Frank

2 Is Subjectivity First-Personal? Tomis Kapitan

3 Degrees of Self-Presence: Rehabilitating Sartre’s Accounts of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and Reflection Kenneth Williford

4 Sartre on Pre-Reflective Consciousness: The Adverbial Interpretation Mark Rowlands

5 Pre-reflective Time-Consciousness The Shortcomings of Sartre and Husserl and a possible Way out Gerhard Seel

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II I-Knowledge, Perception and Introspection 6 The Zero Point and I Terry Horgan and Shaun Nichols

7 A Sketch of Sartre’s Error Theory of “Introspection” Matthew C. Eshleman

8 A Pebble at the Bottom of the Water Sartre and Cavell on the Opacity of Self-knowledge Pierre-Jean Renaudie

9 Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness? Consciousness and Self-Awareness in Sartre’s The Transcendence of the Ego Daniel R. Rodríguez Navas

10 Perception and Imagination A Sartrean Account Uriah Kriegel

III Pre-reflectivity disputed

11 Do we need Pre-reflective Self-consciousness? About Sartre and Brentano Eric Tremault

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12 Sartre’s Non-Egological Theory of Consciousness Joshua Tepley

13 The 'of' of Intentionality and the 'of' of Acquaintance Rocco J. Gennaro

14 A “Quasi-Sartrean” Theory of Subjective Awareness Joseph Levine

IV Body as a Whole, the Other, and Disorder of the Mental 15 Pain: Sartre and Anglo-American Philosophy of Mind Katherine J. Morris

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Sartre,

Enactivism,

and

the

Bodily

Nature

of

Pre-reflective

Consciousness Kathleen Wider

17 The Body is structured like a Language. Reading Sartre’s Being and Nothingness Dorothée Legrand

18 Basic Forms of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: a Developmental Perspective Anna Ciaunica

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19 Ego-disorders in Psychosis - Dysfunction of Pre-reflective Selfawareness? Andreas Heinz

IV Historical Philosophical Background

20 Radical Epokhè: On Sartre’s concept of “pure reflection” Raoul Moati

21 Sartre and Kierkegaard on Consciousness and Subjectivity Iker Garcia

22 Invisible Ghosts: Les Jeux Sont Fait and Disembodied Consciousness Jeremy Ekberg

Index

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Preface

The project which gave rise to this book developed in the context of a cooperation between the University of Porto and the Goethe University– Frankfurt am Main. The cooperation started in 2008 and involved the coordination, by means of common projects, of the research agendas of the Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG: Institute of Philosophy, University of Porto, Portugal; Principal Investigator: Sofia Miguens) and ProtoSociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research and Project, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main (led by Gerhard Preyer). The first common project, Consciousness and Subjectivity (2008–2012; see Miguens and Preyer 2013) started from a shared concern about the generalization of a naturalized epistemology stance in current discussions on consciousness in analytic philosophy. Not only did we have doubts that naturalized epistemology could be the last word in epistemology, but we also believed that such a situation resulted in a blind spot concerning the natures of consciousness and subjectivity. When third-person approaches are dominant (and the proximity of much philosophical work on mind and language with cognitive science reinforces such orientation), issues concerning subjectivity are taken to be exhausted when problems regarding the place of consciousness in nature, or problems of language and firstperson authority, are addressed. Our second project, Pre-Reflective Consciousness, took up issues where that prior, first project left them. We were interested in the shape of what we saw as a return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind, and we regarded the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Héctor-Neri Castañeda, Roderick Chisholm, John Perry, and others, as examples. We

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were also interested in looking systematically at the history of twentiethcentury philosophy. As a result we decided to explore the relations between current debates on consciousness within analytical philosophy (in particular the debate around self-representationalism) and debates taking place in continental philosophy around the time of Sartre, and in Sartre’s work. In fact, one may consider early critiques of functionalism in the philosophy of mind in the 1970s to also be a symptom of the return of subjectivity in analytic philosophy of mind. A number of philosophers, with quite different backgrounds, converged around the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to functional or cognitive properties. Such agreement later went under headings such as the “explanatory gap” or the “hard problem of consciousness.” We took such agreement to concern not only—or not even necessarily—phenomenal experience, but also the pre-reflective structure of consciousness. That is the main topic of this book. One may see such a return to subjectivity as a renewal of what one of us calls “the Cartesian intuition,” i.e., the intuition of the self-givenness of consciousness. It is under such light that a need arises to rethink borders between what counts as “inner” and “outer” when the nature of the mental is at stake. This liminal question of boundaries is, namely, a question of whether the inner should be characterized as under the skin only. And it is also a question of whether there is indeed such a thing as an epistemic priority of consciousness of one’s mental states in relation to knowledge of other minds and of the world. Along with the idea that the mental cannot be described from the outside only comes an analysis of pre-reflective (immediate) consciousness, an analysis which extends to phenomenal consciousness, to selfknowledge (as I-knowledge), and to the consciousness of time.

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A general intention and policy of our common projects here, as it was already the case with the first project (Consciousness and Subjectivity: Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013), is to bring analytic, or analytically inspired, philosophers and phenomenologists working on the continent together alongside Anglo-American philosophers. We believe that discussions (e.g., discussions of the so-called mind–body problem), which have in many quarters of analytic philosophy become quite scholastic, can come alive once again once they are seen through the light of a different philosophical tradition. Furthermore, we believe that even if one shares a non-reductionist position in the philosophy of mind, this does not yet entail the option of a particular ontology. What is at stake, rather, is not opting for ontological dualism in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, but simply taking the explanatory gap seriously. Such was the starting point of the work that gave rise to the articles collected here. We would like to thank all the contributors of the project, which has brought together authors from several countries, and in fact embodies a cooperation between Europe and the USA in the fields of Sartre studies and consciousness studies in a way we hope is mutually illuminating. We would also like to thank many colleagues in Frankfurt am Main and in Porto for their helpful sensitive cooperation, as well as the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia and the EU Erasmus Programme for financing Gerhard Preyer’s lectures, and our meetings at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto. Sofia Miguens Gerhard Preyer Frankfurt a. M./Porto January 2015

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Reference S. Miguens, G. Preyer, Consciousness and Subjectivity, Berlin: De Gruyter 2013. http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/208987?rskey=kCZyEn

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Contributors Anna Ciaunica, post doc., FCT Postdoctoral Fellow - Mind Language and Action Group, Institute of Philosophy, Porto. Jeremy Ekberg, Associate Professor of English, Shantou University, Shantou, China. Matthew C. Eshleman, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Carol, Wilmington, Wilmington, NC, United States of America. Manfred Frank, Professor of Philosophy emer., Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, Germany. Rocco J. Gennaro, Professor and Chair, Philosophy Department/Phil of Mind/CogSci Area Editor, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, College of Liberal Arts, University of Southern Indiana, University Blvd., Evansville, IN, United States of America. Andreas Heinz, Professor of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Klinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin Campus Charité-Mitte, Berlin, Germany. Terry Horgan, Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States of America. Iker Garcia, Visiting Lecturer, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, United States of America. Tomis Kapitan, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, United States of America. Uriah Kriegel, Professor of Philosophy, Research Director, Jean Nicod Institute, Ecole Normal Supérieure, Paris, France. Dorothée Legrand, Professor of Philosophy, Chercheur CNRS, Archives Husserl, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France.

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Joseph Levine, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Mass, Amherst, MA, United States of America. Sofia Miguens, Professor of Philosophy, Departemento di Filosofia, Porto, Portugal.

University

of

Porto,

Raoul Moati, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy. University of Chicago, Chicago. United States of America. Clara Bravo Morando, Dr. phil., University of Porto, Departemento di Filosofia, Porto, Portugal. Katherine Morris, Fellow in Philosophy, Mansfield College, Oxford University, Great Britain. Shaun Nichols, Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, United States of America. Gerhard Preyer, Professor of Sociology, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt a. M., Germany. Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Post-Doctoral Porto/University of Lisbon. Portugal.

Researcher,

University

of

Daniel R. Rodriguez Navas, PhD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Chicago, United States of America. Mark Rowlands, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, United States of America. Gerhard Seel, Professor of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, University Bern, Bern, Switzerland. Eric Trémault, Dr. phil., Post-Doctoral Researcher, Archives Husserl de Paris, CNRS, France. Joshua Tepley, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Saint Anselm College, Manchester, NH, United States of America.

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Kathleen Wider, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Literature, Philosophy, and the Arts, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn Michigan, United States of America. Kenneth Williford, Professor & Chair, Department of Philosophy, UT Arlington, Arlington, United States of America.

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Prof. Dr. phil. Gerhard Preyer Professor of Sociology Editor-In-Chief ProtoSociology An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research and Project Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main D-60054 Frankfurt a. M. www.fb03.uni-frankfurt.de/48480132/gpreyer www.protosociology.de Academia https://uni-frankfurt.academia.edu/GerhardPreyer Youtube http://www.youtube.com/user/ProtoSociology

Prof. Dr. Sofia Miguens Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy – University of Porto Researcher Institute of Philosophy – University of Porto Principal Investigator Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG –Institute of Philosophy / University of Porto, Portugal) http://mlag.up.pt/