当代中国 : Contemporary China

Dr. Tucker S. MLS 500, Fall 2014 Vogel A.

当代中国 Contemporary China

I am studying Contemporary China because I want to find what significant developments have taken place in the last 25 years (since the Tian’anmen incident in 1989) so I can better understand what shapes China and the Chinese today. I believe a thorough understanding of contemporary China will provide key insights into China’s future. With this information I hope to then survey Chinese from all over China for my graduate thesis and find out if it matches with these predictions, particularly in relation to Xi Jinping’s idealistic key slogan “Chinese Dream” (中国梦). This paper will examine Contemporary China by studying history in chronological order starting with the events that took place in Tian’anmen in 1989.

At 10 p.m. on Saturday June 3rd 1989, Premier Li ordered the troops to attack and kill all demonstrators. The attack came in waves earlier into the morning, with heavy machine guns and tanks used to destroy and clear the square. By 6 a.m. the square was covered in dead bodies that were pushed into piles and burned on the spot. Casualties are unknown, of course the numbers were much greater in the west and much smaller on the mainland. Mass arrests and executions followed and a nation was silenced by violence, leaving a fear amongst the Chinese of their government that still lasts to this day.

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“One of the key casualties of the Tiananmen Square uprising was Zhao Ziyang (General Secretary of the Communist Party of China), whose apparent sympathy for the students, and appearance in mid-May in the square apologizing for letting them down, led to his dismissal from his post and house arrest from June 1989 until his death 16 years later” (Brown 50). “The immediate impact of June 1989 was to cause China to be isolated from the international community, and for questions to be raised, both internally and externally, about where the country should now take its reforms” (Brown 51). Left within this vacuum of political power in the urgent aftermath of Tian’anmen, “a relatively small number of political elites sharply contested the basic issues of the day: the definition (in terms of policy) of reform and opening up, and the relative balance of power between Deng Xiaoping and like-minded reformers on the one hand and Chen Yun and ideological and economic conservatives on the other (Fewsmith 165). Deng had rightly realized that his involvement in Tiananmen had greatly weakened his political power and he retired as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1989 and politics completely in 1992. Deng still had much to say in regard to China’s market economy and opening up however, and he did this through his famous “Southern Tour” in which he visited the Special Economic Zones he established in 1980 of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai in 1992 encouraging industry for a more rapid development. “The impact of what was labelled in some quarters as Deng’s ‘imperial visit’(1) was to embolden the reformers and encourage them to further liberalize inward investment regulations, allow more space for the internal market, and rationalize the state-owned system” (Brown 52). Deng’s political ideas of opening up and reform would later be added to the state constitution as “market socialism” and made a mandatory subject for all university students in China and equated with the same kind of importance as Mao Zedong Thought (毛泽东思想). “The southern

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tour’s greatest impact, however, was to ensure that the reforms first started in 1978 of ‘opening up’ and creating a competitive market within China, which embraced foreign capital and was trying to upgrade its knowledge base, continued. There would be no return to Maoist-style state autarky and central planning” (Brown 542).

(An, “A portrait of Deng Xiaoping in downtown Shenzhen”) Although partially covered by the traffic light above, the following message in downtown Shenzhen in 1992 reads “不坚持社会主义，不改革开放，不发展经济，不改善人民生活，只能是死路一条” or “If we did not adhere to socialism, implement the policies of reform and opening to the outside world, develop the economy and raise living standards, we would find ourselves on a dead end road”. Part of the opening up and reforms would be creating a modern financial center with stock markets and stock exchanges.

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No stock markets had existed on mainland China between 1949 and 1990 until the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) opened and reopened in 1990. The largest Chinese Stock Exchange was in Hong Kong (HKEx), a rival to the mainland stock exchanges, partially Shanghai for supremacy in financial markets, especially in Asia. “The Shanghai Stock Exchange deals in two types of shares, which are designated ‘A’ and ‘B’ shares. The most significant difference between them is that prices for ‘A’ shares are quoted in RMB, whereas ‘B’ shares are priced in US dollars. When the system was established, only Chinese investors were permitted to trade in ‘A’ shares; ‘B’ shares could be bought and sold by overseas investors and from 2001 onwards by locals” (Dillion 47). This encouraged one of the critical roles of China’s economic modernization in the early 1990’s, foreign capital. “Part of the rationale behind the great political changes that were launched under the slogans of Four Modernizations and Reform and Opening in the 1980s (and reemphasized by the ‘Southern Tour’) was the need to attract foreign investment, although without jeopardizing state and CCP control over the economy as a whole” (Dillion 49), which is precisely what these stock markets enabled. The Renminbi (RMB) then “would be ‘pegged to a basket of international currencies’ (Dillion 48) in 1993 by the State Council which would lead to China’s vast reserves of foreign currency later on. After the peg, these foreign reserves were greatly added to by foreign trade, another key element of growth established by the SEZ by Deng’s “Southern Tour”. Because the RMB was pegged, it didn’t follow China’s own market, but those it was exporting goods to. These goods “Made in China” were therefore extremely affordable due to the low wages of the workers due to the gigantic populous of China, which made doing business for international corporations in China very attractive. “This was initially achieved by the creation of joint-venture companies

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which combined Chinese management and foreign capital, often from overseas Chinese and Southeast Asia, but also from Japan and the West. This method was initially successful in the development of large scale-enterprises which China had previously lacked, such as steel plants, factories for the volume production of automobiles of a Western standard and high-quality hotels for both the business and tourist trade” (Dillion 49). The structural steel was then used to construct better transportation in the way of railways and bridges, the automobiles used to transport materials and goods (think Caterpillar not Ford) the hotels housed investors and tourists. These elements combined with Deng’s message and today account for the Mega cities like those seen below, and arguably the largest program to eliminate poverty in the world.

Shenzhen Early 1990’s (Web Odysseum, “City evolution then and now”) 5

Shenzhen Today (The New School, “Shenzhen: On and Beyond Chinas Fastest Growing City”)

Pudong New Area 1990 (Magicalurbanis, “Just how fast is Shanghai growing?”) Pudong 2013 (The Atlantic Monthly, “Pudong 2013”) These Mega cities, and China’s east coast in general, were opened up to outer countries’ investments and corporations like “On April 23, 1992, the largest McDonald's restaurant in the world opened in Beijing” (Yan, McDonald’s in Beijing). These corporations brought new goods and service styles for the populist but more importantly they brought about an exchange of ideas for the common people as well, as portrayed by the well-known study of McDonald’s introduction into China by Yunxiang Yan, some of which were popular, some less so.

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While Deng was promoting his “socialist market-oriented economy” theory and the SEZ were opening up, meanwhile the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were holding their first Plenary Session in which Jiang Zemin is selected as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China on October 19, 1992. Jiang Zemin has been described as the “core of the third generation” (Jiang Zemin, Wikipedia) following Deng. “The term core can perhaps best be understood as that combination of informal and formal authority that makes a leader the final arbiter of Party issues – the ability, as the Chinese put it, to “strike the table” (‘拍板子’ paiban） and end discussion” (Fewsmith, 169). However, “five years after Deng had made Jiang general secretary and declared that he was the “core” of the Party, Jiang still lacked authority” (Fewsmith, 169). It wasn’t until the Fourth Plenum Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee that Jiang was able to land a major political victory. Deng Xiaoping’s health was declining and he knew he needed to officially pass on leadership to the next generation. “Deng and other top leaders were most worried about three interrelated problems: the authority of the CCP vis-à-vis society, the authority of the center vis-à-vis the localities, and the authority of Jiang Zemin vis-à-vis his colleagues in the leadership. All three problems revolved around the question of whether Jiang could become the “core” of the Party in reality as well as name” (Fewsmith 169). “The plenum adopted the “Decision on Some Major Issues on Strengthening Party Building,” which on the one hand excoriated negative trends such as corruption and weakness of grassroots Party organizations and, on the other hand, urged renewed attention to democratic centralism – emphasizing the subornation of lower levels to higher levels, the part to the whole, and everything to the Party center (Fewsmith 169). As the Committee put forth, “there must be a firm

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central leading body…and there must be a leading core in this leading group.” And that core, the plenum reiterated, was Jiang Zemin” (Fewsmith 169). The Forth Plenum can be viewed as a considerable triumph for Zemin, the critical point at which he officially became the person in complete control of China and the beginning of the “third generation” of leadership in China. “Moreover, Jiang’s effective power was enhanced when three of his protégés were promoted to the center. Huang Ju, mayor of Shanghai, promoted to the Politburo: while Wu Bangguo, Party secretary of Shanghai and already a member of the Politburo, and Jiang Chunyun, Party secretary of Shandong province, were added to the Party Secretariat. The promotion of Wu Bangguo and Jiang Chunyun served not only to shore up Jiang Zemin’s personal support at the center but also apparently to check the authority of Zhu Rongji, a potential rival” (Fewsmith 170) and later Li Peng. Along with the rise of Jiang Zemin and the start of the third generation, the early to mid1990’s proved to be a pivotal time for Chinese Leadership. “Several key elements arose from the seven plenary sessions held by the 14th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China while in session from 1992 to 1997. Deng Xiaoping Theory was established which heralded opening up and building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, an incorporation applying Mao Zedong Thought to the socio-economics circumstances of the day” (Fewsmith 170). The Sessions hashed out what the goals for reform in the establishment of a socialist market economic system to help speed up growth. Goals defined as “Restructuring of the rural economy continues to deepen. The management mechanism of state-owned enterprises is being transformed. The role of the market is expanding swiftly in the disposition of resources. Economic and technological exchanges and cooperation with foreign countries are widening.

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The planned economic system is being gradually transformed into a socialist market one” (The 14th National Congress, Beijing Review). The economic consequences of these ‘goals’ specifically the “socialist market economy” are hard to exaggerate and China’s growth in the 1990’s was unlike anything it had ever seen before. If examined from an article published by the The Economist in 1990 in regard to the previous decade of growth and new possibilities for the Chinese people, the developments are astounding. “Some $200 billion of foreign investment has come to China in the past decade (1989-1999), and foreign-funded ventures account for over half of China's exports. The private sector now accounts for perhaps one third of the economy, up from almost nothing, and some state companies have started to act like private ones. If goods were hard to come by in 1989, today there are too many of them: consumers are spoilt for choice. Some 1.5m new fixed telephone lines are laid each month, and China will soon be the second-biggest mobile-phone market in the world. Graduates in the 1980s were told where to work. Today they dive into a competitive market (The Economist, “China after Tiananmen: Ten Years On”). Below shows the growth of monthly income for the average household during this astounding time in Chinese history.

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(BBC, “China’s economic miracle”) The opportunities in the cities were much greater than then the rural countryside and more exciting than life in the village. This was in due to the opportunities to make money there, but also the liberalization of Zhang’s state control and the focus on growing the over 2,000 SEZ. “The household-registration system, the work-unit system, the one-child policy” (The Economist, “China after Tiananmen: Ten Years On”). were all greatly weakened, these also attributed to the rural migration to the cities. During his time, private housing was allowed in some major cities, unheard of a decade before. Another one of the side effects of the liberalization of the economy was bureaucratic corruption. All of these developments in real-estate and new joint stock companies and ventures, be them foreign or domestic needed land and resources. He Qinglian, “one of the most celebrated critics of China’s economic and political system” (He Qinglian, Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture) argues that “the local enthusiasm for forming such enterprises resulted from

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local officials and enterprise managers who was the joint stock system as a way to drain off state-owned assets for their own benefit” (He, 中国现代化的陷阱) According to He, “the boom in the real estate market enriched those with connections at the expense of the common people, obstructed the formation of a fair competitive mechanism, and fostered rampant corruption. Such real estate speculation drove up land prices and put housing out of reach of most people – and caused much resentment” (He, 中国现代化的陷阱). Most of this real estate market was located along the east coast of China, creating a growing gap of income inequality and development compared to interior China. “The seamy side of this story is that those who did the best in this new economy-- and some did very well indeed – almost always seemed to have strong political connections. Sometimes they were bureaucrats who tired of the office routine and jumped into the sea of business but retained their connections to colleagues who could offer all-important approvals or access to scarce resources” (Fewsmith 181). Or oftentimes, they were immediate relatives of government officials, sons, brothers, cousins, who used their “关系” (guanxi) or relations to gain power and money. “Sometimes they were enterprise heads who used their positions to siphon off large amounts of state-owned assets to private firms that they controlled directly or indirectly” (Fewsmith 181). “In other words, corruption—massive corruption—was a major part of the story of income redistribution in the 1990’s” (Fewsmith 181). He Qinglian goes on to argue interestingly that “through the ‘marketization of politics,’ officials – or those with close relations to officials – have directed millions of dollars’ worth of assets into private hands, bringing about a form of ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ that rivals anything Marx or Engels observed about ‘primitive capitalist accumulation” (He, 中国现代化的 陷阱). He believes “the result has been income inequality surpassing that in either Japan or the 11

United States (keeping in mind that China had a much more equal distribution of income than either of those countries less than a decade before), the rise of secret societies and mass resentment” (He, 中国现代化的陷阱). He argues, “China seems to be heading not toward liberal democracy and capitalism but toward a ‘government and mafia alliance” (He, 中国现代化的陷 阱). These are issues that continued to fester through Hu Jintao’s period and are only now beginning to be addressed in earnest by Xi Jinping and his administration. Because of the spread of state agencies’ investment in the coastal regions rural folks and villagers suffered from land grabs and insufficient investment in the rural population and obviously the new prosperity of China in the 1990’s was spread too unevenly. For example, the most famous land grab in contemporary Chinese history was the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. Construction of the Three Gorges dam started on December 14, 1994. “When the Three Gorges dam is complete, 19 countries and municipalities will be partially or completely submerged, including two county-level municipalities, 11 county seats, 140 towns, 326 townships, and 1,351 villages” (Spence 575). It was estimated that approximately, “725,500” (Spence 575) people would be relocated from the areas inundated to build the Three Gorges dam, which, for obvious reasons was a pretty controversial endeavor. Folks losing their way of life and their ancestor’s ancient burial grounds and tombs being a couple of the most significant. But for many more reasons, the dam was a pretty good idea. The Three Gorges areas is well suited to accommodate a large resettled population, in particular because of an abundance or good unhabituated farm land at the higher reaches of the mountains there. The dam would force people up to the areas that were too high to be reached previously, meaning villagers would have to carry water on their back up steep mountains and terrace to farm this area, which would be 12

new fertile land. Those people from the townships would simply relocate to a newer town that would create a kind of developmental boom folks would get employed helping to produce. New buildings, roads, and service sector employment would be produced by the relocation, not including the numerous jobs the dam and reservoir and the tourism to this area would produce in and of itself. “Government leaders not only formulated the Developmental Resettlement policy, but also allocated Y100 million for trial projects over the past five years and formed the leading Group of the State Council Overseeing Trial Resettlement Projects” (Spence 578). These are measures never before taken in any previous hydroelectric dam and insured that when the world's largest capacity hydroelectric power station with 34 generators project completed in May 2012 it was a shining success of renewable energy. The Three Gorges dam is an example of the confusing and extremely complex nature of Chinese politics in the 1990’s growth. Land grabs, human rights concerns and bureaucratic corruption were unfortunate consequences of this socialist market economy model. But the greatest number of Chinese are beneficiaries, not victims. Of course, China struggled to strike a balance between development, Communism with Chinese characterizes and keeping its people safe from capitalist exploitation and Western ideology. Deng Xiaoping famously stated “if you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in”. This poignantly describes the nature of China’s development and opening up during the 1990’s. However, the creation of China’s middle-class needed to start somewhere and they were located in these areas along China’s coastal regions and river ways in the 1990’s. “In the mid1980’s, there was fevered talk in the Chinese press, which turned out to be exaggerated, of the emergence of “ten-thousand-yuan households” (wanyuanhu) – an almost unimaginable amount of income in a period in which the average rural resident earned only about 350 yuan per year. A

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decade or so later, there were at least one million households with annual incomes exceeding one million yuan” (Fewsmith 181). These came to be known as the nouveau riche class. The lifestyles that these folks flaunted and the purchasing power that they had attracted both markets to satisfy their desires and the ambition of those looking on to gain what they had or to ‘make it’ which had a profound social and psychological impact on the proletariat. “In many ways, of course, this was a long overdue and healthy change that seemingly marked the appearance of a middle class, albeit one that was still quite small in terms of China’s population, or even its urban population. Nevertheless, the new middle class, including the much more prosperous nouveau riche, drove the new consumerism of the 1990’s and so changed the nature and role of culture in Chinese society by commercializing it and diversifying it” (Fewsmith181). The strength of China, along with the ambition of the poor to earn money and have a better life was fostered by its nouve rich and the rising middle class as the market system grew and state enterprises declined. Common folks wanted to improve their lives with the new consumer goods they saw wealthier people enjoying. Convenience foods and personal care products were starting to take hold, even amongst migrant workers in the cities and the villagers in the countryside, signaling a turn to consumerism and domestic demand. The interior mainlanders saw the coastal regions rising from poverty to prosperity and it fueled their ambitions. For example, “In the city of Yiwu Zhejiang province, one woman has climbed in fifteen years from street peddling to owning a plastics factory with fifty workers, all migrants from poorer regions. This example is multiplied by thousands, and in two decades Yiwu has grown into a metropolis with skyscrapers, industrial parks, and airport” (Morton 262). “The rapidity and continuity of the expansion during the 1990’s were unprecedented. When “the Asian financial crisis in 1997 brought recession to Asia and to the world economy at large,

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China’s growth rate was hardly affected, probably because of its vast size and population: 80 percent of its growth is generated by domestic demand” (Morton 262). Being able to weather this crisis was a large bolster to Chinese leadership and its policies. The return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999 also produced new consumer ideals and ambitions in addition to fostering national pride that helped to strengthen China as well. All of these indicators pointed at a new modernized and prosperous era for China, one symbolized by the passing of Deng Xiaoping in 1997 as breaking away from the revolutionary leaders who controlled China since 1949. Jiang Zemin and his administration saw it as the right time to handle the “paramount issue of the day, economic reform” (Fewsmith 208) and pursue China’s application into the World Trade Organization. “China’s application to join the World Trade organization (WTO) was deemed, both within the PRC and by the international community, to be the most important indication of the modernization of China’s economy, or at least of the acceptance by worldwide opinion that it was a system that other advanced industrial economies could deal with” (Dillion 49). “Coming into his own as a political leader, Jiang Zeming recognized the importance of improving relations with the United States for both domestic reform and his own legitimacy. Gaining China’s international acceptance as one of the great powers of the world would diminish the lingering effects of post-Tian’anmen isolation; it would also realize the century-old desire of Chinese patriots to no longer be treated as a second-rate power but instead to be regarded as an equal in world affairs” (Fewsmith 210). However, “there was the question of how and to what extent China’s economy should be linked to the international economy” (Fewsmith 209). “The WTO (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) is a rules-based organization that requires openness and

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transparency within the global marketing system” (Morton 265). China had sought membership into the WTO for 15 years previously before being allowed to join by the US and other WTO members. The WTO members had concerns with China’s ability to comply with the ‘openness and transparency’ requirements and as what they stated were China’s human rights violations. “This was not simply a matter of political bias against China (though, given the image of China in the US, tougher conditions were certainly needed to convince a skeptical Congress); primarily it reflected a new image of China as a political juggernaut that might overwhelm the United States with cheap exports” (Fewsmith 211). But by the spring of 1998, the time was ripe for negotiations; however they broke down for the next year under the Clinton administration with accusations of Chinese contributions to the Democratic Party in the US and the lack of support by the US business community. However, one significant event, the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by the US on May 7th 1999, which saw the linking of pubic opinion and elite politics throughout China against the US blunder, was likely the catalyst that produced support in the US for China’s entry into the WTO, which it finally joined on December 11th 2001. “In order to gain membership, China had to make tariff reductions, notably for information technology products, chemicals, automobiles, wood and paper products, and many agricultural goods” (Morton 265). “China’s accession to the organization was delayed because of concern by both sides over the implications of these conditions, particularly the requirement that the PRC be opened to the international financial market” (Dillion 50). For China, WTO membership has further integrated it into the global community” (Morton 265). However, towards the end of his two terms, domestically Jiang Zemin had to respond to critical opinions from the New Left regarding joining the WTO, arguing that the sole reason the

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US wanted China to join the WTO was to control China. The New Left in Chinese politics saw the “WTO as part of a broader web of institutions designed to enhance the control of Western capitalist states, particularly the United States, over the developing world” (Fewsmith 223). According to the New Left, “As soon as China joins the WTO, the US can at any time find an excuse to interfere in, sanction, and intimidate our country into accepting so-called ‘international norms’ that do not accord with our national characteristics” (Fewsmith 223). According to the New Left, “globalization is really Americanization and incorporation into multinational corporations. Its purpose is to force governments around the world to take orders from the ‘multinational corporations and international financial chieftains who control the world’s economy’ and from the ‘IMF, World bank, WTO, UN, and other organizations controlled by the US government and Federal Reserve Bank’ – all of which is to serve the interests of the United States” (Fewsmith 223). Indeed, besides the critics from the New Left, Jiang Zemin’s legacy and achievements were locked securely in place by China’s acceptance as a firm player in global politics. “The final acceptance into the WTO fold marked a moment in which China signaled a full commitment to accepting international norms, working within them and attempting to regularize at least some parts of its economy with the rules established largely in the West, in North America and in Europe” (Brown 53). Zemin was happy to pass these insurmountable tasks to the fourth generation of leadership, a young water conservancy engineer and Party Regional Committee Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, who was brought into the Politiburo in the 14th National Congress of the CPC in 1992 with the support of Deng, named Hu Jintao. And so, “the Hu era began with the unfolding of a major landmark in the PRC’s development – its’ entry to the World Trade organization” (Brown 53).

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As stated early, there were widening gaps of inequality, particularly in the coastal regions and mega cities compared to that in the rural countryside and for the 54 minority groups such as the Tibetans and Uighurs in the Autonomous Regions to the West and South. “The growth rate of China’s economy during 2001 was 7.3 percent, but the rate has slowed disproportionately in the less developed areas. By 1999 124 million Chinese were still living below the World Banks standard of $1.00 a day pf per capita income” (Morton 264). Zemin had spawned development west with the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and Hu Jintao and his premier Wen Jiabao, who also worked in the western province of Gansu for a significant amount of time, looked to be the best qualified to handle this monumental task. With the inequality widening between the rich east coast suburban population and poor inland rural villagers, “mass disturbances” numbered some 58,000 in 2003 and would rise to 74,000 in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005” (Fewsmith 231). After 2005, the government stopped counting the “mass disturbances”, which can be understood as peasant and village protests against the local cadres representing the government at the township level. Yu Jianrong argues “that there was a crisis of governance at the local level; the legitimacy of grassroots administration was failing and the ability to control society was declining” The “mass disturbances” “were often large – sometimes involving thousands and even tens of thousands of people – and occasionally violent” (Fewsmith 231). Simultaneously, China had “48 million workers dismissed from state-owned and collective enterprises as a one source of instability (the government state that 100-200 million people reported being dissatisfied with their living conditions0, and a combination of dissatisfaction with living conditions and complaints about corruption, income inequality, and employment as a

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another potential cause of popular anger” ( Fewsmith 234). If left unchecked, social tensions in China could lead to the collapse of the socialist system and national disintegration. It was no surprise then “the Party’s first major policy meeting in January 2003 was a conference on rural poverty, presided over by, Hu Jintao, the new general secretary (Morton 264). Hu’s outlook of China would be drastically different then Jiang Zemin, who grew up in Yangzhou, and spent most of his career in Shanghai while Hu had spent his career in the extremely poor inland provinces of Gansu, Guizhou , and Tibet. “There was no question that Hu and Wen had far more intimate knowledge of the poor hinterland, and their inland concerns were often juxtaposed with the coastal orientation of Jiang and Zeng’s ‘Shanghai faction.’ Similarly, Hu’s base of support in the Communist Youth League, which he once headed, contrasted with Zeng’s extensive network among the ‘高干子弟‘, the sons and daughters of high-level cadres, of which Zeng was one (his father, Zeng Shan, had joined Mao during the Jiangxi period and eventually rose to head the Interior Ministry)” (Fewsmith 238). However, Jiang Zemin addressed the Sixteenth party Congress and gave no indication of a shift in policy. He continued his concept of keeping economic development as the central idea and called for a “quadrupling of the GDP by the year 2020 and emphasized science and technology as drivers of the economic growth” (Fewsmith 239). He also continued to celebrate his Three Represents with the formal state of the theory below: “This experience and the historical experiences gained by the Party since its founding can be summarized as follows: Our Party must always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. These are the

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inexorable requirements for maintaining and developing socialism, and the logical conclusion our Party has reached through hard exploration and great praxis.” — Detail from Jiang Zemin's work report at the 16th CPC Congress, November 8, 2002 (Wikipedia, “Three Represents”) As eager as Jiang was to pass on the tough tasks of further developing the economy, he wasn’t so keen on relinquishing his political power. “China has not had a good track record in peacefully transferring power: Mao Zedong designated successors—Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Hao Guofeng – all failed to attain sustainable power, and Deng Xiaoping’s first two choices – Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang – had likewise fallen amidst political struggle. Jiang Zemin, contrary to early expectations, succeeded in consolidating power despite the very complicated politics of the post-Tiananmen period despite his relative lack of experience at the highest level of China’s political system. Now, the question was whether he was willing and able to transfer power to a younger set of leaders” (Fewsmith 249). However, it was soon shown Jiang “desire to follow the Deng model of slow withdrawal from the political scene was even more evident when it was announced that Jiang would stay on as head of the powerful CMC” (Chinese Military Commission) (Fewsmith 241). This was a position usually linked to the highest in command in China, and meant that if national disintegration did indeed happen under Hu, Jiang would control the military. This also meant that it would be nearly impossible for Hu to become the “core” leader that Jiang had become through the 1990’s. Hu had the very difficult task to “follow two contradictory imperatives: first, he had to demonstrate loyalty, and second, he had to establish independent authority, a task that included promoting people loyal to him, building coalitions, and articulating his own political program” (Fewsmith 242). In the early years Hu needed to walk the fine line of filial piety and respect for Jiang, while differentiating himself from Jiang with the people, in a kind and 20

respectful way. “Only by continuing to show fealty to Jiang could he take advantage of the natural trajectory of incumbency to consolidate power, but only by moving away from Jiang could he establish power in his own right. Hu played this delicate fame with great skill” (Fewsmith 242). During his first address as the general secretary, Hu cleverly took Jiang’s third tenet of the Three Represents as his first tenet, emphasizing the “Fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people” and reminded the CCP to reemphasis “Mao’s ‘two musts,’ namely that they ‘must remain modest, prudent, and without arrogance or rashness’ and they ‘must uphold the spirit of plain living and hard struggle” (Fewsmith 243). Hu was smart in giving credit to Jiang whenever he spoke, but instead of emphasizing Jiang’s first tenet ‘the advanced forces of production’, “but his personal behavior and attention to the “fundamental interests of the vast majority of the people” nevertheless differed significantly from the behavior of Jiang. At New Year’s, Hu Jintao went to Inner Mongolia to join peasants in a yurt; the previous year, Jiang was pictured on the front page of the People’s Daily wearing a Western Suit and giving a formal address” (Fewsmith 244).

(People’s Daily Online, “Jiang Zemin's Speech Greeting Year 2000”) 21

(Daily Online, “Chinese President Hu Jintao (2nd, L) visits a local residence in Hohhot, capital of north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region”)

Hu Jintao, and particularly Wen Jiabao, throughout the entirety of their administration, were seen countless times in the ‘hinterland’s’ remote villages and vast rural landscapes. In fact, when I lived in China from 2007-2012, Wen Jiabao’s visit to really rural and wild areas of China was an almost daily site on CCTV’s main news channel. He was always dressed in plain clothes inspecting this or that crop, visiting a school or sitting down to a meal with rural villagers, which I have to admit, converted me to become a large supporter of Wen and Hu.

(Xinhua, “Premier Wen inspects agriculture in central China”)

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(Xinhua, “Wen pledges to stabilize pork prices”)

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(Chinaview, “Chinese Premier Wen visits quake-hit Sichuan to extend New Year greetings”)

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(Xinhua, “Chinese premier visits rural “left behind” children”)

(Xinhua, “Premier Wen spends Spring Festival holiday with villagers”)

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(CCTV,

“Premier Wen spends Spring Festival holiday at drought-hit Shandong”)

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In fact, when the new disease, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was discovered in Guangdong in April of 2003, Hu Jintao went to Guangdong and Wen Jiabao visited China’s Center for Disease Control personally, while Jiang Zemin hid out in Shanghai, “his ‘running away’ was widely noted on the internet” (Fewsmith 248). This hands on, “people centered” (yiren weiben) approach would define the Hu/Wen administration that differed significantly from Zemin’s vision of economic development. “The SARS crisis had showed that jolts to economic development could come just as easily from society as from the economy, and ‘such unfavorable factors cannot be eliminated by seeking growth alone” (Fewsmith 252). The SARS crisis gave Hu the opportunity during the Third Plenum to lay “out a number of measures to aid he rural economy, including further reducing taxation of peasants (which my peasant parent in-laws still feel very favorably), giving peasants reasonable compensation when their land was requisitioned, and supporting migration to the cities” (Fewsmith 252). It was also during the Third Plenum Hu started introducing his own catch phrases such as “scientific development concept” (kexue fazhan guan) which was the idea of “comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable, development, and promoting comprehensive economic, social, and human development” (Fewsmith 252). Hu Jintao continued to promote Zemin’s Three Represents, but also introduced his most quoted concept and the one that totalized all of the above, which was the need for a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui). Zemin stepped down from head of the PLA military position in 2004, following the trend that Deng Xiaoping had set when Zemin was the General Secretary, giving Hu absolute power that he very cautiously and ardently wielded. His administration was quick to respond to disasters, and even quicker to subdue dissonances or those that spoke critically of the government publically, which was needed to maintain the “harmonious society”. It was also acknowledged that for the

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purpose of a “harmonious society” the remote western regions, of which lived the predominantly poorest citizens, needed development, which was precisely why Hu and Wen were perfectly suited for the job. “For the purposes of the Western Development policy (Xibu da kaifa), the western regions were identified as the autonomous regions of Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Guangxi, the provinces or Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai” (Dillon 198). On November 18th 2004, the West China forum met and identified five key tasks for Western Development, “which were later taken up in more detail by Wen Jiabao, but singled out two major developments, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the construction of tarmac roads in every rural county” (Dillon 201). In February 2005, Wen Jiabao introduced his own written document explaining the macro-level development planning process. “He drew attention to the fact that the population of the west of China (as defined for the purpose of this project) was 30 per cent of China’s total but that its GDP per capita has been only 40 per cent of the level achieved in the east. Net income in the rural west is approximately 50 per cent of that in the east and, of China’s rural poor, over 60 per cent are to be found in the west. It is this inequality and the potential dangers for China’s overall development and stability that have prompted the central authorities to place such a great emphasis on, and devote such a high level or resource to, the development of the west” (Dillon 202). Helping alleviate poverty and increasing the opportunities for people living in western China would help to promote a “harmonious society” but so would providing the energy from the west to the east needed to drive the auspicious 8%+ GDP growth each year during the HU/Wen reign. In 2003 China “became the second largest country in terms of energy consumption, ranking after only the United States” (Dillon 208). The Tarim Basin in western Xinjiang is home to “colossal

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oil and natural gas reserves” (Dillon 208) in which a West-East Pipeline project that began in 2002, pumps natural gas all the way from the Tarim Basin to Shanghai. This is why Beijing “is not willing to countenance any suggestion of independence for Xinjiang and why it has clamped down on any hints of a Uyghur independence movement. To ensure security of supply, it must maintain political control over the region and that requires a degree of social stability” (Dillon 208). The same can be said for minerals and precious metals in Tibet and coal and water in the other western regions. It is this control that led to numerous protests in Lhasa and Urumqi through the mid 2000’s leading to up to 87,000 protests in 2005, the last year the statistics were released publically. Hu attempted to step up his campaign against corruption to deter the unrest and protests in 2006. First he dismissed “Liu Zhihua, the vice-mayor of Beijing in charge of construction for the Olympic Games. Not long thereafter, Wang Yeshou was removed as deputy commander of the Navy, and He Minxu, a vice-governor in Anhui province, and Li Baojin, the president of Tianjin’s Procuratorate, were detained for corruption. In at least three of these four cases, “bad morals” were included in the reports by the Xinhua News Agency” (Fewsmith 270). This campaign against “bad morals” was a warning to the CCP leaders of the highest level that corruption and exploitation of the “people centered” “harmonious society” would not be tolerated, however the campaign against corruption was stymied when the investigations led back to Shanghai and began involving Jiang Zemin’s own son. 2007 saw the CCP’s Seventeenth National Conference in which the “congress selected a small group of new leaders to join the Politburo. The names of two of them, Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping, had been widely canvassed in advance and when Xi took to the platform immediately after Hu

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Jintao and ahead of Li, this was generally taken as a signal that Xi Jinping was to be the future leader of China after Hu’s scheduled retirement in 2012” (Dillion 258) However, unrest continued in Lhasa and Urumqi and massive protests against the government took place in both cities leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Pre-Olympic demonstrations against China were well covered by CCTV, as were the transparent Lhasa riots in Tibet and their judicial outcomes, bringing with it angst to the Chinese people while the eyes of the world watched. However, this is modern China and important decisions were made decisively and transparently in reaction to the terrorism. The tiny minority of protesters were overwhelmingly silenced by the out pouring support of the world for China and the true Olympic spirit of “One World, One Dream” an ideal soon proven on May 12 when the world learned that an earthquake measuring 8.0 on the Richter scale had struck in Wenchuan County in Sichuan province. The Chinese government and military took immediate action to save as many of those trapped under rubble as they possibly could. Mountain passes were closed by landslides. In one location oil freight on a train had derailed inside a mountain tunnel and was burning uncontrollably on the sole route to supply assistance to devastated towns and villages, and so troops risked skydiving with only parcels and personal gear into the quake zone. So too did the CCTV crews, and the nation watched through held tears the live images that unraveled during the 72 hour window for survival and an unbelievable freedom given to the media to capture China’s intense relief efforts. One particularly etching scene was of helpless parents mourning over a collapsed school where their children lay trapped, unable to move the giant concrete slabs knowing well the limitations of time. The Sichuan earthquake killed more than 69,000 people and displaced over 15 million.

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Another first for 2008 was the acceptance of international assistance to a national disaster in China, as scores of doctors, teams of special extreme rescue units, and psychologists from all over the world rushed to assist the survivors of the disaster. The year of the rodent was initially believed to be a lucky one symbolized by the eighth year of this century -- 8 symbolizing prosperity and wealth because of a similarity in their tonal pronunciation. However this wealth is not measured monetarily, as in a purely capitalist society, but in terms of guan xi (relationships) happiness and harmony—and the mantra “One World, One Dream” was an invitation to these ideals as a means of global solidarity and peace. This kind of cooperation and unity are helping rebuild the areas devastated by the earthquake today and for years to come. This boost of confidence to the Chinese people to competently handle untellable natural disasters and forge forward in the wake of undeniable grief and determination in a country with the largest population in the world is my greatest wisdom taken from these kind loving people in this wise land. And so years of preparation in building the Olympic parks, venues from the greatest architects of this era, supporting the best nominees regardless of nationality, but sheerly on brilliance and design were certainly ready to be used by the Chinese athletes determined more than ever to show the world what China could accomplish. Immediately following the Olympics the Chinese launched people into space. The Shenzhou VII spacecraft, carrying three astronauts lifted off from Jinquan Satellite Launch Center on September 25. Two days later, Zhai Zhigang, a 42-year-old from northeastern China, was the first Chinese astronaut to walk in space. This is an effort to establish a space station by 2020 and land people on the moon.

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When the financial events unfold before our very eyes, both countries provided humongous stimulation plans—China had a $586 billion effort to help ease the slowing consumerism. The election of Obama was popular front page news. However, things had changed, “The 2008 financial crisis marked a fundamental shift in the relationship between China and the United States. Nothing could or would be quite the same again…In a few short months, the crisis served to undermine a near-universal assumption of American, and Western, economic competence; in contrast, China’s economic credentials have been considerably burnished” (Jacques 585). Simultaneously, “the crisis at the same exposed the huge levels of indebtedness that have sustained the American economy, accentuated since by the financial rescue package, while underlining the financial strength of the Chinese economy, now the world’s largest net creditor with its massive foreign exchange reserves. Although, hardly new, the crisis finally woke Americans up to the fact that China had become their banker, with all this meant in terms of the shifting balance of power” (Jacques 585). Although, China continued to grow and expand, “After the heady days of the Beijing Olympics passed, stagnation set in: China’s previously stratospheric economic growth slowed amid the 2008 global economic crisis (though the country’s economy fared much better than that of many others), and popular discontent with the leadership’s lack of clear direction seems to have grown” (Wasserstrom 135). This would soon be changed by the Chinese leadership’s new focus on its own domestic market, which hoped to boost consumerism inside of China instead of focusing on exports. Hu and Wen would also be very busy towards the end of their era, shifting between their foreign policy, particularly in East Asia and the ASEAN area, using Chinese soft power abroad while dealing with enormous environmental degradation and apocalyptic pollution levels in its major cities.

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Modern Chinese foreign policy has been informed by “Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that the country should exercise patience and not try to assert itself or seek leadership” (Jacques 588), however there has been a shift since the financial crisis. “In East Asia, during the 2010-11 the Chinese found themselves increasingly on the defensive amidst growing ASEAN concerns about Chinese policy towards the Spartly and Paracel Islands and, linked to that, China’s new naval deployments in the South China Sea” (Jacques 590). The anxiety of the Philippines and Vietnam in regards to China’s claim of the area and islands is warranted as the new shift in Chinese Foreign policy is obvious, along with a buildup of its white water navy and military capabilities. Some academics describe China’s new foreign policy as “mercantilist: in the great majority of cases, from Africa and East Asia to North America and Latin America, its bilateral relations are dominated by economic considerations, most notably trade and loans but increasingly also investment flows and currency issues” (Jacques 592). The “driving force of China’s growing influence as a global power remains its rapid economic expansion. If the United states was the architect of globalization in the 1980’s and 1990’s—with no particular country in the ascendant in the early years of this century—since 2008 China has come to assume that role” (Jacques 596). That ‘role’ has been China having a huge expansion of trade and a major creditor and source of funds and loans. For example, “the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank – the two key institutions – made more than $110 billion available in long-term loans to developing countries in 2009-10, compared with equivalent loan commitments by the World Bank of $100.3 billion from mid-2008 to mid-2010, on terms typically more generous than those of the World Bank” (Jacques 599). “The loans have played a crucial role in underpinning and 33

cementing China’s growing trading relationship with numerous developing countries all over the world, from Central Asia and Africa to the Middle East and Latin America, thereby acting as a key instrument of Chinese foreign policy. In the great majority they help to fund the extraction of raw materials and the provision of infrastructure” (Jacques 599), as can been seen in the film When China met Africa. These new projects and loans, to the developing world in particular, helps to grow the internationalization of the renminbi, and elevate poverty and improve their living standards, creating a respect for China. Wanting to help improve the lives of the developing world is an extension of the kind of ‘morality’ that characterized Hu and Wen towards the end of their leadership. This, along with building Confucius Institutes in every country around the world that teach Chinese language and culture and sending students abroad are clear indicators of the ‘soft power’ Hu and Wen used during their tenure as the leaders of China. The fifth generational of leadership, led by President Xi Jinping, took over from Hu Jintao at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in Beijing in November 2012. “Hu called on all Party members, the military forces and Chinese people of various ethnic groups to follow the lead of the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the general secretary, firmly pursue the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, free up the mind, carry out reform and opening up, pool strength, overcome all difficulties, strive for the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieve new victories for socialism with Chinese characteristics” (People’s Daily Online, “Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping meet delegates to 18th CPC National Congress”).

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(People’s Daily Online, “Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping meet delegates to 18th CPC National Congress”)

During Xi Jinping’s first couple of years he has also been taking on bureaucratic corruption, keeping the market healthy and trying to formulate new ideas to combat some of the worst environmental degradation ever known to humanity. More interesting to me, and to my Master’s thesis, is what has been characterized as his new key idea, the “Chinese Dream,” and western academics and Chinese alike, are wrestling with this idea of what exactly is the Chinese dream?

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Notes 1.) Deng’s ‘imperial visit’ is being compared to those of Qianlong’s expensive southern tours during the Qing Dynasty that eventually bankrupted the Dynasty and seen as a Turning point for decay by historians within the Dynasty

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“He Qinglian.” Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture. 2011. Web. 22 Oct. 2014. He, Qinglian. “中国现代化的陷阱.” 今日中国出版社. 1998. Print. http://heqinglian.net/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/%E4%BD%95%E6%B8%85%E6%B6%9F%EF%BC%9A%E4%B8% AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%8E%B0%E4%BB%A3%E5%8C%96%E7%9A%84%E9%99%B7%E9 %98%B1%E5%BE%B7%E6%96%87%E7%89%88.pdf “History of the People's Republic of China (1989–2002).” Wikipedia. 31 Aug. 2014. Web. 12 Sept. 2014. 38

Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. W. W. Norton & Company; Third Edition. 2012. Print. “The Third Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee Specifies Goals for Reform.” Beijing Review. 10 Oct. 1993. Web. 19 Sept. 2014. “Three Represents.” Wikipedia. 18 Oct. 2014. Web. 27 Oct. 2014. Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. “China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know.” Oxford University Press. 2010. Print. “Wen pledges to stabilize pork prices.” Xinhua. 28 May. 2007. Web. 3 Oct. 2014. Yan, Yunxiang. McDonald's in Beijing: The Localization of Americana. Stanford University Press. 1997. Web. Sept. 22 2014. Yu Jianrong (2005) “Nongcun he’er shili he jicheng zhengquan tuihua” (The rural dark and evil forces and the degeneration of grassroots political power). China Blog (Boke Zhongguo) 2005. Web. Nov. 11. 2014.

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