A Comic Blunder

A Comic Blunder?





I do not believe - indeed I deem it a comic blunder to believe - that the
exercise of reason is sufficient to explain our condition and where
necessary to remedy it, but I do believe that the exercise of reason is at
all times unconditionally necessary and that we disregard it at our peril.


Peter Medawar*



Whereas all Humanists - possibly without exception – reject a
morality based on a rewarding and punishing God, there is no such consensus
regarding the source of the moral impulse. The view of David Hume and T.H.
Huxley that the roots of morality are to be found in the emotional nature
of man is accepted by a large number of Humanists but, with the increasing
stridency of the rejection of religion and theism, the claim that reason
and science can provide a sufficient basis for moral values has been
gaining ground. The problem here – apart from the fact that many humanists
seem to have an "irrational passion for dispassionate rationality" - is
the difficulty of giving up the quest for certainty. As against a morality
based on scriptures and therefore the word of God, a morality based on
something as vague and indefinable as human nature clearly lacks authority.
Science, it is claimed, could provide a firmer foundation. (Ironically,
though, science itself acknowledges the tentative nature of its findings;
and its advance is ensured by this acknowledgement.) Walter Lippmann
says: "The prestige, which once adhered to those who spoke by revelation,
has passed to scientists. But science, though it is the most reliable
method of knowledge we now possess, does not provide an account of the
world in which human destiny is the central theme."

Medawar (himself a scientist and Nobel laureate) held that science cannot
answer questions having to do with first and last things - the ultimate
questions - and that "no conceivable advance of science could empower it to
do so." Lord Hailsham says:"…science can say much about means. But what
can it say about ends? In its nature, physical science owes its triumph to
the study of what can be seen, calculated, observed and verified by
experiment." "If values exist, they exist," he goes on to say, "and must be
discussed without recourse to that salutary discipline." According to
Feynman: "the moral values seem somehow to be outside the scientific
realm". Stephen J Gould postulates two non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA):
"The net of science covers the empirical realm: what is the universe made
of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion
extends over questions of moral values and meaning." This applies as much
to secular humanism as to religion.

One criticism of Western Humanism has been its excessive reliance on what
Iris Murdoch has called "the unadorned promptings of reason". "We know too
much", said Bertrand Russell, "and we feel too little." According to Tom
Kitwood: "There are disturbing parallels between the schizoid state and
the style of moralism that has been pervasive in western culture, where
good-

ness has been so strongly associated with intellect and will, so little
with feelings. It would seem possible that a person might be profoundly
schizoid, and yet have an exceedingly sophisticated theoretical morality."
The early leaders of the Humanist Movement were prominent intellecuals who
had found an intellectually satisfying alternative to dogmatic religions.
But the vast masses of people whose faith in traditional religions has been
eroded by what Lippmann has called the 'acids of modernity' need an
emotionally satisfying alternative. If the Humanist Movement has to gather
within its fold those who have become disenchanted with traditional
religions, the strong emotional needs which religions have satisfied cannot
be ignored. But, in line with Kitwood's thinking, in rejecting religion,
there has been a tendency in Western Humanism to throw out the emotional
baby with the irrational bathwater.

Julian Huxley was a notable exception to this, and it is worth
quoting from his Presidential Address at the inauguration of the IHEU: "As
I see it, the world is undoubtedly in need of a new religion, and that
religion must be founded on Humanist principles if it is to meet the new
situation adequately. Humanists have a high task before them, in working
out the religious implications of their ideas. When I say religion I do
not mean merely a theology involving belief in a supernatural god or gods;
nor do I mean merely a system of ethics, however exalted; nor only
scientific knowledge, however extensive; nor just a political social
morality however admirable and efficient. I mean an organised system of
ideas and emotions which relate man to his destiny, beyond and above the
practical affairs of every day, transcending the present and the existing
system of laws and social structure. Such systems of ideas and emotions
about human destiny have always existed and will always continue to exist;
they certainly include the theistic religions; and I believe we have
nothing to lose by using the word religion in the broadest possible sense
to include non-theistic formulations and systems as well. Otherwise we run
the risk of sterilizing the ideas we put forward by implying that our
systems are not so fully satisfying or compelling as those of the theistic
and supernatural religions." (Emphasis added). Huxley's idea of Humanism
as a new religion has been dropped by the Humanist Movement. The preferred
word now is 'life stance'. This, of course, has nil emotional resonance;
and doubtful etymology. But, whatever the label, few will disgree that
Humanism has to be "... an organised system of ideas and emotions which
relate man to his destiny, beyond and above the practical affairs of every
day, transcending the present and the existing system of laws and social
structure."

The choice between these two alternative views regarding the foundation of
values and morality - science and rationality on the one hand, and the
emotional nature of man on the other - is not merely an academic question.

It is bound to have a profound effect on the character and future course
of the Humanist movement.


***

The authors claim that "… it is revealed that ethics represent a
scientific discipline and, therefore, is subjected to scientific rules."
This is a highly disputable claim. Peter Medawar, a scientist and a Nobel
laureate says: " I do not believe - indeed I deem it a comic blunder to
believe - that the exercise of reason is sufficient to explain our
condition and where necessary to remedy it, but I do believe that the
exercise of reason is at all times unconditionally necessary and that we
disregard it at our peril." He held that science cannot answer questions
having to do with first and last things - the ultimate questions - and that
"no conceivable advance of science could empower it to do so." Lord
Hailsham says:"…science can say much about means. But what can it say
about ends? In its nature, physical science owes its triumph to the study
of what can be seen, calculated, observed and verified by experiment." "If
values exist, they exist," he goes on to say, "and must be discussed
without recourse to that salutary discipline." According to Feynman: "… the
moral values seem somehow to be outside the scientific realm".

Eminent mathematician-physicist George Ellis has this to say: "Many key
aspects of life (such as ethics: what is good and what is bad, and
aesthetics: what is beautiful and what is ugly) lie outside the domain of
scientific inquiry (science can tell you what kind of circumstances will
lead to the extinction of polar bears, or indeed of humanity; it has
nothing whatever to say about whether this would be good or bad, that is
not a scientific question).


Amsterdam Declaration 2002

Para 2. Attempts to explain values in terms of neuroscience or
evolutionary theory in fact have nothing whatever to say about what is good
or bad. That is a philosophical or religious question (scientists trying to
explain ethics from these kinds of approaches always surreptitiously
introduce some unexamined concept of what is a good life by the back
door). 2. Humanism is rational. It seeks to use science creatively, not
destructively. Humanists believe that the solutions to the world's problems
lie in human thought and action rather than divine intervention. Humanism
advocates the application of the methods of science and free inquiry to the
problems of human welfare. But Humanists also believe that the application
of science and technology must be tempered by human values. Science gives
us the means but human values must propose the ends.