A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES
MADU SIMON ONYEKACHI
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
-0-
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that this research work titled: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES, submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Major Seminary of Saints Peter and Paul, Bodija, Ibadan, for the award of BACHELOR OF ARTS (B.A) DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN, IBADAN, is a record of original research carried out by MADU SIMON ONYEKACHI.
-------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------
Date
SUPERVISOR Dr. Philip Ogo Ujomu Acting Head of Department, Department of Philosophy and Religions, University Benin, Head of of Department, Benin- City, Nigeria.
-1-
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to my beloved parents Mr. Paul Chukwukere Madu and Mrs. Helen Madu and in a special way to my beloved brothers and sisters & To all who teach and promote the Christian faith that comes to us from Christ through the Apostles as well as those who have been deceived and led astray by false teachings and doctrines.
-2-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No one walks alone on the journey of life. Just where do I start to thank those that joined me, walked beside me, and helped me along the way and continuously urged me have a positive approach to life and all that life throws at us. So at last, here it is. Much of what I have learned over the years came as the result of being the third son to a wonderful and lovely family- MADU’S FAMILY- all of whom, in their own ways inspired me and, subconsciously contributed a tremendous amount to the content of this write-up. First of all I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Philip Ogo Ujomu, my research supervisor, for his patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. My grateful thanks are also extended to the Rector Magnificus Very Rev. Fr. Dr. Michael Sunday Sasa, for his fatherly advice and encouragement throughout my philosophy years. I would also like to thank Rev. Fr. Dr. Damian Ilodigwe (H.O.D Philosophy Saints Peter and Paul Major Seminary, Bodija, Ibadan), for his advice and assistance in keeping my progress on schedule and Rev. Fr. Dr. Ogundele for assisting me with his library. May God sustain you in his vineyard. I would never have been able to finish my dissertation without the guidance and support from members of the Oblates of St. Joseph, Nigerian Delegation. At this point I shower my fountain of gratitude to the Superior Delegate and Rector, Very Rev. Fr. Michael Odubela, OSJ and his Council, My Prefects of Discipline in the Persons of Rev. Fr. Ashibi Bonaventure, OSJ, Br. Emegharibe Solomon, OSJ, and Br. Jirgba Solomon, OSJ for their guidance and encouragements; and by extension to other Priests in the
-3-
House, Rev. Fr. Cyril Ejiofor Nwamu, OSJ (Spiritual Director), Rev. Fr. Vitalis Odo, OSJ and Rev. Fr. Joseph Ekpayip, OSJ (Vocations Director and Economo) for their wonderful supports. I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many individuals. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Mrs. Atalo for her motherly advice and material supports. God bless you. I also need to thank three ‘wonderful’ men, in the persons of Agubeze Simon, who provided insight to the formulation of the subject matter, Akhalu Jeffery, who proof read the whole write-up, and Jimoh Francis, who remunerated for the binding of this essay. May God reward your invaluable efforts. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to my friends and classmates for their help and wishes for the successful completion of this project most especially to my confreres Kenneth, Raphael, Justine, Kyrian, Paul, Thomas, and Ambi (SMA), Ekanem (CSsR), Omale John (Abuja Diocese) for their special assistance. God Bless you all. Finally, yet importantly, I would like to offer my special thanks to all my brothers in the house- Professed and Non-professed brothers: Marcelinus (May-weather), Sule, Donatus (De-doms), Ntia (One people), Benjamin, Alabi, Osilama (Osi-bobo), and the Orientandis, Year 1, 2 and 3 brothers, and all those working with me in the Choir and computer department. May God reward you all for you all for all your kind gestures towards the success of this work. THANK YOU!!! MADU SIMON ONYEKACHI (A.k.a BAMIDELE)
-4-
ABSTRACT Miracles, unlike some other events are not events which are logically impossible in the way that it is logically impossible for a circle to be a square. Over the ages, this phenomenon has been understood as a deviation from the usual course of natural events and was interpreted to serve religious purposes. Hume, however identified deviation from nature’s course with violations of natural law and argued that just as a uniform past experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle. If Hume were right we would be forced to reject a large number of scientific developments which have taken place over the last few centuries on the basis that they were not in keeping with natural law. Nevertheless, this essay will systematically make a seasoned effort to appraise Hume’s view in order to show that miracles can occur.
-5-
TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0
CERTIFICATION -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
DEDICATION
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6
-
-
-
-
-
-
8
-
-
-
-
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT
-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE 1.1
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF MIRACLES 12
1.2
CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF MIRACLES -
-
-
-
13
1.3
MIRACLES AND NATURAL ORDER
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
14 1.4
THE RELEVANCE OF THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 17
1.5
MIRACLES AND WORLD VIEW
-
-
-
-
-
18
1.6
A PRECURSOR TO HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES -
-
20
-
25
CHAPTER TWO: HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES 2.1
A PRIORI ARGUMENTS
-
-
-6-
-
-
-
ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE
2.2
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
26
ARGUMENT FROM WEAK EVIDENCE -
-
-
-
28
A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS
-
-
-
32
ARGUMENT FROM INSUFFICIENT WITNESSES
-
-
33
ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE AND BARBARISM -
-
34
ARGUMENT FROM RIVAL MIRACLES -
-
37
-
-
-
-
CHAPTER THREE: MIRACLES: DOES GOD INTERVENE IN EARTHLY AFFAIRS? 3.1
ARE MIRACLES PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?
-
40
3.2
THE PLACE OF MIRACLES IN CHRISTIANITY -
-
-
44
3.3
MIRACLES AND SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY -
-
-
48
-
CHAPTER FOUR: THE IMPACT OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES IN OUR CONTEMPORARY WORLD 4.1
DEMERITS OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES
-
-
54
4.2
MERITS
-
-
59
4.3
THE IMPACT OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES IN OUR
-
-
-
-
-
-
CONTEMPORARY WORLD
-
-
-
-
-
60
CONCLUSION
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
62
BIBLIOGRAPHY
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
68
-7-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM The idea of a miracle is a concept used broadly in ordinary language which has generated problems right from the medieval period with people like Augustine and Aquinas. Historically, the appeal to miracles have formed one of the primary lines of argument in favour of specific forms of theism, the argument typically being that the event in question can best be or can be explained as the act- which is not contrary to the laws of nature but of our knowledge of nature- by a particular God or Deity and taken as validations for religious claims. However, this understanding took a different dimension in the modern period with Hume’s analysis which described miracles as ‘transgressions of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent.’1 For him, it is not wise to believe that a miracle has occurred because they are contrary to ‘our uniform experience.’ Human testimony, says Hume, cannot justify the belief that a miracle had occurred because the evidence for the law of nature being violated-‘uniform experience’- always outweigh the testimony to a miracle. For instance, some things happen invariably in our experience, for example that men die, and in matters of fact these invariable experiences constitute certainties and are called, or forms the basis of,
1
Hume in Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 190.
-8-
laws of nature2 (since a firm and unalterable past experience has established these laws3), it will always, therefore, be more likely that the testimony of a witness to a miracle is false than it is true, since it will always be more rational to disbelieve the claim that a miracle has occurred than to accept it. Nevertheless, Hume’s conception and analysis of miracle have generated problems which center around two overlapping issues. The first of these issues is a conceptual one: what is a miracle? This controversy focuses primarily on whether a miracle must be, in some sense, contrary to natural law. Supposing that it must be, a second question arises, namely, whether the conception of such a violation is a coherent one. For example, how can we tell the difference between a case in which an event is a genuine violation (for instance, the resurrection of Christ)-assuming that some sense can be made of this notion- and one (for instance, an answered prayer) that conforms to some natural law that is known to us? And given the occurrence of a genuine violation, how are we to determine whether it is due to Divine agency or whether it is nothing more than a spontaneous lapse in the natural order? The second main issue is epistemological in nature as it concerns the justification of knowledge. Once we settle for what a miracle is, can we ever have good reasons or be justified to believe that one has taken place? This question is generally connected with
2
J.C.A. Gaskin, Hume on Religion in David, F.N and Jacqueline, T (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edt., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 499. 3 Hume in J.C.A. Gaskin, Ibid., p. 499.
-9-
the problem of whether testimony, such as that provided by individuals or scriptural sources, can ever give us adequate reason to believe that a miracle has occurred.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES The primary objective of this work therefore is to critically expose the concept of miracle, its usage and influence on human thinking and behaviour from the Humean point of view. Secondly, this work will expose the relationship, if any, between God and the world. Finally, it will examine the relevance of miracles to Christianity.
RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY This work attempts to correct the distortions to faith stemming from the rise of Pentecostalism and the emphasis of “signs and wonders” found in Christian religion in this contemporary time. Furthermore, this work is to create the following awareness: i. To show that Christianity is founded on faith, not on reason, thus, true faith should not need miracles. ii. To show that miracles are open to different interpretations and thus, can be misleading, for it can neither prove the existence of God nor the truth of a particular religion. iii. To show that miracles count against the nature of God; for it reduces the action of God to mere “signs and wonders” (reductionism).
- 10 -
iv. Finally, to show that miracles may not confirm or lead to belief because we may doubt the reliability of the testimony.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY This noble edifice will definitely concentrate on Hume’s critique of miracles as set out in Section 10 (Part I and II) of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Other sources like Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Natural History of Religion conveying his idea of religion generally are relevant but it will not be so much used here. This work will also put into consideration some vital related issues like God and the world, religion and science as case studies to probing Hume’s conclusions.
METHODOLOGY This essay hopes to achieve its goal using an expository and critical analytic methodology. The work will be divided into four chapters. Chapter one shall critically expose the subject matter (miracle) and its relationship with other concepts, and will end with a precursor to the background of Hume’s critique of miracles. The second chapter shall concentrate solely on a critical exposition of Hume’s critique of miracle as found in the sources. Chapter three likewise will be concerned with the implications of his critique in religion and science. Chapter four finally will evaluate the thesis. This chapter will not fail to find relevance of the theory in our contemporary world. This will be followed by recommendations before ending with the conclusion.
- 11 -
CHAPTER ONE THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE A widespread view of miracles sees them as ‘breaks’ in the natural order of events in the material world.4 These ‘breaks’ are sometimes referred to as ‘violations of natural laws’, and it is often said that they are brought about by God or by some extremely powerful agent who can interfere with the normal course of nature’s operation. However, the question- what is miracle has elicited myriads of answers throughout human history right from the medieval thinkers; whose philosophy is theological in nature; to the theses of many philosophers today. Nevertheless, my focus in this chapter is to attempt a critical evaluation of the term ‘miracle’. It is worthy to note that despite the wide usage of the term by people and scholars, there is no consensus on its definition. As a consequence of this, I will critically expose the problems inherent in any definition offered for miracle. After this, I will end this chapter with the precursor of Hume’s critique of miracles.
1.1
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION OF MIRACLES As a rough beginning, the term miracle is from the Latin miraculum, which is
derived from mirari, to wonder. As such, it must be in some way extraordinary, unusual, or contrary to our expectations. Disagreement arises, however, as to what makes a miracle something worth wondering about. In what sense must a miracle be extraordinary? 4
Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 190.
- 12 -
One of the earliest accounts is given by St. Augustine, who held that “a miracle is not contrary to nature, but only to our knowledge of nature,…miracles are made possible by hidden potentialities in nature that are placed there by God.”5 Thomas Aquinas; in his Summa Contra Gentiles; expanding upon Augustine’s conception, avers that “a miracle must go beyond the order usually observed in nature,”6 though he insisted that “a miracle is not contrary to nature in any absolute sense,” since “it is in the nature of all created things to be responsive to God’s will.”7 He also distinguished miraculous events from other abnormal productions, like the works of magicians and the activities of angels or demons.
1.2
CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF MIRACLES David Hume, in Section 10 of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
gave a classical definition of miracle which has excited volumes of theses from scholars. “A miracle”, says Hume, “may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent(s).”8 Similar definitions can be found in recent works by Richard Swinburne and John Mackie. According to Swinburne, a miracle is “a violation of a law of nature by a god, that is, a
5
Augustine, City of God, XXI .8.2 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by J. Rickaby, (London: Burns and Oates, 1905), Vol. III, art. 100 7 Ibid. 8 Hume in Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.190. 6
- 13 -
very powerful rational being who is not a material object.”9 Likewise for Mackie, a miracle is “a violation of a law of nature” brought about by “divine or supernatural intervention.”10 The laws of nature, Mackie adds, “describe the ways in which the world- including, of course, human beings- works when left to itself, when not interfered with. A miracle occurs when the world is not left to itself, when something distinct from the natural order as a whole intrudes into it.”11
1.3
MIRACLES AND NATURAL ORDER A key factor in any discussion on miracles is the reference to natural order for it is
generally assumed that the physical universe is an orderly system subject to natural laws, and there are uniformities and regularities in the world. As a consequence, miracles must necessarily involve a violation of this order because the grounds for accepting any event as miraculous is that such event would never had happened had nature, as it were, been left to its own devices.12 As such, some stable background is, in fact, presupposed by the use of the term, as William Adams notes: “An experienced uniformity in the course of nature has been always thought necessary to the belief and use of miracles. These are indeed relative ideas. There must be an ordinary regular course of nature, before there can be anything
9
Swinburne in Brian Davies, Op. Cit. p. 191. Mackie in Brian Davies, Op. Cit. p. 191. 11 Mackie in Brian Davies, Op.Cit., p.191. 12 Mackie, J.L, The Miracle of Theism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982), pp. 19-20 10
- 14 -
extraordinary. A river must flow, before its stream can be interrupted.”13 To make clearer this point, for instance, having observed that men die and do not come back to life we jump to the conclusion that a miracle has occurred when a counter event occurs (say the resurrection of Christ) since we presume a certain uniformity in the course of nature as a stable background and necessary for our beliefs. However, there is problem with this reasoning for it raises several questions. First, the concept of a miracle predates any modern concept of a natural law by many centuries. While this does not necessarily preclude Hume’s concept, it does raise the question of what concept or concepts earlier thinkers had in mind and of why the Humean concept should be thought preferable. Second, it becomes difficult to say what law of nature is being violated by the event in question. For instance, is there any law of nature such as “dead men stay dead” of which its violation constitutes a miracle? That dead men stay dead is a widely observed fact, but it is not, in the ordinary scientific use of the term, a law of nature that dead men stay dead.14 Third, there are deep philosophical disagreements regarding the nature and even the existence of natural laws. To buttress this point Antony Flew writes: “to seize the fundamental point that a miracle is an event which violates the ‘ordinary course of nature’ is to appreciate that the notion of a miracle is parasitical on the idea of an order to which such an event must constitute some sort of 13
William Adams, An Essay in Answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, 3rd ed., (London: B. White, 1767), p. 15. 14 John Earman, Hume's Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 50.
- 15 -
exception(s). This being so, a strong notion of the truly miraculous…can be generated if there is first an equally strong conception of natural order. The inevitable tension between the ideas of rule and exception thus gives the concepts of the miraculous an inherent instability.”15
Consequently, as long as the conception of natural order rests on a shaking foundation, Flew posits that “there will be a great reluctance to allow that miracles have in fact occurred or even to admit as legitimate a concept of the miraculous.”16 Contrary to this view, however, Tucker opines that one of the benefits of defining miracles in terms of violations of natural law is that this definition entails that a miracle is beyond the productive power of nature.17 But if that is the key idea, then it is hard to see why we should not simply use that as the definition and leave out the problematic talk of laws. Nevertheless, “on Hume’s own ‘regularity’ view of natural laws, it is difficult to see what it would mean for a natural law to be violated. If the natural laws are simply compendious statements of natural regularities, an apparent ‘violation’ would most naturally be an indication, not that a supernatural intervention in the course of nature had occurred, but rather that what we had thought was a natural law was, in fact, not one. Also, on metaphysically rich conceptions of natural laws, violations are problematic since the laws involve relations of necessity among universals. And on the view that there are
15
Antony Flew, Miracles in Paul Edwards (edt) Encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol. 5&6,( London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987), Pp. 346-347. 16 Ibid. p. 347 17 Aviezer Tucker, Miracles, Historical Testimonies, and Probabilities in History and Theory (Vol. 44, Issue 3), (2005), p. 375.
- 16 -
no natural laws whatsoever, the set of events satisfying the Humean definition of a miracle is, trivially, empty.”18 As a backdrop, many have argued that miracles need not be violations of law of nature. Aquinas, for instance, have argued that miraculous events could not properly be considered a violation, since it would not really represent any infringement, of the fundamental hierarchical order. According to him, “it is not against the principle of craftsmanship if a craftsman effects a change in his product, even after he has given it its first form.”19 Thus, an answered prayer, for example, may properly be described as a miracle, for it does not violate any law of nature. This broader understanding of miracle raises the possibility that there are at least some miracles that are not as improbable as Hume supposes, and so which can attract rational belief.
1.4
THE RELEVANCE OF THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT Beyond all of these considerations, one can make a case for the restriction of the
term “miracle” to events that are supernaturally caused and have some palpable religious significance. For instance, an insignificant shift in a few grains of sand in the lonesome desert might, if it exceeded the productive powers of nature, qualify as a miracle in some thin sense, but it would manifestly lack religious significance and could not be used as the fulcrum for any interesting argument. Considerations such as this have led many
18
Timothy McGrew, Miracles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/miracles/ 2010, p. 3. (4/12/2011) 19 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Vol. III, art. 100.
- 17 -
authors to build both the type of agency and some intimation of the purpose into the definition of a miracle. Thus, Samuel Clarke writes that: “the true Definition of a Miracle, in the Theological Sense of the Word, is this; that it is a work effected in a manner unusual, or different from the common and regular Method of Providence, by the interposition either of God himself, or of some Intelligent Agent superior to Man, for the Proof or Evidence of some particular Doctrine, or in attestation to the Authority of some particular Person.”20 Hume also, in his definition of “miracle,” speaks of an event brought about “by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.” As a consequence, we may take a supernatural cause to be a necessary condition for an event’s being a religiously significant miracle and use the word “miracle” in this sense where there is no danger of confusion. But to say that miracles seek to prove something is altogether problematic. If surviving an accident for instance were considered a miracle because God brought it about then so would death be a miracle because if God determines who survives such an accident so too does God determine (though indirectly) who dies! However we do not hear people say: He died in the accident! It was a miracle! In this sense can we endorse that miracles proof the existence of God? At this point I opine that our conception of miracle seem to depend on our general world view. 1.5
MIRACLES AND WORLD VIEW The outcome of any discussion on miracles seems to depend greatly on our world
view and on what we take their significance to be. From a theistic point of view-
20
Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, 5th ed., (London: James Knapton, 1719), pp. 311-312.
- 18 -
supernaturalism -the existence of an omnipotent God who, while transcending nature, is able to act or to express his will within the natural world, is presumed.21 From this standpoint, belief in miracles is already plausible as it makes reference to supernatural causes in accounting for miracles. Contrary to supernaturalism is ontological naturalism which denies the existence of anything beyond nature, and upholds that observation and experiment are sufficient to provide us with all of the knowledge that it is possible for us to have.22 In this light, one might argue that the tenets of naturalism rules out the possibility of miracles altogether. Another concern one might have with the miraculous could be an apologetic one. By ‘apologetic’ here is meant a defense of the rationality of belief in God. Historically, apologists have pointed to the occurrence of miracles as evidence for theism. Put differently, they have held that scriptural reports of miracles, such as those in the Bible, provide grounds for belief in God.23 Although this argument is not as popular now as it was in the 18th Century, nevertheless, it has strongly influenced the modern conception of the miraculous. The apologetic interest puts important constraints on the account of miracles such that if we accept its position that a miracle supports belief in a supernatural deity, we cannot begin by assuming a supernaturalistic world view as this would beg the question, 24since in this view (supernaturalism) there is a being- God- who transcends nature and is able to act 21
David Corner, Miracles in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy : (http://www.iep.utm.edu/miracles/print 2010, p. 2. 10/24/2011) 22 Ibid., p. 3. 23 Ibid., p. 3. 24 Ibid., p. 3.
- 19 -
freely. Furthermore, if we try to persuade a skeptic of God’s existence using miracles, we are trying to demonstrate to him that there is something beyond or transcending nature, and he will demand to be persuaded on his own terms; we must make use of no assumptions beyond those that are already acknowledged by the ontological naturalistic world view.25 1.6
A PRECURSOR TO HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES Hume, a Scottish philosopher and historian was born at Edinburgh on April 26,
1711 to a father who owned a small estate near Berwichshure named “Ninewells” and a mother, Katherine Falconer, who was from a family of lawyers. About 1723 he entered the University of Edinburgh where he was encouraged to study law, but he disliked law and left in 1726 to embark on an intense study of his own devising which led to the formulation of a philosophical system. He sought for literary fame in History, but also in moral and political thought. He never married, though he had many women friends. He died of cancer around 1776. However my focus here is on his treatise on religion which elucidates his critique of religion, and the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious beliefs. Among Hume’s fifty or so individual essays, there are numerous reflections on religion. However, his two main works directly on religion are the Natural History of Religion (1757) and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779, but first written in the 1750’s). The former deals with religion’s natural origins in human nature and society- their causes, 25
Ibid., p. 3.
- 20 -
while the latter examines the supposed rational grounds for belief in God or gods- its reasons. Part of the latter examination had already been given a preliminary run in Section II of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) in which there also appeared the chapter “Of Miracles”, wherein is found his ‘onslaught on the credentials of the Christian revelation.”26 Hume’s examination and critique of religion, and by extension, miracles, took its roots from the fundamental issues bordering religious experiences: why does anyone believe in God or gods or cleave to the teachings of such theistic religions as Christianity and Islam?27 In answering this question, scholars (particularly eighteenth-century religious apologetics) commonly appeal to arguments (cosmological and design arguments) and revelation. Hume dismantled the cosmological argument in the Treatise, the first Enquiry, and again in Part 9 of the Dialogues; while he subjected the design argument to a uniquely thorough and hostile examination in section II of the first Enquiry and again throughout the Dialogues. On revelation, Hume portrayed that “the appeal to revelation was neither to the general revelation associated with dedicated religious practice nor to individual claims to have direct information about the Divine, but specifically to the particular revelation of Christianity as set out in the New Testament.”28 This, it was supposed, carried with it certain guarantees of its own authenticity. These guarantees were that the revelation 26
J.C.A Gaskin, Hume on Religion in David, F.N and Jacqueline, T (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edt., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 484. 27 Ibid. p. 485. 28 Ibid. pp. 485-486.
- 21 -
fulfilled prophecy and was attended with miracles. Miracles could be brought only by God (and not any god but the one true God). Therefore a rational man had “grounds” for accepting the Christian revelation as genuine. It is precisely on this grounds that Hume set out to undermine in Section 10 of the first Enquiry, where incidentally, he treats fulfilled prophecy as a species of Miracle.”29 In Section 10, Part I of the Enquiry, Hume presents a priori arguments to act as a “check” on superstition. Logically, he shows that it is not wise to believe that a (religious) miracle had occurred since human testimony cannot justify the belief that a miracle had occurred. For him ‘the veracity of human testimony is from experience’ and usually amounts to a proof when it has a strong probability, or does not, when it has a weak probability which according to him, is always the case with reported miracles. And in matters of fact, experience constitutes certainties and is called, or form the basis of laws of nature, as such any testimony contrary to this; whether weak or strong; is opposing certainty and thus, the wise man will believe the certainty because weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger. Hume’s argument purports to show that no wise man-that is one whose belief is proportioned to the evidence- could believe reports of miracles. Likewise, in Part II of the same section, Hume presents a posteriori arguments and case histories to show that “there was never a miraculous event established on so full evidence that the falsehood of the evidence would be a real prodigy.”30 In effect, Part II is concerned with the criteria for good evidence, with the significance of incompatible 29 30
Ibid., p. 486. Hume in J.C.A Gaskin. Op. Cit. p. 498
- 22 -
religious claims based on rival miracles, and with the general conclusion he draws from his arguments- that “a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion.”31 In all, he sums up to a definition of miracle as: “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity.” Therefore, “there must… be a uniform experience against every miraculous event; otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle.”32
Consequently, if as Hume contends in this context that the arguments of natural religion (cosmological and design arguments) do not establish the existence of any deity that could be an object of religious belief, and that miracle (revelation) is not authenticated in any way that could convince a rational man, or proved so as to be the foundation of a system of a religion, then it can seem that the only answer that can be given to the question: “why does anyone believe in God or gods?” is that the belief have natural “causes”- this is what Hume investigates in the Natural History of Religion. By way of summation, although Hume’s arguments against miracles have provoked some fundamental questions; however, they serve as ‘beacons’ to check our beliefs so that we do not get carried away by superstitious beliefs in the guise of miracles. Let me immediately proceed to a critical exposure of his thesis.
31 32
Ibid. p. 498. Ibid. p. 499.
- 23 -
CHAPTER TWO HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES In exposing Hume’s critique of the belief in miracles, we must first understand the definition of a miracle, and the problems implicit in any definition given. As a recapitulation, any definition offered for miracle shows that the reality is based on our perception of the past such as an event contrary to observed experiences. As such, it is based on an individual’s own reality, and the faith in which he or she believes. It is also based on interior events such as what we hear or see firsthand. Examining Hume’s critique of miracle, he interprets and defines a miracle as such; ‘a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature’, an event which is not normal to most of mankind. And he concludes that a miracle cannot be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion since it is not rational to believe reports of miracles in the first hand. My task in this chapter is to expose his arguments- a priori and a posterioriagainst belief in miracles as set out in his Enquiry and consequently, his conclusion that leads us to believe that there has never been a miraculous event established. 2.1
A PRIORI ARGUMENTS In Section X, Part I of his Enquiry, Hume presents a priori arguments to act as a
‘check’ on superstition. The arguments purport to show that no ‘wise man’ (that is one whose belief is proportioned to the evidence) could believe reports of miracles. In doing this, he shows logically that miracles are impossible because of the nature of human
- 24 -
experience and weakness of evidence which is always the case according to him with reports of miracles and thus irrational to believe in miracles.
ARGUMENT FROM THE NATURE OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE For Hume, it is irrational to believe in miracles because they fall beyond our human experience. According to him, all our knowledge or materials of thinking – perception- are derived from experience- sensation (outward sentiment) or from reflection (inward sentiment).33 Thus, all our ideas or judgments extend no farther than “the materials afforded us by the senses and experience”. As a consequence, “experience becomes the only guide in reasonings concerning maters of fact”34, however, as Hume points out, this may lead us into errors since there are variable and invariable experiences, and humans have limited perception. Nevertheless, in matters of fact, as Hume tells us, these invariable experiences constitute certainties- for instance, that men die - and are called or form the basis of laws of nature because “ a firm and unalterable (unalterable because of past) experience has established these laws”.35 On the contrary, variable experiences, for instance, that one will survive a heart attack, constitutes probabilities which admit of degrees ranging from strong (almost always happens) to weak (very seldom happens). As such, a wise man will proportion his belief to the weight of
33
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 317. 34 Ibid, p. 388. 35 Hume in J.C.A Gaskin, Hume on Religion in David, F.N and Jacqueline, T (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edt., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 499.
- 25 -
evidence since he regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event.36 A miracle, he says, is “a transgression of a law of nature”37, and miracles by their very nature are not ordinary regular events we experience every day. It must constitute a violation of a law of nature because “nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happens in the common course of nature”.38 For instance, it is not a miracle that a man survives an auto crash because such a kind of event, though unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. Therefore, “there must be a uniform experience against every miraculous event; otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle.”39 Put differently, Hume is saying that miracles are logically impossible, that our idea of what a miracle is all about (that is, a violation of a law of nature) is parasitical on the conditions to be satisfied before an event can be regarded as miraculous. In other words, any claim that implies the violation of these “established and inviolable laws” should, a priori, be rejected as the product of delusion. But is it legitimate to talk of inviolable laws of nature within the context of Hume’s empiricism? Is such a concept of the laws of nature not a metaphysical concept which is outside the scope of man’s empirical science?
36
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, Op. cit., p. 388. Ibid., p. 391. 38 Ibid., p. 391. 39 Ibid., p. 392. 37
- 26 -
Critics have attacked Hume’s treatment of the laws of nature in this regard as inconsistent with his critical analysis of the principles of causality and the uniformity of nature. Hume has argued that no matter how many times we may have observed an event B follow A in the past, does not guarantee that the same thing will happen in the future since there is no necessary connection between them. “From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea such as that of a necessary connection; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only.”40 Therefore, “a firm and unalterable experience” cannot on Hume’s terms, establish that the future will resemble the past, or that there is a necessary connection between two events since “necessity is something that exists in the mind not in objects”.41 Hume is therefore compelled by the logic of his empiricism to accept the logical possibility of miracles. Also, his assertion that miracles are “uncommon events” has been attacked severely from the scientific stand point. I will examine this in the next chapter.
ARGUMENT FROM WEAK EVIDENCE Hume’s second premise for his rejection of miracles reclines on the weakness of evidence found in reported miracles. Majority of the events we come to know or accept as miracles come to us or are “derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-
40
Hume in Joseph Omoregbe, A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion, ( Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993), p. 215. 41 Ibid., p. 215
- 27 -
witnesses and spectators”.42 And in Hume’s opinion, our reliance on the testimony of men and the reports of eye-witnesses for the evidence and authenticity of miracles rests or is “derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses”.43 However, experience and observation, says Hume, have shown us that “no objects have any discoverable connection together, and all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction.” To this extent, human testimony cannot be an exception for they do not connect necessarily with reality. On the contrary, our reliance and confidence in human testimony appeals to the duty of men to be inclined to truth telling. It also appeals to the ability of men to have a memory tenacious enough to a certain degree, and to have a sense of shame. For instance, “a man delirious or noted for falsehood and villainy has no manner of authority with us.”44 Also, experience have shown us that these qualities we appeal to ab initio does not validate testimony, and the reason why we place any credit on these qualities (truthfulness and accuracy) we assume in historians and witnesses “is not derived from any connection we perceive a priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.”45
42
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p.389 43 Ibid., p. 389 44 Ibid., p. 389. 45 Ibid., p. 390.
- 28 -
Thus construed, when the fact attested to is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation (a miracle), there is here a contest of two opposite experiences (that is, a frequently observed fact versus a seldom observed fact), of which the stronger destroys the weaker. In this case the stronger evidence is the fact that has been frequently observed. Put differently, Hume is asserting that in evaluating stories of miracles we should balance the testimony for the event against the evidence for the law of nature the event violates. Since the evidence for the law of nature is a ‘uniform experience’, it always outweighs the evidence for the testimony. Hence there is always “a direct and full proof against the miracle.” However, the only condition under which it would be reasonable to accept the testimony would be when its falsity would be “more miraculous than the fact it endeavours to establish”.46 Many critics have found this argument inconsistent with our practice in evaluating testimony. One of them is George Campbell who argues that we routinely accept testimony that is less probable than the events themselves. According to Campbell, if someone mentions “that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part of the heavens, a comet will appear”, the chances “would not be as millions, but as infinite to one, that the proposition is false”47 since comets occur so frequently. Yet if “you have the testimony of but one man of integrity, who is skilled in astronomy”, that the comet appeared at that time and place, “you will not hesitate one moment to give him credit”.48 If we take his
46
Ibid., p. 392. George Campbell in Robert G. Meyers, The Marvelous and Miraculous: A Defense of Hume, (Ottawa: 20th Hume’s Conference, 1994) 48 Ibid., Op. cit. 47
- 29 -
claim that the odds are infinite as hyperbole, Campbell’s point is that a comet is considerably less likely than the falsity of the testimony, yet we accept the testimony without hesitation and without any implication that this is irrational no matter how great our presumption against the comet our reliable witness can overturn it. And if we accept testimony to comets this way, there is no reason why we should not accept testimony to miracles. Also, one contemporary critic, Hambourger argues that if Hume were right, we should not believe newspaper stories about lottery winners, since the probability that the reported winner has won is considerably less than the probability that the newspaper is mistaken.49 Nevertheless, some commentators on Hume are of the opinion that this misrepresents what Hume had in mind. For Robert Meyers, Hume “holds that testimony to a miracle disqualifies itself; hence, miracle stories are not evaluated by rules governing other testimony but are unreasonable on their face. Hume expresses this by distinguishing between the miraculous and the marvelous or, as he also calls it, the extraordinary.”50 Miraculous events are violations of laws of nature and so are unacceptable on testimony, but marvelous events are acceptable on good testimony, since they are consistent with laws. In Hume’s own words, we see the distinction he places between the miraculous and the marvelous when he writes:
49
Hambourger in Bruce Langtry, Hume, Probabilities, Lotteries and Miracles in Hume Studies Vol. XVI, No. 1 (April, 1990), p. 67. 50 Robert G. Meyers, The Marvelous and Miraculous: A Defense of Hume, (Ottawa: 20th Hume’s Conference, 1994)
- 30 -
“But in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvelous, is really miraculous, and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to a proof, in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.”51 And in the History, Hume says: “It is the business of history to distinguish between the miraculous and the marvelous; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human; to doubt the second; and when obliged by unquestionable testimony… to admit of something extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances”52
2.2
A POSTERIORI ARGUMENTS In Section X, Part II of his Enquiry, Hume presents a number of case histories and
what have been called a posteriori arguments to show that “there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence” that the falsehood of the evidence would be “a real prodigy”.53 In effect, his argument is concerned with the criteria for good evidence with the significance of incompatible religious claims based on rival miracles, and with the general conclusion he draws from his arguments that “a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion.”54
51
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 391. 52 Hume in Robert G. Meyers, The Marvelous and Miraculous: A Defense of Hume, (Ottawa: 20th Hume’s Conference, 1994) 53 Hume in J.C.A Gaskin, Hume on Religion in David, F.N and Jacqueline, T (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edt., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 498. 54 Ibid., p. 498.
- 31 -
ARGUMENT FROM INSUFFICIENT WITNESSES Aside the weakness of evidence found in any reported miracle, Hume adds that there has not been a miraculous event with a sufficient number of witnesses. He questions the integrity of mankind and how we can trust the testimony of men because men can sometimes be delirious or deceptive. He raises questions such as: who is qualified? Or who has the authority to say who qualifies to provide proof to support a miracle? Finding no answer to these questions, he reduces belief and witnessing to miracles to a natural “passion of surprise” in man, and wonder arising from miracles because “even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at a second hand or by rebound; and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others”.55 This passion for surprise and wonder inherent in human nature is capitalized on and exploited by religious people who indulge in telling fantastic stories of miraculous occurrences to promote the cause of their religious beliefs. “A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality; he may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intention in the world for the sake of promoting so holy a cause”56 Now what would be the case if the spirit of religion (the fact that religious people are only too eager to take advantage of this, to promote the cause of their religion) join itself to the love of wonder, asks Hume. “There will be an end of common sense, and human
55 56
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.), Op. cit., p. 394. Ibid., p. 394.
- 32 -
testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretentions to authority,”57 he says. Another reason he discredits the validity of miracles is that there must be a sufficient number of witnesses to validate a miracle. But regrettably, there is no testimony for any miracle that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses “so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself.”58 This basically means that the witnesses must all give the same testimony of the facts of the event otherwise Hume finds it difficult to belief in the integrity of any individual due to the complexity of detecting falsehood in any private or even public place in history. On the contrary, Hume’s claim that religious people are usually prepared to tell lies in order to propagate their religion may be true but not in all cases. Some religious people may be prepared to do that, but it would be false to say all religious people are dishonest and are prepared to tell lies as a means of propagating their faith.59
ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE AND BARBARISM Hume’s second reason in discrediting the belief in a miracle is that miracle stories are most popular in backward cultures as such there is conflict of explanation between what is attested and the world out there. In his view, historical facts have shown that claims of miraculous occurrences are generally made “among ignorant and barbarous nations”. In Hume’s words: 57
Ibid., p. 394. Ibid., p. 397. 59 Joseph Omoregbe, A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion, ( Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993), p. 219. 58
- 33 -
“It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous events, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous ancestors; or if civilized people has ever given credit to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from these barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend perceived options”60 Put differently, he saying that many of the miraculous events which happened in past history would not be considered a miracle in today’s world, or at any other time in history because the human person and society has developed intellectually and scientifically and can give scientific explanations and naturalistic interpretations to events compared to the past whereby uncommon experiences excite wonder are given metaphysical interpretations. Historical facts have also shown that miracle is believed faster by the lower class or followers within society than the leaders in the society. This is so because ‘all of our beliefs or what we choose to accept or not accept is as a result of our past experience and what history dictates to us.’ For instance, in the case of Peter and John recorded in the bible (Acts 4) who were summoned before the Sanhedrin for performing a miracle, the members of the Sanhedrin council did not believe their testimony but the populace- the lower class - believed quickly, and were spreading the news which made it difficult for the council to pass a strict judgment on them. Also, Hume argues that instances of busted miracles shows that individuals or groups can be bent on deceiving others, and as such confirms the invalidity of miracles generally.
60
Ibid., p. 395.
- 34 -
“the many instances of forged miracles, and prophesies, and supernatural events which have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently, the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvelous, and discredits the validity of miracles.”61 To buttress this point, even the bible warns that some miracles will be performed by the antichrist to deceive the righteous, as such, we should be critical of miracles: “For false christ and false prophets will appear and perform great signs and miracles to deceive even the elect if that were possible.”62 Contrary to Hume’s argument from barbarism, critics have argued with facts that reports of miracles come from just about every nation. Different cultures and societies have reports of miracles and prodigies even till this present time when the human society has developed with scientific knowledge, as such belief in miracles is not something due to ignorance as Hume thought. For instance, in September 21st 1995, millions of Hindus declared a “World-wide Miracle day”. Worshipable Deities in temples ranging as far afield as New Delhi, HoSng Kong, Sydney, Los Angeles, Chicago, London, and Nairobi were said to be accepting milk spoon-fed to them by their devotees. Word spread quickly, and when it was picked up by the media and reported to the Indian public, droves of devotees headed for their local temples to personally experience the miracle.63 Although this event was later discovered to be false by scientists, nevertheless the point here is that this prodigious event was propagated among civilized people. Also, in the most civilized
61
Ibid., p. 394. Matthew 24:24 63 Tamal Krishna Goswami, Reason and Belief: Problem Solving in the Philosophy of Religion, (Texas: Pundits Press, 1997), p. 63. 62
- 35 -
and most learned societies today, like those of America and Europe, there are reports of miraculous cures performed by preachers, evangelists or prophets. These miraculous cures are reported to occur during public prayers, sermons or ‘fellowship’ gathering, American preachers and evangelists conducts ‘miracle crusades’ during which miracles are reported to occur. Yet neither the American nation nor the European nations today can be called ‘ignorant and barbarous nations’.64
ARGUMENT FROM RIVAL MIRACLES Hume’s third reason in discrediting the belief in miracle is the problem of rival miracles. Miracles are ‘contrary facts’. Different religions claim that miracles performed by members of their faith shows that their belief system is true, but they cannot all be true at the same time so they cancel each other out. Hume states that: “Let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary, that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Spain, of Siam and of China should, all of them be established on a solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought by any of the religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so it has the force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system.”65 I shall buttress this point with a practical example. Some Christians believe that claims of the miraculous occurring in other religions or in other Christian denominations are
64
Joseph Omoregbe, A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion, ( Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993), p. 219. 65 Ibid., p. 397.
- 36 -
intended to lead people away from the truth. They would also say that these miracles were not the work of God, but of the devil. Obviously, the same thing could be said by people who belong to other religions about the claims of Christians with regard to miracles. That is why David Hume argues that miracles in different religions cancel each other out, and cannot be used as the basis of faith. However, critics have argued that the fact that two or more different religions report miracles which are contradictory may mean that they cannot both be true but does not mean, as Hume claims, that they cancel each other out-that is, that they are both necessarily untrue. We may be even more inclined in such an instance to question the evidence and the testimony but we cannot rule out the possibility that one is true. Another possible conclusion to come to is that the miracles in question did both (or all), in fact, occur and that their precise significance is still a matter for theological debate within and between the respective traditions which they are claimed to uphold. Although it is true that some miracles could be argued to be mutually exclusive (for example, the name of Allah appearing in Aubergines, and the ‘dark virgin’ appearing to a Mexican peasant cannot both be true- true in the sense of the actual work of Allah (Islamic God) and the Christian God respectively- although either could be true or both true but misinterpreted by either or both religions), nonetheless where the rival claims are less specific they are much less likely to be mutually exclusive. Similarly, a Christian might claim that a miraculous healing is the work of the Christian God, whilst a Muslim might claim that
- 37 -
the same event was the work of Allah. In this case there is no dispute that a miracle has happened, merely about who performed it. In summary, the thrust of Hume’s argument is really that miracles may not be strictly speaking, impossible, but they are impossible to prove and much more unlikely to have happened than to have happened. In the next chapter I shall examine the question of divine (or godly) intervention and its implications to the God-world relationship, religion (Christianity precisely), and science.
- 38 -
CHAPTER THREE MIRACLES: DOES GOD INTERVENE IN EARTHLY AFFAIRS? Having examined Hume’s critique of miracles, it is relevant to state here that his critique has excited volumes of comments and has further questioned the God-world relationship: do miracles prove the existence of a supernatural realm, a deity, God or the Supreme Being? Assuming it does, can it be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion, and finally, if the hard-line skeptical Hume were right, should we be forced to reject a large number of scientific developments which have taken place over the last few centuries on the basis that they were not consistent with natural law? In answering these questions I shall proceed to examine the implications of Hume’s thesis on miracle on the nature of God, on the validity of Christian religion, and on scientific development.
3.1
DO MIRACLES PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? Miracles have been put forward by some scholars as an argument from religious
experience- though an indirect experience- for the proof of the existence of God. Miracles have served as the foundation for the historical proof of the existence of the God of the Western traditions. Among the Jews, the events which are reported to have taken place in the time of Moses are key to the acceptance of the idea of the One God. For the Christians, the events during the times of Jesus, the Christ, are also the basis for the
- 39 -
acceptance of Jesus as being the Son of God. Likewise for Islam whose widespread is regarded as miraculous and proof of the legitimacy of the claims of Mohammed. Generally, the argument from miracles usually assumes the following form: 1. There is an event that has taken place that violates the laws of nature. 2. If the laws of nature are violated it could only be by a power that could violate the laws of nature that could only be the power that would have created those lawsthe law maker, the deity. 3. Therefore, the power that would have created those laws- the law maker, the deity must exist. Hume’s definition of miracle as “a violation of a law of nature by the interposition of the Deity or invisible agent”66 agrees with the first and second premise, but leaves us to ponder on the nature of the “Deity or invisible agent.” Can we for certain claim that a particular event is caused by God and not the Devil, bearing in mind that like effects may be produced by different causes? Can we be sure that we are not deceived? Why does God seem to intervene in some instances but not in others? For instance, if someone is cured mysteriously of cancer in a ward where more than ten patients are suffering the same illness, and we attribute this cure to God, so would death be a miracle because if God determines who survives such an illness, so too does God determine who dies! However, we do not hear people say: He died of cancer, it is a miracle! This problematizes the idea of attributing miracles as proof for the existence of God. For a 66
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 392.
- 40 -
theist, God cares for everyone, yet is self-limiting to provide an opportunity for moral improvement. Thus it is not beyond God’s ability to remove all ills from the world, but that would not ensure the ultimate benefit of mankind, nor would it be compatible with God’s gift of free will.67 Still, it does seem that God is acting whimsically by helping some and not others. More particularly, as process theist David Graffin asks, why doesn’t an all-powerful God act more frequently “in order to prevent particularly horrendous evils”?68 However, contrary to this view, St. Augustine had argued that a miracle need not be contrary to nature but to our idea of nature and are made possible by the hidden potentialities in nature that are placed there by God.69 Following Augustine, and in line with the second premise, Aquinas argues that “it is not against the principle of craftsmanship if the craftsman desires to reshape the craftwork”.70 By this Aquinas conceives that a miracle is not contrary to nature but it is the nature of all created things to be responsive to God’s will. These points to the fact that miracle is caused by God. Contrary to Aquinas’ view, Baruch Spinoza in his Tractatus Theologico- Politicus argues that if there were a God, then miracles would not occur. For him, the will of God is identical with the laws of nature and necessarily, God’s will is inviolable.71 As such miracles cannot happen since a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. A non67
Tamal Krishna Goswami, Reason and Belief: Problem Solving in the Philosophy of Religion, (Texas: Pundits Press, 1997), p. 63. 68 David Graffin in Tamal Krishna Goswami, Op. Cit., p. 63 69 Augustine, City of God, XXI .8.2 70 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by J. Rickaby, (London: Burns and Oates, 1905), Vol. III, art. 100. 71 Spinoza in Timothy McGrew, Miracles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/miracles/. 2010. 29/11/2011), p. 13.
- 41 -
theological version of this argument is given by Voltaire. For him, “a miracle is the violation of mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws. By the very exposition itself, a miracle is a contradiction in terms: a law cannot at the same time be immutable and violated.”72 Furthermore, Voltaire counters the view that miracles should be ascribed to God when he writes: “It is impossible for a being infinitely wise can have made laws to violate them. He could not… derange the machine but with a view of making it work better; but it is evidently that God, all-wise and omnipotent, originally made this immense machine, the universe, as good and perfect as he was able; if He saw that some imperfections would arise from the nature of matter, He provided for that in the beginning; and, accordingly, He will never change anything in it.”73 From the foregoing, it is therefore impious to ascribe miracles to God for they would indicate a lack of fore thought, or of power, or both on the side of God. Reacting to this view William Paley asserts: “In what way can revelation be made but by miracles? In none which we are able to conceive.”74 Paley’s point is not merely negative; rather; it is that only by setting up a universe with regularities that no mere human can abrogate and then suspending them could God, if there were a God, authenticate revelation, stamping it with divine approval by an act of sovereignty.75 Put differently, if there is a God who wishes to authenticate a communication to man in an unmistakable fashion, then, in Paley’s view, an authenticating miracle is inevitable. It is therefore not at all impious to
72
Voltaire in Timothy McGrew, Op. Cit. p. 14. Ibid., p. 14. 74 Paley in Timothy McGrew, Op. Cit., p. 15. 75 Timothy McGrew, Miracles, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Op. Cit., p. 15. 73
- 42 -
ascribe miracles to God, and they imply no limit either on His knowledge or on His power; they are both a sign of His approval and evidence of His benevolent foresight.76 By way of subordination, since the days of Kant, it has become virtually an axiom in philosophy that the existence of God cannot be conclusively proved. Thus it cannot be conclusively proved that God exists or that he does not exist. No argument on either side can be conclusive. Hence it leaves room for the intelligibility of faith as well as for the intelligibility of atheism. As such it is not unreasonable for a person to believe that God exists because to say that God exists or does not exist is to express a belief which is intelligible and legitimate.77 The same applies to the argument from miracles as an act of divine positive intervention in human affairs. The man who says miracles do actually occur and serve as prove for the existence of God is expressing a belief, the truth of which he cannot prove, likewise the man who denies this fact. From the foregoing the boldest claim that can be made against reported miracles is that such events are impossible. But are they (miracles) actually impossible? We shall discover shortly.
3.2
THE PLACE OF MIRACLES IN CHRISTIANITY Traditionally, the belief in the occurrence of miracles has been considered an
important element in Christian faith. In the Old Testament they were essentially demonstrations of God’s power and of his allegiance to his chosen people while in the
76
Ibid., p. 15. Joseph Omoregbe, A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion, (Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993), Pp. 221-222 77
- 43 -
New Testament they are referred to as ‘semeia’ (signs) and ‘terata’ (wonders).78 According to the testimony of both the Old and New testaments, miracles, as a symbol of God’s power, cannot be separated from revelation. As such miracles are considered as a basic element of the biblical witness to revelation.79 For instance, in the Catholic Church miracles are used as proofs to validate the beatification and canonization of a person as blessed or saint. In this regard any miracle that is experienced by the invocation of the saint or by touching the remains or relics of the saint, confirms that the person enjoys favour and eternal bliss with God, and the Church confirms this either by beatifying or canonizing the individual after much investigation. It is obvious from these expositions that the foundation of Christian faith is revelation of which zenith is the miracle of the resurrection of Christ because Christ is regarded the fullness of God’s revelation. However, in the face of Hume’s critique of miracle, together with the controversies concerning miracle, the use of miracles to validate a particular revelation of Christianity is problematic for it appears that Hume’s conclusion suggests to us that the resurrection of Christ cannot be proved in such a way that it can function as a good reason to accept the Christian faith. Little wonder he says, though derogatively, that “our most holy religion (Christianity) is founded on Faith not on reason.”80 By this he shows that the resurrection of Christ lacks sufficient reason-number of witnesses (Only a few saw him after the resurrection compared to the number of people that did not see him) 78
Paul Tillich, Revelation and Miracle in William I. Rowe & William J. Wainwright (edts.), Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), p. 400. 79 Michael Schmaus, Dogma 1: God in Revelation, (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1968), p. 134. 80 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 403.
- 44 -
and no amount of rationalization can convince a wise man that this event actually occurred. Hume asserts: “Our evidence for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses, because, even in the first authors of our religion (the apostles), it was no greater; and it is evident that it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples (to us); nor can anyone rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses.”81 In effect Hume is saying that it is easier to believe the evidence of our senses than the testimony of witnesses on the account of a miracle. He is indirectly suggesting a naturalistic view of explanation of events rather than a supernaturalistic view of miracles which gives a transcendental explanation to the nature of events. With the rise of European liberalism in the modern era, the naturalistic approach was adopted and elevated by some Christian theologians to explain religious experiences and miracles. For these liberal theologians, religious experiences and miracles can be explained as products of natural forces rather than supernatural forces. They account for such phenomena in natural terms without recourse to anything that is beyond the physical realm. Majorly they give alternative explanations on the account of creation and the biblical miracles. For instance they say that the miracle of the “Burning Bush” experienced by Moses was nothing more than hallucination, heat distortion and mirage effect. And that the miracle of the multiplication of the loaves and the fishes by Christ was to teach the value of ‘sharing’. According to these exegetes, an average Jew in those
81
Ibid., p. 387.
- 45 -
days goes about with his lunch pack, and that the little boy with the five loaves and two fishes was an example which others emulated and brought out their lunch packs. Fundamentally, the liberal theologians believe that the biblical miracles are stories or even exaggerated accounts of ‘normal’ events because these miracles do not occur again in our times. They also argue that the bible was written in a pre-scientific era, and as such, contains accounts of things which we would now explain through science, psychology and medicine. A proponent of this view is Rudolf Bultmann, who introduced a method which came to be known as demythologization, which was essentially an existentialist attempt to get to the heart of the biblical teaching without taking literally, the idea of miracles. According to him, “we now live in times when people are less willing to take seriously the idea of ‘someone walking on water’ or even ‘rising from the dead’, as such it would not be rational to insist people should literally believe these things happened because it may prevent them from becoming Christians.”82 However, this view has been criticized on the grounds that miraculous events have fulfilled prophecy and have been used to strengthen belief. The philosophical problem that arises here is: whether one adopts a literal interpretation of biblical miracles or gives a naturalistic interpretation of these events, there still lies the problem of belief. If we reject a literal reading of some of the biblical material, as a liberal would, on what basis then should we accept other parts as being true? Why not reject everything? If Jesus 82
Rudolf Bultmann in Stephen A. Richards, Miracles in the Bible (Part 2): Issues and Responses, (Pelusa Media Group, 1999:http://www.thatreligiousstudieswebsite.com/Religious_Studies/Phil_of_Rel/Miracles/miracles_bible2. php. 4/18/2012).
- 46 -
did not literally perform the miracles as recorded in the bible, then why believe anything people recorded about him saying? On the other hand, there is the challenge that if one does not interpret and apply the meaning of the bible for each generation, then its teaching will become irrelevant and obsolete, and that an important part of doing this is to move away from the belief that the miracles literally happened, when it is no longer deemed credible by most people to believe in them. We should ask: what is the relevance of, say the Burning Bush, or the multiplication of loaves, in our contemporary world? In summary, within Christianity and by extension, Christian theology, there are different views concerning miracles. It lacks univocal acceptance, and as such is problematic. Any belief of miracle in this regard will be a subjective belief that can strengthen the faith of the individual or the believing community but cannot persuade an inquirer or the atheist to believe.
3.3
MIRACLES AND SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY The traditional conception of miracles as ‘acts or interventions of God which is
not contrary to nature, but only to our knowledge of nature’ is irreconcilable with our modern understanding of science. This is because science proceeds on the assumption that whatever events occur in the world can be accounted for in terms of other events that also belong within the world, and if on some occasions we are unable to give a complete account of some happening- and presumably all our accounts fall short of completeness “the scientific conviction is that further research will bring to light further factors in the
- 47 -
situation, but factors that will turn out to be just as immanent and observable as those already known.”83 In this light, any event described in the sense of supernatural intervention is incompatible with science because it goes back to a mythodological outlook and expects God to manifest himself and prove himself in some extraordinary sensible phenomena. Little wonder the early Christian writers used many arguments to establish the claims of their faith, though some of their arguments were strange, they however placed little weight on appeal to miracles reportedly done by Jesus Christ.84 In this way, they were following his (Jesus’) own teaching and example. The Humean notion of miracle as ‘violations of natural law’ does not fall short of this problem too for it raises several questions in science: Do miracles need be uncommon events-‘violation of laws of nature’- as he posits? Because for him “nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happens in the common course of nature…otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.”85 And if this is true, do miracles render the laws of nature false as he conceived? Because in Hume’s hermeneutics of understanding miracles contradict the known laws thereby making them false, but these laws, for him, cannot be false since “a firm and unalterable experience has established them.”86 Also, as a good Newtonian, he considered these laws to be fixed and inviolable. Thus, “the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined”. By this, Hume asserts that if we endorse that a 83
John Macquarie, Miracles in James Churchill & David V. Jones (edts.), An Introductory Reader in the Philosophy of Religion, (London: S.P.C.K., 1979), p. 132. 84 Ibid., p.132. 85 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 392. 86 Ibid., p. 391.
- 48 -
miracle has occurred we render the law of nature false, as such, it is irrational to believe in the miracle. Finally, following his conclusion, is it altogether irrational to believe in miracles? From the scientific viewpoint miracles need not be ‘uncommon’ events
or
‘violations’ as Hume thought, if they are, many scientific inventions and activities will be regarded as miracles; for example, atomic explosion; because these events were once uncommon events. There was a time, for instance, when there were no airplanes, television, space-travels etc, and these developments excited wonder when they began. On the long run, if Hume were right we would be forced to reject these scientific developments on the basis that they were not in keeping with natural law. (It is clear that Hume’s idea of natural law as stable, immutable and founded on past experience that poses the problem that miracle is logically impossible). To this effect, Drange opines that “miracles are not isolated events but are common or everyday experience in as much as, they are events that violate natural law which are forever unexplainable within the system of science”.87 Also, John Hick says that we do not know the laws of nature, and that they appear to have been violated before, as such when new things are observed our understanding of the natural law should simply be widened.88 Similar response is given by C.D Broad and Vardy. For Vardy, Hume talks of laws of nature as though they were set in tablets of stone; however, as science advances it is showing that some of our
87
Theodore M. Drange, Science and Miracles, (Internet Infidels, Inc., 1998: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/miracles.html. 4/8/2012). 88 John Hick in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Miracles: Revision in A Level Religious Studies Revision Note, (http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/wiki/Revision:Miracles. 25/9/2011)
- 49 -
understanding of natural laws has been incorrect.89 While Broad rejects Hume’s assumption that there are known fixed laws of nature, what if the laws of nature as we know them are wrong? The laws may need to be revised.90 Secondly, the idea of a law still being useful even though it is ‘false’ is not incoherent as Hume thought it to be. For instance, if someone is cured ‘mysteriously’ from HIV/AIDS, does it render the scientific generalization that HIV/AIDS have no known cure false or useless? No. Put differently, Newton’s laws of motion and the law of conservation of matter are known scientific laws but the former have been superseded in contemporary physics (Quantum physics) while the latter is violated by atomic explosion (and thus regarded as false), and yet are still used in various practical fields. So to speak of a law as false is not incoherent in science as this does not rule out its usefulness. So also miracles, from the scientific point of view, do not render the laws of nature ‘useless’ or ‘worthless’. In effect we can say that the scientific community does not antagonize the logical possibility of miracles since miracles are not events which are logically impossible in the way that it is logically impossible for a circle to be a square. As such miracles are possible. However the questions that arises here is: does science support belief in miracles? What is the attitude of scientists towards miracles? Do they believe in miracles as scientists or as lay persons? Can the scientist believe in miracles when engaged in scientific research on the specific area in which the alleged miracles occur? And can such 89 90
Vardy in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Op. cit. Broad in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Ibid.
- 50 -
a belief be regarded to be the result of research or a scientific finding? For instance a miracle was reported to occur in Luciano around the 8th century A.D in the little church of St. Legontian when a catholic monk doubted the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. To his surprise the bread and wine became real human flesh and blood. The samples were tested and scientifically proven to be real human tissues and blood. If anyone should believe this miracle (the scientist inclusive) can we attribute such belief to be a result of the scientific finding? It could never be a scientific finding that a miracle occurred, for science is the attempt to understand reality in terms of the laws of nature, and miracles, fall beyond or contradict these laws. As such to say that a miracle occurred is to abandon the scientific- naturalistic- perspective on the matter. Thus if a scientist were to end up with such a belief then it would be incompatible with his scientific point of view. Miracles, therefore lies outside the domain of science because there is no way that appeal to miracles could lead to theories which produce predictions or technological results. Therefore belief in miracles cannot be a result of scientific enquiry. Nevertheless, in the case where the scientist claims and believes that miracles occur, does he contradict himself? In Drange’s view; “scientists can claim that miracles occur but when they do so, they do so only as lay persons, not as scientists”91. For him, “their minds seem to be compartmentalized into at least a scientific part and a religious part”.92 Scientist have a positive outlook on science when they contradict a miraculous event, but when they think religiously, they have a negative outlook on science, assuming 91
Theodore M. Drange, Science and Miracles, (Internet Infidels, Inc., 1998: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/miracles.html. 4/8/2012). 92 Ibid.
- 51 -
that there are aspects of reality that can never be explained by appealing to natural law, no matter how science advances. By and large, can we really say that science has such limits? What possible evidence could there be that there are events which science will be forever unable to explain? To reason that what has not yet been explained can never be explained would be invalid because history and facts have proven otherwise. As such, the only epistemic stance most compatible with a scientific way of thinking would be to with hold judgment on whatever events have not as yet been explained naturalistically. By way of subordination, we have already established that a scientist qua scientist cannot believe in miracles. But it is a further question whether he must deny that they occur as Hume does. In other words, it is either he is an agnostic regarding miracles, neither believing in them nor denying them, or he is an atheist, denying that they even occur. Everyone is entitled to his own views, but this raises the problem of subjectivity and objectivity- are miracles subjective or objective reality? If miracles are reduced to a subjective phenomena it means that belief in it is a personal thing. At least at this level belief is accommodated and can lead to strong conviction and faith in the individual, but on the objective level it raises questions and is problematic.
- 52 -
CHAPTER FOUR THE IMPACT OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES IN OUR CONTEMPORARY WORLD Hume’s critique of the credibility of reported miracles have provoked a tidal wave of responses ranging from constructive to deconstructive criticisms. A great number of critics have vigorously contested and regarded his arguments as destructive not only of miracles but of common sense as well, but to say there is no flaw or success in his thesis is to undermine many scholars that have laid a good deal of criticism on it. Thus, I shall in this chapter begin with a critique of Hume by exposing the merits and demerits of his work. I will also point out some of its relevance in our contemporary society, then end with the conclusion.
4.1
DEMERITS OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLE One of the major criticisms leveled against Hume lies in his a priori argument
against miracle and his definition of miracle as ‘violation of the laws of nature’. Critics have argued that his definition is inconsistent with his analysis of the principle of causality and the uniformity of nature. In his argument against the possibility of the reality of miracles he talks of the laws of nature as ‘well established and inviolable’. Thus any claim that implies the violation of these laws should, a priori, be rejected as the product of delusion. But earlier in his Treatise, in his analysis of the principles of causality and uniformity of nature he argues that no matter how many times we may have
- 53 -
observed event B follow A in the past is no guarantee that the same thing will happen in the future since there is no necessary connection between them. Hume says: First we may observe that the supposition that the future resembles the past is not founded on arguments of any kind but derived entirely from habit by which we are determined to expect the future the same train of objects to which we have been accustomed.93 As such a firm and unalterable experience cannot, on Hume’s terms, establish that the future will resemble the past, or that there is a necessary connection between two events. This being the case, no a priori argument can be validly brought against the logical impossibility of miracles. Therefore Hume’s first argument against the possibility of miracles can be seen as misleading. Another objection against Hume’s argument is given by scientists. According to them, if we are to make progress in science, we must be prepared to revise our understanding of natural law, and there ought to be circumstances in which testimony to an unprecedented event would be credible. To buttress this point, David Corner renders the following critique: Human beings collectively have seen countless squid, few of which have ever exceeded a length of two feet. For this reason reports of giant squid have, in the past, been some times dismissed as fanciful; the method employed by Hume in his Balance of Probabilities Argument would seem to rule out the possibility of our coming to the conclusion, on the basis of testimony, that such creatures exist- yet they have been found in the deep water near Antarctica. Similarly, someone living
93
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (New York: Middle-sex:Pellican, Classics), p. 184.
- 54 -
beyond the reach of modern technology might well reject reports of electric lighting and airplanes.94 So if we accept Hume’s understanding of law of nature as something ‘rigid’ or ‘immutable’ it would be absurd to accept reports of miracles and at the same time we would be forced to reject the recent developments in science since they are not in keeping with natural law. But as we know, science depends for its progress on an ability to revise even its most confident assertions about the natural world.95 Some existentialist philosophers (theistic existentialists) have vehemently jettisoned Hume’s definition of miracle. For them, miracles need not be violations. An answered prayer, for example, may properly be described as a miracle, but it does not violate any natural law. In their opinion, miracles are simply events that point us towards God. In this regard C.S Lewis argues that miracles are a type of revelation.96 And Swinburne argues that “if he (God) has reason to interact with us, he has reason very occasionally to intervene and suspend those natural laws by which our life is controlled.”97 The laws of nature according to him do not have to be rewritten. If God is omnipotent, then he quite clearly could suspend the laws of nature although not too often as this will interfere with scientific progress and free will.98
94
David Corner, Miracles in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/miracles/print 2010. p. 8. 10/24/2011) 95 Ibid., p. 8. 96 C. S Lewis in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Miracles: Revision in A Level Religious Studies Revision Note, (http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/wiki/Revision:Miracles . 25/9/2011) 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.
- 55 -
Meanwhile on the Principle of Testimony, Hume’s argument has been seriously criticized on the grounds that ‘he makes use of a method that is unreliable and it may have us reject reports that are true or accept those that are false.’99 Hume’s method of balancing probabilities where the greater evidence outweighs the weaker is a form of ‘mob psychology’ as Kuhn would say, in which there can be a ‘tyranny of the majority’the crowd may not always be correct. The stronger evidence can be untrue, thereby leading us to falsehood. A different argument is put up by Swinburne. According to him, if we rely on the evidence of senses and perception to give us information about the world, why do we not rely on the evidence and the testimony of those claiming miracle? 100
Hence, in the absence of special considerations Swinburne is suggesting that it is
reasonable to believe that the experiences of others are probable as they report them. In other words, we should believe the reports of other people as well. Against Hume’s a posteriori argument against miracle, Omoregbe presents a comprehensive critique saying that his arguments are even weaker than his a priori argument. According to Omoregbe, Hume realizes that his second argument which purports to show that belief in miracles is due to ignorance or lack of education is weak so he resorted to the absolute impossibility of miracles “but fails to show us why miracles are absolutely impossible and how he can reconcile this view of his with the concept of the laws of nature derived from his analysis of the principle of causality. That miracles
99
David Corner, Op. cit. p. 8. Swinburne in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Op. cit.
100
- 56 -
are impossible is therefore a gratuitous assertion devoid of rational demonstration.”101 Also, Hume’s claim that religious people are usually prepared to tell lies in order to propagate their religion may be true in some cases, but would be both false and unfair to say that all religious people are dishonest and prepared to tell lies as a means of propagating their faith.102 In recent times, discussions on Hume’s critique of miracle views it as requiring defense. For Levine, Hume’s a priori argument is a failure and needs rehabilitation.103 In fact, Earman calls it an “abject failure”.104 Johnson, like Levine, argues that ‘Hume’s a priori argument is confused and unclear and that various attempts to clarify it have failed to elicit a compelling line of argument.’105 In the same vein, Farmer argues that Hume began from a wrong direction. He asserts: “The fatal mistake is to begin the consideration of miracle from the angle of scientific or philosophic one; the proper place to begin is within the sphere of living religion itself. To define miracle as an event involving the suspension of natural laws is to begin in the wrong place.”106 At this juncture, let me examine the merits one can find in his thesis.
101
Omoregbe, A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion, (Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993), Pp. 218-219. 102 Ibid., p. 219. 103 Levine in Timothy McGrew, Miracles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/miracles/. 15/9/2011), p. 26. 104 Earman in Timothy McGrew, Ibid., p. 26 105 Johnson in Timothy McGrew, Ibid. 106 H. H Farmer, The World and God in James Churchill & David V. Jones (edts.), An Introductory Reader in the Philosophy of Religion, (London: S.P.C.K., 1979), p. 128.
- 57 -
4.2
MERITS Aside the various objections to Hume’s position by scholars, there is still
something about his thesis that is worth reckoning. As Charles Sanders Pierce notes, ‘the Humean in principle argument has left an indelible impression on modern biblical scholarship.’107 The Humean maxim ‘that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any system of religion’108 implies that no rational argument is sufficient to prove a miracle, and by implication, miracles cannot serve as foundation for a system of religion. In support of Hume, Vardy asserts: “It is not rational to believe in religion on the basis of miracle. Neither Christianity, Judaism, nor Islam has ever claimed that we should believe the religion on account of the miracle. In fact, Jesus always insisted that it was faith that came first, so miracle and miracle stories should not be an obstacle to faith.”109 Hume himself points this out when he said “our most holy religion is founded on faith not on reason”.110 By this he is suggesting to religionists that little emphasis should be placed on miracles since they cannot be conclusively proven. Secondly, Hume’s arguments act as a ‘check to all kinds of superstitious delusion’111 though not to the extent he conceived it to be. The many instances of forged miracles, false prophets and prophesies that take place in our society shows that 107
Charles Pierce in Timothy McGrew, Miracles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/miracles/. 15/9/2011), p. 25. 108 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 392. 109 Vardy in Helena & Chrisateen (edt.), Miracles: Revision in A Level Religious Studies Revision Note, (http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/wiki/Revision:Miracles. 25/9/2011). 110 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.), Op. cit., p. 403. 111 Ibid., p. 387.
- 58 -
individuals or groups can be bent on reporting events that conflicts with our experience as codified in the laws of nature in order to excite wonder in others, and deceive others for their selfish purposes. Thus the believer who wishes not to be deceived should resign to faith because “whoever is moved by faith…is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.”112 It is only by faith the individual can first of all believe. Miracles may not all the time cause ‘true belief’ in the individual, ‘for some people they are the strongest evidence for their Christian (religious) beliefs, but the same...cause others the strongest doubts.’113
4.3
THE IMPACT OF HUME’S CRITIQUE OF MIRACLES IN OUR CONTEMPORARY WORLD One of the credits given to Hume is his assertion that Christianity is founded on
faith, not on reason. He is suggesting that true faith should not need miracles, but is this the case today in Christian religion? Following the rise of Pentecostalism in the West in the 21st century which places special emphasis on a direct personal experience of God through faith healings and miracles, millions of Africans are flooding to join Pentecostal churches on a daily basis. Nigeria is not left out in this analysis. According to the World Christian database, Nigeria is said to have the world’s third largest population of Pentecostals with 3.9 million members following Brazil with 24 million and United 112 113
Ibid., p. 404. Joseph Rhymer, The Miracles of Jesus, (Mumbai: St. Paul’s Press, 1991), p. 9.
- 59 -
States with about 6 million adherents. But what makes Nigeria as well as other African nations unique is their heavy emphasis- more so than Pentecostalism in the West- on miracles which incorporate traditional African beliefs like witchcraft, and material blessings.114 This wind of change which some had described as ‘disease to faith’ has elicited diverse views from believers and non-believers alike, even among the Pentecostals themselves. Not everyone believes in the authenticity of the miracles they establish and this has created divisions and factions among Christians rather than unite them because people tend to follow pastors and preachers they know that perform miracles at the expense of others who do not. But is this the right thing? The answer is definitely negative. Not every preacher or pastor possess the gift of healing or prophecy, they may possess other gifts that are still useful in their ministry. Jesus Christ himself condemns this act when he said: “it is an evil and unfaithful generation that asks for a sign (or miracle)” before they believe (Matthew 12:39), and elsewhere, “he (Jesus) refused to work miracles because the people lacked faith” (Matthew 13:58). Joseph Rhymer argues that ‘Jesus was not a mere miracle worker, not even the most spectacular miracle worker ever known.’115 ‘The miracle encounters he worked were accidental’116 (not planned as is the case today), and ‘miracles are not the only evidence for the beliefs we hold about him but they are powerful signs of what such
114
Ethan Cole, Nigerian Pentecostalism Thriving on Miracles, Prosperity Promises in The Christian Post (US), (http://m.christianpost.com/news/nigerian-pentecostalism-thriving-on-miracles-prosperity-promises-29322/. 26/4/2012) 115 Joseph Rhymer, The Miracles of Jesus, Op. cit., p.144. 116 Ibid., p. 11.
- 60 -
beliefs actually mean.’117 As such when miracles are ‘elevated’ and faith is ‘relegated’, we reduce the action of God to mere ‘signs and wonders’ as if to say miracle is the only medium for God’s action in the world. Also, miracles are open to different interpretations and can be misleading. It can neither be used as a sufficient proof of the existence of God nor proof for the truth of a particular system of religion. One can be certain of miracles only when one experiences one himself or witnesses one. As such all reported miracles should be treated with caution and proper investigation should be carried out before believing completely, if not one’s belief is akin to delusion. In recent times many Nigerians have been deceived in believing fraudsters who parade themselves as ‘men of God’ on the basis that they perform miracles. A perfect example is the case of Reverend Chukwuemeka Ezeugo, also known as Reverend King; the Overseer of the Christian Praying Assembly; who deceived many that later became his members until the point he killed one of his members named Ann Azuh whose case brought him to book in 2006. Many miracles were reported to have been wrought by him that prompted belief among many Nigerians without the least suspicion that he was a fake. Finally miracles may not confirm or lead to belief because we may doubt the reliability of the witnesses. Individuals may be paid or bribed to account for events that did not really happen. For instance, there are media reports that some pastors of these Pentecostal churches in Nigeria stage and publicize miracles in order to attract membership and consequently make more money, and this has caused
117
Ibid., p. 144.
- 61 -
many to doubt the authenticity of their authority. It is against this and other similar events that Hume warns us to be critical of miracles.
CONCLUSION As already stated, the schema of this thesis was to underscore in the line of Hume’s thought the concept of miracle, its usage and influence on human thinking and behavior. This work has also exposed painstakingly the relationship between God and the world and the relevance of miracles to Christianity. Thus far, this work has established that miracle is essential to Christianity although there is no consensus on its definition and it can neither be proved conclusively nor establish the existence of God or a supreme being and consequently cannot be used as a just foundation for any system of religion. Thus construed, it is no exaggeration to say that Hume’s argument against miracle
was successful to demonstrate the rationale we normally apply when accessing historical accounts or reports of events that are contrary to ‘our uniform experience’ in order to discover their truth. According to J.C.A Gaskin, ‘Hume’s argument is an accurate formal representation of the norm of rationality we all in fact apply, or try to apply, in our search for historical truth.’118 In fact, he says: “when applied to the reports to which Hume has to apply itnamely, to the biblical reports of miracles in general and to the resurrection in particular- the norm is successful in showing 118
J.C.A Gaskin, Hume on Religion in David, F.N and Jacqueline, T (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd edt., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 500.
- 62 -
that these reports would be rejected for the reasons he gives, if they occurred in the historical contexts in which religious faith was not involved.”119 But the context of Hume’s critique did not exclude the religious context therefore his argument generally is not tenable within religion. Religious matters should be treated as such, void of any philosophic or scientific disruption. But Hume’s position on this matter was clear. To briefly recapitulate, he defined miracle as ‘the transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent.’ And he argued that it is not wise to believe in miracles because no human testimony can justify that one has occurred, and that the evidence for a miracle is usually weaker than the evidence for the natural law which it violates. Finally, he concluded that ‘a miracle can never be proved so as to become the foundation of a system of religion.’ But to define miracle as ‘a transgression of a law of nature’ is to begin in the wrong place. Farmer argues that ‘we must first ask what the significance of a miracle is for religion; we must define it and evaluate it, seek to understand the indispensability of it within the context and universe of religion.’120 As such the final judgement on any religious matter should be a religious one. But Hume did otherwise. Miracles, like revelation, is indispensable within religion (Christianity) for they are seen as acts or ‘vehicle for revelation, for grace and for judgement, or for all of these together’121 and this quality makes clear why it is impossible ever to establish by 119
Ibid., p. 500. H. H Farmer, The World and God in James Churchill & David V. Jones (edts.), An Introductory Reader in the Philosophy of Religion, (London: S.P.C.K., 1979), p. 128. 121 John Macquarrie, ‘Miracles’ from Principles of Christian Theology in James Churchill & David V. Jones (edts.), Op. cit., p. 131. 120
- 63 -
intellectual proof that which qualifies an event as a miracle. Just as each man’s situation is entirely his own, and nobody can ever be in his shoes and make it his own in exactly the same sense, so also is miracle to each man and no amount of argument will ever suffice to convince others of the reality of it as a revelatory act of God. Although for Hume this indemonstrability is sufficient to undermine the whole matter, but to the religious mind who understands himself and the situations surrounding him sees this indemonstrability as part of the certification that he is genuinely and personally dealing with the living God- this is what Hume described when he says that “whoever is moved by faith…is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience”122 In fact, Hume only dealt with ‘reports of miracles’, not to our own eye-witnessing of them, and his arguments depends on our reluctance to accept (whether rational or irrational remains to be established) as veridical reports that are contrary to ‘our uniform experience.’ What would he have done if he had experienced one himself, would he apply the same rationale? He never touches on the point of what he would do if he was faced with a miracle. Would he be knave or would he claim that his senses had deceived him? In the prologue of his thesis on miracles he flattered himself that he has discovered an argument that will “be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and
122
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961), p. 404.
- 64 -
consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.”123 However, I don’t think he provided a satisfactory and ‘everlasting’ solution to the problem of miracles because he had confused improbability with impossibility. Miracles though may be unusual events but this does not mean that they have not occurred at all. Finally, although Hume’s critique of miracle has been described as destructive not only to reported miracles and common sense but to religion as well, however it should be noted also that his critique is relevant and thus, worth reckoning most especially as regards the assessment of miracle reports and credence given to miracle over faith. Hence, these dual positions should be revered; none should be jettisoned in favour of the other.
123
Ibid., p. 387.
- 65 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY Aquinas, T. Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by J. Rickaby. London: Burns and Oates, 1905. Augustine. City of God, XXI .8.2. London: Penguin Classics, 1984. Bruce Martin W. Parting Seas, Magic Stars, and Miracles: Can Science Explain Events in the Bible? From Skeptic, Vol. 9, Number 4, 2002. Clarke, S. A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God (5th ed.). London: James Knapton, 1719. Clark, K.J. (edt.). Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers. Illinois: Inter Varsity Press, 1993. Corner, D. Miracles in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/miracles/print 2010. accessed on 10/8/2011. David, F.N & Jacqueline,T. The Cambridge Companion to Hume, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Davies, B. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Drange, T.M. Science and Miracles. Internet Infidels, Inc., 1998: http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/miracles.html. accessed on 4/8/2011. Earman, J. Hume's Abject Failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Ethan, C. Nigerian Pentecostalism Thriving on Miracles, Prosperity Promises in The Christian Post (US). http://m.christianpost.com/news/nigerianpentecostalism-thriving-on-miracles-prosperity-promises--29322/. accessed on 5/4/2012. Helena & Chrisateen, (edts.) Miracles: Revision in A Level Religious Studies Revision Note. http://www.thestudentroom.co.uk/wiki/Revision: Miracles. accessed on 25/9/2011. Houston, J. Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Middle-Sex: Pellican Classics, 1984.
- 66 -
----------
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Translated by John Valdimir Price. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
----------
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding in Richard Taylor (edt.) The Empiricist. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday Garden City, 1961.
----------
The Natural History of Religion. Translated by A.Wayne Colver. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
James, C. & David, V.J. An Introductory Reader in the Philosophy of Religion. London: S.P.C.K., 1979. Kaufmann, W. Critique of Religion and Philosophy. New York: Doubleday&Company, Inc., 1958. Krishna, G. T. Reason and Belief: Problem Solving in the Philosophy of Religion. Texas: Pundits Press, 1997. Langtry, B. Hume, Probabilities, Lotteries and Miracles in Hume Studies Vol. XVI, No. 1 (April, 1990). Mackie, J.L. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. McGrew, T. Miracles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/miracles/2010.accessed on 4/12/2011. Meyers, R.G. The Marvelous and Miraculous: A Defense of Hume. Ottawa: 20th Hume’s Conference, 1994. http://rgm95.tripod.com/homepage/id5.html. Accessed on 22/10/2011. Nikell, J. Examining Miracle Claims. http://www.infidels .com/affiliate.php?Book. accessed on 22/10/201. Ninian, S. The philosophy of religion: Studies in Philosophy of Religion. London: Sheldon Press, 1979. Omoregbe, J. A Philosophical Look at Religion: Philosophy of Religion. Ibadan: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited, 1993. Paul, E. (edt). Encyclopedia of philosophy, Vol. 5&6. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987.
- 67 -
Rowe, W.I et al. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973. Rhymer, J. The Miracles of Jesus. Mumbai: St. Paul’s Press, 1991. Schmaus, M. Dogma 1: God in Revelation. New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1968. Sheen, F.J. God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy. NewYork: Doubleday&Company, Inc., 1958. Stephen A. R. Miracles in the Bible (Part 2): Issues and Responses. Pelusa Media Group, 1999: http://www.thatreligiousstudieswebsite.com/Religious_ Studies/Phil_of_Rel/Miracles/miracles_bible2.php. accessed on 4/18/2011. Tucker, A. Miracles, Historical Testimonies, and Probabilities, History and Theory (2005). William, A. An Essay in Answer to Mr. Hume's Essay on Miracles, 3rd ed. London: B. White, 1767.
- 68 -
