A Platonic \'Problem of Good\' for Naturalism

Matthew J. Bell 1

Matthew J. Bell UMSL – Fall 2011 PHILOSOPHY – Plato Professor Jon McGinnis A Platonic “Problem of Good” for Naturalism Contents I. Introduction................................................................................................................................... p. 2 II. Ancient Naturalism: Atomism...................................................................................................... p. 2 III. Plato Contra Early Naturalism.......................................................................................…......... p. 4 IV. Contemporary Naturalism........................................................................................................... p. 6 V. Problems Evil and Good: A Far-View …...................................................................................... p. 8 VI. Isomorphisms: Broad Spectrum …............................................................................................. p. 15 VII. The Problem of Evil: A Near View ............................................................................................ p. 17 VIII. The Problem of Good: A Near View ......................................................................................... p. 19 IX. Isomorphisms: Narrow Spectrum ................................................................................................ p. 21 X. Hypothetical Objections and Suggested Replies........................................................................... p. 26 XI. Concluding Remarks..................................................................................................................... p. 30

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Introduction Ronald Nash tells us that “...Plato opposed every distinctive claim of naturalism...”. 1 However, one disagreement was preeminant: The ancient naturalists (also called physiologoi) thought that the order that exists in the universe could be accounted for “...without appeal to a transcendent ordering intelligence.” 2 Plato makes the denial of this doctrine “...the first principle of cosmology in the Timaeus. He undertakes to depict the origin of the cosmos as the work of a god who takes over matter in a chaotic state and moulds it in the likeness of an ideal model...”. 3 Discussing “naturalism,” as a philosophical perspective (or worldview), is still relevant in a contemporary setting as well since “[v]ersions of [naturalism] are still popular.”4 And, arguably, the debate centers on the very same dispute. But, what is “naturalism”? And can opponents of contemporary naturalism find anything of use in Plato's opposition to the naturalism of his day? Herein, first, I will sketch a brief history of naturalism. This sketch should illuminate Plato's continued relevance in the worldview debate between naturalism and versions of non- or super-naturalism (e.g., versions of theism). Second, I will look at naturalism's argument from evil against theism (a specific variety of super-naturalism). Third, I will suggest that a Platonic 'argument from good' – one that is isomorphic with the argument from evil – can be advanced against naturalism. I will treat the arguments both initially in a broad and general form and then I will treat them in a more nuanced and specific form, trying to show that the isomorphisms are sustained at every investigative level. Fourthly, I will put forth a few possible objections to the argument from good and try to provide satisfactory answers. Finally, in conclusion, I will hint that, quite possibly, the problem of good poses a greater difficulty for naturalism than the problem of evil poses for theism. But, if not, I will suggest that the argument from good makes at least as much trouble for naturalism as the naturalistic argument from evil makes for theism. And, in my opinion, theist's owe its discovery and initial rough articulation to Plato. Ancient Naturalism: Atomism When applied to the philosophies of the ancient world, the term “naturalism” has at least two senses – one sense that is largely benign and the other that is arguably malignant (when, that is, the relevant evaluations are run from a general Platonic point of view). “Most of the philosophers who came before Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are described as naturalists.”5 However, “naturalism” in this sense chiefly designated the pre-Socratic “focus on nature, [that is,] the physical universe.”6 As such, it simply marked off an ancient philosophical orientation – the direction towards which inquiry was

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Life's Ultimate Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999), p. 37. Gregory Valstos, Plato's Universe (Canada: Paremenides, 2005), p. 24. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid.

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turned - and carried with it no specific (or at least no automatic) connotation regarding conclusions that were reached. However, closely related to this “benign” sense of the term “naturalism” is another sense that did carry with it metaphysical7 implications. Because, whereas “naturalism” in the former sense is merely the tendency to raise questions about nature, “naturalism” in the latter sense is a specific (set of) answer(s) to the questions. For “[t]he central claim of metaphysical naturalism is [the claim] that nothing exists outside the material, mechanistic (that is, nonpurposeful), natural order. ...nothing exists that is independent of the natural order and its processes.” 8 And in the ancient world, this viewpoint was developed into the system that has come to be called atomism.9 The chief idea of atomist philosophers (e.g., Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius) was that the universe (here taken to be the sum of all reality) was composed entirely out of these discrete (discontinuous), “uncuttable” entities eternally in motion. The atomist project was to explain all of reality – rocks, plants, people, properties, even “ethics, theology, political philosophy and epistemology,” 10 literally everything – by appealing to the chance arrangement of these uncuttable entities.11 For our purposes, a key point of the atomistic view was that it “eschewed teleological explanation and denied divine intervention or design”.12 To the atomist-naturalist, fundamentally, all that exists is matter in motion. Macroscopic entities are composed of simpler “atoms.” And whatever exists is entirely explicable in virtue of the simple (and random) motions of simple (antecedently given) atoms. In other words, whatever phenomenal order there is, has come out of chaos – ordo ab chao.13 Atomism steadfastly avoided weaving concepts like “purpose” or “design” into its metaphysic. But, when I say that the avoidance was “steadfast” I do not mean thereby to imply that it was unprincipled. For if all that exists is merely the product of material atoms bumping into each in a void, then it's pretty clear that there really is no room for intentional attributes like purpose or design. That is, randomly moving atoms do not intend to collide with one another when they happen to do so; nor do randomly moving atoms intend to avoid each other when they happen to do so. But, since all entities are composed of atoms; and atomic composition occurs when randomly moving atoms happen to collide with each

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“Metaphysics” is the branch of philosophy that studies what is/exists. It is concerned with categories such as “being,” “becoming,” and the like of that. Nash, op. cit., pp. 37-8, 39. The label “atomism” is a cognate of the root word “atom” (or a-tom, i.e., not-tom) which stems from the “...Greek adjective atomos mean[ing], literally, ‘uncuttable’...” or “indivisible.”Sylvia Berryman, “Ancient Atomism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, Ed., Accessed Fall 2011, . Ibid. “These philosophers developed a systematic and comprehensive natural philosophy accounting for the origins of everything from the interaction of indivisible bodies, as these atoms—which have only a few intrinsic properties like size and shape—strike against one another, rebound and interlock in an infinite void”, Berryman, op. cit. Ibid. The Latin is a Freemasonic motto; cf. http://www.masonicdictionary.com/ordoabchao.html.

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other and somehow conglomerate; then, it follows that all entities exist due to chance. Moreover, since all microscopic events are nothing other than random atomic motions; and all macroscopic entities are nothing other than composites of simple atoms; all macroscopic motions (that is, all motions of macroscopic entities) would apparently be just random atomic motions writ large. In other words, all things – whether entities or events, whether mico- or macroscopic – are material and random. But, although atomism postulates mechanistic interaction of atoms, and emphasizes the chance and random nature of the interactions, nevertheless, what we observe in nature is considerable order. And amongst the questions that atomism seemingly has difficulty answering is the question of how to satisfactorily “explain the lawlike and orderly nature of the universe.”14 And Plato, for one, was supremely unimpressed with the proposed “explanations” proffered by these early atomist-naturalists. Plato Contra Early Naturalism Many of Plato's doctrines were, apparently, and quite arguably, advanced self-consciously as a polemic against ancient atomism. For starters, Plato was acutely aware of the differing (and broad) classes of explanation marking out poles on the explanatory continuum: from the purely naturalistic on the one pole versus sub-, non-, un-, or super-naturalistic on the other. Plato writes: VISITOR: It seems that there's something like a battle of gods and giants among them, because of their dispute with each other over being. THEAETETUS: How? VISITOR: One group drags everything down to earth from the heavenly region of the invisible, actually clutching rocks and trees with their hands. When they take hold of all these things they insist that only what offers tangible contact is, since they define being as the same as body. And if any of the others say that something without a body is, they absolutely despise him and won't listen to him any more. THEAETETUS: These are frightening men you're talking about. I've met quite a lot of them already. VISITOR: Therefore the people on the other side of the debate defend their position very cautiously, from somewhere up out of sight. They insist violently that true being is certain nonbodily forms that can be thought about. They take the bodies of the other group, and also what they call the truth, and they break them up verbally into little bits and call them a process of coming-to-be instead of being. There's a neverending battle going on constantly between them about this issue. 15 The “battle” metaphor hearkens back to the Greek stories regarding the struggle between the “elder god” Titans like Cronos, and the younger generation, chiefly Zeus (albeit in alliance with monsters). 16 The mythical war was, in a literal sense, titanic. Plato therefore is graphically communicating the great (towering, larger-than-life) importance of the battle between the worldview orientations of naturalism (physiologia) and “ontologism.” Above, one group advocates a thorough-going

14 Nash, op. cit., p. 45. 15 Sophist 246a-c. 16 Cf. Edith Hamilton, Mythology (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1942), pp. 77ff.

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naturalism. To the naturalists, the only things that exist (the only things that are) are things which “[offer] tangible contact”. On the other side, the other group maintains that things which truly exist (the only things which fully are) are “nonbodily forms”. In Plato's terms, those things which offer tangible contact are known as perceptibles. Plato is here casting the debating between naturalism and “ontologism” in his own terms – setting forth simultaneously a two-tiered metaphysic (spatiotemporal, becoming perceptibles and eternal being of Forms) and a two-tiered epistemology (opinion and knowledge), in the latter (epistemic) case the two tiers of which are differentiated by their objects (as drawn from the former, metaphysical, case).17 Plato tells us the following story about Socrates. Sometime (perhaps during his early intellectual formation) Socrates “heard someone reading … from a book of Anaxagoras” in which Anaxagoras apparently put forth the notion “that it is Mind [nous] that directs and is the cause of everything.” 18 Socrates related that he was overjoyed at hearing this and was very anxious to read Anaxagoras' account. Subsequently, Socrates acquired and devoured Anaxagoras' book. But, to Socrates' dismay, Anaxagoras' book did not live up to the ancient “hype”! Socrates lamented: “[My] wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that [Anaxagoras] made no use of Mind, nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other strange things.” 19 Plato has Socrates say that Anaxagoras' “explanations” “seemed to me much like saying that Socrates' actions are all due to his mind, and then in trying to tell the causes of everything I do, to say that the reason that I am sitting here [in prison] is because my body consists of bones and sinews...” and then telling a story about those physical constituents. 20 Socrates thinks it obvious that such a story would “neglect to mention the true causes.” 21 Furthermore, he pulls no punchs when he remarks that to use the label “causes”22 to designate impersonal, mechanistic forces is, frankly, “too absurd.” 23 Plato (and, if Plato is reliable on this particular point, Socrates before him) was interested in formulating a cosmological model that was, above all else, rational – not merely in terms of being a reasoned account (for naturalism arguably could provide that); but in the specific sense of being an account that put (intentional) reasons to real explanatory work. For Plato, this meant articulating a teleological (i.e., end- or goal-oriented24) explanation of the world.25 To complete

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Jon McGinnis, Class Lectures, op. cit. Phaedo 97c. Ibid. 98b-c. Ibid. 98c-d. Ibid. 98e. Ibid. 99a; italics added. Ibid. Cf. “Telos,” Frederick William Danker, Greek-English Lexicon, Rev. Ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000), p. 998. And I use the word “world” here deliberately. Following William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, I will try to observe the world/universe distinction. “The universe may be defined as the total spatiotemporal system of matter and (impersonal) energy, that is,

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this explanatory project, Plato would make use of impressive metaphysical machinery, the postulation of which was itself part of Plato's attack on naturalism. For Plato included amongst his ontology (or his “list” of existents) abstract “Forms” that existed in an Ideal realm that has been termed “Platonic Heaven.” 26 However, “wherever” Plato held this realm to exist (and, quite likely, this question embodies something akin to what Gilbert Ryle called a “category mistake”27), it is clear that Plato conceived of the Forms as being entities separately and independently existing from the usual “natural” entities which we observe in the physical universe. For example, Plato famously described the Form of Beauty this way: “First, it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes. Second, it is not beautiful this way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another, ... nor beautiful here but ugly there, as it would be if it were beautiful for some people and ugly for others.”28 Hence, the Form of Beauty just exists – period – and is neither corruptible nor mutable. It is neither temporally nor spatially relative. And it is not susceptible to being mistaken – by anyone – for its opposite (ugliness). Further: “It is not anywhere in another thing, as in an animal, or in earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, it is always one in form; and all other beautiful things share in that...”. 29 Hence, Plato denies the naturalistic contention that physical entities – the universe – are all that exist. Contemporary Naturalism In a contemporary setting, there are several different senses that attach to the term “naturalism,” so much so that David Papineau remarks that “[t]he term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy.” 30 There are many different strands of “philosophical naturalism.” But the two senses that loom largest seem to be metaphysical (or ontological) naturalism and methodological naturalism. “Metaphysical naturalism” is a version of naturalism which maintains that “nature is a closed system; that there are no supernatural entities. ... at least, none that affect nature. … By a natural entity, [we] mean a physical entity or anything that a physical entity produces.” 31 So, for example: “If metaphysical

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as the sum total of material objects, in some way accessible to the senses and to scientific investigation. The world may be defined as the sum total of everything that exists including nonspatiotemporal abstract entities. … Naturalists believe only in the universe; philosophers who are sometimes called ontologists believe in the world”, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview ( Downer's Grove, IL: IVP, 2003), p. 207. Plato himself, e.g., in Phaedrus, seemed to say that the immortal souls could “gaze upon what is outside heaven” (247c). This “place beyond heaven” (ibid.) may have been Plato's depiction of the realm of the Forms. Cf. Amie Thomasson, “Categories,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010), Edward N. Zalta, Ed., Accessed Fall 2011, . Although, since Ryle himself (as a founder of behaviorism) looked askance at “the Cartesian theory of the mind”, I am certainly not suggesting that he would have endorsed my use of his concept. Symposium 211a. Ibid. 211b. David Papineau, “Naturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2009), Edward N. Zalta, Ed., Accessed Fall 2011, . Paul Draper, Purdue University, “The Future of Naturalism,” Conference, Interview, R Joseph Hoffman, Interviewer, .

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naturalism is true, then...there is no god...”. 32 Metaphysical naturalism is, then, a thesis about what exists (as are all metaphysical theses). “Methodological naturalism” is, on the other hand, a thesis about what science is able to “deal with,” independently of whatever happens to exist. For brevity's sake, I will simply stipulate that metaphysical naturalism is the sort that is of interest to us here.33 Contemporary metaphysical naturalism,34 then, is not altogether different from ancient atomism in terms of the fact that both propose that all there is to the world are (natural) physical entities in combination. Hence, Plato's reflections on the naturalism of his day might be fruitful at revealing some insight into contemporary naturalism – both for proponents and opponents alike. Plato identified the key question: Socrates: ...Let us proceed by taking up this question. Protarchus: What question? Socrates: Whether we hold the view that the universe and this whole world order are ruled by unreason and irregularity, as chance would have it, or whether they are not rather, as our forebears taught us, governed by reason and by the order of a wonderful intelligence. 35 To Plato the question is both whether our universe is ordered or disordered (chaotic) and whether it is “reasoned” or “unreasoned.” Plato, then, seemed to treat “ordered” and “reasoned” (and, likewise, disordered and unreasoned) as synonymous. That is, it appears that Plato thought that: if the universe is ordered, then the universe is reasoned. And if the universe is unreasoned, then the universe is disordered. 36

32 Ibid. 33 But, see appendix 1 for additional detail. 34 As T. H. Irwin has noted: “Naturalism does not [necessarily] imply atheism”, “Plato: The Intellectual Background,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge IP, 1992), p. 52. However, for what follows, here is a stipulative terminological note: I will use the terms “naturalism” and “atheism” interchangeably. This is because “atheism” is precisely what is in view with respect to the naturalistic “argument from evil” that I will shortly consider. 35 Philebus 28d-e. 36 As Jon McGinnis has pointed out to me, however, philosophers in a contemporary context have distinguished (at least) two different questions. On the one hand, we want to know whether our universe is ordered or disordered (this is often framed in terms of the question of whether or not there are – in some sense – “laws” in the physical (“hard”) sciences). On the other hand, we want to know, if indeed the world be ordered, whether that order is due to a reasoning “orderer” or to chance (or necessity, etc.). The modern debate has a number of twists and turns. For one thing, there are several ways that “laws” can be understood (e.g., as regularities, propensities, etc.). Here I simply remind the reader that the present discussion is aimed at explicating an isomorphic relationship between the very well-known problem of evil and what I am herein calling a 'Platonic problem of good'. Hence, teasing out the nuances of all the distinguishable question is beyond the scope of this work. I will simply note two things. First, Shelly Kagan has commented, there are naturalists who hold that laws – whether nomological or moral, etc. – do require lawgivers (and so usually, but not always conclude that there are no laws of the relevant sorts). So, there is division in the naturalist camp. Or, to put it another way, the inference from law to lawgiuver is not necessarily definitive of theism. Second, interestingly, in Plato's Euthyphro questions are raised regarding the relationship between moral laws and moral lawgivers. Importing this – albeit in a very quick-and-dirty way – into the present discussion we might think that, even for Plato, merely having laws (that is, the mere fact that laws exist, at least, “laws” in the sense of paradigms for perfect ordering) does not imply a lawgiver, since the Forms seem to exist independently from the demiourgos. This seems controversial, however, as it is apparently an open question as to whether (and to what degree) Plato's demiurge and Plato's Form of the Good are related. What does imply a rational “orderer,” for Plato, isn't the bare existence of laws, but the lawlike behavior of particulars. Therefore, “lawgiver” and “orderer” are arguably distinguishable also. (In fact, I take it that this is one way of cashing out the distinction – by those that draw one – between the God and the Demiourgos: The Good, as a Form,

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However, I take it that sophisticated observers37 will claim neither that “the universe is ordered – period” nor that “the universe is disordered – period.” Rather, for the purposes of the remainder of this paper, I will assume that the universe – prima facie – displays both (at least apparent) order and (at least apparent) disorder. However, what I would like to note here is that the very existence of the argument from evil (in all its permutations and manifestations) implies that the disordered bits of our universe seem (prima facie) to constitute evidence against theism (and, thus, for naturalism). Contrariwise, the ordered bits seem to constitute – again prima facie – evidence for theism. It is my contention that the contemporary discussions about the arguments from evil do not take sufficient cognizance of this parallel in evidentiary dynamics. But, it seems to me, it was well-known to Plato. I hasten to add, however, that in saying that the “ordered bits seem to constitute ... evidence for theism” I am not suggesting that no naturalistic mechanism could be posited to explain the (at least apparent – i.e., “prima facie”) order any more than by saying that “ the disordered bits seem ... to constitute evidence for naturalism” am I suggesting that no theistic explanation could be forthcoming that could satisfactorily account for (at least apparent – i.e., “prima facie”) disorder. Rather, I am simply submitting that, because I take it to be intuitive that theists do not have a problem with order and naturalists do not have a problem with disorder, phenomenological order is easily assimilable into (and explicable in terms of) theism whereas phenomenological disorder is easily assimilable into (and explicable in terms of) naturalism. I will henceforth be concerned to tease out some implications of the prima facie evidentiary state of affairs (or, in informal philosophical jargon, I will try to “keep score” in the debate). And, essentially (so it seems to me), Plato proposed that the early naturalists could not satisfactorily explain the universe's (at least phenomenological) order by setting their explanations on a foundation of chancy, undirected processes. That is, chaos (Plato held) cannot drive an adequate explanation of order. After Plato, the medieval philosopher-theologians (for examples, Sts. Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas) premised their cosmologies on the antecedent ordering principle of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God. Contemporary naturalism (to give short shrift to a whole lot of intervening history) plausibly could be seen, then, as inverting Plato's original criticism – that is, in a sense, modern naturalists complain that, if we posit an explanatory foundation that is (the epitome of) order then we cannot satisfactorily explain the rampant disorder that we observe. Thus, contemporary naturalism proposes that chaos cannot be explained by order. A most

is akin to the lawgiver, while the Demiourgos, as an agent-craftsman, plays the role of orderer.) But, these issues, while interesting and important, not only for Platonic studies, but for cosmology, philosophy of science, and much else besides, are beyond that with which I can competently deal, presently. 37 And I am not intimating that Plato is not a sophisticated observer. (Although, given the etymological link between our word “sophisticated” and the word “Sophist,” which named the group of itinerant philosophers Socrates so vocally opposed, perhaps Plato himself might have reservations about being called sophisticated!)

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pervasive way in which this latter point (i.e., the naturalistic criticism of theism) is made is via the so-called “problem of evil” or “argument from evil.” Therefore, truly, the issues with which Plato and the ancients naturalists wrestled are still hotly debated today (by theists and contemporary naturalists) Broad Problems of Evil and Good: A Far-View (Ulter-Scopic) In brief, I want to suggest that the problem evil 38 has a sort of mirror image. To be sure, language like "sort of mirror image" is nonspecific. But, I think, it is clearly evocative. For now, let me simply note that my contentions do not turn on the scientific functioning of reflection or mirrors. Nor, do I wish to concede that the "mirrored image" is any less real that that which it "mirrors". The use of the mirror metaphor is merely a term of art. And I trust that my reasons for employing this term of art will become clearer in just a moment. I will call this mirror image, "the problem of good." My contention will be that there is a deep structural parallel between these two problems. In fact, I will suggest that the parallel is quite wideranging. In order to set this up, let us consider first what the problem of evil focuses upon, generally. In general, the problem of evil draws our attention to the notion of moral justification by dividing evil into two sorts: justified evil and unjustified evil. Some might immediately object that "justified evil" sounds a bit peculiar. But, I think that this peculiarity is simply due to the fact that the lion's share of attention in this context (that is, all of the attention) is usually focused exclusively upon examples of alleged unjustified evil. That is, the proponent of the argument from evil maintains that if there is any evil that God would not be justified in permitting, then God must either have nontraditional properties or there simply is no God at all. But, if there is any defense open to the opponent of the argument from evil (the traditional theistic opponent, specifically), then the defense must either show that the examples of alleged unjustified evil are really examples of things that are, contra appearances, not really evil at all; or the opponent must show that the examples of alleged unjustified evil are not-unjustified. But, this latter option, if it be truly available, shows that it is possible - in principle - for the opponent of the problem of evil to show that there are justified evils. I trust that the proponent of the problem of evil does not - whether covertly or overtly - require that her interlocutor demonstrate that evil does not exist at all. It will be seen in a minute, though, that justified evil is not central to our comparison. So, I do not wish to linger on the notion. However, let me try to sketch what such an evil might look like. The eminent ethicist Shelly Kagan 39 has

38 Here, I will be speaking mainly of probabilistic versions of the problem of evil. For a rough summary of the varieties of arguments from evil, see Appendix II. 39 Loc. cit.

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suggested that evil can be cashed out in terms of "harm." On his view, very roughly, "x is evil" if "x causes harm." Now I do not wish to sharpen this notion, presently. Let us take it in this broad form. Consider now please a trained and competent doctor. And consider a sick patient. Let us suppose that in order to cure (or facilitate the healing of) the patient, the doctor must cause harm to the patient in the form of an invasive surgical procedure (or administration of a chemical or whatever you please). Stipulate that the patient will be better off if the doctor administers this treatment than the patient would be if the doctor did not administer the treatment. I think that it is not at all implausible to resist saying that, in such a case, the doctor really is not harming at all. I think, furthermore, that if this is so, it is also not implausible to resist saying that the doctor really is not doing evil at all. That is, I think that the situation can be plausibly captured by saying that, although the doctor is doing evil in virtue of harming the patient, the doctor is nevertheless justified in doing so because of the good that will result. But this is just to say that the doctor is doing a justified evil. Now, let us look into the mirror. I submit that the problem of good draws attention to the notion of moral intentionality by dividing good into two sorts: intentional and unintentional. 40 Some might immediately object that "unintentional good" sounds a bit peculiar. But, I think that this peculiarity is simply due to the fact that, in our contemporary context, the lion's share of attention (that is, all of it) is usually focused exclusively upon the problem of evil. The problem of good simply does not seem to arise for us at all. But, it seems to me, the proponent of the problem of evil ought to readily admit the category of "unintentional good". After all, if naturalism is true – as the argument from evil seems anxious to show – and if there really is any such thing as "good" at all (which is a separate difficulty for the naturalist, I think, and one which I will set aside presently), then there should be many goods that end up being called "unintentional" - a sunset might be one, for example (on naturalism). It will be seen in a minute, though, that unintentional good is not central to the comparison in an important way. So, just as was the case with "justified evil," I do not wish to linger on the notion. However, in the interest of demonstrating the breadth of the parallelism, let me try to sketch what such a good might look like. But let me do so by mirroring the approach I took in sketching a "justified evil." In that sketch, I took bona fide evil and showed that, plausibly, that evil could nevertheless be justified if there was an overriding, superior good that resulted from it. Note, that "intentionality" seems built-into the notion of justification. When we say that a person, S, is justified in doing action x, we seem to mean that S is justified in doing x intentionally. If S does x accidentally, we have a different discussion and an at least slightly different set of analytical tools seems relevant. So, here, let us begin again with a bona fide evil. Consider an arsonist. The arsonist 40 Herein, and throughout, I might shift between referring to “unintentional” and “nonintentional” goods. I mean these terms to be (functionally) synonymous.

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intends to do me grievous harm by setting my house on fire. However, the arsonist is unaware of certain relevant facts. Let us stipulate that I would actually be better off if my house burned down (without me causing it myself) then I would be otherwise. Therefore, the arsonist (intentionally) harms me, but a good (unintentionally) results. However, unlike the doctor case, the arsonist did not perpetrate the harm in order to bring about the good result intentionally. Quite to the contrary, in the arsonist case, the good resulted accidentally, from the point of view of the arsonist. But, if so, I think that we plausibly have a case of unintentional good. But, if so, then there - at least possibly - are unintentional goods. We have yet to really get to the heart of the matter. For it is on the other "side" of justified evil that the argument from evil focuses: (alleged) unjustified evil. And it is the mirror of this unjustified evil that lends itself to sustained comparison. Or, so I say. Let me try to make this plausible by painting first in very broad strokes. Begin with a very blunt version of the naturalist's argument from evil - one that is broad and un-nuanced.41 1. There are unjustified evils (UEs). 2. If God exists, then there would be no UEs. 3. Therefore, it is not the case that God exists.

Now this argument is broad in the sense that it focuses upon unspecified "unjustified evils." Any sort of UEs will do. If there are ANY such evils, then God does not exist. Let us now look briefly at one possible reply that the theist could make to the naturalist who argues from (alleged) UEs. I will look at only one possible reply because, after all, I am only sketching the naturalist-theist dialectic (so to speak). My main concern is to direct the reader's attention to the mirroring in my argument from good. It is, as they say, beyond the scope of my discussion to exhaustively treat replies (theistic or otherwise) to the problem of evil. The theist's main response to this sort of argument is what is termed the “free-will defense.” I select the free-will defense on the authority of the great twentieth century atheist, J. L. Mackie who wrote, in his important book, The Miracle of Theism, "...the best known move in theodicy" is "the free will defence"; "It is plain that this is the only solution to the problem of evil that has any chance of succeeding."42 Now, I quote Mackie's confident judgment merely to justify my selection of the free-will defense in the present context. It is my purpose neither to critique nor to endorse Mackie's judgment. My purpose, rather, is to draw attention to the flow of the argument. The naturalist appeals to UEs, and the theist appeals to free-will: 4. God gave human beings free wills.

41 My articulation of this broad argument is very nonspecific. But cf. Trakakis, op. cit.; and James R. Beebe, “Logical Problem of Evil,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2011, < http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/>. 42 J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1982), p. 155.

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5. Human exercise of free will both accounts for evil and exculpates God. 6. Therefore, either there really are no unjustified evils or if there are (that is, concerning human actions) then it is not the case that 'If God exists, then there would be no UEs' (either ~1 or ~2). 7. Therefore, it is not the case that it is not the case that God exists (~3). 8. Either God exists or God does not exist. 9. Therefore, God exists. Note that it seems that there are two possible ways to go for the theist. That is, there exists in "logical space" two logically possible reply routes: The first route is to deny premise 1; the second route is to deny premise 2. I have tried to save space by representing the routes with the "either...or". I hope that my meaning is clear. And here the naturalist makes the following move: The naturalist can say that even if the above "theodicy" is successful, it plausibly only covers "moral evils" and not "surd evils."43 Moreover, claims the naturalist, there are genuine, unjustified surd evils. And this is enough for the argument to be recast. Shortly, I will recast it (or, more precisely, I will reproduce William Rowe's recasting of it). But, before proceeding, let me say something briefly both about premise 1 and about the possible route of denying premise 1. It is largely taken for granted that our world contains examples of horrendous evils. I think that any sensitive theist is aware of this. As Stephen Griffith has well said: "...no human being aware of the basic facts of life can reach adulthood without being painfully aware of distribution and intensity of suffering that prevails in this world. Atheists [naturalists] should not be allowed the conceit that only they are sufficiently aware of these realities, and theists should not feel obligated to demonstrate their awareness and sensitivity by reciting a catalog of existing or hypothetical but realistic horrors whenever they discuss this problem, as if there were some of their who needed to be informed of such things." 44 I think that the most responsible approach for the theist is to grant premise 1 – at least “grant” in the sense of acknowledging that there are apparently unjustified evils that the sensitive theist must admit present a prima facie problem for theism. I do not, in making this statement, mean to rule out that apparently unjustified evils might turn out to be justified after all. I only mean to say that no facile denial of premise 1 will do. Furthermore, no facile denial of any restatement of premise 1 (inserting the qualification “surd”) will do either. That is, I think that is wildly implausible and uncharitable for the theist to deny even that there are apparently unjustified surd evils. To put it another way, one possible naturalist surrejoinder to the theist's rejoinder to the problem of evil is to distinguish two sorts of evil - "moral" and "surd" - and simply argue that even if the theist's rejoinder accounts for moral evil (that is, that evil owing to human agency) it does nothing to account for surd evil (that is, that evil - hurricanes, plagues, and 43 “Surd evils” are also sometimes called “natural evils.” However, since my discussion involves an often tedious back and forth and the repeated application of the word “naturalism” (and its cognates), it seems to me that to also juxtapose “moral evil” against “natural evil” would invite needless confusion – both for the author and reader alike! Hence, I will opt herein to use the term “surd.” 44 “The Problem of Pomegranates,” Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, op. cit., p. 85.

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the like - that apparently owes its existence to no human agency). Again, my authority here is Mackie. Although, my discussion emphasizes precisely what Mackie brackets. For Mackie's burden is to show that the free will defense does not even appropriately account for the moral evil to which it is ostensibly most able to provide a suitable account. And so Mackie merely draws the distinction saying: "If the free will defence is to be of any use to theism, then, it must be extended to cover natural evils... However, I shall leave this extension aside, and examine the argument simply with reference to human free will."45 Admittedly, my discussion here will leave Mackie's sympathizers unsatisfied. For I am simply laying it down that the naturalist will grant exactly what Mackie denies - that the theist's rejoinder effectively rebuts charges that there exist unjustified moral evil. But, again, I beg the reader to be patient as I remind the reader that I am trying to demonstrate a parallelism between the problem of good and a different problem. I am not presently aiming to reply to Mackie. I am merely gesturing towards Mackie to make some of my own moves plausible as I aim instead to point out a particular set of isomorphisms. To this end, I will now sketch an equally rough picture of (what i take to be) the parallel arguments. Call the initial parallel argument, the broad and un-nuanced "problem of good." Recall that the broad and un-nuanced "problem of evil" focused up (alleged) unjustified evil - without qualification. Now then let us look at (alleged) intentional good, without qualification. 1'. There are intentional goods (IGs). 2'. If there existed only mindless, mechanistic, amoral entities/processes, then there would be no IGs. 3'. Therefore, it is not the case that there exist only mindless, mechanistic, amoral entities/processes. And here there are two ways to go for the naturalist - paralleling, I think, the two possible replies that were open for the theist, above. The first route is for the naturalist to deny premise 1'; the second is for her to deny premise 2'. For example: 4'. Either human beings have free will or they do not. 5'. If human beings have free will, then human exercise of free will (agency) accounts for IGs. 6'. If human beings do not have free will, then no entities (that we know of) have free will. 7'. If no (known) entities have free will, then there are no IGs. 8'. Either human exercise of free will (agency) accounts for IGs or there are no IGs (that is, either ~2' or ~1'). 9'. Therefore, it is not the case that it is not the case that there exist only mindless, mechanistic, amoral entities/processes. 10'. Therefore, there exist only mindless, mechanistic, amoral entities/processes. Now, we can scarcely call the naturalistic response a sort of "theodicy." 46 Perhaps we can call it a "physdynamis" or

45 Op. cit., p. 164. 46 Lit. “god-justice.”

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a “dynaphysic”47 or some such thing. However, the parallel does not lie at the onomatological (name) level. On the functional level, however, both theistic theodicies and naturalistic “dynaphysics” serve to rebut arguments directed at theism and naturalism, respectively. But, whatever we term the naturalist's response to the problem of good, the theist can respond (to the response) in kind: The above defense of naturalism, the theist can maintain, either only covers moral goods and not "surd" goods.48 Or, it implausibly denies that there are genuine "surd" (natural) goods that are intentional. And here, before proceeding, it would be prudent for me to say something briefly both about premise 1' and about the naturalist's possible route of denying premise 1'. As was remarked above, it is largely taken for granted that our world contains examples of horrendous evils. I think that any sensitive person - theist or naturalist - is aware of this. Therefore, I urged that the most responsible approach for the theist was to grant the existence of even apparently unjustified horrendous evils. I did not mean this concession to be trivial. In one sense it surely is trivial (for, arguably, if 'p is true' is obvious, then "admitting" 'p is true' is unnecessary). However, in another, deeper, sense the admission is robust and substantive. I urged, in effect, that all sensitive persons - theists and naturalists alike - should acknowledge that the problem of evil raises an issue that needs to be seriously considered; sensitive persons should admit that there is something genuinely in need of explanation. And the issue that is raised - that which cries out for explanation - is the existence of evil, especially (but not exclusively) horrendous evil that appears to be unjustified. In a parallel way, then, I hold that it is equally (and oppositely) obvious that our world contains examples of magnificent goods. I think that any sensitive person - theist or naturalist - is aware of this. Therefore, I now urge that the most responsible approach for the naturalist is to grant the existence of even apparently intentional magnificent goods. As before, I do not mean this concession to be trivial. In one sense it surely is trivial (for, arguably, if 'p is true' is obvious, then "admitting" 'p is true' is unnecessary). However, in another, deeper, sense the admission is robust and substantive. I urge, in effect, that all sensitive persons - theists and naturalists alike - should acknowledge that the problem of good raises an issue

47 Roughly, “nature-power.” 48 Here I must beg the reader's patience. For reasons that have already been given I am trying to avoiding comparing (alleged) “moral” evils and goods to (alleged) “natural” evils and goods. In the discussion of the problem of evil, I therefore employed the word “surd” in lieu of the word “natural.” In order to facilitate exposition of the isomorphic argument from good, I will employ the phrase “surd good” throughout. It is important to understand this to be a stipulative usage. Plainly, strictly so-called, one wouldn't have “intentional surd” anything. But, with respect to goods, I mean the term to designate those goods which are not apparently due to human agency. I mean, that is, to designate goods which I would be very tempted to call “natural goods” - like sunsets, rainbows, intelligent life, and so on – were it not that I am diligently striving to avoid using the word “natural” in order that I do not confound readers trying to follow the overarching juxtaposition of the worldviews of naturalism and theism. Again, the present discussion, insofar as it strikes out onto unfamiliar terrain, will perhaps need to employ unfamiliar terminology (or at least employ familiar terminology in unfamiliar ways). I beg the reader for terminological latitude, therefore, and again earnestly beg for patience as I attempt to point out (what I believe are) various parallels between the problems of evil and good..

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that needs to be seriously considered; sensitive persons should admit that there is something genuinely in need of explanation. And the issue that is raised - that which cries out for explanation - is the existence of good, especially (but not exclusively) magnificent good that appears to be intentional.49 Moreover, as I earlier stated, by acknowledging that there are apparently unjustified evils the sensitive theist must admit that, in the problem of evil, there exists a prima facie problem for theism but that such an admission did not preclude the possibility that apparently unjustified evils might turn to be justified after all. I only meant to say that no facile denial of premise 1 should satisfy us. Furthermore, no facile denial of any restatement of premise 1 would do either. That is, it wildly implausible and uncharitable for the theist to deny even that there are apparently unjustified surd evils. So too, by acknowledging that there are apparently intentional goods the sensitive naturalist ought to admit that, in the problem of good, there is a prima facie problem for naturalism. This is not to preclude the possibility that seemingly intentional goods might turn out to be unintentional after all. But, I think, no facile denial of premise 1' will do. Additionally, no facile denial of any restatement of premise 1' will do either. That is, it wildly implausible and uncharitable for the naturalist to deny even that there are apparently intentional “surd” goods.50 But, note the broad spectrum parallels. Broad Spectrum Isomorphisms: First, the fundamental (for the problem of evil) contrast between evils that are justified and those that are not justified is paralleled in an equally fundamental (for the problem of good) contrast between goods that are unintentional and those that are intentional. (Also, to the degree that there are underlying worries that the contrast between evils is hypothetical, this worry too seems to apply equally to the proposed contrast between goods. In other words, whether real or merely hypothetical, the suggested contrasts seem to show that the relevant evils and goods are very neat, if not exact, parallels of each other.) Second, the initial statements of the respective problems are isomorphic. Just as the naturalist initially posed the problem of evil in a broad form, the theist initially proposed the problem of good in broad form. Both statements of the respective broad "problems" seeked to show that there was an incompatibility between the existence of some sort of evil and theism or some sort of good and naturalism.

49 Cf. the footnote, elsewhere, gesturing towards fine-tuning and intelligent design arguments for those readers who remain recalcitrant. 50 Because of space limitations, I can only gesture here at a defense of the existence of apparent “surd” goods (see, again, the previous footnote regarding terminology here), should their existence be denied. However, a prominent example would be the arguments for the “fine tuning” of the cosmos for intelligent life that have been given by John Leslie, Richard Swinburne, and Robin Collins. Cf. John Leslie, “The Prerequisites of Life in our Universe,” William Lane Craig, Ed., Philosophy of Religion (Rutgers UP, 2002), pp. 114-129; Richard Swinburne, “Argument from the Fine-Tuning of the Universe,” John Leslie, Ed., Modern Cosmology and Philosophy (Prometheus, 1998), pp. 160-179; and Robin Collins, “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning,” Herbert McCabe, God Matters (Mowbray, 2000; Continuum, 2005).

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Third, in response both the theist (contra the problem of evil) and the naturalist (contra the problem of good) had available the appeal to a free-will style defense. In the case of theism defending against the problem of evil, this defense consisted in proposing that God's culpability in permitting genuine evils is eliminated if that evil can be sourced to human agency. In the case of naturalism defending against the problem of good, the free-will defense consisted in proposing that a purely mindless, mechanistic, and amoral cosmos' impotence to effect genuine goods is eliminated if that good can be sourced to human agency. Of course, there are questions, here, regarding what sort of agency is sufficient to function as is required by theist. Mackie, for example, argues both that such agency would have to be of the "libertarian" sort but that there simply is no concept of libertarian freedom that is ultimately tenable. Mackie's difficulty is that there seems to him to be no principled and successful way of explicating freedom such that free choices are demonstrably "...isolated from the antecedent nature...of the agent and from the possibility of divine foreknowledge..." 51 However, it seems to me, perhaps astonishingly, that these additional problems are precisely mirrored in the naturalist's defense also. So, fourth, both the theist and naturalist must clarify the nature of free will, if their defenses are going to work at all. For, the broad problem of good alleges (premise 2') that if all that exists are mindless, mechanistic, and amoral entities/processes, there would be no intentional goods; but there are intentional goods (premise 1'). If the naturalist is to deny premise 2', then her appeal must be to a sort of agency that, precisely as Mackie says, can show that the free choices it produces are demonstrably "...isolated from the antecedent nature...of the agent...", which, on naturalism, and to the degree that there such a thing as an “agent” in the relevant sense, is entirely dependent upon the workings of a mindless and amoral cosmic machinery (if, that is, premise 2' is to be coherently denied). But fifth, in their surrejoinders, both the naturalist (contra the theistic free will theodicy) and the theist (contra the naturalistic free will "dynaphysic") have available the drawing of a distinction between "moral" and "surd" sorts of evil and good, respectively. This distinction, having been drawn: (i.) allows the naturalist to say, even if it be granted that the theistic free-will theodicy successfully rebuts the problem of evil as involves moral evil, still, it apparently does little (without creative extension) to rebut the problem of evil as involves surd evil; and (ii.) allows the theist to say, even if it be granted that the naturalistic free-will dynaphysic successfully rebuts the problem of good as involves moral good, still, it apparently does little (without creative extension) to rebut the problem of good as involves surd good. However, sixth, in fact both theists and naturalists can surely (and perhaps fruitfully) attempt to creatively extend

51 Op. Cit., p. 176.

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their original free will defenses so as to actually accommodate “surd” varieties of evil and good, respectively. And, peculiarly perhaps, it might appear that: (i.) theists, in attempting extensions of the relevant sort, will open themselves up to the criticism that that they are blurring the moral-surd distinction and tending to make all evil moral evil (with which their worldview system arguably more easily deals); and (ii.) naturalists, in attempting extensions of the relevant sort, will open themselves up to the criticism that that they are blurring the moral-surd distinction and tending to make all goods surd goods (with which their worldview system arguably more easily deals). But these criticisms are just to say that what began as a granting of premises 1 and 1', respectively, and what subsequently proceeded in the direction of attacks on premises 2 and 2', respectively, seems possibly to change over into renewed (and somewhat surreptitious) attacks on premises 1 and 1'. In light of these (I believe suggestive) isomorphisms, I propose to put under the microscope a popular version of the probabilistic argument from evil – one owing to William Rowe. After this, I believe that it may be seen that, even under closer scrutiny, a version of the probabilistic argument from good can be articulated that parallels the argument from evil. The Problem of Evil: A Near-View (Prope-Scopic) A fairly straightforward version of the probabilistic argument has been articulated by William Rowe. We will consider Rowe's version.52 Rowe begins with the following question: “Grounds for belief in God aside, do the evils in our world make atheistic belief more reasonable than theistic belief?”53 And he stresses that the question is asking about the effect had on the probability we assign to God's existing by considering the existence of evils while abstracting away from or “putting aside whatever reasons there may be for believing that God exists”. 54 The argument is setup with what is ostensibly and arguably a fair assignment of the relevant antecedent probability: “We therefore begin with a 'level playing field' by setting the probability of God’s existing at 0.5 and the probability of God’s not existing at 0.5...”.55 Now, this initial probability assignment, it has been noted, is an “assumption [that is] not entirely uncontroversial”.56 Rowe also stresses that what is in view is what he terms “restricted theism.” By this, Rowe means to exclude sectarian/denominational peculiarities, such as beliefs that distinguish different varieties of what he terms expanded-theism (chiefly, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) and focus instead only on a “core” set of beliefs something like the following set:

52 Draper's version of the argument (from his 1989 article “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists” (Nous)) is also very influential and deserving of careful attention. But, space limitations forbid my inspection of it here. 53 “Evil is Evidence against Theistic Belief,” in the Chapter “Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?” Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon, Eds., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 3. 54 Ibid., p. 4; italics in original. 55 Nick Trakakis, “The Evidential Problem of Evil,” Internet encyclopedia Of Philosophy (Spring 2005), James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, Eds., Accessed Fall 2011, . 56 Trakakis, op. cit. For an example, see Appendix III.

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“...there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being (God).”57 So, Rowe wants to begin with a 0.5 probability assignment for the proposition “God exists” – call that proposition “G” – and then consider “the evidence generated by the enormous amount of horrendous evil that occurs daily in our world”58 and ask whether such consideration raises or lowers the antecedent probability that G is true. Rowe presents the following that he calls “a simple argument from the existence of some of the evils in our world to the nonexistence of God”:59 1.

There exist horrendous evils that an all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit.60

2.

An all powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good being would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.

3.

THEREFORE, God does not exist. 61

Rowe explicitly says that his “argument is not, nor is it meant to be, a proof that God does not exist.”62 Recall that, ultimately, the argument is intended to be a probabilistic argument. Rowe's desire is that we agree with him that, ceteris paribus, considering the existence of horrendous evil (by itself) lowers the probability that G is true to less than the antecedent 0.5. I submit that Rowe is basically suggesting, as I said above, that – prima facie – chaos (here played by the role of “horrendous evil”) cannot as easily be explained by an orderer (here played by the role of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all57 Rowe, op. cit., p. 4. The reason he gives for concentrating on “restricted” versus “expanded” (or unrestricted) theism is that, since expanded theism conjoins additional beliefs to the core set of beliefs, the resulting conjunction becomes “less likely” since “the truth of theism itself is made to depend on all the essential beliefs of that particular theistic religion,” Ibid. I do not propose, herein, to contest Rowe's restriction. Although, considerations raised by Richard Otte in Otte's reply to Paul Draper's version of the probabilistic argument from evil could seemingly be brought to bear on Rowe's restriction also. Roughly, Otte argues that when a sectarian (or in Rowe's lexicon “expanded”) theist consults all of his or her (relevant) beliefs, different propositions will be more or less probable with respect to the totality than would be if the expanded theist consults (whether voluntarily or not) only a portion of his or her beliefs. Thus, Otte maintain, it cannot be known, a priori, that “restricted theism” will be antecedently more likely to be true than some “expanded” version of theism. If this is right, then Rowe's restriction is plausibly defeated. But, I will not pursue this line. But see: Richard Otte, “Probability and Draper's Evidential Argument from Evil,” Peter Van Inwagen, Ed., Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). 58 Ibid. 59 Rowe, op. cit., p. 5. 60 Here I draw the reader's attention back up in the text to the previous discussion of granting this first premise – at least, granting the prima facie force of it; granting that there is something in need of explanation. 61 There are many permutations of this style of argument. Even Rowe himself has presented it in many different forms. E.g., elsewhere (Trakakis, op. cit.), a variation of Rowe's argument goes as follows: 1*. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2*. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3*. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 62 Rowe, op. cit., p. 6; italics in original. Rowe is here using the word “proof” in a non-colloquial way. The received opinion seems to be that: “To be a proof of its conclusion, an argument must be such that its conclusion logically follows from its premises and its premises are known with certainty to be true”, Ibid. This same point has been put this way: “If you have a doubt-able (dubitable) premise, then you don't have a proof!” (Robert Sloan Lee).

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good God) as it can by naturalism. Now, responding to the problem of evil (and the various arguments that have grown up around the problem) is a task that can – and has – run many thousands of pages. Responding to the arguments from evil typically proceed the way that responding to any argument would proceed. The (rational) attacker of the argument can deny (with reason) one or more of the argument's premises; or the attacker could grant the premises and argue that the conclusion does not follow from the premises; and so on. My interest here, though, is actually somewhat different. I submit that one can find, in Plato, the makings of an analogous argument against naturalism. I will now attempt to do two things. First, I will make a few general comments regarding my Platonic inspiration. Second, I will try to construct this “analogous” argument so that the new argument is narrowly isomorphic with Rowe's argument from evil. Since Rowe's argument from evil presents the theist with the problem of evil, I will call the analogous problem for the naturalist the 'problem of good' and its argument, the 'argument from good.' The Problem of Good: A Near-View (Prope-Scopic) Diogenes Allen has remarked: “For Plato, the inadequacy of natural causes as explanations of nature's operations is that they neglect the beauty and goodness of the visible world order as a whole and in every detail.” 63 Plato observed that “...the world [is] fair and beautiful” 64 and, moreover, is such as to be manifestly “harmoniously ordered”.65 Plato arguably held: “The visible world is the best possible, but not the perfect, image of the the world of Forms. Clearly, for Plato this world is good, even though it is not perfect.” 66 The sensible world of particulars is “organized as perfectly as possible.”67 Plato himself writes: “...of all the things that have come to be, our universe is the most beautiful...”. 68 And Plato has Socrates say: “I assume the existence of a beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great and all the rest.”69 Beauty and goodness are givens.70 But, we don't necessarily need the world to be “good” – full stop. For just as the proponent of the arguments from evil only needs a set of evils, SE (albeit evils of a particular sort), that has a specified cardinality, |SE| (which specificity will depend on the relevant sortal – differentia – that is invoked to mark off the set), so too the proponent of the argument from 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70

Philosophy for Understanding Theology (London: Westminster, 1985), p. 35. Allen, op. cit., p. 19. Allen, op. cit., p. 18. Ibid., p. 19. As Allen notes, “This [judgment of the goodness of the world] is true of the Bible as well: the universe is good, indeed very good, but even before the Fall, it is not said to be perfect”, Ibid. Cf. The Biblical book of Genesis where the phrase “And God saw that it was good,” or a close variation thereof, appears six places in chapter 1 (vv. 4,10,12,18,21, & 25) and in verse 31 it reads: “And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good”, (Revised Standard Version). Allen, op. cit., p. 21. Timaeus 29a. Phaedo 100b. As S. E. Frost, Jr. observes: “Plato never tells us where either the 'Demiurge,' ideas, or matter came from originally,” Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers (New York: DoubleDay, 1962), p. 12. This seems to be true enough. Plato's Forms are, for Plato, “givens.” But, when I write that “beauty and goodness are givens” above I mean more to make a point about experience than about ontology. It appears that for Plato phenomenal beauty and goodness are givens. I take this to cash out to this: Plato thinks that the world displays genuine beauty and goodness. His explanation of why this is invokes Forms which are themselves (ontologically) “given.” But, here, I am simply saying this: that there is something to be explained (genuine beauty and goodness) is also “given.”

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good only needs a set of goods, SG, with a specified cardinality, |SG|. So consider again the argument from evil that Rowe gives. The “relevant sortal” (or specific difference) is not merely “evil,” but horrendous evil. But, seemingly, “horrendous” is just a term of art for Rowe. The real work in premises 1 and 2 is done by the word “unjustified.” Hence, we could say that the relevant sortal is unjustified evil. And so, Rowe is telling us that if you consider the totality of evil, a set with every instance of evil whatever as a member, call that set TE, then there is a proper subset of TE, UE that has as its members every instance of allegedly unjustified evil.71 And here we could really carve out two different versions of the Rowean-type argument: strong and weak. On the strong version, we could construe Rowe's contention to be this: If |UE| 'is greater than or equal to' 1, then (probably) God doesn't exist. That is, probably, unless UE is empty, God does not exist. On the weak version, the version, incidentally, that Rowe actually strenuously advances, the contention would appear to be: If |UE| is above some threshold or other for rational acceptability, then we should conclude that (probably) God does not exist. To Rowe, given the “enormous amount” of apparently unjustified evil – that is, given that UE has an implausibly “enormous” size – probably, God does not exist. Distilled: 4. There are (an enormous number of) unjustified evils. 5. If God existed, then (probably) there would not be (an enormous number of) unjustified evils. 6. THEREFORE, (probably) God does not exist. (That is, probably, theism is false.) The point here is that the problem of evil is not dependent upon (prima facie false and even absurd) claims such as that the universe is utterly reprehensible, the earth is completely despicable, or that human conduct is entirely repulsive or ignoble, etc. The probabilistic problem of evil merely turns on whether theism can satisfactorily account for certain evils or certain amounts of evil. Likewise, a broadly Platonic starting point for the problem of good is not dependent on the (prima facie false and even absurd) claims such as that the world is absolutely untainted, the earth is thoroughly perfect, or that human conduct is thoroughly good or altogether noble, etc. Rather, an argument constructed to present the “problem of good” will simply contend that there is a “relevant sortal” (or specific difference), say magnificent good. But again, ostensibly, “magnificent” is just a term of art. The real work will be done by the word “intentional” (or, “not-unintentional”). Hence, we could say that the relevant sortal is intentional good. And so, we shall imagine that Plato is telling us that if you consider the totality of good, a set with every instance of good whatever as a member, call that set TG, then there is a proper subset of TG, IG that has as its members 71 “UE” is supposed to mark off the proper subset of TE that has for members those evils that are allegedly (i.e., given theism) unjustified evils. But, henceforth, I will usually leave off the word “allegedly.”

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every instance of allegedly intentional good.72 And here we could really carve out two different versions of the Platonic-type argument, paralleling Rowe: strong and weak. On the strong version, we could construe Plato's contention to be this: If |IG| 'is greater than or equal to' 1, then (probably) mindless, amoral, mechanistic processes cannot explain the good or goods that are members of IG. That is, probably, unless IG is empty, a purely naturalistic cosmogony is not true. On the weak version, the contention would be: If |IG| is above some threshold or other for rational acceptability, then we should conclude that (probably) mindless, amoral, mechanistic processes cannot explain the good or goods that are members of IG. And, I am contending that Plato would hold the following: Given that (on naturalism) we have to accept that there is an “enormous amount” of intentional good – that is, given that IG has an implausibly “enormous” size – probably, naturalism is false. Here is the argument: 1*. There exist magnificent goods that plausibly require intentionality. 2*. (Probably) Mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic causes/forces do not (by themselves) provide intentionality. 3*. THEREFORE (probably), mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic causes/forces cannot (by themselves) explain the magnificent goods that exist. Since metaphysical naturalism (as herein construed) is committed to the proposition that a mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic force generated all observable (to us) entities, 3* seems to entail that naturalism is false. Not all causes/forces can be mindless, that is. Distilled: 4'. There are (an enormous number of) intentional goods. 5'. If all causes/forces are mindless, amoral, and purely mechanistic, then (probably) there would not be (an enormous number of) intentional goods. 6'. THEREFORE (probably), not all causes/forces are mindless, amoral, and purely mechanistic. (That is, probably, naturalism is false.) As a reminder, when dealing with the dialectic involved in (what I termed) the “broad spectrum arguments” I revealed that, as rejoinders and surrejoinders mount, both the arguments from evil and from good have a tendency to concentrate on “surd” varieties (of evil and good, respectively).73 So, the point is, the reader is invited, if he or she wishes,

72 “UG” is supposed to mark off the proper subset of TG that has for members those goods that are allegedly (i.e., given naturalism) unintentional goods. But, henceforth, I will usually leave off the word “allegedly.” 73 Philosophy, it seems to me, is very much like the game of chess. A serious student of chess knows that there is “opening move theory,” “middle game theory,” and “end game theory,” etc. These theories involve the meticulous study of different move sequences, called “lines.” An investigator will trace chess move lines to try to discover the best moves for white and black. Game theorists (not chess theorists) refer to chess as an example of a “finite” game. In principle, this means that “every position on the board is either (a) a win for white, (b) a draw, or © a win for black”, Morton D. Davis, Game Theory (NY: Dover, 1983), p. 8. Well, like chess,

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to insert the word “surd” before “evil” in arguments from evil or before “good” in the argument from good. Isomorphisms: Narrow Spectrum Notice the isomorphism between the argument from evil and the argument from good. Firstly, both arguments are probabilistic ones. We can suggest that Plato himself articulated this proviso in the case of the argument from good. As Allen explains: “...since the father of all things is beyond us, Plato has recourse to what he calls a 'likely story'.” 74 And, as has already been noted, Rowe states plainly that his argument is not a proof. Secondly, the probabilistic question itself is limited in both arguments. Rowe aimed to examine – independent evidence for the existence of God aside – whether consideration of the enormous of amount allegedly unjustified evils tended to lower the (stipulated 0.5 antecedent) probability of God existing. Well, similarly, let us plainly set it down that the Platonic argument from good against naturalism aims to examine – independent evidence for the truth of naturalism aside – whether consideration of the enormous amount of allegedly unintentional goods tends to lower a (now) stipulated 0.5 antecedent probability of naturalism being true. Thirdly, both arguments attack restricted versions of their target ideologies. Just as Rowe is intended to attack mere theism – that is a bare-bones variety of theism that has not been enhanced or expanded by any sectarian doctrines – so, too, let us say that the Platonic argument from good intends to attack mere naturalism. That is, we are concerned with any ontologically-minimalist construal of reality that asserts that only natural-physical entities exist and only natural-mechanical processes account for observable phenomena. Fourthly as Rowe says of his own first premise: The argument from evil's “first premise is not known with certainty to be true. The claim is only that the first premise is one that we are rationally justified in believing to be true.”75 Furthermore, “...the [inferential] claim is only that the premises provide sufficient rational support for [the] conclusion.” 76 Likewise, for Plato, certainly (if possible in this life at all) is only attainable by rational apprehension of the Forms. In terms

numerous philosophical problems seem to have various “lines.” At hand is the question of the problems of evil and good. And so when I say, in the main text, “oth the arguments from evil and from good have a tendency to concentrate on 'surd' varieties” I think I can plausibly be understood as saying that the “main lines” (to borrow the chess lingo) in the problem of evil discussion tend to go such-and-so. But, as in chess, there are “variant lines.” So, in an actual game/dicussion, things can get interesting, even if philosophy turns out to be “finite” in the game theorist's sense! 74 Allen, op. cit., p. 27. The Greek phrases “eikws logos” and “eikws muthos” (or “mythos”) are rendered “likely story” and “likely tale”, respectively in Cooper, loc. cit. The breakdown seems to be this: “eikws muthos” is given in Timaeus 29d, 59c, and 68d; while “eikws logos” is given in Timaeus 30b, 48d, 53d, 55d, 56a, 57d, and 90c, Luc Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000), p. 129, notes 10 & 12, . 75 Rowe, op. cit., p. 6. 76 Ibid.

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of sensibles, really the best that we can hope for is to have beliefs that are probably true.77 Fifth, as we noted above, there are both strong and weak versions of both arguments. I will simply assert – but not argue (for lack of space) – that both arguments are also similar in that the weaker versions are more plausible than the stronger versions. Sixth, the arguments have modus ponens forms, articulated by proponents, and modus tollens “reversals” that can be endorsed by opponents. For example, 4-6 can be “reversed” as follows: 5. If God existed, then there would not be unjustified evils. 7. God exists. 8. THEREFORE, are no unjustified evils. Whereas, 4'-6' can be “reversed”: 5'. If all causes/forces are mindless, amoral, and purely mechanistic, then there are no intentional goods. 7'. All causes/forces are mindless, amoral, and purely mechanistic. 8'. THEREFORE, there are no intentional goods. Seventh, the argument from evil is a class of argument – an argument “type,” if you like. There are very many different instances of the argument – many tokens of it, that is. I submit that the argument from good exactly parallels the argument from evil in this respect as well. I believe that Plato gave such an argument against the naturalism of his own day. (In fact, in many respects the entire Platonic project is arguably Plato's response to naturalism – writ large.) The instance of the argument that I have tried to give here is, then, merely a sketch of an argument form. It seems very likely that a better articulation could be given of it than that which I have managed to give herein. Eighth, the argument from evil tends to advance the notion that God – if he existed – would have stopped certain evils (because, according to some versions of the argument, he should have done so). The argument from evil typically assumes that God is able to stop whatever evils he wishes. Hence, the issue in the argument from evil is not usually cast in terms of God's lacking an ability. However, this apparent difference turns into an isomorphism when responses to the argument from evil are taken into account. For theists may defend against the argument from evil by trying to maintain that God, for reason or another, is actually unable to prevent certain evils (e.g., because he plausibly cannot override creaturely freedom without destroying that freedom) given that God has already actuated certain states of affairs (e.g., that he has

77 Jon McGinnis, “Plato,”.UMSL, Fall 2011, Class lecture.

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endowed his creatures with libertarian freedom). The argument from good, on the other hand, advances the notion that mindless, undirected, amoral processes are, essentially, unable to bring about certain goods (at least that such processes are unlikely to do so in the enormous quantities that we observe). Or, at any rate, it advances the notion that positing only mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic causes/forces does not adequately explain ostensibly intentional features of experience. Hence, in both cases, the argument's success turns on the ability of those defending against an argument to convincinly maintain that their explanatory model (either God or mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic causes/forces) has the ability to account for certain observed features of the world. It is important to realize, though, that the claim here, on behalf of the Platonic problem of good, is not that the phenomenally obvious magnificent goods can be “stacked against” equally phenomenally obvious horrendous evils “neutralizing” them. Rather, the claim is that the existence of horrendous evil – even if the existence of unjustified or “pointless” evil be granted – by itself does not make it more probable that magnificent goods were produced unintentionally than that they were produced intentionally. We are, after all, setting aside independent evidence for each of the worldviews in running the problems of evil and good, respectively. We ask about the impact of allegedly unjustified evil on the probability of 'God exists' and, quite separately, we ask about the impact of allegedly unintentional goods on the probability of 'naturalism (is true)' (or 'the universe is the product of chance', etc.). It has been succinctly put that the probabilistic or “...evidential problem of evil... [is] a challenge to theists to square their theistic commitments with the facts of evil in the world.” 78 Similarly, what I am saying here is that Plato seems to issue (and we could follow Plato's example by reissuing) a challenge to naturalism to square their naturalistic commitments with the facts of good (beauty, order, etc.) in the world. And besides being thoroughly Platonic, I believe that the problem of good also reveals an advantage that theism possesses over atheism. First, recall Plato's text in the Phaedo, reproduced above. Socrates was describing his experience of reading Anaxagora's cosmology/cosmogeny. And Socrates made no secret of his disappointment. Whereas he hoped that Anaxagora would employ the concept of mind in his explanations of the cosmos, Anaxagoras did nothing of the sort. In fact, says Socrates, Anaxagora's explanations are entirely mechanistic, amoral, and mindless. Now, Socrates insists that this appeal to entirely mindless, amoral, and mechanical entities and processes cannot be worth calling a “cause.” For Socrates, the notion of cause seems to be bound up with rationality. Socrates says that it is “absurd” to call mindless, amoral, and mechanical entities and processes “causes.” What is interesting about this translation is that we might say that this is really

78 Peterson, et. al., op. cit., p. 122.

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no objection at all. Socrates appears merely to be restating the naturalist position. For, recall that “surd,” in the relevant context (namely discussion of the problem of evil), has to do with evils for which there is no plausible ascription of agency. Plausibly – at least prima facie – entirely mechanical, amoral, and mechanical entities and processes lack agency. But this is simply the naturalist's view: Order comes from entities and processes that are not agents. But, then, it might seem that Socrates is complaining that non-agent entities and processes are not agents. But, of course they are non-agents. That's the naturalist project, after all. But here (perhaps by Plato's lights) is the coup de grâce: Socrates position is that the naturalist project is a non-starter – it's literally ab-surd – where we first take “ab” to mean proceeding “away from” or “out of” the surd. The naturalist tries to spontaneously generate causation from “the surd.” And Plato just thinks that this is prima facie ridiculous.79 And this hearkens back, I think, to a couple of things. Plato referred to the battle between naturalists and supernaturalists as a battle between gods and giants. In other words, the issue is a huge one. Vlastos comments: “In Book 10 of the Laws Plato drafts a statute against impiety which is without parallel in any surviving code of ancient Greece. The mildest of its penalties is five years' solitary confinement, to be followed by execution if the prisoner is still unreformed. … His punitive measures are directed … against men who hold that the original consituents of the universe are material entities … which exist 'by nature' and 'by chance' – that is to say, things whose existence did not come about..., as Plato puts it, 'by art': things which just happened to exist.”80 As the Psalmist has said: “The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God. They are corrupt, and are become abominable in their studies...”. 81 In contemporary jargon, we appear perhaps to have a “battle of intuitions” – the godly versus the gigantic. However, in general, Plato appears to think that it's just obvious that the rational cannot emerge from the irrational. Order does not come out of chaos. That he takes as a given. Perhaps it is an “intuition.” He's concerned enough about it that anyone who says otherwise is removed from his polis. The idea that order comes from chaos Plato takes to be dangerous – corrosive. And, in any case, it is entirely unsuitable to serve as the basis of a cosmogeny/comsology. For Plato, it seems: Order needs explanation. Chaos needs none. In fact, chaos cannot have any explanation, for it is nothing even possibly explicable. “Chaos” is another way of saying “nothing able to be explained.” Hence, it also cannot

79 Two comments are in order. First, “absurd” in the modern sense means “ridiculous.” I'm suggesting that it seems like “absurd” in the ancient sense meant “ridiculous” also. But, what I am speculating is that the use of the word here almost serves like an illustration. It's almost like one could imagine an idiom such as: “that's as absurd as positing mindless causes.” But, second, this play on words (of a sort) works in the English translation. I have neither the space nor the resources presently to investigate the matter in the Greek. But, whether the actual wordplay carries into the Greek or not, it appears to me mentioning the wordplay is merely an expedient way to gloss Plato's point. I take it that the point is that Plato thinks naturalism is simply intuitively implausible. 80 Gregory Vlastos, Op. Cit., p. 23. 81 By Greek denumeration: Psalm 13:1 (Douay Old Testament, 1610); Psalm 14:1, by Hebrew denumeration.

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serve as an explanans.82 And it cannot underwrite any investigation of order. Ironically, even modern science makes certain assumptions about the knowability of the natural world. And, as Vlastos discusses, even if the ancient naturalists (physiologoi) recognized that the universe is ordered (that it is a cosmos), still, Plato gives us a reason that explains not only why and how this should be so, but why we are able to recognize it at all – namely, the world was crafted by a supremely rational being, and we have a soul of a piece with the world-soul. Naturalism must – in principle – leave the “why” and “how” questions either unanswered or answered only ab-surdly. This is Plato's point, I think. If one is interested in any nonab-surd answer to cosmogenic questions, there appears only to be one. And it involves an unequivocal denial of naturalism. But, perhaps this is too quick. What objections can be made against this so-called “problem of good”? Hypothetical Objections and Suggested Replies OBJECTION 1: Why is the problem of evil more obvious or more impactful than the “problem of good”? REPLY: Number one, there's a history here that is relevant. Plato advanced teleological considerations against the prominent naturalistic metaphysical systems of his day. As we put it above, he wondered how chance or chaos could explain order. Then, for a variety of reasons that we haven't space presently to catalog, philosophy took a theological turn. Contemporary naturalism, arguably, is raising the specter of chaos and chance against the postulation of a fundamental ordering designer. Hence, perhaps as a historical residue, people have come to take it for granted that disorder is what is more in need of explanation. But, if this is so, it is only because theism has been assumed. In other words, given theism, sure, evil is more in need of explanation. But, as soon as the foundational explanatory framework becomes naturalistic, good supplants evil in terms of that phenomenon more in need of explanation. Frederick Nietzsche complained to his generation that people clung illicitly – unjustifiably – to a vestigial Christian morality that lacked a metaphysical ground given the “death of God” and the discrediting (so called) of Christianity. Likewise, I submit that the reason that at least some people think of the problem of evil as “more real” than the problem of good is, frankly, because those people haven't yet realized that, if theism be false, good no longer has a tidy explanation. Number two, “obviousness” and degree of “impactfulness” are, arguably, psychological phenomena. Hence, the reason that one consideration might be more or less “obvious” or “impactful” to a person lies more in the purview of psychology than of philosophy. OBJECTION 2: For Plato, the Good isn't in the visible world. 82 Perhaps this is the root of Augustine's notion that “evil” is a “privation.” An argument might look something like this: a proper explanandum is susceptible to being explained by something; “chaos” is not susceptible to being explained by anything; therefore, “chaos” cannot be an explanandum. Similarly, by extension: A proper explanans is capable of explaining something; “chaos” is not capable of explaining anything; therefore, “chaos” cannot be an explanans. I take it that naturalists will deny the second premise in both arguments. See further discussion regarding the idea of a titanic battle (cf. Sophist 246a) of intuitions.

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REPLY: Number one, for Plato, the Form of the Good is not perfectly instantiated in the visible world. However, it doesn't follow – and Plato explicitly denies – that the Form's not being perfectly instantiated in the visible world implies that no visible entity participates (to even a minimal degree) in the Form of the Good. “[E]verything … in the universe … is a combination of a perfect idea [a Form] and matter.” 83 And the Form of the Good is not excluded from visible combinations. The Form of the Good is one of Plato's “blueprint Ideas.” Number two, the Good arguably steers all of our actions. For, as Socrates is presented as saying: “No man voluntarily acts badly.”84 On this account, everyone aims at the good – even professing naturalists. But, if this is the case, then the problem of good seems to be exacerbated. For it seems to me to be antecedently highly implausible that in a purely physically constituted, randomly generated universe, humans – themselves the products of blind, purely unguided, mechanistic naturalistic processes – should even plausibly believe that they aim at anything like “the Good.” But suppose the critic presses that we should assign the antecedent probability to 0.5. I think that this rejoinder drastically underestimates the relevant probabilities for three reasons. First, it seems to assume that there are only two options: humans aim at the good or they aim at not-the-good. But, it appears to me that some people – though they be in a minority – actually aim at the bad (where “the bad” is distinguished from “not-the-good” in way analogous to that way by which Plato distinguished “pain” from “not-pleasure” and “pleasure”). But, then, minimally, we should expect an antecedent probability somewhere in the neighborhood of 0.33, since we would want to account for (and make equiprobable) aiming variously at the good, the bad, and the “neutral” (which option is, perhaps, merely a colorful way of saying that some people don't really aim at all). However, secondly, the objector seems to have underestimated the complex psychological requisites (a.) for conceiving of “the Good” and (b.) for “aiming,” that is, for goal-oriented (intentional) action and planning. Intuitively, the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for (a.) and (b.), were they to be fully laid out, would be ponderous. (One reason to think this is simply that, despite advances in neuroscience and psychology we have nothing like a list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for either (a.) or (b.) by themselves, let alone both together.) But, the conjunction of a large number of even highly probable conjuncts is not necessarily highly probable. On the contrary, the more conjuncts are added, the less probable the entire conjunct would seem to become. For example, it might not be highly improbable – individually considered – that a person selected randomly (that is from a random city, say, at a random time and date) be a woman. Roughly, the probability would be 0.5 Likewise, if we're considering randomly selected women, it

83 Frost, op. cit., p. 12. 84 Frost, op. cit., p, 84.

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might not be highly improbable that a woman selected randomly be blonde (and have whatever height and whatever attire). It might not be highly improbable – individually considered – that a woman selected randomly be 5' 5” (and have whatever hair color and whatever attire). It might not be highly improbable – individually considered – that a woman selected randomly be wearing a dress rather than slacks (and have whatever hair color and whatever height). But the conjunction of these is much less probable than any of them considered singly. That is, it is less probable than 0.5 that a person selected randomly be a blonde woman standing 5' 5”and wearing a dress, and this is so even if the probability is stipulated to be near 0.5 that she possess only one of the conjunct features by itself. And the more features we add, the less probable it becomes that a woman be selected with those features – ceteris paribus. And this holds even if we restrict our conjuncts to those features that we know, antecedently, it is possible for a normal woman to possess. Third, most entities on earth – including minerals, vegetables, and most animals – do not have the capacity for either (a.) or (b.). Considering only the animal kingdom, out of the roughly 2 million identified animal species (anecdotally numbered) on earth arguably only one apparently aims – intentionally – at the good at all. When non-animal entities are included in the count, the probability decreases still further. Hence, it seems to me to be striking that humans should arguably and intuitively have anything evenly remotely approaching 33% aiming at the good (or aiming at any evaluative goal at all) – let alone that it should be set at 50%! The main questions, as I see them, are: (a.) why should humans be the sorts of entity who aim at anything at all?; and (b.) why should humans be the sorts of entity who aim at the good in particular?; especially when it is vastly more probable that they – like the majority of other entities on earth – not aim at the good (either because they aim at something else or, what is more likely, they are not developed enough to aim at all – e.g., because they lack the neural or psychological complexity to conceive of the good or intend to achieve it). OBJECTION 3: The enumeration of isomorphisms leaves out a crucial difference: The argument from evil is not concerned only with epistemic considerations, but makes a moral claim as well, namely, God – if He existed – would not permit unjustified evils. The 'argument from good' has no moral claim to make against 'mindless, amoral, purely mechanistic causes/forces.' REPLY: Number one, for Plato, the Craftsman designed the world to be the very best. Arguably, this sort of consideration introduces morality into the discussion of the problem of good. But let me abort this potential line and simply say that, even if the argument from evil is more overtly moralistic than the argument from good, this seems to be superficial. I think that despite this surface difference, the “deeper” structural parallels – as cataloged under the heading “Isomorphisms,” above – between the two arguments are striking. Basically, I would suggest that the difference – if any – is

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material (related to content), whereas the similarities are formal. My contention is, then, that the formal similarities are the more relevant of the two sorts in any case. Theism and naturalism are, after all, very different worldviews. We should not be surprised if the content of arguments attacking one is different from the content of arguments attacking the other. The remarkable thing in our case seems to be that we have, in considering the two problems side by side, what amounts to a formal mirror-image. And this mirroring phenomenon is quite sufficient to make the comparison philosophically interesting (to me, at any rate). OBJECTION 4: The “argument from good” is really either just a.) divine command theory or b.) the argument from design. REPLY: Number one, divine command theory (DCT) is probably best understood as a theory of moral ontology that suggests that the metaphysical ground of moral values and obligations is the commands of God. DCT is concerned with the question of the objective foundation – if any – for morals. The problem of good is simply an argument to the effect that the enormous amount observed, phenomenal good (and beauty) in the world cannot be adequately explained by naturalism. The problem of good does not seek to ground our value judgments. The problem of good simply appeals to our value judgments. But, in this appeal it is, again, isomorphic with the problem of evil. For, arguments from evil do not first ground moral values. They assume that humans can make true moral judgments. No argument from evil could get off the ground if human value judgments are ultimately ungrounded. This is not a special problem for the argument from good. Number two, the argument from design is an argument to the conclusion that “God exists.” The problem of good was expressed as an argument to the conclusion (roughly) that, “probably, naturalism is false.” The conclusions do not seem to me to express the same propositions. For, even if naturalism has to be false for supernaturalism to be true; and even if classical theism is a form of supernaturalism (which it surely is); still: a.) there are non-classical forms of theism (e.g., process panentheism), b.) there are other metaphysical possibilities besides supernaturalism (e.g., perhaps some version of non-naturalism). Number three, even if I am wrong in one or both of my above responses, maybe I can just say: So what? Even if “the problem of good” is not entirely different from other sorts of theistic argument, it might still count as a different version of some preexisting argument. And, again, as far as philosophical interest is concerned, it seems that the proliferation of versions of the argument from evil shows unequivocally that there is often no lack of interest in well-known arguments being cast in different forms. OBJECTION 5: “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder”: Goodness/beauty aren't objective features of the universe, they're

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merely subjective features of human conceptualization of the universe. REPLY: Number one, suppose that human appreciation of beauty (e.g.) really is a subjective feature of human conceptualization. As Alvin Plantinga has put it, on naturalism, our cognitive faculties are aimed at survival. It's more than passing strange, then, that we should conceive of such things as “beauty,” on this picture. We can certainly understand sexual desire having adaptive value. But, it is difficult (for me) to see what adaptive value there could be in something like appreciation of the beauty of a sunset or a rose. In fact, number two, it seems even worse for naturalism than simply saying that conceptualization of beauty (if it be subjective) or recognition of beauty (if it be objective) is merely not obviously adaptive. It's not just that such appreciation (whether conceptualization or recognition) doesn't seem to confer any survival advantage. Arguably, such appreciation actually confers a disadvantage. For, consider two of our ancestors, both aware that the daylight hours are dwindling. They're alert as they both make their respective ways back to their shelters. One is suddenly awestruck by the beauty of the sunset. Seemingly, this sort of behavior in a primate would tend to make that primate more susceptible to ambush or accident. Thus, such appreciation would seem, plausibly, to be disadvantageous. But, number three, suppose that some advantage could be discovered. Still, even if beauty is a subjective feature of human consciousness, it is still intersubjective – that is, shared in some sense by many people. It seems to me to be equally implausible that randomly generated humans should be so constituted as to share a subjective sense of something as extravagant and arguably unrelated to functional-necessity as “beauty” as that randomly generated environments should be so constituted as to actually embody beauty (objectively). Concluding Remarks: One can easily get caught up emotionally in discussions of evil. One can easily forget that there are goods to be explained as well as evils. The natural (no pun intended) thing to do – at least, situated as we are in our contemporary socio-historical context – seems to be to treat evils as more in need of explanation than the goods. Of course, if the existence of God is at issue, then, indeed, evils do seem more in need of explanation than goods. But if, instead, the question is over the plausibility of mindless, directionless, purposeless, amoral, purely mechanistic processes having caused all observable phenomena then, I submit, it is the goods that cry out louder than the evils for explanation. In a way, beauty speaks for itself; whereas evil cries out to observers to say a good word (eulogy) to redeem it. Perhaps – inspired by John Hicks comments elsewhere85 – we can say that goods are prima facie evidences for

85 The Existence of God (London: Macmillan, 1969), Introduction, passim.

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theism and prima facie difficulties for naturalism; while evils are prima facie evidences for naturalism and prima facie difficulties for theism. Each system, it seems, has explanatory difficulties. It recalls the thought: “We must do away with all explanation and allow only description in its place.”86 But a couple of things can perhaps still be said. Number one, it seems more plausible to me that evils can be satisfactorily explained on the theistic picture, than that goods can be explained on naturalism. It seems to me, to put it slightly differently that in order to account for evil, theism must give a satisfactory account of devolution. Plato sculpts his account in terms of the inherent irrationality of matter and the struggle between the intelligent cause of the demiurge and the “wandering cause” of chance/necessity. 87 Christian theists give an account in terms of sinfulness and rebellion against the creator. For lack of space let me simply assert: However, devolution is cashed out, intuitively, it seems to me that devolution – disordering – insofar as it is a breaking up of order, can be satisfactorily accounted for equally by random, mindless, accidental action as well as by purposeful, mindful, intentional destruction. For devolution is, in an Augustinian sense, merely the loss or removal or lack of order. Theism, then posits creation followed by destruction (due to evil intention) and devolution due to chance. Naturalism, on the other hand, seems to have a steeper hill to climb. For naturalism must give a satisfactory account of evolution. They initial posit is chaos. And out of this chaos is alleged to proceed order. This seems a steeper hill because, for one thing, “evolution” and ordering is a sort of “building up” and building up doesn't seem as easily explained by appeals to accident. 88 And this is so because order is not plausibly the loss or removal or lack of disorder. Order is (something like) the presence of some real, substantive, information-bearing structure. Suppose, though (which supposition is likely), that an advocate of naturalism (i.e., a proponent of the problem of evil) just thinks that I'm wrong about this assessment. We have a battle of intuitions, as it's phrased. Still, I think that the claim is defensible that horrendous evils are no more intractable, given theism, than magnificent goods are, given naturalism. That is, I think that the theist is not obviously in any worse position than the naturalist. The theist does not have more to explain – except maybe in this: evil arguably tends to be more “psychologically real” to us. 89 Rationally speaking,

86 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #109. 87 “When [Plato] presents his own cosmology in the Timaeus, he recognizes two causes – intelligent design aiming at the best and the nonteleological necessity of the 'wandering cause' (47e-48e)”, Irwin, op. cit., p. 53. 88 I add this here as a sort of flourish. But, really, this is a rich subject on its own. Here we could introduce the rich discussions regarding the so-called “anthropic principle” and “fine-tuning” of the universe for life; as well as the many papers written on “Intelligent Design Theory” in biology, perhaps with particular attention paid to: (a.) Stephen Meyer's work on “biological information”; (b.) William Dembski's analysis of “specified complexity”; and (c.) Michael Behe's work on “irreducible complexity.” Cf. Stephen Meyer, Signature in the Cell (Harper; 2009); William A. Dembski, The Design Inference (Cambridge UP, 1998); Micahel Behe, Darwin's Black Box (Free Press, 1996). 89 See my suggested answer to the pertinent objection, above. And, hearkening back to what was written early, this fact about human psychology – to the degree that it even is a fact about human psychology – seems more within the province of the counselor than the philosopher. Also, the Christian theist has a ready explanation for this tendency to focus on evil over good, to brood, and whatnot;

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though, I think that the two considerations are at least on a roughly even keel (if theism is not actually at a distinct advantage). Number two, I also remember Russell: “Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way.”90 Arguably, – and ironically – naturalism seems to have a problem with both goods and evils. Russell seems to suggest that, because, “omnipotent matter” and its mechanistic process is simply “blind” we should expect a world of good mixed with evil, haphazardly. But, for my part, I side with Plato. I am struck first at the world's beauty and regularity. Secondly, I am struck with evil – a great deal of which seems to me to be explicable without recourse to chance; which recourse would cut off the branch from under us with respect to the observed beauty and order. Finally, I can't help but think that if blind, random processes really were responsible for a world, we should expect that world to be morally neutral – that is, neither aiming at nor achieving good or bad – in a way that our world clearly is not.91 That is, it seems to me that a process incapable both of intending as well as aiming at good is unlikely to produce it. And it seems to me awkward to suggest that a truly blind, completely mechanical process is likely to create a world susceptible of any evaluative predication – evil included. But, again, Plato has perhaps already articulated as much of a conclusion as could be expected, namely, that the cosmos appears telos-oriented and intentionally (even artfully) arranged for the good. And perhaps, also, Plato articulated what is, in the final analysis, the ultimate (as in “final”) reason for endorsing his cosmological views, namely, the intuition that nothing else but the existence of a rational craftsman can account for the enormous amount of phenomenal good that obviously exists. However, also as Plato himself noted, what we still see raging around us (for those with the perspicacity to look), is something like a battle over the nature of reality waged between gods and giants. And such a titanic battle, may ultimately boil down to warring intuitions about which are the primal existents: evil or good; chaos or order; beauty or ugliness. In any event, having extended over thousands of years of human history, this conflict (the seemingly timeless and even mythic gigantomachy) is not likely to abate any time soon – much less abate because of any comments of mine!

namely, the Fall has perverted human sensibilities. As Plantinga might put it, our “noetic” (cognitive) faculties have suffered the effects of sin. 90 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic, Qtd. In Nash, op. cit., p. 42. 91 But, as Mcginnis has noted, “Plausibly, there are many ways to miss a mark; and perhaps far fewer ways to hit it.” However, this seems to assume that our world has vastly more evil than good. And I would simply dispute this. I take most arguments from evil to argue that our world has vastly more evil than a world created by a good, all-powerful God should have; not particularly that our world is obviously a world where evil outweighs good. If a naturalist is inclined to hold that evils literally outnumber goods, I would respectfully suggest that they count more carefully. But, the point is, even – or rather especially – if evil should be so much easier to achieve (because they're just missed marks), our world should have far greater chaos than it has were it fundamentally irrational.

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APPENDIX I

Matthew Bell

“Methodological naturalism” is, on the other hand, a thesis about what science is able to “deal with,” independently of whatever happens to exist. As the name suggests, it is a methodological constraint: it in some sense specifies the proper method for scientific study. It places restrictions on the practice of science. However, “naturalism” is not itself clearly a “method.” It is, perhaps, more of a worldview.92 Thus, methodological naturalism is something less than a straightforward methodological constraint, since it does not clearly specify any method. But, it is also more than a straightforward methodological constraint in that what it does specify is something that is plausibly much broader than a mere method, namely, an entire framework within which inquiry (of which science is the premier, if not the only viable, example) is conducted – or, as I have said, a comprehensive worldview orientation.

Methodological naturalism is, however, probably also best understood (at least partially) as an epistemic (or, perhaps, doxastic) constraint insofar as it takes a position on what sorts of considerations are relevant or salient epistemically (or doxastically) in scientific inquiry. Further, we might also say that methodological naturalism is a procedural constraint (if we wish to distinguish such a constraint from a methodological one), insofar as it specifies a proper object of scientific procedure (say, nature). But, whatever its epistemic or procedural aspects, methodological naturalism is distinguishable from metaphysical naturalism insofar as the latter commitment takes a position on the furniture of reality, as it were, whereas the former does not. Metaphysical naturalism, that is, takes a position on what sorts of entities exist (in its case, positing solely physical ones). Methodological naturalism, on the other hand, merely restricts itself to handling or dealing with physical entities, whether or not other sorts of entities (chiefly, supernatural ones) exist.

92 By “worldview” I mean (very roughly) one's total picture of how things are – the totality of what one knows or believes to be true. This “totality” will have a filtering effect on one's experiences. One will tend, that is, to interpret one's experiences through the “lens” of one's current beliefs. That is, one looks at the world through one's worldview.

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APPENDIX II

Matthew Bell

Arguably, the problem of evil has two overarching sorts, which we may call the psychological and the intellectual. In turn, the intellectual problem of evil standardly takes two forms: the logical, and the probabilistic (or evidential).

The psychological or “[t]he emotional problem of evil concerns how to comfort those who are suffering and how to dissolve the emotional dislike people have of a God who would permit such evil.”93 On the other hand, “[t]he intellectual problem evil concerns how to give a rational explanation of the coexistence of God and evil.”94 Craig and Moreland rightly observe: “The intellectual problem lies in the province of the philosopher; the emotional problem lies in the province of the counselor.”95 And as such, nothing (much) more will be said here regarding the psychological or emotional problem of evil.96

However, of the two forms of the intellectual problem of evil, nothing much will be said regarding the so-called logical problem. “Critics who advance the logical version of the problem allege that there is an inconsistency between certain theistic claims about God and evil.”97 The thrust of the allegation against theism is that there is some sort of lurking logical inconsistency amongst the usual core set of theistic doctrines. In brief, as interesting as this contention is, the reason that this particular version of the problem will not occupy us here is that, apparently: “It is fairly widely agreed by theists and nontheists alike that Alvin Plantinga, Keith Yandell..., and other theistic philosophers have cast serious doubt on the viability of all formulations of the logical problem.”98 That is, the really interesting version of the problem – in contemporary terms, anyway – is the probabilistic or evidential version of the argument. “Critics who still think that evil presents a problem for theistic belief99 have shifted focus away from the logical version of the problem and have sought to construct a viable evidential version.”100

93 94 95 96

Craig and Moreland, op. cit., p. 536; Italics added. Ibid. Ibid. But see the subsection “OBJECTION 1: Why is the problem of evil more obvious or more impactful than the 'problem of good'?,” further along. 97 Michael Peterson, Et. Al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), p. 118. 98 Ibid., p. 121. 99 E.g., “...Edward Madden,... Peter Hare..., Michael Martin..., William Rowe..., Wesley Salmon...”, Ibid., p. 122, as well as Austin Dacey, Paul Draper, and Bruce Russell, among others. 100 Ibid., p. 121.

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Appendix III

Matthew Bell

Alvin Plantinga has contended that belief in God (which belief implies assent to the proposition 'God exists') is amongst the set of beliefs that is rightly construed as “properly basic” beliefs.101 (Other such “properly basic” beliefs would include those beliefs that have, as contents, propositions that are selfevident or incorrigible.) His suggestion amounts to an extension of the “classic foundationalist” picture of the structure of epistemic justification (as opposed to other, competing views such as “coherentism” or “infinitism”) where beliefs are understood to be “[divided]...into two groups: those which need support from others [i.e., the non-basic beliefs] and those which can support others and need no support themselves [i.e., the basic beliefs].”102 Hence, Plantinga has argued that it is reasonable to take belief in God as a belief that is, essentially, self-justifying. Plantinga has suggested that each human might have, as part of his or her native cognitive faculties, something that (effectively commandeering a term from John Calvin) Plantinga designates a “sensus divinitatis” (or “God-sense”). Now, it is no part of my present project to argue for the truth (or even the plausibility) of Plantinga's suggestions. However, in order to illustrate one possible direction from which a criticism of our antecedent probability assignment might come, I note that an adherent (and among this number should be counted William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff, et. al.) of “reformed epistemology” (as these Plantinga-sourced or Plantinga-esque notions are termed) might fully well object that, given that any human being – who is possessed of a “properly functioning” cognitive apparatus – will have a sensus divinitatis, the antecedent probability (at least the antecedent subjective probability) of God's existing, will not be 0.5, but will likely be very much higher. But, I simply note, here, that the assumption of a 0.5 antecedent probability assignment for God's existence is not immune to criticism. Nevertheless, I set this aside in the present paper.

101 Cf. Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000). 102 Cf. Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 53.)