Amoral social attitudes and value systems among Serbs and Australians

TAJP104847

(NT)

Australian Journal of Psychology, Vol. ??, No. ?, ?Month? 2005, pp. 000 – 000.

Amoral social attitudes and value systems among Serbs and Australians

LAZAR STANKOV, & GORAN KNEZEVIC2 The University of Sydney, Australia, and The University of Belgrade, Serbia

Abstract The aim of this study was to investigate the factorial structure of a battery of measures of amoral social attitudes and compare samples of Serbs and Australians in their performance on these measures. New scales of amoral social attitudes and Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1990) Value Survey were completed by samples of Australian (n = 452) and Serbian (n = 359) students. Four factors were extracted using exploratory factor analysis: Malicious Amorality, Tough Amorality, Self-indulgence/Selftranscendence and Conservatism/Individualism. Correlations among the factors suggest that there are two independent Amoral Social Attitudes and Values Systems - factors at the higher order. Serbs score significantly higher than Australians on Tough Amorality. Australians score higher than Serbs on the remaining three factors.

Amoral Social Attitudes and Value Systems among Serbs and Australians Much of the recent psychological work on moral behaviour has been influenced by Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development. This theory postulates the existence of six stages with the last stage being principled morality, based on the notion of justice. It is implied that this last stage is the only true rational moral behaviour. The philosophical origins of this position can be traced to Immanuel Kant. This tradition is rich from the theoretical point of view but, like so many similar approaches in psychology, the empirical fit of the model is far from perfect (see Kurtines & Grief, 1974). A persistent problem that plagues measures of moral reasoning based on categorical notions has been the frequently observed weak and unsystematic correlation with the actual moral behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Pejovic-Milovancevic, 1998). The approach adopted in the current study can be justified in terms of Locke’s (1983) arguments. According to him, moral behaviour can arise both from actions that are pre-meditated and judged to be dictated by the moral law and also from momentary reactions that are characterised by the absence of conscious evaluation. This understanding of the sources of moral behaviour opens the possibility that there are dispositions to act in a moral fashion, habits

that have been developed in the course of socialization and acculturation. In the present context, the term ‘‘habit’’ should be understood as a ‘‘trait’’ – that is, a tendency to act in a particular way that can be modified to some degree, depending on the circumstances - not a completely automatic reaction. This trait is akin to ability and personality traits and may, in principle, be reduced to the latter and perhaps related to the former. Our approach is to study moral behaviour by focusing on the opposite pole of the hypothesised dimension of morality. We employ the term ‘‘amoral’’ to designate such a trait or, perhaps, traits that predispose individuals to act on matters that may have ethical implications. This label gives valence-free, psychological, rather than ethical meaning to a behaviour that may be perceived as antisocial. There are several reasons that led us to focus on amoral/antisocial instead of moral behaviour in this study. Firstly, this helps to facilitate the expression of individual differences and therefore the measurement of aspects of social attitudes, which would otherwise be difficult to investigate. This is because our upbringing tends to instil relatively uniform ethical values and norms that frequently act as powerful guardians against the expression of aberrant moral views. For example, it would be hard to imagine that many people will disagree with the commandment ‘‘Thou shall not kill’’, but a few

Correspondence: Lazar Stankov, Department of Psychology, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 0004-9530 print/ISSN 1742-9536 online # The Australian Psychological Society Ltd Published by Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/00049530500048649

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L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

would not be opposed to endorsing an amoral statement ‘‘I ‘love’ him so much that I can drink his blood’’. A disagreement with the former would bring into play taboo-like forces, whereas the latter may be interpreted in both the literal and figurative sense, and those who are less alert and sensitive may fail to detect the moral implications of the statement. Secondly, amoral behaviour may arise either out of a desire to inflict damage or, perhaps more frequently, from a disregard for moral principles and because of one’s focus on personal needs (‘‘I do not care about anybody else but myself.’’). In either case, social consequences may be serious and the study of the causes of amoral, rather than moral, behaviour may be a more profitable course of action from the societal point of view. Thirdly, there are reasons to believe that amorality may arise from the disturbances in the normal functioning of personality. For example, people scoring high on Eysenck’s Psychoticism scale may have a tendency to display high levels of amoral behaviour. Finally, it is conceivable that the nature and causes of amoral behaviour differ from the nature of moral behaviour in a fundamental way - they may not be the opposite poles of the same dimension but in fact, different dimensions. The situation may be similar to findings with measures of circadian rhythms (e.g., morningness and eveningness, Roberts & Kyllonen, 1999), or positive and negative affects (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), that tend to define two independent factors and are therefore two different traits. Consequently, amoral and moral behaviour may display different correlations with the external measures. In order to examine this possibility, the present study employed variables that measure amoral behaviour and also measures of values that people see as guiding principles in their own lives. These latter measures, at the very least, can be interpreted as assessing aspects of moral behaviour. In particular, values can be seen as broad goals that capture the full range of human motivation, including motivation to benefit others and exploit them. The theory of values espoused by Schwartz (1996) applies to both antisocial and prosocial values and behaviour. For example, the value orientation, power, can be seen as being the guide of amoral/antisocial behaviour. Social attitudes and extreme political behaviour Whilst only a few individuals are prone to extreme radical action (e.g., terrorism), perceptions of the world that may trigger such actions may be prevalent in any given society. Radical behaviour is often justified by extreme political, religious, and nationalistic views, or a mixture of any two or all three. It is sometimes assumed that normal political behaviour in any society (democratic or otherwise) is influenced

by perceptions and attitudes that differ from the extremes only in degree, not in terms of quality. This provides justification for those holding particular stereotypes to label a whole nation, or some other large group of people, as being prone to terrorism and radical actions or represent ‘‘forces of evil’’. Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, some Muslim groups, and people in the Balkans and Asia provide examples. Are there indeed large groups of people who are more prone than the rest of humankind to engage in violent behaviour or, perhaps, terrorism? If so, what are the psychological underpinnings of such behaviour, particularly if internal and external political pressures on a society approach a breaking point? It is also possible to argue that psychological factors have little or no bearing on political behaviour of large social (e.g., ethnic) groups. Such arguments may be based on the assumption that every human society contains a wide range of psychological traits, including amoral social attitudes, and people differ widely on each of these traits. The decision to act violently may be a consequence of the immediate situation arising from the interplay of economic and political forces. Social institutions such as religion, education, and media within a given society may provide powerful forces that can be manipulated by those in control. Their effects may be direct on dimensions of culture like those identified in the work of Hofstede (2001) – i.e., Masculinity, Individualism, Power Distance, and Uncertainty Avoidance (see Table VI for the definitions). However, their effects on particular psychological traits that are captured by scales of amoral social attitudes and values may be indirect and perhaps rather small. Such traits would then have no, or at best a small, role to play in political behaviour of a radical kind. The present study provides empirical evidence of relevance to the issues raised above. In particular, it investigates amoral social attitudes and value systems in two national groups, one of which has gone through a lot of upheaval lately, and is sometimes perceived as being prone to aggressive and violent action. If amoral social attitudes indicate a propensity for such actions, the group that generates more violent actions can be expected to express stronger amoral social attitudes. There are two reasons for studying and comparing amoral social attitudes and values among Serbs and Australians. Firstly, since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, much of the blame for the events in the Balkans has been attributed to the policies of Serbia’s President Slobodan Milosevic. These policies have led to the Serbian state and its people being accused of initiating four wars, of being major perpetrators of ethnic cleansing via its military and paramilitary

Amoral social attitudes and value systems units, of using rape as a weapon of war, of committing atrocities in prisoner of war camps, indiscriminate killings during the siege of Sarajevo, and of the expulsion of almost half of Kosovo’s Albanian population during the NATO bombings of that country. Throughout this period, partly as a consequence of economic sanctions, the crime rate in Serbia has risen considerably and there was a noticeable breakdown of law-and-order, culminating in the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in the spring of 2003. A large number of dissidents and intellectuals have emigrated from the country. Given all these facts and accusations, it is reasonable to assume that some benefit may arise from the study of amoral social attitudes in Serbia. Does life under such political circumstances promote amoral social attitudes and values? Psychology should be able to inform policy makers and statesmen/women about social attitudes, since these, more than any other psychological construct, have putative bearings on political behaviour. Amoral social attitudes, in particular, may be able to inform about the likely tolerance or otherwise of political manipulations and breakdowns of democratic processes. All data to be reported here were collected over the past five years, immediately prior to, during, and after NATO’s bombardment of Serbia and the exodus of refugees from Kosovo. Secondly, the current study of amorality originated in Serbia. The first measures of amorality were constructed as part of a large-scale project designed to examine the mediating role of personality and micro-social factors in the well-established relationship between socio-economic status and criminality (see Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). The first study was carried out in 1993 and it showed that four subscales of amorality (Machiavellianism, Machoism, Hyper-individuality, and Aggressiveness/Bullying) proved successful in discriminating between people who committed different types of crime. Subsequently, it was found that these scales are effective in discriminating between criminals who were recidivists and those who can be labelled as criminal amateurs. Although this initial work acknowledged that there are aspects of amorality that do not involve criminal behaviour, it was felt that criminal behaviour represents amorality’s most drastic form. Consequently, the initial work with these scales focused on distinguishing criminals and non-criminals and differentiating among various criminal subgroups. Subsequent studies were carried out with incarcerated criminals, juvenile offenders and University and High School students as well as conscripted soldiers serving in Yugoslavian armed forces. Altogether some 12 different studies employing modifications of the original four scales, and several

3

additional new scales, were carried out within a period of seven years. Items within the scales were continually modified and new items were developed and tried out. Item generation was based on the texts of the Marquis De Sade, Dostoyevsky, Serbian proverbs, psychoanalytic views about the role of superego and, of course, on the expressions produced by the people tested (i.e., criminals and people from the streets in Belgrade and other townships in Serbia). By the beginning of 1995, some 500 items had been employed. Factor analyses of these items suggested the existence of nine subscales of amorality, all of which are employed in the present study. The present study The focus of the present study is on amoral social attitudes held by Australians and Serbs. A description of the nine psychological traits measured by these scales is provided in the Method section of this paper, together with two (out of 20) examples of items used in each scale. Since it is plausible to assume that such attitudes may be related to the value systems held by members of the society, we also employed the Value Survey developed by Schwartz and Bilsky (1990; see also Schwartz, 1992, 1996). The 11 values covered by this instrument are also described in the Method section of this paper. These values are assumed to be important to all people to some extent. Data collected in Australia (Fogarty & White, 1994; White & Fogarty, 2001) indicate that 11 values define two dimensions roughly corresponding to individualistic and collectivistic (sometimes also referred to as conservatism) value systems that are fostered to different degrees by different cultural groups. Both Schwartz (1992) and Rohan (2000) point out, however, that individualistic and collectivist value orientations appear rather infrequently in studies of values. Rohan (2000) proposed different ways of classifying human values and points out that alternatives to individualistic and collectivistic classification do exist. She presented an idealised circumplex structure of the 10 value dimensions of Schwartz (1992). A slightly modified version of her diagram is reproduced in Figure 1. As can be seen in the figure, Rohan (2000) suggested that values can be classified with respect to ‘‘focus on individual outcomes vs. focus on social outcomes’’ or ‘‘focus on organization vs. focus on opportunity’’1. The present study will

1 Schwartz (1992) uses different labels (i.e., openness to change vs conservation and self-enhancement vs self-transcendence) for these two dimensions.

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L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

Figure 1. Location of 10 value types in a two-dimensional space (after Rohan, 2000).

use exploratory factor analysis to examine the feasibility of this classification. The main issue to be addressed in this paper is whether such value systems relate to amorality and, if so, in what way. Of particular importance will also be the issue of whether Serbs and Australians differ in their endorsement of value systems and whether these differences can account for the differences in amoral social attitudes. Using the full sample of Serbian and Australian students, we shall first establish the factorial structure of amoral social attitudes and values. Comparison between the two groups will be made at both the scale level and in terms of the obtained factor scores. This study also employs a Big Five measure of personality (NEO-PIR, Costa & McRae, 1992) and a nonverbal test of fluid intelligence (Raven’s Progressive Matrices test). These latter measures are used to establish if Serbs differ from Australians on the most accepted psychological traits of personality and abilities. They are not the focus of this report but rather serve as control variables. In summary, the present study examines the differences between Serb and Australian students in respect to amoral social attitudes and social values. Preliminary results with smaller samples of nonstudent participants from both Serbia and Australia indicated that noteworthy and unexpected differ-

ences between groups do exist. These preliminary findings are not reported here.

Method Participants Participants in this study were 452 First Year students from two Universities in Sydney, Australia (68% females), and 359 Second Year Psychology students (81% females) at the University of Belgrade. Table I presents descriptive information for the two groups based on demographic data collected by the questionnaire as well as the overall findings with the Big Five personality measure (NEO-PIR) and Raven’s Progressive Matrices test. In terms of age, the two groups differ in accordance with the year of enrolment at University. The effect size is 0.46 of the average standard deviation. It is convenient to divide the information about Serbs and Australian students into several groups of variables that are likely to be of importance in any discussions about amoral social attitudes and value orientations. Firstly, compared to the Serbian sample, Australian students reported a large number of mild transgressions against the law and also disciplinary problems. Although these were all significant at the

Amoral social attitudes and value systems

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Table I. Descriptive characteristics for Serbian and Australian samples of students Serbs (n = 359)

Age Mild Disciplinary Problems Reported school misbehaviour Troublemaker Reported mild form of criminal activity Traffic offence Convictions Served jail term Reliogisity Religious intensity (5-points) Regular prayer Church attendance Changed religion (convert) Personality Traits (NEO-PI) Neuroticism (US Norm M = 24.56) Extraversion (US Norm M = 30.49) Openness (US Norm M = 27.82) Agreeableness (US Norm M = 30.14) Conscientiousness (US Norm M = 30.71) Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test Accuracy (% Correct Score) Confidence (% percentage score)

Australians (n = 452)

t-test

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Df = 1,809

19.69

3.04

21.31

3.08

5.36**

0.01 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.00

0.12 0.12 0.41 0.15 0.00 0.00

0.13 0.20 0.63 0.16 0.02 0.002

0.34 0.40 0.48 0.36 0.15 0.05

3.88** 5.17** 8.88** 4.16**

2.59 0.17 0.18 0.02

1.68 0.38 0.39 0.15

2.69 0.41 0.24 0.25

1.24 0.49 0.43 0.44

0.71 5.03** 1.39 6.00**

23.04 29.02 32.84 32.38 32.49

7.55 6.34 5.17 5.15 6.48

23.81 30.20 29.93 30.05 26.89

6.51 6.02 5.91 5.53 6.72

1.08 1.85 4.82** 4.08** 8.00**

75.11 82.80

13.47 11.09

75.66 77.24

13.08 12.97

0.41 4.04**

0.01 level, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the large N would show statistical significance, even though psychological significance of the difference may be relatively small (i.e., reported school misbehaviour and traffic offences). The largest effect size is 1.05 for the ‘‘Reported mild form of criminal activity’’. Secondly, even though there was no significant difference between the groups in terms of the intensity of religious feelings and church attendance, there was evidence that Australians are somewhat more religious than Serbs since they pray more frequently (effect size 0.28). Thirdly, in terms of the Big Five personality traits, there were no significant differences between Serb and Australian students on Neuroticism and Extraversion. Serbs scored significantly higher on Agreeableness (effect size 0.50), Openness (effect size 0.53) and, in particular, on Conscientiousness (effect size 0.85). It may be informative to compare these arithmetic means to the means reported by Costa and McRae (1992) for the normative American data. These means are also provided in Table I and it is clear that, although for most traits Americans did not differ from either Serbs or Australians, there was evidence that Serbs scored more highly than Americans on the trait of Openness. This may be explained in terms of the highly selected Serbian student sample. On the other hand, Australians scored lower than Americans on Conscientiousness. That is in accordance with the anecdotal evidence that Australians are a carefree nation. Fourthly, in

terms of performance on a measure of fluid intelligence (Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test), there was no significant difference between Serbs and Australians. However, there was a significant difference between these groups in terms of selfconfidence. This latter construct is measured by asking a person to indicate, on a percentage scale, how confident he/she is that the answer provided to an item is correct. Our typical findings (see Stankov, 2000) are that people tend to be well calibrated (i.e., their self-confidence matches their actual performance) on this test. Although Serbs are somewhat more overconfident, the difference between Serbs and Australians in terms of self-confidence is not psychologically significant since a difference of less than about 10% is not noteworthy from the psychological point of view. Since the remainder of this paper deals with group differences on amoral social attitudes and value orientations, it is important to keep differences on variables listed in Table I in mind. Towards the end of this paper we present the findings that partial out from the difference potentially confounding variables from Table I. Although, apart from the comparison with the NEO-PIR norms, our data do not contain a direct proof that Australians are representative of what is sometimes referred to as Western culture and society, there is ample evidence that, indeed, Australians can be characterised in that way. Being a British colony in the past, Australian society has

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L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

also been open to strong American influences since the end of World War II. Measures of amoral social attitudes and social value orientations In this study we employed nine measures of amoral social attitudes and a measure of psychoticism developed by Yugoslavian psychologists during the 1990s (see Knezevic, 2003; Momirovic, Wolf, & Djamonja, 1993). Each measure consists of 20 items, responses being one of five alternative Likert-type statements. Scales 1 (Poor Impulse Control) to 9 (Resentment) are based on a series of cluster and factor analyses of over 500 items. This sample of items was carefully selected to cover all relevant manifestations of amoral behaviour. More than 40 different potential areas of amorality were identified and around 10 or more items were generated to cover these areas. The areas of amorality covered in the initial studies included brutality, revengefulness, tendency to cheat, lie, manipulate, tendency to rationalise and to project amoral impulses to others, egoistic hedonism, absence of the sense of fair play, apology for the use of brutal force, hate, and the like. In the end, a set of nine subscales showing good psychometric properties was selected from this item pool. The description of the intended construct, and two items from each of the scales, is as follows: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Poor impulse control (capriciousness, imprudence, unrestrained action, poor capacity for redirection of energy into labour and constructive activity). Examples: a I live for the moment. b I can’t stand people who think for a long time before they do anything. Machiavellianism (conspiracy, machination). Examples: c All’s fair in love and war. d A wise person knows when to put the truth aside. Brutality and rebelliousness (poor socializing influences, justification of violence, brutal hedonism, problems in relating to authority). Examples: e People respect you more if they know you can beat them up. f Where I grew up the normal way problems were sorted out was by fighting. Sadism (pleasure in inflicting pain on others, cruelty, absence of empathy and lack of compassion). Examples: g I love to give idiots a hard time. h People who were born crippled or deformed shouldn’t be allowed to live.

5.

Toughmindedness (individuality, hedonism, being on guard, negative attitudes towards global social events). Examples: i A brave person uses all necessary means to succeed. j I can’t stand getting orders from anyone. 6. Haria (after Cattell’s second-order personality factor, indicative of hard realism). Examples: k When I am attracted to someone, I’ll do anything to get him or her. l I can’t stand people who are weak and dumb. 7. Rationalisation (cynicism about human nature, dehumanisation of a potential victim). Examples: m To steal from a thief is no sin. n You would be a fool to obey laws, which are thought up by old codgers and crooked politicians. 8. Selfishness and vice-proneness (egocentricism, tendency to vice, denigration of women, egocentric orientation and lack of interest in others except as objects for personal needs). Examples: o If your body tells you it feels good, it must be good. p It’s best to say what others want to hear. 9. Resentment (hatred, malice, envy, vengefulness). Examples: q If I had a complete power for only a few days, a lot of people would regret they were ever born. r Those people who are meant to be successful, talented and creative are mostly weird and perverts. 10. Psychoticism (or cognitive disintegration). This is not a measure of amoral social attitudes but rather a measure similar to Eysenck’s Psychoticism scale that has been used extensively in Yugoslavia and has shown good psychometric characteristics. Examples: s My enemies are after my head. t For me, life lost all sense long, long time ago. The Values Survey (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) is a items instrument designed to measure the following eleven values: 11. 12. 13. 14.

Achievement (ambition, success, capability, influence, intelligence). Power (authority, wealth, social power, public image, social recognition). Self-directedness (creativity, freedom, independence, curiosity, choosing own goals). Benevolence (helpfulness, loyalty, forgiveness, honesty, responsibility, truth, friendship, mature love).

Amoral social attitudes and value systems 15.

16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21.

Traditionalism (respect for tradition, humility, devoutness, acceptance of one’s portion in life, moderation). Conformism (obedience, self-discipline, politeness, honouring parents and elders). Universalism (broadmindedness, social justice, equality, world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom, protection of the environment). Security (social order, family security, national security, reciprocation of favours, cleanliness, sense of belonging, health) Spirituality (spirituality, meaning of life, sense of inner harmony, sense of detachment). Stimulation (variety, excitement). Hedonism (pleasure, enjoyment of life).

Each facet of a value (given in the parentheses) was used in the stem of the item, in the following format: ‘‘UNITY WITH NATURE’’ (Universalism)

As a guiding principle in my life, this value is: 71 0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 6 7

Opposed to my values Not important Important Very important Of supreme importance

In statistical analyses presented in this paper, a value of 2 was added to the above 9-point scale in order to make all numbers positive2. Paper-and-pencil versions of these measures of amoral social attitudes and value orientations, together with Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test and a measure of the Big Five personality factors (NEO-PIR) were given to all participants in this study. The order of presentation was as listed above. Altogether the participants had to answer 320 questionnaire items and a 20-minute cognitive test. The whole session lasted somewhat longer than one hour.

2

In order to check if our way of scaling the Value Survey has affected psychometric properties of the scales, the data for 179 Serbian students were sent to Prof. S. H. Schwartz. He analysed these data using his preferred Smallest Space Analysis procedures (Guttman, 1968). Two outcomes of that analysis are relevant for us here. First, the overall pattern of results matched very closely his own previously collected data for Serbs. In the present data, only one facet (spirituality) cannot be clearly delineated. Second, correlations between scores for the ten Value Survey scales based on his preferred way of scoring that employs the – 1 to 7 code indicated in the main body of the text and 9-point scale adopted by ourselves ranged from 0.95 to 1.00. Seven out of ten correlations were, in fact, equal to 1.00. Clearly, our scoring of the Value Survey data has not affected measurement properties of the scale in a significant way.

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Results Table II presents descriptive statistics for the 21 individual scales of amorality and value orientations in the two national groups, t-test of the differences and Chronbach’s alphas. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) between the two groups is significant (Wilk’s lambda = 0.379; F (21, 671) = 52.294, p 5 0.000). As can be seen from Table II, Serbs and Australians do not differ significantly on one scale (Machiavellianism). Although Australians scored more highly on the majority of the remaining scales, Serbs scored significantly higher on two scales: Toughmindedness and Haria. Chronbach’s alpha coefficients are presented in the last column of Table II. They vary from low 0.45 (Toughmindedness) to as high as 0.94 (Psychoticism), but the majority of these coefficients are around 0.70. Alpha coefficients calculated within each sample (not reproduced in Table II) are comparable to the values obtained from the total sample Correlations among all 21 variables for the total sample of Serbian and Australian students (N = 811) are provided in Table III. Table IV presents the results of exploratory factor analysis of this correlational matrix. The solution reported in this paper employed the Maximum Likelihood extraction procedure which was rotated using PROMAX from SPSS. Although five latent roots were greater than 1, four factors with latent roots 5.54, 4.66, 1.73, 1.32, respectively (accounting for 63% of total variance), that provided unambiguous psychological interpretation, were retained. Their interpretation is as follows. Factor I: malicious amorality Factor analyses of the set of amorality scales on their own tend to produce two factors (Knezevic, 2003). One of these is broad in the sense that the majority of variables usually have salient loadings on it, similar to Factor I in the present study. In order to understand the nature of this factor, it is useful to consider the relative size of factor loadings. Thus, the highest loadings come from Brutality, Psychoticism, Resentment, and Sadism. The other high loadings are from Rationalization and Poor Impulse Control. There are no salient loadings from the scales of value orientations on this factor. This pattern of factor loadings is consistent with the definition of the factor in terms of Aggressive and Malicious Amorality. The presence of loadings from the Psychoticism dimension of personality reinforces this interpretation.

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L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

Table II. Descriptive statistics, t-tests of the differences between Serbs and Australians, and reliabilities of the amoral social attitude scales and value orientations

Amorality 1. Poor Impulse Control 2. Machiavellianism 3. Brutality 4. Sadism 5. Toughmindedness 6. Haria 7. Rationalization 8. Selfishness 9. Resentment 10. Psychoticism Values 11. Achievement 12. Power 13. Self-directedness 14. Benevolence 15. Traditionalism 16. Conformism 17. Universality 18. Security 19. Spirituality 20. Stimulation 21. Hedonism

Australians

Serbs

t-test df = 1,809

Chronbach’s alpha

54.73(7.63) 52.95(9.15) 46.62(7.58) 41.38(7.42) 62.55(5.75) 61.95(5.95) 48.40(7.35) 49.66(6.84) 62.05(7.84) 54.79(14.45)

53.11(8.31) 51.94(10.99) 42.53(7.90) 38.60(7.57) 65.26(6.47) 65.58(6.16) 46.99(9.18) 47.67(8.21) 52.95(9.07) 43.24(12.29)

2.90** 1.39 7.49** 5.25** 7 6.23** 7 8.50** 2.37* 3.70** 15.31** 12.26**

0.67 0.80 0.68 0.71 0.45 0.53 0.75 0.68 0.69 0.94

6.47(1.03) 4.74(1.32) 6.72(0.94) 7.06(0.88) 5.10(1.36) 6.09(1.25) 6.62(1.01) 6.37(0.95) 6.04(1.23) 6.16(1.27) 6.86(1.27)

6.00(1.11) 3.66(1.33) 6.35(1.02) 6.25(0.94) 3.99(1.39) 5.00(1.19) 5.66(1.08) 5.56(1.07) 5.73(0.96) 5.15(1.41) 5.24(1.62)

5.97** 11.13** 5.11** 12.16* 10.94** 12.15** 12.35** 3.83** 3.84** 10.38** 15.33**

0.77 0.72 0.59 0.77 0.63 0.65 0.72 0.73 0.56 0.74 0.68

Factor II: tough amorality Amorality scales of Machiavellianism, Selfishness, Toughmindedness, and Haria have high loadings on this factor. In several studies in our laboratory and with both Yugoslavian and Australian samples, Toughmindedness and Haria clearly define a separate factor we call Tough Amorality and since neither Machiavellianism nor Selfishness modify this interpretation in a significant way, this appears to be the appropriate interpretation of this factor. The presence of lower loadings from Achievement and Stimulation value orientations is also in broad agreement with this interpretation. The only somewhat unusual loading on this factor comes from Traditionalism. However, this loading has a negative sign, indicating that the factor of Tough Amorality may be associated with the rejection of values that show respect for tradition, humility, devoutness, acceptance of one’s portion in life, and moderation. This, again, is in accordance with the other variables that load on this factor. Factor III: self-indulgence/self-transcendence The variables that define this factor come from the Value Survey. They include Self-directedness, Stimulation, and Hedonism, all of which represent individualistic, self-indulging value orientations. The other three variables – Benevolence, Spirituality, and Universality – are not primarily individualistic. They

indicate a focus on social context outcomes, implying value orientation that is sometimes referred to as Self-transcendence. Thus, the factor indicates value orientations that combine a tendency to enjoy life on one hand and, at the same time, be charitable to others and appreciate broader social context of life. Factor IV: conservatism/individualism Again, all variables that define this factor come from the Values Survey. This factor has salient loadings from Traditionalism, Conformism, and Security, all of which indicate conservative value orientation. However, this orientation is also characterised by Power (social power, social recognition) and Achievement (ambition, success, influence), both of which are indicative of individualistic value orientation. Alternative interpretations of Factors III and IV are possible, of course. The salient characteristic of Factor III may be orientation towards the enjoyment of pleasures of life, and inner fulfilment both at the individual and social level. A salient characteristic of Factor IV may be the orientation towards success at work and preservation of what has been achieved. The nature of the two value factors is different in the present study from what has been typically reported in the literature. To a significant degree, this reflects the difference in the methodology employed. As mentioned in the introduction, scaling

0.46 0.50 0.35 0.25 0.39 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.33 7 0.04 0.13 0.09 7 0.17 7 0.18 7 0.20 7 0.08 7 0.08 0.01 0.21 0.27

0.42 0.52 0.32 0.41 0.57 0.56 0.36 0.19 0.11 0.26 0.10 7 0.23 7 0.20 7 0.16 7 0.14 7 0.00 7 0.08 0.25 0.27

2

0.51 0.16 0.22 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.53 7 0.04 0.18 0.10 7 0.10 0.00 7 0.09 0.05 7 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.21

3

0.16 0.22 0.52 0.57 0.38 0.32 0.02 0.25 0.02 7 0.21 7 0.02 7 0.07 7 0.17 7 0.04 7 0.09 0.17 0.19

4

0.53 0.31 0.24 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.11 0.17 7 0.14 7 0.10 7 0.11 7 0.07 7 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.07

5

0.40 0.28 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 7 0.23 7 0.27 7 0.22 7 0.15 7 0.10 7 0.03 0.09 0.05

6

0.56 0.50 0.36 0.10 0.29 7 0.01 7 0.16 0.02 0.02 7 0.12 0.07 7 0.02 0.15 0.19

7

8

0.42 0.23 0.13 0.31 0.03 7 0.25 7 0.15 7 0.10 7 0.18 0.01 7 0.15 0.22 0.35

Note. Variable numbers correspond to those presented in previous tables.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

1

Table III. Correlations between scales of amorality and value orientations

0.48 0.17 0.40 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.02 0.23 0.30

9

0.03 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.17

10

0.62 0.51 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.55 0.24 0.51 0.45

11

0.28 0.30 0.37 0.51 0.25 0.59 0.20 0.43 0.51

12

0.43 0.20 0.26 0.59 0.39 0.37 0.58 0.39

13

0.57 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.41 0.38 0.38

14

0.69 0.45 0.58 0.48 0.22 0.18

15

0.46 0.71 0.38 0.32 0.28

16

0.54 0.45 0.46 0.36

17

0.43 0.43 0.44

18

0.26 0.19

19

0.56

20

Amoral social attitudes and value systems 9

10

L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

procedures that lead to circumplex configuration are used in the study of values and value orientations are often interpreted in terms of opposites (i.e., in terms of values on the opposite sides of the circle). For example, as mentioned in the introduction, the interpretation favoured by Rohan (2000) can be with respect to ‘‘focus on individual outcomes vs. focus on social outcomes’’ or ‘‘focus on organization vs. focus on opportunity’’. As can be seen in Tables IV and V, correlations between all values are positive and rotated factors III and IV have only positive loadings. Interpretation in terms of opposites is therefore unjustified for these factors. Clearly, the two factors cannot be interpreted in terms of Rohan’s (2000) classification. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the two factors have loadings from the contiguous slices in Figure 1. The outcome suggests a new classification of the values captured by the Schwartz (1992) system, and Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/Individualism appear to be useful dimensions from the factor analytic point of

view. Needless to say, this classification does not challenge Schwartz’ and Rohan’s interpretation of the circumplex in terms of the opposites which, indeed, may be more appealing from the substantive point of view. In general, the factor intercorrelations indicate that pairs of factors (Factor I with II and Factor III with IV) are correlated. This pattern of correlations suggests that social attitudes that are captured by Malicious and Tough Amorality factors would define an Amorality factor at the second order of analysis. In an analogous way, the value orientations of Selfindulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/ Individualism would define a Value Orientation second order factor. Despite a small correlation of 0.20 between Factors I and IV, in our experience, there is virtually no relationship between measures of Amorality and Value Orientations in these data. In order to gain further understanding of the nature of these factors, we calculated four multiple correlations between the measures of mild disciplin-

Table IV. Factor pattern matrix and factor intercorrelations: promax rotated maximum likelihood solution Factor I: Malicious Amorality 1. Poor Impulse Control 2. Machiavellianism 3. Brutality 4. Sadism 5. Toughmindedness 6. Haria 7. Rationalization 8. Selfishness 9. Resentment 10. Psychoticism 11. Achievement 12. Power 13. Self-directedness 14. Benevolence 15. Traditionalism 16. Conformism 17. Universality 18. Security 19. Spirituality 20. Stimulation 21. Hedonism Correlation matrix Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV Multiple correlations with measures of ‘‘mild disciplinary problems’’

Factor II: Tough Amorality

Factor III: Self-indulgence/ Self-transcendence

Factor IV: Conservatism/ Individualism

0.47 0.59 0.78 0.50 0.52 0.45 0.46 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.39

0.56 0.76 0.83 0.46

7 0.51

0.40 0.59 0.82

0.77 0.72 0.37

1.00 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.38

1.00 7 0.11 0.01 0.31

Note. Salient loadings above 0.35 are reproduced in this table.

0.43 0.58 0.37

1.00 0.53 0.17

1.00 0.12

Communalities 0.42 0.57 0.63 0.50 0.20 0.31 0.54 0.57 0.45 0.45 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.77 0.70 0.72 0.33 0.57 0.47

Amoral social attitudes and value systems Table IV continued Factor Intercorrelations: Factor I: Malicious Factor II: Tough Factor III: Selfindulgence / Selftranscendence Factor IV: Conservatism /Individualism

0.35 0.00

7 0.11

0.20

0.01

0.53

Multiple correlations with measures of ‘‘mild disciplinary problems’’ (see Table I). Measures of mild disciplinary problems were predictors, extracted factors were criteria: Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV 0.38 0.31 0.17 0.12

ary problems (as predictors) listed in Table II and factor scores (as criteria). As can be seen in the last row of Table IV, Malicious Amorality has the highest correlation (0.38) with mild disciplinary problems followed by Tough Amorality (0.31). This finding is in agreement with Yugoslavian data, which indicate that amoral social attitudes are predictors of criminal behaviour. Both Value Orientation factors have low multiple correlations with measures of mild disciplinary problems. Differences between Serbs and Australians on factor scores Given the existence of four meaningful factors in the data, it is reasonable to ask questions about the differences between the two groups of participants Serbs and Australians - on these factors3. For this purpose, we have calculated factor scores (using the BART procedure in the SPSS) corresponding to the above four factors. Factor scores are standardised (i.e., their mean is 0 and the standard deviation is equal to 1). The pattern in Table V is clear and is predictable from the mean differences on individual scales presented in Table II and factor loadings presented in Table IV. Australians in our sample reported significantly higher scores on the Malicious Amorality, Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence, and Conservatism/Individualism factors. The differences were significant in terms of the t-tests based on both ‘‘raw’’ scores and after partialling out five personality traits, gender, and mild disciplinary problems. These differences also reveal strong overall effects since the two groups differed by slightly less than one standard 3

The comparisons among the groups are predicated on the assumption of matching factorial structure in the two groups. Although this report focuses on factor analysis that involves the combined sample of Serbian and Australian students, we did carry exploratory factor analyses in two separate samples and the finding was that the two samples produce substantially the same factor structure of the amoral social attitudes and value variables.

11

deviation on all three factors. The direction of these differences is perhaps surprising. Firstly, Serbs endorsed Malicious Amorality statements less strongly than Australians. Secondly, although there was no a priori reason to assume that the strength of endorsement of the values captured by the Value Survey should differ between Serbs and Australians, it is clear that the Australian sample endorsed all values more strongly than did the Serbian sample. A completely different situation obtains with respect to Factor II, Tough Amorality. Clearly, Serbs scored somewhat higher than Australians on this factor. The difference in favour of Serbs was not strong – the effect size is only about 0.12 of a standard deviation. Amoral social attitude factors and factors of culture Since the differences between Serb and Australian samples in this study appear at odds with the prevailing perceptions of these two nationalities, it may be profitable to consider other work that provides for further comparisons. A recent influential book by Hofstede (2001) provides comparisons between Serbs and Australians on the main dimensions of culture – Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individuality, and Masculinity. Table VI contains brief definitions of these dimensions and average scores for Serbs and Australians. As can be seen from Table VI, the most pronounced differences are on Power Distance, with Serbs scoring high, and on Individualism on which they score low. In fact, on both dimensions the differences between these two countries are larger than many other pairs of countries that may be compared on the basis of Hofstede’s (2001) report. Thus, Serbs tend to accept that the power in society is distributed unequally whereas Australians hold a more egalitarian attitude with respect to power distribution. At the same time, Australian society has clearly distinct gender roles whereas Serbs live in a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Finally, Serbs are high on Uncertainty Avoidance dimension. This indicates that they tend to feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations. Overall, these patterns of differences suggest that Australians are egalitarian, have pronounced gender role stereotypes, and are less threatened by uncertainties. They also tend to endorse malicious social attitudes more strongly than Serbs. On the other hand, Serbs expect greater differences in power, they accept that both genders should have similar roles, and they are threatened by uncertainty. They also tend to endorse tough social attitudes more strongly than Australians.

12

L. Stankov & G. Knezevic

Table V. Arithmetic means and t-tests of differences among Serbs and Australians on factor scores Mean

1. 2. 3. 4.

Malicious Amorality Tough Amorality Self-indulgence / Self-transcendence Conservatism/Individualism

t-test

Australians

Serbs

df = 1,691

Partiala t-test

0.38 0.01 0.32 0.43

7 0.50 0.12 7 0.45 7 0.57

11.29** 7 2.69** 10.03** 13.85**

6.81** 7 1.97* 4.55** 4.16**

Note. Factor scores are in standard score units – that is, with mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. a Partial t-test refers to the test of the differences between Serbs and Australians after removing the effects of gender, mild disciplinary problems listed in Table I and five personality factors.

Table VI. Average scores of Serbs and Australians on Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions of culture

Power Distance Uncertainty Avoidance Individualism Masculinity

Australia

Serbia

36 51 90 61

86 92 25 43

Note. All four dimensions are expressed on a scale that range from 0 to 100. Brief descriptions of the high scoring countries on each dimension are as follows: Power Distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of institutions and organizations within a society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

The pattern of differences between Serbs and Australians on social attitudes appears to be related to cultural dimensions. In Australian society, strong endorsement of Malicious Amorality may be seen as a radical expression of a psychological trait that is superimposed on a particular type of culture. Similarly, Tough Amorality may be a radical expression of a psychological trait that is superimposed on Serbian culture. Put simply, in Australia you are ‘‘bad’’ if you are malicious; in Serbia you are ‘‘bad’’ if you are tough. Discussion There are two groups of findings in the present study that are of importance. The first set of findings relates to the factorial structure of amoral social

attitudes and values. The second is the comparison between Serbs and Australians. Our results show that there are two dimensions of amorality: Malicious Amorality and Tough Amorality. They are correlated and are likely to define a single second-stratum factor. Malicious Amorality refers to a belief system that endorses vicious and cruel statements that can be interpreted as accepting of a considerable degree of violence. Tough Amorality, on the other hand, refers to rebelliousness, hard realism, an attitude of posturing, and being prepared to bend the rules to achieve one’s goal. There are also two dimensions among the value systems: Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/Individualism. Thus, Self-indulgence/ Self-transcendence contains features that imply value orientation that indicates the enjoyment of life at both individual and social levels. Conservatism/ Individualism, on the other hand, should be seen as indicating orientation towards getting ahead in society. Again, since there is a non-trivial correlation between Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/Individualism factors, it is likely that a single ‘‘Values’’ factor will emerge at the next order of analysis. These two dimensions are the outcomes of factor analyses of a circumplex matrix. They do provide an interpretation of the structure of values that is different from the interpretation typically endorsed in the literature (e.g., Schartz, 1997; Rohan, 2000). However, they do not challenge the basic empirical findings and interpretation of the circumplex. Our data clearly show that amorality and value dimensions are largely unrelated. It appears, therefore, that whatever value system one endorses – either Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence or Conservatism/Individualism – has relatively little to do with the attitudes one has towards malicious acts or towards being tough and rebellious. If values can be interpreted as guiding principles in moral behaviour, our results show that moral and amoral behaviours are indeed separate dimensions.

Amoral social attitudes and value systems Comparisons between Serbs and Australians have produced unexpected results. Thus, the Australian sample tended to endorse Malicious Amorality statements more strongly than Serbs. At the same time, Serbs tended to endorse Tough Amorality statements somewhat stronger than Australians. Finally, Australians tended to endorse both Selfindulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/ Individualism value orientations more strongly than Serbs. The pattern of differences on amorality scales is clearly inconsistent with the prevailing media portrayal of Serbs. In order to ensure that our findings are not due to methodological errors we considered the possibility that there may be important differences between the samples of participants from these two countries. Although the selection process for entrance to University in both Belgrade and Sydney is very strict, the nature of the two samples is different in a potentially important way. Thus, in Belgrade, students are specifically selected for entry into Psychology courses, and from the very beginning these courses are tailored towards Psychological training. Australian students, on the other hand, are not initially selected for a particular discipline, but can choose their area of academic interest in later years. In Belgrade, both the selection process for psychology students and First Year courses tend to be oriented towards a liberal and open-minded view of the world. The Australian educational system may thus be more tolerant than the Serbian system towards people with higher scores on indices of misbehaviour, if they have satisfied core criteria for University entrance. In short, Serbian students tend to endorse less extreme levels of Malicious Amorality (that is closely connected to pro-criminal behaviour) than their Australian counterparts. When this hypothesis was put to a test by partialling out indices of misbehaviour, gender, and measures of Big Five personality dimensions in Table V, the t-tests were reduced in size but remained significant. Thus, these differences in samples of participants from Belgrade and Sydney cannot entirely explain the observed differences on amorality scales. The results of our preliminary study which is not reported in this paper point to the same conclusion. That study showed that Serbian army conscripts and Australian vocational training college students produced similar findings to those of University students. Both these groups approximate general populations in the two countries better than University students themselves. It appears, therefore, that the differences between Serbs and Australians are genuine. It appears that differences between Serbs and Australians can be understood, at least in part, in terms of the dimensions of culture that are reported

13

by Hofstede (2001). Australians score higher on Malicious Amorality because this dimension represents a radical social attitude that is superimposed on a culture that is characterised by egalitarianism and the presence of pronounced gender role stereotypes and appears less threatened by uncertainties. Serbs, on the other hand, score higher on Tough Amorality because this dimension represents a radical social attitude that is superimposed on a culture that is characterised by the expectation of greater differences in power, acceptance that both genders should have similar roles, and they are more threatened by uncertainty. The second finding that Serbs score lower than Australians on Self-indulgence/Self-transcendence and Conservatism/Individualism can be interpreted in three ways. One is that Serbs, in general, tend to endorse low ratings on all Likert-type scales. This interpretation is not supported by the amorality and personality ratings in the present study since there exist scales where Serbs score higher than Australians4. It is still possible that Serbs attach less importance to the value orientations than Australians. At this stage, however, we are not aware of Serbs’ relative standings in international comparisons with respect to Value orientations. The third interpretation is that perhaps at this period in their history, Serbs have become somewhat disenchanted with lofty human values and distrustful of high moral claims. Whatever the causes of the difference between Serbs and Australians, it seems apparent that there is no relationship between the violent behaviour of a nation as a whole and attitudes and values of individual members of the society. There may be a further long list of intermediate and indirect ‘‘causes’’ between individual’s amoral social attitudes, individuals’ behaviours, group dynamics, political systems and historical causes of war and peace.

Acknowledgements Several people, in addition to the second author, should be credited with the development of Yugoslavian versions of the amorality scales. The most important contributions were by B. Radovic, K. Momirovic, and A. Hosek. We are also grateful to Dr. Richard Roberts for his help in modifying ‘‘offending’’ statements in the scales of amoral social attitudes. We are particularly grateful to Professor S. 4 It is possible, of course, to divide amorality statements into two groups – desirable and undesirable. This may suggest that the differences between groups are due to the presence of stronger acquiescence response sets among the Australians. The evidence for this argument appears rather weak.

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Schwartz who did the analyses mentioned in Footnote 2 of this paper.

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