Assessing Turkish Foreign Policy. A review essay

Reviews

Assessing Turkish Foreign Policy A review essay Stein, Aaron: Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order, Whitehall Paper 83, Routledge 2015, 104 pp., ISBN: 9781138907232

Herzog, Marc, Robins, Philip (eds.): The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations. Routledge 2014, 192 pp., ISBN: 9780415707176

whether one likes it or not, publishing analysis on Turkey in general and Turkish foreign policy in particular has become a kind of popular sport. An ever-growing number of books, articles, comments and opeds have appeared throughout the years. In addition to the fact that academic publishing in newspapers, magazines, blogs and even journals has become a relatively fast, cheap and easy job due to the digital ‘revolution in information affairs’ (to be understood first and foremost as an expression of a kind of liberalisation in academic publishing, more and more disempowering editorial circles) there might be several particular reasons for this development with regard to Turkey. First of all, it seems to be the result of Turkey’s intensively changing visual appearance and its own growing activity in international affairs. It is quite common that socio-economic change and political activity attract much public attention which, in a sense, also includes and is followed by scientific analysis and publication. without doubt, it is also a consequence of a chang-

1

2

ing international and regional order, initialised by ‘9/11’ and subsequently aggravated by the US-led wars, ‘on terror’ and in Iraq. Turkey was at that time directly affected by those attacks and interventions which deeply changed relations between the west and the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East. Yet, paradoxically, Turkey managed to be widely acknowledged by both East and west as an important regional and global player, and an anchor for political stability in a region which had been unable to leave the period of massive turmoil behind. This achievement is mostly related to the Justice and Development Party (referred to here by its Turkish acronym AKP), governing the country solely in various yet quite coherent personal constellations and with an ambitious political agenda for change since coming to power in 2002. The party has been attracting more attention than any other political actor for years, both in and beyond Turkey. The AKP is widely considered to be the director and protagonist of Turkey’s recent transformation into ‘new Turkey’1 not to leave unmentioned former foreign, now acting Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s widely accepted role as the scriptwriter of proactive Turkish foreign policy.2 And last but not least, Turkey’s emerging economy led to a medium-scale revolution in higher education. Throughout the country, universities and think tanks (the latter often inspired by the (geo-) strategic outlook of the AKP foreign policy) were mushrooming, ‘producing’ scholars, analysts and other knowledge-producers and opinion-shapers. However, looking at the production of ‘Turkish Studies’ in recent years – including books, journal articles, reports and other more analytical contributions in newspapers, magazines and the like – reveals

Apart from being a recently developed AKP-slogan, ‘new Turkey’ was already part of the discourse. See e. g. Çandar, Fuller, Grand geopolitics for a new Turkey, 2001; Yavuz, The emergence of a new Turkey, 2006. See e. g. Kadıoğlu, Karlı, Öktem, Another Empire?, 2012.

ORIENT II / 2015

47

Reviews

some problems which in my opinion should be addressed and taken into closer consideration by professional scholars when analysing and assessing the current status and development of Turkish politics generally and Turkish foreign policy in particular. In a rather essayistic manner, these critical aspects will be discussed here, with two recent publications on the subject at hand: Aaron Stein’s Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Davutoğlu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order on the one, and the Turkey-related contributions written by Meliha Benli Altunışık and Marc Herzog in the latter’s and Philip Robin’s anthology, The Role, Position and Agency of Cusp States in International Relations, on the other.3 Turkey expert Aaron Stein’s analytical synopsis of the AKP foreign policy towards the Middle East from 2002 to 2014 is a timely production, as the war in Syria goes into its fifth year and the appearance of the so called Islamic State has been turning the state, social and ideological order of the heartland of the Middle East upside down (including revived dreams of Kurdish independence). In his book, Stein shows the evolution of the AKP Middle East policy (which he calls ‘ostpolitik’, following a notion of Ahmet Davutoğlu, p. 13) from its point of departure: from Davutoğlu’s ‘philosophical’ concept of “Strategic Depth”,4 which the AKP somehow must have ‘embraced’ (p. 9) in the early 2000s, until the present, when the government, now led by Davutoğlu himself, is ‘stumbling’ with its policy in Turkey’s tumultuous neighbourhood. Of course, plenty of works on major issues related to AKP foreign policy have been published already, covering various topics: Turkish foreign policy’s moving away from its passive, security-oriented tradition to the proactive, diplomacy-oriented stance under Davutoğlu and the AKP; Turkey’s new atti-

3

4

48

tude and opening up towards the Eastern neighbourhood at a certain expense of its traditional western alliances, or on the challenges and difficulties which the AKP has been facing while trying to juggle with more and more balls. Yet, where interested readers had to scour several different articles and book chapters in the past, they can now read Stein’s comprehensive book which is presented in a concise, systematic and well written way, including many details and less-noticed but relevant information. Content-wise, Stein offers an analytical description of political decisions and steps taken by the government on diverse fronts in three stages: during the “conservative politics and problem-solving” period of 2002-2011 (with main focuses put on AKP’s relations with Syria, Hamas, Iraq and Iran); at the “end of ‘Zero Problems’” years of 2010-2013, following Turkey’s “cautious” (Tunisia), “courageous” (Egypt) and “confused” (Libya) reactions on the so-called Arab Spring; until AKP’s “stumbling in Iraq and Syria” in 2011-2014. But more than that, Stein presents a clearcut interpretation of AKP foreign policy along two main theses, whose indicators and evidence (or at least plausibilities) he sows throughout the book: His first thesis is that the AKP’s ‘ostpolitik’ aimed at meeting Ahmet Davutoğlu’s pre-defined goals of making Turkey a central and regional power. These goals, according to Stein, are themselves based on Davutoğlu’s rather Islamist and anti-western geopolitical thinking that he had developed in the 1990s (p. 7-10, 88-91). Stein’s second thesis is that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy ultimately failed, not simply due to the regional maelstrom which both the government’s proactive policy and the Arab upheavals had led Turkey into, but rather the AKP’s favouritism of siding with the wrong partners, first and fore-

with another eye on the contributions in the recent issue of ORIENT (1: 2015) with its focus on “Turkish foreign policy: Iraq, Syria and the Kurds in the region”. Davutoğlu, Stratejik derinlik, 2001.

ORIENT II / 2015

Reviews

most the region’s Muslim Brothers. This policy has left Turkey in isolation: “Across the region, Ankara is on the defensive and – beyond Qatar, Gaza and Erbil – has failed to maintain the carefully cultivated partnerships that it had pursued before the start of the Arab upheavals. This, in combination with persistent tensions with its Western allies, has left Turkey’s government isolated and with little influence at a time when many of the region’s current conflicts touch directly upon its core interests.” (p. 87) Although being in line with many critical voices on the AKP and Turkish foreign policy, one may doubt, if not even disagree with Stein’s assessment of failure and isolation, when seeing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently signing contracts in Latin America or holding talks with King Salman of Saudi Arabia (just a day after Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was in Riyadh), or with Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad alThani; Prime Minister Davutoğlu travelling to France, Germany or the US; and many ministers gathering for meetings and conferences in Turkey, which holds the G20 presidency in 2015. Moreover, reducing Davutoºlu to Islamist and anti-western thinking by singling out supportive quotes from selective sources seems inappropriate given his much wider range of published books, articles and speeches throughout the years.5 However, Stein’s final assessment of the AKP’s stance on foreign policy towards the Middle East sounds more appropriate: “Nevertheless,” he concludes, “the AKP remains assured that, in playing the ‘long game’ in the region, its foreign policy deci-

5 6

sions will ultimately be vindicated.” (p. 87) And, based on opinions of other key decision makers such as Yasin Aktay, AKP deputy chairman in charge of foreign policy, no change in the government’s foreign policy is planned. According to Stein, against all odds, “the AKP has demonstrated the courage of its convictions.” (ibid.) Holding back on some general critical aspects of Stein’s study, it is worth adding here the Turkey-related chapters in Marc Herzog and Philip Robins’ anthology on Cusp States in International Relations to the picture. It goes without saying here that the authors consider Turkey as a ‘cusp state’ – a concept which is more or less newly introduced by Philip Robins to the international relations research community. This concept, according to Robin’s working definition, is appropriate to approach and analyse the attitude, identity and behaviour of other countries, too: Cusp states are “states that lie uneasily on the political and/or normative edge of what is widely believed to be an established region.” (p. 1) Although, to my mind, relating ‘cuspness’ to the concept of ‘region’ makes the matter rather more complicated,6 the introduced category of ‘cusp states’ itself is worth the reflection – especially with regard to the selected case studies. These include a diversity of countries such as Ukraine, Iran, Israel, Brazil, Mexico, Japan and Taiwan in addition to Turkey, thus grouping together democracies and authoritarian regimes, and large and emerging as well as rather backward economies of North and South, East and west. This raises the question of what these “strategic countries” (p. 2f.) have in common. Robins, who stresses that the process of precise conceptualisation is still under way, thus leaving the benchmarks

A comprehensive preliminary review of DavutoÊlu’s work is still a desideratum. with regard to the academic debate about Regionalism, Robins himself admits that ‘region’ is a social construction as is ‘cuspness’. Thus, defining one social construction with another lifts the reader to a high level of tautology from where one has difficulties to get down again. Yet, Robins puts up a ladder: “If Regionalism […] has been portrayed as being based upon a shared sense of ‘we-feeling’, cuspness invariably contains a heightened sense of ‘me-feeling’.” (p. 6)

ORIENT II / 2015

49

Reviews

open for the authors of the case studies to put their own emphasis on each cusp state, nevertheless offers several characteristics: Cusp states have a certain significance and importance, “whether for ill or for good”, due to different sources or state capacities; they are “states that matter”, although not necessarily being strong; and – which is maybe the most important characteristic – cusp states are likely to feel a “tension between geography and identity” which may result in awkward behaviour: Accepting the social constructivist paradigm in political analysis, Robins stresses that, in the end: “Cusp States are what leaders and nations make of them. […] there is a willingness on the part of government institutions to instrumentalise the Cusp State, and hence to reinforce that experience and create advocacy for such perspectives. It is in this aspect that prompts actors to operationalize such values in practice.” (p. 6f.) Having conceptualised cusp states in this sense, it becomes perspicuous why and how two experts on Turkey and Turkish politics, Meliha Benli Altunışık and Marc Herzog can further elaborate on that specific case which, in Robin’s words “seem[s] to be crystalising in an extremely insightful way” (p. 18). In her chapter, Altunışık examines the “Geopolitical representation of Turkey’s cuspness: discourse and practice” since the foundation of the republic. Having been constantly an object for Europe’s and the Middle East’s ‘othering’, during the Cold war, modern Turkey was trying to define its cuspness

7

50

in a closer relation to the west, yet still holding up its national interest as seen in the case of Cyprus. Then, the AKP, and first and foremost again Ahmet Davutoğlu redefined Turkey’s cuspness with the concept of a ‘central power’ aiming at ‘zero problems with neighbours’ and “using its cuspness to increase its attractiveness for the two worlds – ‘the west’ and ‘the East’ […].” (p. 36). Altunışık illustrates and discusses the AKP’s practice of cuspness by referring to four examples: the discourse on “Turkey as a model”, the “Alliance of Civilizations”, the government’s attempts to mediate in regional conflicts, and its idea of Turkey being an ‘energy bridge’. Not dissimilar to Altunışık or Stein, in his chapter “From cusp to hub? How Turkey tried to instrumentalize its cuspness as an aspiring multi-regional middle power”, Marc Herzog addresses notions of cuspness during the AKP era. Herzog’s major interest is the question of actorness in the concept of ‘cuspness’. By using a triangular of central aspects of actorness, consisting of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’, and referring to the AKP’s policies towards the Middle East and the Balkans, Herzog is able to show the used potentials as well as Turkey’s limitations to put forward its ambitious concept of turning the country into a ‘central’, or ’middle power’.7 According to Herzog’s results, the analysis of Turkey shows that: “Cusp States possess the ability to benefit from their perceived location at the cusp of larger regions,” although “this depends heavily on an ability

However, it should be said that the two expressions have different conceptual meanings. Although ‘middle power’ is today quite common and used likewise for the ‘BRICS’, emerging powers or regional powers, it was created as a concept in the late 1990s for countries such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries, that have been engaging in particular within the framework of international organisations to address global issues in a multilateral way. (Jordaan, The concept of a middle power in international relations, 2003.) In contrast, ‘central power’, which has been used rather rarely and hasn’t yet been conceptualised in a comprehensive and clear-cut manner, is mainly related to unified Germany or, due to Ahmet Davutoğlu’s approach, borrowing the term from the German context, to Turkey. The geographical or rather geopolitical connotation of ‘centrality’ suits both Germany (with regard to wider Europe) and Turkey (with regard to its location along three continental lines, thus supporting the AKP’s metaphorical image of Turkey as a hub for goods, energy, finance, etc.). A connection between the conceptual idea of geopolitical ‘centrality’ and cuspness in accordance with Robin’s definition as “being at the edge of a region” may be given by political geographer Saul B. Cohen in his Geopolitics in the new world era (1999 [1994]), to whom, beyond others, Ahmet Davutoğlu relied upon in his Strategic Depth, too.

ORIENT II / 2015

Reviews

to match the available options and ambitions with the material and ideational resources at their disposal. Moreover, the ability of Cusp States to address their geopolitical status is contingent upon greater shifts in the international system involving recognized powers.” (p. 57) So far, it has been made clear that both books are highly qualitative contributions for conceptually explaining and analytically understanding Turkish politics and foreign policy. Rather than elaborating on a detailed critique on both works, I would now like to focus more on critical or crucial aspects with regard to the state of art of ‘Turkish Studies’ which I find worth mentioning. As mentioned before, I understand ‘Turkish Studies’ here not in a narrow sense of a certain discipline of academic scholarship and specific field of area studies (which, in fact, it is not, given the range of disciplines which the study on Turkey covers – from history and linguistics, law, economic or social studies to specialised cultural studies focusing on religion, Alevis, Kurds, etc.).8 Instead, I observe the landscape of ‘Turkish Studies’ widely, with actors from various backgrounds (academia, media, et al.) who are ambitious in conducting and publishing analysis on Turkish politics in books and journals, magazines and online. One first comment rather expresses a fear, since it seems to me that working and writing on Turkish politics is more and more pressured by the polarised public atmosphere in Turkey’s domestic political scenery, and even runs the risk of (un)in-

tentionally becoming a driving force for polarisation by itself.9 Admittedly, politics in Turkey has always had a polarising impact on all segments of society and culture, and it would be surprising if the wave of general polarisation of the Turkish society stops in front of academia, despite the latter’s (similar to media’s) ideals for objectivist research and analysis. But being pushed or pulled to one or the other side of Turkish politics is one thing, whereas epistemological and methodological reluctances are another. This is the case, for instance, when authors base their analysis almost exclusively on (quickly published online) information provided by biased observers and opinion-shapers (such as columnists in many Turkish, but also international, newspapers and magazines),10 instead of conducting their own research in the country with eyes and ears wide open towards all sides and spectrums of the socio-political scenery. Having said that, in contrast, I see Stein and Herzog et al. as recommendable examples for vigilant researchers ‘on the ground in Turkey’, using primary literature and other adequate sources and methods for inquiry, which help them to come to a sound analysis and convincing results. Yet, what seems rather missed by the authors (as is the case with others, too) is a kind of greater sensitivity when it comes to relevant aspects and circumstances of both, politics (policies and policy-making) in general and public political culture and the aspects of political communication in par-

On the state of the art of Turkish Studies in that rather narrow sense see the “Special Issue: Turkish Studies from an Interdisciplinary Perspective” of the journal Turkish Studies (4: 2014) and the introduction given by Ciddi, Levin. The comments here are partly inspired by that issue’s contributions. Besides, I owe thanks to Benedikt van den woldenberg for his hints on the widespread and ongoing debate on ‘disciplines of social sciences vs. area studies’, which relates not only to Turkish Studies. See, for example, the review essay of King, The problem with areas: Asia and Area studies, 2012, and in general on the debate Basu et al., Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate, 2003. 9 Some years ago I perceived two camps of researchers on Turkish foreign policy – one that was rather in favour of the proactive policy of the government and another one opposing it. See Schulz, Vom Wohl und Wehe einer Strategie, 2012 (also available in Turkish). 10 On the problem of polarisation in the Turkish media see Baruh et al., Press-Party Parallelism and Polarization of News Media during an Election Campaign, 2014. 8

ORIENT II / 2015

51

Reviews

ticular.11 Acknowledging, for instance, the very fact that politics ultimately (and definitely in Turkey) is centred on the question of power in its various dimensions, or that Turkey’s public political culture and communication is less ‘German-style’ consensual, but confrontational in a French way,12 seems, in my eyes, essential and in a way preconditional for a sound and sober academic analysis on Turkish domestic and foreign politics, as it reduces the danger of normativity. Given that, Herzog et al. in general do not put much emphasis on basic aspects of politics or culture, due to their conceptual approach and interest in rather comparative analysis (although it wouldn’t do damage the understanding of the concept if the relevance of basics such as power politics and political culture in the context of ‘cuspness’ had been made clearer). Yet, what they do stress is to see ‘cuspness’ as a strategic communicative means in the hands of decision makers and opinion shapers to build up or foster collective identity, political intention and action, as well as, ultimately, political legitimacy for those in power (p. 7). The way in which Ahmet Davutoğlu and the AKP have been able, since 2002, to shape the public discourse of what Turkey is and which role it should play in the 21st century,13 is with respect to Altunişik (pp. 33-36) and Herzog (pp. 44-5) a formidable example of how Turkey’s ‘cuspness’ is publically put forward (and is, by the way, also telling of how the opposition and other political ac-

tors so far have largely failed to create an alternative discourse). In comparison, Stein interprets foreign policy-related political talk invariably as the policy-makers’ clear-cut expressions of intention or explanation for action directed towards the governmental audience in washington, Jerusalem, Damascus, etc. This results not only in his apparent reluctance to consider the option of manipulative communication in foreign policy (which should never be put out of question by critical minds).14 More than that, Stein leaves largely unnoticed the fact that foreign policy in Turkey has become an object of power politics – especially in periods of election campaigning, but even throughout the whole, politically highly contested AKP era.15 Foreign political issues as much as domestic issues fuel the constantly heated political debate between government and opposition. Thus, for instance, arguments on the government’s foreign political stance on ‘the west’, Israel, ‘Kandil’, Syria or Egypt, should not always be taken literally and as an expression of clear-cut conviction. Instead, such buzzwords and arguments have become standard elements of the debate within the highly polarised political scenery, and are mostly without much impact then on the actual conduct of foreign policy (at least with regard to the widely calm and stable Turkey-western relations). what analysing political talk and communication in Turkey at least teaches is not to be reluctant, but to be clear on one’s own wording.

See Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 1974 (22005); and Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, 2014, respectively. 12 A telling example is the comment of Çengiz Aktar, Polarization is about democracy, 2010. For the conceptualisation of this confrontation logic, named ‘radical democracy’, which is obviously appropriate for approaching modern Turkish politics, see Harvey, Democratic Agonism: Conflict and Contestation in Divided Societies, 2012. 13 Ahmet Davutoğlu’s attempts to adapt Turkey’s ‘cuspness’ to the changing conditions of the crisis in Syria and Iraq from 2013 onward – from a country which aimed at ‘zero problems with neighbours’ to one which emphasises ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ in the shadow of the massive refugee crisis, though in order to achieve the former goal in the long run – is a complementary example. See Davutoğlu, Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects, 2013. 14 See e.g. Grove, Political leadership in foreign policy: Manipulation support across borders, 2007. 15 However, it shouldn’t be left unmentioned, that due to Ahmet Davutoğlu and the AKP government’s impact, foreign policy-making in Turkey became ‘civilised’ from an elitist sector dominated by a closed, military-led security complex, and opened up to the public sphere of universities and think tanks, conventional and social media. See also Herzog’s remarks, p. 56. 11

52

ORIENT II / 2015

Reviews

One prominent example for that may be the assessment of nowadays’ failure of the AKP foreign policy across the board (from EU affairs and Turkey-US relations to issues concerning the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, yet, first and foremost, regarding the government’s actions in the turbulent Middle Eastern neighbourhood). Instead of drawing up a balance sheet of selected quotes and statements, allegedly wrong decisions and critical developments on those different fronts of Turkish foreign policy and, thus, concluding ‘failure’, I would prefer to raise various kinds of questions in advance, such as: what are the overall criteria for measuring failure (or, ex negativo, success) in foreign policy – especially by admitting a complex global or regional political scenery with various burning issues and complex multiple-actor-relations? Do we find really those criteria for (in)effective action in quotes and statements in comparison with the ‘facts on the ground’ – although, as mentioned above, we should be suspicious anyway, when it comes to political talk, as foreign policy is also to be regarded as public policy and is, thus, part of the power play in the domestic political arena? And, related to that, doesn’t our usually unconsciously dominating understanding of policy as a linear input-output model clash with the reality of a complex world of a multitude of actors and conflicting and/ or converging interests? In other words: Aren’t foreign affairs to be understood as complex, multi-actor constellations in which the domestic politics and foreign policies of the states and actors in question should be assessed more or less equally, too?16 Thus, when it comes to the analysis of foreign affairs and relations, shouldn’t we take not only the AKP administration in our focus of analysis, but likewise and equally critically the Assad regime, Netanyahu’s coalition government, the specific governments of the EU member states or the Obama ad-

16

ministration – each one with its particular interests, options and constraints for action? The argument here goes that when scholars and analysts address Turkish politics and foreign policy in journals, newspapers and online, they should try to put less emphasis on ‘Turkish’ and show more awareness about the various epistemologies and logics of ‘politics’ and ‘foreign policy’, as well as the critical methodological questions related to them. Yet, what seems to me especially true for ‘Turkish Studies’ in this wider sense is critical for that peculiar field of academic area studies. Again one might argue for putting “more political (or other social) sciences into Turkish Studies”. But this could strongly bother the inner borderlines of the discipline, and – in the specific case of contemporary Turkey – may increase politicisation and polarisation of the field, which instead should be avoided. However, the problem lies also within ‘Turkish Studies’, which is – despite sounding paradoxical – too focused on Turkey. what nowadays follows from some analysts’ narrow focus on (if not obsession with the AKP) Turkey is, in my opinion, a growing tendency to overemphasise the country’s (and the AKP’s) significance at the expense of other factors, thus supporting claims of Turkey’s exceptionalism and uniqueness (while likewise heating the fear of many in Europe and elsewhere of a ‘too unique’, too ambitious, too powerful Turkey – a fear that itself is instrumentalised by Turkey-sceptic forces). In this regard, Herzog et al. do make a good job in combining the case of Turkey with other countries to be analysed. Even if their main interest is trying to clarify ‘cuspness’ via using different case studies, their attempt to deconstruct and, thus, indirectly weaken the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘exceptionalism’ which are often acclaimed, i.e. constructed by opinion makers and shapers in

For a brief introduction into ‘constellation analysis’ in international relations theory, see Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 2001, 80f.

ORIENT II / 2015

53

Reviews

these countries, is important. By doing so, they can find a common ground for further analysis of each of these cases, or of all of them in large-n combination.17 Nevertheless, Turkish Studies in a narrower sense still offers valuable insights and contributes to understanding Turkey. Stein, for example, is definitely not to blame for the single case study on Turkish foreign policy. In contrast, his focus and sound analysis on the AKP foreign policies with regard to the case of the highly dynamic Middle East gives not only insight into beliefs and arguments, mechanisms and patterns of foreign policy-making and conduct in the AKP era. It further serves as a comprehensive and well-instructed analysis and interpretation of AKP foreign policy towards the Middle East, although not all aspects are sufficiently covered. Therefore, after reading Stein, an additional analysis on Turkey’s economic and social transformation during the AKP era and times of changing global economy should be considered, too.18

the western view and, thus, do they actually contribute to political stability, economic progress, social fairness and human rights globally? Do Turkish and western, especially European policy-makers act in concert for shaping such a new world order – and if not, what has to change? Finally, it almost goes without saying that ‘cusp states’, such as Turkey, have a significant role to play in shaping the new political order; and that there are some flagrant actors, such as the AKP, who push their country to the perceived ‘winning side’ of globalisation. In the end, reflective Turkish Studies will also tell whether they succeed or fail. Ludwig Schulz

Finally, sound analyses, such as the ones delivered by Altunişik, Herzog and Robins, as well as Stein, are supported by their actor-specific approaches (although ‘cuspness’ as a structure serves as an appropriate approach for analysing Turkey, Turkish politics and AKP foreign policy, too). Given that, scholars working on Turkey and Turkish politics should hold on to actor-specific approaches, but should do more than ‘just’ updating assessments of Turkey- and AKPspecific issues. Instead, as a matter of relevance, scholars should not refrain from critically addressing crucial questions such as: where does Turkey stand in the global scenery, and how is it pushed to the ‘winning side’ of globalisation by its policy-makers? Given that, do they imagine a similar or an alternative kind of globalisation than

Arguments that stress the potentials for comparative research on Turkey and other countries in order to activate new impetus in Turkish Studies were also put forward by Ciddi, Levin, Interdisciplinarity and Comparison in Turkish Studies, 2014. 18 An option may be Gümüşçü, Keyman, Democracy, identity and foreign policy in Turkey, 2014.

17

54

ORIENT II / 2015

Reviews

Reference list AKTAR, ÇENGIZ, “Polarization is about democracy,” Hürriyet Daily News, September 17, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=polarization-is-aboutdemocracy-2010-09-17. BARUH, LEMI; ÇARKOğLU, ALI; YILDIRIM, KEREM, “Press-Party Parallelism and Polarization of News Media during an Election Campaign: The Case of the 2011 Turkish Elections,” The International Journal of Press/Politics (3: 2014) pp. 295-317. BASU, AMRITA; Miresepassi, Ali; waever, Frederick (eds.), Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003). CIDDI, SINAN; LEVIN, PAUL T, “Interdisciplinarity and Comparison in Turkish Studies,” Turkish Studies (4: 2014), 557-570. COHEN, SAUL. B., Geopolitics in the new world era: A new perspective on an old discipline,” in Reordering the world. Geopolitical perspectives on the 21st century, ed. George J. Demko, williams B. wood, (Boulder (CA), Oxford: westview Press 1999 [1994]), 40-68. ÇANDAR, ÇENGIZ; FULLER, GRAHAM E., “Grand geopolitics for a new Turkey,” Mediterranean Quarterly (1: 2001), 22-38. DAVUTOğLU, AHMET, “Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects,” Nationalities Papers (6: 2013), 865-870. DAVUTOğLU, AHMET, Strategjik derinlik. Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (Istanbul: Küre 2001). Dougherty, James E., Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. (Jr.), Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Addison wesley Longman, 5 2001). Grove, Andrea K., Political leadership in foreign policy: Manipulation support across borders (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). GüMüşÇü, şEBNEM; KEYMAN, E. FUAT, Democracy, identity and foreign policy in Turkey: hegemony through transformation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). HARVEY, KATHRYN: “Democratic Agonism: Conflict and Contestation in Divided Societies. Applying the Theoretical Assumptions of Chantal Mouffe and william Connolly to the Case of Turkey,” e-IR.info, 2012, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/20/democratic-agonism-conflict-and-contestation-in-divided-societies/. JORDAAN, EDUARD, “The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers,” Politikon (2: 2003), 165-181.

ORIENT II / 2015

55

Reviews

KADIOğLU, AYşE; KARLI, MEHMET; ÖKTEM, KEREM. (eds.): Another Empire? A decade of Turkey’s foreign policy under the Justice and development Party (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2012). KING, VICTOR T., “The problem with areas: Asia and Area studies,” in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (2-3: 2012), pp. 314-324. LUKES, STEVEN, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan Press, 1974; 2 2005). MISKIMMON, ALISTER, O'Loughlin, Ben; Roselle, Laura, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (London, New York: Routledge, 2014). SCHULZ, LUDwIG, “Vom wohl und wehe einer Strategie. Ahmet Davutoğlu und zehn Jahre AKPAußenpolitik in der Diskussion,” in Zehn Jahre AKP. Eine Retrospektive auf Außen-, Innenund Kommunalpolitik, ed. Charlotte Joppien (Istanbul: Orient-Institut Istanbul, 2012), 324; also available in Turkish as “Ahmet Davutoğlu ve AKP Dış Politikasının On Yılına İlişkin Tartışmalar. Bir stratejinin esenliği ve sancıları“, in AKP’nin On Yılı. Dış, İç ve Yerel Politikaya Bir Geri Bakış, ed. Charlotte Joppien (Istanbul: Orient-Institut Istanbul, 2012), 3-25. YAVUZ, M. HAKAN (ed.), The emergence of a new Turkey (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 2006). All internet sources were accessed and verified on March 20, 2015.

Stephan Kokew Annäherung an Toleranz Kokew, Stephan, Annäherung an Toleranz. Ausgangspunkte,

Kontexte

und zeitgenössische Interpretationen des Toleranzbegriffs aus dem schiitischen Islam. Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag GmbH 2014, 181

Seiten,

ISBN:

9783956500671

Mit dem Terror der Miliz Islamischer Staat (IS), ehemals Islamischer Staat in Irak und Syrien (ISIS), erreicht der Begriff der Toleranz aus islamischer Perspektive eine neue Dimension. Die IS-Miliz beansprucht für sich den ‘wahren’ Islam zu leben und geht skrupellos und unmenschlich gegen alle

56

Andersdenkenden bzw. ‘Andersgläubigen’, wozu auch schiitische Muslime gehören, vor. während man annahm, die Diskussion um die Toleranz im Islam sei längst ausgeschöpft, gerät dieser und seine Anhänger aufgrund extremistischer Tendenzen einer Minderheit erneut in Erklärungsnot. Als Aufklärung und Abgrenzung des Toleranzbegriffes zur Auslegungsart der salafistischen und dschihadistischen Bewegung kann das vorliegende Buch betrachtet werden. während sich die sunnitische Mehrheit bereits mit dieser Thematik auseinander gesetzt hat, gibt es im deutsch-sprachigen Raum kaum Untersuchungen zur schiitischen Perspektive. Dem islamisch-schiitischen Toleranzbegriff legt der Autor den europäischen Toleranzbegriff zugrunde, den er als Entwicklung einer wahrung fremder Glaubensüberzeu-

ORIENT II / 2015