BELO MONTE DAM EIA REVIEW – BELO MONTE DAM EIA REVIEW

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ASSIGNMENT 2 – ERST621 BELO MONTE DAM EIA REVIEW Victor Pitanga Lincoln University

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Introduction

The Belo Monte three dam complex hydroelectric being constructed in the state of Pará on the Xingu river was one of the main welcome card from the labour government in Brazil (Villas-Bôas, Garzón, Reis, Amorim, & Leite, 2015). The power generated would place it as the third biggest hydropower plant in the world (The Economist, 2013). Its largest reservoir, known as either Babaquara or Altamira Dam, occupies an area of 6,154 km² and would have the role of controlling the flow of the Xingu river (Fearnside, 2006). However, local and indigenous peoples were seldom consulted and were not explained about its externalities (Fearnside, 2012). In theory, financial reparations and public participation were supposed to be a part of the venture, as were food security and housing policies (Blog Belo Monte, 2014). In reality, the government failed to accomplish these and other promises, such as improvements in health, infrastructure and basic sanitation (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015). Local indigenous peoples and riverside dwellers are the most affected as their livelihoods depend on the Xingu river. The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which refers to the effects of human actions on the environment and its ecosystems (Morgan, 2012), released by the government briefly explained the negative effects such work would have upon the environment and the local communities. More recent reports, like the “Dossiê Belo Monte” (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015) had a more thorough analysis on the impacts felt by communities. This paper aims at critically reviewing the EIA (RIMA, in Portuguese) released by the Ministry of Energy (Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2009) during Brazil’s labour government. Even though the government named it an environmental assessment, it would be more precise to say it is an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA).

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RIMA Review Brazilian development projects are usually funded by the National Development Bank (BNDES) and Belo Monte received the mammoth amount of 22.5 billion Brazilian Reais (around eight billion US dollars) for its funding and 3.2 billion Brazilian Reais (over one billion US dollars) for its social and environmental actions (BNDES, 2012). Around 40% of the credit, however, were transferred to financial institutions: the government owned bank “Caixa Econômica Federal” and the national bank BTG Pactual (BNDES, 2012). The latter is currently directly involved with the Brazilian political crisis, hundreds of employees have been fired and its owner and founder has already been arrested (Moore, Porzecanski, & Marcelino, 2015). The project, therefore, cannot escape the corruption that surrounds – and haunts – the Brazilian government as of lately. The three contractors responsible for building the dam are also deeply involved in the current political crisis (BBC, 2015). They were also the companies collaborating in the ESIA released by the Brazilian government. Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Corrêa are the three contractors that had much to benefit from the project. Together with Brazil’s Ministry of Energy and the country’s nationwide electricity company (Eletrobras), the three companies fulfilled the legal regulations to present an ESIA to support the construction of the dams. These regulations are full of bureaucracy and high costs. Brazil may be the only country that counts with a three-phase licensing process: Previous Licence, Installation Licence and Operation Licence, which have different procedures, contributing for delays, high costs and uncertainties. In average, in order to get a Licence of Operation, it may take over six years since the Previous Licence was acquired (World Bank, 2008). Besides that, this legal framework has remained unaltered since the military dictatorship in the 1980’s, a testament that it is outdated and does not reflect the development of the environmental and social fields

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of the past two decades (World Bank, 2008). Another layer of the problem is the lack of funds and personnel in the licensing agencies, which account for poor Terms of Reference as well as EIAs (World Bank, 2008). This helps explain the poor language, the non-professional layout and, most importantly, the lack of data in the Belo Monte ESIA. The impression is that the RIMA was done mainly to cover the legal requirement, even though a prior EIA has been done by the government, but not made available for the public (Fearnside, 2006). This lack of data also affects the impacts presented, which are squeezed in a brief chapter filled with cartoon drawings, despite being extremely negative. This certainly favours those three contractors, whose common interest in building the dam would pressure a government decision on their favour. This confirms that “proponents engage consulting firms to prepare impact assessment statements that are inevitably in their favour” (Duncan, 2003, p. 80). Therefore, it would not be irrational to think the outcome of the report was biased. Especially when you look at other similar projects EIA – such as the São Manuel hydroelectric – which are made by the Energetic Research Company (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2011), a technical government organ. Whereas the “Ministério de Minas e Energia” is political, thus susceptible to external influences and political manoeuvres. From all of the impacts listed in the ESIA, almost 90% of them were negatives. In this report, the Brazilian government allocated each impact into one of the project’s three phases: study, implementation of the project - meaning construction of the dam - and operation, when the dam is finished and already working. The chart on the next page shows the disparity between the negative and positive effects of the project. In its first phase, both impacts listed were negatives as they were mainly related to false expectations. The number of negative effects rose to 24 in the implementation phase, while in the operation one they were six. From the 35 impacts listed, only four were positive and only three of those regarded the indigenous and local communities.

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Impacts on Indigenous and Local Communities

Number of Impacts

30 25 20 Positive

15

Negative

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Ratio 5 0 Study

Implementation

Operation

Project's Phase

The negative impacts identified on the second and third stages were very significant. The main environmental effects include: -

Deterioration of the water quality;

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Changes in fish species and fishing patterns;

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Loss of vegetation and changes in the fauna;

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Landscape alteration, including loss of beaches and recreational areas;

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Loss of natural habitats for fish and birds.

The social impacts listed by the report were just as important: -

Increase of mining activity and of conflicts with indigenous tribes;

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Higher pressure on indigenous lands;

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Increased population causing disorderly occupation of spaces;

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Housing losses;

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Loss of jobs and decreased income;

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End of access to the Xingu river for certain tribes;

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Fishing losses;

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Propagation of mosquito-transmitted diseases.

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The impacts are substantial. The scoping focused on the environmental, social, economic and health issues, which are interconnected. The scoping seems to be broad, but that is due to the size of the project. Its impacts are bound to be spread out in different sectors. Since there is hardly any data or statistics on the impacts - such as the size of the predicted fishing losses, or the level of increase of unemployment or more detailed information on the habitats and species losses and so forth – it is possible to say the assessment did not use the mathematical model. The model used was most likely the expert judgements and analogue model. Expert professionals more likely drew the conclusions through analogous situations (Glasson, Therivel, & Chadwick, 2005). Given Brazil’s prominence in the hydroelectric field – where 75% of the energy is generated by hydro power plants (World Bank, 2008) -, it is likely the appointed experts used former hydroelectric projects in Brazil – especially the ones implemented in the Amazon – to draw their outcomes. When comparing to São Manuel Hydroelectric EIA – it is possible to attest that the expert judgment model is also used even though there are some elements of the mathematical model: statistics and objective data are used to support some of the impacts listed, like the creation of jobs (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2011). Even though this EIA looks better structured, the impacts assessed on both projects are very similar. However, since hydroelectric projects deeply affect the landscape – thus, the surrounding flora, fauna and waterways -, it would be interesting to include a physical and architectural model. In other words, it should be included illustrative models explaining the connection between project and environment or illustrations showing the visual impact of each dam on their respective environment (Glasson et al, 2005). The result would make a difference for the public, especially the indigenous peoples in Xingu, whose first language is not Portuguese. This is just another example that showcases the lack of commitment with people’s perspectives. This happens because proponents of big development projects tend not to like

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public participation (Glasson et al, 2005) and Belo Monte was no exception, as there have been little or no discussion of the details of the dam project with local communities (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015). Public input was not taken into consideration and in 2015 still local dwellers had not been properly informed on the project’s status of compliance of the mitigation plans (VillasBôas et al, 2015). This was in accordance to what is the pattern in Brazil. Indigenous peoples and poor communities continue to be marginalised and are kept apart from the decision making processes. This led to a reprimand on behalf of the Organisation of American States (OAS), who considered the absence of participation by the indigenous peoples in the Belo Monte project’s ESIA a violation of international rules (Fearnside, 2012). Because the indigenous – alongside with local dwellers – are the most affected (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015), their input would be essential for the project’s ESIA. The way found to camouflage the indigenous relevancy and the nature of the impacts listed was the lack of distinction between the impacts’ significance. The São Manuel Hydroelectric EIA distinguishes the impacts according to their significance, considering the size and severity of effects on ecosystems, communities, landscapes and so forth (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2011). That way it is possible to analyse which assessment area or stakeholders would be most affected. The Belo Monte RIMA, however, does not make such classification of impacts. Instead, it uses a geographical variant in order to show which areas would be most impacted. This geographical criterion divides the Xingu region into areas directly affected (ADA) and areas of direct influence (ADI). The former comprises only the sites that are being built on, while the latter refers not only to these, but also to neighbouring communities, roads, housing and so forth. According to this division, a layman could think the ADI would comprise less significant impacts. However, effects such as housing losses, increased conflicts in

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indigenous lands, loss of fish species and so on would be included in this category. According to Villas-Bôas et al (2015), these effects are significant and have changed the communities’ livelihoods, making them less sustainable. On the other hand, the ESIA presents the demand of the National Indigenous Foundation (FUNAI), a government agency, to better analyse the indigenous tribes living inside the ADA. The RIMA, however, does not present a thorough analysis of why these tribes are more affected if not for the geographical reason. Instead, it only provides baseline information on these indigenous peoples. Their habits, culture, traditions, economy, in other words, their livelihoods are well-described in the ESIA. Again, there is no robust data explaining the links between the indigenous livelihoods and the impacts associated. The source of the baseline information despite being unclear, was probably provided by FUNAI, which is considered a reliable source. Other types of baseline information are plentiful. Fauna and flora contextualisation is also well-documented. And so are the descriptions of the towns in the ADA. This helps understand the local economy, the plurality of actors involved and the complexity of the project. The baseline seems to be well integrated with the scoping as they both focus on the environmental and social issues as the main part of the effects. The baseline information, however, is much more detailed than the impacts assessed. Mitigation follows the same pattern. Eighteen plans are proposed under the umbrella of an Environmental Plan. From those, only the one regarding land ownership is more detailed and offers a broader view as to whom is affected and which project would be implemented for each group. The proposed projects, however, ignore indigenous groups and focus on land owners, seasonal rural workers and land lessees. From the other mitigation plans, it is possible to highlight: -

Ecosystems Conservation;

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Adaptation of the Educational System to Indigenous Population;

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Public Health;

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Water Management;

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Indigenous Institutions and Rights Strengthening Plan;

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Indigenous Housing.

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Given the quantity of negative impacts, the assessment is offering as many mitigation actions as possible in order to limit and remedy the predicted effects. However, these actions are either not adequate or they have not been implemented in the projected timeframe, which is why many specialists are contesting the Licence of Operation (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015). The Indigenous Housing Plan, for example, focus on indigenous reallocation and urban interventions. In practise, reallocation means moving the tribes away from the river – thus away from fishing - to areas without sanitation or public transport. Besides that, financial reparation only covered the house’s physical structure and not the value of the land (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015).

Evidently, this was not explained in the ESIA. Similarly, the Public Health Plan

promised programmes for disease prevention, malaria control and basic health incentives, without presenting comprehensive data to explain how they would achieve the proposed goals. Instead local tribes have seen an increase of 127% of child sub nutrition and of 200% of hospital visits (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015). The lack of commitment with – and explanation of - the proposed mitigation actions has a reason: the absence of monitoring mechanisms in the ESIA. Moreover, basic public services – predicted by the mitigation policies – have not been accomplished, instead there was a distribution of 42 vehicles, 578 boat engines and countless plasma TVs and even bottles of soda (Villas-Bôas et al, 2015). These data exemplify what the government think of mitigation and development.

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Conclusion Even though EIA practice is still developing, there is a consensus around what the best practises are. Transparency, public participation and good quality of information are amongst them (Morgan, 2012). For the Belo Monte ESIA, it is possible to conclude that the process was neither engaging local communities nor providing them with good information. Additionally, political manoeuvres might have overshadowed the transparency. Besides that, Brazilian laws regarding environmental impacts have not developed the last few years the way they should have, which help explain the poor quality of the Belo Monte ESIA - like the absence of monitoring mechanisms. The negative impacts listed by the assessment are plentiful and real. The mitigation plans need to be reformulated in order to support local and indigenous communities and be implemented in its entirety in order to give some legitimacy to the government’s report. However, that does not seem to be the case. Inadequate mitigation programmes will only widen social, economic and environmental problems. Unfortunately, that is the norm in developing countries and not the exception.

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References Blog Belo Monte (2014). A Norte Energia e os povos indígenas do Xingu. Retrieved from http://blogbelomonte.com.br/2014/04/19/a-norte-energia-e-os-povos-indigenas-doxingu/ BBC (2015). Presidentes da Odebrecht e da Andrade Gutierrez são presos na Lava-Jato; relembre principais prisões. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/ noticias/2015/06/150619_lava_jato_atualiza_mdb BNDES (2012). BNDES aprova financiamento de R$ 22,5 bilhões para Belo Monte. Retrieved from http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/ Sala_de_Imprensa/Noticias/2012/energia/20121126_belomonte.html Duncan, R. (2003). Constructing barriers in the translation and deployment of science: Basslink – a case study. Australian Journal of Public Administration. 62(1), 80-87. Empresa de Pesquisa Energética (2011). Usina Hidrelétrica São Miguel: Relatório de Impacto Ambiental RIMA. Retrieved from http://www.epe.gov.br/MeioAmbiente/Documents/ Rimas/Rima%20-%20UHE%20S%C3%A3o%20Manoel.pdf Fearnside, P.M. (2006). Dams in the Amazon: Belo Monte and Brazil’s Hydroelectric Development of the Xingu River Basin. Environmental Management 38:1, 16-27. doi: 10.1007/s00267-005-00113-6 Fearnside, P. M. (2012). Belo Monte dam: A spearhead for Brazil’s dam-building attack on Amazonia?. Retrieved from http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/03/19/belomonte-dam-a-spearhead-for-brazils-dam-building-attack-on-amazonia/ Glasson, J., Therivel, R., & Chadwick, A. (2005). Introduction to environmental impact assessment. London: Routledge.

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Ministério de Minas e Energia (2009). Relatório de impacto ambiental: Aproveitamento hidrelétrico de Belo Monte. Retrieved from http://philip.inpa.gov.br/publ_livres/ Dossie/ BM/DocsOf/RIMA-09/Rima_AHE%20Belo%20Monte.pdf Moore, M., Porzecanski, K., & Marcelino, F. (2015). O que a crise crescente do BTG significa para o Brasil. Exame. Retrieved from http://exame.abril.com.br/economia/ noticias/o-que-a- crise-crescente-do-btg-significa-para-o-brasil Morgan, R. K. (2012). Environmental Impact Assessment: the state of the art. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 30(1), 5-14. doi: 10.1080/14615517.2012.661557 Villas-Bôas, A., Garzón, B., Reis, C., Amorim, L., & Leite, L. (2015). Dossiê Belo Monte: Não há condições para a licença de operação. Retrieved from https://www. socioambiental.org/sites/blog.socioambiental.org/files/dossie-belo-monte-site.pdf World Bank (2008). Licenciamento ambiental de empreendimentos hidrelétricos no Brasil: Uma contribuição para o debate. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTLACBRAZILINPOR/Resources/Brazil_licenciamento_SintesePortugueseMarch2 008.pdf