Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria : causal factors and central problematic
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African Renaissance Vol 9, No 1, 2012 Pp 91‐118 Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: Causal Factors and Central Problematic Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Benjamin Maiangwa ………………………………………………………………………… Abstract Boko Haram, the Islamic radical sect from northeastern Nigeria, has been responsible since 2009 for a string of bomb attacks strategically directed at the Nigerian government, security officials, churches, civilians, and the U.N. headquarters in Abuja. With the attacks getting more sophisticated, coordinated and deadly with each year, there are growing concerns, nationally and internationally, about not only the fast deteriorating security situation in Nigeria but also the potential implications for Nigeria. Given the sect’s focus on the Nigerian government as well as other local targets, it appears that the grievances from which Boko Haram originates is highly localized and emblematic of the conditions of state failure in Nigeria. So conceived, this article explores the contextual factors that gave rise to the emergence and radical evolution of the Boko Haram sect. Informed by the state fragility and the Human Needs frameworks, the paper argues that Boko Haram terrorism is triggered by the cocktail of bad governance in Nigeria, including the widespread failures of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, and endemic corruption, poverty, unemployment, and extensive underdevelopment in the north of Nigeria. The resulting security conditions have been exacerbated by the spectacular failure of government intelligence and security apparatus. The paper further examines the state responses to the Boko Haram impasse and concludes that the menace is unlikely to dissipate unless the Nigerian government alters significantly the conditions of state failure.
Keywords: Boko Haram, State Failure, corruption, terrorism, poverty, underdevelopment.
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria Introduction and Background In late 2009, in fulfillment of a religious obligation, I decided to participate in jihad against the United States. The Koran obliges every able Muslim to participate in jihad and fight in the way of Allah, those who fight you, and kill them wherever you find them, some parts of the Koran say, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. ‐ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab ‐‐ “Underwear Bomber” on why he chose the terrorist path. On 16 February 2012, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by a United States Federal Court for trying to blow‐up a Northwest Airline jet about to land on Christmas Day 2009 in Detroit, Michigan. The then 23‐year old young Nigerian man is the son of a wealthy businessman and former Nigerian government minister. By all accounts, he lived a highly privileged life. For him, his jihadist path was not motivated by hunger or poverty, or the need to redress social inequalities. Rather, it seems that he was motivated primarily by the belief that he had a responsibility to wage war against non‐believers. As he told the court during his trial: “The Quran allows every Muslim to undertake jihadʺ and his attempted murder of hundreds of people was justified ʺbecause of the tyranny of the United States.ʺ Clearly, religious extremists are motivated by a range of factors. Abdulmutallab and others such as Osama bin Laden show that personal wealth is not necessarily a deterrent to extremist religious views. However, there is very little doubt that perceptions of social injustice and poverty are often critical features that fuel the gravitation towards extremist religious positions. Islamist activism and protests against the state and its authority are not new in Nigeria. In fact, such activities can be traced as far back as the pre‐colonial times. For instance, the Uthman Dan Fodio jihad, which was launched in 1804, was a spectacular reformist religious revolution against repression by local political authorities. The jihad created the largest state in Africa in the 19th century – the Fulani Empire ‐‐ by 1811. The new empire established the foundations for social and political relations in contemporary Nigeria (and throughout the Sahel region of West and Central Africa) with its revolutionary message. Dan Fodio, who authored several dozen books, targeted some of his most scathing attacks against corruption by state authorities as well as on a range of official abuses: social and political injustice against the rights of 92
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ordinary people, heavy taxation, and state interference in trading activities. Dan Fodio’s influence remained palpable not only during the colonial period but also in the post‐colonial era. He influenced generations of Muslims in the entire Sahel belt extending from modern‐day Senegal to Sudan. Indeed as Warburg notes, although the Sudanese Mahdi sought external assistance and had been influenced broadly, The most compelling precedent for Muhammad Ahmad, however, came from a territory west of the Sudan, ‘where Usman [sic] dan Fodio had led a revivalist jihad against the corrupt and decadent rulers of what is now northern Nigeria’. Like Muhammad Ahmad al‐Mahdi, ‘Uthman Dan Fodio was an ardent Sufi of the Qadiriyya who did not claim to be a mahdi but called on all the Hausa to go on a jihad against the corrupt rulers, as mandated by the Prophet. (2009:270)
Mahdist ideology constituted one of the most significant challenges to formal political authority under British colonial rule in Nigeria. The rise of ʹMahdismʹ, a trans‐Sahelian movement against colonial rule, coincided directly with the period of intensification of European colonialism in Africa. For Sunnis, Mahdism is a commonly accepted belief ‐‐ most notably during times of major crisis ‐‐ that a messiah would arrive to resolve the problem by strengthening Islam and restoring justice. The Mahdi or ‘the guided one’ is usually the al‐imam, the head of the Islamic community, whose duty it is to restore order or appropriate governance: ‘to fill the earth with equity and justice even as it has been filled with tyranny and oppression’ (Warburg, 2009: 268). As Best (1999: no page) underscores, Some Mahdists regarded the forces of Lord Lugard (the first British Governor‐General of Nigeria who amalgamated the north and south in 1914) as Satan. They saw any pact with the British and subsequent rule by Christians as worse than death. Thus, after the capital of the Fulani empire (Sokoto) fell to the British, sultan Attahiru fled to Sudan in a ʹhijra,ʹ rather than live under ʹChristianʹ rule.
Pressures from Mahdists in the ensuing years forced the British to compromise by instituting an indirect rule system in northern Nigeria that assured minimal interference in the life of Muslims and maintained the conservative Muslim ruling hierarchy. Despite these arrangements, the officials of the British colonial government and the Emirs remained in 93
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria permanent fear of a Mahdist uprising for decades due to the persistent threats and challenge by Mahdists against the colonial state. The threats and challenges remained until the end of colonial rule. It is crucial to bear in mind that the then‐cozy arrangement would come back to haunt post independent northern Nigeria and the whole state. Although there were other sorts of opposition to state authority, particularly from members of the ʹQadiriyyaʹ and ʹTijaniyyaʹ brotherhoods – both of which overwhelmingly accounted for all Nigerian Muslims before the end of colonial rule in Nigeria – this began to change after both began to associate closely with, and became absorbed into, the postcolonial ruling elite circles of the state. As a result of this, revivalist groups either grew in stature (such as the Maitatsine Movement) or were formed (Izala Movement – 1978 and Muslim Brotherhood / “Shiite” – 1979). In essence then, the emergence of revivalist movements seems to be a direct response or net outcome of the perceived failures of the dominant religious orders such as the ʹQadiriyyaʹ and ʹTijaniyyaʹ brotherhoods to challenge the Nigerian state and its officials with respect to their own failures to deliver the accoutrements of good governance – particularly with respect to poverty alleviation, moral rectitude, and social and legal justice. Best (1999) argues that: Unlike radical groups such as the ʹShiitesʹ, they [ʹQadiriyyaʹ and Tijaniyyaʹ brotherhoods] seem comfortable with the secular notion of the state and there is little support for an Islamic state and constitution for Nigeria among their members. As such, they have been the targets of revivalist Islamic movements, who tend to identify them with the complacency of the state, and accuse them of moral bankruptcy. The revivalist movements also appealed to youths, and the state is a key subject of attack.
Thus, at the time of Nigeria’s independence in October 1960, there were already some indications of major fault lines in northern Nigeria between not only Christians and Muslims but also between the state and some elements in the Muslim community. For instance, such divisions were already palpable in the Borno area of the northeast and what came to be known as the Middle Belt on the one hand, and the Fulani‐ dominated Sokoto Caliphate on the other (Sanusi, 2007: 182). In the post independence period, sectarian clashes manifested in religious radicalism and violence, organized crime and, increasingly, a new gravitation towards terrorism. Perhaps, no other issue since Nigerian civil war has 94
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occupied the headlines more menacingly and demonstrated more starkly the failure of the Nigerian state as the issue of Boko Haram terrorism. Within the first six weeks of 2012 alone, Boko Haram claimed attacks that killed more than 286 people in several parts of Nigeria including policemen, military officers, Christians, and Muslims. Given the scale of its attacks and pronouncements, the sect seems intent on provoking another civil war in Nigeria. The net effects of the violent attacks have been inflamed national tensions and emotions as well as a deepening gulf between members of Nigeria’s different religious, ethnic, and regional communities. The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan has offered to Nigerian citizens and members of the global community much by way of verbal palliatives but very little by way of finding or even pointing towards a lasting solution to the Boko Haram challenge that is threatening to further destroy progress towards national cohesion and development.1 A number of analyses have already emerged purporting to explain the current Boko Haram impasse in Nigeria. For Onuoha (2011), the raison d’être of the sect is emblematic of Islamic extremism given the steady rise of religious fanaticism and intolerance in Nigeria through the activities of the Maitatsine and Izala movements (Ibrahim, 1989: 71). Another argument is that as the name Boko Haram – “Western education is forbidden” – denotes, the sect, ipso facto, is averse to Western education and modern civilization. Such a popular account of the emergence of Boko Haram ‐‐ derived largely from casual discussions, newspaper reports, and academic reports ‐‐ represents another reductionist explanation of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. While it is not inaccurate to attribute religious extremism and anti‐Western animosity as the casus belli of the Boko Haram uprising, this paper goes beyond these parameters to explore the contextual factors that gave rise to the emergence and radical evolution of the Boko Haram sect. Informed by the state fragility framework, the paper argues that Boko Haram terrorism is triggered by the cocktail of bad governance in Nigeria. Simply put, Boko Haram terrorism represents the net result of sustained failure of state policies, inefficient and wasteful parastatals, endemic corruption and abuse of state authority, pervasive poverty,
New African, 2012. Four Bombers Dead as Blasts rock Nigerian Flashpoint city http://www.africasia.com/services/news_africa/article.php?ID=CNG.96a7 b5fbe4f5da204d5e094764d857cf.1a1
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Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria unemployment, and underdevelopment in the north as well as the failure of national intelligence and security apparatus. The paper further examines the state responses to the Boko Haram impasse and concludes with prospects and possibilities for defusing the menace. Theoretical Considerations: State Failure and the Foundations of Violent Conflicts in Nigeria By way of a prelude, the word ‘state’ is used in a dual sense by Beblawi and Luciani (1987: 4) to denote “the overall social system subject to government or power,” and “the apparatus or organisation of government or power that exercises the monopoly of the legal use of violence.” In a similar light, Yates (1996: 14) defines the state as “the structure of power and authority that exercises the attributes of sovereignty within [a defined territory].” The monopoly of legitimate power that states exercise allows individuals to escape what Hobbes labeled the ‘war of every man against every man’ (cited in Fukuyama, 2004: 1). However, the same coercive power that allows states to protect property rights and provide public safety also gives them the carte blanche to “confiscate private property and abuse the rights of their citizens” (Fukuyama, 2004: 1). Here, the main focus is on the African state which some authors argue was never properly institutionalised because it was never emancipated from society (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). As a result, “its formal structure ill‐manages to conceal the patrimonial and particularistic nature of power” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 3). This explains why African regimes are often labeled ‘neopatrimonial,’2 so called because patronage‐based clientelistic networks operate behind the Weberian rational‐legal façade of statehood (Clapham, 1982). Shifting attention to the state failure theory, Rotberg (2002) traces the root of state failure to what we may condense into three main sources: economic dislocation, political instability, and loss of legitimacy. The economic sphere is characterised by deteriorated standards of living, a lack of public goods and services, the flourishing of corruption and rent‐ seeking, and a pervasive economic stagnation. (Rotberg 2002:86). In the
In a neo‐patrimonial system, the states’ modus operandi is informal, rule of law is feebly enforced and the ability to implement public policy is weak. According to Lewis (1996: 99), “the personal prerogatives of the ruler typically eclipse the authority of laws and organisations, fostering a weak and unstable institutional arena.”
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political sphere, some leaders and their allies readily work to subvert prevailing democratic norms by coercing legislatures and bureaucracies into subservience, compromising judicial independence, stifling the emergence of civil society or space, and abusing security and defense forces for parochial ends. Moreover, the political sphere is dotted with ethnic discrimination and resultant discord. Governments that once appeared to operate for the benefit of all the nation’s citizens are perceived to have become partisan (Rotberg 2002:129). Consequently, corrupt ruling elites invest their ill‐gotten gains overseas, building lavish residences and palaces with state funds. Like their civilian colleagues, military officers are often major beneficiaries from such corrupt systems (Rotberg 2002:89). In the last phase of failure, the state’s legitimacy will collapse. Once the state’s capacity to secure itself or to perform in an expected manner recedes, there is every reason to expect disloyalty to the state on the part of the disenchanted and aggrieved citizens. Logically, many transfer their allegiances to their clan and group leaders, some of whom gravitate toward terrorism as they strive to secure their communal mandate. Mobilizing support from both external and local supporters, the terrorists seek out havens in the more remote and marginalized corners of failed states where they blend in more comfortably in the prevailing chaos associated with state failure (Rotberg 2003:9). A considerable number of Third World countries are regarded as failed states. These include: Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Beyond those states is one collapsed state: Somalia. Lebanon was also a failed state. So were Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Nigeria (Rotberg 2002:91). Focusing on Nigeria, Chinua Achebe, the renowned Nigerian social pundit, argues in 1983 that Nigeria ‘is an example of a country that has fallen down; it has collapsed’ (1983: 1). In many ways, the foregoing statement mirrors the chaotic and anarchic situation in Nigeria of 2012. Nigeria exemplifies the characteristics of a failing or weak state that is degenerating into full failure. The extant literature on state failure and its conditions discussed above appears useful in this regard. Nigeria is still steady in the Failed States Index (2011) at No.14. The 2010‐2011 Terrorism and Political Violence Map rated Nigeria No. 5 as a severely afflicted terrorist region. Furthermore, in the Human Development Index Trend, 2011 Nigeria was ranked at No. 156 out of 186 countries. Beyond actually causing state failure, governmental misrule often hinges on the capacity of the leaders to limit or prevent citizen responses through protests and mass movements for systematic change. It is the latter scenario that lays 97
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria the basis for the sort of interest‐based politics that ultimately breeds and nurtures a terrorist movement like Boko Haram (Reno 1998). The spate of the Boko Haram bomb attacks cannot be divorced from the seeming complacency and failure on the part of the Nigerian government to deliver needed infrastructure services, human security and social justice, jobs and decent income, transparent and accountable, and other features of a positively developing state. State failure in Nigeria has a direct connection with its high level of corruption, the negative effects of which Ihonvbere and Shaw (1998: 151) capture aptly: “corruption has reduced the legitimacy of the state, eroded the credibility of political leaders, replaced merit and hard work with strong and complex patron‐client relations, accentuated inefficiency, ineffectiveness and general disorder in the bureaucratic apparatuses and led to mismanagement, waste and, ultimately, economic crisis.” However, corruption in Nigeria is so endemic that it is not limited to state operatives. Adibe (2012) captures the depth of the challenge when he argues: … the Nigerian state, contrary to the media hype, is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram’s bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while revelling in moonlighting, organised labour, including university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strikes on a whim while journalists accept ‘brown envelopes’ to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected, anti‐Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe that the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy.
Consequently, there has been increasing rates of poverty and unemployment in the country. A 2011 report by the World Bank indicates that 54.7% of the nation’s population lives in abject poverty (World Bank Data, 2011). The ramifications of the entrenched culture of endemic formal corruption and grave leadership neglect and incompetence over the decades have actually become too painful for many Nigerians to endure. Large numbers of Nigerians die each year of preventable diseases as a result of living in deteriorating and dehumanizing environments, 98
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poor health care services and, increasingly, famishment and destitution. Successive regimes in Nigeria have been too weak and unable to ensure the physical safety of citizens against organized attacks by criminal gangs and during sectarian violence (Isa, 2012). For instance, in recurring outbreaks of ethno‐religious violence in various parts of the country like Kaduna and Jos, dozens, hundreds and even thousands of people are often killed, injured, and displaced under the helpless watch of officials of different Nigerian regimes. Given these contexts, there is a general and profound sense of disenchantment and even desperation among an army of unemployed, poor and aggrieved citizens who sometimes show their resignation by leaving the country or opting for a range of criminal activities. In the absence of structured or effective institutionalized support systems, state officials (acting independently) and non‐state actors (including religious and ethno‐religious leaders) often intervene to ameliorate human sufferings. Some also maneuver to cultivate loyalties that are often used to pursue objectives that are not in line with official state preferences (Onapajo, 2011: 9). Alluding to the significant (and growing) security threat of organized groups ‐‐ especially Boko Haram ‐‐ and the inability of the state to assure the personal safety of its citizens, the leader of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) reportedly advised Nigerian Christians to defend themselves against Boko Haram ‐‐ a clear confirmation of the systematic failure of the state to tackle such security challenges. It is within the context of state failure that the human needs theory takes form. A defining principle of the theory is that a primary cause of lingering violence is people’s quest to secure their unmet needs. It is apposite, therefore when analysts conclude that the relatively high level of poverty in north‐eastern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is based, disposes people to violence (Adibe, 2012). While there is merit in this position, the overall estimation of this paper is that the audacity of the Boko Haram sect can be best understood within the comprehensive framework of state failure in Nigeria. Explaining the Boko Haram Phenomenon In order to understand the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in line with the thrust of this paper, it will be germane to first explain the Boko Haram phenomenon in terms of its identity, grievances, modus operandi,, membership, leadership, and adversaries. The name Boko Haram is derived from the combination of the Hausa word boko, meaning book, 99
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria and the Arabic word ‘haram,’ meaning something forbidden or sinful. Boko Haram conjoined literally means ‘book is sinful’, but its essence is that, as with all sins, western civilization should be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009: 9). Boko Haram’s ideological frame is remarkably straightforward: the West and its globalizing influences are the most serious threats to the survival and prosperity of Islamic cultural values. The sect has been associated with various names such as the Muhajirun, and Nigerian Taliban. Dubbed derogatorily as ‘Nigerian Taliban’ by some local people who disagree with the group’s philosophy and teachings, there is no concrete evidence of formal links with the Afghan group despite clear indications of their ideological propinquity (Onuoha, 2011: 8). The group is also referred to as Yusufiyyah, which suggests the movement of Yusuf – the founder of the group – by the public. However, the most reliable of all identities given to the group is that emanating directly from it in a February 2011 release in Maiduguri, Borno state, under the name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal‐Jihad (people of the tradition of the Prophet [SAW] for preaching and striving) (Abiodun, 2011). Of all the names, the sect prefers to be referred to as Jama ’atu Ahlissunnah lidda’ awati wal Jihad ’, which means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” Even so, it is by the ‘Boko Haram’ designation that the sect is widely known, and albeit the sect’s name may have changed over the years, its ideological mission is quite clear: to take over the Nigerian government and then impose Islamic Sharia law throughout the country. The exact date of the sect’s emergence is mired in controversy. According to Ujah (2009), Abubakar Lawan founded the sect in various guises around 1995 and later left Nigeria for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Gusau (2009) argues that the sect was formed in the University of Maiduguri as an evangelical group by Muslim students who generally felt dissatisfied with Western education. Contrary to the widely held view that the sect’s vendetta is against Western education, the ideology of the sect is centred on its opposition to the totality of Western culture upon which its educational system is based. In a statement allegedly released in August 2009, the acting leader of the sect Mallam Sanni Umaru argues that Boko Haram does not frown in any way at ‘Western education’ as the infidel media portrays. According to him, Boko Haram actually means ‘Western Civilization’ is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that they are opposed to Western‐styled education, which is not true, the second confirms their belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not 100
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education), for culture is broader and includes education (Vanguard, 26 March 2009). The sect’s membership cuts across the broad spectrum of social classes but a preponderant number of members come from the poorest groups. Thus, beyond former university lecturers, bankers, officers of Borno State (including a former commissioner), membership extends to drug addicts, vagabonds, university undergraduates and graduates, political elites, and migrants from neighbouring countries. It seems that although the one common denominator that binds all members is their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, the reservoir of poverty, the perception of social injustice, and the high level of youth unemployment in northern Nigeria combine to create the enabling condition for Boko Haram terrorism (Isola, 2009: 3). Those factors coupled with the ostensibly stolen election mandates, have led to a high and growing disillusionment with the Western system of governance, particularly among jobless young men who ascribe their hopeless conditions to the imposition of western education by a government that also has continued to mismanage national resources (McConnell, 2009). In terms of the leadership of the sect, Boko Haram was first led by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf until his death in the hands of the Nigerian security forces just after the uprising of July 2009. Prior to his death, Yusuf led the sect as its Commander in Chief (Amir ul‐Aam). Native to Girgir village in the Jalasko local government area of Yobe State, he was born on 29 January 1970. He had two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul‐Aam I & II). Each state where they exist has its own Amir (Commander/Leader), and each Local Government Area where they operate also has an Amir (Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009:14). Yusuf dropped out of secondary school but received Quranic education in Chad and Niger, where he was exposed to a radical ideology. He became known to the local people for his radical debates and ideas on Islamic issues expressed on local radio and television stations in which he often targeted Islamic scholars such as Abba Aji, Jafar Adam and Yahaya Jingir (Danjibo, 2009: 6). He also had little or no kind words for government and established political institutions. There was also Ibrahim Shekau, a devout follower of Mohammed Yusuf, who believed that an Islamic state was realizable through preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers (Suleiman, 2012: 41). Yusuf was said to have had hot arguments with Shekau over the 101
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria group’s modus operandi. Shekau had relentlessly advocated arms struggle for the group to actualize their objective. But Yusuf was said to have stood against any form of violence, saying it was against the teachings of Islam. But with the crackdown of the members by police and security agencies over seditious preaching of Yusuf, Shekau’s influence in the group began to grow, and counter‐violence was seen as the only alternative to save the group and advance its cause (Suleiman, 2012: 41). Given the foregoing, Boko Haram members withdrew what loyalty they had for the Nigerian state, and refused to obey the laws of the state as they considered such laws the outcome of Western civilization (Gusau, 2009). Several clashes soon ensued occasionally between the state and sect members. The first signs of Boko Haram insurgent activities came in its attack on the village of Kanamma, which was located about a mile from its camp. The group attacked local government installations and killed about 30 people on 29 December 2003. At the time, government forces estimated that Boko Haram consisted of some 60 members, and that all but seven were captured. Most probably, the purpose of the Boko Haram raid on Kanamma, which coincided with a raid on a police station in nearby Geldam, was to obtain weapons for further destabilization (Cook, 2011: 4). Boko Haram intensified its activities after this initial ostensible defeat. On 7 January 2004, seven members of the sect were killed and three were arrested while attempting to attack a police station with AK‐47 assault rifles in Dambo. On 23 September 2004, Boko Haram attacked police stations in Gwoza and Bama (in Borno state), killing four policemen and losing 27 members. On 10 October 2004, the group also attacked a convoy of 60 policemen at Kala‐Balge on Lake Chad, taking 12 of them hostage and presumable executing them. In response, the federal government dispatched military troops to attack them leaving several members of the sect dead (Bakare, 2009). The spark for full‐fledged insurgency came in July 2009 following intense confrontations between the group and Operation Flush, the Bauchi State enforcement agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing a newly introduced crash‐helmet law for motorcyclists in the country. The sect refused to adhere to the law and continued cycling without crash‐ helmets. This led to a violent clash in which 17 members of the sect were shot death and many others arrested. The police also ransacked the sect’s hideout in Bauchi state and confiscated materials for making explosives. The group’s response was to mobilize its members for a bitter attack that resulted in the deaths of several policemen and civilians. The riot was ostensibly quelled only after the capture and death of Mohammed Yusuf, 102
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the sect’s leader, and the arrest of some of its members (Gusau, 2009; Bakare, 2009). While the extra‐judicial killing of Yusuf was still generating strong criticisms from international and local commentators, one of the supposed financiers of the group, Alhaji Buji Foi, was also captured and executed in same manner just a few days later. In all, over 700 individuals were killed in the one incident. There appears to be ample evidence of atrocities and high‐handedness by government security forces that handled the incident. Indeed, a video footage released by Al‐Jazeera revealed wanton killings and gross human rights abuses perpetuated during the process by the Nigerian security forces (Aljazeera, 2009). With the death of their leaders and the mass killings and arrest of many of their members, Boko Haram retreated for a while only to resurface more fiercely on 7 September 2010 to free 721 prisoners, including approximately 100 members of their group. As a follow up, Boko Haram launched an attack on the police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011, killing at least 2 people. In August 2011, a series of attacks on police stations and banks by the sect’s members killed at least 16 people (Cook, 2011: 18). In their bid to avenge the violent deaths of their leaders and members, almost every other person and group outside the parameters of the sect fit into the mode of an enemy. In essence, the actual nature of state response – the extra‐judicial form, the share brutality used, and the disregard of accepted norms – appears to have served to further harden the resolve of Boko Haram members that their ideological message must be joined with force and violence if they were to achieve their stated objectives. Internationalization of the Boko Haram Impasse The peak of all Boko Haram’s previous attacks was the suicide attack carried out by Muhammed Abu al‐Barra – probably a pseudonym – on the United Nations complex in Abuja on August 26, 2011, killing 23 people (Cook 2011:19). The attack signaled a major shift toward the inclusion of international targets, as opposed to their previous focus on only Nigerian targets. Many fear that this attack may symbolize a stronger linkage with al‐Qaeda affiliates in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which also attacked UN offices in Algeria in 2007 (Ero 2011). This fear is not misplaced bearing in mind that Abul Qaqa, its purported spokesman, had made statements validating public concerns that Boko Haram may be 103
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria working with Al Qaeda. In fact, Qaqa stated on 24 November 2011 that the sect receives assistance from al Qaeda: “It is true that we have links with al Qaeda. They assist us and we assist them” (News24 2011). Anyway, the bomb attack on the UN complex was a boundary‐creating attack, designed to expel foreigners and the foreign influence epitomized by the UN presence in Nigeria. It was also clearly designed to demonstrate to Nigeria and the global community that Boko Haram’s goals were no longer local in nature, but that it had spiraled to instigate violence anywhere in Nigeria, and perhaps even beyond (Cook 2011:20). According to David Cook (2011), “while the attack on the police General Headquarters can be seen as a continuation of Boko Haramʹs fixation upon the Nigerian police and army, the United Nations attack is much more in line with other global terrorist organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August 2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency.” Meanwhile, Boko Haram has admitted to establishing links in Somalia. A statement allegedly released by the sect read, ”very soon, we will wage jihad...We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable...This time around, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been” (Zimmerman 2011). So conceived, it would not be hard to claim that the Boko Haram sect may be splitting into two, with one section focused on domestic issues and another on violent international extremism (Imo Herald, 28 August 2011). The attack on the U.N. headquarters also raises the important issue regarding the potential alliance between Boko Haram and foreign terrorist groups such as Al‐Qaeda and Al‐Shabaab. The Nigerian government reckons that the alliance is possible. In July 2009, after the upsurge of the Boko Haram radical uprising, the Nigerian State Security Service claimed that Boko Haram members were being trained in Afghanistan and Algeria by Al‐Qaeda. President Jonathan re‐echoed that view the day following the bombing of the UN building in Abuja when he declared that Boko Haram is a local insurgent group with links to other terrorist networks. But this has not been fully ascertained. John Campbell (former US ambassador to Nigeria) and Loannis Mantizikos (a Greek expert on radical Islamic movements) argue that there is no evidence of Boko Haram linkage to Al‐Qaeda (Adibe, 2012). However, the sect’s statement issued after the U.N. attack seems to make the link: “All over the world, the U.N. is a global partner in the oppression of 104
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believers. We are at war against infidels. In Nigeria, the Federal Government tries to perpetuate the agenda of the United Nations….We have told everyone that the U.N. is the bastion of the global oppression of Muslims all over the world” (Punch, 25 September 2011). Given the foregoing, the fear that Boko Haram may be linking with Al‐Qaeda affiliates in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may not be misplaced. But in the absence of any cogent evidence to corroborate the sect’s affiliation with Al‐Qaeda, it can be argued that the Nigerian government has a vested interest in presenting Boko Haram as having such a linkage for three reasons. First, it will make it easier to attract international sympathy and technical assistance from European countries and USA which are normally paranoid about any group rumoured to be linked to Al‐Qaeda. Second, linking Boko Haram to Al‐Qaeda will blunt criticisms against the failures of successive governments in Nigeria to tackle the malaise created by their persistent mismanagement not only of the national political economy but also the security challenge posed by Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants. Third, by linking Boko Haram to Al‐Qaeda the government may hope to use innuendos and name‐ dropping of US involvement to frighten the sect and help to pressure it to the negotiating table (Adibe, 2012). Nevertheless, the perceived link between the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria to Al‐Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al‐Shabaab is very troubling for most Nigerians and the international community. To be sure, the rapid evolution of Boko Haram may “point to the sharing of weapons and expertise among various terrorist organization across the African continent made possible by the porosity of the Nigerian borders” (Meehan, 2011: 13). Certainly, it appears that Boko Haram has membership connections in countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Sudan; and it is thought that the same countries serve as their weapons sources. The external connections seem to underscore the growing mobility and transnational nature of Boko Haram operations. Borno, which is the base of the Boko Haram sect, is a border state to Chad. With Nigeria’s borders largely porous, and given that Cameroonians, Chadians, Nigeriens, and Beninois can blend easily into local populations in Nigeria, unlawful movements and activities of non‐ citizens can go undetected by the country’s security forces. Indeed, such immigrants, especially Cameroonians, who were the followers of Mohammed Marwa, the Maitatsine leader, formed the bulk of the
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Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria Maitatsine fighters in the early 1980s (Fawole, 2008: 113).3 Despite the time gap between the Maitatsine uprising and Boko Haram terrorism, the socio‐economic conditions that sustained the uprisings in the 1980s are still relevant for the on‐going Boko Haram impasse (Adesoji, 2011: 106). Boko Haram, the Sharia Factor, and the North‐South Chasm in Nigeria A careful perusal of the annals of colonial history in Nigeria evinces the fact that the north‐south divide in Nigeria is a corollary of colonial policies. To recall, pressured by more resolute Muslim resistance to its authority, the colonial administration vested more resources in the south by establishing schools, constructing light industries, and exploiting primary commodities, to service the colonial project. Perhaps unintentionally, they created the basis for the impression that southern Nigeria is a custodian of western civilization as it became economically and educationally more developed than northern Nigeria. In addition, when Olusegun Obasanjo ‐‐ a southern Christian ‐‐ emerged victorious in the 1999 presidential elections, many northern political elites were embittered. Their response was to impose Sharia laws ‐‐ the Islamic legal code – “including its penalties of amputations and floggings, its strict code of sexual segregation. Local politicians, bereft of serious political programs, latched on to Sharia as an easy tool to win support from a population desperate for an end to years of frustration, corruption, and more than anything else, hopelessness” (Maier 2000:144). The initial implementation of Sharia enjoyed mass popular support in northern Nigeria. The northerners were generally dissatisfied with their lot, having lost the political edge to a southerner. Consequently, they felt generally insecure given that, like other Nigerians, “they were victims of a corrupt and mismanaged system that led to widespread poverty and apathy” (Sanusi, 2007: 185). With a Christian southerner as president of the
The Maitatsine was a group of mostly foreign religious fundamentalists with a radical and violent ideology. They were led by Mallam Muhammadu Marwa, a Cameroonian who resided and operated in Kano and other northern cities. Due to his violent religious activities, the Kano state government attempted to expel him. This triggered a bloody religious uprising that claimed hundreds of lives in Kano and spread ripples to other northern states (Fawole, 2008: 103). 3
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country, they expected worse4. In this way, religion offered a sense of hope and an opportunity to improve their pathetic circumstances. Given this context, resistance (and violent activities, if needed) offered by Boko Haram becomes a more viable option. The election of President Goodluck Jonathan ‐‐ another southern Christian – in 2011 and the resulting electoral dispute by Muhammadu Buhari ‐‐ a Muslim northerner ‐‐ not only reveals graphically the north‐ south divide in Nigeria but also partly explains the callous activities of radical Islamist sects. There were ominous signs before the election – following a series of bomb blasts in several parts of the country ‐‐ that violence in Nigeria had not only changed but also would follow if the results did not favour the north. For instance, Buhari issued a warning of an “Egypt‐style” rebellion if the elections were not free and fair and directed his supporters to defend their votes. Further, he sent a clear signal to his supporters to take their protests to the streets by arguing that the courts could not be trusted to adjudicate the election results fairly and would be a waste of time (USIP 2011:2). Therefore, it is not surprising that since the election of Jonathan as President, the catalogue of the political sponsors of the Boko Haram terrorist sect expanded to include some disaffected northern politicians. Hence, coupled with its radical ideology and anti‐Western position, Boko Haram became “a tool for murderous expression of political embitterment and for making the country ungovernable”’ (Vanguard 13 February 2012). Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections, many Muslims reacted violently towards their Christian counterparts in northern Nigeria. In the three days following the 2011 election results, more than 800 fatalities were recorded – thus making it the most violent elections in Nigeria’s history. The political climate created by the elections was bound to fuel the activities of the Boko Haram sect that derives its existence from a fundamentalist religious ideology. Hence, there seems to be a direct connection between the political failure of a Muslim northerner (Buhari) in the 2011 elections with the stepped‐up activities of Boko Haram. The net result is the slow but
4
When the youth launched protests against President Jonathan’s election victory in May 2011, they set fire to properties belonging to the emir of Kano and VicePresident Namadi Sambo, who hails from Kaduna. Certainly, without a deliberate and determined development effort by the federal government, that anger is unlikely to dissipate soon.
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Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria steady growth of southern exodus from northern Nigeria. This has triggered isolated reprisal attacks against northerners in the south despite strong pleas by southern state governors and other leaders. It seems that as Boko Haram attacks continue, the exodus and reprisal attacks will merely serve to push Nigeria towards the brink of a civil war – an outcome that would not be out of line with the group’s objective (Ibelema, 2012). Boko Haram: Symptom of State Failure and Underdevelopment in Nigeria But what contextual factors actually sustain and facilitate Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria? In 2010, the United States Air Force released a study that suggested the likelihood that Nigeria will disintegrate by the year 2030. The study portrayed a picture that would culminate in a civil war, much like Lebanon in the 1980s and Somalia since the early 1990s (Kinnan, et al, 2011; Ibelema, Feb. 5, 2012). The study states that “while Nigeria has experienced civil war in the past, the ramifications of one in the 2030 time‐frame, given the importance of Nigerian oil to the world economy and easy access to advanced technology, would be much greater” (Kinnan, et al, 2011: 109). When this happens, “One can only imagine the impact on the world economy of the sixth most populated country on Earth – the most populous nation in Africa and a top 20 economy ‐suddenly collapsing and erupting into nationwide violence” (Kinnan, et al, 2011: 109). The findings of the U.S. study is not misplaced, neither is it unfounded, bearing in mind that Nigeria suffers from an appalling image crisis. The mention of Nigeria in many parts of the world stirs up images of bribery, corruption, nepotism, dishonesty, fraud, and all such vices. According to Dowden (2008: 445), “politics in Nigeria is a business career. Any politician who does not end up a multi‐millionaire is regarded as a fool.” In short, the state in Nigeria is seen as a national cake to be divided and subdivided among officeholders. As such, corruption has been regularized in Nigeria to the extent that it is the norm rather than an abnormality. For many Nigerians, it is viewed as the way the system works. In this way, corruption in Nigeria has moved from merely being shocking to being poisonous; “and Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is only slightly indisposed” (Achebe, 1983: 38). Clearly, Boko Haram cashes in on this enabling environment by laying the blame for the awful plight of most Nigerians ‐‐ especially Muslims and northerners ‐‐ at the feet of the country’s Western‐oriented and corrupt governments 108
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by arguing that a better future can only be achieved through adherence to Sharia law and embracing core values of their brand of fundamentalist Islam. Another important problem is the failure of the government to react effectively to the crisis. Over the years, successive Nigerian governments have dealt ruthlessly, rather than effectively, with the breakdown of law and order, or even the threat of such a breakdown. Examples abound including: the Gowon regimeʹs “land, air and sea operation” that targeted demonstrating students at the University of Lagos; the organised massacre of unarmed students at Ahmadu Bello University under Obasarjo in 1978, and again under Babangida in 1986; and of peasants in Bakolori in 1980” (Ibrahim, 1989: 69). Given the spate of the Boko Haram bomb attacks since 2010, President Jonathan admitted that the sect has infiltrated all the security agencies and the higher echelons of his administration. Certainly, his government’s handling of the situation has been a dismal failure, particularly due to the failure of security agencies – Nigerian Police Service, State Security Service, and office of the National Security Adviser (NSA ‐‐ to identify and infiltrate targets for the purpose of gathering and responding appropriately to intelligence information (Ejoor, 2012). Their recourse to unprofessional and unscrupulous use of force to deal with members of Boko Haram, serve not only to violate basic human rights principles but also to waste human and material resources and incite emotional responses (for revenge) from the group and, thus, to exacerbate the conflict (Abdulkadir 2009). There is also a perceived nexus between the Boko Haram insurgency and the development crisis in the northern region of Nigeria. Northern Nigeria is less penetrated by foreign trade and investment than the south. The region also lags behind on most indices of modernization such as access to health care, potable water, education, income, or infrastructural development. The wealthy in Nigeria are located in the southwest and the oil‐producing areas (Bienen, 1986: 120). The development crisis and modernization lag in the north is frequently attributed to the impact of Islam. Admittedly, agreements between British colonial authorities under Lord Lugard and the traditional Islamic rulers kept the Christian missionaries and their attendant schools, roads, and skills, at bay. Peter Kilby has rightly asserted that the north and south differ massively in the intensity of their desire for modern consumer goods and that these differences can be accounted for by the conservative influence of religion and the socio‐political system of northern Nigeria. The conservative Islamic mission of the northern leaders and their shunning (even barring) 109
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria of western education and the imperative of modernization (with later and less intensive engagement), have meant that “in the north the whole process of modernization – changes in the way of living, values, and skills, as well as directly material terms – has lagged behind that of the east and west” (Kilby, 1969: 32) Consequently, most residents in northern Nigeria, ‐‐ where Boko Haram recruits most of its members and operates ‐ live in extreme poverty. For instance, the Nigerian National Population Commission not only reports that northern states have very low levels of literacy with 58% illiteracy rates in Yobe and Bauchi states but also that 72% of children around the ages of 6‐16 never attended schools in Borno state ‐‐ the operational hotbed of the Boko Haram sect. (Vanguard, 6 July 2011). In Maiduguri, most residents live on less than two dollars a day. Given this context, the teeming, impoverished masses of the north seem to harbour a “quiet rage over their falling living standards, their lack of clean water, decent schools, health clinics and jobs” (Maier 2000:144). These problems and challenges have swollen the army of vulnerable people, whose disillusionment and impoverishment have made them easy targets and tools in the hands of religious demagogues like the Boko Haram leaders. The preponderance of unemployed youth and armed gangs like the Almajirai and Yan Tauri in northern Nigeria has made parts of the north such as Kano, Damaturu, and Maiduguri, hot spots for terrorist activities. In the main, many gang members resort to violence as a coping mechanism ‐‐ a tendency that became prominent during the structural adjustment years in the 1980s. Yan Tauri, which has a longer history and whose members are described as economic opportunists and professional mercenary soldiers who are prepared to offer their services to whomever hires them, together with the Almajirai, constitute a handy instrument, which could be used by anybody to instigate terrorism or civil disturbance (Albert 1997:285‐325; Dawha 1996:4‐14). Furthermore, northern Nigeria is especially lacking in skilled manpower. In terms of western education, the region still has the worst indicators in Nigeria, with literacy levels, enrolment rates and success levels in national examinations plummeting. In certain northern states, 70% of children do not see the inside of a classroom. Under‐funding by federal and state governments, decrepit educational institutions are producing graduates who are virtually unemployable. A growing number of young people, unable to find jobs, face a bleak future. The morass of the educational system is mirrored in the region’s Quranic schools (Bolujoko 2008). Many Muslim parents have long preferred such 110
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institutions, which include a moral content lacking in the Western‐style public schools. In Kano state, for instance, over 80 per cent of the 3.7 million persons between 5 and 21 years are estimated to attend some form of Islamic school, either exclusively or in addition to a state school. Many of these persons neither live up to their parents’ moral expectations nor develop the skill necessary for developing the region. With urbanization, increasing number of children are sent to schools far from their families, and millions of Almajiri children are required to beg for alms to pay for their upkeep. While this system is ostensibly designed to brace the children for tougher times and also inculcate in them a sense of empathy over the poor and needy, in a context of increasing poverty and unemployment, the system is open to abuse by political elites and religious demagogues who cash in on the vulnerability of these children to incite them for war, religious violence, and terrorism. Despite decades of military rule by leaders from the north, poverty and unemployment coupled with a lack of formal education, have driven the region’s bulging youth population toward violent extremism. Analogous to a plate of china, Nigeria remains crisscrossed by a myriad of stress cracks and fissures that are the result of the ethnic and religious cleavages spanning the country. If sufficiently stressed, this china plate will split or even shatter. The Boko Haram onslaught since 2009 typifies how the mismanagement of such pressure points can enliven and unleash centripetal forces that can threaten the state itself. Indeed, the escalating terror of Boko Haram is posing such huge challenges in 2012 that it will take considerable fortitude, wisdom and leadership on the part of the Nigerian leaders and citizens to avert civil war and the possibility of a splintered state. Conclusion: Cleaning the Augean Stable The foregoing analysis reveals a range of factors that have combined to lay the foundation for a rabid challenge to elite impunity and parasitic governance. They include: failure of the Nigerian political elite to forge a true national consciousness, endemic corruption, absence of a social safety net for the poor and unemployed, rampant gangsterism and weak security apparatus, pervasive underdevelopment in the north, ineffective judicial system, and ideological struggles within and between religions. As a group, those are the key contributory factors generating violent extremism in Nigeria (Sanusi, 2007: 184). As Adibe (2012) aptly notes, “there is a heavy burden of institutionalised sectional memories of hurt, 111
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria injustice, distrust and even a disguised longing for vengeance”. Thus to fight terrorism or sectarian violence effectively, the Nigerian government will need not only to eschew the ongoing efforts to externalize the problem but also to target the causal factors directly. There is a good chance that the chasm between the Niger Delta and the rest of the country will heal under the Jonathan administration, but the north and south appear to be two nations going in different directions as the developmental gap between them continues to widen. Clearly, Nigeria needs a leadership core that understands and appreciates not only the perils of socioeconomic marginalization but also that there is an active link between the Boko Haram violence and arrested development (Norbrook, 2011: 3). Importantly, priority should be given to appropriate reforms in the north where political and religious leaders dominate and shape the social structure in a way that serves to stifle education, restrict global and national engagement, and restrain economic opportunity and development. As the Muslim population in the north grows, the combination of traditional values will keep the restive youth in the conservative north primed for conflict against the more liberal south. These northern “have‐nots,” possibly radicalized and angry, will likely constitute a huge following of the Boko Haram sect in the years to come. To this end, reversing the economic and social degradation that has provided a fertile ground for extremism in northern Nigeria can be a first step in curbing the activities of the sect. A number of initiatives are possible in the short and medium terms for government action. For instance, efforts can be made to resuscitate the once‐thriving agricultural sector in the north which has been substantially dormant since the oil boom in the 1970s. If the Kaduna and Kano state governments can resuscitate their once flourishing textile factories, unemployment could be massively reduced in those states. In states where the Almajiris roam about in the street, the government can emplace policies to curtail their movements and confine them in the Koranic schools. Equally relevant in this regard is the need to set up viable civil society institutions that will promote democracy and rein‐in the excesses of political authorities in the north. Abuse of power is widespread in states such as Kogi, Adamawa, and Jigawa, where relatives of the governors have become the leading suppliers of services to their state governments. With regards to the security challenges in the country, a more robust, focused, pragmatic and dynamic approach is needed. This pragmatic approach would involve an urgent attention given to the security agencies in Nigeria, whose collective ineptitude must be associated with the success of Boko Haram 112
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in fomenting its terrorist activities. The incompetence and travesty of the Nigerian authorities were highlighted when the alleged mastermind of the Christmas Day attack outside the church at Madalla that killed 44 people soon escaped from police custody in suspicious circumstances. The police forces are simply ill‐equipped and too corrupt to handle any serious case of violence or insecurity in the country. The Nigerian military have also lost the confidence of the local population due to a culture of human rights violations. Therefore, it is relevant in this regard that the Nigerian government must invest in truly capacitating the security sector in terms not only of skills development in counter‐ terrorism and the use of force but also in their role as custodians of human rights and the ethical imperatives that govern professional security service. Consequently, the main variable in Nigeria’s future that will determine if the country succeeds as a democracy or fails as a state is the government’s ability to provide good governance. If Nigeria uses its national treasures and oil wealth properly, its people and institutions may yet prosper despite a weakened global economic climate. Nigeria’s future will be shaped by the ability and willingness of elected officials and their supporters to provide professional governance and security to Nigeria’s people while building solid infrastructure and diversifying the economy. Nigeria’s political success could be a model for all future democracies desiring to leave their corrupt civil‐military dictatorships behind. Political success creates conditions for economic progress. In Nigeria’s case, its failure could affect the entire world (Kinnan, 2011: 37). Clearly, efforts at reform must target key areas including: government transparency and accountability; transformation of the economy; strengthening of education; and reforms of the judiciary and the justice system. Special focus must be given to the crucial issues that shape economic and educational opportunities in northern Nigeria with an eye on achieving sustained redress. Collaborative projects such as the United States support programs for local and state governments should be vetted appropriately and optimized. The Nigerian government must also partner appropriately with the US, which has begun to engage Nigerian Muslims primarily through two programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the northern states of Bauchi and Sokoto (Meehan, 2011: 25). Finally, the recommendation offered by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) on the need for religious dialogue is equally useful. WANEP acknowledges that more than ever before religious 113
Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria leaders in Nigeria particularly Muslim and Christian leaders should reach out to one another with a new sense of purpose for unity, love for humanity, and peace. In this regard, religious leaders should go beyond making solidarity visits to the president and engaging the media with statements that mitigate tensions and anxiety. There is a need for them to work collectively to explore the opportunities for meaningful dialogue ‐‐ the only means towards finding a sustainable solution to the growing religious crises in the country. The Federal Government should be firm and have the courage and gravitas to prosecute any political office holder indicted as a supporter or accomplice to the Boko Haram sect. The institutions of the Federal Republic with a mandate to promote peace should take the leadership in the design of dialogue and joint problem solving approaches for engaging various levels of ethnic leaderships and groups in the country (WANEP, 2012). References Abdallah, Nurrudeen, M, 2011. Bad Leadership Brings about Insecurity: Senator Waku. www.gamji.com (accessed 28 November 2011). Abubakar, Aminu, 2011. ‘Boko Haram claimed responsibility for Killing more than Hundreds in Nigerian Bomb Attacks. http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/21/boko‐haram‐claims‐ responsibilty‐for‐killing‐more‐than‐100‐in‐nigeria‐bomb‐attacks/ Achebe, Chinua. 1983. The Trouble with Nigeria. Oxford: Heinemann. Adesoji, Abimbola, O. 2011. Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State. Africa Today 57(4): 99‐119. Adibe, J. 2012. Boko Haram: Symptom of Crisis in our nation building project. http://dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com content&view=article&i d=154323:boko‐haram‐symptom‐of‐crisis‐in‐our‐nation‐building‐project‐ i‐&catid=6:daily‐columns&Itemid=6 [Accessed 11 February 2012]. Al‐Jazeera, 2009. Nigeria’s Boko Haram Chief Killed. www//english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/07/2009730174233896352.ht ml (accessed 28 March 2011) Ambe‐Uva, Terhemba N. 2010. Identity Politics and the Jos Crisis: Evidence, Lessons, and Challenges of Good governance. African Journal of History and Culture 2(3): 42‐52.
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Bakare, Waheed, Ademola Adedeji and Hammed Shobiye. 2009. Islamic Militant Leader Killed – Borno Government. The Punch (Lagos), 31 July, 5. Best, S, 1999. “Nigeria: The Islamist Challenge: the Nigerian ʹShiiteʹ Movement”, Searching for Peace in Africa. Accessed 24 March 2012 on http://www.conflict‐ prevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=1 Bienen, H. 1985. Political Conflict and Economic Change in Nigeria. London: Frank Cass. Bolujoko, Sally N. 2008. Education and Human Capital Development in Northern Nigeria, paper presented at Conference of Northern States Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (CONSIMA), Abuja, 7 October 2008. Chabal, Patrick, and Daloz Jean‐Pascal. 1999. Africa Works: the Political Instrumentalization of Disorder. Journal of Asian and African Studies. Clapham, C. 1982. Private Patronage and Public Power. London: Frances Pinter. Cook, David. 2011. ‘The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, CTC Sentinel, September 2011, pg. 4. Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria, N.D. 2009. Boko Haram Tragedy: Frequently Asked Questions. Minna: DCCN. Danjibo, D. N. 2009. Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The “Maitatsine” and “Boko Haram” Crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. Debiel, Tobias. 2002. Fragile Peace: State Failure, Violence and Development in Crisis Regions. London: Zed joor, T. 2012. Taming Boko Haram. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/taming‐boko‐haram/. [Accessed 11 February 2012]. Englebert, Pierre, and Denis Tull. 2008. Post‐conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States, 1‐34. Ensign, Margee. 2012. ‘Religious tolerance in Nigeria: A View From the North. www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com content&view=article&i d=152935:religious‐tolerance‐in‐nigeria‐a‐view‐from‐the‐ north&catid=6:daily‐columns&Itemid=6 (accessed 24 January 2012)
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Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria Ero, Comfort. 2011. Bombing in Abuja: On Nigeria’s Boko Haram. crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west‐africa/nigeria/op‐eds/bombing‐in‐ buja.aspx (accessed 26 December 2011). Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. State‐Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. New York: Cornell University Press. Global Trend 2025. N.D. 2008. A Transformed World, i‐99. Gusau, Isa, U. 2009. Boko Haram: How It All Began. www.dailytrust.com/sunday/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic le&id=825:boko‐haram‐how‐it‐all‐began‐&catid=3:people‐in‐the‐ news&Itemid=110 (accessed 29 March 2011). Haruna, Muhammed. 2011. Stemming Nigeria’s Descent into a Failed State. www.dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com content&view=article&i d=148772:stemming‐nigerias‐descent‐into‐a‐failed‐state&catid=6:daily‐ columns&Itemid=6 (accessed 1 December 2011). Ibelema, M. 2012. Will Nigeria Splinter in 2030 … or Sooner? Punch 5 February. http://www.punchng.com/columnists/punchwise/will‐nigeria‐ splinter‐by‐2030‐or‐sooner/. [Accessed 10 February 2012]. Idris, Hamza, and Ibrahim, Yahaya. 2011. Boko Haram Widows, Orphans Abandoned in Pains. www//sunday.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti cle&id=5823:boko‐haram‐widows‐orphans‐abandoned‐in‐ pains&catid=44:feature&Itemid=28 (accessed 30 March 2011). Ifeka, Caroline, 2010. War on Terror: Africom, the Kleptocratic State, and under‐class Militancy in West Africa‐Nigeria. Concerned Africa Scholars 25: 30‐49. Ifeka, Caroline. 2010. War on Terror: Africom, the Kleptocratic State, and under‐class Militancy in West Africa‐Nigeria. Concerned Africa Scholars 25: 30‐49. Imo Herald, N.D. 2011. Boko Haram: It is now an International Issue, US, UN. www.imostate.blogspot.com/2011/08/boko‐haram‐it‐is‐now‐ international.html (accessed 20 October 2011). Isa, M . K . 2010. Militant Islamist groups in Northern Nigeria. In Militias,Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa, edited by W. Okumu and A. Ikelegbe. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies. ISVG, N.D. 2011. Boko Haram. www.vkb.isvg.org/Wiki/Groups/Boko Haram#cite note‐2 (accessed 21 January 2012).
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