Can Filipinos Destroy Political Dynasties?

CAN FILIPINOS DESTROY POLITICAL DYNASTIES?

ATTY. MICHAEL HENRY LL. YUSINGCO, LL.M

TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE I.

Corrupting Local Governance 1. Of Political Dynasties and Local Term Limits – MindaNews, March 5, 2015 2. The Toxic Brew of Federalism and Political Dynasties – Mindanao Times, December 9, 2014 3. Are Filipinos ready for federalism? – Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2015 4. Are local leaders ready for federalism? – The Daily Guardian, April 24, 2015 5. Incorporating bayanihan in local governance – Politics for Peace, July 14, 2015 6. Commencing federalization even before Cha-Cha – The Daily Guardian, August 19, 2015

II.

Fostering Centralization of Government 1. 2. 3. 4.

A culture of dependence – Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2015 De-Centralizing Executive Power – MindaNews, June 5, 2015 Should politicos stop 'pleasuring the president?' – Rappler, June 7, 2015 Are we essentially electing a dictator? – Mindanao Goldstar Daily, May 29, 2015 5. What we want to hear from Binay, Roxas, et al – Edge Davao, December 23, 2014 6. Reject these 2016 presidential wannabes – Rappler, June 16, 2015 III.

Suppressing People Power 1. Diagnosing pathologies in the 1987 Charter– Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 2015 2. Pope Francis, Mamasapano and civic constitutionalism – MindaNews, February 14, 2015 3. Sure way to break up PH political dynasties – Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 11, 2015 4. Political dynasties vs. Political rights – MindaNews, August 11, 2015 5. Can Filipinos destroy political dynasties? – Halalan 2016, June 4, 2015 6. Rethinking Political Dynasties – Mindanao Law Journal Issue No. 5, 2013

PREFACE “Counterflowing drivers are no better than corrupt politicians who forgo the public good and think only of what's good for themselves. This breakdown of respect for others or at the very least "hiya" displayed by the jeepney and truck driver to the Mercedes Benz owner just shows us how weak our sense of community and nationhood has become. It has become so pervasive that no one even reacts anymore. Palampasin na lang. Pagpasensyahan na lang. I do not know anymore who is worse -- the impunity of counterflow and corruption, or the meekness of everyone just watching all these wrongs happen.” -

A Facebook post dated August 13, 2015 by Professor Ronald U. Mendoza, Director of the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center

It is an accepted fact that political dynasties control the Philippine political system. I have been studying and writing about this problem for the past two years. And one thing is certain, majority of Filipinos concede the country’s political system is controlled by traditional political families. A Sydney Morning Herald piece in 2012 fittingly called the latter “dynasty in steroids”. The novel feature of this compilation is that I have organized my published works here in such a way that would narrate the underlying theme of my research on political dynasties─ that its continued existence gravely undermines the Constitutional mandate of establishing local autonomy in the country. Political dynasties are actually proscribed in the Philippine Constitution. This is very clear in Section 26 of Article II which reads as follows: “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” However, the phrase “as may be defined by law” has sustained the prevailing belief that actualizing this prohibition necessarily depends on an anti-political dynasty legislation. Unfortunately, the fact that as of the last reckoning at least 75% of legislators in the Philippine Congress belong to political dynasties flatly prevents the enactment of this law. (See Table 1 below) The senator primarily responsible for this task is even quoted to have said that although anti-political dynasty bills have been filed, “all it got was lip service from members of Congress, many of whom did not want to touch the measure with a tenfoot pole for obvious self-preservation of family clan members who have occupied various elective posts in government.”

Table 1 Share of Dynastic Legislators in Parliaments for Selected Countries Philippines

75%

India

24%

Greece

10%

Thailand

42%

Mexico

40%

Japan

33%

Ireland

22%

Argentina

10%

United States

6% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Notes: Data from Dal Bo et al. 2009 (United States); Rossi 2009 (Argentina); Asako et al. 2015 (Japan and Mexico); The Hindu 2014 (India); Thananithichote 2013 (Thailand); Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou 2015 (Greece and Ireland); and AIM Policy Center 2013 (Philippines). For India and the Philippines, dynastic relationship includes the legislator’s relatives who were also incumbent officials. For Greece, dynastic relationship was determined by family ties to a previous or incumbent legislator. For the rest, dynastic legislators were identified by their kinship to previous legislators.

While there is presently no enforceable legal definition of political dynasty, I believe most Filipinos will concur with the way it was described by the prime mover behind the inclusion of its prohibition in the 1987 Constitution, esteemed legal scholar Jose N. Nolledo, to wit: “In the Philippines, I think it is known to everyone that a person runs for governor; he becomes a governor for one term; he is allowed two re-elections under our concept. Then he runs for re-election; he wins. The third time, he runs for re-election and he wins and he is now prohibited from running again until a lapse of another election period. What does he do? Because he is old already and decrepit, he asks his son to run for governor. In the meantime, he holds public office while the campaign is going on. He has control; he has already institutionalized himself. His son will inherit the position of governor, in effect, and then this will go to the grandson, et cetera. The others who do not have the political advantage in the sense that they have no control of government facilities will be denied the right to run for public office. Younger ones, perhaps more intelligent ones, the poorer ones, can no longer climb the political ladder because of political dynasty.

It seems to me that the public office becomes inherited. Our government becomes monarchical in character and no longer constitutional.” [Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p731 (September 17, 1986)] In light of the Nolledo description above, it is immediately perceptible that political dynasties adversely impact local governance. Indeed, in some cases dynastic families have captured the local government structure itself. An anomaly aptly described as “clan-inclusive government”. The current make-up of the local government of the Dinagat Islands is a good illustration of this odious governance scenario. Presently, the Governor and ViceGovernor, three Mayors, and four local council members in this province all come from one bloodline, the Ecleo clan. The first part of this book is comprised of think-pieces which discuss how these dynastic politicians undermine the decentralization effort in the country. The vital role that local governance plays in nation-building is particularly wellestablished. According to the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Authorities issued by UN-HABITAT─ “Political decentralization to the local level is an essential component of democratization, good governance and citizen engagement”. However, the status quo in the Philippines paints the contrary picture. A respected political commentator articulates the dire situation so poignantly this way─ “In the 1970s, there was only one dictatorship in the country: the Marcos dictatorship. Today, we have many “small dictatorships” in the form of political dynasties.” The concentration of local government authority in a single family has two notable results. First, accountability in office is no longer a standard for public service for blood relations would expectedly trump over the public’s demand for checks-and-balance amongst officials in local government. Obviously, when this happens unabated graft and corruption infects local governance itself. In fact, according to the latest report from the Office of the Ombudsman, the most number of corruption indictments filed in 2014 were against officials of local governments. The second effect of dynastic dominance in local government is the steady deterioration of the quality of leaders being elected to office. One political commentator lamented that meritocracy in governance is actually “dying at the hands of political dynasties.” According to Colombian academic, Pablo Querubin, in Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines, political elites in the Philippines are so entrenched in their dominant position they have become essentially insulated from political competition. Sadly, being in this station of privilege and impunity for so long has led to the inculturation of a myopic and parochial governance frame of mind. Clearly

demonstrated by the local politico who can only be bothered by short-term projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her supporters. And worse, as local communities continue to suffer inept and corrupt dynastic leaders, those who can and are willing to push for reforms but do not have the inherited political advantage are effectively denied the right to run for public office because of the “monarchical” character of local government. Indeed, Filipinos who are more qualified, passionate and patriotic, including many from the youth ranks, are unfairly deprived of the opportunity to establish clean and effective local governance. Both these outcomes have become the bane to the socio-economic progress of local communities in the country. According to a groundbreaking study on political dynasties by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center in 2012—lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the districts governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty. The more alarming development is that the fattest dynasties—those with the most number of family members in elective office—are actually ensconced in the poorest parts of the country. (See Table 2) Table 2

Note: Data obtained from Philippine Statistics Authority.

Such a chokehold of local dynasties on local governance brings to bear serious doubts on our country’s readiness to shift to a federal form of government. There is a very real fear that enhancing local autonomy with political dynasties still having their way in local government will prove disastrous for local communities. Increasing local authority can further entrench these traditional families in their positions of power thereby condemning many Filipinos in perpetual misery. The last two articles in this section suggest reform measures to overcome this particular trepidation. The second part of the book takes off from this anxiety over the country’s federalism aspirations. My articles here focus on how dynastic politics actually fosters the centralization of government, in direct contravention to the constitutional command to decentralize. This section elaborates on the debilitating “political umbilical cord” to Malacañang, which according to former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. was already severed by the Local Government Code in 1991. But actually kept pulsating with life by the very lifeblood of political dynasties, patronage politics. Unfortunately, this patently unbreakable conduit between Malacañang and local dynasties from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi also facilitates the President’s omnipresence in all matters of government from agriculture to zoning. Indeed, this could be the very reason why decentralization has not produced the level of development in the country as envisioned by the esteemed former lawmaker. With such an anomaly in mind, the last two articles in this section can function as a handy guide for Filipinos in the forthcoming Presidential elections. In fact, I expect the overall reform narrative expressed in this book to help voters to be more critical in evaluating those aspiring for public office. The theme of the final and third part of this book launches from this culture of patronage pervading in Philippine politics. This section contains my written works which shed light on how the reign of political dynasties actually suppresses the Constitutional principle enshrined in Section 1 of Article II─ “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” This “people power” tenet in the Constitution is an indispensable requirement for good governance. Its veritable absence in the Filipino’s civic consciousness is particularly crippling to the current local autonomy regime and absolutely fatal to our nation’s political culture. The discussion here commences with the fact that while family dynasties were an integral feature of pre-colonial society, powerful clans emerged in leadership roles during this era underpinned by a social contract. They enjoyed the advantage of such an elevated social status but also assumed the role of protectorate of the community. And it was incumbent upon them to exercise good leadership for to do otherwise may cause their removal from their privileged position.

However, a review of the country’s colonial past has unravelled the loss of two extremely valuable indigenous political traditions. First, the fundamental belief that rulers have the duty to exercise good leadership in order to keep their privileged position in the community. Second, the core principle that it is the community that holds the power to choose its ruler and no one else. These losses are critical because modern political dynasties actually sprung out from this void in our political culture. Indeed, the Filipino polity has for a very long time now neglected to wield the innate power they possess over those who must lead them. A situation which has allowed political clans to run rampant with abusing elected office. Local communities have somehow been easily manipulated to leave its future in the hands of a political dynasty, with the latter using the electoral process to legitimize their hold on this power. For how else can authority be held by 55+ families for such a long period within the democratic context, if not for the inaction and apathy of the electorate? The painful truth is Filipinos have forgotten that sovereignty resides in them. And most important of all, government authority emanates from within their ranks. Therefore, the answer to the query as to whether Filipinos can destroy political dynasties must be─ WE HAVE TO! The alternative scenario is absolutely dire and unthinkable. The phenomenon of political dynasties is not unique to the Philippines. In fact, the frontrunners in the forthcoming US presidential election are politicos with pedigree (i.e. Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush). And interestingly, neighboring Indonesia has recently “legalized” the place of political dynasties in its electoral process. But as demonstrated here, political dynasties in the Philippines have become a debilitating hindrance to the country’s national development aspirations. The link between dynastic politics and all the country’s problems (from Metro Manila’s appalling traffic woes to Mindanao’s unconscionable power outages) is very easily established. The unchallenged reign of these “small dictatorships” all these years has pushed the Philippine political system down to rock bottom. With the vast majority of Filipinos receiving the brunt of this severe and painful decline. Moreover, it should be clear to all of us now that political dynasties actually flourish because of this nationwide misfortune. According to respected political pundit, Lila Ramos Shahani, herself a bona fide member of a political dynasty, dynastic politicians “thrive on inequality”. To put it bluntly, political dynasties are fundamentally predisposed to keep Filipinos poor and powerless on account of the inherent desire to solidify and perpetuate their hold on power. Hence, our first priority in the struggle to get out of this hellhole is to destroy political dynasties. I must note however, that political reform entails a very long and arduous process. The eradication of dynastic politicians from the socio-political landscape is only the initial step.

However, given the high stakes involved now such as the overhaul of the current local autonomy regime, with the end view of transitioning to a federal structure of government, I must emphasize that our customary “Palampasin na lang. Pagpasensyahan na lang.” attitude is no longer acceptable. A positive development on this front is the categorical recognition by President Benigno Aquino III in his valedictory State of the Nation Address of the urgency of passing an Anti-Political Dynasty Law before his term ends in 2016. In fact, last August 3, 2015, I attended a meeting of a group of political scholars and commentators (some of whom are cited in my works) who were aiming to mobilize a media strategy to consolidate efforts compelling Congress to enact such a legislation before the present session adjourns on May next year. Pertinently, the goal was not just to pressure lawmakers to enact an anti-political dynasty law without delay but also to motivate the general public to actively participate in the clamor for one. In this regard, it is worthy to note that youth leaders all over the Philippines joined forces last August 19, 2015 to announce the Youth Manifesto Urging Congress and the President for the Immediate Passage of the Anti-Political Dynasty Law. Ostensibly, this admirable act proves that the revolutionary spirit is still alive amongst our young. I believe however, that even if all these efforts fail to motivate legislators to enact an anti-political dynasty law sooner rather than later, it still would not be a total waste. At the very least, the extensive media activities can generate enough interest within the electorate to parlay the anti-political dynasty advocacy as a major campaign issue in the 2016 Presidential election. So that even though the one elected to the top post in the land will most likely come from a traditional political family, he or she will assume the office knowing fully well that there is already brewing public disdain for political dynasties.

Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, LL.M Melbourne, Australia September 2015 N.B.: All the tables used in this piece have the permission of the Asian Institute of Management – Policy Center.

PART I CORRUPTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE Of Political Dynasties and Local Term Limits MindaNews, March 5, 2015 The rationale for the imposition of a specific time frame for elected office was best expressed by a member of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) which drafted the 1987 Constitution. Mr. Edmundo G. Garcia made the following argument during the debates on this very particular issue— “I know that some of us here have been in politics for a long time and I do not wish to offend them. But I simply think that there should be no special caste of professional politicians. It should not be a life-time profession or a career, but rather an opportunity for public service to be broadened to as great number of people and there should be no effort to accumulate power. Accumulation of power, at one time, really brings about the desire to accumulate more, and rather than providing a structure or a setup which strengthens this trend, the alternative must be to provide structural safeguards for this kind of practice. Therefore, I would not subscribe to more than one reelection for Senators and more than two reelections for Representatives or local officials.” [See Journal Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Two, July 24, 1986, p219.] Obviously, the rule on term limits was conceived to be a “safeguard” against the propensity of local elected officials to accumulate political power during (and even beyond) their term in office. It was envisaged to be a mechanism to prevent the creation of a “special caste of professional politicians” or in current parlance, political dynasties. I do not know where Mr. Garcia is today but I bet he would be very upset to know that the rule on local term limits has actually failed to prevent these very contingencies. Indeed, all of the ConCom members would be profoundly flabbergasted to see that the imposition of term limits itself has motivated politicians to use members of their family to circumvent this rule. This ploy is impressively described with accuracy by the Colombian academic, Pablo Querubin, in an article published in the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies last October 2011 entitled, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines— “In the province of Bukidnon, Jose Zubiri Jr. served in congress between 1988 and 1998. Upon reaching his term limit, his son Juan Zubiri took his seat in congress. Jose successfully ran for governor in the 2001 election. After his victory, two members of the Zubiri family were in power in Bukidnon. In 2007, Juan reached his term-limit in congress. However, unlike the Romualdo family (illustrated in Figure 2), Juan did not switch offices with his father. Instead, his seat in congress was taken by his brother Jose Zubiri III and Juan became a senator. With three members of the Zubiri family involved in politics, the family had managed to increase its sphere of influence despite term limits. In short, these examples underscore that the response and adaptation of

dynasties to term limits may enhance the political power of these families as their scope of influence increases both in terms of the number of family members involved in politics and in the number of elective offices controlled.” Indeed, traditional politicians have found a way to beat the three-term limit set forth in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution by employing the revolving door scheme amongst family members. Concomitantly, they have also expanded the reach of their political power by establishing a public governance syndicate described by respected Mindanao civil society activist, Guiamel Alim, as a “clan-inclusive government”. The said phenomenon is unequivocal proof that the three term limitation for local elected officials has actually facilitated the least desirable result for our political system—the unabated reign of political dynasties. This is indeed a clear demonstration of a dire pathology in the 1987 Constitution. Needless to say, local term limits must be a major consideration in any projected constitutional reform project. However, such a realization also brings with it a clarion call for immediate action. Implicit in the Querubin article cited here is the reality that political dynasties have stunted the development of Philippine democracy. It should be obvious now that Filipinos are still held hostage by the culture of patronage that sustains traditional political families. And according to a groundbreaking study on political dynasties by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center in 2012—lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty. Indeed, it would not be a huge leap to conclude that the continued dominance of political dynasties is the very root cause of all our country’s problem. Hence, its eradication should be the foremost concern of every Filipino wherever province, city, municipality or barangay he or she may be found. March 5, 2015 ─ MindaNews http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/03/05/commentary-of-politicaldynasties-and-local-term-limits/

The Toxic Brew of Federalism and Political Dynasties Mindanao Times, December 9, 2014 It appears that the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) has inspired a renewed vigor among local leaders in Mindanao to push for the shift to a federal form of government. What is interesting here is the call for the shift to be immediate as if this undertaking was as simple as changing outfits. Obviously this is not the case. For many of the states with the federal form of government, such as the United States, Malaysia, Australia and Germany for instance, federalization was actually a state-

building effort. These countries each began as loose collections of disparate sociopolitical entities but gradually transformed themselves into a unified nation-state through the process of federalization. In our case, it would essentially be the reverse. And thus we face a much harder and more complicated version of federalization. One that entails a significant length of time and also demands the exertion of a tremendous amount of effort from all of us. However, I am most alarmed with the presumption of purported advocates of federalism that our local leaders are fit and ready for this form of government. They immediately harp on the perceived disparity in revenue-sharing with the central government to justify the shift without even touching on the readiness of local leadership in the country to assume the big responsibility of local governments under federalism. Note that one of the most important lessons in the BBL discourse is the realization about the ARMM as a failed experiment. The lesson being—increasing the autonomy of local levels of government ultimately amounts to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and incapable to properly utilize the expanded powers and resources. Indeed, with the exception of a notable few, it is difficult to be confident on the ability of our local leaders to formulate and implement long-term and far-reaching development objectives. In fact, the over dependence of local government executives on the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and the continued existence of central government largess such as the PDAF and DAP point to the conclusion that the development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of sophistication necessary to sustain federalism. But the biggest indicator that the quality of local leadership in our country is still below par as far as federalism is concerned is the prevalence of political dynasties. The problem here was poignantly articulated by respected Mindanao civil society activist, Guiamel Alim, in a speech delivered at the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao seminar-workshop in Hiroshima, Japan last June 23, 2014: “Political Dynasty and clannish social structure in the Bangsamoro is a big challenge to democracy where the doctrine of check and balance is most often than not set aside. Change politics will always be challenged by the “business as usual” norm. Political dynasty, while it is true everywhere in the country, is more pronounced in the Bangsamoro where you see practically the whole clan running the government in local government unit. I call this clan political enterprise or clan-inclusive government. In many instances, local politicians are the most resistance to change.” Now consider the key finding in the 2012 groundbreaking study on political dynasties by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center that lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty. One cannot help but conclude that federalizing under these conditions would be tantamount to condemning these communities to perpetual poverty. I still maintain though, that the change to a federal form of government is a constitutional reform we can all rally behind. But we have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that instituting federalism in our country is as easy as turning on a light switch. Indeed, our foremost task right now in the pursuit of this goal is to lay the foundations

and we do that by improving the quality of local leadership. On this score, federalism advocates can help the cause by actively pushing for the enactment these particular pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Party Development Act of 2014. Ostensibly, there are other ways of uplifting the standards we have for our governors and mayors as well as enhance their capacities to be effective community leaders. Nevertheless, these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural reforms that could instigate drastic improvements to the way local governance is currently conceived and delivered. However, I must emphasize too that the transition to federalism also requires the elevation of the electorate to a higher level of political consciousness. The prevailing culture of patronage, which is the lifeblood of political dynasties, must be addressed head on. The best way to commence with this task is to abandon the populist approach some sectors are wont to adopt. The obvious danger here is that rhetoric and soundbytes, while may be good for catching the attention of media, could caricaturize the effort and thus diminish its potency to convince the vast majority in the polity. I would instead suggest to proceed with a clinical and academic approach. The advocates of federalism, whoever they may be, must create an environment that is conducive to the integration of the polity rather than its fragmentation. Indeed, they must oversee a process that facilitates the circumspect and level-headed discussion and debate on federalization between all sectors of the community. Because federalism is not just a political framework, it is also a frame of mind. December 9, 2014 ─ Mindanao Times http://mindanaotimes.net/peacetalk-the-toxic-brew-of-federalism-and-politicaldynasties/

Are Filipinos ready for federalism? Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2015 The campaign pushing Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte to run for president in 2016 rides on the advocacy for the Philippines to shift to a federal form of government. But supporters of the extremely popular mayor seem to think that the shift can happen easily, as if it were as simple as changing outfits. Unfortunately, this is not the case. For many countries, such as the United States, Malaysia, Australia and Germany, federalization was actually a state-building effort. Each began as a loose collection of disparate political entities that gradually, and with painful upheavals, transformed themselves into a unified nation-state through the process of federalization.

It would essentially be the reverse in our case. Consequently, we face a much harder, more complicated, and possibly harsher version of federalization. It is thus disconcerting that purported advocates of federalism seem oblivious to the gravity of this sociopolitical reform. They quickly harp on the promise of enhanced local autonomy without even considering the readiness of the local leadership to assume the big responsibility of local governments under federalism, as if the fitness of the current crop for this form of government were already a given. Note that one of the most important lessons in the discourse on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law is the recognition of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao as a failed experiment. The lesson being: Increasing the autonomy of local governments will ultimately amount to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and incapable of properly utilizing expanded powers and resources. In fact, the overdependence of local government executives on the Internal Revenue Allotment and the continued existence of central-government largesse, or pork barrel funds, signify the stark reality that the development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of sophistication necessary to sustain a federal government structure. Political dynasties constitute the unequivocal proof that the quality of our local leaders is still below par as far as federalism is concerned. According to a groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center in 2012 titled “An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress,” lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by political dynasties. It would thus not be unfounded to conclude that federalizing with political dynasties still firmly entrenched in power would actually condemn the affected communities to perpetual poverty. It would certainly be justified to be concerned that federalizing with the quality of local leadership still at an untenable state would only make socioeconomic development more inequitable than it is. With these trepidations in mind, it is indeed very difficult to conceive of Filipinos as primed and ready for federalism. Still I maintain that the switch to a federal form of government is a constitutional reform that we can all rally behind. But we have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that the switch will be as effortless as turning on a light switch. Indeed, the primary task in the pursuit of this goal is to improve the quality of local leadership. Ardent believers of federalism can actively push for the enactment of these pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Party Development Act of 2014. There are other ways of uplifting leadership standards for our governors and mayors. Nevertheless, these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural reforms that can instigate drastic improvements to the way local governance is currently conceived and delivered.

However, I must emphasize, too, that the transition to federalism also requires the elevation of the electorate to a higher level of political consciousness. First and foremost, Filipinos must have a clear understanding of what this massive sociopolitical undertaking entails. And the best way to commence with this task is to abandon the populist approach that some supporters of federalism are taking. The obvious danger here is that rhetoric and sound bytes, while good for catching the media’s attention, could make a caricature of the advocacy and thus diminish its potency. I suggest a clinical and academic approach that would facilitate a circumspect and level-headed discussion on federalization among all sectors of Philippine society. Accordingly, I envisage a community congregation organized for such a purpose through the barangay-assembly apparatus and moderated by genuine promoters of federalization. Admittedly, dissecting the intricacies of federalism does not exactly fall within the powers of the barangay assembly under the Local Government Code (LGC). But this mechanism is still the most convenient way to gather ordinary citizens and give them the opportunity to speak out and be heard. After all the LGC itself considers the barangay a “forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered.” The desired result is for all Filipinos between Batanes and Tawi-Tawi to see themselves not as passive observers in the sidelines but as continuing stakeholders in the establishment of federalism in the country. March 13, 2015 ─ Philippine Daily Inquirer http://opinion.inquirer.net/83276/are-filipinos-ready-for-federalism#ixzz3ijnmypfQ

Are local leaders ready for federalism? The Daily Guardian, April 24, 2015 IF FREQUENCY of elections is the only benchmark for democracy, the Philippines would have no parallel. The election for local officials in our country is held every three years on account of the rule on term limits set forth in the Constitution. However, this democratic mechanism has given rise to three major constraints on local development planning which negatively impacts the aspiration to establish a federal form of government. First, the three important local planning bodies, namely the local chief executive, the local development council, and the sanggunian, cannot establish administrative continuity within the local government structure because of the frequent changes in political leadership. The corresponding administration turn-over rate has made any form of long term development planning practically impossible.

Second, local leaders have acquired the proclivity for quick-gestation projects. Strategic development formulation is grossly limited by a benefits-now paradigm such that undertakings that require an extended time frame, even if it will produce more socio-economic benefits for the community, almost always never see the light of day. Third, local officials very often yield to populist demands and avoid difficult but necessary reforms. And in conjunction with the inclination to come up with development ideas with instantaneous effect, these very same ideas are often dictated by the need to be re-elected. Meaning, local officials have selfishly linked the mandate for development to the burden of pleasing their followers. This electoral arrangement has grown to the extent that urgent and critical reforms that will benefit the public at large are ignored if they will cause discomfort and displeasure to voters. Indeed, the sad by-product of the triennial local electoral system is the local official who only has a short-sighted development outlook and therefore can only be bothered by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her constituents. Or in other words, most likely the one currently holding office in the kapitolyo and munisipyo. Ostensibly, this incapacity to formulate a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive local development plan is the unarticulated reason that justifies the discretionary funds (DAP and PDAF) that Malacañang and Congress cling to so dearly. And sadly, the continued existence of these “pork barrel” funds signifies the stark reality that the development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of sophistication necessary to sustain a federal government structure. Furthermore, this budgetary mechanism effectively underpins the unbreakable attachment of local public officials to central government largess, or the political relationship we all know as political patronage. This is the most abhorrent feature of our political system because it is the life source of political dynasties. Suffice to say, political dynasties constitute the unequivocal proof that the quality of local leadership in our country is still below par as far as federalism is concerned. For according to a groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center in 2012 entitled, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress—lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty. Of course, there is no skirting the most important realization in the discourse on the Bangsamoro Basic Law; that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is a failed experiment. The lesson being—increasing the autonomy of local levels of government ultimately amounts to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and incapable to properly utilize the expanded powers and resources.

It is definitely unwise to proceed with federalization with the quality of local leadership still at an untenable state. It is certainly justified to be concerned that federalizing with political dynasties still comfortably lording it over local communities would make socioeconomic development more inequitable than it currently stands. With the foregoing trepidations in mind, the approach to federalism ought to be revisited. Indeed, the most urgent task right now should be the recalibration of the development mindset of our local public officials with the view towards improving the quality of local leadership in the country. Accordingly, ardent promoters of federalism can help the cause by actively pushing for the enactment these particular pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Party Development Act of 2014. Note that these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural reforms that could instigate drastic improvements to the way local governance is currently conceived and delivered. Unquestionably, this is a much better and surer way to commence the federalization process. April 24, 2015 ─ The Daily Guardian http://thedailyguardian.net/index.php/iloilo-opinion/52029-are-local-leaders-ready-forfederalism

Incorporating bayanihan in local governance Reposted at the website of Politics for Peace, July 14, 2015 Not all assertions of unconstitutionality against the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) can be accepted as absolute truth. Actually, some claims really necessitate further examination. For instance, the contention of Senator Bongbong Marcos in his privilege speech on the BBL last June 3, 2015 that, a “parliamentary form of government within a presidential form of government” runs counter to the Constitution because, “There is no constitutional basis for this effort to change the form of government.” Acts are determined to be unconstitutional because they violate a specific provision in the Constitution. Acts which are not sanctioned nor prohibited by the Constitution or by specific legislation are generally considered permissible acts. An act which is described as simply having no “constitutional basis” with no other specific disqualification would likely fall under the latter category. Hence, Senator Marcos’ view that creating the Bangsamoro Parliament is an unconstitutional act ought to be reconsidered. Furthermore, shifting to a parliamentary local government structure similar to the “leader-and-cabinet model” used in the United Kingdom and Australia is actually a

positive reform measure that should be seriously considered. I have witnessed firsthand how its underlying philosophy of collective governance can be an asset to local development planning. I attended a community meeting organized by the local council of a suburb in the State of Victoria in Australia. The agenda of this gathering was a proposed development plan for a “Civic Precinct”. One item in the draft master plan particularly caught my attention: “The current community effectively holds public facilities in trust for the future. This Civic Precinct should remain an important place for generations to come. To do this it is important to identify the most valuable parts and ensure their continued relevance to the community. It requires an investment in design quality –consistent with the investment made in the past– and a long term outlook.” This effort from the said local government clearly manifests a development paradigm that is underpinned by a sense of community stewardship. The words “in trust for the future” and “for generations to come” cannot convey this point any clearer. Sadly, this type of governance mindset is a rarity amongst our local executives. Traditional political families have manipulated the current presidential-type model to such an extent that the fate of the local government itself has become highly dependent on the person holding the gubernatorial or mayoral office, who most likely is always a member of their bloodline. And according to the groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center in 2012, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress, lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty. The reason for such a grim outcome is the fact that dynastic politicians can only be bothered by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her own supporters. It would be really hard to find local executives who hold office “in trust for the future” or “for generations to come”. I submit that an effective countermeasure against such a parochial and dynastic local governance mindset is to incorporate that sense of community stewardship in the local government structure itself. Interestingly, a parliamentary framework may not be that foreign an idea given that collective governance is actually an indigenous tradition. During the pre-colonial era, the notion of governance was premised on the preservation of the community. The datu was expected to protect his people from their enemies and safeguard their way of life. More importantly, a datu’s ability to retain his position as chief of the barangay depended highly on his performance as a leader. Notably however, there was always a council of elders beside the datu to help him govern.

The alternative local governance structure can therefore be configured to reflect this pre-colonial convention. So instead of a mayor governing in opposition to a legislative council like the current model, he can be mandated to govern in collaboration with the council. There are two changes involved here. First, the position of vice-mayor must now be removed. And second, local governance at the city and municipal level becomes a collective and collaborative effort of the mayor and the council with executive and legislative functions now merged. This pre-colonial tradition of collective governance can also be applied at the provincial level. According to esteemed historian Fr. Horacio de la Costa, S.J. in his book, Asia and the Philippines, strong datus ruled with the collaboration of other chiefs who gave support to one another. Indeed, important decisions were always made by consensus amongst the datus. So again instead of the governor governing the province in opposition to a provincial legislative council and institutionally disconnected to the mayors of the component municipalities and cities of the province, he can be mandated to govern in collaboration with this latter group. Two changes again in this regard. First, the position of vice-governor and provincial board members are eliminated. And second, the governance of the province becomes parliamentary in nature with the governor as head and the council of mayors as his cabinet. Governance of the province also becomes a collective effort with executive and legislative functions now merged. As a corollary to this restructuring, the mechanism of sectoral representation can be further enhanced in the local “cabinet” to widen and deepen community participation in policy formulation and implementation. Indeed, according to the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Authorities issued by UNHABITAT, local governance should “involve an appropriate combination of representative and participatory democracy.” In sum, shifting to a parliamentary form of local government should not easily be dismissed precisely for these foreseeable benefits. First, streamlining the available political positions makes electoral competition tougher. This could potentially disturb political dynasties in their comfortable status. Second, because local governance would be underpinned by a sense of community collectivism, development planning at the local level can be more coordinated and coherent. Of course, the ultimate hope for institutionalizing a collective governance framework in local government is to establish that sense of stewardship or the bayanihan spirit as an enduring influence in local development. So that everyone in the community will always believe that progress is not just for us now, but also for the generations to come. July 14, 2015 ─ Reposted at the website of Politics for Peace http://politicsforpeace.com/blog/174-incorporating-bayanihan-in-local-governance

Commencing federalization even before Cha-Cha The Daily Guardian, August 19, 2015 THERE SEEMS to be a prevailing notion that a "super-politico" is needed to make federalization a reality. Such a messianic outlook stems from the belief of proponents and followers in this very popular reform movement that shifting to a federal structure of government absolutely requires charter change. I concede that restructuring the current form of government would require Constitutional revision. But the process of federalizing can actually commence now under the current Constitutional regime. According to a noted expert on federalism, Professor Cheryl Saunders from the Melbourne Law School, in a paper entitled, Options for Decentralizing Power: Federalism to Decentralization, the functions of government can be decentralized in various ways. And federalism is just one example of a decentralization arrangement among a spectrum of arrangements establishing greater or lesser degrees of local autonomy within a nation-state. Pertinently, our Constitution does not actually mandate a specific decentralization arrangement (See Section 3 of Article X) but actually authorizes Congress to define the structural mechanics of local autonomy. It is therefore only reasonable to expect that lawmakers can already start laying down the foundations of a federal structure of government by incorporating federalist principles in the current decentralized unitary structure. Accordingly, as a staunch advocate of federalism, I believe the cause will be strengthened further by pushing for the incorporation of these three fundamental tenets of federalism in the Local Government Code (LGC) as building blocks to a federal governance framework. First, the allocation of responsibilities between the central and local governments must be clear and coherent. This is not exactly a pioneering innovation given the work done in the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Therefore, the only task required here is to come up with a broader national arrangement that exhibits this streamlined division of government labor. The point to remember here is that the devolution of functions has to be re-formulated in such a way that the assignment of accountability is unequivocal. We do not want a distribution scheme that would also leave everybody clueless as to which government office can be held answerable for our dissatisfaction. Neither do we want overlapping designations that would also allow government agents to pass the blame for failure to deliver public services to our satisfaction. Second, the local government structure must reflect a collective approach to local governance. The current model has to be replaced because local political families

have exploited the LGC to ensure the fate of the local government is highly dependent on the person holding the gubernatorial or mayoral office. This shameless manipulation of the current decentralization arrangement has actually further entrenched the patronage relationship between the local executive and his constituency. Thereby allowing local politicos to enjoy an unhealthy and corrupting prominence in local governance. An effective countermeasure against this pattern of patronage in local politics is to integrate a sense of community in the administration of the kapitolyo and the munisipyo. The local leadership structure itself must be configured to facilitate the collective governance mindset among the local constituency. An example of such would be a parliamentary type of configuration similar to the “leader-and-cabinet model” used by local governments in the United Kingdom and in Australia. As a corollary to this restructuring, the mechanism of sectoral representation can be further enhanced in the local “cabinet” to widen and deepen community participation in policy formulation and implementation. Third, mechanisms must be established to foster cooperation and collaboration among the local governments in addressing national concerns. One solid truth about the process of federation is that it does not diminish the integrity of the state. For example, the governing body of the current National Economic and Development Authority could be re-organized to be comprised of provincial representatives appointed by the governor for a fixed term. However, for this office to effectively function as the national congregation of the various communities in the country, it should not be a mere advisory council. It should be designed to have legitimate policymaking functions as well. Indeed, federalization is not just about the devolution of political and fiscal powers to the sub-national level, but it is also about clearly defining a shared responsibility between the two tiers of government for shaping the future of the whole country. This idea is already reflected in Section 2 of LGC where it is explicitly expressed that “the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.” It is truly unfortunate that the current local autonomy regime in the country is afflicted with a slew of institutional defects. The overlapping and confusion of government functions, the debilitating influence of local dynasties in the management of local government, the myopic and parochial approach to development, just to name a few. All of which have ultimately led to the failure of both levels of government to effectively and efficiently deliver essential public services. A determined federalist advocate would definitely be pushing for the necessary reforms mentioned here. According to Professor Saunders, the designation of the decentralized arrangement is of no consequence. Rather, what is important is that the

design meets the needs of people of the state and that there is a shared understanding of the governance structure created and a shared commitment to making it work. In other words, there can be no excuse for not initiating the federalization process now because the more fundamental elements of the shift to a federal form of government can be accomplished by simple legislation. Indeed, the lesson to be emphasized here is that we should not be deterred by the popular view of the Constitution as a seemingly immovable hindrance to federalization. Moreover, the intransigence of those who blindly insist on the constitutional argument against federalizing now can be interpreted as unwillingness to let go of advantages gained from the current structure, which is still too centralized on Malacañang. August 19, 2015 ─ The Daily Guardian http://www.thedailyguardian.net/index.php/iloilo-opinion/55150-commencing-withfederalization-even-before-cha-cha

PART II FOSTERING THE CENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT A culture of dependence Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2015 It is a painful irony that the Local Government Code (LGC) has provided a legal platform for a culture of dependence to persist among local executives. According to noted legal scholar Romeo Raymond C. Santos, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for local governments has bred a “dole-out mentality” among local officials. Most, if not all, governors and mayors have in fact become extremely reliant on the IRA as their primary source of funding for development initiatives despite other means of raising revenue available under the LGC. In a subtle way, the IRA has allowed the central government, through the Office of the President, to maintain its dominance over the local governments. But the more troubling corollary of this anomaly is that local leaders continue to accept the convention to be constantly deferential to the president, thus allowing patronage politics, the longtime scourge of our political system, to continue unabated. Nowhere was this fact more evident than in a meeting called by then President Gloria Arroyo on Oct. 11, 2007. This meeting with local executives in Malacañang was ostensibly to discuss matters pertaining to development projects. A few days after the meeting, however, two governors revealed that they were each given a gift bag with half a million pesos in cash. A public uproar followed this revelation, with the demand that Arroyo explain why her office was handing out cash gifts to local officials. It was later admitted by a Cabinet official that the giving of cash gifts to local executives was normal practice in the Arroyo administration—an apparent standard operating procedure to keep her allies at the local level on a tight leash. Sadly, this subservient relationship is sustained further by programs instituted in good faith by current central-government officials who, by all accounts, truly believe in the principle of local autonomy. The Performance Challenge Fund set up by President Aquino, for instance, essentially allows him to give monetary rewards to local executives who in his view have done a good job. Whether by design or inadvertence, programs such as these create an environment that, instead of fostering among local leaders an independent-governance frame of mind, encourages them to be dependent on the good graces of Malacañang. ‘Political umbilical cord’ It is not hard to see that the debilitating “political umbilical cord” to Malacañang— which, according to former senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., was severed by the LGC—

actually continues to pulsate with life. This is the reason decentralization has not produced the level of development envisioned by the esteemed former lawmaker. The challenge, therefore, is to find a way to reconfigure the relationship between the president and local executives in order to minimize, if not remove, the undermining influence of Malacañang in the implementation of decentralization under the LGC. First and foremost, the prevailing view that local governments are mere agents of the central government must be changed. The more appropriate civil-law analogy is that the central government and local governments are partners in governance. To institutionalize this new paradigm, Malacañang and Congress must work toward a meaningful implementation of Section 14 of Article X of the Constitution: “The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.” The current Regional Development Plan (RDP) has essentially no imprimatur to discipline local executives regarding their mandate for local development. This is clearly implied in the plea of the National Economic and Development Authority director for local governments to align their development initiatives (if any) with the RDP drawn up by the pertinent regional development council (RDC). To be a truly effective development mechanism, the RDC should be organized in such a way that it functions as a continuing presence in the region which supports and coordinates with the constituent local governments. Its task should not be limited to occasional consultations with local executives. It should be given the clear mandate and the right resources to bring all the relevant local officials in the region together and come up with a viable RDP. Economic framework The outcome contemplated here is not simply a collection of suggested policies. Rather, it is an economic framework for the region which the constituent local governments are obliged to implement. This is the only way the RDC can truly fulfill its constitutional function to “accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region.” But more critically, a genuinely robust regional development mechanism can provide a modicum of cohesion in national development planning. It can result in the clear identification and designation of development expenditures that can minimize, if not eliminate, the need to allocate for discretionary funds (i.e., the Priority Development Assistance Fund and the Disbursement Acceleration Program). Meaning, it can destroy the very life-source of this culture of dependence.

Secondly, congressional oversight over local governments must be strengthened. A strong oversight function can be a potent mechanism not just to monitor the implementation of the LGC but also to serve as a public forum where local executives are obliged to demonstrate their aptitude in the performance of their functions. Their insufficiencies, whatever these may be, can be exposed and properly dealt with by their constituencies. More importantly, the oversight committee can also be a forum for local executives to assert the prestige of their autonomy from central authority. This can be the platform for governors and mayors to showcase their significant role as partners of the president in national development. Either way, the constant grinding from Congress will eventually churn out a generation of local leaders free of this pathological dependence on Malacañang. The culture of dependence still thriving among local leaders despite the LGC is a serious hindrance to the Philippines’ development aspirations. After all, this is the virus that allows political dynasties to flourish. The onus is now on the electorate to keep this pathology in mind when evaluating Binay, Roxas, or whoever else in 2016. June 13, 2015 ─ Philippine Daily Inquirer http://opinion.inquirer.net/85793/a-culture-of-dependence#ixzz3ijpmiTus

De-Centralizing Executive Power MindaNews, June 5, 2015 As the electorate prepares for the 2016 elections, I propose that we rethink the rationality as well as the practicality of a government framework wherein the delivery of public services, from revenue collection to urban housing, all intersect at the Office of the President. We have known for years that Malacañang’s strong influence in all matters of government is the very life-source of political patronage. Indeed, many of us will have a story to support this assertion. However, my clear favorite would be the meeting called by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on October 11, 2007. This gathering with local executives inside the Palace was ostensibly to discuss matters pertaining to development projects. A few days after the meeting however, two provincial governors revealed that they were each given a gift bag with half a million in cash. There was a public uproar following this revelation, demanding the President to explain why her office was handing out cash gifts to local officials. It was later on admitted by one of her cabinet secretaries that the giving of cash gifts to local chief executives had been a normal practice in the Arroyo administration. Probably, to keep her allies at the local level on a tight leash.

This subservient attitude is not the exclusive domain of local officials. Indeed, we are often witness to the medieval-esque tradition of cabinet officials treating their tenure in government as serving at “the pleasure of the President”. A sad excuse commonly used by embattled officials to fend off frenetic calls to resign. We heard these words quite regularly during the term of President Macapagal-Arroyo. It is certainly plausible that the debilitating “political umbilical cord” to Malacañang, which according to former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. was already severed by the Local Government Code in 1991, still actually pulsate with life. For this could be the reason why decentralization has not produced the level of development envisioned by the esteemed lawmaker. The challenge therefore is finding a way to re-configure executive authority in order to minimize, if not remove, the hovering influence of Malacañang in the overall administration of government. There are two ways to accomplish this and the first one is constitutional reform. South Korea’s executive structure in its constitution is worth emulating here. Article 66 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea explicitly provides that “Executive power shall be vested in the Executive Branch headed by the President.” The other members of the Executive Branch are the Prime Minister (see Article 86) and the Supreme Council (see Article 88). The most notable difference in the South Korean model is that executive power is given to an institution and not to a person. Moreover, under this framework, the exercise of executive power is diffused because the same is technically held by three persons. And therefore the responsibility to manage government is accordingly distributed. The fate of the nation’s affairs does actually not revolve around a single person. The second way is structural reform through legislation. Congress can help relieve the chokehold of Malacañang over government administration by institutionalizing the involvement of the community in the various offices in the executive branch. In other parts of the globe, non-government sectors of the polity now play an increasingly important role in designing and executing policies and services. The fact is some public goods are best delivered by decentralized specialist agencies that are managed by public servants with the appropriate specialized skills set. This kind of governance structure is actually reflected in the organization of the Monetary Board (MB) where five of the seven members come from the private sector. Here at the very least, the public can reasonably expect that five people in the MB will not just have the proper expertise but will also be assuming the office without the usual “baggages” accompanying a person officially attached to Malacañang. It does make me wonder why this governance model has not been replicated at all. In fact, the “long hand of Malacañang” model is still the standard governance structure for government agencies and offices. Consider for instance Republic Act No. 9003 which created the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC).

Under Section 4 of this law the NSWMC shall be under the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. Believe it or not, this commission is composed of 14 members from the government sector and only 3 members from the private sector. Of the 14, seven are officially considered the alter-ego of the President, three are under his supervision and control and four are local government officials under his general supervision. The private sector is represented by the following: (a) A representative from nongovernment organizations whose principal purpose is to promote recycling and the protection of air and water quality; (b) A representative from the recycling industry; and (c) A representative from the manufacturing or packaging industry. What is wrong with this set-up is self-evident. The people deeply involved in solid waste management are far outnumbered by people who are politicians by profession. How then can the public be assured that this office will function properly according to its given mandate? And I must point out that giving the community a direct line in managing the delivery of services could significantly weaken the leverage of politicians (i.e. Malacañang lackeys). This is a scenario which can disturb the culture of patronage in our political system and hence, diminish the influence of dynastic politicians in the administration of government. The ever increasing dominance of the Chief Executive in all matters of government is the bane in our political system that urgently needs to be remedied. It has stifled political and economic development in the country. It has even undermined the Constitutional mandate to promote local autonomy. I believe voters would be very keen to hear how this challenge of de-centralizing executive power is addressed by Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for Malacañang in 2016. June 5, 2015 ─ MindaNews http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/06/05/commentary-de-centralizingexecutive-power/

Should politicos stop 'pleasuring the president?' Rappler, June 7, 2015 The phrase “I serve at the pleasure of the President” is the common retort used by embattled Cabinet officials to fend off frenetic calls to resign. We heard these words quite regularly during the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. A few years back former Customs Commissioner Ruffy Biazon was bombarded with resignation demands after his name was dragged into a malversation indictment arising from the PDAF scandal. Expectedly, he initially insisted that presidential appointees serve at the pleasure of President Noynoy Aquino.

He later on relented saying, “but I also believe that public officers serve with the trust of the Filipino people” and tendered his irrevocable resignation. Sadly, this lone act of delicadeza did not portend a new governance frame of mind in the executive branch. Indeed, most politicos that have passed through the halls of Malacañang do not possess this organic sense of shame when their performance in office is challenged. Notably, this “pleasuring the President” dogma has found its way in legislation. For example, under the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, “The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the Department's powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary, who shall hold office at the pleasure of the President." Correspondingly, creative legalists from the executive ranks have traditionally asserted that this “pleasuring the President” principle fundamentally means that they hold their posts at the complete sufferance of their boss. Thus transforming this legal notion into a chronically abused excuse to cling on a little bit more to one’s office. And in most cases, much to the displeasure of the public. Clashing principles It can certainly be argued that this conventional view contradicts the republican and democratic principles the Philippines ascribes to. Specifically, in Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution which states that government authority emanates from the people. Hence, once these officials assume their executive posts, the public expects full devotion to the constituency of their mandate and no longer to the person who extended their appointment. Accordingly, it is only reasonable, for example, to expect from the Secretary of the DILG that he will champion the autonomy of local governments. Unfortunately, experience has instead shown that past DILG secretaries are more adept at devising schemes to utilize local leaders to serve the interests of the president. However, the most objectionable aspect of this “privilege” within the executive branch is that it allows cabinet secretaries and other officials of similar stature, indeed the very people tasked to manage public interest portfolios, to deflect demands of accountability. By allowing them to assert the prerogative of pleasuring the President first and foremost, they are in effect relieved of the obligation to justify their actions (or inaction) to the people. This is of course an absolute travesty because a public office is a public trust. Meaning, all public officials, including the President, serve at our pleasure above all else! Furthermore, the delegation involved here certainly does not mean setting aside ethics and common sense. Indeed, when public trust is breached, then the holder of the office is morally and rationally obliged to relinquish the position. This move should not be treated as an admission of guilt but plainly as heeding the people’s lack of confidence on the public official concerned. Clearly, the “pleasuring

the President” dogma must lose its purchase when the people’s displeasure and disapproval have been sufficiently articulated. 'Public trust' Sadly, this idea of performing public duties to pleasure the president is firmly entrenched in our political culture because it is actually anchored on how executive power is defined here. According to the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Marcos vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211- October 27, 1989): “The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.” The bitter irony is that those terrible years under the Marcos dictatorship should have jolted our heads not to give too much power to a single person. And yet Sections 1 and 17 of Article VII still do exactly that. Needless to say, the aforementioned characterization of Malacañang prestige by the Supreme Court dispels any question at all on the sublime authority of the President over the executive branch of government. Indeed, the durability of the “pleasuring the President” mindset despite its blatant dictatorial underpinnings is just one of the many pathologies in our Constitutional begging for reform. At this juncture, South Korea’s executive structure in its constitution is worth noting. Article 66 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea explicitly provides that “Executive power shall be vested in the Executive Branch headed by the President.” The other members of the Executive Branch are the Prime Minister (see Article 86) and the Supreme Council (see Article 88). The most notable difference in the South Korean model is that executive power is given to an institution and not to a person. Moreover, under this framework, the exercise of executive power is diffused because the same is technically held by 3 persons. And therefore the responsibility to manage government is accordingly distributed. The fate of the nation’s affairs does actually not revolve around a single person. There is without doubt an urgent need to recalibrate attitudes about executive power. Obviously, there is no denying that Malacañang’s strong influence in all matters of government is the very life-source of political patronage. Patronage of course, is the very lifeblood of political dynasties. And the unabated reign of dynastic politicians is the very evil that sustains graft and corruption in our political system. And every Filipino knows from personal experience that graft and corruption in government is the biggest bane in our country’s development.

Therefore, the unhealthy practice of politicos performing their public duties at the pleasure of the President has to stop. But since constitutional reform remains to be elusive, then the onus is now on the electorate to keep this anomaly in mind when evaluating Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for Malacañang in 2016. June 7, 2015 ─ Rappler http://www.rappler.com/views/imho/95141-should-politicos-stop-pleasuring-president

Are we essentially electing a dictator? Mindanao Goldstar Daily, May 29, 2015 The fighting in the next presidential election has begun. In fact, an attempt is being made to frame the campaign battle between these two sides—the honest versus the experienced. Hopefully, as the discourse on the qualification of Presidentiables rolls along, the matter of membership in a political dynasty will be a hot issue for debate as well. But the sad fact is personality and patronage politics will still reign supreme in this political exercise. This is a particularly perilous reality because executive power is configured in our Constitution in such a way that the President practically functions like a dictator. Consider first Section 1 of Article VII on the Executive Department which states that, “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” Then read this in conjunction with Section 17 which provides that, “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” It is immediately noticeable in the very text of our Constitution how immensely powerful the office of the President is. But the sublime authority of the Chief Executive over virtually everything within the executive branch has been declared unequivocal by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Marcos vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211October 27, 1989)— “The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.” An interesting contrast is the way the Constitutional Court of Korea described the office of their President whose impeachment they overturned—

“However, the President is not an institution that implements the policies of the ruling party, but instead, the President is the constitutional institution that is obligated to serve and realize the public interest as the head of the executive branch. The President is not the President merely for part of the population or a certain particular political faction that supported him or her at the past election, but he or she is the President of the entire community organized as the state and is the President for the entire constituents. The President is obligated to unify the social community by serving the entire population beyond that segment of the population supporting him or her.” [Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case (16-1 KCCR 609, 2004HunNa1, May 14, 2004)] The characterization of our President is palpably tilted in favor of how powerful the office is rather than on the responsibility it carries. The South Korean perception of their President really goes the other way with its emphasis on the primacy of the duty of this position to the people and even downplaying its prestige. Indeed, it is quite possible that the difference in the way the office of the chief executive is comprehended is the very reason why there is a huge disparity between the economic developments of our two countries. Malacañang’s omnipresence in all matters of government is the bedrock of the culture of political patronage. Patronage of course, is the very lifeblood of political dynasties. And the unabated reign of dynastic politicians is the very evil that sustains graft and corruption in our political system. And every Filipino knows from personal experience that graft and corruption in government is the biggest bane in our country’s development. I must emphasize that there is no intention here to diminish the prestige or relevance of the Office of the President in the overall political order. I merely want to propose the diffusion of executive power with the purview of ensuring the efficient and effective delivery of public goods. I am only suggesting the re-designing, through simple legislation, of agencies and offices within the executive branch which could minimize, if not remove, the hovering influence of Malacañang in the delivery of public services. One way Congress can achieve this objective is by institutionalizing the involvement of the community in the governance structure of the office tasked to deliver a particular public service. The fundamental advantage I foresee here is giving the public having a direct line in managing the delivery of services to them could significantly weaken the leverage of politicians (i.e. Malacañang lackeys) to barter the public good concerned for favors or to gain votes. This is a scenario which could potentially disturb the pattern of political patronage in our political system. At the very least though, the involvement of the private sector and civil society groups could de-politicize, and maybe even professionalize, the delivery of public services thus making the process actually efficient and effective. There is without doubt an urgent need to recalibrate attitudes about executive power. But since the reforms contemplated here remains to be mere suggestions, then the onus is now on the electorate to keep in mind the dictatorial underpinnings of the Office

of the President when evaluating Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for Malacañang in 2016. May 29, 2015 ─ Mindanao Goldstar Daily http://goldstardailynews.com.ph/are-we-essentially-electing-a-dictator/

What we want to hear from Binay, Roxas, et al Edge Davao, December 23, 2014 It is almost guaranteed that 2015 will be a colorful year. One year removed from the biggest spectacle in Philippine politics, we are bound to witness a lot of braggadocio from those aspiring for residency in Malacañang. Certainly not beyond these folks to fictionalize their importance to the country. Some of them will even pontificate about God’s endorsement of their bid even as they tear each other down like ravenous dogs. Therefore, it is incumbent upon us, the electorate, to filter through the dirty noise. It would be good then, to remind ourselves of a passage from one of our national hero’s works, The Indolence of the Filipino— “The good curate,” he says with reference to the rosy picture a friar had given him of the Philippines, “had not told me about the governor, the foremost official of the district, who was too much taken up with the ideal of getting rich to have time to tyrannize over his docile subjects; the governor, charged with ruling the country and collecting the various taxes in the government’s name, devoted himself almost wholly to trade; in his hands the high and noble functions he performs are nothing more than instruments of gain. He monopolizes all the business and instead of developing on his part the love of work, instead of stimulating the too natural indolence of the natives, he with abuse of his powers thinks only of destroying all competition that may trouble him or attempt to participate in his profits. It matters little to him that the country is impoverished, without cultivation, without commerce, without, industry, just so the governor is quickly enriched!” The “governor” described above can be any one of those who have declared themselves fit for the Presidency. Precisely why Filipinos should be discerning in evaluating those aspiring for the country’s top job in 2016. We should reject the same old spiels on “uplifting the masses out of poverty” or “creating a strong republic” or “paving a straight road”. We should rebuff the rehashed story of being poor once or of being one with the poor. We should definitely spurn “soapbox pronouncements” that are only inspired by the news of the day and filled with spin and stop-gap measures. These are all catchphrases that may rouse our politics but they project absolutely nothing about our nation’s future. Voters deserve to know from these presidential aspirants the specific public policies they intend to translate into decisive action once they assume office. We want to hear a narrative that actually addresses the paramount concerns of all Filipinos.

For instance, our population now stands at a 100 million. Given the pressing global environmental concerns, food scarcity is a very distinct and frightening possibility. Therefore, we must insist that presidential candidates present a comprehensive food security plan. Food production and climate change is a curious mix. We expect our top leader to know what needs to be done to find the balance. Another fundamental concern with such a massive population is to decrease the number of the uneducated and the unhealthy. Hence, we want a firm commitment to establish a genuine comprehensive national public health management framework. But we want to hear the specifics beforehand. Again, we will no longer accept slogans or sound-bytes. And as far as improving our education system is concerned, promises of more classrooms and textbooks will not be enough. We want to hear a specific policy to uplift the quality of educators. We want to hear concrete ways to increase their pay and definite steps to enhance their training. Interestingly, while still on the topic of our massive population, recent economic reports indicate that the country is now a huge consumer market. And if forecasts about our economy are to be believed, market growth will still be on the upward trend. Accordingly, we want entrepreneurship in the country to expand but we also want the conduct of business to be socially responsible. Hence, we want to hear rational proposals from Presidentiables on creating a genuine and modern consumer protection framework without any of those burdensome regulations. We expect industries to be established that will make us competitive in the global economy. But we will never stand for exploitation of any form. Finally, it has also been reported that remittances from overseas workers is the key component of our growing economy. Past Presidents have hailed these fellow Filipinos as modern-day heroes. The most responsible act any government could do for this group is to make sure they can stay easily connected with their families back home. And yet our government does not seem to be bothered at all that our country has one of the slowest internet speeds in the world. It is disappointing as well that our airports continue to be appalling given that our economy is reliant on people who rely on this infrastructure. Hence, we also want to know of actual plans on putting our internet connectivity and all our airports at a world-class level. Both of these demands are imperative as matter of recognition to the contributions of overseas workers. But they can also be a big boost to tourism and domestic trade. Our politicians are truly an entertaining lot. But it is clear to us now that being good at speaking carabao English or being cute like Nora Aunor does not cut it anymore. And as we have recently learned, having a pedigree of honesty and nothing else, is simply not enough. We need to know that our next President has a viable action plan to implement for his term in office. Particularly regarding the socio-economic cornerstones mentioned above. Therefore, this caveat for all voters—a Presidentiable who fails to unveil one next year will most likely be another “governor” in Malacañang come 2016. December 23, 2014 ─ EDGE DAVAO http://www.edgedavao.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18845:w hat-we-want-to-hear-from-binay-roxas-et-al&catid=36:vantage-points&Itemid=55

Reject these 2016 presidential wannabes Rappler, June 16, 2015 Some presidential aspirants are now marketing their experience in local government as a premium qualification for the Presidency. Before accepting this claim as gospel truth, it would be good for the electorate to take a long pause and consider this fact. Since our country's rebirth in 1986, we have had only one president with extensive experience in local government. And we all know how utterly disastrous his short tenure in office was for all Filipinos. Actually, in principle being a mayor or a governor can be an on-the-job training of sorts for the highest post in the land. But the reality does not align with this logic at all for the sad truth is local government has always been a breeding ground for dynastic politicians. According to noted Colombian academic, Pablo Querubin, in an article published in the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies in October 2011, the threeterm limitation set forth in the Philippine Constitution for local elected officials has actually facilitated the least desirable result for the nation's political system – the unabated reign of political dynasties. Traditional politicians have found a way to beat the three-term limit by employing the revolving door scheme amongst family members. Thus, establishing at the local level a public governance syndicate described by respected Mindanao civil society activist, Guiamel Alim, as “clan-inclusive government." Sadly, such an adverse outcome has also led to the inculturation of the myopic and parochial governance frame of mind. Clearly demonstrated by the local politico who can only be bothered by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her supporters. Of course, such is the prototypical dynastic politician and most likely the one currently holding office in the kapitolyo and munisipyo. Therefore, voters should be extremely wary of possible presidential contenders propping up their local government credentials. In fact, in evaluating presidential candidates, it would be good for the electorate to reflect on this particular passage from one of our national hero’s works, The Indolence of the Filipino: "The good curate," he says with reference to the rosy picture a friar had given him of the Philippines, "had not told me about the governor, the foremost official of the district, who was too much taken up with the ideal of getting rich to have time to tyrannize over his docile subjects; the governor, charged with ruling the country and collecting the various taxes in the government's name, devoted himself almost wholly to trade; in his

hands the high and noble functions he performs are nothing more than instruments of gain. He monopolizes all the business and instead of developing on his part the love of work, instead of stimulating the too natural indolence of the natives, he with abuse of his powers thinks only of destroying all competition that may trouble him or attempt to participate in his profits. It matters little to him that the country is impoverished, without cultivation, without commerce, without, industry, just so the governor is quickly enriched!" The villainous "governor" described in the literary work can be any one of those who have declared themselves fit for the Presidency. In fact, two of our most recent Presidents have been perfect incarnations of this plunderer in Rizal’s opus. And sadly, one of the two also boasted of his extensive background in local government. Indeed, the only presidential candidate who deserves serious consideration from the electorate is the one who does not fit the profile of a dynastic politician. And it is a safe bet that he will display these two particular characteristics. First, he has an acute appreciation of the challenges we face today. Our population now stands at a little over a 100 million. And given the pressing global environmental concerns, food scarcity is a very distinct and frightening possibility. Food production and climate change is a curious mix. We should be able to rely on our most senior leader to know what needs to be done to find the right balance. Another fundamental concern with such a massive population is to decrease the number of the uneducated and the unhealthy. Hence, there will be a firm commitment to establish a genuine comprehensive national public health management framework from this presidential standout. And as far as improving our education system is concerned, promises of more classrooms and textbooks would no longer suffice for him. Additionally however, a worthy presidential candidate also has a keen eye on the future. Meaning, he must have a discernible long-term development perspective. Therefore, the same old spiels on “uplifting the masses out of poverty” or “creating a strong republic” or “paving a straight road” will not be heard during his campaign. His team would definitely spurn “soapbox pronouncements” that are only inspired by the news of the day and filled with spin and stop-gap measures. Because a viable presidential material is ready and willing to set economic building-blocks for future generations no matter how unpopular these undertakings may be. Second, a notable presidential aspirant would have the audacity and smarts to present to the electorate a detailed plan of action for his term of office. This program shall embody specific public policies which his administration will translate into decisive action once he assumes office. This documented action plan would demonstrate his acumen and determination to be the chief executive of the republic. At the very least, having such an itemized and comprehensive agenda for his tenure in the top job will distinguish him from conventional candidates who can only present political party platforms replete with

slogans and sound bites that say absolutely nothing about genuine economic development. To conclude, the caveat that must be raised here is that a presidential candidate's "pilgrimage to power" reveals a lot about him and about what he can do for the country. And understanding how to proceed from this knowledge is the most profound civic responsibility a Filipino will ever bear. However, recent experience has already taught us that a presidential candidate who is found wanting of the two vital leadership attributes mentioned above will most likely be another “governor” in Malacañang come 2016. June 16, 2015 ─ Rappler http://www.rappler.com/views/imho/96494-reject-2016-presidential-wannabes

PART III UNDERMINING PEOPLE POWER Diagnosing pathologies in the 1987 Charter Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 2015 The 1987 Constitution is considered one of the most enduring constitutions in the world because it has stood for 28 years without being amended. This is an odd quality considering that most scholars will agree that a constitution is never infallible or immortal even as they debate among themselves the ideal life span of a nation-state’s charter. But none of these experts will deny that pathologies in the constitution can emerge during its reign. These pertain to provisions in the text itself that may have been designed with good intentions for the polity but have eventually become debilitating to the political system it purports to govern. Our own 1987 Constitution is no exception. A very obvious one pertains to the quality of government that the republic should have. The Preamble is explicit about the Filipinos’ desire “to establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations.” Of course, a corollary of this goal is the intent “to prohibit political dynasties” (Section 26 of Article II). No need to elaborate here, but the current government framework certainly does not embody our ideals and aspirations while traditional elites maintain their chokehold on the political system. These two unfortunate realities clearly point to an anomalous area in the Constitution that begs to be addressed. Inquirer publisher Raul C. Pangalangan, a former dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law and recently elected judge of the International Criminal Court, proffered a more organic irregularity in an article published in the National Taiwan University Law Review [Vol. 4: 3, 2009], where he wrote about a “built-in contradiction between the economic and the governance clauses of the constitution.” According to Pangalangan, the Constitution’s passionately nationalist stand with regard to socioeconomic matters and its avowed protectionism against foreign interests seem to project a partiality for an “expanded state.” Yet in allocating governmental powers, a maze of check-and-balance provisions has been instituted to actually form a “shriveled state.” Essentially, the Constitution has established a schizophrenic state which is once again a sad reality that yearns for remedial action. Obviously, diagnosing pathologies in our Constitution is a huge task. And as House Speaker Sonny Belmonte himself has learned from his “economic amendments” debacle, mere determinations from politicians and interest groups, no matter how wellthought and presented, will not be credible enough for the general public. In fact, in order to produce an accurate and truly legitimate result, this process demands the ardent participation of the polity itself.

Constitutional scholars have long theorized that the active engagement of citizens in the constitution-writing process actually engenders a deep sense of investment for the establishment of rules and principles in the community. Furthermore, the people’s involvement in the drafting enterprise essentially lays the groundwork for a political culture of consultation and cooperation. Indeed, according to the United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes (April 2009), “Constitution-making presents moments of great opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state, the results of which can have profound and lasting impacts on peace and stability.” This collective approach in the constitutional project and its resulting benefits also holds true for constitutional reform. Therefore, the task of identifying the aspects of the 1987 Constitution that require remedial action has to be carried out via a widespread and substantial public consultation process. Issues such as expanded regional autonomy for Mindanao and the Cordillera, blanket prohibition on political dynasties, further economic liberalization, consolidation of social safety nets, electoral reforms, etc. must all be exhaustively threshed out by the people in this nationwide political exercise. The scenario I envision for this comprehensive “diagnostic” process is not at all complicated and implausible. I see members of a community congregating for this purpose via the barangay assembly apparatus. Admittedly, dissecting constitutional issues pertaining to good governance, economic prosperity, liberal democracy and social justice does not exactly fall within the powers of the barangay assembly under the Local Government Code (LGC). But this mechanism is still the most convenient way to gather ordinary citizens and give them the opportunity to speak out and be heard. After all, the LGC itself considers the barangay a “forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered.” Moreover, I envision representatives of law schools in the area assuming the role of moderator in these assemblies. I concede that this would be a daunting imposition on these academic institutions. But it is warranted under Section 5(a) of the Volunteer Act of 2007 which states: “Volunteerism in the academe includes, but is not limited to, provision of technical assistance and sharing of technology within the academic circle, target communities and other clienteles and the upgrading of the quality of education and curriculum methodologies while providing career enhancement and exposure to the volunteers.” The fact is law schools are the only institutions in the country where constitutional professionals, so to speak, are produced. Their knowledge in constitutional reform forms part of legal “technology” which they can share with the communities where they belong. Taking the helm in this task can only enhance the standing of participating law schools and can certainly be a big boost to their faculty and students. Ostensibly, the detailed mechanics of the sessions themselves shall be the responsibility of each law school involved. But the targeted output for each barangay

should be a position paper outlining the pathologies in the 1987 Constitution and the remedial action that must be undertaken. Indeed, the entire endeavor can be a good precursor to constitutional revision. Those position papers could all be formally endorsed to Congress and form the basis of a working draft that can initiate the amendatory process under Article XVII. But this undertaking can also function as a massive civic education campaign on constitutional principles for local communities. It is highly possible that after undergoing this cathartic political exercise, Filipinos from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi will begin to see themselves not merely as passive observers in the sidelines but as continuing stakeholders in the enforcement of constitutional rules and tenets. July 25, 2015 ─ Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://opinion.inquirer.net/87017/diagnosing-pathologies-in-the-1987 charter#ixzz3jDE3uZPW

Pope Francis, Mamasapano and civic constitutionalism MindaNews, February 14, 2015 February 2 came and went. Nothing special happened to commemorate Constitution Day. I suppose for this year this oversight is to be expected. Between the grand elation generated by the visit of Pope Francis and the deep sorrow caused by the loss of lives in Mamasapano, Maguindanao it is understandably difficult to pencil in a day just to contemplate the 1987 Constitution. Pertinently, these very significant events themselves can be good precipitants for reflecting on the country’s constitutional order. For going through this process involves both the academic examination of constitutional text and pondering on momentous events occurring within the polity itself. In fact, the ruminations of political commentators on the impact of the Pope’s visit and on the ramifications of the most recent tragedy in Maguindanao have unravelled valuable questions about the state of Filipino constitutionalism. Constitutionalism refers to the commitment to be governed by constitutional rules and principles. Therefore, the term civic constitutionalism used here means the capacity of citizens to live in the community according to constitutional tenets such as the rule of law, respect for human rights, the democratic process, judicial independence, to name a few. In the context of the two recent events mentioned above, the constitutional principle most profoundly tested is the one articulated by the first sentence of Section 1 of Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers—“Public office is a public trust.” Notably, the second sentence of this provision provides a baseline meaning of this principle— “Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve

them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” A friend of mine who works for the Philippine Consulate in Sydney, Consul Marford Angeles, has an interesting take on the scope of this constitutional principle. He said, “When a person holding a public office behaves in a certain manner that cannot be justifiable, as the old folks say, “in Plaza Miranda”, or if they do something that will not hold up in public scrutiny, then you disappoint the people you are indebted to.” Indeed, the message behind this constitutional standard is pretty straightforward and demands no further explanation. Hence, the question to ask is this—Is this constitutional edict discernible in the Filipino’s socio-political conduct? From some of the government actions we have witnessed during the visit of Pope Francis and heard from the testimonies of those directly involved in the Mamasapano tragedy, it would appear that by and large, those who hold public office have a very low regard for the demands of public trust. For instance, the move to give temporary shelter to street children and their families in a holiday resort during Pope Francis’ visit is reminiscent of the Manila face-lift ordered by then First Lady Imelda Marcos to hide the city’s poor during the visit of Pope John Paul II. So should we really consider this act as public service “with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency”? Or how about the suspended police chief influencing operational matters on the sly? Or how about the commander-in-chief tolerating such an irregularity on account of his close relationship with the said police officer? Are these the acts of public officials who fervently believe in being “accountable to the people”? Sadly, the electorate’s comprehension of this constitutional principle also leaves a whole lot to be desired. The people we put in Malacañang, the Senate and Congress, and every kapitolyo and munispyo in the country are all painful reminders that Filipinos have little to no regard to public office as a public trust. In light of this disconcerting realization about the Filipino’s political mentality, our traditional lukewarm approach to Constitution Day now seems more detrimental to us than we think. The fact that we do not celebrate our Constitution with the reverence it deserves could be the reason why our civic constitutionalism is particularly at a disappointing state. Unfortunately, this is precisely the condition that sustains many of the political ills we are suffering today as proven by the observations we have extrapolated from recent events. Constitutional scholars would suggest that to reverse the untenable state of our civic constitutionalism we must deliberately engage in a purposeful discussion about constitutional principles. Because doing this actually generate the awareness and attachment to constitutional rules and principles that are essential for selfenforcement. Simply put, talking about the Constitution with the appropriate seriousness and intent can help Filipinos become socially and politically responsible citizens.

Section 1 of Article XI would certainly make the repartee over dinner tables more interesting than usual. Obviously, it would be an exciting theme to debate on for our youths in our high schools and universities. However, I believe the best venue to hold the lively discourse on the notion of public office as a public trust, or any constitutional principle for that matter, is the local government mechanism persistently championed by the author behind The Worm’s Eyeview—the barangay assembly. Just imagine friends and neighbors exchanging views on what public trust means and together gauging if public officials can still justify themselves “in Plaza Miranda”. This is bayanihan at its best! A town hall meeting is indeed the most plausible method to instill constitutional principles in the frame of mind of Filipinos. And regularly engaging the barangay assembly mechanism could eventually empower the polity to undertake the fundamental reforms the political system badly needs. Come to think of it, organizing a community gathering for such a purpose would be the most meaningful way to celebrate people power on February 25. February 14, 2015 - MindaNews http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/02/14/commentary-pope-francismamasapano-and-civic-constitutionalism/

Sure way to break up PH political dynasties Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 11, 2015 “Political dynasty, while it is true everywhere in the country, is more pronounced in the Bangsamoro where you see practically the whole clan running the … local government unit. I call this … political enterprise or clan-inclusive government.” These words were spoken by respected Mindanao civil society activist Guiamel Alim in a speech delivered at the Consolidation for Peace in Mindanao seminar-workshop in Hiroshima, Japan, on June 23, 2014. Oddly, Alim’s concern about the reign of “claninclusive” LGUs has been very rarely articulated in the congressional deliberations on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. Nevertheless, the issue of political dynasties is undeniably a national concern. And this problem is addressed by the 1987 Constitution in Section 26 of Article II: “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” Clearly, the scourge of political dynasties was not unknown to the framers of the Constitution. In particular, Jose C. Colayco, during the debates on this subject, stated: “One of the worst effects of political dynasties is that [they breed] graft and corruption.”

Corruption is defined by the United Nations Development Programme as “abuse of public power for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement”—all hallmarks of a political dynasty in the Philippines. Interestingly, the prime mover of the inclusion of a provision on political dynasties, Jose N. Nolledo, provided a simple summation of why this pathology in Philippine politics needs to be eradicated: “It seems to me that the public office becomes inherited. Our government becomes monarchical in character and no longer constitutional.” But this constitutional provision is viewed merely as a declaration of opposition to dynastic politics and not actually an executable prohibition against politicians of this pedigree. Correspondingly, Filipinos believe that for this constitutional proscription against political dynasties to have any practical meaning at all, an implementing piece of legislation is needed. The basic theme of the anti-political dynasty bills now pending in Congress is pretty straightforward: A candidate that is part of a political dynasty is disqualified to run for office if a co-member of the dynasty is an incumbent. Ironically, this approach may actually be in conflict with established democratic principles. Two prominent legal minds in the 1986 Constitutional Commission elucidated on this concern. Blas F. Ople, now deceased, cautioned that any prohibition against running for public office may impinge on the right of suffrage: “What I feel is an inner demand for logic and rationality so that this provision can be actually attached to some principles of equity without doing violence to the freedom of choice of the voters because they are entitled to as broad a freedom of choice as the environment can provide. And if they want somebody to run for office even if he is closely related to someone in office, do we have the right to curtail the freedom of the voters?” (Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p. 762, Sept. 18, 1986) On the other hand, former Commission on Elections chair Christian S. Monsod argued that adding another hurdle for those aspiring for elected office contradicts the very idea of people power and can even be seen as unconstitutional: “I just want to say that here we are in this assembly, extolling people power and saying that the people have a new consciousness, and yet not trusting that they will make the right choice. We want to put a section on political dynasty on the assumption that there will be violations of the Electoral Code, that people in power will use their office to elect their children. We cannot assume that certain sections of this Constitution will be violated and then try to cover and compensate for them in another section.” (Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p. 939, Sept. 23, 1986) Pertinently, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Quinto vs Comelec (G.R. No. 189698, Feb. 22, 2010) that the right to seek public office, “by itself, is not entitled to

constitutional protection.” This doctrine is clear and succinct but it is very difficult to reconcile with an earlier determination of the high court in the old case of Aurea vs Comelec (G.R. No. L-24828, Sept. 7, 1965) that: “Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office. The imposition of unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from running is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty of freedom in the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the electorate to choose freely from among those eligible to office whomever they may desire.” On one end, the high court is clearly for the constitutional protection of the right to run for public office because it is an integral component of the right of suffrage. But on the other hand, the high court has implicitly ruled that the right to seek an elected office can be divorced from the broader concept of elective franchise. And as a separate and individual right, it does not actually enjoy any constitutional guarantees. Whether these two sides contradict each other is subject to debate. But these two rulings from the Supreme Court in conjunction with the critical objections of Ople and Monsod just confirm that addressing the problem of political dynasties may prove to be more intricate than simply enacting a direct prohibition law. Some legal luminaries from Mindanao have suggested that the parliamentary form of local government espoused in the Bangsamoro Basic Law is the best antidote to political dynasties. While there is some credence to this proposition, it is also a distinct possibility that the projected Bangsamoro Parliament would just become the new and more lucrative playground of the traditional political families in the region. Indeed, the Constitution itself provides a clear hint that other remedial measures are available within the confines of the democratic process. Section 1 of Article II states quite emphatically that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Proceeding from this principle, it can be argued that the surest way to break the political dynasties’ stranglehold on the Philippine political system is simply not to vote their members into office. With the 2016 elections just around the corner, this is the solution on which all Filipinos should now be focusing. April 11, 2015 ─ Philippine Daily Inquirer http://opinion.inquirer.net/83992/sure-way-to-break-up-ph-politicaldynasties#ixzz3ijuidPDW

Political dynasties vs. Political rights MindaNews, August 11, 2015 The main issue hindering the enactment of an anti-political dynasty law is the reality that as of the last reckoning at least 70% of Congress members belong to political dynasties. The senator primarily responsible for this task is even quoted to have said that although anti-political dynasty bills have been filed in Congress, “all it got was lip service from members of Congress, many of whom did not want to touch the measure with a ten-foot pole for obvious self-preservation of family clan members who have occupied various elective posts in government.” But the plain fact is the damaging effect of dynastic politicians is particularly wellestablished. No one doubts anymore that the unabated reign of this grim lot is the very life-source of graft and corruption in our political system. And every Filipino knows from personal experience that graft and corruption in government is the biggest bane to our country’s economic development. However, the foremost damage caused by political dynasties was well-articulated by the eminent economist, Professor Ronald U. Mendoza from the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center, in a scalding rebuttal a couple of weeks ago to Senator Nancy Binay’s preposterous claim that “a family of politicians is no different from a family of doctors”. According to the good professor, “An Anti-Dynasty Law also opens much-needed breathing room to resuscitate meritocracy in the Philippines, since the evidence suggests that it is already dying at the hands of political dynasties.” Pertinently, apart from the observation that dynastic politicians have all but obliterated meritocracy in governance, Professor Mendoza also highlights the need to enact an Anti-Political Dynasty law. Indeed, it has become utterly reprehensible that lawmakers continue to sit on this reform legislation. I think our legislators fail to realize that the public’s demand is not only about the enactment of an “anti-political dynasty” law. Indeed, Filipinos are also clamouring for an “equal access guarantee” piece of legislation. It must be noted here that Section 26 of Article II primarily protects a political right, specifically─ every Filipino’s right to “equal access to opportunities for public service”. Furthermore, our lawmakers ought to be reminded that equal access is a political right guaranteed by international law, particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which

shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” Article 25 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 1. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 2. to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; 3. To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.” Clearly therefore, the campaign for the enactment of an Anti-Political Dynasty law is profoundly more than just about targeting a special caste of politicians. Indeed, the legislative agenda behind this advocacy can be understood as preserving and promoting a political right guaranteed in our Constitution and in international law for ALL Filipinos. Hence, complaints by dynastic politicians that such a law infringes their right to run for and be voted to public office seem pathetically self-serving. Specially given that the Supreme Court has already ruled in the case of Quinto vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010], that the right to seek public office, “by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.” Theoretically, our lawmakers should be proud to cast a vote for an anti-political dynasty bill because to do so is simply about respecting a political or human right guaranteed by the Constitution and international law. In fact, they can all take the high road by claiming such a move is fundamentally championing real democracy in the Philippines. The reality of course is more nuanced than this. Being bona fide members of political dynasties themselves, members of Congress and the Senate need to be cajoled further in enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty law. President Aquino has declared the urgency of passing such a law before his term ends in his last State of the Nation Address. Malacañang has even released an official statement reiterating our Chief Executive’s directive. Even a COMELEC Commissioner has come out on a limb imploring legislators to enact the law without any further delay. I am beginning to suspect that Filipinos filling up the streets is the spark our lawmakers need to finally pass the Anti-Political Dynasty law. Indeed, people shouting “Sobra na! Tama na!” could jolt them from their stupor. These words took down a dictatorship after all. August 11, 2015 ─ MindaNews http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/08/11/commentary-political-dynastiesvs-political-rights/

Can Filipinos destroy political dynasties? Reposted at the Halalan2016 website on June 4, 2015 The prevailing view is that the anti-political dynasty provision in the Constitution (Section 26 of Article II) is merely a declared opposition to dynastic politics but it won't be able to actually prohibit politicians with the same bloodline from running. Filipinos have accepted that for this constitutional proscription against political dynasties to have any practical meaning at all, it needs implementing legislation. But it seems difficult to be optimistic about the fate of the anti-political dynasty bills pending in the House of Representatives and in the Senate because as of the last reckoning, at least 70% of members of Congress belong to political dynasties. So can Filipinos still destroy political dynasties? The answer is yes. But only if we take direct and primary responsibility for it. And we begin with a simple recalibration of how we should perceive the constitutional provision against political dynasties. Exercising right to suffrage responsibly Note that the ultimate aim of the Constitution in this particular instance is to establish and maintain honest and efficient civil service. Certainly no Filipino will ever dispute that the existence of political dynasties is the most obvious hindrance to achieving this goal. Accordingly, a deep and fervent belief that such high quality government bureaucracy is what the people deserve should motivate Filipinos not to vote dynastic politicians into public office. Indeed, each Filipino can give life to this constitutional proscription by simply exercising his or her right of suffrage. Degrading political dynasties need not be contingent on the enactment of an antipolitical dynasty law. However, the degradation process contemplated here only commences when Filipinos commit to take a step further by passionately convincing others to never cast a vote for a candidate who belongs to a political dynasty. At a very modest level, this can be accomplished at a personal level by dissuading our work colleagues or classmates from voting Vice President Jejomar Binay, Manuel Roxas II, or whoever else in the coming 2016 presidential elections simply on the basis of their political pedigree. Indeed, this conversation can also be had with friends and family over merienda and can also cover not voting for the same old political clans for the Senate or Congress. This caveat can be applied to local politicos as well.

A more formal and organized discussion can be conducted in high schools and universities using the groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center in 2012 entitled, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress as a take-off point. Let the main finding of this study – that lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty – agitate students and teachers alike. Creativity and artistry to fight dynasties And if the ultimate goal of the degradation process is to inculcate in the minds of all Filipinos a profound hatred for political dynasties, then it mandates Filipino artists to use their craft to breed this fundamental disdain for dynastic politicians. Thus we need more works like Pinatay si Mayor! by Mae Paner (aka Juana Change). This mode of protest is not new. At the start of the American colonial period, nationalist artists such as Juan Abad, Aurelio Tolentino, and Juan Matapang Cruz, produced “seditious dramas” which upset the new colonizers so much that they were persecuted as insurrectos. Brocka, Bernal, Portes, and company all made films along these lines in the 1970s1980s against the dictatorship. The point here is that the writers, artists, and filmmakers of today must produce more “seditious” works that challenge the political establishment – films, paintings, and books that not just jar the audience with the harsh conditions of modern Filipino society, but also ridicule and attack the incompetence and wrongdoings of those holding political power. No Filipino who grew up in the 1990s will ever forget Congressman Manhik Manaog! But to ensure the success of the degradation process, civil society must also do their part. Groups such as ANDAYAMO (Anti-Dynasty Movement) and MAD (Movement Against Dynasty) can follow the example of the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice in South Korea which published a voters’ guide that included a list of 167 politicians who should not be elected because of their involvement in corruption scandals and opposition to reform policies during the 2000 elections. This exercise has a dual purpose. First, to warn the voters of the calamity awaiting them at the other end of the polling booth if they do not exercise their right of suffrage wisely. And second, to clearly demonstrate how pathetic and abhorrent dynastic politicians are. Civil society organizations can then deliver the knock-out punch by running a sustained, comprehensive and well-thought social media campaign to monitor the movements of public officials, particularly those who belong to, or are allied with political dynasties. This is essentially to always remind them that, “People should not be afraid of their governments. Governments should be afraid of their people.”

The task of teaching Filipinos from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi to loathe political dynasties will obviously take time. But the reality is that only the intense hatred for dynastic politicians will empower communities to vote them out of office. I must emphasize however that I am not diminishing the importance of enacting an anti-political dynasty law. Indeed, the presence of such legislation will obviously play a vital role in the degrading process. But we have to accept that the destruction of political dynasties ultimately lies in the hands of Filipinos. Indeed, we can all expect that once Filipinos have made family dynasties politically irrelevant, their stranglehold over our country’s political system will be destroyed completely. Genuine patriotic leaders can then finally emerge and be properly recognized. Reposted at the Halalan2016 website on June 4, 2015 http://halalan2016.com/2015/06/can-filipinos-destroy-political-dynasties/

Rethinking Political Dynasties Mindanao Law Journal Issue No. 5, 2013

Rethinking Political Dynasties by Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco1

Rationale for the Rethinking Process Why do we need to rethink political dynasties? Is it not common knowledge now that traditional political families are the most despised feature of Philippine politics? Was not this sentiment passionately manifested in the Anti-Epal campaign that bombarded social media in the months preceding the last elections?2 In fact, was not the result of the May 2013 elections an unequivocal illustration of the Filipinos’ revolt against family dynasties in public office?3 I remember appearing before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) during the chairmanship of a political family patriarch (Benjamin Abalos). I was advocating for a client who was publicly indicted in campaign attacks as “guilty” of being in a political dynasty. Our contention was that since there was no provision under current election laws, which criminalized the existence of political dynasties, campaign materials pronouncing guilt as if there was such a proscription constitutes undue harassment on its target candidate. It was a novel argument but sadly the petition was eventually mooted for as the general public now knows, in the 2007 elections Senator Koko Pimentel had to face off with a more sinister election adversary.

Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco recently released his book, Rethinking the Bangsamoro Perspective, published by the Ateneo de Davao University Publication Office last November 22, 2013. He is a Volunteer presenter/news reader, Radio Pilipino EBI Radio, Adelaide, SA; Student Exchange Program (Spring 2011), Chung Ang University, Seoul, Korea; Masters in International Business (2010-present), University of South Australia; Bachelor of Laws (2002), Arellano University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy (1995), Ateneo de Manila University; published author, Lawyers Review (June, April 2010; August, April, February 2009; November, December 2008.) 2 Caroline J. Howard, ‘Anti-'epal' campaign empowering netizens’, ANC, September 13, 2012 http://www.abscbnnews.com/anc/09/12/12/anti-epal-campaign-empowering-netizens accessed September 6, 2013. 3 See The PCIJ Blog for June 28, 2013, ‘Many dynasties ‘trimmed down’ after May 2013 elections’, http://pcij.org/blog/2013/06/28/many-dynasties-trimmed-down-after-2013-elections accessed September 6, 2013. 1

I am relating this personal experience simply to demonstrate that there is something objectively disagreeable with politicians who are part of political dynasties running (and competing) for public office. Pertinently, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) blog cited here reported that candidates belonging to 10 of the 20 well-entrenched political families lost their grip on power in the last elections. Sadly, this result seems terribly insignificant in the light of the overall political landscape of the nation as illustrated by the current composition of the Senate with siblings and scions making up this formerly august body. In fact, the reality after the election dust settled last May 2013 still shows that “at least 55 political families will have each controlled an elective post for 20 to 40 years straight.”4 Political clans are still a prominent feature of modern Philippine politics. Political power is still concentrated on a select segment of the polity that is relatively unchanged. The family names may have changed, but the quality of those who wield the power has not. The diagnosis above may be grim. Nonetheless, I believe that Philippine polity is at a crossroads with regard to political dynasties. We have been bitterly conscious of its evil for a very long time but it is only now that our anger is nearing cataclysmic point. Yet even with this disdain brewing in our hearts and minds, we are obviously at a loss on how to rid ourselves of this colossal problem. In 1986, the supposedly wisest and most patriotic among us actually had the chance to strike a swift and clean blow against political dynasties. The drafters of the 1987 Constitution were certainly fully aware of the trouble with political dynasties in the country. In particular, Mr. Jose C. Colayco during the debates on this subject stated, “One of the worst effects of political dynasties is that it breeds graft and corruption.” 5 Indeed, no Filipino today is ignorant of the connection of political dynasties to corruption. The latter has been defined by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as an “abuse of public power for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement.6 All of these criminal acts are hallmarks of a political dynasty in the Philippines.

KAREN TIONGSON-MAYRINA, ‘55 political families have unbreakable hold on power, one clan for 43 years’, GMA News Research, July 5, 2013, http://www.gmanetwork.com/ news/ story/ 316096/news/ specialreports/ 55-political-families-have-unbreakable-hold-on-power-one-clan-for-43-years, accessed September 6, 2013. 5 Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p940 (September 23, 1986). 6 Jon S. T. Quah (2006), ‘ Curbing Asian Corruption: An Impossible Dream?’, Current History April 2006, p176. 4

According to the historian Francia, “the illness that vitiates the body politic above all is that of corruption.”7 And correspondingly, the virus lingering and infecting our sociopolitical culture, as it were, is political dynasties. Indeed, the attachment to public office by political families has been rendered almost unbreakable by the promise of government largesse. Instead of being the vehicle for civil service, government has essentially become a cash cow for political dynasties; thereby making the Constitutional declaration that “public office is a public trust”, a big fat joke on the Filipino people. 8 But the ramification of government corruption is no joking matter. The World Bank (WB) has estimated that between the years 1977-1997, the Philippines lost about USD48 billion to corruption.9 Setting aside the complicity of the WB in this unbelievable amount, this lost money essentially covers only the Marcos10 era corruption. When the Erap11 and GMA12 eras are factored in, the amount would certainly balloon to unimaginable proportions. Indeed, the scourge of political dynasties is not just about the restriction of political power by the privileged elite but also of the theft of the people’s money by these select families. Interestingly, the prime mover behind the inclusion of a provision in the 1987 Constitution on political dynasties, Jose N. Nolledo, provided a simple and practical summation of why the existence of political dynasties in the Philippine politics needs to be addressed, to wit: MR. NOLLEDO. ...In the Philippines, I think it is known to everyone that a person runs for governor; he becomes a governor for one term; he is allowed two reelections under our concept. Then he runs for re-election; he wins. The third time, he runs for re-election and he wins and he is now prohibited from running again until a lapse of another election period. What does he do? Because he is old already and decrepit, he asks his son to run for governor. In the meantime, he holds public office while the campaign is going on. He has control; he has already institutionalized himself. His son will inherit the position of governor, in effect, and then this will go to the grandson, et cetera. The others who do not have the political advantage in the sense that they have no control of government facilities will be denied the right to run for public office. Luis H. Francia, A History of the Philippines From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (The Overlook Press, New York, 2010), p317. 8 See Section 1 of Article XI. 9 Above n6. 10 Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 11 Former President Joseph E. Estrada. 12 Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. 7

Younger ones, perhaps more intelligent ones, the poorer ones, can no longer climb the political ladder because of political dynasty. It seems to me that the public office becomes inherited. Our government becomes monarchical in character and no longer constitutional.13

Of course, we know now that this passing of the baton system is not limited to sons and grandsons but it also includes all children, both legitimate and illegitimate, all spouses, both the legal and the actual, and nephews, nieces, in-laws, and inaanaks. All are privy to this exclusive succession process. Unfortunately, even the earnest efforts of Atty. Nolledo were not enough to muster a decisive and surgical approach against this political ill. What we have instead is Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution that reads as such: Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that Congress will enact a law that will expressly remove family dynasties from our political system because the reality is, for these privileged few, the inclination for the preservation of wealth and prestige is quite difficult to overcome. In fact, I have encountered only one proposed piece of legislation that endeavors to implement this Constitutional mandate, Senate Bill No. 2649 introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago in January 2011.14 According to Section 3 (a) of this bill, a "Political Dynasty" shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously with the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective official. It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity run simultaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if neither is so related to an incumbent elective official.

Clearly, this definition of political dynasty is limited by territory. With this proposed law, two brothers can actually run simultaneously in an election in two different territorial Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p731 (September 17, 1986). Last November 22, 2013, the House of Representatives committee on suffrage and electoral reforms unanimously approved the Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2013. However, it is still a very long way for this bill to become a law. 13 14

political subdivisions and they will not be considered a political dynasty. The case of the cities of San Juan and Manila is an interesting demonstration of the insufficiency of this definition. Whilst the personalities involved are neither bound by blood nor by law, the local executives of these cities are generally accepted as the matriarch and patriarch of a political dynasty. And yet even though Metro Manila is not technically a province, they still will not be legally considered as such under the definition of the aforementioned bill. However, the key feature of Senator Santiago’s bill is the way it proposes to address political dynasties through direct prohibition. This measure is spelled out in Section 4, to wit: Section 4. Persons Covered; Prohibited Candidates. - No spouse, or person related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity whether legitimate or illegitimate, to an incumbent elective official seeking re-election shall be allowed to hold or run for any elective office in the same province in the same election. In case the constituency of the incumbent elective official is national in character, the above relatives shall be disqualified from running only within the same province where the former is a registered voter. In case where none of the candidates is related to an incumbent elective official within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, but are related to one another within the said prohibited degree, they, including their spouses, shall be disqualified from holding or running for any local elective office within the same province in the same election. In all cases, no person within the prohibited civil degree of relationship to the incumbent shall immediately succeed to the position of the latter: Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to Punong Barangays or members of the Sangguniang Barangay.

This provision is pretty standard. A candidate who is part of a political dynasty as defined in Section 3 is disqualified to run for office if a co-member in the dynasty is an incumbent. However, this approach, whilst simple and straightforward, may run in conflict with established democratic principles such as the right to run and be voted into office. Two prominent legal minds in the 1986 Constitutional Commission can elucidate this concern. The late Blas F. Ople cautioned that any prohibition against running for public office might impinge on the right of suffrage, to wit: MR. OPLE. What I feel is an inner demand for logic and rationality so that this provision can be actually attached to some principles of equity without doing violence to the freedom of choice of the voters because they are entitled to as broad freedom of choice as the environment can provide and if they want

somebody to run for office even if he is closely related to someone in office, do we have the right to curtail the freedom of the voters?15

On the other hand, former COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod argued that adding another hurdle for those aspiring for elected office contradicts the very idea of people power and can even be seen as unconstitutional: MR. MONSOD. ...I just want to say that here we are in this assembly, extolling people power and saying that the people have a new consciousness and yet not trusting that they will make the right choice. We want to put a section on political dynasty on the assumption that there will be violations of the Electoral Code, that people in power will use their office to elect their children. We cannot assume that certain sections of this Constitution will be violated and then try to cover and compensate for them in another section. We have in this Constitution qualifications of those who seek elective office. We are adding in this section a disqualification to those who may aspire after public office, and, in effect, amending the various provisions in this Constitution, which enumerate the qualifications and disqualifications of the law.16

Notably, these arguments were made years before Senator Santiago filed her bill. And yet surprisingly, the good senator in her proposed piece of legislation did not take these into account. Pertinently though, the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Quinto vs. COMELEC, that the right to seek public office, “by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.”17 This doctrine is succinctly clear but it is very difficult to reconcile this with an earlier determination of the Court in the old case of Aurea vs. Comelec, to wit: Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office. The imposition of unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from running is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty of freedom in the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the electorate to choose freely from among those eligible to office whomever they may desire.18

Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p762 (September 18, 1986). Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p939 (September 23, 1986). 17 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. 18 FELIPE N. AUREA and MELECIO MALABANAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. L-24828, September 7, 1965. 15 16

On one end, the Court is clearly for the constitutional protection of the right to run for public office because it is an integral component of the right of suffrage. Yet, the Court has implicitly ruled that the right to seek an elected office can be divorced from the broader concept of elective franchise. As a separate and individual right, it does not actually enjoy any constitutional guarantees. Whether these two sides contradict each other is up for debate. But these two rulings from the Supreme Court showed that addressing the problem of political dynasties might prove to be more intricate than simply direct prohibition. Before going any further in the discussion, it must be disclosed that the additional requirement questioned in the Aurea case pertained to property ownership. Therefore, it is easy to understand the objection against such an imposition, that it is— inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.19

Nonetheless, following the arguments of the late Mr. Ople and Chairman Monsod, I maintain that a direct and blanket restriction on political dynasties as envisaged by Senator Santiago’s bill could be argued as an “unwarranted restriction” against the right to run for public office and by extension, an infringement on the right of suffrage. The principle of equal opportunity in the abovementioned jurisprudence cannot sanction imposing an electoral handicap on the poor or the wealthy. Corollary thereto, neither can it justify an encumbrance on either candidates with political pedigree or those without. Therefore, legislating against political dynasties has clearly proven to be very tricky. In the light of the ambivalence relating to democratic rights, remedial action on this problem can easily vacillate from absolute prohibition to rationalized inaction. Furthermore, merely enacting a direct prohibition law is not only impossible given the political realities of the country, but it may also fail to address the root problem of political dynasties. 19

Ibid.

However, it is absolutely a mistake to think that a direct prohibition is the sole remedy against this socio-political problem. The crusade against political dynasties certainly does not end with the demise of Senator Santiago’s bill. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the inadequacy of Section 26 of Article II that justifies subjecting this political conundrum to the rethinking process from whence practical and viable solutions can be determined. Indeed, the principle enunciated in the Aurea case, that sovereignty resides in the Filipino people and all government authority emanates from them, is a clear hint that other remedial measures are available within the confines of the democratic process. Historical Review of Political Dynasties The first stage of the rethinking process springs from the Filipino adage, “Ang hindi marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makakarating sa paroroonan.” It is truly unfortunate that traditional wisdom has often been dismissed as out-dated and irrelevant. But I believe that some have a place in scholarly discourse as a potent analytical framework. A robust examination of the past can certainly result to a better understanding of present conditions. And a deeper perception of the situation-on-hand can certainly lay down the correct path towards the attainment of desired results. Accordingly, the rethinking process is commenced with a historical review of political dynasties. Family dynasties have been a main feature in Philippine politics for a very long time. This socio-political phenomenon can be traced to pre-colonial society for the power structure of the communities of that period was built around blood relations. The leadership of a preHispanic community rested on the datu.

According to the historian Scott, a datu was

expected “to govern his people, settle disputes, protect them from their enemies, and lead them into battle.”20 And “in return for these responsibilities and services, a datu received labor and tribute from his people.”21 The position of datu could be inherited but unlike the monarchs of feudal Europe, a datu could make “no claims to a divine imprimatur or special access to the heavens, nor

William Henry Scott, Barangay Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society (Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2004), p130. 21 Ibid. 20

boasts about having a hotline to God.”22 Indeed, community chiefs claim their leadership position on the basis of their reputation as brave warriors, and not on mere noble lineage. 23 More importantly, a datu’s ability to retain his office as the ruler of the barangay depended highly on his performance as a leader.24 Meaning, when warranted by the circumstances, he could be replaced by the community with a challenger who is more able to deliver the needs of the barangay. It is a peculiar feature of our pre-colonial history that powerful clans emerged in leadership roles during that era underpinned by a social contract. They enjoyed the advantage of such an elevated social status but also assumed the role of protectorate of the community. Additionally, it was incumbent upon them to exercise good leadership for to do otherwise may cause their removal from their privileged position. In a sense, the community retained the power to choose its ruler but recognized the office of the datu as necessary in order to preserve peace and maintain order within the barangay. A socio-anthropological leap, perhaps, but this pre-colonial leadership structure looks like a primitive manifestation of the republican principle of sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. Unfortunately, this organic social democratic arrangement was completely destroyed during the Spanish colonial period. With the encomienda system in place, the colonial government utilized the tribal ruling class as their lackeys (i.e. tribute collectors). Those who embraced their new role became the first among the indigenous population to be Hispanized; they were rewarded for their loyal servitude with wealth and limited authority, thus “separating them from the rest of their countrymen and leading to a class structure more pronounced than pre-colonial days.”25 The datu class thereafter become the principales and the barangay evolved into the generic appellation, indios. This was a fundamental transformation because the principales, unlike their previous incarnation as datu, functioned not as a community leader but as “a servant of the town’s Above n6 p33. Above n15 p267. 24 Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Ateneo de Manila Press, 2000), p139. 25 Above n6 p68. 22 23

parish priest and constabulary commanding officer.” 26 The underpinning social contract was now gone and the obligation to protect the community with it. More importantly, the power of the community to choose its own ruler was now lost and has found its way into the hands of a central authority. Indeed, from a mandate to be earned, authority to govern the community has now become a commodity that can be bargained for. 27 Consequently, the principales became a new type of privileged class in Filipino society. This was the point they became a clique that has learned to see itself as “different” from the rest of the indio population. Not surprisingly, many from the Filipino ruling elite immediately and willingly collaborated with the Americans when the United States of America replaced Spain as the nation’s colonial master, as this was ostensibly the best way to “preserve and expand their local power.”28 However, the eagerness of the principales to collaborate with the Americans was a critical event in our political history. As luck would have it, their almost child-like acceptance of the new colonizer’s ideas of modernity and statehood proved to be the seed out of which grew the political dynasties we see today. According to the noted scholar Cullinane, “the structure and operation of Filipino national politics had its origins in the municipal and provincial elections of 1901-1902 and in the proliferation of political networks and alliances that came into being as local elites competed for political power through the electoral process.”29 Moreover, once democratically ensconced in office these new breed of principales “entrenched themselves further through intricate ties with other local elites.”30 These words described the political system in the country at the onset of the American colonial period; ironically, they still ring true for the political system we are enduring today. It is a painful irony indeed that our nation’s introduction to the democratic way of life was actually the point when public office became not just a commodity to barter with, but

Apolinario Mabini, The Philippine Revolution, translated into English from Spanish by Leon Ma. Guerrero (National Historical Institute, 1969), p28. 27 Leon Ma. Guerrero, The First Filipino (Guerrero Publishing Inc., 2010) pp147-147. 28 Patricio N. Abinales, Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative (Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2010), p5. 29 Michael Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2003) p3. 30 Above n23 p8. 26

also to profit from.31 More importantly, this was the moment when the authority to govern the nation fell completely under the control of the privileged few. According to Abinales, “Local elites competed for control over local power via elections, and then extended their power beyond the province into the ‘national’ arena with the aid of American patrons and allies.”32 Alliances and loyalties gained municipal elites access to national government largesse.33 This was the political mechanism that paved the way for Quezon, Osmeña, and Roxas to take full control of the nation in Malacañang, the very same method used by others after them to ascend to power as well as for the 55+ political families to keep their hold on their supposedly elective offices for the past half-century. Indeed, the Americans brought with them democratic institutions that we enjoy and are proud of today. Sadly, they also brought with them the politics of patronage, the bedrock of modern day political dynasties. Abinales succinctly states, “Decentralized patronage politics in the Philippines, begun in the late Spanish period and routinized in the American ...” 34 According to Francia, colonialism is in the Filipino’s DNA.35 This is a bold statement indeed and bears significantly in our rethinking of political dynasties. A review of the country’s colonial past has unravelled the loss of two extremely valuable indigenous political traditions. First, the fundamental belief that the rulers have the duty to exercise good leadership in order to keep their privileged position in the community. Second, the core principle that it is the community that holds the power to choose its ruler and no one else. These losses are critical because modern political dynasties actually sprung out from this void in our political culture. And if this socio-political abyss were now deeply embedded in our people’s genetic make-up, then clearly enacting a simple direct prohibition law against political dynasties would never be enough. Consequently, a deeper empirical analysis of this problem is obviously needed in order to arrive at any meaningful remedial action. Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties

James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (The World Bank, 1999) p35 and pp-5859. 32 Above n24 p8. 33 Above n23 p151. 34 Above n23 p12. 35 Above n6 p10. 31

We know now that putting a definition after political dynasty does not make formulating countermeasures any easier. Hence, the next stage of the rethinking process has to do more with identifying the pathology of this socio-political disease than giving it a better technical meaning. We have seen its evolution in the previous section, now we take a good look at its inner workings. For this purpose, I have referred largely on the ground-breaking work of the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15 th Philippine Congress.36 This paper is very significant because political dynasties were “measured” by its authors and the results showed that political clans “comprise 70 per cent of jurisdiction-based legislators”.37 Meaning, a full majority of the members of the House of Representatives were found to be part of a political dynasty. Hence, Congress will never enact a direct prohibition law despite a clear Constitutional fiat. However, unlike Senator Santiago, the academics at the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) did not exactly provide a technical definition for political dynasty. They did agree with the lawmaker that the key feature of this socio-political reality is kinship among political leaders. In fact, the AIM paper enumerated the extent of some of the more known political dynasties in the country today.38 1. Former Congressman Ronald Singson and Congressman Ryan Luis Singson are the children of Governor Chavit Singson; Congressman Ryan Singson was the 2010 Vice Mayor of Vigan City then its district representative upon the removal of Ronald Singson from office; Vigan City Mayor Eva Medina is the niece of Governor Chavit Singson, who is the first cousin of Quezon City Congressman Vincent Crisologo; Congressman Eric Singson, Jr. and Candon Mayor Allen Singson are the sons of former Congressman Eric Singson, Sr.; and former Congressman Eric Singson, Sr. is the brother of Vice Mayor Alfonso Singson and the cousin of Governor Chavit Singson. 2. Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the mother of Congressman Fatima Dimaporo and Governor Khalid Dimaporo; Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the wife of former Ronald U. Mendoza, et. Al, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress’ (Asian Institute of Management Working Paper 12-001, 2012). 37 Ibid p1. 38 Ibid p31-32. 36

Congressman Abdullah Dimaporo, the son of the patriarch of the Dimaporo dynasty Mohammad Dimaporo; Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the sister of Tubod Mayor Nenita Noval; Maminta Dimakuta is the cousin of former Congressman Abdullah Dimaporo; Pantao-Ragat Mayor Eleanor Dimaporo Lantud is the cousin of former Congressman Abdullah Dimaporo; Mayor Eleanor Dimaporo’s nephew Ulwan Dimaporo is the Mayor of Sultan Naga Dimaporo; and Ulwan Dimaporo’s father Motalib is the Vice Mayor of Sultan Naga Dimaporo. Interestingly, the AIM paper prefaced its discussion with a salute to democracy, “Political democracies are important because they facilitate and sustain broader and more inclusive processes of economic and human development.”39 Corollary thereto, it is worth repeating that a democratic political system does not necessarily preclude nor prevent the existence of political dynasties. In fact, the most renowned and glamorous political family of all, the Kennedys, thrives in the most liberal democratic nation in the world. Examples closer to home are Lee Hsien Loong, the current Prime Minister of Singapore and the eldest son of Singapore's first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew; Yingluck Shinawatra, the first female Prime Minister of Thailand and the younger sister of the deposed former Prime Minster, Thaksin Shinawatra; and, Park Geun-hye, the first female President of South Korea and daughter of the military dictator, General Park Chung-hee. Correspondingly, the paper also proffered the caveat that “underdeveloped democratic institutions could be associated with weak political participation and thus produce, in some cases, political dynasties.” 40 I must emphasize though that the realization that democracy and dynasty are not mutually exclusive ideas is not the highlight of the AIM study. Indeed, a key finding of the AIM paper pertains to the connection of poverty to political dynasties for the study shows the prevalence of “lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality” in the communities governed by a political dynasty. There are obvious exceptions to this rule (i.e. the Binays in Makati). And ostensibly, the lack of a family dynasty does not necessarily lead to a poverty-free local government unit. Nevertheless, the AIM study has revealed a very disturbing paradox that truly makes political dynasties a gargantuan crisis to struggle with, to wit: 39 40

Ibid p2. Ibid.

a) provinces with lower aggregate levels of health, education, and income tend to elect dynasties; and/or b) dynasties implement policies and programs that may not necessarily improve (or possibly lower) aggregate levels of income, health, and education.41

Following this finding of the AIM study, it appears that the poor Filipinos are the lifeblood of political dynasties in the Philippines. This realization certainly explains the simultaneous occurrences of 55+ families holding government authority for the past halfcentury and the ever-increasing poverty threshold in the country. For sure, this observation sheds light on why some public officials who are part of a family dynasty do not actually implement the necessary programs to improve the lives of their respective constituents, because to do so may mean eventual expulsion from power. This underhanded scheme appears less objectionable because family dynasties have done this within the context of the electoral process. Indeed, on face value, these political clans were democratically elected by their impoverished “parokyanos”. The depressing fact in this gloomy equation is that the people concerned have not given any incentive at all for their leaders to change their ways. The communities of the 10 political families reported in the PCIJ blog have come to their senses. But those under the spell of the 55+ have not. So does this unfortunate paradox mean the end of the road in the battle against political dynasties? The answer of course is, absolutely not. Indeed, the key phrase to ponder on is “underdeveloped democratic institutions” and its ramifications vis-avis political dynasties. Therefore, the more appropriate question to ask is, how precisely do these democratic failures, and by extension political dynasties, adversely impact the socioeconomic outcomes in the country? There are three ways according to the AIM paper, to wit: First, if the prevalence of political dynasties prevents the majority of the citizenry from effectively communicating their needs to the government, it could also prevent the government from appropriately and adequately responding to social and economic problems. The misrepresentation (or inadequate representation) of the excluded groups could skew poverty reduction policies and income redistribution mechanisms, worsen poverty and income inequality, and ultimately compromise the capacity of the government to provide the most necessary public goods. Second, democratic institutions can be further compromised if dynastic officials use the powers of the state for self-serving interests. Finally, dynasties could skew the selection of political Ibid p28.

41

leaders favouring those with influence and prevent the best and the brightest from serving in government; thus, in turn, result in sub-optimal policy design and ultimately weaker socio-economic development.42

With this concise explanation, it is immediately obvious that Senator Santiago’s line of attack is immensely inadequate to address the problem of political dynasties. First, the direct prohibition approach certainly does nothing to encourage Filipinos to effectively communicate their needs to those in government. Second, while it may prevent the election of unsavoury characters, it does nothing specific against those already in power from using the state for self-serving interests. And lastly, a direct prohibition law absolutely does nothing to reverse the reality of duly elected scions of political clans governing with “sub-optimal policy design”. As previously mentioned, the true scourge of political dynasties is not the instance of family members simultaneously holding government positions. To harp on this point would probably be pointless. Moreover, lowering the nation’s poverty threshold alone may not be enough to get rid of political dynasties because poverty in the country appears to be both the result and the reason why political families continue to have practically unabated access to public office. Indeed, the Philippines now enjoy unprecedented economic growth, but political families and the concomitant government corruption still persist. Following the observation of the AIM academics cited above, the root of this problem is definitely buried much deeper than it seems. I submit that the pathology of political dynasties lies squarely within a defect in our political culture. Harkening to our lost indigenous political traditions, this systemic breakdown is two-fold. First, political leaders who are members or are connected to a family dynasty have no internal compulsion to exercise good leadership. They go about governance with neither vision nor mission. At the very least, they hold office with absolutely no clear and comprehensive development plan for their community. Ad hoc projects such as basketball courts and medical missions comprise the highlight of their term of office. Worst, they brazenly use the power of their office for their own benefit. Sadly, there is no need to cite

Ibid p16.

42

examples here. I daresay that most of the 55+ families, if not all, mentioned in the PCIJ blog, would fall under both categories. Secondly, the Filipino polity has forgotten how to wield the innate power they possess over those who must lead them, a situation that has ironically allowed political clans to run rampant with abusing elected office.

Local communities have somehow been easily

manipulated to leave its future in the hands of the political dynasty, with the latter using the electoral process to legitimize their hold on this power. For how else can authority be held by 55+ families for such a long period within the democratic context, if not for the inaction and apathy of the community itself? To be clear, I am not putting the blame for the continued existence of political dynasties on the shoulders of the Filipino electorate. I am, however, prepared to assert that Filipinos have rendered themselves powerless in holding their leaders accountable, even if under the law they are not. Therefore, I believe the greater challenge posed by political dynasties is the Filipino polity’s inability to actualize the dictum, “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them” enshrined in Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution. The focus of the discourse on political dynasties has been Section 26 and the absence of its implementing law. I maintain, however, that a more effective way to address the problem is to find ways to implement the fundamental tenets our pre-colonial forebears held for centuries. The primordial belief that the ultimate power to rule always belongs to the community and therefore rulers are continually beholden to them during their incumbency. The task now is how to channel this indigenous mindset into modern democratic institutions and to parley this organic principle into concrete political action. Enforcing Section 1 of Article ll The rethinking of political dynasties has now led to a return to pre-colonial attitudes. Specifically, the call now is to recover that spirit of community solidarity or at the very least, the awareness of it. The goal is now to re-ignite that ancient bayanihan spirit and use its power to implant in the minds of public officials once more that the principal purpose of their office is to exercise good leadership. To instil in their heads the constant reminder that those

who wield political power only hold it in trust for the people. Hence, they have to fulfil their obligations in order to keep this trust. The challenge with this theory is that its Constitutional imprimatur, Section 1 of Article II, is a particular provision which public officials cannot be relied upon to enforce. The principle expressed in this section is the exact opposite of the political reality. This truth is best exemplified in this current brouhaha concerning the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) has charged a slew of lawmakers and their accomplices for plunder for using their respective PDAF for their own benefit. Unfortunately for Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, and Ramon Revilla, Jr., they have become the face of this beleaguered motley crew.43 The filing of the plunder case was the culmination of an extensive investigation process. Comments made by the principals and by people in their behalf to the media during this period are most revealing. When asked if lawmakers have the duty of care, as custodians of a public fund, to ensure that the recipient (typically a non-governmental organizations or NGO) of their multi-million allocation is a rightful beneficiary, Senator Jinggoy Estrada replied, "It is not up to the senators to determine whether an NGO is bogus or not.”44 "Alangan naman na kami pa ang magsasabi na, 'Uy, bogus 'yan.' How will we know?"45 The response of the wife of Senator Ramon Revilla, Jr., Cavite 2nd district Representative Lani Mercado-Revilla, to a similar line of questioning was crass and characteristic. Her words, "Basta 'wag lang manghihingi sa amin ang mga tao!" is now a classic in the world-wide web.46 This cavalier attitude displayed by Senator Jinggoy Estrada and via spousal proxy, Senator Ramon Revilla, Jr., could be either a reaction to the onslaught of disgust from the general public or a public relations strategy in order to save as much credibility as they can for the next elections. The nonchalance they have shown, however, is a clear manifestation

See GMA News Online, ‘Three senators to be charged with plunder’, September 16, 2013 at http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/326608/news/nation/three-senators-to-be-charged-with-plunder. 44 Ryan Chua, ABS-CBN News, ‘Jinggoy: We're not obliged to check NGOs getting pork’, August, 15, 2013. See http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/focus/08/15/13/jinggoy-were-not-obliged-check-ngos-getting-pork. 45 Ibid. 46 Camille Diola, philstar.com, ‘'Just don't ask from us!': Lani's defense of pork goes viral’, August 21, 2013. See http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/08/21/1116081/just-dont-ask-us-lanis-defense-pork-goes-viral. 43

of the sense of entitlement public officials now have in their heads. Senator Jinggoy Estrada’s quip suggests that public office, or at least the office of the Senator, cannot be bothered to determine the parameters of their discretion over public money. The people should simply accept that public officials, like him, are patricians who are beyond reproach. On the other hand, Congresswoman Lani Mercado-Revilla’s famous retort to defend both her Senator husband and their use of the PDAF shows that for her, and maybe by extension for her spouse as well, constituents are to be perceived as peasants because all they want to do is pester public officials for dole-outs. Interestingly, Senator Jinggoy Estrada delivered a fiery privilege speech last September 25, 2013 wherein he publicly and officially confirmed a fact that all Filipinos know already and that the PDAF scandal involves practically everyone in Congress. 47 Curiously, whilst he was trigger-happy in implicating his fellow lawmakers, he did not directly deny his participation in the unlawful scheme attached to the PDAF.48 “Mr. President, I believe that we all here are victims of a flawed system which is so ingrained that it has been institutionalized. However, the recent events which unfolded before us have given us the chance to finally reform the system and do away with the “pork barrel” mentality.”49

Senator Jinggoy Estrada and his lot could hardly be classified as the “victims” in this tragedy. And after benefiting for decades from this unjust system, it is utterly shameful of him to even describe this travesty in our political history as “the chance” Filipinos have been waiting for to undertake serious reforms. But he is correct to put on notice the prosecutors of this plunder charge that they should not be selective in their quest for justice. 50 Indeed, there are definitely more public officials that need to be held liable for this most grievous crime. These claims coming out of the mouths of long established public officials echo the lament of Atty. Nolledo that political dynasties have transformed elected office into a monarchy. Therefore, can Filipinos reasonably expect their elected officials to respect Section

See http://www.senjinggoyestrada.com/index.php/articles/view/609.html. Ira Pedrasa, ABS-CBNnews.com, ‘Jinggoy blasts 'selective justice'Jinggoy blasts 'selective justice'’, September 25, 2013. See at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/09/25/13/jinggoy-blasts-persecution. 49 Above n42. 50 Ibid. 47 48

1 of Article II? To carry on with their office guided by its principle? Seeing the leech-like attachment of members of Congress to their PDAF, the answer is—probably not. In fact, the PDAF itself is a regrettable progeny of political dynasties because it skews the lawmakers’ appreciation of their office mandate. The power of Congress is outlined in Article VI of the Constitution and none of the 32 sections therein can be interpreted to sanction the PDAF. Notably, there is no law either that authorizes the existence of PDAF. Essentially, this payout scheme has been sustained solely by the collusion of the powers-thatbe in the executive and legislative branches of government since 1990. It is thus another painful irony for the Filipino that the PDAF could even be an unconstitutional disbursement of public funds, expressed in Section 25 (6) and Section 29 (1) of Article VI, to wit: Section 25. (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law. Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

It must be pointed out though that there are several petitions pending before the Supreme Court seeking, among other reliefs, to have the PDAF declared unconstitutional. 51 Notably however, ever since this PDAF scandal broke out many months ago, no elected member of Congress has ever provided a convincing argument that the PDAF is directly, or even just remotely, related to their lawmaking duties. 52 With due respect to the principle of sub judice, it is worthy to note that as early as 1994, the relevance of this particular kind of fund afforded to members of Congress in relation to their legislative duties under the Constitution has been questioned in the case of Philconsa vs. Enriquez.53 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to provide a direct and clear disposition of this particular issue but merely provided a cautious and equivocal explanation.

See http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/pdaf/. See Christian V. Esguerra, Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘2 lawmakers ask SC to free up PDAF’, September 17, 2013 at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/489699/2-lawmakers-ask-sc-to-free-up-pdaf. 53 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994. 51 52

The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XlI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory..... The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.54

Pertinently, the question of this special fund’s bearing on lawmaking functions was again raised in the case of LAMP vs. DBM55. And yet again, the Supreme Court failed to provide a clear-cut resolution of this particular issue. It certainly appears that the Court is deliberately trying to provide an acceptable rationalization for the existence of this “special fund” to favor members of Congress, to wit: ……..Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress…

Ostensibly, even the imminent threat of graft and corruption contemporaneous with this “special fund” would not move the Supreme Court to uphold clear Constitutional

Ibid. LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, et al., G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012. 54 55

provisions to protect the public interest. Hopefully, the firm grasp of political dynasties would no longer stifle the proper disposition of the current cases pending now in its docket.56 Therefore, I firmly believe that the task of giving relevance to Section 1 of Article II in the Philippine political system belongs to the Filipino polity itself. Actually, I submit that the responsibility must be borne by two specific institutions within the Philippine polity—media and civil society. The news media has to be unrelenting in holding public officials accountable to the people. For the most part, the Philippine media has not been remiss at all with this undertaking. The best example for their diligence would be the PCIJ as well as the other sources of news feeds cited here. Needless to say, the difficulty in performing this mandate is enormous. The Philippines is ranked as the world's third most dangerous country for journalists behind Iraq and Somalia. Of course, other forms of media such as art, literature, film and theater are likewise called for this crusade.

At the start of the American colonial period, nationalist artists

performed plays or seditious dramas to protest against US imperialism. Eight plays in particular reverberated loudly among the Filipinos and caused such an alarm and grief to the new colonizers that its authors were literally persecuted as insurrectos.57 Brocka, Bernal, Portes, and company all made films along these lines in the 1970s-1980s against the dictatorship. It would certainly help the cause if the writers, artists, and filmmakers of today produce more “seditious” works that challenge the political establishment. Films, paintings, books, among others not only just jar the audience with the harsh conditions of modern Filipino society, but also exposes the incompetence and wrongdoings of those holding political power. At this juncture, social media is worth mentioning. The power of this medium to influence the minds of public officials has been starkly illustrated in the Occupy Movement,

Last November 19, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a resolution declaring the PDAF unconstitutional. However, as this journal goes to print, this ruling has yet to be final and executory. 57 Ang Tanikalang Guinto and Isang Punlo ng Kaaway by Juan Abad; Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas by Aurelio Tolentino; Hindi Aco Patay by Juan Matapang Cruz; Pulong Pinaglahuan by Mariano Martinez; Dahas ng Pilak by Maximino de los Reyes; Malaya by Tomas Remigio; and, Walang Sugat by Severino Reyes. See Above n24 p117. 56

Arab Spring, and in our very own mass actions against the pork barrel fund. Even traditional media outlets and personalities have now utilized this medium as part and parcel of their work. Certainly, when employed by the right people and for the correct purpose, social media can readily unravel incompetence and corruption among the ranks of government officials. In conjunction with sustained efforts from the media industry, the mobilization of civil society is also very crucial in putting Section 1 of Article II into action. In this regard, I would like to quote a passage from a book I recently read, South Korea Since 1980, to wit: Despite the regionalism that dominated voting patterns, a change occurred in the 2000 elections concerning the role of civil society and its impact on election outcomes. During the campaign period, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) published a voter’s guide that included a list of 167 politicians who should not be elected because of their involvement in corruption scandals, opposition to reform policies, or appeals to regionalism for political gain. Moreover, 460 civil society groups organized Chongseon Yondai (The Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 National Assembly Election) and released a list of politicians who should not be nominated. After candidates were nominated, the Chongseon Yondai finalized a list of eighty-six candidates who should not be elected and campaigned against twenty-two of them. The campaign against select politicians by Chongseon Yondai significantly affected the election results, and only seven of the twenty-two against whom Chongseon Yondai campaigned were elected.58

I chose this specific section of the book because I am not entirely convinced that civil society in the Philippines are as organized and as fierce as their South Korean counterparts. I do not mean here the capacity to mobilize mass actions because Filipinos are particularly sublime in this area. I am more concerned about their capacity to implement an advocacy program that will run consistently for a sustained period. The political actions in the Philippines are mostly ad hoc campaign projects such as the Team Patay versus Team Buhay gimmick of the Catholic Church in the last elections and the Anti-Epal Movement. I think Philippine civil society groups can also come out with a far-reaching program that discourages voters from electing candidates who are involved in corruption scandals or charged with criminal offenses. They certainly have the wherewithal to run a comprehensive and well-thought campaign to dissuade the electorate from putting into office candidates who have no long-term development plans for their constituencies; who have no definite 58

Uk Heo & Terence Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p58.

stand on urgent issues such as climate change, population control, urban development, etc.; and who are obviously running for office simply to perpetuate their family in power. Filipino civil society groups can certainly lift the standard of their political actions in scale and sophistication. They can certainly do better than just hanging streamers and banners with clever slogans. CONCLUSION The rethinking process ends with the recognition that the Filipino polity cannot wait for public officials, elected and appointed, to act on the problem of political dynasties. Section 26 of Article II will remain dormant as long as the composition of Congress remains as is. Unfortunately, even legislations that indirectly weaken the hold of political dynasties have so little chance of ever coming into fruition. In fact, there are two bills pending now in Congress that can strike a huge blow against this political bane. The first one is the Freedom of Information Bill (FOI). Fortunately, this proposed piece of legislation has been certified by the President as urgent. Therefore, its passage in Congress has gained some traction. The other one is the Full Disclosure Bill filed by Congresswoman Gerona-Robredo, a first term Representative of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur. The fact that the said lawmaker is the widow of a political hero indeed bodes well for the enactment of this bill. Nevertheless, the reality is these bills are still pending before a Congress that is littered with political families. Quite literally, the fate of these proposed measures is in the hands of the very people it is seeks to eradicate. In fact, unless civil society groups and the media put their collective weight behind these bills, their odds of becoming law are patently not good. Indeed, the most viable remedial measure against political dynasties available for the Filipino polity is reintegrating Section 1 of Article II in our political culture. Pursuant thereto, I deeply believe that for our generation, this PDAF scandal as well as its other current and future manifestations such as the DAP (disbursement acceleration plan), is the line drawn in the sand against political dynasties. Accordingly, the polity must not let up in seeing the petitions pending in the Supreme Court and the plunder cases against Senators Enrile, Estrada, Revilla, and their cohorts through their proper conclusions.

And therefore, news outlets, of all forms and sizes, must always have space for these two legal actions in conjunction with a deeper and more sustained probe on the irregular and potentially unlawful use of public funds by the current regiment of government officials. Concomitantly, pundits and columnist of any persuasion must methodically breakdown this well-entrenched patronage scheme and unmask more public officials who continue to profit from it. Let the full extent of this syndicate be exposed and the principals placed on the docks for proper disposal. Furthermore, artists of all genres must author plays, poems, novels, songs, comedy shticks, documentaries, and screenplays tackling this unfolding crisis in our political system not only to record it for posterity but also to fuel the passion of the Filipinos for the crusade against political dynasties. Correspondingly, civil society groups must likewise be relentless in monitoring developments in these two cases as well as related events in the broader political landscape. And with more innovative presentations vigorously keep the polity involved and invested in this critical juncture of our nation-building efforts. Most important of all, Pinoy Netizens all over the globe should Twit, FB, and blog as often as they can about this crucial episode in our country’s history.59 No insight is mundane; no comment is irrelevant. Those holding political power must feel the wrath of the Filipinos. Essentially, the plan is to bombard all branches and agencies of government from every angle and via all available legitimate means until both the legislature and executive relent and first, scrap the PDAF, DAP or whatever form it may take without any conditions or concessions attached; then, recognize that this was an unlawful pay-out scheme; and finally, hold those who profited from it accountable down to the last centavo. In other words, let the syndicate (a.k.a. political dynasties) unravel in the face of this intense community pressure. For truly, this particular battle is the Filipinos’ Rubicon to cross where hopefully at the other side, we shall regain the power over those who rule us. And from whence, genuine political reform in the polity shall be undertaken under the dictate of this truism—“People should not be afraid of their governments. Governments should be afraid of their people.”60

See Arianne Munar, ABS-CBNnews.com, ‘Netizens weigh in on plunder case vs lawmakers’, September 17, 2013 at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/09/17/13/netizens-weigh-plunder-case-vs-lawmakers. 60 This is a quotation from the movie V for Vendetta. 59