Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power

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Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance Michael Rochlitz

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Higher School of Economics, Moscow Published online: 12 Aug 2014.

To cite this article: Michael Rochlitz (2014) Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, Europe-Asia Studies, 66:7, 1199-1201, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2014.934142 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.934142

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likely to express their loyalty to the regime by participating in elections (p. 141). On the other hand, the middle-class members pleading for more democracy are more likely to make their voices heard by directly contacting and petitioning party officials. Overall, more than 60% of the interviewed middleclass individuals had participated in the previous elections and only a tiny minority had engaged in active political behaviour (p. 161). The careful definition of the middle class helps Chen avoid many pitfalls, but at times the reader wonders whether middle-class members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) behave differently from non-members. The author makes it clear that there is a link between private-sector employment expansion and democratic support and suggests that ‘as the size of that non-state sector segment of the middle class increases, the general level of democratic support within the middle class should gradually rise’ (p. 165). Nevertheless Chen points out that the middle class’ satisfaction with its own social and economic status represents a second cluster of variables influencing the degree of support for democracy amongst this group (pp. 113 – 114). As long as the middle class is content with its social and economic status, there should not be any shifts in its orientation toward democracy. Chen’s data show that, paradoxically, the Chinese middle class compared to the lower class is more anti-democratic. So what might shatter the political loyalty of China’s middle class? Chen conjectures that the middleclass support for the status quo might decline if economic and political inequality in China continues to rise. Even though the gaˆige´ ka¯ifa`ng (reform and opening up policy) initiated by Deng Xiaoping served to raise tens of millions of Chinese out of poverty, the growing lack of social mobility may strengthen the wealth – party nexus in China and alienate part of the middle class in the future. Chen’s volume makes a significant theoretical and empirical contribution to the long-standing debate between those social scientists favouring a contingent approach and those supporting the modernisation perspective with regards to China’s future evolution. The present study falls in the contingent approach camp, since its findings offer support to the claim that in China, the middle class’ support for democracy is contingent on two sets of variables: its social and economic status satisfaction and its dependence on state patronage. The more satisfied the middle-class members are with their current status, and the more patronage opportunities are provided by the state, the less likely it is that the middle class will demand political changes. The growing private sector of the Chinese economy, rising economic inequality and vigorous economic development are potential disruptors of the existing equilibrium. However, it is difficult to tell what is the precise mix of factors that will sever the bond established between the Chinese state and the middle class. Moreover, these changes may only occur in the long term. After all, the CCP is continuously recruiting members of the middle class as members, and thus adapting to the changing economic and social environment. For now, Chen’s prediction is rather static, for as he says: ‘China’s middle class is unlikely to serve as a catalyst of democratisation, either immediately or in the very near future’ (p. 163). Even though the transition to a capitalist economy under the guidance of the CCP is still an ongoing process, Jie Chen’s well-researched study successfully enhances our understanding of the conditions under which capitalism may breed a multiparty democracy in China. It is a must-read, not just for scholars studying China, but also for those academics interested in the political implications of economic transition in the former communist countries. Rutgers University

ION MARANDICI q 2014

Alena Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013, xv þ 314pp., £19.99/$55.00 p/b. GO TO ANY RUSSIAN BOOKSHOP, AND THE POLITICS SECTION WILL BE FULL of colourful journalistic accounts discussing who really pulls the strings behind the Kremlin walls. However, while there is no lack of books, either within Russia or outside, on Vladimir Putin and the people in his inner circle,

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serious evidence-based studies on Russia’s power networks are still rare. The question of how informal governance and political decision making really work behind the fac
ade of Russia’s often hollowed-out institutions has so far remained mostly the object of speculation. Following on from her two books on informal networks at the lower levels of Russian society during the late Soviet Union and in early post-communist Russia, Alena Ledeneva’s new work tackles the question of how elite networks at the very top of Russian politics are organised. In her usual thorough fashion, Ledeneva combines anthropological and sociological methods to analyse how informal elite networks emerge, work and reproduce themselves in Putin’s Russia. She then asks how this system of informal networks, which she calls sistema, affects the ability of the Russian state to modernise economically and politically. In large parts, Ledeneva’s study is based on 42 in-depth interviews with high-level members of Putin’s administration and expert observers of Russian politics. The interviews are complemented with an analysis of publicly available writings by former and current Russian state officials, as well as by an ethnographic analysis of the material culture of power networks in Putin’s Russia. Informal networks have played an important role both in the Soviet Union and in post-communist Russia, even though the nature of informal practices has changed over time. Whereas in Soviet times blat (the Russian term for informal connections) was extensively used to obtain access to scarce consumer goods, in the new Russia getting access to money, secure investment, elite education and well-paid jobs has supplanted access to washing machines, cars and flats in the hierarchy of needs. What has remained the same is the all-permeating nature of the phenomenon, with two-thirds of respondents in a 2007 survey answering that blat is widespread or rather widespread in their region (p. 9). It is thus no surprise that informal networks play an important role in Russian politics as well. During the chaotic 1990s, informal connections between businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians were used to get things done in a fledgling market economy that was still full of contradictions. In adding flexibility to the system, informal networks did not necessarily have a negative effect on the country’s economic performance at that time. However, Ledeneva argues that when Vladimir Putin seemingly re-consolidated the Russian state during the 2000s, these networks did not gradually decrease in importance, but actually expanded into an endogenously evolving and self-sustaining system that today permeates all levels of government decision making. This personalistic system, or sistema, permits the ruling elites to bypass existing institutions in order to quickly obtain specific results. Thus, leading businessmen can be informed through informal channels that it is in their interest to co-finance a specific investment project. A judge may receive a phone call telling him what judgement it would be wise to pass. Even without receiving specific instructions, subordinates who are able to read the signs know when an official order has to be followed up on, and when it would be better to actually do the opposite. While personal ability and merit also play a role, people are often recruited into high-level positions for their ability to play by sistema rules. Finally, the flexibility inherent in sistema also makes it possible to provide rewards, kick-backs and privileges for insiders, and thus is in no small way responsible for Russia’s sprawling levels of corruption. Once you are an insider, it is difficult to leave. Due to the informal nature of sistema, everyone sooner or later is bound to break some official rules. In the event of non-compliance, this compromising information can then be used against you. The existence of incriminating information on every insider serves as a means of controlling the powerful clans and interests at the top of Russian politics, and ensures that no-one oversteps the bounds of sistema’s unwritten rules. The system thus guarantees a certain level of stability at the top of Russian politics, and makes it possible for the country’s leadership to mobilise resources for a limited number of projects, solve a certain number of problems and control the political opposition by using informal links and manual control. But while ruling the country by using informal networks might have been a necessary evil during the early days of economic transition, in Russia’s increasingly sophisticated market economy

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such a personalistic system of governance is a decisive liability. The necessity to maintain sistema makes it impossible to effectively de-centralise and delegate tasks and decision making, and to achieve local and regional autonomy and accountability. Every necessary decision is invariably passed up to the president. The result is an institutional system that is cumbersome and inflexible, and badly suited for any kind of economic modernisation or institutional reform. Ledeneva calls this dilemma the ‘modernisation trap of informality’. Having created a system that concentrates power and control within a small group of people around the Russian president, the country’s leadership has effectively entangled itself in a network of informal links and understandings that cannot be unbundled without compromising and bringing down Russia’s ruling elites themselves. As long as high oil prices provide enough rents to keep the system’s many clients as well as Russia’s overall population happy, sistema might survive. But once the country’s leadership has to start building its legitimacy on its ability to successfully implement economic modernisation and institutional reform, it is difficult to see how Russia’s current elites will be able to maintain their hold on power. Higher School of Economics, Moscow

MICHAEL ROCHLITZ q 2014

Marle`ne Laruelle & Se´bastien Peyrouse, Globalizing Central Asia. Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development. Armonk, NY & London: M. E. Sharpe, 2013, xx þ 354pp., £27.95/ $32.95 p/b. AS SOMEONE WHO IS BOTH A RESEARCHER AND A NATIVE of Central Asia, I closely follow publications on the region, and note with pleasure that recent work is increasingly more analytical, better informed and less biased. It is indeed rewarding to read the new wave of publications which provide in-depth, multidimensional, critical analysis of Central Asian affairs and view the countries of the region not only as pawns in the ‘great game’ of the global powers, but also as fully-fledged complex actors in their own right. Globalizing Central Asia by Marle`ne Laruelle and Se´bastien Peyrouse is a decent example of the new wave of research in Central Asian studies. Based upon detailed analysis of numerous and varied sources, including research publications by local and international authors, statistical data and extensive interviews, the book provides an excellent all-round overview of Central Asian politics and economy within a broader context of international politics and geo-economics. The book is divided into two parts. The first analyses Central Asia through the prism of its relations with powerful external state actors: Russia, China, the United States and the European Union—the usual suspects of geopolitical games around the world. Russia is the most long-standing actor engaged with the region. Despite the ‘civilised divorce’ with its former fellow Soviet republics, Russia finds itself in a position to influence local politics, and is inevitably obsessed with security on its southern borders (p. 14). Russia undoubtedly has advantages stemming from the Soviet past shared with its Central Asian counterparts. Soviet integration in the spheres of economic infrastructure and institutional mechanisms accompanied by uninterrupted people-to-people relations give Russia more leverage when dealing with its southern neighbours (p. 22). In contrast to Russia, China is still in the process of re-discovering its neighbours in Central Asia. While Central Asia plays a minor role in Chinese foreign policy when compared to Russia or the US, it is nevertheless an important strategic and economic region. Central Asia is crucial for China’s security and integrity on its western borders, as it shares a frontier with China’s rebellious Xing Jiang province. In addition, Central Asia is a new big market for Chinese goods, and a promising source of energy resources. The US—a distant but ‘unavoidable partner’ (p. 43)—is largely driven by its security interests informed by the war on terror and the Afghan campaign. Central Asia, in particular Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, offers safer routes to and from the troubled Afghanistan (Northern