China\'s Political Prospects

Ezra Baeli-Wang
7 August 2015
Chinese Politics & Governance
Prospect of Political Reform

In this essay I will analyze the prospects of political reform in China's future through two lenses: the reform itself, and the potential reformers. In each category I will discuss the existing and historical factors that either support or contest the probability of significant political reform taking place in the coming years, and formulate a conclusion regarding China's forthcoming political trajectory. My argument rests on historical analysis and scholarly research that suggests China's political future will be characterized by internal reforms and superficial progress towards apparent democracy, coupled with the careful evasion of any significant, systemic democratization. It is important to note the distinction between progress towards apparent democracy and "progress" in this context, as I posit that a sustainable, post-democratic future could be on the horizon for the world's most populous country.
Most experts agree that, with the unprecedented growth of its capitalist market economy, China's current political model is not sustainable. Industrialization has occurred on a rapid scale and, nation-wide, the vast majority of Chinese citizens have experienced an enormous improvement in their standards of living in the past decade. However, the political progress that usually goes hand-in-hand with such swift financial development has been conspicuously absent in the Chinese model. Some experts say the Chinese government lacks political legitimacy, and Minxin Pei, Chinese public policy expert at Claremont McKenna College, goes so far as to say that the government retains its influence over the Chinese people "mainly by repression" (Li, 2012), citing the party's ban on the sale of knives, as well as balloons and flying toys, on the eve of the 18th Party Congress for fear of an attack on government officials, or in the latter case, the anonymous distribution of anti-governmental messages as a prime example of the paranoia that characterizes the Party in the current era(Reuters?). Cheng Li of the Brookings Institute argues that this necessity for political reform stems from rampant corruption and the Communist Party of China's consequential loss of the "moral bottom line;" these factors, he believes, will bring about much needed political reform in China (Li, 2012).
Pei, though in agreement with Li that Chinese political reform (in the form of democratization) is long overdue, is hesitant to equate the necessity for reform with the inevitability of reform. He draws attention to the frequency with which the international community sees examples of authoritarian states in political disrepair that continue to operate in stubborn opposition to the idea of making internal reforms. Turning his focus inward, Pei further insists that even domestically, China has shown little inclination towards enacting reforms regardless of their level of purported necessity. As impressive as the Chinese economic model has proven to be, Pei points out that the past decade has illuminated the need for, and witnessed much discussion of, rebalancing the economy, rooting out corruption, addressing inequality, and perhaps most importantly, halting the unmitigated strengthening of the state sector at the expense of the private sector (Li, 2012). Yet, Pei points out, little has been done. In an area that requires much less bureaucratic and dogmatic navigation than policy, this inaction on the part of the Chinese government is a strong caveat to those hopeful for imminent democratic political reform.
Those more optimistic about China's potential for democratization assert that there is a historical pattern of reform that parallels generational changes in the individuals that comprise the political elite. Li points to Deng Xiaoping's move away from Maoism and the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents," and most recently, and perhaps most relevantly, Hu Jintao's "Harmonious Society" and the increased focus on social issues, social cohesion and more balanced regional development (Li, 2012). Li therefore posits that the fifth generation of Chinese leadership could very well set their sights on fundamental political reform.
Here the conversation transitions from the less controversial desire for reform, to the murkier discussion of the (potential) reformers themselves. As Pei points out, while it can be beneficial to analyze the historical precedent set by the fifth generation's predecessors in the hopes of discerning the possible intentions of the current leadership, pragmatically it simply makes more sense to turn one's attention to the current leadership and their actions. Though they lived through the Cultural Revolution and were undoubtedly influenced by the political circumstances under which they matured, both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have lengthy track records that suggest strong administrative capabilities, but also relatively consistent adherence to party-line politics. In considering the fifth generation's predecessors, Pei points out that perhaps even more important than the reforms that they enacted, is the powerful policy influence that individuals like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao still wield (Li, 2012). While they each oversaw new programs and made modifications to Chinese governance during their tenure, their administrations were conservative and restrained when it came to taking any sort of political reform beyond a certain point. Hu's discussion of democracy in connection with establishing his "Harmonious Society" for example, encourages 'fuller expression of the popular masses' and various sectors' activism, initiative and creativity," through recognition of the 'organic unity of party leadership' (Nathan, p. 28). This sort of democratic rhetoric regularly accompanies and euphemizes, what amount to insignificant internal reforms and empty generalities in Chinese politics. In fact, the mention of "democracy" in Chinese political rhetoric is often associated with the praise of necessary changes having already been enacted, and not indicative of a call for reform.
In the 2004 "Resolution on Enhancing the Governing Capacity of the CCP," the indispensability of "maintaining the organic solidarity of the leadership of the party…and continuously raising and developing the capacity of socialist democratic politics," of "democratic elections, democratic decisionmaking democratic management and democratic supervision" and of "multiparty cooperation" all appear in the same clause (Nathan, p. 29). The seemingly counterintuitive aggregation of what are generally seen as diametrically opposed ideas—democracy and maintained party control—are telling gauges of Chinese political thought. The concept of blending these conflicting ideologies, or more accurately, of allowing one ideology (democracy) to be swallowed whole and processed by the other (authoritarian single-party control), is exactly what defines Chinese policymaker's methodologies. Note that the resolution is careful to describe the involvement of outside parties as one of cooperation and not competition. This technique is seen today in the way that the Chinese government will draw on NGO's and other parties as consultants of sorts, or even lower-level branches of its own influence, delegating specific policy areas and issues as these other party's or NGO's responsibilities. However the idea of a party other than the CPC competing for power has no place in the Chinese definition of "democracy." This defiance of Western democracy's most rudimentary criterion is illustrated in the resolution's opening statement: 'Our party's role as ruling party is the choice of history and the choice of the people" (Nathan, p. 29). That sustained control of power is at the top of the CPC's agenda is made crystal clear, that its legitimacy should be periodically tested by competitive elections is not suggested (Nathan, p.29).
These ideologies are reflected in the reforms that the Communist Party of China has already undertaken, and should be viewed as methods by which the Party is attempting to present a façade of change behind which it can actually strengthen the legitimacy of a single-party state. In addition to the examples illustrated by the party documents above, Chinese policymakers have, in their public statements about democracy, given every indication that their attitude towards change and political reform is one of complacence and contentedness; their conviction that the party already has made some significant changes that should satiate the democratic appetites of Chinese citizens, and international onlookers, is unwavering. In Wen Jiabao's discussion of three important aspects of a democratic system—elections, judicial independence, and supervision based on a system of checks and balances—the article's author reminds the reader that while the invocation of these aspects is reassuring on a surface-level, it is important to consider the political context of Jiabao's statements. The elections Jiabao referred to were already occurring on a local level, with village leaders seeing the highest degree of freedom and competition in election. These leaders, invariably, hold very little real policy influence, and at each successively higher level of government the competition declines. Even just one step above township-level posts, the frequently narrows to three candidates running for a two seats. In the upper echelons of government, the National Party Congress has no difficulty in indirectly electing leaders, because there is only ever one candidate, which results in comically high election margins, with national leaders consistently garnering 98-99% of the "vote" so to speak. That being said, Jiabao's, and the CPC's understanding of "elections" as a part of a democratic system are seen as helpful, but more importantly, harmless tools that can be used effectively to give constituents a sense of direct involvement with the lowest-level government officials with whom the people most frequently interact. The village election precedent tends to suggest that universal suffrage elections for seats in people's congress is a conceivable part of China's political future; however, a position in the people's congress holds no more democratic significance for China, in that those that the congress elects are unopposed, party-selected candidates as discussed above. Posts like local CCP secretaries and other that wield more-than-nominal political influence, will most likely remain under strict governmental control (Nathan, p. 28).
Democracy however, in spite of what the West will have most countries believe, may not be the highest form of "-ocracy" a state should aspire to operate under. While many China-watchers might lament the dim prospects of Chinese democratization, and those with even more cursory understandings of the Chinese governmental system and policy machinations in general might falsely equate this probable failure to democratize with a failure to reform, the fact is that the Chinese Communist Party is one of the most effectively self-reforming systems in the international community. Its effectiveness can largely be attributed to China's having established one of the best working models of meritocracy in the world. While few would deny that China's current system is plagued by a certain degree of corruption, employment, mobility, and promotion within the government is predominantly merit-based. Statistical polling conducted within China corroborates this idea, indicating that the general public's perception of corruption is heavily restricted to local-level politicians. Though certainly not universally applicable, the public's perception is not altogether misguided. In fact, as early as 2000, the People's Paper (renmin ribao) in China published a popularly circulated article criticizing the lack of meritocratic methods in the United States' method of electing a national leader, pointing out that to make a realistic bid for office, candidates must be well-off enough financially to fund his or her own campaign (人民报告, p. ). The article asserts that a system that so heavily discourages those of a lower socio-economic status from holding public office borders on a plutocracy, and can hardly claim to authentically represent its constituents. China's perception of the traditional Western model of democracy, in this particular aspect, is certainly not one of admiration.
In contrast to the American democratic system, where the nation's leaders, and its candidates for leadership, consistently rank comfortably within the top quartile of the nation's socioeconomic classes, it is not uncommon for top-ranking Chinese officials to come from middle- and even low-class backgrounds. Prior to the 18th Party Congress, of the 25 members of the Politburo, only five came from privileged backgrounds; within the CPC's larger central committee, the number of privileged individuals is even smaller (Li, 2013). While this is not to say that being a part of China's financial elite automatically disqualifies one from holding political office, it is evident that the rigor and relative objectiveness of the Chinese system (that has an ancient history of relying on standardized examinations to determine governmental employment) lends itself to hard-working, talented individuals with a passion and ability for policy, regardless of socioeconomic status. This balance, and (at least theoretical) elimination of unfair advantages for society's elites, is something that the West's democracies are conspicuously lacking. This argument, promoted by intellectuals like Eric X. Li, supports the idea that, different as it may be from what the international community, and particularly the West, would like perhaps like to see, political reform will continue to occur in China. The controversy here lies in the concept that China's reform is not only different, but also perhaps beneficial in bringing the world into a new post-democratic era in its demonstration of a sustainable, successful form of government.
Under the new fifth-generation leadership, China has shown considerable resolve in the face of the recent economic downturn and the increasingly educated and progressive-thinking populous. The CPC's sustained dominance in the face of globalization, a growing middle class, a pluralizing society and generational turnover is looking more like the result of careful policymaking decisions of a highly-attuned central government, and less like a desperate bid to cling to power. The continued success of the CPC in an international atmosphere that tends to tilt in favor of Western-style democracies can be attributed to a number of factors, all of which transcend their circumstances and suggest sustainability beyond their current efficacy. Most notably, the party has taken measures to simultaneously address some of the public's largest grievances by expanding the role of the third sector and increasing public involvement while intensifying the supervision and prosecution of increasingly common local-level corruption.
The growth of the first and second sectors in present-day China, coupled with rapid economic and population growth, have considerably increased both sectors' responsibilities and consequently augmented the need for a strong third sector capable of providing social services to the masses (Lau, ). As the party's tenuous ties to the revolution that have historically provided it with political legitimacy grow increasingly weak, economic performance has remained the government's main concern in keeping people satisfied and society stable. While the government has not struggled to achieve this task—with 54% of respondents in a recent survey affirming that they anticipated moderate or great income growth in the coming five years—the economic-heavy focus of the government has left social programs lacking, and has illuminated the need for the party-state to readjust its relationship with society (Fewsmith, p. 214). These attitudes not only offer some insight into potential reasons for why "China's political elite feel little compulsion to initiate democratic reform," but also explain the impetus behind the increasing opportunities for growth that have been granted to various NGO's and GONGO's (Fewsmith, p. 215). China's NGO's are a quintessential example of the blend of the contradictory forces that characterize Chinese politics discussed earlier in this essay. Their responsibilities are serious and far-reaching, from distributing funds donated domestically and internationally, to providing social services to the public and assisting the government in performing local level tasks from education to infrastructure (Lau, ). However, it is important to note that though NGO's development marks an important change in state-society relations, this "does not imply that 'civil society' is about to break out in China (Fewsmith, p.220 ). Like "democratization" it's unproductive to view even something as internationally understood as NGO's (and their development in China) through a Western lens. The government's endorsement of the third sector's growth is not without its limitations and unique restrictions that ensure that with society's progressive advancements, the CPC's authority will not be challenged in the same way the authoritarian governments in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were overturned by the "color revolutions" of 2004-2005 (Fewsmith, p. 218). NGO's are legally required to register with the government in order to operate, and as a prerequisite to registration, they must find a supervisory organization, usually a relevant governmental department, to act as their advisory group (Lau, ). Furthermore many NGO members are run by former government officials, and often still maintain close ties with the government, so much so that some NGO members are on the government payroll (Lau, ). Keep in mind that these organizations differentiate themselves from the even more explicitly and counterintuitively government-affiliated Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGO's). Such a paradoxically close relationship between NGO's and the government is unthinkable to Western onlookers, but is conducive to understanding the attitude and methodology of the Chinese government in terms of its approach to political reform.
Ultimately China's prospects for political reform are complex and full of potential, but impenetrably difficult to understand if approached from a Western sociopolitical stance. There is a historical basis to the skepticism in some spheres of the CPC's intent to reform at all, democratically or not. The recent economic slowdown and continued support of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE's) that threaten the livelihood of private businesses that are vital to a prosperous market economy moves scholars like Minxin Pei to doubt China's responsiveness to signs calling for change (Li, 2012) Fortifying his doubt is the current leadership's track record and the observable influence that older, officially-retired government officials still hold in current policy-decisions; neither Hu Jintao nor Jiang Zemin made any real steps towards democratization, though they were did implement some changes to increase social cohesion and rebalance regional wealth distributions (Nathan, p. 27). Furthermore, the rhetoric of party leaders, and increasingly important legal documents of the party (Chi-Yuk) all illustrate an almost ironic eagerness to employ the concept of "democracy," but an equally swift resolve to distinguish it as a uniquely Chinese form of democracy and not a concession to international (and chiefly Western) pressures (DeLisle, p. 203). Though not a concession to external influences this "Chinese democratization," at least nominally, is a concession to an increasingly progressive and educated populous. While there appears to be an observable flow of power from the top down, from the hands of the party to Non-Governmental Organizations and even the public in areas of public social service and elections, further analysis of these systems reveals a mutually exclusive provision of liberty and responsibility to NGO's and local constituents that carefully avoids a simultaneous reduction in the power held by the central government. NGO's are fundamentally different from the NGO's in the West in terms of their relationship with the government; their "non-governmental" characteristics are unimportant except to illustrate that they operate in areas that receive less officially-sanctioned attention from the economy-focused government. Their real political influence, beyond the specific duties they are delegated, is virtually nonexistent due to required governmental oversight, and the heavy overlap of employees involved in both NGO's and some branch of the government. This "just-enough" philosophy of political appeasement of the masses is also evident in the application of competitive elections at the lowest, and most locally-involved, level of government, giving the public exposure to what feels like a democratic process but with very little actual political implications, as elections just one or two tiers up immediately narrow to candidates running unopposed for their seats. These patterns indicate that China's philosophy regarding future reforms will continue to be handled on a case-by-case basis with the central committee taking advantage of its ubiquity and absolute authority to gauge the public atmosphere and determine which issues deserve the most attention. The CPC is ruthlessly pragmatic and impressively self-aware, it understands that the sentiment of the international community has more sway among its people now, with the spread of the internet (despite the great firewall) and the spread of globalization, than it did twenty years before. However the CPC's adaptability will ensure that its legitimacy is derived from continuously changing sources, each reflecting the contemporary attitude of its people, from historical triumph over foreign invasion to economic performance to wealth redistribution. Today, the CPC is increasingly putting forth policies (and even more energetically publicizing these policies) that are designed to appear as though power is being actively transferred from the government to the hands of the people. This nominal effort at emulating democracy for the singular purpose of manufacturing a more acceptable international image will require constant maintenance but will allow the CPC to maintain its monopolization of power and behind-the-scenes development of the world's most promising meritocracy.



Works Cited
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Lau, Clement Chu S. "The Role of NGOs in China." Quarterly Journal of Ideology 31 (2009): n. pag. Abstract. : n. pag. Print.
Li, Cheng, and Minxin Pei. "Li vs. Pei on China's Prospects for Political Reform." The Brookings Institution. The Wall Street Journal, 08 Nov. 2012. Web. 08 Aug. 2015.
Li, Eric X. "The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China." Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations, Jan.-Feb. 2013. Web. 8 Aug. 2015.
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