Cicero De Provinciis Consularibus, Oxford University Press, American Philological Association series

A M E R I C A N P H I L O L O G I C A L A S S O C I AT I O N

CICERO’S DE PROVINCIIS CONSULARIBUS ORATIO

Introduction and Commentary by

Luca Grillo

Preface Cicero delivered his speech on the allocation of the consular provinces (De Provinciis Consularibus) at the age of fifty, in the summer of 56 bce. The year is remembered as the time when the so-called first triumvirate was renewed. In the spring, Caesar left Gaul to meet with Pompey and Crassus, and the deal was struck: Pompey and Crassus would support Caesar’s confirmation as proconsul in Gaul, and his veterans would in turn support their election as the consuls for 55. But all the ambition, money and power of the three dynasts were not enough. To realize their plans, they needed the aid of the most prominent orator of the time, Cicero. Between May and July, Cicero responded to pressure from Pompey and delivered a speech to the senate De Provinciis Consularibus (henceforth Prov.). His eloquence persuaded the senators, with the result that Gaul was again assigned to Caesar, a fact that dramatically changed the course of Roman and European history. Transalpine Gaul was “pacified” (to use Cicero’s term), and Caesar managed to realize his ambitions, thanks to the powerful weapon that Cicero had put in his hands. In less than six years, and much to Cicero’s distress, Caesar would break with the senate, and the civil war he then fought against Pompey marked the end of the Roman Republic and the eventual beginning of the Principate. Aside from its historical importance, Prov. is a prime example of Roman political oratory. Cicero used his talents to attack Piso and Gabinius and to praise Caesar; to justify Roman imperialism and provincial administration; to hide the intricacies of his relationship with Caesar and the senate; and to convince his fellow senators to take a decision that Caesar, Pompey and Crassus had in fact already taken. Prov. thus provides a powerful window into the high politics of the 50s, the relations between Rome and the provinces, the senators’ view on governors, publicans and foreigners, the complicated personality of Cicero, and the role of oratory in ancient Rome.

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but he did not publish all of them, and only a portion of those he published have survived for us.

ii. context and date of delivery and publication Historical context of 56 The beginning of the year saw Cicero active both in senatorial meetings and in court, where he successfully defended some friends (Calpurnius Bestia in February, Sestius in February and March, and Asicius and Caelius in April). His archenemy, Clodius, was no less active and continued to use popular assemblies, interventions in the senate, judicial trials and street riots to carry on his program. The fluid equilibrium of alliances brought Clodius close to some conservative senators, who saw him as a convenient check on the power of Pompey, until the events of April caused a turning point not only in Cicero’s life but also in the history of the Roman republic. On April 5, the senate followed Cicero’s proposal and fixed a meeting for May 15 to discuss the hot issue of the Campanian land. This proposal certainly displeased Caesar. As consul in 59 Caesar had carried a law for allotting some land in Campania (the fertile region around Naples, south of Rome) to needy citizens with families, and after the people passed the law, commissions were formed to buy, divide and distribute the lots of land (MRR 2.187–8; Att. 2.6.2 and 2.7.3–4). In December 57, however, while the distributions were still taking place, the dire straits of state finances led a tribune of the plebs, Lupus, to suggest that the state resume possession of the land and that distributions be blocked. Nothing became of Lupus’ proposal, and Caesar must have been relieved to see that the issue was put on the back burner, but only until the financial situation worsened due to the skyrocketing prices of grain in Rome and the senate’s grant of 40,000,000 sesterces to Pompey for taking care of grain supplies. In this context Cicero brought up the issue of the Campanian land again. This amounted

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to nothing less than an aggressive move against Caesar: most probably, Cicero, who at first disapproved of the private alliance joining Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, saw that in 56 the senate was more supportive of Pompey than of Caesar and hence seized the occasion to try to drive a wedge between them (Fam. 1.9.6–9). Meanwhile, in February 56 Cicero also attacked Vatinius, the protégé of Caesar who had proposed the law granting him command in Gaul, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus declared he that would stand for consulship for 55, voicing his intention to recall Caesar from Gaul. These threats elicited Caesar’s prompt and energetic reaction. In April 56 he managed to meet with Pompey and with Crassus, and they re-formed their private alliance. The details of the meeting are much debated but its effects are clear: Caesar offered the votes of his veterans to support Pompey and Crassus in the consular elections for 55, and they promised their help in having Caesar confirmed in Gaul. It is uncertain how much Cicero knew of this deal, but soon he felt the pressure, since Caesar had also asked Pompey to use his influence with Cicero and induce him to withdraw his opposition. Cicero was cornered. Although concerned and disgusted at Clodius’ rapprochement with the so-called optimates, he could not risk losing Pompey’s support: on May 15 the senate debated the issue of Campanian land, but Cicero, who had proposed this addition to the agenda, skipped the meeting. Soon the demands of Caesar, Pompey and Crassus became even more pressing, and Cicero was chosen to champion their cause. When the senate met to decide on the provinces to allot to the consuls of 55, Cicero (who may or may not have known that Pompey and Crassus intended to stand for the consulship) attacked his enemies, Piso and Gabinius, arguing that they should be recalled from Macedonia and Syria, and withdrew his opposition to Caesar, arguing that he should be confirmed in Gaul. Prov. is the transcription of this speech. The outcome of the senatorial debate What happened next? It is hard to overstate the historical importance of the dynasts’ machinations and of this speech in their support.

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Leaving aside speculations on what would have happened if Cicero had not yielded to their will, we can observe at least two spectacular consequences. Crassus, having served as consul in 55, replaced Gabinius in Syria, where he died in 53; and more important, Gaul was reassigned to Caesar, a fact that dramatically changed the course of Roman and European history. Gaul became part of the Roman Empire, and Caesar managed to realize his ambitions, thanks to the powerful weapon that Cicero had put into his hands. In less than six years, much to Cicero’s distress, Caesar broke with the senate, and the civil war he fought against Pompey marked the end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Principate. And yet, what was the direct outcome of Cicero’s intervention in the senate? As seen, Cicero made a twofold recommendation—to have Caesar’s mandate in Gaul confirmed, and to recall his personal enemies, Piso from Macedonia and Gabinius from Syria. To achieve these goals, Cicero proposed to extend Caesar’s command in Gaul and to make Macedonia and Syria both consular and praetorian provinces (cf. 17.8n.): making them consular meant assigning them to the two not-yet-elected consuls of 55, who, being busy in Rome, would not reach them until the end of their consulship. But since Cicero wanted to see Piso and Gabinius replaced as soon as possible, he recommended making Macedonia and Syria also praetorian, so that two praetors would replace them at the beginning of 55, until the consuls’ arrival. According to Asconius, Piso and Gabinius were recalled from their provinces “because of Cicero’s recommendation”: cum revocati essent de provinciis Piso et Gabinius sententia Ciceronis (ad Pis. 2.2–3). Other evidence, however, demonstrates that Cicero was not so successful. Piso returned from Macedonia in summer 55 and upon his return he attacked Cicero in the senate (Ascon. ad Pis. 2): the fact that Piso returned in 55 and that he recognized Cicero’s agency behind his recall suggest that Cicero had succeeded in making Macedonia a consular and praetorian province (Prov. 17). This is confirmed by another passage from Pis., where Cicero alleges that Piso turned white and dropped half-dead at the news that he had been replaced because Macedonia was made praetorian but that

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Gabinius, by contrast, had not been replaced in Syria (debilitatio atque abiectio animi tui Macedonia praetoria nuntiata, cum tu non solum quod tibi succederetur sed quod Gabinio non succederetur exsanguis et mortuus concidisti, Pis. 88). This last statement from Pis. also demonstrates that Asconius must be wrong about Syria. In fact, unlike Piso who was recalled from Macedonia in 55, Gabinius remained as governor of Syria until 54, and this implies that Cicero had failed in persuading the senate to make Syria a praetorian province. Moreover, in 55 Trebonius, a protégé of the consuls Pompey and Crassus, pushed through a law, the lex Trebonia, in order to make Spain and Syria consular provinces, thus allotting Spain to Pompey and Syria to Crassus. This seems to imply that Cicero’s recommendation was not enough to make Syria a consular province and thereby recall Gabinius (cf. Marshall 1985: 84–5 and Lewis 2006: 194). Perhaps Asconius oversimplified the outcome of Prov. to magnify Cicero’s success. Similarly, Caesar’s reappointment in Gaul cannot be completely ascribed to Prov.: another law, the lex Licinia, passed by the people in 55, was needed to reassign Gaul to Caesar for five more years. Hence, Cicero’s actual contribution with Prov. was to prevent the senate from replacing Caesar by assigning the two Gauls to the consuls of 55 according to the lex Sempronia (cf. Balb. 61) and to have Piso recalled from Macedonia and replaced by one of the praetors of 55. Date Since we lack external evidence to date Prov., we can rely only on Cicero’s references to contemporary events. Cicero states that the senate refused a thanksgiving to Gabinius (Prov. 14), and we know from one of his letters that this happened on May 15 (QF 2.7.1, in the same meeting where the distribution of the Campanian land was discussed). May 15 therefore is the terminus post quem, and since the allocation of consular provinces had to take place before the consular elections (cf. below on the assignment of consular provinces), which were normally held toward the middle of July, Prov. was given between May 15 and mid-July. But we can be more specific.

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The end of May (suggested by Mommsen, 1894: 5.130 n.1) can be excluded, for at 15 Cicero says that “if the couriers do not slow down, within a few days Gabinius will repent for having requested a thanksgiving,” implying that the news of the senate’s refusal was to reach Gabinius soon, paucis diebus. A courier would take between five and eight weeks to reach Syria from Rome, so that a calculation based on the senate’s decision on 15 May, plus 5–8 weeks to allow time for the courier to reach Gabinius, minus a few days since Cicero assumes that the news had not reached him yet, locates Prov. between mid-June and mid-July. Scholars’ attempts to narrow this window have given different results. Gelzer (1983: 168–9) and Habicht (1990: 69–70) believe that it was pronounced in June (cf. Marinone 2004: 119 B13). Kaster (2006: 393–408), however, having conducted a thorough and clear analysis of the Roman calendar, suggests 1–9 July, observing that June had 29 days and that 16–29 June were comitial days, when popular assemblies could be summoned and the senate would not typically meet. This hypothesis is appealing but does not rule out June, since Romans were especially keen to avoid meetings of the senate and of popular assemblies on the same day, but on comitial days, if no popular assembly was held, the senate could be summoned even if the agenda was not particularly pressing (Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 241–3). Moreover, the presiding consul who interrupts Cicero in the course of Prov. is almost certainly Philippus (see 18.20n.), and since consuls alternated monthly in presiding over the senate and since the other consul, Lentulus Marcellinus, seems to have presided in January and March (Fam. 1.2.1; QF 2.5.2, with Saunders 1919), it follows that Prov. probably fell under Philippus’ presidency, being pronounced in (the second half of) June. The months from April to June 56, when Caesar, via Pompey, put pressure on Cicero, coincide with a visible change in Cicero’s attitude toward the dynasts; and, as a result, scholars have ransacked Cicero’s correspondence and speeches looking for evidence for what Cicero thought, said and did, and to reconstruct this momentous time in Roman history. In particular, much scholarship has focused on Cicero’s reference to his public and humiliating palinodia, “recantation.”

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Palinodia? As seen above, early in 56 Cicero supported various bills against Caesar, but after the conference at Luca, and especially after Pompey pressured him to withhold his opposition to Caesar, his attitude dramatically changed. Cicero was well aware of his change of attitude and of the reaction it elicited from some of his contemporaries, especially from some leading senators who opposed the new alliance between Caesar, Pompey and Crassus. Sometime between April and June 56 Cicero responded to his friend Atticus, who complained about not being the first to receive something he had written: Ain tu? an me existimas ab ullo malle mea legi probarique quam te? cur igitur cuiquam misi prius? urgebar ab eo ad quem misi et non habebam exempla duo. quin etiam ( dudum enim circumrodo quod devorandum est) subturpicula mihi videbatur esse . Att. 4.5.1 What do you mean? Do you believe that I prefer that what I write be read and approved by anyone more than by you? Why have I sent it to someone else before you, then? He put pressure on me and I did not have a second copy. And besides—I keep nibbling around that which I must just swallow—, it seemed to me a bit of a dishonorable recantation. The identification of both this recantation and of the individual who urged Cicero has become a sort of cause célèbre. Butler and Cary (1924: 106–8), following Saunders (1919) and Rice Holmes (1920), argue that, since Cicero had no reason to be ashamed of Prov., the recantation is something else. Mommsen (1894: 5.130), Shackleton Bailey (1965: 233–4 and 1971 84) and Gelzer (1968a: 124), however, believe that Cicero refers to Prov., which they see as a betrayal of his previous position toward Caesar. This has become the standard view among scholars. The identification of Prov. with the palinode, however, poses some serious problems and must be rejected. For one thing, Cicero

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publicly displayed his changed attitude toward Caesar before he pronounced Prov., and therefore Prov. cannot be taken as the turning point. As seen above, on April 5 Cicero attacked Caesar in the senate, and in March 56 Cicero had been so horrified by proposals for granting money and ten legates to Caesar that in a letter to his brother Quintus he called them monstra (QF 2.5.3). In Prov., however, Cicero reminds the senators that he has supported and even led the senate toward these very decisions (26–8nn.; cf. Balsdon 1962: 137–9), which looked like monstra just a few months before. One must conclude that the change in Cicero’s public stance toward Caesar occurred after April but before Prov. Equally, the conciliatory tone of Prov., where Cicero acts as a mediator between Caesar and the senate, is at odds with his statement in the same letter to Atticus that he wanted to join himself to Caesar, Pompey and Crassus and “never be able to slip back to those senators who, even when they should be sympathetic, continued to be jealous” of him (ego mehercule mihi necessitatem volui imponere huius novae coniunctionis ne qua mihi liceret relabi ad illos qui etiam tum cum misereri mei debent non desinunt invidere, Att. 4.5.2). As Carey and Butler rightly point out, with Prov. Cicero does not burn ships, but “is studiously respectful to the leaders of the optimates” (1924: 107). The fact that no attempt to identify “the palinode” has proved conclusive must not lead to its identification with Prov.1 On the contrary, there are three more reasons to doubt that Prov. is the palinode. The dating of the above-cited letter to Atticus is far from certain, and Cicero may have written it before pronouncing Prov. (Kaster 2006: 404–5); moreover, while in Prov. Cicero certainly praises Caesar and supports the cause of Pompey and Crassus as well, probably Cicero had praised Caesar in the senate before Saunders 1919: 213–14 believes it was a letter Cicero had written either to Pompey or to Caesar, Rice Holmes  1920: 44 that it was a letter Cicero wrote to Pompey, and Balsdon 1962: 149 that it was the speech Cicero pronounced to the senate to support the money and the ten legates to Caesar. This last proposal is the most convincing, since as Shackleton Bailey has noticed (1965: 233), the hypothesis of a private letter does not take into account that Cicero “had wanted to tie himself down irrevocably to the new alliance with the dynasts; a private letter would hardly involve such necessitas.” 1

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(Crawford 1984: 158–60), so that Prov. is better seen as Cicero’s “post-recantation” attempt at reconciling his ideal of cooperation between different classes (the concordia ordinum) with his admittedly shocking support of Caesar. Cicero praises the senators as much as he praises Caesar, hoping to give both some education: Caesar should continue to seek the senate’s approval, and in turn the senate should appreciate what Caesar has done for the state and welcome him back into its bosom (38–9). Lastly, Cicero writes to Atticus that he was under pressure (urgebar), implying that he had to turn in his writings quickly. But the refined style and balanced arguments of Prov. make one believe that Cicero carefully processed and polished this speech. This mistaken but slow-to-die identification has colored our reading of Prov., leading to extreme and inaccurate misjudgments about its content and style. Other than triggering a fundamental turning point in Roman history, Prov. is a great piece of oratory, and only bias can make one see it as “tortuous in its structure and full of indirections that are frequently painful, not to say embarrassing.”2 Cicero’s defense of Caesar may have sounded surprising to some senators, who interrupted him three times in the course of his speech: by reporting such interruptions, however, Cicero advertises his response to their objections. It is equally misleading to label Prov. “pro-Caesarian” and Vat. “anti-Caesarian” and to compare the two in order to track Cicero’s changed attitude between early March and late June 56. In fact, without denying that Cicero’s attitude did change (and we all know why), we must take into account that in Vat. Cicero carefully distinguishes between Caesar and his protégé Vatinius (13–15). He even acknowledges Caesar’s great achievements in Gaul, going so far as to state that if desire for glory led Caesar too far, “it should be forgotten because of the great deeds he later achieved” (Vat. 15, cf. Prov. 38). We must equally take into account that also in Prov. Cicero admits that Caesar has treated him unjustly (43). 2

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Rose 1995: 393.

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