Cohibas for Crops: Can a Barter System Stimulate Stagnant U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade?

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Cohibas for Crops: Can a Barter System be a Realistic Way to Revive Stagnant U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade?
Jennifer Penn

Introduction 1
I. Embargos 5
II. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act 9
III. Proposal 21
IV. U.S. Market for Cuban Goods 31
V. Cuban View 38
Conclusion 46


Introduction
The United States (U.S.) is engaged in a comprehensive embargo against the Caribbean nation of Cuba. This embargo was enacted for political reasons; namely, that Fidel Castro instituted a Communist government that was at odds with U.S. interests on the island such as agricultural plantations. During the Cold War, this was the gravest mistake a nation could make if it wanted to continue to have a relationship with the U.S. In Cuba's case, it was especially problematic, as a significant portion of the U.S. had originally supported the rebellion that overthrew the previous government under Batista in 1959. When Castro rolled out a Communist regime with close ties to the Soviet Union, the U.S. took it as a slap to the face and reacted in an equally hostile manner by enacting the first version of the Cuban Embargo.
The embargo has been modified over the years with the tightening restrictions of the Helms-Burton Act and, most recently, the executive action revising the travel prohibitions. The specific act that this Note is concerned with is the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA), and possible future modifications to this act to allow increased trade with Cuba. The TSRA allowed U.S. companies to export agricultural products, along with processed food and medicine, to Cuba under certain conditions. Not many people know that, while the Cuban Embargo has persisted since 1962, the U.S. has exported agricultural products to Cuba since 2001. With the recent events reestablishing a diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Cuba, this minor trade relationship has become exceedingly important.
Part I of this note will seek to establish a foundational understanding of what an embargo is, how it is created, and how it is ended. Part II of this note will focus on the history of the Cuban Embargo, particularly the existing TSRA exception, and the benefits and detriments it provides to both the U.S. and Cuba. Part III of this note will place this TSRA exception into the broader political context of the emerging diplomatic relationship by proposing a way to establish two-way trade with Cuba in a manner that may actually stand a chance at being passed by Congress. This proposal serves to enlarge the existing TSRA exception to provide for an exchange of goods between the U.S. and Cuba, thus taking a small step towards normalizing trade relations with Cuba while refraining from jumping headfirst into attempting to remove the entire embargo overnight. Part IV of this note will discuss a possible U.S. market for any Cuban imports as such a market would need to exist to establish a barter system. Part V of this note will discuss what current Cubans, from farmers to agricultural lawyers, and policy-makers in D.C. think of adding a possible barter system and its feasibility.
I. Embargos
Agricultural trade with Cuba was non-existent from when the Cuban Embargo began as an executive action in 1961 to 2001, when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 took effect and granted an exception to the sale of agricultural products to Cuba. While it began as an executive action, the Cuban Embargo was codified into U.S. law when Congress passed subsequent acts, including the TSRA. Because Congress enacted the majority of embargo, Congressional resolution is necessary in order to remove the embargo, because, while executive action can modify certain small aspects of the embargo such as expanding or loosening the travel restrictions, the President alone cannot end the embargo. This difference in who can end the embargo is important because, in order to restore robust agricultural trade with Cuba rather than the ever-decreasing trade the U.S. does now, farmers and agricultural producers must wait for a combative Congress to cooperate on divisive legislation relaxing, or ending, the embargo.
While reestablishing diplomatic relations is a monumental step towards removing the barrier that is the Cuban Embargo, it has not reduced the amount of political tension within the U.S. over the issue. Various members of Congress and candidates vying for the 2016 Presidential slot hold extreme views on the Cuban Embargo. Some believe that the embargo is a gross human rights violation or that democracy in Cuba would be better served by boosting the level of trade with Cuba, yet others believe that the embargo has not yet served its purpose, as Cuba is still a Communist nation, and that ending the embargo would effectually be Castro and his regime winning the stalemate that is the Cuban Embargo. This political tension is what will make it incredibly difficult to accomplish any truly substantial change to the existing embargo. What is needed now, similar to the small steps taken with the travel restrictions, is a minor change to the existing exception for agricultural trade that would allow Cuba to use goods instead of cash to pay for U.S. agricultural products in an effort to increase in trade with Cuba, and perhaps establish some sort of two-way trade in the process.
II. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
The U.S. has been interested in Cuba's agricultural production since the Spanish-American war, which began as Cuba's war for independence from Spain. Spain and the U.S. were interested in Cuba for the same reason, its strategic location in the Caribbean combined with its landmass and potential for agricultural production as the largest island in the Caribbean. When Cuba had all but kicked the last Spanish ship out of the harbor, the U.S. swept in and "saved the day." In exchange for this unnecessary and wholly unwelcome intrusion into Cuban affairs, the U.S. required that they be allowed to intervene at any time in order to protect the American plantations on the island, which were instrumental to the U.S. agricultural economy as the largest supplier of sugar, as well as other crops such as coffee and tobacco. The U.S. had a vested interest in keeping a hand in Cuban government affairs as a large number of plantations, including many sugar plantations such as the Hershey-owned plantation and the Bacardi plantation, were American owned. Fast-forward a few decades and the U.S. was still looking out for its own interests in Cuba during the revolution of 1959.
Originally, the Cuban Revolution did not have a political ideology as it benefited them to accept assistance from everyone. It was not until after Fidel Castro had made his victory tour of New York and returned home that he became openly entangled with the Soviet Union and created a Communist government. This transformation from non-ideological revolution to Communism happened during the very beginnings of the Red Scare and McCarthyism when the U.S. was in the midst of a highly volatile Cold War and was determined to eradicate Communism wherever it arose, regardless of its potentially catastrophic effects on the agricultural industry at home. The U.S. was not interested in diplomatic relations, or any kind of relations, with Communist countries. The U.S. attempts to purge Communism from Cuba were disastrous; from the Bay of Pigs fiasco to the clandestine CIA operations involving LSD, everything the U.S. did only seemed to strengthen the Cuban peoples' resolve. This political ideology of Democracy or bust is still prevalent in the U.S. today and continues to block any attempt to ease the restrictions of the embargo, including easements that would benefit the U.S. agricultural community.
On the heels of failure in 1961, the President of the U.S., John F. Kennedy, issued an executive order, which served to officially begin the Cuban Embargo. Over the past five decades, this original executive order has been adopted into codified law, revised, and added to by Congress making any repeal actions virtually impossible as they must pass through the gridlock that is modern Congress. The particular addition to the embargo that is being analyzed in this Note is the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA).
The TSRA had allowed the U.S. to be one of the top four suppliers of agricultural products to Cuba. The TSRA was passed in October 2000 and authorized the export of certain food products and medicine to Cuba. The first sale of U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba after the commencement of the embargo occurred on December 16, 2001. This delay in effect was due to Cuban pride as after it was passed in 2000, Cuba took the cash-in-advance provision as an insult and originally chose not to buy any products from the U.S. Rather than having the desired effect of pushing U.S. interests to lobby for removing the credit provisions, the boycott of the TSRA served to dishearten those in the U.S. seeking to export to Cuba. It was not until a hurricane struck Cuba in the fall of 2001 that Cuba agreed to buy agricultural products from the U.S. because it desperately needed the food but staunchly refused to take humanitarian aid from the U.S.
After passage, and Cuban acceptance of the TSRA, the U.S. enjoyed being its top agricultural supplier from 2003 to 2012. Many states in the U.S., most of whom had agriculturally depressed economies, were searching for other markets in which to sell their products and Cuba became a solution. The cost to transport goods from other countries is roughly thirty to thirty-five percent of the production costs of such products compared to the costs to transport the same goods from the U.S. to Cuba, making importation from the U.S. an attractive option for Cuba. This resulted in an estimated 4.1 billion dollars in agricultural exports over that decade. From 2001 to 2004, Iowa exported agricultural products such as corn, grain, and soybeans to the tune of approximately $30 million. Cuba was Iowa's sixteenth largest agricultural importer from 2002 to 2003.
Despite this billion-dollar trade agreement, since 2013 the U.S. has continued to fall behind the E.U. and Brazil in agricultural exports to Cuba, from estimated $410 million in 2011-2012, to an average of $318 million in 2013-2014. This decline in trade can be attributed to the U.S. policy of "cash in advance." The TSRA does not allow for a normal market relationship regarding these products as there was, and still is, a requirement that Cuba provide "cash in advance" before any shipment enters Cuba. "Cash in advance," when the TSRA was originally enacted, meant that Cuba needed to pay in full, in cash, before the U.S. goods ever left port.
In 2004, Cuba was $12.2 billion dollars in debt with another $20 billion owed to Russia, which was a budget deficit increase of .5% from 2001 to 2003. After Cuba began defaulting on short-and medium-term credit lines in late 2001, coincidentally the same time that Cuba began to pay cash for U.S. agricultural goods, their credit rating was downgraded to "speculative, very poor," making the U.S. unwilling to risk its companies or banks extending loans to Cuba. After running out of a steady supply of cash, and perhaps getting pressure from their debtors for using their cash to buy goods from the U.S., this "cash in advance" provision led to Cuba using confirmed and irrevocable letters-of-credit from third country banks to pay for these exports. As this process was laborious, both for Cuba and the U.S. farmers selling their goods, Cuba has begun to increase trade with countries who have easier agricultural export requirements rather than participate in the extensive and circuitous process required by the U.S.
It could also be surmised that the hurricane, and Cuban pride, which originally forced Cuba to trade with the U.S., is what caused Cuba to spend cash on U.S. agricultural products rather than pay back its external debt or credit. This cash paid to the U.S. and not to its debtors probably led to Cuba decreasing its U.S. imports in favor of products from the EU or Asia in 2008. If this practice were to continue unmodified, U.S. farmers could miss a ready market with large growth potential.
Prior to the embargo, the U.S. exported an approximated $600 million annually in agricultural products (calculated using current commodity prices). If this level of trade were to be reached again, it would result in an increase of $2 billion in sales over a ten-year period compared to 2003-2012, and an increase of $282 million a year compared to the 2013-2014 average. While the types of agricultural imports have changed (from rice, lard, pork and wheat flour to chicken meat, corn, soybean meal, and soybeans), the potential for a solid market is there. With the increase in private businesses in Cuba (many of which are restaurants), the increase in the amount of money that Cuban ex-patriots are allowed to send back to family and friends (meaning more spending money), and the potential for increased travel from the U.S. with relaxed travel restrictions (meaning more hungry "educational tourists"), the U.S. could easily use their high agricultural production and close geography to their advantage.
The potential for agricultural trade with Cuba can be compared to the U.S. agricultural trade with the Dominican Republic, as they are similar in total population and per capita income. Comparing the agricultural exports from 2012-2014, the U.S. sold an average of $1.1 billion per year to the Dominican Republic versus an average of $365 million per year to Cuba. Should the U.S. make the trade of agricultural products easier for Cuba, the market growth could match the Dominican Republic as Cuba begins to trade more with the U.S. at the expense of others such as the E.U. and Brazil. While recent executive actions will allow U.S. institutions to open accounts in Cuban banks to try and streamline the "cash in advance" policy, this may not be enough as Cuba is still considered a high credit risk with a low quality sovereign debt making financial investments in Cuba very risky.
III. Proposal
Pro-embargo politicians point to Fidel Castro's continued communist regime as evidence that ending the embargo would only reward him for staying strong in his political theory when the entire goal of the embargo was to cripple his communist regime. In contrast, bi-partisan supporters for taking steps toward ending the embargo introduced the theory in 2004 that constructive economic engagement with Cubans would lead to a change for the better in the political policies of Cuba. Since 2004, there has been a sizeable percentage of Congress that has expressed interest in, or actually attempted to, pass resolutions to amend different provisions of the embargo. This percentage of people interested in modifying the embargo has not yet succeeded, even after eleven years, as the pro-embargo supporters are still prevalent and unrelenting.
Estimates from 2004 for ending the embargo suggested an annual export of $3.6 billion from the U.S. to Cuba, with more than $70 million coming from Iowa alone, which could create nearly 2,000 Iowa jobs. However, this estimate for increased economic trade after ending the embargo includes the necessity of U.S. investment in Cuba, which is currently an incredibly risky endeavor given the Cuban national debt. Not to mention the fact that ending the embargo is still something that is not feasible in today's political climate. Still, two-way trade between the U.S. and Cuba could prove doubly profitable for the U.S. as it could receive Cuban tobacco, coffee, and other agricultural goods; as well as the increase in value Cuba gains by using the imported products from the U.S., which would pump up the Cuban economy and allow more money to be spent on U.S. agricultural goods.
A better solution may be to expand the definition of "cash in advance" to include a commodities barter system. When the TSRA was originally passed, the cash-and-carry provision, commonly known as cash-in-advance, prohibited any lending of credit from the U.S., including governmental credits and private bank credits. It was later expanded by executive order to allow for cash in exchange for title of the agricultural products. This allowed U.S. companies to ship the products into Cuban ports and then receive the cash payments at the ports before the goods were unloaded. While this allowed for an easier transition of goods, it did not allow for two-way trade or a non-cash option for Cuba. The barter system exception would encourage two-way trade as an addition to accepting cash for U.S. agricultural exports, meaning the U.S. would also accept certain agricultural shipments from Cuba as payment. These agricultural imports from Cuba would have to amount to an equivalent value to those products being exported from the U.S., but it would allow Cuba to pay for the goods using things that Cuba has, or could potentially have, in abundance.
This expansion of the TSRA would be easier for Congress to pass as a resolution to allow for more agricultural trade, all while maintaining the embargo during this period of rehabilitating the political relationship. Cuba may not seem like it has anything to offer the U.S. because it is a relatively small country under Communist rule, however, Cuba had a history of supplying an estimated $2.2 billion in imports to the U.S. prior to the embargo (calculated using current commodity prices). These imports included cane sugar, molasses, tobacco, and coffee. While current U.S. regulations on sugar importation and NAFTA trade agreements would make it hard for Cuba to resume exporting sugar to the U.S., tobacco and coffee still have the potential to be strong imports. In addition, should the Bacardi trademark issue ever be resolved, Havana Club rum could be added to that list.
There are some difficulties in establishing this barter system exception. The major hurdle is that a fairly large and vocal section of the country, while it accepts cash from a Communist state-run agency for U.S. goods, is opposed to accepting Cuban goods from this same state-run agency. This state-run agency is called Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios or CUBAEXPORT. Due to Cuba's structure of agricultural production, CUBAEXPORT controls all exports. A sister agency, ALIMPORT, is responsible for all importation into Cuba and is the agency that the U.S. is amenable to accepting cash from. These agencies were developed in order for the government to control the distribution of goods, ideally to allow everyone to receive the same amount, due to the Communist nature of the government.
Farmers in Cuba are either family farms, who were able to retain or were recently gifted a tract of land to farm, or part of a cooperative. Once the crops or goods are harvested, they move up to the intermediary cooperatives. These cooperatives are responsible for gathering all of the agricultural goods, assembling them in a manner allowing for transportation to the CUBAEXPORT, and then disseminating the payment from the CUBAEXPORT to the farmers. The CUBAEXPORT then sells these products, some to Cuban citizens but most to other countries. ALIMPORT functions in a similar way. It exchanges money or credit for imports and then disseminates these imports to cooperatives, which in turn disseminates the imported products to Cuban citizens.
Although it may be hypocritical, this presumption that goods imported from a Communist state agency are somehow dirty, while cash is not, is something that must be overcome in order for Congress to pass a commodities barter system exception to the TSRA. The other obstacle is the possibility that, should Congress pass this proposal, Cuba may not accept this barter system. Similar to Cuba's initial boycott of the TSRA agricultural trade exception, Cuba may view this expansion to the exception as an insult. This is a relatively small possibility, however, as it makes financial sense to barter goods with the U.S. rather than spend thirty percent or more of an increase in price on importing goods from a farther away country.
Given the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, the international push to abandon the embargo, and the ever-growing bi-partisan support for embargo reform, it may be possible to work through this "dirty goods" presumption to create an opportunity for two-way trade. This barter system exception would be a great place to start. It allows both Congress and the Cuban government to control the trade, in terms of what gets traded and how it gets traded, and it is a relatively small change to the embargo that would be comparatively easy to remove should things between the U.S. and Cuba deteriorate instead of improve.
If the definition of "cash in advance" were revised to include this barter system, the U.S. could trade agricultural products for an equivalent value of tobacco, coffee, and possibly rum. This would allow for increased agricultural exports from the U.S., an increase in bilateral trade with Cuba while still imposing an embargo, and a solid foundation for trade without risky credit investment. In order for this commodities barter system to work, there has to be a market in the U.S. for these Cuban goods.
IV. U.S. Market for Cuban Goods
This note focuses on rum, coffee, and tobacco, rather than attempting to encompass all prospective trade options with Cuba. While the U.S. is the world's leading market for an enormous amount of products, the specific market for each of these three commodities is different. The market for rum in the U.S. is quite large, but Cuban rum, particularly Havana Club, is at a disadvantage. Havana Club and Bacardi have been engaged in "the most anticipated of wars" regarding the trademark rights to the rum produced in Cuba and used for Havana Club. While the whole story has been the subject of many books, the premise of this war is that the state of Cuba stole Bacardi's factory and business when it ran them out of the country and proceeded to use their facilities and recipes to produce Havana Club. While many expect Havana Club, as a forbidden fruit, to quickly become popular in the U.S., this trademark war will cause tremendous problems with the sale of Havana Club initially. Thus, while the market is there and Cuba could use it to barter, the more realistic options are coffee and tobacco.
"[A]t one time Cuba was the world's largest exporter of coffee… a premium coffee bean", and Cuba is home to some of the finest coffee in the world, particularly that grown in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. While the embargo dealt a swift blow to the coffee industry in Cuba, it still exports premium coffee around the world. Surprisingly, Cuban coffee can still be found in the U.S., although it is never one-hundred percent Cuban. It must be sold as a blended "Cuban Style" coffee in order to pass the embargo. These blends are still incredibly popular with the ex-patriot Cubans living in America, especially in South Florida. Cuban coffee, or more aptly espresso, is a way of life for those claiming this heritage; for example, approximately ninety-five percent of restaurants and cafes on Southwest 8th Street in Miami use Cuban Style coffee. This street is just a reflection of the larger Cuban coffee demand and the fact that the U.S. is the world's largest market for coffee. Indeed, one Hispanic-oriented coffee company, with Cuban roots, does an annual nationwide sale of coffee for around $75 million and that is just one company, imagine how much money there is to be made from the sale of pure Cuban coffee in the U.S. market.
Introducing one-hundred percent Cuban coffee into the U.S. market would be both a lucrative endeavor and a humanitarian/capitalistic one as "[a]griculture is the key to the Cuban economy." Current international investors and exporters of Cuban coffee pump capital into the coffee industry that raises the standard of living for coffee farmers and enables them to acquire new equipment. They aspire to raise overall labor conditions in Cuba by investing in the agricultural sector. Given the decreased production of coffee in Cuba, a significant investment of capital would be needed to boost that production to levels that would supply the U.S. market. Investing the required amount of capital would grow the new private business sector in the Cuban economy as well, enabling a more capitalistic environment to take hold.
The same could be said of investment into the tobacco industry; "the origin of a cigar [is] an integral part of its value." When it comes to Cuban cigars, both U.S. and world cigar experts hold Cuban cigars in high esteem, going as far as to prosecute imitators. Multiple court cases have been initiated to try and prevent imitation labels of Cuban brands, such as Cohiba, from being used to capitalize on that prestige. It is this high value placed on Cuban cigars that makes them the ideal commodity to barter with in the U.S.
The U.S. is the world's largest market for premium cigars and the easing of restrictions, specifically around bringing Cuban tobacco back through customs after a visit, highlights how valued a product these cigars are to the U.S. market. Their forbidden nature makes them exotic and collectible, a fact that will only amplify if the U.S. were to accept these cigars as payment. While the excitement of being illegal would rapidly disappear, Cuban cigars would continue to be a rare, and thus valuable, commodity. Cuba can only produce so many hand-rolled cigars at present, and the laws of supply and demand dictate that when you have a product that is already revered and in high demand and you expose it to an even broader market, the limited supply with shoot the price of that product sky-high. Estimates put the worth of the U.S. premium cigar market at $2.6 billion, of which Cuba could immediate takeover twenty-five to thirty percent. This makes it perhaps the "world's most lucrative cigar market" for Cuban cigars.
Americans in the agricultural industry can take advantage of this lucrative market. Bartering with Cuba would put American businesses in a prime spot to get these premium cigars at a discounted rate. This discounted rate assumes that the U.S. will negotiate with Cuba to accept these products as payment for a certain percentage of their market value to cover the costs of transporting them back to the U.S. and then selling them for profit. The profit they could make though is staggering. In 2014, a box of fifty Cuban cigars, made in 1992, was auctioned off in London to the tune of $41,463. While it is doubtful a normal market would see those prices, it is indicative of the kind of value these cigars have in the premium market. A market in the U.S. that is all to ready to pay up to experience a Cohiba.
V. Cuban View
Several individuals in the Cuban Agricultural Law Society and the Union Nacional de Juristas de Cuba (UNJC) shared their opinion related to the Cuban Embargo, or what the Cubans call the "blockade", and the new diplomatic relations with the U.S. These lawyers are at the top of their field and have working relationships with the Cuban Agricultural Minister. The most pertinent of information they have shared is that the practice of bartering is already used in trade by Cuba.
At the present, Cuba engages in trading their medical professionals, doctors, with other countries in return for either money or trade goods. These contracts are primarily with third world countries in places such as Africa. There are three variations of contracts. The first is run in much the same manner as all other Cuban trade. The Cuban state agency enters into a contract with the foreign government. The contract details how many doctors will be needed and for how long they will work in that country. The payment for this service is also negotiated into the contract. The payment can range from money to equipment to much needed agricultural products. With the Cuban system the way it is presently, the state needs to import much of its food supply as they need to grow a large quantity of cash crop to trade internationally because they do not grow the variety of food necessary to sustain their population. That makes these kinds of contracts particularly desirable for Cuba. Once the contract is finalized, the state then flies the doctors over to the other country to commence work. The doctors still work for the state of Cuba and are paid the same rate as if they were working in Cuba.
The second form of this contract is not a barter agreement struck by the state of Cuba. Rather, it is a contract that the doctors themselves enter into with the foreign government. The doctors are paid directly from the foreign nation but must pay a form of tax back to Cuba. This tax is in exchange for Cuba's permission to let the doctor work outside of the country.
The third, and last, form this contract can take is one of humanitarian aid. While the U.S. may not think of Cuba as being capable of helping anyone else, the truth is that they regularly provide assistance and humanitarian aid to other nations. As one of the popular Cuban rap songs reminds us, Cuba may not have much, but what they do have an abundance of is doctors. Cuba donates its doctors' time to countries in need of medical assistance. Though this humanitarian aid is not precisely a barter agreement, it is part of the larger notion that Cuba is willing to engage in negotiation and trade outside of the traditional cash for commodity.
What Cubans desire most in their increased relations with the U.S. is an extension of credit. As aforementioned, the reason the U.S. has insisted on a cash only provision is Cuba's notoriously bad credit rating. So, while Cubans may want the U.S. to extend a line of credit, with their escalating national debt and high risk credit rating, coupled with the U.S.'s tepid political climate in all matters Cuba related, that particular event is unlikely to happen. When asked specifically about whether Cuba would be open to negotiating a barter agreement with the U.S. to avoid all issues involving credit, almost every Cuban responded with "Of course! We already have similar agreements for our doctors, why wouldn't we do so for our other commodities?" Should the U.S. agree to such proposition, it could solve the incontrovertible problem of bi-lateral trade without an extension of credit while at the same time keeping the remaining portions of the embargo intact. Any greater change to the embargo, which would delight the international community, would anger a substantial portion of the constituency.
Perhaps this can be just the first in a long line of steps passed through Congress to dismantle the embargo. Unfortunately, despite the President's unilateral actions, Congress is still the only body that can remove the bulk of the provisions in the embargo. As such, Congress must pass the removal legislation, which will not happen unless the populace that desires the embargo to remain is appeased. Proving that bi-lateral trade is feasible, and the effect such capitalism may have on the Cuban market, would go a long way towards that appeasement.
In addition to being open to a barter agreement, Cuba will most likely move towards allowing individuals to contract for goods directly with interested foreign parties rather than filtering all trade through the state agencies. This change is necessary as the state agency currently uses their agricultural products, particularly sugar, as collateral for their credit loans from European countries and other nations. While the U.S. would not be allowed to trade in Cuban sugar as Cuba is not involved in the North American Free Trade Agreement provisions regarding the legal terms for trade in sugar, it does mean that the Cuban state agency may not want to barter with the sugar it uses for collateral on its loans. Allowing individual citizens to contract directly with foreign individuals or corporations would allow agricultural products to be traded directly without fear of being already spoken for as collateral for the state. Of course, in order to do that the Cuban government would need to eliminate the dual currency system that keeps the Cuban people's buying power severely limited on a global scale, but that is a policy much debated in Cuba and another paper for another day.
Conclusion
Creating an opportunity for bi-lateral agricultural trade with Cuba is not an easy task as Congress is the only governing body in the U.S. capable of initiating such trade. While the President can issue orders regarding travel and tourism, any program designed to bring Cuban goods onto U.S. soil in exchange for U.S. agricultural products must pass through Congress. The problem with a full-scale modification of the embargo is that the current political climate in the U.S. will not allow it.
While the 2016 elections may look entertaining, the reality is that the extreme polarization of the parties can be seen with some of the top presidential candidates for one party being resolutely unwilling to modify the embargo to increase trade with Cuba. Any change that will be made to the embargo will be made after the 2016 election and, most likely, will be small. This proposal, that the TSRA cash in advance provision be expanded to accommodate goods in exchange rather than solely cash, is exactly the kind of small change that both the Cuban government and Congress can agree to establish.
The ripe U.S. market for Cuban goods means high resale prices for companies who accept payment in this form. Cuba's current practice of bartering in trade, coupled with their shortage of cash, makes this proposal an enticing one for the Cuban government, which controls all exports from the country. The fact that this proposal does not require extending a high-risk credit line to Cuba is the cherry on top.
Should this change be made to the agricultural trade exception in the TSRA, the U.S. could once again enjoy being Cuba's top agricultural supplier, which would pump an estimated average of at least $400 million annually into the agricultural economy, if not the historical pre-embargo average of $600 million annually (calculated using current commodity prices). Iowa would especially benefit, to the tune of somewhere in the $30 million range, if past profit numbers are any indication. While establishing bi-lateral trade with Cuba is perhaps the most important step in normalizing relations, it does not hurt that such bi-lateral trade would also boost the U.S. agricultural industry. While it is not going to happen overnight, slowly expanding the agricultural trade exception to the embargo, and perhaps adding other trade exceptions somewhere down the line, will eventually result in eliminating it completely and normalizing relations with Cuba once again.


See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 88-99, 163-78 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 24-27 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 40-43, 78-79, 87-89 (2d ed. 2012).
See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (2012); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2012); Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963) (amended in 2015); Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 173-77 (2d ed. 2012); John Kerry, Sec. of State, Remarks at Flag Raising Ceremony (Aug. 14, 2015).
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012).
See Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. § 7202(b), 7205(a) (2012); Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004); Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015); Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004); Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012); Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 88 (2d ed. 2012).
See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (2012); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2012); Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963) (amended in 2015).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004).
See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963) (amended in 2015 through executive order on travel restrictions); Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004); Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004); Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004); Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
See Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 8-12 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 8-12 (2d ed. 2012).
Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 8-11 (2d ed. 2012).
Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 11-12 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 13 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 13 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 78-79 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 84-87 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 95-96 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 81 (2d ed. 2012).
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 82-88 (2d ed. 2012). The author is aware of at least one CIA attempt, during the course of government and military experiments with LSD, to infuse Castro's cigars with LSD in an attempt to humiliate him during media or social appearances and show the Cuban citizens how he was "crazy."
See Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 82-88 (2d ed. 2012).
See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 88-89 (2d ed. 2012).
See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001 et seq. (2012); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2012); Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963) (amended in 2015); Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 88-101, 162-173 (2d ed. 2012).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015); Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) 22 U.S.C. §§ 7202-7205 (2000).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1 (2004).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 15 (2004).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 15 (2004).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 15-16 (2004).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 2 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 2 (2004).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (2004).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1 (2004).
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) 22 U.S.C. § 7207(b) (2012); Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 1 (2004).
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) 22 U.S.C. § 7207(b) (2012); Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 4 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 4 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 4 (2004).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015); see Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) 22 U.S.C. § 7207(b) (2012).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 16 (2004).
See Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 16 (2004).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 7 (2004); see Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 8-9 (2004); see Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 17 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 10 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 10 (2004).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 16-17 (2004).
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2012) (where "cash in advance" was originally defined as requiring Cuba to pay for the goods in cash before they were shipped out of U.S. ports, but is currently defined as requiring Cuba to pay cash after the goods reach Cuban ports but before title for said goods is transferred).
Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 15 (2004).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Sarah L. Farhadian, Note, Stealing Bacardi's Thunder: Why the Patent and Trademark Office Should Stop Registering Stolen Trademarks Now, 30 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 317 (2012).
Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Almientos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 59, 64 (District Ct. D.C. 2009); Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
See Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015); see also Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Almientos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 59, 64 (District Ct. D.C. 2009)
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015); see also Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Almientos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 59, 64 (District Ct. D.C. 2009)
Symposium, US-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present & Possible Future, USDA Economic Research Service http://www.uaex.edu/farm-ranch/economics-marketing/food-agribusiness-webinars/posts/10-28-15-us-cuba-agricultural-trade-zahniser-childs.aspx (2015).
See Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13, 15 (2004).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 2 (2004).
See Hamish Smith, The Beginning of the Beginning, Drinks International (Sept. 25, 2015), http://drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5620/The_Beginning_of_the_Beginning.html.
Hamish Smith, The Beginning of the Beginning, Drinks International (Sept. 25, 2015), http://drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5620/The_Beginning_of_the_Beginning.html.
See Hamish Smith, The Beginning of the Beginning, Drinks International (Sept. 25, 2015), http://drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5620/The_Beginning_of_the_Beginning.html.
Hamish Smith, The Beginning of the Beginning, Drinks International (Sept. 25, 2015), http://drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5620/The_Beginning_of_the_Beginning.html.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
See 100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
Jodi Mailander Farrell, Cuban Coffee 101, Miami Herald http://www.miami.com/cuban-coffee-101-article (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
Jodi Mailander Farrell, Cuban Coffee 101, Miami Herald http://www.miami.com/cuban-coffee-101-article (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
Larry Luxner, Cuban Coffee: Rowland Takes Aim at the U.S. Hispanic Market, Tea & Coffee Trade Journal (Feb./Mar. 2005), http://www.teaandcoffee.net/0205/coffee.htm.
Larry Luxner, Cuba: A Once-Proud Coffee Industry Falls on Hard Times, Tea & Coffee Trade Journal (Sept./Oct. 2001), http://www.teaandcoffee.net/0901/special.htm.
Larry Luxner, Cuban Coffee: Rowland Takes Aim at the U.S. Hispanic Market, Tea & Coffee Trade Journal (Feb./Mar. 2005), http://www.teaandcoffee.net/0205/coffee.htm.
Larry Luxner, Cuba: A Once-Proud Coffee Industry Falls on Hard Times, Tea & Coffee Trade Journal (Sept./Oct. 2001), http://www.teaandcoffee.net/0901/special.htm (quoting William Messina from University of Florida's International Agricultural Trade and Development Center).
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/.
Kristina Maranges, Comment, The American Government: Cuba's Best Marketer for its Cohiba, 19 St. Thomas L. Rev. 509, 519 (2007).
Kristina Maranges, Comment, The American Government: Cuba's Best Marketer for its Cohiba, 19 St. Thomas L. Rev. 509, 519-22 (2007).
See Kristina Maranges, Comment, The American Government: Cuba's Best Marketer for its Cohiba, 19 St. Thomas L. Rev. 509 (2007).
Bryan Llenas, Why U.S. Cigar Companies Can't Wait for You to Light Up Cuban Cigars, Fox New Latino (Sept. 9, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2015/09/09/why-us-cigar-companies-cant-wait-for-to-light-cuban-cigars/.
See Bryan Llenas, Why U.S. Cigar Companies Can't Wait for You to Light Up Cuban Cigars, Fox New Latino (Sept. 9, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2015/09/09/why-us-cigar-companies-cant-wait-for-to-light-cuban-cigars/.
Bryan Llenas, Why U.S. Cigar Companies Can't Wait for You to Light Up Cuban Cigars, Fox New Latino (Sept. 9, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2015/09/09/why-us-cigar-companies-cant-wait-for-to-light-cuban-cigars/.
Bryan Llenas, Why U.S. Cigar Companies Can't Wait for You to Light Up Cuban Cigars, Fox New Latino (Sept. 9, 2015), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2015/09/09/why-us-cigar-companies-cant-wait-for-to-light-cuban-cigars/.
Zachary Fagenson and David Adams, Reuters, American Cigar Makers Brace for Their Cuban Rivals to Enter the Market, Business Insider (May 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-whats-in-a-name-cuban-cigars-plant-legal-seeds-for-us-future-2015-5.
Zachary Fagenson and David Adams, Reuters, American Cigar Makers Brace for Their Cuban Rivals to Enter the Market, Business Insider (May 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-whats-in-a-name-cuban-cigars-plant-legal-seeds-for-us-future-2015-5.
Erik Sherman, Here's What Could Happen to Cuban Cigar Prices, Fortune (Aug. 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/23/cuban-cigar-prices/.
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016) (The author was able to visit Cuba to attend this symposium-like course on Cuban agriculture and conducted first-hand research to determine the feasibility of her proposal according to leading Cuban attorneys. Notes on these interviews, along with a certificate of completion for the course, are on file with the author).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
See Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Cuban Artist Exiled to U.S., Song was Released in Cuba (Recorded on camera from the radio during a taxi ride in Havana, Cuba on Jan. 9, 2016) (On File With Author).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 10 (2004).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
Julia E. Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know 217 (2d ed. 2012); Interview with the National Union of Cuban Jurists (UNJC) during the Course of Cuban Legal System and Legal Agrarian System, Havana, Cuba (Jan. 6-11, 2016).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2004); Wayne S. Smith, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Opening Speaker: U.S.-Cuban Trade: How We Got to this Point and Prospects for the Future, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (2004).
Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 7 (2004); see Tom Saler, Economic Sanction on Cuba to Thaw Slowly, Milwaukee Wisconsin Journal Sentinel (Aug. 1, 2015) http://www.jsonline.com/business/economic-sanctions-on-cuba-to-thaw-slowly-b99547619z1-320382411.html.
See Hamish Smith, The Beginning of the Beginning, Drinks International, (Sept. 25, 2015), http://drinksint.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/5620/The_Beginning_of_the_Beginning.html; 100% Cuban Coffee: Is it Coming to a U.S. Store Near You?, Craft Beverage Jobs (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.craftbeveragejobs.com/100-cuban-coffee-is-it-coming-to-a-u-s-store-near-you-42015/; Kristina Maranges, Comment, The American Government: Cuba's Best Marketer for its Cohiba, 19 St. Thomas L. Rev. 509, 519 (2007).
See Cuba UNJC; Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Steven Zahniser & Bryce Cooke, USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S.-Cuba Agricultural Trade: Past, Present, and Possible Future (2015).
See Enrique R. Carrasco, Whither Goes Cuba? Prospects for Economic and Social Development Part I of II: Introduction to the Symposium: Cuba's Development and Trade with U.S. Midwestern States, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 3 (2004).