contemporary philosophy 2 class notes

Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas Faculty of Philosophy

HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 2 Summary of Lecture Notes

Disclaimer The following is a summary of notes taken in lectures delivered by Professor Riccardo Paparusso at the Angelicum, February to May 2015. They have not been checked by the professor, and I take no responsibility for any errors that may be found.

Ryan Black 11586

Page |1 Semester 2 began with a continued study of Bergson, which began at the end of Semester 1. The notes on the Spiritualist in the first semester are found below, before the notes from the second semester. Session 23, Semester 1 An important philosopher who was influenced by Nietzsche’s notions of time is Henri Bergson (see [Session 1] from Semester 1). As a philosopher who belonged to the second phase of spiritualism, he was interested in asserting that the consciousness cannot be reduced to matter. He is opposed to positivism and materialism and asserts that the consciousness cannot be reduced to the objects of science, it cannot be measured. He distinguishes time of matter from time of consciousness. The time of consciousness cannot be linear in his view, because each moment in the consciousness is absorbed by another. He agrees with Nietzsche that it cannot be linear because consciousness is transcendental and so it cannot have limits.

Session 24, Semester 1 Spiritualism is a result of the spread of German idealism in France and the rest of Europe. The first phase developed throughout the first half of the 19th century and the second phase, to which Bergson belonged, developed in the second half. Those who belonged to either phase asserted that consciousness, the spirit, could not be identified by science (and so, by materialism or positivism). This criticism can also be understood as having been directed towards Nietzsche. The most important philosophers of the first phase are Pierre Maine de Biran (1766 – 1867) and Victor Cousin (1792 – 1867). Maine de Biran believed that the experiences of the consciousness caused it to attempt to overcome the body. In this way, one might notice the Cartesian influence on spiritualism. Consciousness fails to completely overcome the corporeal. In this way, one should notice the Hegelian influence. Cousin was a student of Maine de Biran’s, and was the first to coin the term ‘spiritualism’. Although there are a few notable philosophers who belonged to the second phase, none are more so than Bergson. He developed a better distinction between consciousness and matter by proposing that each belonged to a different temporal system. The time of matter is linear and so limited in space; it is quantitative but not qualitative. It is also homogenous – each point is identical (but unrelated) to the others in that they are all effects of a predetermined cause). For these reasons, science can reproduce a temporal point, which is understood by its cause. The time of consciousness is not quantitative but is qualitative and in flux. Each point is related to the others and therefore it is impossible to isolate an individual point, as the sciences would demand. Because of it being in flux, there is no causality or determinism. It is related to memory. The past is a silent impression on the present, but it is not a cause of it. This and other notions of the time of consciousness can be found in Bergson’s doctoral thesis: Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1889). If one reads the work of Hegel carefully, one might notice that the explanation of a time which precedes space was first proposed by the German idealist, though he did not focus heavily on it. He suggested that in order for linear time to come about, some point must be named first. Of course, the only being able to name itself is a human being, and so this refers to the beginning of historical time.

Session 25, Semester 1 Bergson’s most important work is Matter and Memory (1896). It is based on the distinction he makes between the time of matter and the time of consciousness. It is important to remember that his primary interest was in freeing consciousness from matter. In his view, the same mistake is made in positivistic psychology as is made in the theory of parallelism. In the former, each event is understood as an effect of a phenomenon occurring in

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |2 the brain; in the latter, the brain and the consciousness are the same. Although he wants to free consciousness from matter, he does not propose a new kind of dualism. Rather, he aims to free himself from realism. First, he studies matter. He states that it is neither a representation of the mind nor something entirely independent of consciousness (as is stated in realism). Instead, he argues that matter is an existing image, independent but related to the subjective faculty of representation. Thus, ‘matter’ and ‘image’ are synonymous. The consciousness attains knowledge from the world through a special kind of matter, the body, which is perceptive. The perceptive body receives images which put pressure on it. It then reconfigures and repeats this movement, transferring images into the consciousness. Therefore, knowledge is both active and passive.

Session 26, Semester 1 Bergson’s notion of representation is a development of Kantian philosophy; the German insisted that activity comes from the intellect alone, whilst the Frenchman believes that the body is also active. Hegel’s legacy in Europe is not his notion of ‘absolute knowledge’, but rather his questions concerning the relationship between the material and the immaterial, the imminent and the transcendent. After studying matter, Bergson studied ‘memory’, which alludes to the time of consciousness. In his view, there are two distinct types of memory: organic, material memory and memory of consciousness. The former works as a kind of administrator of sense data, reducing experiences to a sort of ‘file of memories’; the latter ensures the survival of the individual’s past in his present. The past applies pressure to the present, which sketches out a plan for the future, which always refers to the past. In this way, past, present and future are intrinsically related, and the progressive notion of time is overcome. Bergson influenced the phenomenologists Husserl and Heidegger, who attempted in a different way to overcome the progressive notion of time. Thus, the body offers meaning to the consciousness. Without it, the past cannot apply pressure to the present. These influences of the past on the present are unique traces of the individual’s existence and are made manifest in the body.

Session 1, Semester 2 [Read from quotes from Matter and Memory, sent by email on 16.02.15] In chapter 1 (pg. 18-22), we find that in the aggregate of the material world, the body is “an image that acts like other images”. Perhaps the only difference is that “the body appears to choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives.” Therefore, because the body is capable of exercising new actions upon surrounding objects, it occupies a privileged position in regard to them. The freedom of consciousness is a free involvement in the world. “But I have supposed that the office… the profit which my body can gain from them.” This particular passage is one of the most important in the entire work. Although the consciousness cannot be reduced to matter, there is an ontological link between the two. Bergson sums up this point well at the end of this quote from chapter 1 (pg. 18-22), found in the attachment. Also in chapter 1 (pg. 35-38), Bergson introduces the notion of discernment (end of third quote). He explores more fully what representation is. If Descartes proposed a reduction of the sensual, Bergson proposes a contrary reduction; that is, one of what is useless in satisfying biological desires. It may seem that the consciousness is not involved in the discernment of what is useless or otherwise, but this is not the case. Only the consciousness is able to offer to the body a clear discernment, and this is why it is so important.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |3 Session 2 [Read from quotes from Matter and Memory, sent by email on 16.02.15] In chapter 3 (pg. 149-150), a distinction is made between non-authentic memory and authentic memory. The former is corporeal, and can be considered as ‘memory of the brain’; this practical memory works in a mechanical way, and is referred to as ‘memory-habit’. It is the memory that solves practical problems, such as passing exams. The latter is pure memory of consciousness, in which the events and experiences of our life are stored. It is the memory that solves existential problems. It is important to note that problems – practical and existential – are connected. Bergson notes that man always feels pressures from the past. These pressures allow us to discern which actions should be taken in order to solve the existential problems we will face in the future. This connection of past with future signifies a special status for the body. The non-authentic memory provides the consciousness with possibilities, whilst the authentic memory does the same for the body. Thus, memory can be understood as a dimension, in which the corporeal and the consciousness are connected. Another important work of Bergson’s is Creative Evolution (1907). It is important to remember the core theme of Matter and Memory if one wishes to study this second work. Although the liberation of the consciousness from the matter is important for Bergson, he also emphasises the relationship that exists between them. He defines the duration as the principle of consciousness and the corporeal life. This is revolutionary for Bergson, who in Matter and Memory, simply asserts that duration is an essential feature of consciousness. Life is the origin of the world. Bergson calls it the vital impulse, and it is this that triggers generation and corruption of form and matter. Moreover, it has its own temporal system – duration – which is cyclical. It is from this cyclical movement that generation and corruption come. God coincides with the vital impulse. Thus, consciousness emerges from life and gives the vital impulse new vitality. Although duration triggers generation and corruption, it is reciprocal; each generation and corruption works as a kind of duration. Bergson and Hegel understand immanence differently. For Hegel, the spirit (or project) of the world exists before the actualisation of the world, and it sinks into the world before being absorbed by it. Eventually, the spirit delivers the world. Thus, there is distance between the spirit and the world. However, Bergson radicalises any notion of Hegelian immanence: the spirit exists only after the world does, and it only becomes apparent when the vital impulse is developed. Thus, the idea-itself is eliminated in Bergson’s philosophy. The only feature of Hegelian philosophy that Bergson preserves is the notion that the idea emerges from the world. Morality can only be found in the consciousness; there is no morality in the matter. There are also comparisons to be made between Bergson and Nietzsche. Most obvious is the former philosopher’s vital impulse with the latter’s vital force. The emergence of form and consciousness in Bergson is better understood when the chaotic and rational principles of Nietzsche’s Birth and Tragedy are revised. In fact, it is easier to understand how form emerges from life on a Bergsonian account. Furthermore, both philosophers speak about the emergence of a morality from the world. Another important notion for Bergson is that of evolution. The vital impulse – being the origin of the world – is synonymous with evolution and development. He speaks about non-linear progression, rejecting deterministic evolution and idealistic evolution. The former involves a chain of causes and effects; the latter involves teleology. Bergson believes that because any progress comes from the vital impulse, then it cannot be linear. Thus, he proposes a multidirectional progression, which permits for improvement (improvement comes from the new impulses of the consciousness) and decline. Progress is not regular. This ‘forking’ of evolution allows us to better understand history, in which examples of linear progress are impossible to find. Furthermore, it allows us to understand the perpetual generations and corruptions that occur in history; the vital impulse is in flux, but occasionally it consolidates itself in the extension of the world. This consolidation coincides with matter, and whenever particular matter corrupts, the flow is resumed. One might note the influence Hegel has on Bergson on this point – Hegel asserts that the consciousness of the slave is able to destroy (transform) matter. Bergson’s philosophy of religion and philosophy of morality are connected to his theory of evolution. He makes a distinction between the authentic morality, which emerges from the vital impulse, and the unauthentic morality.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |4 Session 3 The unauthentic morality is described by Bergson as closed, because it comes from a closed society that puts pressure on its members to follow social and moral obligations without making sure that they understand said obligations. The authentic – not ‘perfect’ – morality is described as open, and comes from the vital impulse (this is why it is authentic). It expresses itself as an impulse to love all members within a given society, and here we can see the influence of Christianity of Bergson’s work. It is expressed primarily in the leaders of a society, in order that it might then become evident in the entire community. The moral model of the community encourages all of its members to sustain it. Clearly, Christianity is for Bergson the authentic, open religion. However, he also considers unauthentic, closed religion. He also calls this static religion, as it is static like matter is in the consolidation of the vital impulse. He states that mythology and narrations hinder human progress because they answer questions that have not yet been asked (about the divine dimension), resulting in a passive attitude towards this dimension. The actualisation of the impulse to love everyone within a given community comes with the invitation to free the soul. One might note the influence that Marx has on Bergson. In fact, his philosophy might be understood as a coming together of Marxism and Christianity, in which the solution to the alienation of man is authentic religion. The Christian mystic, in his view, can authentically put an end to the reduction of man to machine. Our study of Bergson ends here, and our study of the ‘second semester’ philosophers begins… The most important philosophers of the second semester (excluding Bergson) are Husserl and Sartre, the founders of phenomenology and existentialism, respectively. We will study Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931), which serves as an introduction to phenomenology, and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943). However, in order to study Husserl effectively, it would be prudent to first study his professor and mentor, Franz Brentano, who influenced him a great deal. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, there was a newfound focus on and return to a Kantian theory of knowledge in German philosophy. Husserl is one of the most famous consequences of this. According to the Kantian theory of knowledge, man’s possibility to understand how the world relates to his subjectivity lies in a priori, formal structures. Husserl’s transcendental consciousness is constituted by a priori structures.

Session 4 Brentano (1837-1917) was a Catholic priest for a while, but after many debates concerning Papal Infallibility he left the priesthood. As a young philosopher he could be described as very Aristotelian. He is noted for rejecting a Kantian metaphysics and theory of knowledge at a time when they were becoming popular again. He stressed that the Aristotelian notion of being and Aristotelian categories are not functions of man’s subjectivity. In order to overcome idealism, he felt obligated to adopt realism. His psychology, which he developed later, is of particular interest. He aimed to emancipate psychology from the positivistic notion – that the psyche is simply an object – that had become prevalent in the science. To do this, he had to overcome the most popular method of positivistic psychologists: the physical method, proposed by Wundt. In its place, Brentano proposed a biological method, which was more interested with observations than measurements. Wundt was only interested in analysing and measuring the various elements of the psyche, but Brentano developed a descriptive psychology, of which the primary concern is how the psyche relates itself to the world, and vice-versa. To analyse this relationship, he first had to distinguish between the essences of objects and the essence of the psychic phenomenon. The object is concrete and discrete (unrelated to other objects), whilst the psychic phenomenon is essentially pointed towards something that is not itself. Thus, having a psyche means being directed toward something else. In asserting this, Brentano revived a philosophical term that had previously been adopted by the scholastics: intentionality. However, in returning to the notion of intentionality, he had to (in some way) return to Kantian philosophy and (in some way) turn away from his Aristotelian roots.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |5 Brentano criticises Wundt’s classification of acts (acts of knowledge, acts of emotions and acts of will) and proposes an improved classification: 

Acts of representation Corresponding with Wundt’s Acts of knowledge



Acts of judgement



Motion of the soul

He reintroduces the Aristotelian notion of the relevance of language, and recognises a (fine) line between emotions and the will. This revolutionary classification implicitly reintroduces and emphasises the importance of the emotional process in the knowing process. One might note that Kierkegaard and St Augustine had an influence on this aspect of Brentano’s philosophy. His theory of evidence is also noteworthy. Evidence is certain knowledge, according to Brentano. It cannot be found in a mere object, which cannot know itself by itself. Furthermore, it is intentionality; the intentional act of an object that is sure of itself. An intentional act overcomes the distinction between the object and the subject, and one might note Hegel’s influence on Brentano again. In descriptive psychology, the validity of all disciples is of primary concern. The core of each discipline coincides with a particular psychic act. In attempting to overcome positivism, Brentano was implicitly influenced by it. This is evident in the reduction to the psyche, an element of the world. [Later, we will see that Husserl strongly criticises this reduction of wisdom to the psyche.] Brentano also developed genetic psychology, of which the main process is the study of the temporal flux of the psychic act. This is not an evident science (as descriptive psychology is), but rather it is anticipatory. Each anticipation can be followed by an illusion, and it his understanding of time might be said to be similar to that of Nietzsche and Bergson. Our study of Brentano ends here, and our study of his most famous student, Edmund Husserl, begins… Husserl (1859-1938) was interested in mathematics as a young boy. It was while he was studying this in Germany that he first met his master, Brentano. Following his professor’s advice, he began to study mathematics under a psychologist-mathematician. In Philosophy of Arithmetic, he reflected on his studies and developed descriptive psychology. He asserted that number is a product of a psychic act; it is not an idea that exists in itself, as Plato would have it. Husserl felt strongly that realism is not connected to positivism. He stated that positivists reduce everything to a naïve realism. In Logical Investigations (1900-1901), Husserl attempts (almost exclusively) to free logic from the psyche, which is real and evident – contrary to Brentano’s assertion – but logic is the foundation of all principles. The body can only be studied empirically, and there is no evidence because it is absorbed into the natural world. To overcome the residual realism present in Brentano’s work, Husserl returns to idealism. According to him (and others), his master’s philosophy was full of errors. If Logical Investigations marked the first major turning point in his philosophy, the second came with Ideas: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology (1913). Without doubt, this is his most significant work, in which he systematically proposes phenomenology. In it, we find his most important notions; those of pure consciousness and έποχή (epoche) – suspension or interruption. This suspension is one of the knowing circuit, which is composed of two elements: natural knowledge and scientific knowledge (positivism).

Session 5 Despite difficult conditions – including losing his job as a professor because of the Nazis – Husserl remained where he was in order to study the decline of European culture and the role of philosophy in it. He wrote two

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |6 important works during this time: Cartesian Meditations (1931) and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). Immediately after his death in 1938 (before the Holocaust), the Nazi party would have liked to have destroyed his works. However, a Franciscan named Herman Leo Van Breda saved his works and moved Husserl’s legacy to Louvain in Belgium, where they remain today. Let us now return to 1913 and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. His reflection on the science is a response to positivism, the representatives of which tried to acknowledge the scientific approach to the knowing process. He begins by criticising the opposition between subject and object, and establishing ‘identity’ between everyday knowledge and the positivistic approach. Man continues to know the world according to habit, without questioning the role of his own subjectivity. The epoche – ‘ansschaltung’ – is the solution to this passivity: it is a deactivation of the circuit in which the knowing process moves itself. The goal of suspension is to regain the original manifestation of all things to man’s subjectivity. One might note the similarities between this aspect of Husserl’s philosophy and the Cartesian notion of absolute doubt. However, there are fundamental differences between Descartes and the founder of phenomenology: Descartes failed even to trust his senses, resulting in doubt as to whether the world exists; Husserl sought to suspend the traditional knowledge that the world exists, but he never doubted its existence. Phenomenology, the analysis of the phenomenon, is a discourse on the source of manifestations. The process of suspension ends when it faces the irreducible, residual subjectivity that is the original consciousness. It is irreducible because it is the author of the entire process: it is not an empirical consciousness. Synonymous with ‘suspension’ is transcendental reduction, the author of which is the transcendental consciousness. This consciousness has many intentional acts (note the influence that Brentano has on his student), which we will look at in more depth later. Husserl wants to indicate the flux of life of the consciousness, which gives rise to the transcendental experiences man has when he receives manifestations. He introduces the German verb (with a prefix), ‘erleben’, which is translated as ‘begin to live’ in English.

Session 6 [Read chapter 1, paragraph 27 from the first volume of Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Ideas)] When he speaks about the “world of natural attitudes”, Husserl describes the natural attitude, in which things are at hand. In this immediacy, there is no cause to reflect on the origins of things. The scientific approach does not allow man to reflect on his own subjectivity, or on the role that it has in the material world. The solution to the problem of a lack of reflection on objectivity is the epoche; is science prevents man from considering what things are, then the solution is to suspend all judgements, which come from science. There is a linguistic problem that must be raised here: transcendence and immanence. According to Hegel, the former is spiritual and ‘far away’, and the latter is the concrete absorption of the world; however, Husserl swaps these around: transcendence refers to the world and is synonymous with external reality, and immanence refers to the internal subjectivity. The transcendental consciousness is a priori, and is not empirical. Simultaneously, it receives the original manifestations of things and it works as the principle of individuation that is able to identify the particular manifestations of material elements (which have many manifestations) that coincide with common sense. [We will return to this point later, with a reflection on the temporal system of the transcendental consciousness.] Comparisons can (and should) be made between Brentano’s psyche and Husserl’s transcendental consciousness. The former, regarded as the basis of the knowing process, is replaced by the latter. Husserl believes that his old master attempts to find the foundation of knowledge in something real, universalising the contingent psyche. This cannot be right, according to the phenomenologist, because there must be a universal foundation – the transcendental consciousness, which is inter-subjective: all of humanity takes part in the process of suspension. The transcendental consciousness is not real, as the psyche is. Nevertheless, we may understand Brentano to be the ‘forefather’ of phenomenology; although Husserl rejects the reality of the principle of reality, he preserves the notion of intentionality: the transcendental consciousness is always pointed towards something else.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |7 Thus, we can say that Husserl’s transcendental consciousness is universal, and that it is the universal foundation of knowledge and reality. Before humanity can reflect on itself, it must reflect on the senses. Thus, the first reflection is practical. Before it moves itself across reality, the consciousness is the original life (erleben), life before acts of judgement. This represents the pure (not in the Hegelian sense) dimension of the transcendental consciousness. The core of phenomenology, as we have seen, lies in the manifestation of the thing itself. The pole of the transcendental consciousness, from which representation, perception and other such intentional acts flow, is pointed towards the material elements of the material world.

Representation

Transcendental Consciousness

Perception

material element

Memory

material element material element

Etc.

External World The intentional act of perception has a particularly important role; it is the only one that is able to recognise common sense and what coincides with it. There is an obvious distinction between Husserl’s phenomenology and Kantian philosophy: according to Kant, the sensual faculty recognises common sense, but according to Husserl, it is implied that intellection flows through the senses. In this way, Husserl overcomes Kant’s configuration of objects. Like Bergson and Hegel, Husserl believes that Kantian philosophy is founded on immanence. To define the intentional relationship between the transcendental consciousness and the external world, it is important to first state what it is not: it is not extrinsic. If it were, there would be a risk of returning to Brentano’s realism, and the transcendental consciousness might be understood as just another element in reality. Furthermore, it is not only belonging to the internal act. If it were, there would be a risk of returning to idealism.

Session 7 The first fundamental action is that of epoche (of judgement and the habit of knowing). In Cartesian Meditations, Husserl takes as an example a cube: man has a pre-philosophical knowledge of what a cube is. What remains of the epoche of judgement is the original starting point of life; that is, before experience (erleben). Husserl abandons the notion of psyche as a kind of naïve realism. Although he holds on to intentionality, it is now related to the transcendental consciousness (not the psyche). The various manifestations are responses to the flux of intentional acts. The perceived object is a particular manifestation. Synthesis is important; it is how the transcendental consciousness reaches the manifestation. When a manifestation (e.g., cube) passes from perception to memory, the consciousness can know what the object is (e.g., cube). [To talk about synthesis, we must consider time. Before we do this, though, we will look more closely at the fundamental intentional act of perception.] Perception is crucial in all of this; it is the ‘base layer’ of the flux of intentional acts. This is because man always receives manifestations. It is precisely this fundamental intentional act that allows for synthesis, and thus it is what allows transcendental consciousness to relate to the various manifestations. One might note once more the influence Bergson has on Husserl at this point: Bergson’s relationship between consciousness and authentic time is evident in Husserl’s flux of consciousness, which is temporal and continuous. This notion that perception is temporal is the main theme of Cartesian Meditations, which was at first a series of lectures and conferences. If two men stand at different sides of a cube, then after epoche each man only perceives what he can see. In order to perceive the other sides, they must manoeuvre their bodies and fulfil their anticipations, confirming that each side has the same dimensions. In new perceptions, old ones are not forgotten. Husserl calls this retention; it

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |8 is not memory. Furthermore, during a current perception, the retention of a previous perception continues to apply itself. Retention is not an act; there is no fulfilment, it is empty. It is the condition of possibility for synthesis.

Session 8 The manifestation does not work inside the intentional act; it belongs to the world. Like Bergson, Husserl overcomes idealism and realism. The consciousness is in no way reducible to reality, which is independent and autonomous. The transcendental consciousness is independent, but it cannot exist without being directed towards reality. On the other hand, reality can exist independently, but it can only manifest itself to the consciousness. Husserl then speaks about the noema, the objectual sense that is the product of synthesis, and about the noesis, the task of the sensual perception. Note the difference between Husserl and Kant: The latter would have said that the noesis (had he used the term) was the task of the intellect. According to Husserl, the noema is not the Kantian noumenon, which is unattainable and can relate only to reason. Both Hegel and Husserl accuse Kant of intellectualism. Husserl aims to overcome definitively the distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon: the thing as it appears simply is the thing in itself. Thus, it is able to relate to the consciousness, albeit in a defective way; it appears in some way limited. It is important to note that the noema does not coincide with the thing in itself. Returning to the example of a cube, the noema is the horizon of anticipations that helps man to understand the object. Precisely this is the ‘objectual sense’. One might be forgiven for noting the influence that Kierkegaard seems to have on this aspect of Husserl’s phenomenology; what is more likely is that Kant’s influence of the Dutch ‘philosopher’ also influenced Husserl. Protention is another key aspect of his phenomenology. It is another movement of the sensual perception. Put simply, it is the anticipation of the next moment, the one that has yet to be perceived. In speaking about the role of the body without analysing said body, and considering his assertions about the noema, Husserl could not escape talking about the existence of the body – at least at first. Later, he realises the crucial role of the body in the entire process that moves towards ‘objectual sense’. Thus, in Cartesian Meditations, he had two main aims: to attain knowledge of the body, and to explore the meeting between my consciousness and another. In the first volume of ‘Ideas…’ he maintained that the transcendental consciousness remained lonely. He did not explore the possibility of being around other human beings. He was afraid of this, and so he decided to speak about how one consciousness meets another in his conferences (which would become Cartesian Meditations). Inter-subjectivity is important for Husserl, and through it the second aspect of epoche becomes apparent. The transcendental consciousness suspends judgements about ‘cultural objects’, those objects related to social activity. After this epoche, it returns to the private (lonely) dimension, and must therefore be at peace with itself (before it can interact properly with others). This is a very existential point. The private dimension is also called private nature; the phenomenologist begins to configure objects naturally. The first object that is configured in this private dimension is, of course, the body. In German, there are two words: körper and leib. The körper is a material body that is quantifiable; the leib is specifically a living, mobile body. In the eyes of a scientist or a physician, however, they appear the same. Furthermore, in the eyes of a positivist, a leib is merely a körper. Philosophically, a körper is understood as a passive object, and a leib is both an object and a subject. Husserl states that if the body is both subject and object, it must be related to the consciousness. He uses the example of a man’s right hand grabbing his left hand: the right hand is the subject and the left hand is the object, but the left hand also feels the right hand. Moreover, the consciousness cannot exist independently of its body, and so the transcendental activity of synthesis is related to the body. If perception requires movement – which cannot happen without a body – then the body is crucial for arriving at the ‘objectual sense’.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

Page |9 All of this being said, let us no study the meeting of one consciousness with another. It can only happen once the consciousness has configured its body, because the meeting is always mediated by the body. Even a transcendental consciousness in Husserl’s view cannot take possession of another pure consciousness. This is very obviously a rejection of positivism, in which the consciousness is understood as an object among other objects. There are also ethical consequences: if one consciousness is unable to take possession of another, then the first has no control over the actions of the second, and thus it has no responsibility for the other. 1. 2. 3.

My consciousness meets the body of another. Although it is a leib, it appears to me to be a körper. I do not approach it, nor do I question its consciousness. Next, the other body appears to move itself. Now I realise that it is in fact a leib, like me. Then, I consider that it may have a consciousness, like me.

Thus, by an analogical process I come to realise the possibility that there is another consciousness. Husserl speaks about combination: in some way, I combine the body of the other with my own, as if I was there, in the place of the other body. The result of this process Husserl calls empathy. Finally, I consider that if the other body has a consciousness, it may have a transcendental consciousness, capable of epoche, like me. This is inter-subjectivity. The entire process is a transfer of perceptions. It is not projection, but recognition of similarities.

?



Session 9 [An email was sent on 13.04.15 with an attachment containing quotes from Cartesian Meditations; the notes from the last session are related to the first paragraph of the quotes. In this session, we began by reading from paragraph 17.] Because every manifestation is complete, Husserl introduces the notion of shadow (‘abschattung’). In paragraph 44, Husserl speaks about kinesthesias, coming from the Greek kinesis (movement) + aistesis (perception). This kinesthesias is what happens when, for example, a consciousness moves itself to perceive new sides of a cube.

Session 10 [Began by reading from paragraph 54 of the quotes from Cartesian Meditations] What should be noted almost immediately after reading this paragraph is that Husserl allows for the incompatible to become compatible. The transcendental consciousness sees nothing more than a körper when it first sees the other. Only after the other moves itself does the first consciousness consider that it might be a consciousness too. In order to recognise that the second consciousness is autonomous (instead of a copy of the first), the first must recognise that there are similarities between it and the second. This ‘paired association’ is called combination, and once it is achieved, the first feels that it is associated with the other. After combination has been achieved, the first consciousness realises (not necessarily immediately) that the other has its own point of view; it does not occupy the same position as the first. Only then can the first realise that there is both similarity and difference. Thus, there will never be a full perception of the world, because there is more than one consciousness. This is a theoretical part of Husserl’s philosophy, but the field that surrounds it is an ethical one.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 10 Our study of Husserl ends here, and our study of the founder of existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, begins… Sartre (1905-1980) was captured by Nazis on the frontline in 1939. It was during his imprisonment that he began to write his most important work: Being and Nothingness (1943). Later, in the 1950s, he became involved in politics and joined the French Communist Party. As a result, many of the important relationships that he had built up over many years broke down, including those with the co-founders of a journal called Les Temps Modernes. While it is true that one may be a communist without necessarily being a Stalinist, Sartre was both. His first important work, The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) demonstrates his transition from traditional phenomenological thinking and his break from Husserl’s school of thought into his own. [More on this later.] Years later, in 1968, he endorsed the famous Student Rebellion of the 1960s and, by extension, the extraparliamentary Left. Many comparisons can (and perhaps should) be made between Sartre and Marx. Like Bergson, he gave literary shape to his philosophical works, and in 1964 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. However, he refused to accept the award, citing opposition to French culture. Even in 1964, Sartre was a radical Marxist-Stalinist. He refused to be recognised as a French intellectual and to be a representative of France in any way. As a young man in Berlin, he adopted Husserl’s phenomenology, but he later radicalised it before finally moving away from it completely. He rejected the notion of a transcendental consciousness, believing that anything that is directed always towards the world is not transcendent. It might better be described as a continuous explosion towards the world. Furthermore, he radicalised the relationship between the world and the consciousness, rooting the latter in the former. Thus, epoche is impossible. This philosophy of Sartre’s might be understood as a more perfected rejection of positivism. He emphasises the importance of the intentional act that is imagination in his critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. To the imagination, the world appears as something that does not exist. The situation, then, allows the consciousness to go beyond the situation. The imagination is strictly related to the body, the permanent ‘here’ of the consciousness. One can imagine what does not exist only because one’s body is able to move around. Thus, the consciousness is always rooted in the world and always has the ability to negate or abstract it. Returning to The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre criticises Husserl and his understanding of the relationship between the consciousness and the subject. In order to assert that the consciousness is the substratum of knowledge, one must reduce the consciousness to something concrete: this is a reduction of the consciousness to matter, and there – says Sartre – lies the paradox. Sartre asserted that this was most obvious when Husserl understood the consciousness as a ‘pole’. The reduction has its origins in Descartes, and its peak in Husserl, according to Sartre. Of course, this is not strictly correct: Husserl did not reduce the consciousness to matter, but Sartre’s understanding of Husserl comes from his radicalisation. The consciousness is the condition of knowledge of the world, but it is not the substratum; it is not a ‘thing’, according to Sartre. An important aspect of his philosophy is that of negation (of the rigidity of matter). The temptation that the man has to (conceptually) reduce the consciousness to ‘a point’ comes from Modern Philosophy. In fact, consciousness is always in flux. Thus, it is a kind of ‘broken foundation’ – one that is not reduced to a point. This assertion of Sartre’s is a radical consequence of Bergson’s attempt to liberate consciousness from matter. The intentional act must continually negate itself.

Session 11 So, according to Sartre, the relationship between the consciousness and the subject proposed by Husserl results in a conceptual reduction of the consciousness. Even for Sartre, the consciousness is the cornerstone of knowledge of the world. As a young student, he adopted Husserl’s phenomenology. The foundation of knowledge moves, continually losing and regaining itself. Thus, it is a ‘broken’ foundation. It is also important

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 11 to remember that according to Sartre, the consciousness is always in situation – it is in the world – but it is never completely absorbed by the situation. Applying its imagination on an object, the consciousness is able to imagine non-existents. It is able to overcome its situation because of the body and because of the intentional act of imagination. For example, John (who is in Rome) can imagine that he will live in Paris; because John has imagined it, and because he has a body, he can choose to live in Paris. Transcendence of Ego (1937) was written to criticise the proposed transcendence. In 1943 he wrote Being and Nothingness, in which he devotes himself to perfecting the notion of abstraction of the consciousness. ‘Being’ in the title coincides with ‘object’ – there is nothing abstract about the ‘being’ in the title of this work. ‘Nothingness’ comes (perhaps unknowingly) from Kierkegaard’s notion of breaking free from the ties to this world. Thus, the work can be said to be phenomenological and existential. However, it represents a radical break away from Husserl’s phenomenology. The object is closed in on itself (note the similarities with Bergson). When man reflects on himself, he separates himself from himself in order to point towards oneself. Of course, on the other hand the consciousness is always in the world, but can overcome the situation; it can overcome the rigidity of matter and direct itself (thanks to the flux of intentional acts). To configure an object, the consciousness must deny the presence of it – senseperceptions are not sufficient. This is also how the consciousness configures the subject (as an object).

Session 12 Opacity is a feature of Sartre’s philosophy that comes from Bergson. Indeed, he studies the difference between object and consciousness because of the influence of Bergson, who also wanted to free the latter from the former. The original essence of the object is found through the concept of opacity (obscurity) – a lack of difference from itself. In comparison with the consciousness, the being is unable to distinguish itself from itself. Put another way, the object is unable to point towards other uses. Thus, it is unable to understand itself; it cannot interrogate its own substance, and so it cannot relate itself spontaneously to other objects. Human beings are the only beings that can do this. The first fundamental question that Sartre asks in Being and Nothingness is whether the essence of an object is reducible to its manifestation to the consciousness. Sartre says that it is not. The object must be illuminated by the consciousness if it is to be understood (if its opacity is to be eliminated). Therefore, its essence lies in its opacity (as has been said). Although the consciousness can illuminate, it is not necessary that it should do so: there is no predetermination. The consciousness is able to decide whether it will attempt to know the world. This is key in understanding Sartre’s atheism. The consciousness is defined as being ruled by an internal nothingness (nullity). It is true that this internal nothingness comes from Kierkegaard, but the Dutchman related it to God; the Frenchman argues that the nullity flows from inside the consciousness, require neither God nor other human beings. It seems that instead of overcoming idealism (as he intended), Sartre radicalises it. The assertion about the nullity flowing from within seems to suggest that the consciousness is the subject. Analysing Husserl’s intentional relationship between the (transcendental) consciousness and the object, Sartre considers whether the intentional attitude is the essence of the intentional consciousness. He concludes that it is not. When the consciousness fixes itself to itself (as Husserl and Hegel promote according to Sartre), it reduces itself to an object. The consciousness that closes in on itself in order to illuminate itself actually reduces itself to an object, which of course cannot understand anything. Nullity is superior to intentionality. Because of the internal nothingness, the consciousness is able to go beyond itself to the world and other human beings. Although Kierkegaard’s nothingness is only realised when the consciousness is faced with the world and other beings, Sartre’s nothingness actually makes encounters like these possible. Many criticise Sartre as a subjectivist. It is also true that there may even be traces of Hegelian thesis and antithesis in his notion of nullity.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 12 Important is his notion of unconditional human freedom. Although the consciousness is always rooted in a particular situation, it is always able to free itself from one and become rooted in another. It is able to anticipate its future, which is not yet realised. A future can only be imagined from a particular situation. The consciousness faces nothingness; it is a projection of its own internal nothingness, and it results in anxiety or despair. Once again, Kierkegaard’s anxiety is related to God and other beings, but Sartre’s comes solely from within (from a fear of internal, ontological nothingness). There is no telos – here and now, the consciousness is free. The freedom is unconditional because there is no telos, no determination. It is indeterminate because it is comes about in the uncertain anticipation of the future. Thus, he also rejects a universal human nature (not the similarities with Nietzsche’s rejection of universality).

Session 13 To understand better Sartre’s understanding of the meeting between one consciousness and the other, it is useful to review what Husserl said about ἐποχή, which he said has two parts: suspension of judgement and alterity. Because Sartre rejects a transcendental suspension of the world, he rejects the necessity of ἐποχή. Moreover, he rejects alterity – he does not consider that the original meeting between one and the Other is worthy of investigation, taking it as given. He is more interested in the relationship in the present. The consciousness feels the gaze of the Other on it, meaning that it feels judged. Sartre speaks about the first phenomenological meeting between one consciousness and another with a very pessimistic tone. The first feels shame because the Other reduces it to an object when it judges it. Furthermore, the first feels embarrassed (also applicable to the body) because the Other seems to be able to do what the first cannot: the Other seems to be able to define the first and gain an objective view of it. In some sense, the Other seems to deprive the first of its desire (to define itself). Of course, this does not actually happen, but the shame that the first feels becomes a fear (of being reduced to an object), and so the first decides to fight. [Note that while Husserl speaks of combination, Sartre seemingly overturns it by suggesting that it is as though the Other takes the place of the first.] Because he rejects a universal human nature, Sartre is unable to recognise the Other in the way that Hegel did. The aim of the fight is to reduce the Other to an object – it is a ‘fight to the death’ without any real possibility for recognition of the Other. However, the attempt to reduce the Other only results in a further reduction of the first to an object. Thus, there is a kind of recognition in the first, but it is only a recognition of its own objectivity. The solution is the acceptance of the irreducibility of the relationship; in fact, this is the only possible action. Each consciousness realises that they will remain in conflict with each other, but they also realise that they never possess each other: this is the acceptance of the irreducibility alterity of the Other. It is noteworthy that although they approach it different ways, Husserl and Sartre arrive at the same conclusion: he irreducible alterity of the Other. Sartre struggles to propose a moral philosophy because of this conclusion because there seems to be no room for responsibility. After Being and Nothingness, he was criticised for his pessimistic tone. According to critics, it reflected his descent into subjective idealism. In response, Sartre attempted to overcome subjectivism and idealism by adopting (founding?) existentialism. However, many scholars since have said that in doing so, he contradicted a lot of his earlier work and indeed returned to idealism once more. To remedy this, he reflected on the lack of a notion of human essence. He later suggests that there is, in fact, a human nature, although it cannot be defined. The human nature provokes man to try to define it.

Session 14 The consciousness must take responsibility (the giving up of focus on itself) for the Other. In the struggle for responsibility, the human essence is shaped. In some sense, the essence might be understood as responsibility. Because there is conflict in the relationship, and because the counter comes about as a result of the internal nullity in each consciousness, the essence is not fixed. As suggested in the brief introduction to Sartre, comparisons should be made between him and Marx. To do this, we must first compare the dialectic processes of both. As a communist, Sartre is naturally interested in Marxism.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 13 In attempting to overcome the idealism found in his own works, he studied in depth the works of Marx, including his dialect process. He focussed on the residual idealism in Marx’ dialectic in an attempt to overcome that which was found in his own philosophy. According to Sartre, Marx was influenced by Hegelian idealism. He tried to propose a non-idealistic dialectic process. To understand it better, we should look in more detail at his criticism of Marx, who he said had developed an essence (the end of classes). For Sartre: 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 = ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 Just as Hegel’s ‘idea’ predates history, so does Marx’ ‘end of classes’; history proceeds from the predetermined idea of the ‘end of classes’. On the contrary, Sartre proposes a practical dialectic, one that allows the goal to arise directly from the history of man. The practical situation is the conflict between the human consciousness and the rigidity of matter. So, the essence – the telos – of Sartre’s dialectic process emerges from the opacity of the world, and so it is always reshaping itself. However, the ‘essence of the essence’ ever changes.

Session 15 The residual idealism found in Sartre’s philosophy is found in the solipsism (the doctrine that there exists a firstperson perspective possessing privileged and irreducible characteristics, in virtue of which we stand in various kinds of isolation from any other persons or external things) between the consciousness and the Other. Some scholars suggest that he actually reduces the consciousness to the subject. In his own eyes, his solution is a kind of practical Marxism and a practical dialectic. In other words, it is a nonsubjective Marxism. For Sartre, idealism is the reduction of consciousness to the universal, subordinating man to universality (or ‘the Spirit’). Although Marx criticised Hegel for this, Sartre believed that his mistake was not giving up the telos. Moreover, Marx’ telos is extrinsic. Man is opposed to the inert practical field (rigid nature), and must overcome it. Sartre’s dialectic involves three steps, but these steps should be understood as happening all at once. Thus, they can also be called three ‘modes’ of dialectic. In this assertion, we see how Sartre’s tries to overcome the extrinsic telos. 1.

2.

Constituent dialectic a. The relationship between a man (who needs to satisfy his biological desires) and the concrete world causes the man to work to overcome the situation (Marxist alienation from labour). The telos arises spontaneously and work reduces man to nature, bringing about new biological desires and needs; nature will never be fully transformed. Cultural dialectic a. The telos begins to emerge, and man is aware of his ability to transform nature in such a way that he will be able to recognise himself in his production. [Note another difference between Sartre and Marx: the latter did not reflect on culture.]

Session 16 3.

Constituted dialectic a. There is a contrast between the group and the series. Marxism is also evident in the third mode – man is alienated by work. The group is the mass of workers who decide to initiate a fight between classes in order to overcome this alienation. At first, the group is unable to shape humanity. Opposed to the group is the series, an accumulation of the majority who do not attempt to overcome alienation together and who have no common goal. Each member of the series is only interested in himself and his own freedom from alienation. The members of the group try to show the members of the series that they can have a shared, common goal.

If Marxism was sufficient for Sartre, he could end his dialectic here with the overcoming of alienation. However, because he posits no extrinsic telos, there will always be alienation. His dialectic is open: it coincides with an infinite task. In one sense the dialectic overcomes alienation, but in another sense it is precisely the dialectic that preserves it. The telos emerges from the responsibility that the group feels for the series.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 14 Session 17 [Read from Introduction, paragraph 6 of Being and Nothingness on the opacity of being, sent on 29.04.15] This paragraph allows us to reflect on the opacity of being, and on being in general. “Being is just what it is…” suggests that there are limited possibilities open to it. Although his philosophy is complicated, Sartre uses repetitive, simple language. Being is not subject to temporality (which does not coincide with time). There is a distinction between time of being and time of consciousness. One should note the obvious influence that Bergson has on this aspect of Sartre’s philosophy. Being is neither something possible (with the exception of human beings), nor necessary, nor universal.

Session 18 [Read from Part 2, chapter 1, paragraph 1 of Being and Nothingness on the consciousness] The consciousness cannot be analysed because of its internal nullity; it is limitless. It cannot be reduced to an object of study. It is the being that is able to interrogate its own being, but because its being is present in all interrogations, it is infinite. Because man’s essence is open, his being is open. If the consciousness sought its equivalence in another being, it would risk reducing itself to an object and losing its consciousness. The material being has no distance (separation) from itself. For this reason, all of its aspects are contained in the determined possibility of the matter. Therefore, it is unable to discover new aspects in the future. Furthermore, the density of being is infinite (even though the being is finite); it is uncreated, eternal. Put another way, the density of being is infinite as long as the (finite) being exists. “The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness…” The consciousness is able to free itself from its fixation on density and its own identity. Thus, it is able to free itself from the risk of reducing itself to the positivity of matter. Every movement of emancipation results in either an elevation out of density or a fall into density. Because this is not progressive, the consciousness does not attain absolute knowledge (or God). The consciousness cannot be reduced to an act of believing; it cannot fixate on its intentional acts. Sartre arrives at the internal nullity of the consciousness after reflecting on Husserl’s phenomenological transcendental consciousness. “So the self, therefore…” Sartre cannot deny subjectivity. A self-consciousness is one that recognises itself: it has a presence in front of itself. Because manifestations are always in shadow, we can never attain full objectivity of the objectified world. Of course, the consciousness presents itself to itself in shadow too. To be the foundation of the knowing process, the consciousness must know itself completely. According to Sartre, the history of philosophy has given this role to the subject. There is no complete objectification of the consciousness because it is nothingness; presence to self is not complete objectification.

Session 19 [Read from Part 1, chapter 1, paragraph 5 and Part 4, chapter 1, paragraph 2 of Being and Nothingness on the notion of freedom] Whilst Sartre stresses the importance of absolute freedom, in response to his critics he paradoxically considers freedom as a subjective foundation. Everything depends on the power of subjective desire. The paragraphs that the professor has chosen to look at in relation to Sartre’s notion of freedom prove that not only did he risk returning to subjective categories, but he also realised this. His philosophy is originally based on a criticism of the Cartesian cogito, but he later bases

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 15 some of his philosophy on it. Thus, many scholars assert that his philosophy is incoherent. Sartre understands – at least for a while – that the consciousness is the only possibility for human beings; this is a prime example of subjectivism. In the last sentences of the paragraph on freedom and facticity, Sartre explains that obstacles and resistance only come about because of the free choice of man. He once more considers the relationship between freedom and the situation. Although previously in his radicalisation of freedom he was able to suggest that freedom can project, it results ultimately in a return to subjective idealism. Thus, the situation is the condition of possibility for emancipation from the situation, which is an obstacle to freedom. Put another way, man can only affirm his free choice to overcome an obstacle (the situation) because the obstacle (the situation) exists in the first place. It is also important to remember that whenever one situation is overcome, another arises. At the very least, Sartre remains a coherent phenomenologist on this point. Schopenhauer and others would have simply abandoned matter when it posed a threat to their philosophical systems. Sartre, at least, always insists that the consciousness possesses a leib.

Session 20 [Read from Part 3, chapter 1, paragraph 1 of Being and Nothingness on alterity] When the first consciousness feels touched by the Other, it feels shame; it is objectified. Thus, Sartre preserves the Hegelian notion of recognition. However, Sartre’s notion might be understood as overcoming Hegel’s. The Hegelian unaware self-consciousness recognises its status as a Spirit once it encounters the Other. Desire allows it to go on directing itself towards its biological desires and then towards the Other. Thus, in some sense, it realises that it is distinct from objects after it recognises its irreducibility to them. Furthermore, the meeting between the first and the Other is a positive thing in Hegelian philosophy, because it leads to the attainment of absolute knowledge. However, in Sartre’s philosophy, the consciousness is nothingness and so it immediately recognises that it is distinct from the objects. It is only after recognition that it is reduced to an object. He preserves two Hegelian notions: that the Other is a mediator, and recognition. When the consciousness (which is nothingness) is at last able to recognise itself, it is – tragically – as an object. It fails to recognise its nothingness. This is because of the negative, objectified force of the Other, This is the drama of Sartre’s philosophy. Furthermore, because many different Others can perceive many different qualities in the first consciousness, it appears as a substrate: different objects to different Others (one might say). Finally, even in being objectified new situations can arise, which of course result in new possibilities for emancipation. In these new situations, the consciousness is more and more acutely aware of the risk of being objectified by the Other. Our study of Sartre ends here, and our study of the very influential Martin Heidegger begins… Although we study him after Sartre, it is important to remember that Heidegger (1889-1976) comes first chronologically. In fact, he heavily influenced Sartre’s criticism of Husserl, and is credited as a cornerstone in the history of philosophy. In 1919 he became a student of Husserl’s, but eventually they became enemies when the former student replaced his professor after he was thrown out by Nazis. At least for one year, Heidegger himself was a member of the Nazi party, but eventually turned his back on it. Many scholars believe that he did this when the party failed to deliver on a promise that he would become the ‘spiritual guide’ for the party. Anyone who is interested in finding out more about Heidegger should read his ‘black notebooks’, which contain his political beliefs and philosophy, as well as evidence of anti-Semitism. He was very interested in the ontological differences between man and objects. Indirectly, he worked on overcoming totalitarianism. According to him, Husserl subordinated the practical life to the theoretical life. He noted that there was a risk of returning to subjectivism, idealism and Cartesian philosophy in Husserl’s phenomenology.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 16 The core of positivism, as we should know, is an infallible trust in the sciences to explain everything that can be explained in the world. Husserl was wary of it and tried to overcome it. According to Heidegger, he did this by following the path laid out by positivists: making the subject the starting point. Furthermore, Heidegger calls positivism the final radicalisation of metaphysics, implying that it is a form of subjectivism. Heidegger rejects the universal ἐποχή (influencing Sartre). He emphasises that phenomenology should be understood with regards to the practical, everyday life. The transcendental consciousness is a universal concept. Heidegger invites his readers to think about existence, but does not class himself as an existentialist (although some later scholars do). Because he inherits a lot of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, Sartre will later become known by some as a disciple of the Dutchman. Heidegger’s philosophy is one of language He assigns philosophical meanings to everyday words. The dasein is ‘in-der-welt-sein’, or ‘being in the (practical, concrete) world’; it is the experience of being peculiar to human beings. At least at first he promotes thinking about things in a phenomenological way. He rejects the importance of intentionality proposed by Husserl as related to the transcendental consciousness and the preeminence of scientific observation and analysis. At first, the object does not appear as something receptive, but as a tool or instrument (zuhanden, ‘ready to hand’, ‘usable’). One should note the risk of infinite regress: it is not very clear how he deals with the body of self and the body of the Other.

Session 21 Man makes sense of an object in its zuhandenheit, its usefulness, which is the practical action that is realised when the object is used. An object is identical for all members of a given community; it offers a limited range of possibilities. The perceivable aspects of an object emphasised by Husserl (e.g., colour, form etc.) are secondary in importance to the practical possibilities. [Later we will see that he believes man has predetermined knowledge of the entire range of possibilities of being.] Heidegger makes an important distinction between wo-zu (‘to which’) and um-zu (‘for which’). Together, they constitute the zuhandenheit, the significance of an object. All men are like craftsmen who produce useful objects. Whenever an object has already been produced, it reminds man of its zuhandenheit. In some sense, there is a practical dialogue between man and object. Using the example of a key, the wo-zu would be the keyhole, and the um-zu would be the opening of a door. [Later we will see that Being is the horizon of all wo-zu and um-zu.] The principle concern in phenomenology is determining the original source of manifestations, according to Husserl. Heidegger asserts that this source is what allows all manifestations to appear to man and so it cannot be reduced to an object. It is essential that one does not mistake the source of manifestations for an object. Heidegger is the first to state that Husserl reduces the (transcendental) consciousness to an object. The ‘transcendental subject’ is this reduction. According to Heidegger, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ coincide: the subject’s foundations are rigid, as an object. To avoid the mistakes made by Husserl, Heidegger proposes a change of perspective. If it is not to be objective, then neither can the principle of manifestations be subjective. He understands it as a sort of background or horizon that cannot be reduced; it is what allows all else to be seen and individuated whilst it itself cannot be. To speak about the horizon only makes sense when one speaks about the objects that appear in front of it. It might be said that Heidegger adopts Kant’s condition of possibilities. However, Kant asserts that it is transcendental; Heidegger plainly disagrees, understanding it ‘in the flesh of the world’.

Session 22 The source of manifestations is Being. Thus, phenomenology is ontology. Heidegger criticises Husserl’s phenomenology and indeed the entire history of ontology as mistaken. The history of ontology considered that being was the supreme reality, but Heidegger suggests it is the source and the background or horizon of reality. He believes that to understand it as the supreme reality is to risk understanding it as an object.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 17 Thus, he proposes a destruction (of sorts) of the entire history of ontology – of metaphysics – which betrays what the pre-Socratics said about being (that it is a context), in Heidegger’s view. As a linguist, he uses Greek to do this: ἀλήθεια (‘truth’) means ‘un-hiddenness’, and this coincides with Heidegger’s horizon. Anything that is unhidden must first be hidden; the truth is obscure and it cannot be individuated, but its obscurity allows man to identify other things. Put another way, while it itself is hidden, its illumination means that other things are unhidden. In order to understand what follows from this in Heidegger’s philosophy, one must – temporarily – accept that his assertions thus far are correct. Being is the principle of manifestations and therefore it is the principle of reality.

Session 23 To understand how Being causes things to manifest themselves, we must return to the notion of zuhandenheit. Another important term is bewandtnis, which translates in English as ‘involvement’. However, translated into Italian and then English, it might mean ‘satisfaction’, which the professor is happier with. The field of manifestations is composed of an infinite and complete number of practical possibilities. Man maintains his own infinite field of practical possibilities whilst receiving the manifestations of other things. According to Husserl, consciousness coincides with the source of manifestations. According to Heidegger, man can only reflect on himself (dasein) because of the gift of being that comes from the source of manifestations. To reflect on his dasein, man must begin with Being (and vice-versa). This is called the circle of comprehension. Being (source of manifestations) needs being (dasein) and being (dasein) needs Being (source of manifestations). Man is unable to observe Being through intentional acts. The comprehension is not theoretical, but rather it is practical. This Heidegger calls verstehen (‘to understand’). In order to comprehend Being, man must use tools; only in the use of tools can their obscurities be overcome and their practical possibilities be understood. The dasein is both weak and powerful: it is dependent on Being, but it is the condition of possibility for the interrogation of Being. Let us look more closely at the relationship between Being and ἀλήθεια. First, Being cannot be pointed at because the source of manifestations is hidden. A small part of the total connection of possibilities is all that is ever revealed (unhidden). To understand this better, consider the example of a man driving his car to work; in doing so, the practical possibilities of his car are revealed, but those of his tools at home are not. However, the practical possibilities of his car are of course related to those of his tools. So, not only is there a circular relationship between dasein and Being, but also between Being and object (tool). The Being is in no way reducible to anything: it is not objective. However, neither is it abstract: it appears in the world. Being and Time (1927) was originally supposed to consist of two volumes, each of which was to have three parts. However, Heidegger only wrote the first two parts of the first volume, the first of which focused on the dasein and the second of which focused on Being. In the interrogation of Being, time must be kept in mind. Time gives Being sense, because Being must not be associated with eternity. As a result, Heidegger asserts that man can only understand Being – which is free from the world – through the world. Because the dasein plays such an important role in his philosophy, many scholars say that there is a risk of a return to subjective phenomenology and to metaphysics (even though the dasein plays a practical role instead of a transcendental, theoretical one). His stress on the ontological difference between dasein and object is a perfection of Bergson’s attempt to free the consciousness from matter. Ontic primacy and ontological primacy distinguish the dasein from objects. The first primacy refers to the fact that only a human being can interrogate the being of other things. The second

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 18 primacy refers to the fact that the dasein is the only being that can interrogate its own being. The dasein lives in a realm of possibilities, and here we can note the influence that Kierkegaard has on Hiedegger.

Session 24 Not only does the dasein live in a realm of possibilities, but it projects possibilities. Again, these projections are not theoretical: they are related to practical experiences. It does not create possibilities, but it allows them to emerge when it uses tools. Thus, objects inspire the discovery of practical possibilities, which essentially belong to the dasein and only belong to the object secondarily. Of course, the body is very important: without it, the use of tools is impossible. Heidegger, interestingly enough, does not consider that the body needs to be interrogated. This is because it is the first thing that is ‘to hand’ and there is an immediate relationship between the dasein and it. Many scholars have suggested that this is a mistake of Heidegger’s, as he reduces the body (leib) to an object. Furthermore, it reveals his blatant lack of interest in biological desires such as the fundamental desire for the conservation of life. The possibility of death is what allows the dasein to be open to the realm of possibilities (and to be able to project possibilities). Thus, Heidegger asserts that man’s finitude means that he is incomplete and that all he does is imperfect. Because he is directed towards death, man is a defective creator. More specifically, the condition of possibility is an awareness of death. The ‘Übermensch’, according to Heidegger, is he who eludes an awareness of his finitude and is thus able to ‘enjoy life’. One should note the similar nature of Heidegger’s ‘superman’ with that of the aesthetic life in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. At least on this point we can agree with Heidegger and Kierkegaard: he who authentically encounters God must necessarily become aware of his own finitude and limitations. Our study of Heidegger ends here, and our study of the analytic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein begins… Session 25 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) belonged to the school of analytic philosophy. In order to study analytic philosophy (however briefly), we should first return to positivism, in which science is understood as able to solve almost any problem. Analytic philosophy is a sort of neo-positivism; the representatives of this school believe that they must assert the scientific status of philosophy. Logic and language are very important. Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) was the only book-length philosophical work published by Wittgenstein. More than just another analytic philosopher, he might be better understood as a bridge between continental and analytic philosophy. His motive for studying logic, mathematics and language was an existential one. [Later we will see why.] Philosophy is incapable of clarifying philosophical questions because it lacks a clear language. In order to be a true philosophy, its propositions must be evident, with no need for questions or clarifications. All philosophical problems come either from a lack of a clear language or from linguistic tricks. Thus, the truthfulness of philosophical propositions is related to clear evidence. Moreover, without clear evidence and language, there is no philosophy. For this reason, logic seems like a sensible starting point for Wittgenstein: it offers a linguistic structure to philosophy. In some sense, logic can be understood as the formal object of the certain sciences; it is an instrument (note a return to Aristotelianism) that must be used if philosophical questions are to be answered. One should note that Aristotle believed it was important to lay out a logical structure before asking philosophical questions, and Hegel’s dialectic process is a logical one. To begin, says Wittgenstein, man must suspend all of his presuppositions and knowledge. One should note that Husserl has a remarkable influence on the Austrian-British philosopher, and that Husserl was indeed interested in logic and language in his earlier, Aristotelian years.

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015

P a g e | 19 Philosophy has its essence in language. Put another way, the real philosophy is that which is based on philosophical mistakes that are remedied through the use of clear language. Thus, like Heidegger, Wittgenstein suggests that the history of philosophy is mistaken. The main concept of his ontology is that of the world; the world is not a mere accumulation of objects, but rather it is the structure that allows man to perceive objects. The world might be better understood as the totality of affairs (or facts), when an affair is a relationship between objects. So, language is the condition of possibility for true philosophy. It is composed of images of these affairs – it is a sort of ‘copy’ of the complete number of relationships between objects. Therefore it is man’s starting point in his reflection on the affairs of the world. Because there is no world without the particular situations of objects, then there is no world without language. The world exists before language, but it only appears to man because of language. Furthermore, man does not have language without logic, which is the structure of language. Of course, a logical structure exists before a linguistic expression, which as we have said is a representation of affairs. Put another way, the linguistic expression is representation, and the form of representation is logic. The brute world (that without language) is full of representations, which belong to the general form that is logic. There are many different logical relationships including ‘human’ (Mary is John’s friend), ‘spatial’ (The pen is on the table), ‘rhythmic’ (Rob listens to Mozart) and ‘chromatic’ (Joe wears a red shirt with blue trousers). Because logic can be understood as the mathematical dimension, Wittgenstein proposes formulae to define some of the forms of representation:  

Formula defining ‘human’ relationship: Formula defining ‘spatial’ relationship:

R(a-b-c-…-n) aRb

It is worthwhile remembering that Wittgenstein’s work was very abstract. So much so that he never produced one example in Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus. Any examples given in class are provided by later scholars.

END OF STUDY NOTES 07.06.15

Ryan Black

History of Contemporary Philosophy 2

May/June 2015