Cyprus (Developments in 2011). Political Data Yearbook

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Delivery date: 15 Oct 2012

European Political Data Yearbook 51: 61–74, 2012

61

doi: 10.1111/j.2047-8852.2012.00006.x

1

Cyprus

2 3

EROL KAYMAK1 & HUBERT FAUSTMANN2

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1

Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus; 2University of Nicosia, Cyprus

5 6

Efforts to Solve the Cyprus Problem

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

The year 2011 saw a lot of diplomatic activity but little momentum towards the solution of the Cyprus Problem. To the contrary, there was even some evidence of regression on tentative convergences and growing impatience on the part of international mediators. In parallel, drilling for natural gas commenced off the southern coast of Cyprus, portending a new regional and strategic dimension to the conflict while providing potential incentives for functional cooperation between the conflicting sides.

15 16

Progress in the negotiation dossiers

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

The lack of substantive progress in the talks that commenced in 2008 prompted the United Nations to adopt new strategies to push the sides to narrow differences so that a final give and take stage could start. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, invited both leaders to a series of summits where as host he hoped to leverage his moral authority to pressure the leaders to meet interim progress deadlines. If internal matters were thus resolved, ultimately the external dimension of the Cyprus Problem would be settled through the participation of all relevant parties, including Turkey. The year started with the tri-party Geneva Summit held between the Cypriot sides and the UN on 26 January. In the run-up to the summit, the Greek Cypriot leader, President Demetris Christofias, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Dervis¸ Erog˘lu, held a series of intensified meetings to bridge differences and reach convergences. The Geneva meeting produced no substantive breakthrough, but Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged that the two leaders had worked to move closer together through a range of bridging proposals on governance and power sharing, the economy and European Union matters. The sides have reached agreement on representation and decision making within the EU, but still diverge on how a settlement should be incorporated into EU law. Only minor divergences remained in the economy chapter. On © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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Table 1. Elections to the House of Representatives Date of election: Total number of seats: Electorate: Total votes cast: Total valid votes:

Party Dimokratikos Synagermos – Democratic Rally (DISY) Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou – Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) Dimokratiko Komma – Democratic Party (DIKO) Kinima Sosialdimokraton Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosi Kentrou – Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) Evropaiko Komma – European Party (EVROKO) Kinima Oikologon Perivallontiston – Ecological and Environmental Movement Ethiniko Laiko Metopo – National Popular Front (ELAM) Grafeio Dikaiomaton tou politi – Office for the Rights of the Citizen (LASOK) Zigos Kinima Anexartiton Politon – Zigos Movement of Independent Citizens Kipriaki Proodeftiki Sinergasia – Progressive Student Movement (KIPROS) Kyriakos (Outopos) Kostas Efstratiou Andreas Konstantinou Neofitos Stavrou Pampos Pieridis Antonis Stavrou Loukas

22 May 2011 56 531,463 418,247 (78.70%) 404,577 (96.73%)2 Number and percentage of votes

Change since 2006

Number and percentage of seats

Change since 2006

138,682 (34.28)

+3.76

20 (35.7)

+2

132,171 (32.67)

+1.36

19 (33.9)

+1

63,763 (15.76)

–2.22

9 (16.1)

–2

36,113 (8.93)

–0.03

5 (8.9)

0

15,711 (3.88)

–1.91

2 (3.6)

–1

8,960 (2.2)

+0.25

1 (1.8)

0

4,354 (1.08)

n/a

0 (0.0)

0

2,667 (0.66)

+0.42

0 (0.0)

0

859 (0.21)

n/a

0 (0.0)

0

709 (0.18)

n/a

0 (0.0)

0

234 (0.06) 213 (0.05) 46 (0.01) 39 (0.01) 36 (0.01) 20 (0.00)

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)

0 0 0 0 0 0

© 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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CYPRUS

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Table 2. Cabinet composition of Küçük I For the composition of Küçük on 1 January 2011, see Faustmann and Kaymak (2011: 934).

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Table 3. Cabinet composition of Küçük II A. The party composition of Küçük II: Date of investiture: 6 April 2011 Number and percentage of parliamentary seats

Party Ulusal Birlik Partisi – National Unity Party (UBP)

27 (54)

Number and percentage of cabinet posts

11 (100)

B. Cabinet members of Küçük II: Prime Minister/Bas¸bakan: I˙rsen Küçük (1940 male, UBP) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs/Bas¸bakan Yardımcısı ve Dıs¸is¸leri Bakanı: Hüseyin Özgürgün (1965 male, UBP) Minister of Internal Affairs and Local Administrations/I˙çis¸leri ve Yerel Yönetimler Bakanı: Nazım Çavus¸og˘lu (1965 male, UBP) Minister of Finance/Maliye Bakanı: Ersin Tatar (1960 male, UBP) Minister of National Education,Youth and Sports/Milli Eg˘itim, Gençlik ve Spor Bakanı: Kemal Dürüst (1971 male, UBP) Minister of PublicWorks and Transportation/Bayındrılık ve Ulas¸tırma Bakanı: Ersan Hamza Saner (1966 male, UBP) Minister of Health/Sag˘lık Bakanı: Ahmet Kas¸if (1950 male, UBP) Minister of Labour and Social Security/Çalıs¸ma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanı: S¸erife Ünverdi (1955 female, UBP) Minister of Tourism, Environment and Culture/Turizm, Çevre ve Kültür Bakanı: Ünal Üstel (1955 male, UBP) Ministry of Economy and Energy/Ekonomi ve Enerji Bakanı: Sunat Atun (1973 male, UBP) Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources/Tarım ve Dog˘al Kaynaklar Bakanı: Ali Çetin Amcaog˘lu (1952 male, UBP)

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

governance and power sharing, the disagreement remained on electing the executive, but given existing convergences Ban claimed that the differences were not ‘insurmountable’. There were extensive negotiations on property, but considerable divergence on the issue of exercise of competing claims between compensation by current users to the original inhabitants, and restitution to the owners prior to © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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Table 4. Cabinet composition of Christofias I For the composition of Christofias I on 1 January 2011, see Kaymak and Faustmann (2009: 927; 2010: 925); Faustmann and Kaymak (2011: 934). Changes during 2011: Minister of Foreign Affairs/Upourgς ⌭xwterikn: Markos Kyprianou (1960 male, DIKO) resigned on 19 July and was replaced by Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis (1949 female, Ind) on 5 August Minister of Finance/Upourgς Oikonomikn: Charilaos Stavrakis (1955 male, Ind) resigned on 28 July and was replaced by Kikis Kazamias (1951, male, AKEL) on 5 August Minister of Defence/Upourgς munaς: Costas Papacostas (1939 male, AKEL) resigned on 28 July and was replaced by Demetris Eliades (1947 male, Ind) on 5 August Minister of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment/Upourgς Gewrgaς, Fusikn Prwn kai Peribllontoς: Demetris Eliades (1947 male, Ind) resigned on 28 July and was replaced by Sofoklis Aletraris (1953, male, Ind) on 5 August Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism/Upourgς ⌭mporou Biomhcanaς kai ⌻ourismo: Antonis Paschalides (1952 male, DIKO) resigned on 27 July and was replaced by Praxoulla Antoniadou Kyriacou (1958, female, United Democrats) on 5 August Minister of Education and Culture/Upourgς Paideaς kai Politismo: Andreas Demetriou (1950 male, AKEL) resigned on 28 July and was replaced by Giorgos Demosthenous (1964, male, Ind) on 5 August Minister of Communications and Works/Upourgς Sugkoinwnin kai rgwn: Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis (1949 female, Ind) resigned on 28 July and was replaced by Efthymios Flourentzos (1955, male, Ind) Minister of Health/Upourgς Ugeaς: Christos Patsalides (1973 male, DIKO) resigned on 27 July and was replaced by Stavros Malas (1967, male, United Democrats) on 5 August

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

the Turkish invasion in 1974. Whereas the sides had agreed in principle that remedies to affected property claims would be dealt with through a mix of reinstatement, compensation and exchange, they remained philosophically apart on the degree to which the original owner exercised discretion in determining the fate of particular properties. On the issues of security and guarantees, both sides had identified the aspects that needed to be addressed but had not yet commenced negotiations. On territory, both sides could not agree if and when this issue was to be discussed. At the meeting there was no breakthrough on substance, but there was partial progress on procedures regarding cross-chapter negotiations. Up until then the Turkish side had argued that all chapters should be concluded separately, but it proposed otherwise in Geneva. However, the Turkish Cypriot © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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proposal came with a proviso that the security dossier be excluded and that a timetable be adopted for a conclusion of the negotiations. The Greek Cypriot response to a firm timetable was to propose a more tentative three-stage negotiation process. In the end, the leaders only agreed to intensify the negotiations through a series of additional meetings. In his report to the UN Security Council on his mission to Cyprus of 4 March, Ban reiterated concern regarding the lack of progress and declared that the negotiations could not be open-ended despite the expressed Greek Cypriot concern that deadlines should not be imposed. Ban declared that he would call for another tripartite meeting upon reviewing progress in the coming weeks. March also marked a milestone when the leaders breached the figure of one hundred meetings since negotiations commenced in 2008. The second Geneva summit was held on 7 July. Despite agreeing with the UN Secretary-General that the negotiations should be intensified, no substantial progress was made. The Turkish side proposed to discuss all matters except maps with a view to expediting the talks to secure a deadline for their conclusion. However, the Greek Cypriot side emphasised the lack of progress on core issues including territory, settlers, security and guarantees, as well as property. There was some progress on internal security and policing. The UN had also dispatched technical experts to engage both sides on the property issue, but no formal negotiations of the dossier had taken place. Meanwhile, the UN claimed ‘that both sides have agreed that the issue of maps and figures related to this chapter should be discussed only during the last phase of the process prior to a multilateral meeting’.1 In the governance chapter, there was agreement regarding the conclusion of international treaties binding on a reunified Cyprus. Once again, the Turkish side pushed for deadlines, but territory remained off the table pending a multilateral conference, whereas the Greek Cypriots still insisted on the closing off of all internal chapters, including agreement on territory. For the Greek Cypriot side, an agreement on territory and property remained sine qua non for the holding of a final conference. Both sides agreed to hold separate censuses to facilitate an agreement on citizenship criteria in a unified Cyprus. Both leaders also agreed to a more intensified timetable of meetings as well as an enhanced role for the UN in the negotiations. Though formally still a Cypriot-led process, the side effectively acquiesced to a more substantial mediating role for the UN. The expressed goal was to reach agreement on all core issues by the next meeting in October. In the interim, the sides agreed to the UN assuming an ‘enhanced’ role in order to facilitate an ‘intensive period of negotiations on the core issues’.2 The greater sense of diplomatic urgency was apparently related to virtual political © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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deadlines – particularly the Republic of Cyprus’ assumption of the EU Presidency in July 2012. Following the meeting on 30–31 October, the Secretary-General acknowledged that progress had been made on some key issues and expressed faith that the leaders could reach a settlement. He noted considerable progress on EU matters, economy and internal aspects of security. However, little had been achieved on governance, territory, property and citizenship. Ban pressured both sides to make considerable progress within the ensuing two months in order to move to the ‘end game’ of the negotiations.3 Consequently, he announced that the two leaders would meet again in January, expressing his expectation that by then all internal aspects of the Cyprus Problem will have been resolved. However, the year ended with a crisis regarding the governance and powersharing chapter. Doubt was cast on a near convergence on the electoral system, entailing a rotational presidency and cross-voting, when the Turkish side argued against one community’s participation in the elections of the other. Christofias, in turn, declared that minus the cross-voting element he could not defend power sharing in the form of a rotational presidency, thus the issue remained unresolved at the end of 2011. Similarly, progress was limited in other core issue areas, so a pessimistic mood prevailed in anticipation of the January 2012 summit. In the latter months of the year, overt speculation regarding the failure of the talks became more prominent in public discourses. The UN hinted at the end of its good offices mission and also initiated an overview of the UNFICYP peacekeeping mission that has been renewed biannually since 1964. The shutting down of good offices could foreclose an opportunity to mediate a political settlement since no mechanism outside of the UN has been utilised in the Cyprus Problem. Moreover, the withdrawal of peacekeepers would create a sense of insecurity, especially among Greek Cypriots, as the buffer zone would no longer be internationally monitored. However, these outcomes were far from certain given the reliance of the Greek Cypriots on the Russian veto in the Security Council to any developments that could undermine UNFICYP. The deadlocked negotiations in Cyprus also affected Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, while it inhibited cooperation between NATO and the EU in security affairs. Therefore, talk of ‘Plan Bs’ became more prominent, especially on the Turkish side, which wanted to emphasise the costs of protracted talks to the Greek Cypriots and the EU. Moreover, ‘Taiwainization’ or, better yet, full diplomatic recognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’4 remained strategic alternatives. Thus, the EU Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus was presented as a virtual deadline for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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Factors affecting the negotiations

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Hydrocarbon drilling and the ensuing discoveries of reserves off the coast of Cyprus have the potential to affect the Cyprus Problem. It provides an incentive for both the Cypriot sides and for Turkey in terms of the future export of natural gas to regional markets. By contrast, conflict over ownership of natural resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus could lead to the breakdown of reunification efforts and, in the worst possible case, even to armed confrontation. In August, the American company Noble Energy confirmed that it would be drilling for oil and gas in block 12 of the Cypriot EEZ in the autumn.At one level, Turkey, which has not signed the UN conventional law of the sea, upon which the Republic of Cyprus bases its right to exploit its EEZ, contested the continental shelf of Cyprus based on its own interpretation of the law of the sea. Therefore the Turkish continental shelf in Ankara’s reading overlaps with the continental shelf claimed by the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot side interprets the Republic of Cyprus constitution as entitling them to claim an equal share of natural resources through their community’s status as a founding partner of the Republic. In response to the commencement of drilling in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot warnings not to proceed, the Republic of Turkey and the TRNC signed a bilateral agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf on the sidelines of New York General Assembly on 21 September. However, the precise details of the agreement, including maps, remained shrouded from public view. Therefore, it is still unclear to what extent future Turkish and Turkish Cypriot EEZs overlapped with the zones of the Republic of Cyprus designated for exploration. The Republic of Cyprus had not declared any EEZs along the northern coast of Cyprus for exploration. The TRNC legislative body outsourced drilling in their continental shelf to the Turkish petroleum company TPAO. In conjunction, the Turkish exploration vessel Piri Reis, escorted by Turkish naval vessels, began a series of seismic test in areas including block 12. The potential for conflict in the autumn and winter months was underscored by the presence of American, Russian and Israeli military vessels in the area. Despite these maneouvers, there was no military confrontation. The crisis simmered on following high-level consultations between Turkey and the United States. Apparently the latter expressed support for Noble Energy and, by extension, the Greek Cypriot right to exploit its EEZ irrespective of any objection from the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side. In similar fashion, President Christofias rebuffed Turkish Cypriot moves at the negotiation table to raise the matter of natural gas findings in the context of © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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the formal negotiations. Initially Christofias rejected Turkish attempts to link the Cyprus issue to the right for exploration. He also rebuffed Turkish Cypriot claims to revenues sharing. However, he later backtracked and stated that Turkish Cypriots would benefit from any income even in the absence of the solution. Internationally, the Greek Cypriots developed closer links with an unlikely ally – Israel – which had already begun exploiting gas reserves in the Leviathan field neighbouring block 12. Noble Energy was licensed to drill in both EEZs. This development was partly prompted by tension between erstwhile allies, Israel and Turkey. Thus, Israel and Cyprus considered alternatives to exporting potential gas reserves through Turkish pipelines, including nascent plans to build a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility off Cyprus’ southern coast despite relatively higher costs than pipelines. On 28 December, Noble Energy announced that the findings from its drilling discovered ‘significant natural gas resources in Cyprus on Block 12’. This, in turn, heightened expectations that, coupled with the Israeli reserves, as well as the potential for further findings in other blocks, Cyprus could potentially serve as an export hub.This could entice bidders for rights to the other blocks in 2012.

19 20

Greek Cypriot domestic developments

21 22 23 24 25 26

The year was marked by the parliamentary elections in May and the departure of DIKO, the only remaining coalition partner of ruling AKEL, following an explosion at a military base that cost the life of 13 Cypriots. The disaster also led to the resignation of three ministers, a government reshuffle and waves of protests against President Christofias.

27 28

Disputes between the executive and legislative

29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

In February, a House resolution supporting Cypriot participation in Partnership for Peace (PFP) had the potential to lead to a constitutional clash between the legislature and executive in the future. DISY, DIKO, EDEK and EVROKO passed a resolution in favour of Cyprus joining PFP. President Christofias, who had pledged that Cyprus would not join as long as he was in power, insisted that only the executive has the authority to exercise foreign policy and vowed to veto the resolution. By the end of the year, the resolution had not been followed up by any policy move of either the parliament or the President. © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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Parliamentary elections

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

On 22 May, parliamentary elections took place.Although voting is compulsory, more than 20 per cent of the electorate did not cast their vote, continuing the trend of high abstentions by Greek Cypriot standards. A total of 544 Turkish Cypriots who reside in the south also voted. All six parties represented in the parliament managed to pass the 1.8 per cent threshold.The main victor was the opposition party DISY, which gained 3.76 per cent and increased the number of seats from 18 to 20 in the 56-member body. Ruling AKEL gained more than 1 per cent and increased the number of seats from 18 to 19. The third strongest party and member of the ruling coalition, DIKO, lost more than 2 per cent and two seats. EDEK, which had left the ruling coalition in 2010, kept its electoral strength and its five seats. Opposition EVROKO lost almost a third of its voters and was reduced to two seats. The smallest party, the Greens, slightly increased their votes but remained at one seat. As a result, the government controlled exactly half of the votes in the parliament until August, when DIKO departed. On 2 June, Yiannakis Omriou, the leader of EDEK, was elected House Speaker. He was supported by his own party, DISY, and EVROKO, and defeated his predecessor and leader of DIKO, Marios Garoyian, who had been backed by AKEL. One DIKO parliamentarian (Zacharias Koulias) went against his own party because of its alliance with AKEL and the concessions Christofias had made at the negotiation table to the Turkish side.

24 25

The Mari disaster, cabinet reshuffle and the end of the ruling coalition

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

In January 2009, ammunition was found on a Cypriot-flagged ship that became the subject of a diplomatic dispute between the United States, Israel and Syria. Pending a way out of the diplomatic quagmire, the 98 containers were stored at the Evangelos Florakis military base at Mari without the public ever being informed about their content. As it was later revealed, the UN Security Council had urged the Cypriot government to work with other countries with the capacity for the safekeeping of the ammunition. Moreover, a panel of experts from the UN Sanctions Committee had repeatedly asked to inspect the containers, but the government had rejected this. On 11 June, a fire spread into the military base and caused the explosion of the 98 containers. The huge blast killed 13 people, injured 62 and destroyed the main power station of the Republic, Vassilikos. Defence Minister Costas Papacostas and the Chief of the National Guard Petros Tsalikidis resigned only hours after the explosion. The same night, hundreds of protestors gathered outside the presidential palace demanding the resignation of President Christofias, blaming him © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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personally for the deadly explosion. The next night an estimated 10,000 people demonstrated outside the presidential palace calling for the resignation of Christofias in an unprecedented show of disapproval. When a group of demonstrators tried to storm the gates of the palace, throwing stones and flaming torches over the palace gates, the police used tear gas to push the demonstrators back. This was just the beginning of a series of demonstrations during the following weeks. Faced with massive public criticism and demands for his resignation by DISY and EVROKO, Christofias ordered an investigation into the circumstances and reasons for the explosion. The alleged personal responsibility of President Christofias led to a political crisis which was reinforced by the impact of power shortages and electricity cuts all over the south throughout the summer. Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou (DIKO) resigned on 19 July, citing the Mari blast as the reason. On 27 July, DIKO withdrew its remaining two ministers from the government. The next day, the President requested and received the resignation of all ministers, which enabled him to reshuffle the entire cabinet. One week later, DIKO officially ended its participation in the coalition government, citing disagreements on the Cyprus Problem as the main reason. On 5 August, the new Council of Ministers was sworn in. Six of the 11 Ministers were new appointments; two – Communications and Works Minister Erato Kozakou Marcoullis and Agriculture Minister Demetris Eliades – changed portfolio. Marcoullis became the new Foreign Minister, and Eliades took over the Defence Ministry. Neoklis Sylikiotis (Interior), Sotiroulla Charalambous (Labour and Social Insurance) and Loucas Louca (Justice and Public Order) retained their previous portfolios.

26 27

Economic developments

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

In January, the European Commission suspended excessive deficit procedures against the Republic of Cyprus. Under the government’s budget for 2011, the deficit was estimated to fall from 5.5 per cent in 2010 to 3.8 per cent of GDP in 2011. The government’s stated goal is to stay below 3 per cent in 2012. At the end of the year, the fiscal deficit was estimated at 6.2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) for 2011, with the budget for 2012 aiming to reduce it to 2.8 per cent. Throughout the year the three major international rating agencies Moody’s, Standard and Poor, and Fitch gradually downgraded Cyprus’s sovereign bond ratings and the ratings of the major banks in the south. The agencies were mainly concerned about the exposure of the major Cypriot banks to the Greek market, problematic loans and the possible inability of the government to support the banking system. According to Moody’s, the three © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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largest banks of the island have over 40 per cent of their total lending in Greece. Their assets are estimated at around 650 per cent of Cyprus’s GDP. As a consequence of the Mari explosion, Moody’s further downgraded Cyprus’ bond ratings and reduced the economic forecast from 1.8 per cent to zero. The Central Bank governor, Athanasios Orphanides, warned in July that Cyprus was facing an EU bail-out if drastic measures were not taken. Then the Greek ‘haircut’ led to dramatic losses which particularly affected the Popular Bank and the Bank of Cyprus – the two largest banks on the island. By the end of the year, Cypriot bonds had been downgraded by Fitch to BBB, two notches before junk status with a negative outlook. Being unable to borrow money on the international market, Cyprus relied on a Russian 2.5 billion rouble loan to finance itself until the end of 2012. The Cypriot government responded with austerity packages in August and December.The packages included a two-year wage freeze for civil servants, a 2 per cent rise in value added tax to 17 per cent as well as increased income taxes for salaries above €2,500. Unemployment massively increased during 2011 to 9.3 per cent in December, while the GDP grew by 0.5 per cent.

18 19

Turkish Cypriot political developments

20 21

Cabinet

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Prime Minister I˙rsen Küçük reshuffled his cabinet on 6 April. Overall, three ministers were ousted. Despite the reshuffle, dissent within the ruling National Unity Party (UBP) led to a boycott of the parliament by a group of UBP MPs, hence ensuing a quorum crisis. Failure to make quorum prompted opposition parties to jointly initiate a vote of no-confidence. The crisis and spectre of an early election was averted after internal consultations within UBP. UBP MPs ultimately regrouped, including dissident MPs in the parliament, to block the confidence vote. As UBP held an absolute majority in the parliament, opposition parties’ combined votes were insufficient. The apparent schism within UBP and the unpopularity of the government’s austerity programme served to galvanise opposition parties who called for early elections throughout 2011. Lacking numbers, opposition MPs resorted to symbolic acts of dissent. Notably, Mehmet Çakıcı of the Communal Democracy Party (TDP) set a parliamentary record in speaking for 13 hours straight on 1 November, attempting to effectively ‘filibuster’ voting on contentious bills. Parliamentary proceedings and comity broke down when on one occasion MPs resorted to fisticuffs. © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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Issues in national (TRNC) politics

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A former party leader of the UBP, Tahsin Ertug˘rulog˘lu, set up a splinter party, the Democracy and Trust Party (DGP). Despite this, UBP retained an absolute majority as no defections followed. The year 2011 also witnessed a change of helm of the main opposition Republican Turkish Party (CTP). Former TRNC Prime Minister, Ferdi Sabit Soyer, did not stand for re-election as the chairman of the party, making way for Özkan Yorgancıog˘lu, a former Minister for Youth and Sports. The year 2011 proved to be a divisive year in Turkish Cypriot politics. Although the government enjoyed a majority in the parliament, internal divisions and the unpopularity of austerity measures affected politics and daily life. Moreover, a spat between protestors and the government in Ankara required intervention. The government’s mandate – carried over from previous governments in accordance with a protocol signed with Ankara – was to restructure the economy through privatisation and by raising revenue through taxes to balance the budget. This set the government on a collision course with labour unions that aggregated under the collective banner of the ‘Union Platform’, which declared 2011 a year of ‘communal struggle for existence’ against the ‘destruction package’. The unions staged protests and there was a series of indefinite strikes. The target of protestors was often Turkey, as personified by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdog˘an. On 28 January, the first ‘Communal Existence’ protest was held in Nicosia. Austerity measures and privitisation were portrayed as impositions by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Ankara. Erdog˘an took particular exception to various banners displayed that depicted Turkey as an occupying power in Cyprus. He retorted that protesters were ingrate ‘spongers’ of Turkish largesse. His comments sparked a crisis. Despite a list of demands (drafted as 13 points) that were put forth by the Platform, the confrontational element of the crisis predominated media coverage both in Cyprus and Turkey. Erdog˘an claimed that protestors were calling for Turkey to ‘get out of Cyprus’ and that Turkish Cypriots did not have merit in challenging austerity and restructuring. He maintained (incorrectly) that the lowest civil servant salary in TRNC was 10,000 TL. Moreover, he asserted that the protests were coordinated with Greek Cypriots and that it was an injustice to criticise Turkey, which was contributing to the economic welfare and growth of the Turkish Cypriot economy. Turkish Cypriot President Dervis¸ Erog˘lu’s response was timid in an attempt to appease both sides. Ultimately, Erdog˘an was deemed to have been partly misinformed about Turkish Cypriots’ views and regarding exaggerated © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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CYPRUS

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statements on public sector salaries. Küçük’s response on behalf of the government went further towards appeasing Erdog˘an, singling out terminology that caused offense in Ankara, while UBP condemned the substance of statements and banners at the protest meetings. Most opposition groups and parties sided with the protestors, as did the main opposition party in Turkey. Ankara’s formal response to the crisis was to recall its ambassador and replace him on short notice with a diplomat, Halil Ibrahim Akça, known for his commitment to the austerity and restructuring. The Opposition and the Union Platform mobilised many thousands to protest on 2 March against austerity and the perceived insult by Erdog˘an. Organisers made attempts at self-censorship to avoid a repeat of the previous banner crisis. Despite the mass protest the government remained obliged to implement the protocol with Turkey. Union leaders complained to EU authorities in Brussels in an attempt to internationalise the dispute. Thereafter the Platform began to fragment. As a result, participation in the third protest meeting of 7 April was significantly lower. Moreover, police used heavyhanded tactics in dispersing crowds and making arrests. The zenith of the crisis was on 20 July during ceremonies to mark the anniversary of the Turkish landing of troops in 1974. Erdog˘an’s trip itinerary was designed to avoid direct confrontation with protestors. Police intervened at key points, leading to allegations of police brutality, much of it captured on film. Cases against 19 officers were filed only on 14 December. Conflicts with unions and political opposition in the parliament had the effect of forestalling the privatisation of electricity and telecommunications in 2011. On the other hand, a social security reform bill was approved by parliament, accompanied by partial debt amnesty to employers who had failed to make deposits in previous months and years in a one-off attempt to close a 20 million TL deficit in the fund. Cost-of-living adjustments were suspended for a year. A new Public Finance and Debt Administration Law was passed to limit debt ceilings. As a result of cost-saving measures and taxation, government revenues increased by 20 per cent. Meanwhile, infrastructural projects financed through Turkey were widely touted, especially a water pipeline project designed to transport water from the southern part of Turkey to Cyprus. Ground was broken at a ceremony on 20 July. The pipeline project was scheduled to be completed on 7 March 2014. A census was held on 14 December 2011, the results of which will be announced in 2012.

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Notes 1. S/2011/498. Assessment Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Status of Negotiations in Cyprus, 8 August 2011. © 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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EROL KAYMAK & HUBERT FAUSTMANN

2. Remarks of the UN Secretary-General following the meeting of Cyprus leaders, Geneva, 7 July 2011. Available online at: &tt=graphic&lang=l1″>www.uncyprustalks.org/ nqcontent.cfm?a_id=4599&tt=graphic&lang=l1 3. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on the situation in Cyprus, Media Stakeout, Greentree Estate, Manhasset, New York, 1 November, 2011. Available online at: &tt=graphic&lang=l1″>www/uncyprustalks.org/ nqcontent.cfm?a_id=5058&tt=graphic&lang=l1 4. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is only recognised by the Republic of Turkey. While for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, Dervis¸ Erog˘lu serves as President of the TRNC, the international community considers him the communal leader of the Turkish Cypriots. As the government of the Republic of Cyprus remains internationally recognised as the government of the whole of the island, the entire island is now considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the acquis communautaire is not in force in northern Cyprus pending a political settlement to the Cyprus Problem (see Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty).

© 2012 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2012 European Consortium for Political Research

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