Minds & Machines (2010) 20:325–326 DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9180-4
David Braddon-Mitchell, Robert Nola (eds): Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2009, viii+370, $38.00, ISBN 0-262-51228-9 Bradford McCall
Published online: 14 January 2010 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
David Braddon-Mitchell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, while Robert Nola is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland. Together, they edit a volume of 14 fine essays that critically evaluate the philosophical methodology and analysis now known as the Canberra Plan, the project to which this edited volume has its origin in Frank Ramsey’s 1990 essay entitled ‘‘Theories’’. The 14 essays are broken into three different parts, addressing issues in mind, metaphysics, and normativity, with the bulk of the essays to be found in part one. In what follows, select essays from this volume are highlighted to give a sample of what may be found therein. Braddon-Mitchell leads off the volume with an essay that sets the tone for the remainder of the essays in part one, all seven of which deal with the application of the Canberra Plan to issues related to philosophy of mind, semantics, concepts, and the Plan’s a priori character. Indeed, in ‘‘Naturalistic Analysis and the A Priori’’, Braddon-Mitchell considers ways in which the distinction between O-terms and T-terms was initially drawn by the logical positivists; notably, he considers their distinction to be a failure, and as a result their analyses based upon the distinction are also failures. Frank Jackson contributes a chapter in which he discusses physicalism, defending the notion that what makes the world physical is that it only contains physical things, the aggregations of which a priori entail that a certain pattern is instantiated. Fred Kroon builds on the argument of Jackson, and in so doing contends that the Canberra Plan is actually a family of distinct doctrines, united by a confidence in a broadly physicalist worldview and the ability of a priori philosophizing to support the data derived in reality. The four essays found in part two address matters related to metaphysics in relation to the Canberra Plan. In one of the last papers prior to his death—which is only available in this volume—David Lewis writes about ‘‘Ramseyan Humility’’. B. McCall (&) Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA, USA e-mail:
[email protected]
123
326
B. McCall
Lewis argues that whereas there is only one final instantiation of a theory, there are nevertheless many possible realizations of any one theory, and it is impossible to predict which of the possible realizations of the theory will be the actual realization of the theory. Lewis contends that Ramseyan Humility is our irredeemable ignorance about the identities of the actual fundamental properties that realize a final theory. Picking up the earlier emphases on physicalism, Philip Pettit endorses a version of it that says there is an a priori entailment from the ways things are physically to the way things are in other respects, be it psychological or social. Part three includes two essays, both of which raise issues concerning normativity in relation to the Canberra Plan. Notably, Mark Colyvan considers how the normativity of rationality can be naturalized, and thereafter ponders problems raised by the Canberra Plan with relation to the normativity of ethics. The greatest contribution of Colyvan, however, is that his naturalistic account of normativity is not viciously circular. This volume will be welcomed by patrons who have interests in the school of thought that led to, and has been bred from, the Canberra Plan. The excellent introduction allows for readers to be introduced to the terminology used in the volume, and truly makes the work accessible to non-experts. Anyone with interests in a priori knowledge, metaphysics, and normativity should definitely purchase this fine volume.
123
