Descartes: A Modest Epistemologist?

Descartes: a Modest Epistemologist? Christopher Healow December 15, 2015 Abstract ‘The Cartesian Circle’ is generally supposed to pose an insurmountable problem for Descartes because it is thought that, once global skepticism is introduced and the link between psychological certainties and metaphysical facts are brought into question, there is no way to reestablish the truth of the beliefs of which we are most certain. In this paper, I argue that though it may indeed be the case that Descartes cannot reestablish this link, there is reason to believe that doing so is not his aim, nor is it necessary for his epistemological project. I wish to claim that the M editations have 3 apparent goals: (a) to prove the existence of God, (b) to find a suitably solid foundation for basing one’s knowledge, and (c) to thwart the skeptic. But each of these can be achieved by an abductive argument that only assumes the presence of psychological certainty. Therefore, although Descartes abandons metaphysical certainty and is left without the means to confirm that the things of which he is psychologically certain are guaranteed to be true, he is left in a favorable position in which consistency among his beliefs allows him to prove the existence of God, establish a firm basis for knowledge, and respond to the skeptic.

1 1.1

Preliminaries A Sketch of the Problem

In his M editations on F irst P hilosophy, Descartes provides what he takes to be convincing arguments for the existence of God and his certain knowledge of various truths. There has long been disagreement as to how effective Descartes’ arguments actually are, but one of the most well documented criticisms of Descartes’ argument is known as ‘The Cartesian Circle’ (henceforth 0 T he Circle0 ). The problem, very roughly, is that neither of Descartes’ main conclusions of the M editations (that God exists and certain classes of beliefs are veridical) can be accomplished without assuming the truth of the other. 1

In order to know that one’s beliefs are true, it is necessary that God exist to guarantee them, but then God is proven to exist on the basis of the fact that some beliefs are known to be true. Therefore, we appear to be left with two questions, both of which lack non-circular answers: 1) How can we know that our beliefs are true? and 2) How can we know that a benevolent, undeceiving God exists? In recent scholarship, much attention has been paid to the fact that Descartes’ project consists of trying to reinforce the bond between psychological and metaphysical facts.1 On this reading, in an effort to purge his mind of all falsehoods (i.e. misrepresentations of the metaphysical fact), Descartes suspends belief in everything until he can find a psychological standard by which he can reliably form only truthful beliefs about what is metaphysically the case. He then hypothesizes cases and skeptical scenarios according to which he might be psychologically certain of propositions even though they are false, thus creating a rift between his psychological impressions and the metaphysical facts they lead him to believe. Of course, he adopts this skeptical mode in the hope that he might methodologically rebuild the foundation of his knowledge without incorporating whatever feature it was that rendered his former beliefforming practices improper as a basis for stable, scientific reasoning. However, the problem Descartes then faces is how he or anyone can regain confidence in one’s beliefs, and how one can reestablish the link between psychological certainty and metaphysical facts about the world, once skeptical doubt is introduced. More than a few philosophers have opined that this is not a problem that Descartes is able to overcome.

1.2

Interpretation Desiderata & Explananda

For my part, I must confess at the outset that I fall squarely in the category of those who think Descartes cannot escape the skeptical challenges he invoked. However, this does not mean that his attempt to escape the skeptic was not interesting and instructive. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper I intend to bear the mantle of the Cartesian, just as he so boldly dawned the guise of the skeptic. What follows, then, is my attempt to provide what I take 1 See especially Alan Gewirth (1941) “The Cartesian Circle” T he P hilosophical Review 50, p. 368-95, James Van Cleve (1979) “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,” T he P hilosophical Review 88, p. 55-91, and Michael Della Rocca (2005) “Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God,” P hilosophy and P henomenological Research 70, p. 1-33.

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to be a novel and charitable interpretation of Descartes for the purposes of finding a way out of T he Circle.2 I take my starting point the fact that Descartes believed the M editations accomplished three goals. The first goal is found in his Dedicatory Letter to the Sorbonne, where Descartes seeks to convince preeminent theologians of the merits of his ambitious work. The tone of the letter is, of course, obsequious, which is not surprising given its intended audience and purpose. However, there is little reason to doubt that Descartes was sincere when outlining his personal beliefs, and what he takes to be the practical and philosophical achievement of his work: For us who are believers, it is enough to accept on faith that the human soul does not die with the body, and that God exists; but in the case of unbelievers, it seems that there is no religion, and practically no moral virtue, that they can be persuaded do adopt until these two truths are proved to them by natural reason. . . . Moreover, I have noticed both that you and all other theologians assert that the existence of God is capable of proof by natural reason, and also that the inference from Holy Scripture is that the knowledge of God is easier to acquire than the knowledge we have of many created things − so easy, indeed that those who do not acquire it are at fault. . . . Hence I thought it was quite proper for me to inquire how this may be, and how God may be more easily and more certainly known than the things of this world.3 CSM II 3-4, AT VII 1-2 This passage makes it clear that one of the M editations0 goals was to provide a demonstration of the existence of God and to show that this truth is as evident as any truth about the material world. So, Descartes appears to be committed to G1 : (G1 ) The M editations prove the existence of God. 2

Of course, one should not interpret my decision to give such a reading to be tantamount to the claim that this is the only, or even best, reading of Descartes. My aim is only to suggest that the position I expound herein finds it’s basis in Descartes writings and I believe that it is worth our attention, since it seems to provide a way for him to conclude all that he needs to without being overwrought with the defects normally assigned to his project. 3 All of the Descartes quotations found this paper are from John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch, T he P hilosophical W ritings of Descartes, V ol. II (New York: Campbridge University Press, 1995). Since this translation was in turn dawn from the canonical edition of Descartes by Adam and Tannery, I will include both a ‘CSM’ and an ‘AT’ citation for each quote.

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Descartes reveals yet another purpose of the M editations, both in the aforementioned letter4 and in the opening lines of the M editations themselves: Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary . . . to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. CSM II 12, AT VII 17 Thus it is clear that Descartes is interested in establishing a solid epistemological foundation for his beliefs in the meditations. This second belief about the M editations0 can be expressed as: (G2 ) The M ediations provide a solid foundation from which one can formulate systematic, true beliefs about the world. Finally, although not acknowledged straightforwardly in the primary text, the method of doubt that Descartes uses, and his personal correspondences confirm, that he also had the goal of providing a response to skepticism with his M editations. That this was another of Descartes’ goals is also supported by the work of Newman and Nelson, and Machamer and McGuire, all of whom note that skepticism was in fashion in Descartes’ time. Accordingly, any serious epistemologist would have to tackle the challenges of old and new skeptics alike in order to be taken seriously during this time.5 So, as a third and final belief about the goals of the M editations, let us note that Descartes believed: 4

“I think there can be no more useful service to be rendered in philosophy than to conduct a careful search, once and for all, for the best of these arguments and to set them out so precisely and clearly as to produce for the future a general agreement that they amount to demonstrative proofs. I was strongly pressed to undertake this task by several people who knew that I had developed a method for resolving certain difficulties in the sciences − not a new method (for nothing is older than the truth), but one which they had seen me use with some success in other areas; and I therefore thought it my duty to make some attempt to apply it to the matter at hand [demonstration of the existence of God and the distinctness of the soul from the body].” CSM II 4, AT VII 3 5 Lex Newman and Alan Nelson (1999) “Circumventing Cartesian Circles,” N ous 33, p. 370, they write that, “Descartes’ work comes on the heels of a 16th century revival of Greek scepticism, a revival in which the writings of Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics, and of Montaigne, were prominently featured. Adding to the air of defiance, Descartes begins his M editations by introducing a ‘greatest hits’ from the sceptic’s favorite literature, taking care to include the most hyperbolic of contrivances.” See also Peter Machamer and J.E. McGuire (2006) “Descartes’ Changing Mind,” Studies in History and P hilosophy of Science 37, p. 398-419, (especially p. 412) where they extensively detail the shift in Descartes thinking

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(G3 ) The M ediations provide an answer to skepticism by showing that its hypotheses are false. Given that G1 , G2 , and G3 constitute the M editations0 goals, any charitable interpretation will involve an attempt to explain how Descartes could have believed these ends to have been achieved. Indeed, explaining each of these might even be taken to constitute minimal conditions that must be satisfied in order for a Descartes’ interpretations to be initially plausible. This seems appropriate since, notwithstanding the minor errors or confusions other philosophers might have observed, so long as his three goals were achieved, Descartes would have judged his work to be a marginal success.

1.3

Path(s) to a Solution

Suppose G1 - G3 capture the goals of the M editations. In that case an interpretation must begin with the assumption that Descartes has given a coherent proof of God, a system for determining what it is that we know about the world, and the means to answer the skeptic. When seen in this light, T he Circle serves as a challenge to all potential readings since none of G1 - G3 could be true if Descartes is guilty of falling into circularity. That is, if indeed Descartes’ answer as to how one comes to know metaphysical truths is that he must use the psychological faculty that God guarantees tracks the truth, and this faculty in turn can be used to prove the existence of God, it must be admitted that Descartes is guilty of the charge of circularity. As such, he would have failed to achieve each of his aims. However, it’s worth noting that the charge of circularity sticks only insofar as both of the following two propositions are supposed to be true of the M editations: (D1 ) Descartes initially doubts the veracity of all his beliefs and belief-generating faculties. (D2 ) Descartes attempts to provide an argument that ensures a link between psychological certainty and metaphysical truth. If in fact it can be show that D1 or D2 is false, then there is a straightforward way in which T he Circle can be avoided. And, once T he Circle is avoided, that took place prior to the M editations0 publication. Some of the correspondences they draw attention to make it clear that Descartes was aware of the skeptical challenge and was being pressed by his contemporaries to strengthen his work by addressing it.

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one can proceed to evaluate how G1 - G3 might be true on the basis of how Descartes eludes this common charge. For consider: if D1 is false, Descartes can simply hold that there is a certain class of beliefs that he knows to be indubitable and true. Therefore, if these beliefs are sufficient to prove the existence of God, then God can be invoked to validate Descartes’ faith in the beliefs and belief-generating faculties that he initially brought into doubt.6 On the other hand, if D2 is false, then the M editations can be seen as an effort by Descartes to develop an internally consistent set of beliefs, none of which can be doubted and some of which hold things to be true of the world. This would allow Descartes to argue for the apparent truth of his beliefs on the basis of their consistency and seeming plausibility. If God is included in these beliefs, and the skeptic is unable to provide a comparable set of beliefs, then Descartes can achieve all his goals by noting that his method yields a set of beliefs that amount to the best explanation of the evidence he has. For my part, I’m skeptical that either D1 or D2 are true, but the purpose of this paper is to argue for the rejection of D2 and to further elaborate on the means by which Descartes can successfully vindicate G1 - G3 , having abandoned the task of establishing so-called ‘metaphysical certainty.’7

2

Conceptual Background of Descartes’ Epistemological Project

There are a number of concepts Descartes uses to spell out his epistemology, each of which must be grasped if his project is to be properly understood.

2.1

The Ability to Doubt

The bounds of Descartes’ doubt are somewhat controversial, but what is clear is that doubt plays a fundamental role in Descartes’ theory of knowledge. In6

I take some version of this strategy to be that which vindicates Descartes’ approach in Della Rocca (Ibid.) and Samuel Rickless (2005) “The Cartesian Fallacy Fallacy” N ous 39, p. 309-36. 7 In actuality, holding that D1 and D2 are both false puts one in a somewhat awkward position, since the denial D1 provides an obvious way to assert the truth of D2 . Similarly, the falsity of D2 makes it far easier to argue that the complete skepticism D1 implies is true. I note this fact simply to set it aside, as I take it to be fairly obvious that Descartes must (and does) embrace complete skepticism in order to accomplish G3 .

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deed, Descartes even goes so far as to define ‘knowledge’ in terms of doubt.8 The candidate beliefs of doubt − that is, the beliefs Descartes thinks should be doubted − are those that are false or, when considering evidence or reasons that support the skeptics challenge, might be false. It’s worth noting, of course, that the presence of doubt expresses a psychological, not a metaphysical, fact. This is made clear by the fact that one can not only doubt the truth of false ideas and doubt the falsity of true ideas, but it’s also possible to doubt the truth of true ideas and the falsity of false ideas. Therefore, although one should only doubt in cases where there are reasons to do so, the fact that one doubts doesn’t indicate anything absolute about the state of the world other than the fact that the person is doubting.9 It is also important to note doubt’s relationship to certainty, as they both appear to be two sides to the same psychological coin.

2.2

Certainty

First, we must note that Descartes takes certainty to be the opposite of doubt, as he says this explicitly in the Objections & Replies: Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, there there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. . . . [S]uch a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. CSM II 103, AT VII 144-5 What follows from this, given what we said about doubt’s relation to knowledge in the last section, is that the things of which we are certain are the things we know. Thus, knowledge can be understood either in terms having a complete lack of doubt or as certain conviction.10 8

This insight is due found in Lex Newman, “Descartes’ Epistemology,” T he Stanf ord Encyclopedia of P hilosophy (F all 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = ¡http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/descartes-epistemology/¿. Newman cites a personal correspondence of Descartes in which he writes “I distinguish the two [knowledge and conviction] as follows: there is conviction when there remains some reason which might lead us to doubt, but knowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason. AT III 64-5” 9 I am here ignoring the fact that there is a place in which Descartes offers up a version of the Cogito argument to the effect that doubt entails existence. But clearly this is a non-standard case of doubt, and one can draw this conclusion only when attending to doubt as one is experiencing it in a particular way. 10 There is further evidence for this understanding of the relationship between certainty and knowledge in the follow quote:

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One of the more extensive places in which Descartes discusses certainty, and at which he provides a glimpse of certainty in its purest form, is in his discussion of the Cogito argument. Descartes notes that when he thinks about the fact that he is a thinking thing, he is simply certain of the truth of the fact that he exists: At last I have discovered it [that thing which necessarily exists] − thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist − that is certain.” CSM II 18, AT VII 27 Now there are different ways in which one can understand certainty in this context. Since the Cogito argument appears to be something like an a priori and necessary truth, many have suggested that Descartes must be attempting to reforge a relation between things that are psychologically certain and things that are metaphysically true at this point. Given Descartes’ discussion of necessary truths and his essential nature, it is perhaps unsurprising that this is the understanding of Descartes most often adopted. However, despite the fact that Descartes mentions a number of metaphysically laden concepts, it seems rather rash to jump to the conclusion that he is here reestablishing the link which skepticism destroyed is what Descartes is up to, at least at this point in the M editations. It seems to me there is a much easier and more modest way in which to take the Cogito. It’s true that Descartes says explicitly that he is certain at this point, but all this means (by what we have said above, at least) is that he cannot doubt that he exists, given that he is thinking, since certainty is just the absence of doubt. Furthermore, we might say that he knows the Cogito; all that is required for him to know it, or anything else, is that he is unable to devise a reason that would defeat the reason he has for thinking he exists, which is that he can clearly and distinctly perceive this fact (I’ll say more about this below). When understood in this way, we can also account for the claim Descartes makes later in the same passage to the effect that the Cogito is a necessary truth. If, at this point in the M editations, Descartes were to flat out assert “[E]ven though the objects of my sensory experience and imagination may have no existence outside me, nonetheless the modes of thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory perception and imagination, in so far as they are simply modes of thinking, do exist within me - of that I am certain. . . . [these things] I truly know.” CSM II 24, AT VII 35

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that the Cogito is a necessary truth, it would be a claim wholly without merit. Given that he has come to doubt everything that could be reasonably doubted, his grasp of what is even contingently true has been lost. So how could he possibly suppose himself to thus have grasped a necessary metaphysical truth? Answer: he can’t. But I think he recognized this. What Descartes means when he says that the Cogito is a necessary truth is not that there is an inviolable metaphysical fact that if something thinks, then it must exist. He only means to note that he can’t conceive of a way in which it could be the case that there is thinking thing (which he is) and that this same thing doesn’t exist. This doesn’t get him metaphysical truth or falsity, but it gets him something like psychological truth which comprises all those claims which are indubitable, certain, and known. In line with this reading, anything that Descartes claims to ‘truly know’ at this point in the M editations is simply that which he can’t conceive of being false, which for him is tantamount to holding certain conviction.

2.3

Clear and Distinct Ideas

As was already mentioned above, the notion that we can perceive ideas clearly and distinctly plays an important role in the argumentative strategy of the M editations. Specifically, as Descartes begins to isolate those beliefs of his that are true upon considering the skeptical hypothesis, he latches on to those which are clear and distinct as those that are most certain to him and liable to be true. So, for instance, you can see clear and distinct perception functioning as the primary evidence in favor of the Cogito argument: I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such clarity and distinctness was false. So I now seem able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true. CSM II 24, AT VII 35 Having recognized that thinking is sufficient evidence for knowing that that which thinks must exist, Descartes notes that knowledge of one fact implies the 9

use of a standard of knowledge. This standard seems to be clear and distinct perception.11 Of course, until Descartes comes to know that God exists, every piece of knowledge he holds seems ephemeral, since one needs to maintain a clear and distinct perception in order for it to be indubitable. However, by the end of the F ourth M editation Descartes has suggested that his new found standard is guaranteed to be correct by the existence of a veracious God, who he knows to be that which provided him with the faculties he has. Thus, he has further reason to place faith in the faculty of clear and distinct perception. If, however, I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error. CSM II 41, AT VII 59 There is awkwardness in this strategy, however, as these argumentative maneuvers constitute the primary reasons why scholars have taken Descartes to be arguing in a circle. As Gewirth writes: The question whether clear and distinct perceptions are true is, in turn, the focal point of the Cartesian circle. For the circle is held to arise rom Descartes’s arguing that God exists and is veracious on the ground that this is clearly and distinctly perceived, and then that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is true on the ground that God exists and is veracious.12 Again, there are various ways in which one might opt to avoid the circle. What I am inclined to say here is that Descartes can say that the faculty of clear and 11

The form that Descartes argument takes here seems to be the following:

1. If it could turn out that: (i) I perceived p clearly and distinctly, and (ii) p was false, then clarity and distinctness would not make me certain that p is true. 2. Clarity and Distinctness do make me certain that p is true. 3. By Modus Tollens (1, 2), it can’t turn out that both I perceive p clearly and distinctly, and p be false. 4. Equivalent to (3) is: it must be the case that p is true if clearly and distinctly perceived. What is terribly odd about this argument is that Descartes seems to presume that (2) is true even though he hasn’t exhaustively tested this new clear and distinct criteria. Thus, the move seems ad hoc at first glance. Perhaps what he means to say is that he has no evidence to the contrary, and so there is no reason to doubt the reliability of this standard. What is unclear, however, is how much corroborating evidence he has in its favor. 12 Alan Gewirth (1970) “The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered” T he Journal of P hilosophy 67, p. 669.

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distinct perception is legitimate as a test of whether beliefs are true because: (i) the beliefs the standard yields are not able to be doubted, (ii) they are used by Descartes to derive further claims about what is true, and (iii) it is the test Descartes uses to determine whether candidate beliefs can fit with the belief set he already holds. If he can’t see a belief clearly and distinctly, then it means that there is a incongruity between the beliefs Descartes already accepts and the one being considered. I’ll say more about this later. But suffice it to say for the moment that Descartes seems to spell out this standard in terms of the psychological notions of certainty and doubt. Since truth, which is generally taken to be a metaphysical notion and it here provides only a supplemental role to the psychological notions Descartes begins with, I think there is good reason to suppose that Descartes means to be drawing attention to those things which seem true, rather than those which are true. His epistemological standing up until the establishment of God in the T hird M editations simply demands that metaphysical uncertainty remains.

2.4

That which is Revealed by the Natural Light

There is one final concept that needs to be introduced in order to get the full picture of the tools Descartes uses in his epistemological project. In the T hird M editation, Descartes notes that: When I say nature ‘Nature taught me to think this,’ all I mean is that a spontaneous impulse leads me to believe it, not that its truth has been revealed to me by some natural light. There is a big difference here. Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light − for example that from the fact that I am doubting it follows that exist, and so on − cannot in any way be open to doubt. This is because there cannot be another faculty both as trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that such things are not true. CSM II 26-7, AT VII 38-9 The quote suggests that something being revealed by the natural light is a sufficient condition for that something being indubitable. Expanding on this claim, Descartes also indicates that this faculty is trustworthy, and can reveal when things are not true, to such a great extent that there could not be one more so. Now, there are two ways to understand this claim.

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The first, and perhaps the most obvious, is to suggest that clear and distinct perception and the natural light refer to the same faculty.13 Since Descartes takes this faculty to be one that reveals metaphysical truths to him, such that whenever he knows something by the natural light, he can be metaphysically certain because this faculty only yields metaphysical truths. The problem with this answer, if it is indeed the one Descartes means to give, is that all the work of the M editations would then simply rest on the assumption that we have beliefs and faculties that track the metaphysical truth, and which we know to be those that track the metaphysical truth. Of course, if this were the case, then it would simply be to beg the question against the skeptic and to not take the challenge of G2 or G3 seriously. The second alternative is to suppose that, when Descartes says that the natural light’s affordances can’t be doubted, and that the faculty itself is trustworthy and able to reveal falsities, what he means to convey is a psychological fact about the faculty. He is not suggesting the utterly groundless claim that the natural light is tied to metaphysical truth and can be used to prove all metaphysical truths. Rather, his point seems to be that in analyzing that which the natural light makes evident, there simply doesn’t seem to be a way he can conceive of its not being true. This, of course, need not mean that claims supported by the natural light actually are true, it only means that these claims must appear as though they are, which is a psychological, rather than metaphysical, matter. It’s also noteworthy that he calls this faculty ‘trustworthy.’ This too can be explained in merely psychological terms because a faculty’s being trustworthy need not mean it yields truth. Since it appears to be the case that Descartes hasn’t identified any beliefs formed by the natural light which have been overturned by future evidence, he has every reason to say that the beliefs this faculty yields is trustworthy. But this doesn’t necessarily mean the faculty is true. This insight makes it evident that trustworthiness bears a closer 13

Recent scholarship has focused some attention on what the relationship between the natural light and clear and distinct perceptions is. Traditionally it was thought that they were either one and the same or that ‘the natural light’ could simply be a name for the faculty or process by which we come to view that which is clear and distinct. However, Rickless (2005) argues that the natural light being distinguished more substantially from clear and distinct perception might provide an easy way out of T he Circle. For my purposes this question, while interesting in its own right, is fairly inconsequential. Regardless of whether they are the same or different faculties, I think the argument I outline below is still successful. Still, it is important to consider what Descartes writes about the natural light in order that I might head of some confusions before they mount.

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relationship to being reliable or consistent than it does to truth per se. Finally, there is the matter of the faculty’s being able to show that things are not true. The first move one might make to preserve the psychological reading is to suggest, as I did above, that there might be a psychological and metaphysical conception of truth in Descartes’ view. I think there is something to this claim, but I think the better route is to just admit at this point that Descartes has a slight degree of metaphysical bias that he is sneaking into the story, even though he aims to keep it merely psychological. As I will discuss a bit more below, Descartes appears to be committed to the fact that contradictions cannot be manifested, since inconsistency is the kind of thing that infects our thinking about the world, but is not the kind of thing that ever happens in the world. This position is quite evident in the infamous fourth paragraph of the T hird M editation.14 But if Descartes is committed to even this minimal metaphysical truth, then he can justify this final claim about the natural light revealing what is not true, either by suggesting that this basic metaphysical insight about manifest contradictions being untrue is itself granted by the natural light, or by noting that there he has had beliefs in the past which have been inconsistent with those which the natural light reveals. When the latter occurs, the natural light reveals that the conjunction of natural light and non-natural light beliefs cannot be simultaneously held because it would be not true. 14

“But what about when I was considering something very simple and straightforward in arithmetic or geometry, for example that two and three added together make five . . . [d]id I not see at least these things clearly enough to affirm their truth? . . . I cannot but admit that it would be easy for him [God], if he so desired, to bring it about that I go wrong even in those matters which I think I see utterly clearly with my mind’s eye. Yet when I turn to the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something . . . or bring it about that two and three added together are more or less than five, or anything of this kind in which I see a manif est contradiction. And since I have no cause to think that there is a deceiving God, and I do not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all, any reason for doubt which depends simply on this supposition is a very slight and, so to speak, metaphysical one. But in order to remove even this slight reason for doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain about anything else.” (my emphasis) CSM II 25, AT VII 35-6

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3

Cartesian Modesty

Suppose that the conclusion of section 2 is correct and that the beliefs which seem to be clear and distinct are revealed by the natural light. That is, for the sake of simplicity let us suppose that there is one faculty and criterion by which Descartes can establish what the beliefs are of which he is certain, are unable to be doubted and appear to be true. Along with this, let us suppose that this faculty doesn’t reveal metaphysical truths, but mere psychological truths. What then? In what manner can Descartes possibly hope to accomplish G1 G3 , much less escape T he Circle, with psychological certainty only? I believe the answer is that he can do all these things by means of abduction or inference to the best explanation.

3.1

Struggling with Skepticism

In his preliminary discussions of doubt, Descartes makes it clear that one cannot dismiss skepticism off-hand, but neither is it the case that skepticism should be readily accepted. He seems to be willing to accept skepticism, and believes others should accept it, only insofar as there is a sufficient reason to motivate the possibility that a skeptical hypothesis is true. Indeed this seems like a rather reasonable position to hold; we are all rational people and should only be willing to accept the suggestion that claims are true insofar as there are reasons one can find in support of them. Thus, it seems that one who accepts a skeptical hypotheses as true when there is insufficient reason to do so is behaving irrationally. Descartes seems to believe that there is little to distinguish the unfounded skepticism from the ravings of an insane person.15 One thing that goes hand in hand with being a rational individual, however, is the fact that just as we do not dismiss skeptical hypotheses prematurely, it is also the case that we should not claim to know things contrary to skeptical hypotheses unless they are refuted or found to rest on beliefs that are inconsistent. This helps to explain the importance of indubitability for Descartes’ understanding of knowledge. By its very nature, contradictions will involve incompatible claims that imply each other’s opposites are true. Thus, the presence of contradiction will ensure dubiousness among one’s beliefs. It is 15 Judging by an earlier passage in the F irst M editation, Descartes seems to believe that the very definition of a mad person is one who claims outrageous ‘truths’ about reality that are contrary to those of which their senses must certainly inform them. Thus, to be a sensible person one must not believe outlandish claims without a reason.

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for this reason that Descartes must admit to having a weak position near the onset of his skeptical enterprise, for he is left with reasons to doubt and no systematic way of discovering that which is indubitable and those things which are necessarily true from a psychological perspective. I have no answer to these arguments [skeptical arguments which suppose that we are not the products of a veracious and powerful God, but of ‘fate or chance’], but am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasons. CSM II 14-5, AT VII 21-2 Whereas from a methodological point Descartes seems to see the unavoidability of dealing with skeptical concerns, it appears that there is a practical element in his thinking that recognizes that taking these view seriously is problematic because we are naturally inclined to accept common-sense explanations about the way the world is and to trust our various faculties, despite their fallibility. I think this idea that, at the end of the day, we are all forced to relapse into our habitual beliefs plays an important role in what Descartes’ ultimate answer to skepticism is, since some of our beliefs seem beyond our control to doubt. In cases where we are faced with alternative explanations of the same phenomena, we simply have to go with the one that seems most plausible to us. My habitual opinions keep coming back, and despite my wishes, they capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation and the law of custom. I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to these opinions, so long as I suppose them to be what in fact they are, namely highly probable opinions − opinions which, despite the fact that they are in a sense doubtful . . . it is still much more reasonable to believe than to deny. CSM II 15, AT VII 22 These two points make it clear that Descartes, in considering skeptical challenges, recognizes the need for people to look to those faculties which seem to be inescapably obvious to us; we must heed the judgments that we are unable to doubt precisely because their denials are unthinkable. The question is where this leaves us with respect to metaphysical certainty. 15

3.2

Responding to Skepticism

Aside from his general stance with regard to skepticism, Descartes never explicitly states an argument against its conclusion. One is simply left to conclude that, since God exists and His existence is provable on the basis of indubitable truths, there really are no grounds for believing skeptical hypotheses because a veracious almighty wouldn’t allow such things to be true. This is indeed one argument easily extracted from what Descartes does say. However, despite the compactness of this argument, these moves are not open to Descartes without his facing T he Circle. Still, there are hints of an alternative and perhaps stronger response to be found in Descartes own writings. When understood in a certain way, I believe that some of Descartes own opinions suggest a more interesting response to the skeptic than this flat-footed response and allow Descartes to avoid T he Circle entirely. This alternate argument against the skeptic is much more abductive in character because it provides a framework for evaluating beliefs about the world that shows the strength of Descartes own position while also showing the weaknesses of the skeptic’s. One of this alternate argument’s crucial premises finds its roots in Descartes’ argument for the distinctness of the soul and body. In the Sixth M editation, Descartes provides an argument for substance dualism: the position that the mind and body are separate substances. In some respects, his argument for this thesis closely mirrors arguments made in earlier meditations such as the Cogito and arguments for the existence of God, insofar as Descartes uses the clarity and distinctness of certain insights as a basis for forming inferences. But the sixth Meditation’s argument is also somewhat different because it depends on a thesis not utilized (at least not explicitly) in the earlier arguments. Specifically, Descartes introduces a principle that resembles what is now often called the Conceivability T hesis, which, in his formulation, asserts that anything that he clearly and distinctly understands must at least be possible.16 Ultimately, what the conceivability thesis allows Descartes to do (along with a few other clear and distinct beliefs) is to prove that his set of beliefs is, so far 16

Descartes’ introduction of this thesis is interesting for a few reasons. First, it is interesting because this seems to be contrary to what Descartes asserts in the F ourth M editation, where he claims that all his clear and distinct insights are true (as they are guaranteed by veracious God), rather than merely being possible. Second, insofar as Descartes grants that clarity and distinctness are not features that are necessarily only present when one grasps metaphysical truths, he provides an interesting insight into what he what kind of certainty he takes himself to be establishing in the M editations.

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as he knows consistent, and thus metaphysically possible. Therefore, insofar as someone has a set of beliefs that are also possible, they will be as good as Descartes own beliefs and will be worthy of consideration. However, insofar as a set of beliefs, such as the set of beliefs the skeptic holds, are inconsistent, they couldn’t even possibly be true, which not only means that the person who holds them has an inadequate grasp of their own beliefs, but also implies that there belief set isn’t metaphysically possible.

3.3

The Argument

The first premise of Descartes’ argument is rather uncontroversial: (1) There is a category of beliefs that are simply undeniable, insofar as they appear to be indubitable and I cannot help but to assent to them. These are the ideas that are said to be ‘revealed by the natural light’ and ‘clear and distinct.’ The next is not uncontroversial, but I think it is quite plausibly a proposition Descartes would accept. (2) Ideas perceived clearly and distinctly (i.e. those revealed by the natural light) are the only ones I know to be possible. Next, there is Descartes’ formulation of the Conceivability T hesis: (3) If I perceive p clearly and distinctly, then it is possible that p.17 By Contraposition on (3), (4) If it is not possible that p, then I can’t perceive p clearly and distinctly. Descartes also holds a version of the Law of N on − Contradiction: (5) If p is possible, then p is not self-contradictory.18 17

“I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. Hence, the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct.” CSM II 54, AT VII 78 18 This premise appears to be drawn from the fact that we have a natural aversion to contradictions; it seems obvious to us that contradictions cannot obtain in the real world, but it also appears that we cannot clearly perceive contradictions because we can’t imagine what the world would have to be like in order for them to be manifested. Descartes puts this point in this way:

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By Contraposition and Double N egation on (5), (6) If p is self-contradictory, p is not possible. By Hypothetical Syllogism on (4) and (6), (7) If p is self-contradictory, then I can’t perceive p clearly and distinctly. With these premises alone one can begin to see a position Descartes might take with regard to skepticism. First off, for anyone who has a self contradictory belief, (7) implies that they won’t be able to conceive of it clearly and distinctly. Then, since (2) tells us that a belief must be clear and distinct perception if it is to be something that has the possibility of being true, all of those beliefs that don’t meet this criteria will lack a reason for us to believe them. In the case of evaluating a skeptical belief, if one is able to identify a self-contradiction in it, then one has a sufficient reason to reject it because the belief isn’t even possible. If, on the other hand, no contradiction is identified in the skeptic’s belief, one is still able to reject the hypothesis so long as one has reason to say that the belief is not clearly and distinctly perceived, since that is the only standard by which one can ensure the consistency, and hence possibility, of one’s beliefs according to Descartes. Much the same is true when we engage in the process of trying to examine our own ordinary beliefs: so long as we have a belief that is clear and distinct, we have a reason for thinking it’s possibly true. So these premises allow Descartes to begin testing and legitimizing each of his beliefs individually. But what makes these premises even more interesting is that they seem to suggest a way in which entire sets of beliefs regarding many facts about the world might be created. To see this, consider the following further steps: Assuming that one can clearly and distinctly believe more than one belief at a time, (1)− (7) seems to imply the following: “All self-contradictoriness or impossibility resides solely in our thought, when we make the mistake of joining together mutually inconsistent ideas; it cannot occur in anything which is outside the intellect. For the very fact that something exists outside the intellect manifestly shows that it is not self-contradictory but possible. Self−contradictoriness in our concepts arises merely from their obscurity and confusion: there can be none in the case of clear and distinct concepts.” CSM II 108, AT VII 152

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(8) For any person, P , and set of beliefs, β, where beliefs b1 , b2 , . . ., bn ∈ β, if P clearly and distinctly perceives that β, then β (b1 & b2 &, . . ., bn ) is possible. and (9) For any person, P , and set of beliefs, β, where beliefs b1 , b2 , . . ., bn ∈ β, if: (a) P holds β to be the case, (b) ∃x∃y((x = bi & y = bj ) & (bi ∈ β & bj ∈ β)), and (c) ∼(bi & bj ), then P cannot perceive β clearly and distinctly. and if β represents a purported way the world might be, then (10) If β is not clear and distinct, then P lacks sufficient reason to believe that β represents the way the world might be. By simply following the process of adopting all and only those sets of beliefs that we can clearly and distinctly perceive, we can ensure that our belief sets, which ultimately amount to our metaphysical view of how the world is, are at least possible. Then, by creating a consistent and possible idea of how the world might be, each of us can compare our metaphysical views with those others that are also consistent in an attempt to find that which appears to best to us. Now, it’s not entirely clear that this will lead to everyone having the same view of what the world is like. Maybe it just happens to be the case that the world is such that only one interpretation of its facts can be consistent, maybe there is a plurality of ways the world might be. However, so long as one is able to claim that skepticism does not amount to a consistent belief set, it looks as though it can be safely rejected, and for principled reasons, in favor of more obvious and viable explanations of how the world is. That is, so long as it is show to be inconsistent.

4

Escaping T he Circle and Achieving Descartes’ Goals

This brings us back to the preliminaries I mentioned at the beginning of the paper. At that point I argued that any interpretation of Descartes must vin19

dicate his belief in G1 − G3 and also provide a way to avoid T he Circle as a minimal condition of plausibility. Thus, I will now attempt to briefly show how each of these conditions can be met by my reading.

4.1

T he Circle

This problem only appears to present a challenge for those who take Descartes to both: i) prove the existence of God on the basis of clear and distinct perception, and ii) use God to guarantee the truth of the clarity and distinctness rule. Since clear and distinct perception can itself not be shown to reveal metaphysical truths without God’s existence, but one needs to use the rule to prove God’s existence, the problem looms. My account avoids this difficulty because I think that Descartes only ever accepts two basic metaphysical truths: T he Law of N on − Contradiction and T he Conceivability T hesis. Thus, the clarity and distinctness of Descartes’ idea of God grants him psychological certainty that God exists. This in turn proves that it is at least possible that God metaphysically exists. But God’s possible existence is not sufficient to guarantee the metaphysical reliability of the clear and distinct faculty: the clear and distinct faculty is simply that which one can’t help but trust given our natures as rational human beings. Descartes himself trusts the faculty more than others might because he believes it is a metaphysical fact that God exists, that he is not a deceiver and that he gave us the faculty of clarity and distinctness in order to give us a means of grasping truth. But this belief isn’t what leads Descartes to trust this faculty; he simply can’t not trust it. In this way, T he Circle is escaped.

4.2

How One Proves that God Exists

On my interpretation of him, Descartes believes that clear and distinct perceptions give us a view to metaphysical possibility, not actuality. As such, so long as we are able to make our beliefs consistent, we have reason to believe they are possible. In the M ediations although Descartes has an immediate idea of God, He is not proved to exist by the kind of immediate inference that Descartes used to prove that he is a thinking thing and that he exists. Rather he claims that it follows directly from ideas he has are immediately clear and distinct. Once it is shown that God’s existence is a natural consequence of his more basic clear and distinct ideas, he has the grounds to believe that 20

God at least possibly exists and that this being, if He existed, could do lots of explanatory work for him. It’s worth keeping in mind that Descartes seems to have strong skeptical concerns prior to God existing because, if God didn’t exist, he suggests that he would be able to know anything at all. From my perspective this claim needs to be taken seriously, but also needs to be qualified. When Descartes says he can’t know anything without God, what he seems to mean is not that nothing is known, but that things cannot be known with any stability unless God is proven to exist. For without God, I might continue to doubt that the things I once clearly and distinctly perceived still remain so unless I check them yet again. God, according to Descartes’ idea of Him, is therefore the Great Regulator who ensures that things continue on much as they have in the past. Since He has attributes that would prevent our being massively deceived, the skeptical hypotheses are excluded from Descartes’ beliefs. Furthermore, He gives us the means by which we can trust our previous experiences and the knowledge we have accumulated by using our clear and distinct perception, but which we no longer clearly and distinctly perceive. Of course, one might still object that this interpretation of Descartes makes it a mere metaphysical possibility that God exists, which is nowhere near as strong as that which Descartes certainly wished to claim. This is true, of course, but if it is in fact the case that God allows us to know and explain far more than we would be able to in his absence, it is possible that Descartes could convincingly argue that, though only a possible being, accepting God’s existence is necessary for anyone who wishes to preserve the the majority of their beliefs. For, were He not to exist certain skeptical worries might threaten all but those who believe in God. Thus, God is part of the best, most complete, possible metaphysical explanation and may be part of the only real metaphysical explanation available to us.

4.3

How One Provides a Foundation for Knowledge

The foundation of knowledge for Descartes on my interpretation is not so much a set of undeniable, clearly true beliefs, as it is a procedure for forming one’s own beliefs and evaluating competing sets of beliefs once they are established. The way in which the account constitutes a large departure from the traditional understanding of Cartesian epistemology is that the foundations Descartes

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establishes do not give a metaphysical certainty. However, it seems to me that this account of knowledge is guided by the basic commitments that our traditional epistemologies accept (e.g. T he Law of N on−Contradiction) and the fact that it only rules out those views that are clearly unacceptable to us seems ideal for the purpose of forming personal beliefs in a pluralistic society and pursuing more systematic, joint enterprises. So even though knowledge doesn’t constitute beliefs that are metaphysically certain on this view, there still seems to be room for knowledge.

4.4

How One Defeats the Skeptic

The argument presented in section 4.3 showed how the skeptic could be defeated, at least in principle, according to my position. What I hope to do now is to show how skepticism can be thwarted in a more detailed manner. 4.4.1 Take two people, B and S. Suppose the former is a believer, who holds many beliefs and the latter is a skeptic. Let us also suppose that βb is B’s set of beliefs and βs is S’s set of beliefs. Finally let’s assume that p is an arbitrary belief, that p ∈ βb and ∼p is a skeptical hypothesis. Since B follows the procedure outlined in 4.3, she believes βb only because she clearly and distinctly perceives both βb and all its members. Now, suppose S comes along and asserts ∼p. B, being a believer, will consider this assertion and decide whether it should be adopted as a belief considers this belief in two phases. In the first phase, B considers her own beliefs βb in relation to ∼p. In the second phase she considers the beliefs that support ∼p, βs , and compares the latter to βb . 4.4.2 Let’s take the first phase first. Since B is a responsible believer she knows that she must not discount beliefs unless she has a reason to do so, and so she considers ∼p. It seems there are two ways she might evaluate this claim. First, let’s suppose B considers ∼p by comparing it with βb immediately. In this case her standing beliefs will immediately yield the contradiction, p & ∼p. This contradiction is not metaphysically possible, nor will it be clearly and distinctly perceivable. But since βb is possible and βb & ∼p is not, B has

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a reason to deny ∼p. At this point, B may proceed to the next phase, but need not since the skeptical hypothesis, ∼p, posed no challenge to her beliefs. Second, let’s suppose B considers ∼p on its own. If she can perceive ∼p clearly and distinctly, then she will proceed to the next step of evaluation. However, if she cannot perceive ∼p clearly and distinctly, ∼p is not possible and so there is no reason for it to be considered any further.19 Suppose B can perceive ∼p clearly and distinctly; in this case she knows it is possible and so she checks ∼p against βb . Since p ∈ βb considering ∼p alongside βb will yield the contradiction p & ∼p. Since contradictions are not metaphysically possible, p & ∼p can’t be clearly and distinctly perceived and so B has no reason to believe the contradiction. On the other hand, B then has a reason to doubt the conjunction of two beliefs that were each able to be clearly and distinctly perceived, when considered individually. Thus, in order to decide which of p, ∼p should be affirmed, B must move to the next phase of her evaluation. 4.4.3 In the second phase, B begins to ask herself about belief sets, rather than token beliefs. Since, ∼p was incompatible with βb , she must consider βs , the belief set with which ∼p is consistent. So B will try to decide whether βb or βs is the better belief set on the basis of which contains the most complete explanation of the phenomena she observes. Now, if S is indeed a skeptic, one of two things is likely to be found when B considers S’s beliefs. If S is a na¨ıve skeptic and βs contains a number of the ordinary beliefs that βb also contains, then βs will be contradictory, hence metaphysically impossible and B will have a reason to prefer βb to βs . If, on the other hand, S is a Pyrrhonean skeptic and βs has no members, then B will be faced with the decision of opting for either a perhaps incomplete and imperfect belief set, βb , or opting for a beliefs set that is trivially consistent because it contains no members, βs . On my view Descartes would suggest that this is hardly a choice at all: in such a case each of us, as a matter of psychological necessity, must choose βb . Many since have 19

If ∼p is truly a skeptical hypothesis, there is every reason to believe that Descartes will deny that it is a clear and distinct perception, whether one adopts my interpretation or the standard one. Serious problems ensue if the standard for knowledge certifies a skeptical hypothesis. On my view, this would force Descartes to admit that skeptical hypotheses are metaphysically possible, if metaphysically possible, then there is a sense in which a skeptic is justified in holding his position, even if it is not the best explanation available.

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agreed with Descartes that this is an adequate response to the skeptic.

5

Final Thoughts

Allow me to summarize what I take myself to have accomplished here. Having argued that the M editations have three main aims (captured by G1 − G3 ), this paper sought to expand on a interpretation of Descartes’ epistemological project which embraces the notion that his final stance is not one one of metaphysical certainty, as it is traditionally understood. Rather, Descartes whole purpose was to establish a solid foundation for making scientific claims and for grounding our common sense beliefs that were free from skeptical doubt. But he accomplishes this task by means of bolstering his psychological certainty in order to demonstrate the plausibility of his set of beliefs. Then, by virtue of the fact that Descartes crafts a coherent metaphysical conception of how the world could be, he is in a position to argue that he is warranted in believing that his beliefs are true in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Since Descartes takes this coherence to be unique to his own belief set, he can argue that his beliefs are more reasonable than that of the skeptic, and account for all the data that requires explanation. Thus, Descartes avoids T he Circle, his position’s most famous difficulty, by surrendering robust metaphysical certainty to a modest epistemological certainty that suggests a strong metaphysical likelihood.20

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Although there are certainly still deficiencies in the view, insofar as it is not entirely clear whether Descartes’s beliefs are consistent, and whether he is correct that his metaphysical view is the only one that could adequately explain the available data, it is my belief that this account is better able to vindicate Descartes’ three goals while overcoming T he Circle than it’s competitors. At the very least, it seems we should pursue the line of inquiry I have here outlined and ask what would be so bad about abandoning the task of establishing metaphysical certainty, both for Descartes and for us.

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References Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. & Murdoch, D. (1995) T he P hilosophical W ritings of Descartes, V ol. II (New York: Campbridge University Press). Della Rocca, M. (2005) “Descartes, the Cartesian Circle, and Epistemology Without God,” P hilosophy and P henomenological Research 70, pp. 133. Gewirth, A. (1941) “The Cartesian Circle” T he P hilosophical Review 50, pp. 368-95. − (1970) “The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered” T he Journal of P hilosophy 67, pp. 668-85. Machamer, P. & McGuire, J.E. (2006) “Descartes’ Changing Mind,” Studies in History and P hilosophy of Science 37, pp. 398-419. Newman, L. “Descartes’ Epistemology,” T he Stanf ord Encyclopedia of P hilosophy (F all 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . Newman, L. & Nelson, A. (1999) “Circumventing Cartesian Circles,” N ous 33, pp. 370. Rickless, S. (2005) “The Cartesian Fallacy Fallacy” N ous 39, pp. 309-36. Van Cleve, J. (1979) “Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,” T he P hilosophical Review 88, pp. 55-91. Jonathan Vogel (1990) “Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation” T he Journal of P hilosophy 87, pp. 658-66.

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