Descartes\' Cosmological Argument

Topic C
"Something which is more perfect –in other words, that which contains more reality in
itself – cannot be made from that which is less perfect." (Meditation III)
How does Descartes use this principle to prove the existence of God? Does his proof
work?

Descartes' 'Meditations' contribute an extensive attempt at determining 'absolute truths' within our realm of consciousness. In his Third Meditation, Descartes attempts to arrive at an unambiguous predication for the existence of all external 'clear and distinct' truths, using a cosmological argument for the existence of God. In this essay, I will argue against Descartes' cosmological argument, after having initially examined its structure. I will attempt to refute the soundness of his argument by criticising the plausibility of the 'innate idea of God', which Descartes offers as a proposition, and countering any possible replies Descartes may have offered my critique.

A cosmological argument is "an argument for the existence of God which claims that all things in nature depend on something else for their existence", namely an attempt to prove God's existence by beginning with worldly items. In order to examine Descartes' cosmological argument, a sufficient understanding of his hierarchical classification of 'ideas' and 'realities' is necessary. Descartes differentiates between three ontological categories of: finite substances (particular finite things, i.e the mind), infinite substances (particular infinite things, i.e God) and modes (the attributes of a substance). Hence, Descartes considers ideas "merely as certain modes of my thought"; they are principal attributes of a finite 'thinking thing' (mind). These ideas can be subdivided into innate (those inherent in the mind), acquired (those resulting from external influences) and fabricated (those fabricated by the mind). Furthermore, Descartes defines two 'realities' : formal and intentional. Formal reality is that which a substance contains by virtue of existing. As with substances, formal reality is differentiated into three hierarchical realities : infinite, finite, and modal. God is the only thing in existence with infinite formal reality. The mind has finite formal reality, and it follows that ideas have modal formal reality. However, ideas are also subject to Descartes' second form of reality; intentional reality. Intentional reality refers to "the being of the thing represented in the idea, as it occurs in the idea."

With these distinctions in mind, it is now possible to analyse Descartes argument of causation. Initially, it is evident that the intentional reality of an idea contains the same degree of formal reality that the object of the idea would contain if it existed. Also, though all substances and modes contain formal reality, they do so to different degrees. For example, infinite substances contain a higher degree of formal reality than finite substances. These principles are central to Descartes' causal argument. He continues:"There must be at least as much reality in an efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause", and hence derives the innate logical principle "something cannot be made from nothing." From here, it follows that "something which is more perfect - in other words, that which contains more reality in itself- cannot be made from that which is less perfect." Descartes arrives here by assuming that an effect cannot obtain formal reality from a cause that does not also possess it. He reasons that a substance could not simply begin existing, without having been created by a previous cause which contained all of the substance's formal reality. This logic is also applied to ideas, and their intentional reality. A cause of an idea must contain as much formal reality as there is intentional reality in the idea itself. Finally, ideas themselves exist within the mind - regardless of their 'truth' - and therefore contain some amount of intentional reality, consequently they themselves cannot come from nothing either.

At this point Descartes attempts to define the archetypal, self-evident idea, from which all others arise. He states that though "it is possible for one idea to generate another, this does not lead to infinite regress."Therefore, there must be a single idea which contains all formal and intentional reality, and causes all consequent ideas. However, Descartes recognises that he contains no such idea within his self, as a 'thinking thing', and therefore this idea must come from elsewhere. He observes that, as a substance, he may contain within him enough reality to create ideas of other substances, and modes of substances - insofar as both contain as much intentional and therefore formal reality as a 'thinking thing' itself. However, this leaves the question of God. "By the word 'God' I understand some infinite substance, which is independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and by which both I, and everything else that exists…were created."According to Descartes logic, as God is by his essence an infinite substance, his idea could not have originated from a finite substance (the mind), as God must contain more reality, and therefore be more perfect, than any other substance or idea. Thus, the Idea of God is innate within the mind, and God himself is self-evident, self-creating, and infinite. Descartes therefore concludes that existence is the necessary property of God's substance.

There are various plausibilities within Descartes account of God's existence, however within this essay I will explore only one: whether there really is an innate idea of a supremely perfect and infinite being within the human mind that is cause for validating such a being's existence. Initially, one must ask if any idea of God could possibly be inherent throughout the minds of all 'thinking things'. With the knowledge we have today, it appears that the idea of 'God' is merely a social construct. For example, atheism is becoming more widespread throughout Western culture. However, Descartes reply to such an etiological argument could be that if one understood the meaning of the word 'God' - as surely even atheists do - then they must have an idea of God, therefore his intentional reality would continue to exist within the mind, and cause his formal existence. In return, one could argue that, considering the variety of intrinsic religions apparent across the globe, it is quite plausible whether every 'mind' contains the same idea of an all-perfect, infinite God. Muslims praise Allah, and Hindus pray to a variety of Gods and Goddesses - all pertaining to their own specific qualities. Surely all these 'thinking things' cannot have the same innate idea of 'God'. And what of tribal communities, living in primitive societies without connections to the surrounding world? It is more than probable that a child being raised in a society without any notion of 'God' would not contain his 'idea' within its mind. Here, Descartes could offer the following objection: "everyone…had an innate idea of God; but this idea might remain implicit, might remain an unactualised capacity to know God."This follows the logic that even those denying any idea of 'God' contained within them, might simply be unaware of such a capacity. However, such an objection would refute Descartes original argument regarding God's existence. In his Third Meditation, Descartes had explored his own mind and arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing 'infinite' enough within it for him to have caused all consequent ideas. Yet, according to the logic of implicit capacities of the mind, then perhaps each mind could contain infinity within itself - and cause all creation. I use this logic not to claim that each 'thinking thing' is a God within itself - for such an assumption I find quite incredible - yet simply to refute any of Descartes possible justifications for an innate idea of God. It therefore appears that Descartes cannot prove his proposition of an 'innate existence of God within the mind'. Perhaps a less specific proposition of an "innate idea within one's mind of infinite entity" would allow Descartes a more sound argument for arriving at the epicentre of existence, whilst pertaining to the validity of his original argument: "something cannot come from nothing".

In this essay I have analysed Descartes' proof for the existence of God in his Third Meditation. I have since refuted the presupposition of an 'innate idea of God' which Descartes offered as proof of God's existence, by realising that such a claim is unfounded. I have suggested instead that everything tends to a general infinity.















BIBLIOGRAPHY
Descartes, R. (1998) Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings. London: Penguin Books.
Kenny, A. (1997) Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy. New York: Random House.
3. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cosmological-argument



http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cosmological-argument
Descartes, R. (1998) Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings. London: Penguin Books. pg. 33
'realitas objectiva'
Kenny, A. (1997) Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy. New York: Random House. pg. 131
Descartes, R. (1998) Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings. London: Penguin Books. pg. 35
Ibid. pg. 35
Ibid. pg. 35
Ibid. pg. 36
Ibid. pg. 38
Kenny, A. (1997) Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy. New York: Random House. pg. 128
Ibid. pg. 35