Detente as a Strategy

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Détente as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974–9 Lykourgos Kourkouvelas Published online: 21 Aug 2013.

To cite this article: Lykourgos Kourkouvelas (2013) Détente as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974–9, The International History Review, 35:5, 1052-1067, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2013.820772 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.820772

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The International History Review, 2013 Vol. 35, No. 5, 1052–1067, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.820772

D
etente as a Strategy: Greece and the Communist World, 1974–9

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Lykourgos Kourkouvelas*

The transition to democracy in 1974 was a turning point in modern Greek history. The two Turkish invasions of Cyprus and the emergence of the dispute over the Aegean seabed complicated Greek security dilemmas. Apart from cold-war challenges, including the traditional ‘menace from the North’, the country had to face a new threat that was coming from within NATO. The implementation of a d
etente policy was motivated by political as well as security considerations. In terms of national security, the ‘opening’ to the Communist bloc aimed to balance the perceived Turkish hegemonism and ameliorate Greek defence problems. Moreover, following the humliating military dictatorship of 1967–74, a multidimensional foreign policy was also demanded by the vast majority of the Greek public. Last but not least, an active regional policy could also aid Greece’s effort to secure accession to the European Communities. The article will analyse and interpret the political and security dilemmas that were posed by the international developments of the period and the ways these interacted with Greek perceptions to shape Athens’ new d
etente policy. Keywords: d
etente; Greece; Soviet bloc; cold war

The collapse of the Greek Colonels’ dictatorship and the transition to democracy in July 1974 was a turning point in contemporary Greek history. The new political leadership had to preside over a ‘reconstruction’ of almost every aspect of the political, social, economic, and cultural life in the country. The Colonels’ regime (1967–74) had led to the ‘freezing’ of Greece’s association with the European Economic Community, to the country’s expulsion from the Council of Europe, and to its international isolation, especially in the context of Western institutions.1 These meant that during the transition to democracy in 1974 Greece had to face the challenge of an extensive reorientation both internally as well as in terms of its foreign relations; in fact, Greece needed to effect a belated large-scale adjustment to a new era. This article will discuss the country’s new d
etente policies as a part of this wider adjustment. The analysis will start in 1974, when the transition to democracy was effected, and will end in 1979, which also marks the end of international d
etente, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In terms of foreign policy, the most immediate problem was the deterioration of Greek–Turkish relations after the two Turkish invasions of Cyprus (in July and in August), and the beginning of the dispute over the Aegean seabed. The Greek–Turkish conflict dramatically complicated Greek security dilemmas since Turkey was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally and an essential Western footing in the

*Email: [email protected] Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis

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cold war.2 Greece remained a member of the West, and aspired to become accepted to the European Communities (EC) as a full member. However, the country also withdrew its forces from the NATO military command, as a protest against the alliance’s inactivity during the second Turkish invasion in August 1974.3 Athens now considered that a major threat was coming from within the Western alliance, not only from the Soviet bloc.4 Greece’s employment of a d
etente strategy was a part of its response to this new political and strategic environment. The emergence of a Greek Ostpolitik, unfolded in two phases. In 1975–6 the Balkans emerged as a priority: the Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, visited all the Balkan Communist countries (save Albania) in spring and summer 1975. Moreover, following a Greek proposal, a multilateral Conference of Balkan states was conveyed in Athens in January 1976: this was the first time that all Balkan states (save Albania) participated in an international meeting aiming to promote cooperation in the region. However, the culmination of Greece’s Ostpolitik was recorded in 1979, when Karamanlis became the first Greek Prime Minister to pay official visits to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China; in the same year he also visited Hungary and Czechoslovakia. This new opening to the Soviet bloc also had a novel aspect, namely, the need to find additional sources of petrol and natural gas during these years of the oil crises. I. The new conceptual framework Under the 1974–80 Karamanlis governments, Greek foreign policy was shaped by a group of people who were close to the main policy-maker, the Prime Minister,5 and shared common values regarding Greece’s position within the cold-war system. Dimitris Bitsios, the Foreign Minister in 1974–7, was a distinguished former diplomat who had served as Permanent Representative in the United Nations (1961–5 and 1967–72), and as head of the King’s Political Office (1965–7). A highly professional figure, he could radiate (mostly to Greece’s allies) a sense of calm and continuity of Greek foreign policy in the cold war. This was important in those years of spectacular adjustments of Greek foreign policy. George Rallis, the Foreign Minister after 1978 (who eventually succeeded Karamanlis in the premiership in 1980), had been a prominent political figure since the mid-1950s. A major figure of the moderate Right and a prominent Westerner, he had also played an essential role in the resistance against the military dictatorship in 1967–74. Vyron Theodoropoulos, the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in 1976–81, had previously served as Permanent Representative to the NATO and the EC; he also played an important role in the success of the negotiations with the EC, which led to Greece’s accession in 1979. Theodoropoulos, the most intellectually oriented of all, was also an exquisite analyst of international relations, whose views influenced and, to a certain extent, shaped younger generations of Greek diplomats.6 Karamanlis and his foreign-policy staff shared the view that Greece’s position in the world was unquestionable: the country belonged to the West not only due to the outcome of the Greek civil war but most importantly for cultural and historical reasons. Those people belonged to the liberal-conservative ideological spectre and had been part of the social-democratic/Christian Democratic consensus that shaped postwar Western Europe.7 During Karamanlis’s first term in office (1955–63) they had distinguished themselves as cold warriors. When they returned to office in dramatic circumstances in 1974, their main aim was accession to the EC: this would

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consolidate the position of Greece into the Western world, stabilise the young democracy, and also liberate the country from the continuous, yet humiliating, effort to seek ‘protectors’. In this context, they also held that the country, always as a member of the West, should lead a more independent foreign policy. They tried to adjust Greek foreign policy to a model of interdependence, providing for a context which could address the pressing security dilemmas, as well as the attainment of their main aim, accession to the EC.8 Greece’s d
etente policy in 1974–9 was based on two fundamental assumptions, involving the international context and the transformation of Greek threat perceptions. Since the mid-1960s, East–West relations had entered into a new phase that was characterised by the relative relaxation of tensions. In terms of superpower relations, the Gaullist challenge to the United States and the Vietnam War, as well as the Sino-Soviet split and the ascent of ‘national’ roads to Communism in Eastern Europe questioned the absolute power of both the United States and the USSR within their respective alliances, and resulted in a reappraisal of both superpowers’ approach to the cold war. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s ‘realistic’ conception of foreign affairs and the execution of triangular diplomacy (the simultaneous ‘opening’ to the Soviet Union and China) paved the way for a new understanding of superpower relations. The climax of the new era was reached at the Moscow Summit of 1972, when the United States and the Soviet Union signed the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreement. A year later, during the 1973 Summit in the United States, the two sides signed the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement. At the same time, another episode of d
etente was unfolding within Europe. The European d
etente was initiated by the West German Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, went through the mutual recognition of the two German states, and reached its culmination with the Helsinki Accords of August 1975, the outcome of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).9 Thus, Karamanlis’s rise to power, first as Prime Minister of a National Unity government in July 1974 and then as an elected Prime Minister in November 1974, came at the height of d
etente. The second premise that made the conception and implementation of d
etente possible was the change in Greek threat perceptions. Since the inter-war period, Greece’s national security was oriented at facing the ‘menace from the north’, referring to the need to defend the long and strategically thin northern frontier of the country from its northern neighbours. During the cold-war years the geopolitical threat was combined, according to Greek officials, with Communist ideology, thus intensifying the perceived danger.10 The two Turkish invasions of Cyprus in July and August 1974 and the projection of Turkish claims in the Aegean seabed since November 1973 resulted in a dramatic change of Greek threat perceptions. Thus, in autumn 1974, the Minister of Defence, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza (a former Foreign Minister and another staunch supporter of Greece’s Western identity) sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister delineating the security needs of the country and referring to the profound changes in the nature of the threat that Greece had to face: While the permanent threat towards the country, for geopolitical reasons comes from the north, recent brutal developments force us to confront, chiefly, the threat coming from Turkey . . . In the light of new circumstances Greece is not adequately prepared to face the new danger from the east.11

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A few months later, while preparing to begin his visits to the Balkan neighbours, Karamanlis assessed the new situation in the Balkans in an interview with the Times:

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The old infamous Slavic threat does not exist today - at least in the way previous generations had perceived it - as a direct political and military threat against Greece. For generations the Greeks lived with the persistent thought that the Slavs were ready to conquer northern Greece in order to acquire an exit to the Aegean Sea. Today relations with most of our northern neighbours are excellent.12

The need to adjust Greece’s policies led the Karamanlis government to adopt a multidimensional foreign policy. Speaking in Parliament immediately after his election Karamanlis indicated that Greece belonged geographically and ideologically to the West. Yet, his government was willing to seek friendship and co-operation from all countries, irrespective of their political and social regimes. This goal was to be attained in the context of ‘equality, mutual interest and respect to the principle of non-involvement in the internal affairs of every nation-state’.13 Karamanlis also defined five main aims of his foreign policy: (1) accession to the EC; (2) peace and co-operation in the Balkans; (3) friendship towards every country willing to reciprocate that friendship; (4) ‘re-adjustment’ of relations with NATO in order to strengthen national security; and (5) retention of those US military bases in the country that would serve the national interest.14 According to a later memorandum by Theodoropoulos, it was a conscious choice of the Karamanlis government not to allow itself become ‘absorbed’ by the intensity of the Greek–Turkish dispute; on the contrary, it aimed to effect a general adjustment of foreign policy, which would form the basis for the long-term projection of Greece’s national interests. Thus, Athens would now seek to develop its relations towards all directions, including the Soviet bloc.15 A multidimensional foreign policy and an opening to the Soviet bloc seemed to be supported by international as well as internal political imperatives. The holding of the Helsinki Conference in late July and early August 1975 came immediately after Karamanlis’s first tour of the Balkan capitals, and allowed the Greek Prime Minister to present his proposal for the holding of an multilateral Balkan conference as a manifestation of the ‘Helsinki spirit’: the climax of international d
etente gave to Greek diplomacy the leverage to support its aims and initiatives. At the same time, public support for a d
etente policy was enormous. Since the late 1950s antiAmericanism had been one of the basic features of Greek political culture. In the context of the notable political radicalism of the 1970s, the 1967–74 military dictatorship was perceived by the Greek public as a by-product of US policy in Greece. Last but not least, the US unwillingness to prevent the Turkish invasions of Cyprus created emotions of bitterness and even hostility towards the Western superpower.16 In this context, the ‘opening’ to the Communist world was considered as natural and even desirable. Indeed, it was a means for the pro-Western Karamanlis government to satisfy public opinion and gain legitimacy for its major foreign-policy aim, namely, accession to the EC, which, at the end of the day, involved the country’s integration in the European sub-system of the West. It is indicative that even as late as 1979, prior to Karamanlis’s visit to Moscow, more than 65% of the Greek citizens approved of their Prime Minister’s trip to the USSR.17 On the other hand, Karamanlis also had to face domestic political constrains on its d
etente policy from a considerable part of the Right. Many ex-junta supporters criticised the Prime Minister for

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being too lenient with Communism, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. According to their views, Karamanlis’ ‘appeasement’ policy towards Communism could destabilise Greece’s Western orientation. At a period when pro-junta elements remained strong in the army, there were rumours that ultra-Right elements were planning the Prime Minister’s assassination.18 The main aim of a multidimensional diplomacy was the gradual ‘elevation’ of Greece’s status in the international arena. This target was linked with the primary goal of the Karamanlis governments, namely the accession to the EC. Although the architects of Greek diplomacy did not explicitly link their ‘opening’ to the Communists with Greece’s attempts to join the EC, it was understood that an extroversive foreign policy would add significantly to Greece’s European aspirations. In this perspective, it is not a coincidence that the Karamanlis government in spring 1975 began a dual ‘opening’ to the Balkans and the Arab world. According to the Foreign Minister, Dimitris Bitsios, the new approach to the Arab world ‘was combined with the impending accession to the EEC, since geographically and in terms of our political relations with the Arabs we are an essential link between the Europeans and the Arabs’.19 The attempt to claim a new regional role in the Balkans and in the Eastern Mediterranean aimed, to a certain extent, at changing Western European perceptions of Greece as a constant problem, and at showing that the country was moving away from its international isolation and was constructively assuming new international roles. The use of d
etente as a strategy was most evident in the case of Greece’s relations with Turkey. Evidently, the architects of Greek diplomacy pursued d
etente in the Balkans as a counterbalancing factor against the perceived Turkish aggressiveness and hegemonism. The Karamanlis governments aimed at ‘blackmailing’ Turkey through the ‘opening’ to the Communist Balkan countries in two ways: if Balkan d
etente succeeded without the participation of Turkey then the Turks would find themselves isolated and encircled by a ‘peaceful coalition’ of states that would dispute its hegemonic role in the area; on the other hand, if Turkey proved willing to participate, its aggressiveness would be limited. In either scenario, d
etente in the Balkans would reduce the likelihood of a Greek–Turkish war, and could even assist the efforts to achieve a Cyprus settlement. Last but not least, if things came to the worst, stability in the Balkans could allow Athens to release military forces from its northern frontiers in order to confront (or balance) Turkey.20 During his visits to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in June and July 1975 Karamanlis went out of his way to stress that Turkey was a destabilising factor in the Balkan Peninsula, and to ask for the mediation of both leaders, Josip Broz Tito and Todor Zhivkov. Talking to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Dzemal Bijedic, Karamanlis expressed the view that: ‘Everyone who is interested in peace in the Balkans should put some pressure on Turkey to reach a compromise in the Cyprus issue. On this subject I am counting on Yugoslav support.’21 One day later, Karamanlis repeated these views to Tito: As a consequence all who are interested in deterring war and believe that they can put some pressure on Turkey in order to be more reasonable, should do that because, I repeat, Turkey is on the wrong side. Marshal Tito with his international status, especially among the non-aligned countries, could help substantially. I am aware of his interest and I appreciate it. My request is for this interest to be manifested in a more profound way. I have deep respect for the experience and objectivity of the Marshal.22

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Almost a month later, when Zhivkov expressed doubts that a war could break out in the Balkans, the Greek Prime Minister cautioned him that if the Balkan states did not put some pressure on Turkey: ‘I am really sorry to ascertain that war between Greece and Turkey is a great possibility.’23 Perceptions about the role of the two superpowers also influenced Greek notions of Balkan d
etente. A large part of the Greek public blamed the United States for the Colonels’ rise to power as well as for doing nothing to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus.24 The Karamanlis government was the most pro-Western political force of the country, and did not blame the United States for the 1967 dictatorship. Yet the Greek leaders were not entirely immune from this climate: they especially resented the Western inaction and indifference during the second Turkish invasion in August 1974, when they had tried in vain to reach their Western counterparts, only to be told that they were absent in vacations.25 Arguably, in the post-1974 years, it is possible to detect a major shift in Greek perceptions of US–Greek relations, compared to the previous years. The leaders of the Karamanlis governments were among the staunchest supporters of the West; they were convinced cold warriors who had fought for the Western cause during their previous term in office (1955–63) and aimed to integrate Greece in the West through accession to the EC. However, even these people were shocked at what they perceived as a US ‘betrayal’ in 1974. Thus, they were attracted by the thought that Greece had to follow a multidimensional foreign policy: the United States needed to get the ‘message’ that Greece’s co-operation was not to be taken for granted. This policy was made also evident by the decision of the Karamanlis administration to begin negotiations on the revision of the status of US military bases in Greece. At the same time, Karamanlis also believed that Balkan co-operation could restrain Soviet interventionism in the area. Thus, the architects of Greek diplomacy, by initiating bilateral as well as multilateral co-operation in the Balkans, aimed at achieving a degree of ‘independence’ of the regional states from both superpowers. The Greek preference to reduce superpower intervention in the Balkans through a d
etente policy was emphasised by Karamanlis in his discussion with Tito in June 1975: The Balkans must become an area of cooperation and peace. Then, the Great Powers will not be tempted to create conflicts between them. If the Great Powers cannot create conflicts, then, except for the case of a general war, they will not be able to intervene in the Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, through cooperation temptations will be limited.26

From 1978, Greek diplomacy was heavily concerned with two additional issues that affected its d
etente policy: the prospect of Tito’s death as a destabilising factor in the Balkans, and the new global role of China (including its ‘opening’ to Romania and Yugoslavia) that could result in a Sino-Soviet contention in the area.27 Balkan co-operation and a d
etente policy seemed to be a way to respond to these eventualities as well.28 Discussing his policy in the Balkans with his Danish counterpart, Anker Jorgensen, in March 1978, the Greek Prime Minister stressed: I want this policy [in the Balkans] to succeed so as to enhance the non-aligned position of Yugoslavia. After Tito’s death we will have problems. If this policy succeeds, Yugoslavia will feel safer to continue its non-aligned policy. I aim to further cooperation and peace in the Balkans and to help Yugoslavia . . . Lately, Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations deteriorated. I consider this as a warning of what it is going to follow after Tito. That explains my efforts.29

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Regarding China’s role in the Balkans Karamanlis in a speech before the Greek Parliament underlined that:

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The latest and most important development in terms of foreign policy is China’s exit from its international isolation and its global initiatives which will certainly affect the balance on which the post-war international system is based . . . Within this international atmosphere Greece is being called to shape its foreign relations . . . In the Balkans the latent competition between the Soviet Union and China could create troubles in the future. And as a means to deter such troubles, Greece supports the idea of trans-Balkan cooperation and improves its relations with all neighbours.30

Greece’s d
etente climax in 1979 was mainly based on two factors. First, the country could not accomplish its professed aim for a multidimensional foreign policy without improving its relations with the two Communist Great Powers, the Soviet Union and China. In fact, according to Karamanlis, the ‘opening’ to China and the USSR covered an important gap in Greek foreign policy, since most Western European countries had already improved their relations with the two major Communist states. Furthermore, with the economic and energy crisis of the late 1970s, Greece’s agreements with the Soviet Union and China, as well as with the Arabs, aimed at offering essential outlets to the Greek economy that could not be attained by the EC.31 Greek d
etente policy was a well-conceived strategy that radicalised Greek foreign policy in a very short period of time. However, this policy had its limits within the confines of the cold-war international system. In the mid- and late-1970s the cold war had already moved to a new phase in which the ‘battle’ between the two superpowers was taking place in the Third World. Apart from Vietnam, there were superpower confrontations in Cuba, Angola, and the Horn of Africa while the demise of superpower d
etente was signalled by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in late 1979.32 In this context, Athens called for a dual policy of d
etente-and-prudence: for the Greek policy-makers d
etente signalled another phase of the cold war, and not its end. Speaking at the North Atlantic Council in Washington in May 1978, Karamanlis stated: It seems that the Soviet Union has neither the intention nor the interest to abandon its d
etente policy, at least in the near future. That, of course, does not mean that if an opportunity arises it will not take advantage of it, either to enhance its erosive attempt in Europe or to extend its influence in the Third World and especially Africa. Both possibilities involve obvious dangers for the West and impose constant alert on our side . . . Let us not forget that the d
etente policy of the Soviet Union does not comprise a target but a tactic. However, it will not hesitate to alter this tactic if its interests and capabilities allow it to do so.33

The views of the Karamanlis governments on d
etente were shaped by a clear understanding of Greece’s position within the cold-war system. The Greek governments were staunch supporters of the Western world for political, economic, security, and, above all, cultural reasons. Karamanlis sketched Greece’s position within the cold war in his first speech before the Greek Parliament when he claimed: ‘Geographically, politically and ideologically Greece belongs to the West. And Greece aims to cooperate with the West in order to secure its defence, and to promote its material prosperity and its cultural development.’34 In this perspective, the Greek governments, despite their pursuit of a d
etente policy with the Communist

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world, never doubted Greece’s Western identity. This was evident in the country’s attempts to join the EEC, and its heavy reliance on the United States and NATO for its security.35 Indeed, Greece’s new d
etente venture aimed at facilitating the country’s full integration in the Western European sub-system.

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II. Greece’s d
etente in practice During the early cold war, the idea of Balkan co-operation appeared in the 1957 proposal by the Romanian Prime Minister, Chivu Stoica, calling for the holding of a Balkan Conference and the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in the area. In the height of the cold war, when the world was still divided into two rigid camps, this initiative could hardly be successful. The then Karamanlis governments considered the Stoica proposal as mere propaganda and rejected it on the grounds that mutual trust had not been restored among the Balkan states.36 By the early 1970s, difficulties still existed. Yugoslavia had become a leading member of the non-aligned, while Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu was claiming a significant measure of autonomy in its foreign policy. Moreover, the Macedonian issue threatened to destabilise Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. The most pressing problems in the Balkans were coming from the Greek-Turkish conflict on the Aegean and Cyprus, while Albania was following a policy of complete international isolation. From Athens’ perspective it was obvious that multilateral political understanding and cooperation could not be achieved; hence Karamanlis opted for Balkan co-operation in the economic and technical fields. Successful Balkan multilateral co-operation, even in such limited fields, could lead to a considerable improvement of political relations as well. As usual, bilateral and multilateral co-operation was prepared on a lower level, before discussions among the leaders of the Balkan countries could take place. In December 1974 the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Milos Minic, visited Athens and held discussions with his Greek counterpart, Bitsios. Some days later, on 8 January 1975, Bitsios visited Sofia and on 27 February the Romanian Foreign Minister, George Macovescu, visited Athens. This first round of meetings demonstrated the will of these countries to create a new political climate in the Balkans.37 The actual implementation of Greek d
etente policy began in spring and summer of 1975. In May, June, and July the Greek Prime Minister visited Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria and held talks with Ceausescu, Tito, and Zhivkov. Indeed, Karamanlis’s visit to Sofia was the first-ever official visit of a Greek Prime Minister to Bulgaria. Discussions with the three Balkan leaders convinced Karamanlis about the prospects of inter-Balkan relations.38 In August 1975, during the CSCE conference at Helsinki, Karamanlis discussed with the three Balkan leaders the possibility of multilateral Balkan co-operation.39 On 20 August 1975 he officially proposed to the leaders of Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey the calling of a Balkan Conference in Athens at the level of under-secretaries of economic coordination. The Greek Prime Minister expressly noted that the Balkan Conference would take place in the context of the decisions taken at the CSCE.40 Karamanlis stressed that ideological and sociopolitical differences were important but they were not obstacles to the fulfilment of mutual goals. The Greek proposal received a mixed reception. Romania and Yugoslavia accepted it, but while Bulgaria appeared hesitant. Sofia, clearly influenced by the USSR’s policy in the Balkans that discouraged the creation of peripheral blocks,

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expressed the view that the premise to multilateral co-operation was bilateral understanding.41 This was the main difference between Karamanlis and Zhivkov: the former believed that bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the Balkans should evolve simultaneously. Things were different with Turkey Ankara’s participation in a Balkan Conference was not necessary for its success but on the other hand, Turkey, surely, would not want to appear isolated in the Balkans and leave the initiative to Greece. Thus, despite the fact that Turkey never gave a formal reply to Greece, it participated in the Conference which took place in Athens between 26 January and 5 February 1976. The only negative reply came from Tirana.42 The 1976 Balkan Conference was a strange affair. All sides were evidently interested in expanding their co-operation. However, at the same time the Conference revealed the differences of Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia on one side and Bulgaria on the other. The former three encouraged the multilateral character of the meetings and expressed their willingness for the Conference to be the first step for a more systematic multilateral co-operation in the near future. On the contrary, Bulgaria focused on bilateral co-operation, and also asked for other countries outside the Balkan Peninsula, such as Hungary, to participate in the new discussions. Bulgaria also asked for the term ‘Balkan Conference’ to be replaced by ‘Meeting of Consultants’. Yugoslavia and especially Romania reacted strongly to Bulgarian demands. Apparently a failure of the first Balkan Conference could completely bury Karamanlis’s initiative. Hence, in the end, under careful handling of the issue by the Greek Under-Secretary of Co-ordination, George Kontogeorgis, the Conference fulfilled its limited aims. All governments agreed to indicate issues to be discussed in a second multilateral conference. As Bitsios wrote in his memoirs: ‘We did not expect anything more from this initial phase. The seed had been dropped. Now, other countries had to undertake the initiative.’43 In less than one year the Karamanlis government had laid the ground for a new policy in the Balkans. Moreover, the Greek government continued its ‘opening’ to the Communist Balkans. In March, April, and May 1976, Ceausescu, Zhivkov and Tito visited Athens, while in September, November, and December Karamanlis exchanged letters with Zivkov on the Cyprus issue and with the other Balkan leaders on the subject of Balkan co-operation.44 The period 1976–9 saw the gradual expansion of the Greek ‘opening’ beyond the Communist Balkans. Until then, there were few high-level contacts with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR. In the words of Bitsios: ‘It was as if the “iron-curtain” still existed for us, which since many years had been torn apart by the Western countries, opening the door for close economic and commercial relations.’45 Balkan co-operation and the dramatic improvement of Greece’s bilateral relations with its Communist neighbours now attracted the attention of Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, which took the initiative to invite Bitsios for formal visits. These resulted to the conclusion of low-level, yet important agreements on economic, commercial, and educational co-operation.46 The most important development of the period, however, was the beginning of an opening to the Soviet Union itself. In 1974–6 the USSR, despite Greece’s evident attempt to adopt a multidimensional diplomacy, had not shown any willingness for rapprochement: economic and commercial relations remained at a low level while in the issues of Cyprus and of Greek-Turkish relations Moscow had not been supportive to Greece. In the summer of 1976, Bitsios hinted to the Soviet Ambassador at Athens that Greece was willing to open discussions with Moscow at a lower level;

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then, meetings at the highest possible level could follow. Some days later, the Soviet Ambassador delivered the positive reply of his seniors in Moscow. It was obvious that if these discussions proved successful, the ‘ice’ would melt and a new era on Greek–Soviet relations would open.47 Talks between Greek and Soviet delegations were held in Athens on 25–27 October 1976. After a careful and intense review of bilateral relations, the communiqu
e underlined the desire of both sides to develop their financial, technological, and scientific co-operation, and to conclude long-term commercial and educational agreements.48 A new leap for Greece’s d
etente policy began with the visit of the new Greek Foreign Minister, George Rallis, in Moscow in September 1978. Rallis’ visit was the first of a Greek Foreign Minister since the restoration of bilateral relations in 1924, and was the result of the gradual and cautious diplomacy that had begun in October 1976.49 The two sides signed a consular and a scientific/educational agreement, and expressed their dedication to the United Nations and the Helsinki principles.50 In the same month, on 21–24 September, the Chinese Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Huang Hua, visited Greece and held discussions with Rallis and other members of the Greek government on the development of bilateral relations in the economic, commercial, maritime, agricultural, scientific, and educational fields. Hua also visited Karamanlis and officially invited him to visit China.51 The year 1979 was the culmination of Greece’s multidimensional foreign policy. In March and April the Greek Prime Minister turned again to the Balkans by visiting Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria, advocating the holding of a second Balkan Conference. It was also evident from the discussions with Tito and Ceausescu that multilateral Balkan co-operation in the economic and technological fields was blocked by Bulgaria, mirroring Soviet discomfort with the idea.52 However, in May 1979, Karamanlis sent a letter to Ceausescu, Tito, Zhivkov, and the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent E¸c evit suggesting the calling of a Balkan conference of experts on transportation and telecommunication.53 All leaders accepted the Greek Prime Minister’s proposal, while Ecevit expressed Turkey’s desire to host the conference that was to take place in autumn 1979.54 The Greek Prime Minister’s forthcoming visit to Moscow was a delicate exercise, especially in view of the various difficulties that had appeared in US–Greek and Greek–NATO relations since 1974. Thus, prior to the visit, Karamanlis took particular care to reassure Greece’s Western allies that: ‘It is natural for the Greek prime minister to visit Moscow, as did almost all Western leaders, without signaling the reorientation of their foreign policy.’55 Thus, he stressed that the visit did not form part of a Greek effort to change its foreign policy, or to play the East against the West: he was going to Moscow as a Western statesman. After all, in May 1979, Karamanlis had signed the Treaty of Accession of Greece to the EC. Greece was now a full member of the Western world; evidently, this also played a role in increasing the confidence of the Greek leaders, and allowing them to undertake the visits to Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, the visit to Moscow did not affect adversely US–Greek relations: the US officials accepted Karamanlis’ reassurances that this did not signal a re-orientation of Greek foreign policy. At the same time, Karamanlis himself stressed to the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, that Greece was belatedly doing what most of Western countries had done in previous years.56 In October 1979, Karamanlis went to Moscow and held discussions with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev,

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and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosygin. Kosygin explained to Karamanlis that the USSR was not in favour of Balkan co-operation because it was against the creation of regional blocks. Karamanlis replied that his initiative involved low-level co-operation on the economic and technological fields, which, in his view, contributed greatly to the improvement of the political atmosphere. In addition, the Greek Prime Minister’s attempts focused on energy and Greece’s needs in view of the on-going oil crisis. Karamanlis’s visit to the Soviet Union lay the foundations of bilateral co-operation on energy, while on the political level it closed an important gap in Greek foreign policy. It is notable that, according to the available documentation, the Greeks were markedly unimpressed by the ageing Soviet leadership.57 Returning from the Soviet Union, Karamanlis visited Budapest and Prague, where he met presidents Janos Kadar and Gustav Husak and his counterparts Gyorgy Lazar and Lubomir Strougal. The acceptance of the principles of the Helsinki Accords was again the basis of relations with these countries. Discussions also aimed at the development of bilateral co-operation in the economic, commercial, and industrial sectors.58 In the same direction, relations with Poland involved contacts at a ministerial level and bilateral agreements on the economic, commercial, and educational fields. This, however, was not the case with the German Democratic Republic since its unwillingness to meet Greek demands on the issue of compensations of Greek properties that were abandoned before the Second World War resulted in the suspension of a rapprochement between the two countries.59 Another milestone of Greek d
etente policy was Karamanlis’s visit to China on 12–16 November 1979. The Greek Prime Minister’s discussions with president Hua Guofeng and Vice-President Deng Xiaoping involved the exchange of views on international affairs as well as on bilateral relations. Karamanlis stressed the importance of the problem of energy, which he considered to be one of the major problems for Europe. That was why, he told Deng, he was also going to visit Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Greek Prime Minister was pleased to hear that the Chinese leadership supported his policy in the Balkans. On their part, the Chinese leaders mostly raised the problem of ‘hegemonism in world politics’, although they clearly used the term in connection with Soviet, not US policy. Indeed, the largest part of the discussion between Karamanlis and the Chinese leaders dealt with the Chinese preoccupation with Soviet policy. Both Greece and China agreed that the danger posed by the USSR could only be dealt collectively. Hence, the Chinese leaders expressed their support both for European unification, and for Karamanlis’ Balkan policy. For the Chinese leadership, Balkan d
etente was the only means through which Soviet encroachment in the region could be inhibited.60 The international press showed great interest on what many called ‘the Greek Ostpolitik’. In analysing Greek policy, emphasis was placed on Greece’s need to find support for its energy problems and on the fact that Greece had for the first time agreed to permit Soviet warships to dock on the island of Syros for repair. Many viewed this as a way for the Greek government to express its bitterness and disappointment towards the United States and NATO. Others stressed the importance of economic and commercial agreements between Greece and the two Communist powers. However, all analysts agreed that Greece’s ‘opening’ to the Communist world was a step that had to be taken in the light of East–West d
etente, and that the Karamanlis government’s multidimensional policy had considerably elevated the international status of the country.61

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III. Conclusions In the aftermath of Greece’s international isolation under the Colonels’ dictatorship, the Karamanlis governments had to face the challenge of an extensive reform of foreign policy. In the international arena, d
etente had prevailed since the mid-1960s. However, on a regional level, Turkey’s invasions of Cyprus and the dispute over the Aegean seabed radically transformed Greek threat perceptions, adding a new ‘threat from the East’ to the traditional ‘menace from the north’. Moreover, the Eastern neighbour belonged to the Western world and was a formidable NATO ally. Within this international and regional environment, the Greek governments conceptualised and implemented a multidimensional foreign policy that, in their view, could meet the challenges. In the context of its staunch support to Western values, the Karamanlis government conceived and implemented a bilateral and multilateral opening to the country’s Balkan neighbours. This was seen as a means to elevate Greece’s international position, which would promote the country’s strategic aims of joining the EEC, counterbalance Turkish regional hegemonism, balance Greece’s absolute dependence from the United States, and achieve, to some extent, an emancipation of the Balkan Peninsula from the two superpowers. As bilateral and multilateral Balkan co-operation proved successful, at least in the creation of a climate of friendship and co-operation, Greece then turned to the Soviet Union, its EastCentral European allies and China to accomplish a d
etente policy that, in the light of the energy crisis and the improvement of East–West relations especially in Europe, was viewed as necessary. By 1979, the year when Greece signed its Treaty of Accession to the EC, the Greek Prime Minister was actively involved in the discussions for the holding of a new Balkan conference, and visited Moscow and Beijing, while relations with other Soviet bloc countries were being furthered. Thus, it can be argued that the adjustment of Greek foreign policy in the second half of the 1970s was successful. However, within the cold-war international system in which ideological and sociopolitical differences fostered suspicion and mistrust, d
etente had its limits. Greece’s d
etente policy did not bring ‘tangible’ results, especially at the political field. Undoubtedly, the development of economic, technological, and educational relations was satisfactory and created a new atmosphere that was unimaginable a few years ago. It is telling that commercial exchanges with Yugoslavia were doubled in 1974–8, and joint projects were being examined on the industrial sector; commercial exchanges with Bulgaria were tripled within 1974–5 alone; equally impressive was the rise of the Greek-Romanian commerce.62 However, in terms of ‘high’ politics, the Eastern Communist countries, despite their positive response to the Greek opening, were very cautious on the possibility of deepening bilateral relations with a country that publicly professed its adherence to the values and policies of the capitalist world. Moreover, with regard to Greek–Turkish relations, the Eastern Bloc countries adopted an equal distance between the two states: something that could hardly go unnoticed in Athens. It is also difficult to measure accurately the impact of Balkan d
etente in the evolution of the Greek–Turkish dispute: a war between the two countries was averted, but it is unclear how far Balkan co-operation contributed in this. Last but not least, the international system itself would soon impose new limits: it is ironic that the culmination of Greece’s d
etente policy in 1979 coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the demise of superpower d
etente. Thus, in the 1980s the Socialist governments under Andreas Papandreou wanted (and tried) to

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undertake Balkan initiatives, but this effort now had to unfold in a much more burdened international environment: the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had killed international d
etente and had led to a new intensification of the cold war. It is difficult to speak of a d
etente policy in the 1980s. In retrospect, Greek d
etente policy proved that the limits in inter-state relations are determined on the political level. That is why there were little ‘tangible’ results from this policy, even in the economic and technological fields. On the other hand, political leadership should always envisage ways that can contribute to the improvement of inter-state relations. Therefore, it is always possible that improvement on other fields (economic, technological, cultural) could have a deep and essential impact on politics. Notes 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

J. Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950– 1974 (Chapel Hill, 2009), 157–75; L. Klarevas, ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967’, Diplomatic History, xxx (2006), 471–508; E. G. H. Pedaliu, ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, xviii (2007), 185–214; E. G. H. Pedaliu, ‘“A Discordant Note”: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, xxii (2011), 101–20; K. Maragkou, ‘The European Factor and the Greek Colonels’ Coming to Power on 21 April 1967’, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vi (2006), 427–42; K. Maragkou, ‘Favouritism in NATO’s Southeastern Flank: The Case of the Greek Colonels, 1967–1974’, Cold War History, ix (2009), 347–66. See, among others, T. A. Couloumbis, The United States, Greece and Turkey: the Troubled Triangle (New York, 1983); S. Rizas, ‘Managing a Conflict between Allies: United States Policy towards Greece and Turkey in Relation to the Aegean Dispute, 1974–76’, Cold War History, ix (2009), 367–87. For a critical assessment of this initiative, see J. Iatrides, ‘Challenging the Limitations of the Atlantic Community. Konstantinos Karamanlis and NATO’ in K. Svolopoulos, E. Hatzivassiliou, and K. Botsiou (ed), Konstantinos Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century (Athens, 2008), ii. 17–36. K. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή eξvterikή poλitikή, 1945–1981 [Greek Foreign Policy, 1945– 1981] (Athens, 2004), 80–110. For Karamanlis’ absolute command of Greek foreign policy see, Goodison (South East European Department) to Heyhoe (Department of Defence), ‘Anglo/Greek Defence Relations’, 4 Feb. 1975, [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], F[oreign and] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice Records] 9/2227; Vereker to Wood, ‘RCDS Briefing: Greek Foreign Policy’, 30 Sep. 1975, FCO 9/2228; Cormack to Sutherland, ‘Position of Mr. Karamanlis’, 1 July 1977, FCO 9/2564. For Vyron Theodoropoulos’ important impact in Greek public debate, see, among others, his works Oi Toύ rkoi kai emeί & [The Turks and Us] (Athens, 1988); Parά metroi eξvterikή& poλitikή& [Parametres of Foreign Policy] (Athens, 2001); and Programmatismό& sthn Eξvterikή Poλitikή [Planning in Foreign Policy] (Athens, 2004). For the post-war Conservative/Social-Democratic consensus in Western Europe see, T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (London, 2005), 360–89. For the ideological background of Karamanlis and his staff see, E. Hatzivassiliou, Eλλhnikό& ’iλeλey#erismό&: to rizospastikό reύ ma, 1932–1979 [Greek Liberalism: The Radical Trend, 1932–1979] (Athens, 2010). For the Greek foreign-policy making process and fundamental orientation under Karamanlis in this period see, among others, K. E. Botsiou, ‘Anazhtώnta& to Xamέno Xrόno: h Eyrvpaϊkή Troxiά th& Metapolίteysh&’ [Seeking the Time Lost: the European Trajectory of the Transition] in K. Arvanitopoulos and M. Koppa (eds), 30 Xrόnia Eλλhnikή& Eξvterikή& Poλitikή&, 1974–2004 [Thirty Years of Greek Foreign Policy, 1974–2004] (Athens, 2005), 99–121; E. Heila, ‘H “Aktinvtή” Diplvmatίa tvn

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9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

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Kybernήsevn Karamanlή: Diamόrwvsh kai Ajiolόghsh’ [The ‘Spreading’ Diplomacy of the Karamanlis Governments: Shaping and Evaluation] in Svolopoulos and Hatzivassiliou (eds), O Kvnstantί no& Karamanλή& ston Eikost ό Aiώna, ii. 511–26; K. Yfantis, ‘Tέlo& Epoxή& . . . Oi Ellhnoamerikanikέ& Sxέsei& kai o Kvnstantίno& Karamanlή&, 1975–1980’ [‘The End of an Era . . . Greek–US Relations and Konstantinos Karamanlis, 1975–1980’], ibid., 526–36. See also, T. A. Couloumbis, ‘Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1974’ in V. Coufoudakis, H. Promiades, and A. Gerolymatos (eds), Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opprtunities (New York, 1999), 407–22. The bibliography on d
etente is vast. See among others, W. Loth and G.-H. Soutou (ed), The Making of D
etente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975 (London, 2010); A. Hofmann, The Emergence of D
etente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik (London, 2009); A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Nuenlist (eds), Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965– 1975 (London, 2009); F. Logevall and A. Preston, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977 (New York, 2008); R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York, 2007); R. L. Garthoff, D
etente and Confrontation (Washington, 1994); M. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (London, 2003). For the ‘menace from the north’ and Greek security policy after the end of the Second World War see, E. Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967 (London, 2006). Memo of the Minister of National Defence, 30 Nov. 1974, K[aramanlis] A[rchive] in ‘Konstantinos G. Karamanlis Foundation’, Athens, Greece, File, 67B. See also, Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, ‘Greece-Turkey: The Aegean Seabed Dispute’, 5 Feb. 1975, in F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973–1976] (Washington, 2007), xxx. 126–30. Karamanlis, interview with the Times, 18 March 1975, in K. Svolopoulos (ed), Kvnstant ί no& Karamanλή&: arxeί o, gegonόta kai keί mena [Konstantinos Karamanlis: Archive, Events and Texts] (Athens, 1992), viii. 337 (hereafter referred to as Karamanlis). Minutes of the Greek Parliament, period A, 11 Dec. 1974, Karamanlis, 9–12. One of the basic elements of US–Greek relations of the period was the negotiations on the status of US military bases in Greece. The most updated account and analysis on the issue is K. Mitsotakis, Oi sympλhg ά de& th& eξvterikή& poλitikή&: esvterikέ & kai die#neί & piέ sei& sti& eλλhnoamerikanikέ & diapragmateύ sei& gia ti& bά sei&, 1974–1985 [The Symplegades (Clashing Rocks/Cyanean Rocks) of Foreign Policy: Domestic and National Pressures in Greek-American Negotiations for the Bases, 1974–1985] (Athens, 2006). V. Theodoropoulos, Memorandum, 1 Oct. 1977, KA, File 51B. I. Stefanidis, ‘Telling America’s Story: US Propaganda Operations and Greek Public Reactions’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, xxx (2004), 39–95; I. Stefanidis, Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967 (London, 2007); K. Botsiou, ‘Anti-Americanism in Greece’ in B. O’ Connor (ed), Anti-Americanism: History, Causes and Themes (Oxford/Westport, 2007), iii. 213– 345. K. Botsiou, ‘The Interface Between Politics and Culture in Greece’ in A. Stephan (ed), The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism after 1945 (New York, 2005), 277–306. An estimation by New York Times, in Karamanlis, xi. 306. Richards to Callaghan, ‘The First Year of New Democracy’, 10 Dec. 1975, FCO 9/2225; Wood (British Embassy Athens) to Cornish (FCO), ‘The Opposition’, 8 Oct. 1975, FCO 9/2225; Richards to FCO, ‘Greece: Democracy without Karamanlis?’, 23 Dec. 1976, FCO 9/2396; Clements (British Embassy Athens) to Short (FCO), ‘Developments on the Right’, 24 Nov. 1976, FCO 9/2396. D. Bitsios, P έ ra apό ta s ύ nora, 1974–1977 [Beyond the Frontiers, 1974–1977] (Athens, 1983), 159. Karamanlis, ix. 198. Minutes of the conversation between the prime ministers of Greece and Yugoslavia in Bled, 4 June 1975, KA, File 50B.

1066 22. 23.

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24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42.

L. Kourkouvelas Minutes of conversation between Marshal Tito and the President of the Greek Government, 5 June 1975, KA, File 50B. Minutes of Greek–Bulgarian relations on the occasion of the official visit of Prime Minister Karamanlis in Sofia, 4 July 1975, KA, File 50B. See also, memcon, ‘Secretary Kissinger meeting with Foreign Minister Bitsios’, 7 March 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, N[ational] S[ecurity] A[rchive], http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/KT/ 01519/all.pdf. The anti-United States climate in Greece was candidly depicted in a conversation between Kissinger and Greek Foreign Secretary Dimitris Bitsios. After a picture-taking session, Kissinger told Bitsios that ‘having your picture taken with me may ruin you in Greece’ while a little later, talking on ambassador Kubisch and his stay in Athens, Kissinger remarked bitterly that he will ‘need 2,000 police to protect him there’. Memcon, ‘The Secretary’s Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios’, 11 Dec. 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, NSA, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/KT/01445/all.pdf. See also, Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: ‘Athens Frustrations with the US and the Prospects for the Greek Left’, 29 Aug. 1974, in FRUS, 86–90. Memo, ‘U.S. Security Policy Toward Greece’, 8 Feb. 1975, Presidential Directives, Part II, NSA, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/PR/01283/all.pdf. Minutes of conversation between Marshal Tito and the President of the Greek government, 5 June 1975, KA, File 50B. China’s interest in the Balkans is evident at least as early as 1975. See, memcon, meeting between Henry Kissinger and Deng Xiaoping, 21 Oct. 1975, China and the U.S., NSA, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CH/00369/all.pdf. See also, memcon, meeting between Henry Kissinger and Huang Zhen: ‘US-PRC Relations, Policy Towards the Soviet Union, Africa, NATO, Turkey-Greece Relations’, 29 May 1976, NSA, http:// nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/CH/00409/all.pdf. Sutherland to Fergusson, ‘Greek Foreign Policy: The Balkan Dimension’, 11 April 1979, [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], FCO 28/3814. Karamanlis’ visit to Denmark, 30–31 March 1978, KA, File 168A. Karamanlis, xi. 20. Karamanlis, xi. 263. For the cold war outside Europe see, O. A. Westad, The Global Cold War (New York, 2007). Karamanlis, x. 239. Minutes of the Greek Parliament, period A, 11 Dec. 1974, 10. The fact that Greece would remain pro-Western due to political, ideological, economic, and defensive reasons was never doubted by the Americans even when the Cyprus Issue was at its height. See Tasca (Ambassador to Greece) to the Department of State, 15 Aug. 1974, in FRUS, 80–2. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή eξvterikή poλitikή, 93–4; Hatzivassiliou, 58, 94–5; L. Kourkouvelas, H Eλλά da kai to zήthma tvn pyrhnikώn όpλvn, 1957–1963 [Greece and the Issue of Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1973] (Athens, 2011), 93–6. Bitsios, P έ ra apό ta s ύ nora, 1974–1977, 129–32; Karamanlis, viii. 289, 330–1. K. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή poλitikή sta baλkά nia, 1974–1981 [Greek Policy in the Balkans, 1974–81] (Athens, 1987), 76–7. Meeting between the Greek Prime Minister and Mr Zhivkov, 31 July 1975; Meeting between the Greek Prime Minister and Mr Ceausescu, 31 July 1975, KA, File 50B. The link between a new policy in the Balkans and the ‘spirit’ of the CSCE was a notable feature of the rhetoric of the Greek governments during this period. See, Robinson (CSCE Unit) to FCO, 8 Nov. 1979, FCO 28/3951; Tait (CSCE Unit) to FCO, ‘Greece and the CSCE’, 19 Sep. 1979, FCO 28/3951; Dain to Tait, ‘Greece and the CSCE’, 8 Aug. 1979, FCO 28/3951; Clements to FCO, ‘CSCE Consultations’, 23 May 1979, FCO 28/3951; CSCE Unit (FCO), ‘CSCE Anglo-Greek Discussions on May 1979 at the MFA in Athens’, 24 May 1979, FCO 28/3951. Karamanlis, viii. 499–500. See also Ar. A. Ulunyan, ‘Karamanlis’s Greece and the Soviet Union (Flashpoints and Observations), Late 1950s–1970s’ in Svolopoulos et al. (eds), Karamanλή&, ii. 395–405. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή poλitikή sta baλkά nia, 78–84.

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44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

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Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή poλitikή sta baλkά nia, 85–91; Bitsios, P έ ra apό ta s ύ nora, 1974–1977, 139; See also Karamanlis, ix. 148–52. See, Karamanlis, ix. 170–6; Note on discussion between Mr. Prime Minister and the President of People’s Democracy of Bulgaria Mr. Zhivkov, KA, File 33B; Informative note on the discussion between the President of the Socialist Federal Democracy of Yugoslavia with the Greek Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis, 11 May 1976, KA, File 50B; Karamanlis to Zhivkov, Ceausescu, Demirel and Tito, 7 Aug. 1976, KA, File 57B; Zhivkov to Karamanlis, 9 Nov. 1976, KA, File 33B; Karamanlis to Zhivkov, 31 Dec. 1976, KA, File 57B. Bitsios, P έ ra apό ta s ύ nora, 1974–1977, 139. Ibid., 139, 141. Bitsios, P έ ra apό ta s ύ nora, 1974–1977, 144. Karamanlis, ix. 315. Vereker (British Embassy in Athens) to Coltman (FCO), 18 July 1978, FCO 9/2740. Karamanlis, x. 306–10. Ibid., 329. See Ulunyan, ‘Karamanlis’s Greece’, 404–5. Dain (British Embassy in Athens) to Coltman (FCO), ‘Balkan Cooperation’, 7 June 1979, FCO 28/3951; Fergusson to Sutherland, ‘Greek Foreign Policy: The Balkan Dimension’, 2 May 1979, FCO 28/3951. Discussions of Karamanlis in Yugoslavia, 16–18 March 1979, KA, File 52B; Discussions of Karamanlis in Romania, 19–26 March 1979, KA, File 52B; Discussion between Karamanlis-Zhivkov, 29 April 1979, KA, File 52B; Karamanlis correspondence, 26 May–7 June 1979, KA, File 57B. Karamanlis, xi. 219–20. Minutes of discussion between Karamanlis and the Chancellor of West Germany Mr. Schmidt, 20 Oct. 1979, KA, File, 52B. Clements (British Embassy in Athens) to Brett-Rooks (FCO), 8 Nov. 1979, FCO 28/ 3743; Karamanlis, xi. 229–54. Karamanlis, xi. 254–8; Plenum of two delegations under the presidency of K. Karamanlis and L. Strougal, 10 Oct. 1979, KA, File 52B. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή poλitikή sta baλkά nia, 330. Minutes of Greek-Chinese discussions; ‘Note-Meeting of Mr. Prime Minister with Hua Guofeng in Beijing’, 15 Nov. 1979, KA, File 52B. Karamanlis, xi. 306–11. Svolopoulos, H eλλhnikή poλitikή sta baλkά nia, 28–9, 56–7, 64.