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Marine Policy 32 (2008) 643–652 www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Developing underutilized fisheries: Oregon’s developmental fisheries program Michael Hartea,, Polly Endrenyb, Gil Sylviac, Heather Munro Mannd a
Marine Resource Management, College of Oceanic and Atmospheric Sciences, Oregon State University, USA b NOAA Research, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, Silver Spring, MD, USA c Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University, and the Coastal Oregon Marine Experiment Station, USA d Munro Consulting Inc., Siletz, OR, USA Received 10 October 2007; accepted 15 November 2007
Abstract Oregon’s Developmental Fisheries Program is designed to encourage the commercial exploration and development of State managed underutilized fishery resources. A key program strategy is allocating relatively secure harvest rights to pioneering entrepreneurs when a fishery successfully transitions from ‘‘developing’’ to ‘‘developed’’ status. Since the program’s inception in 1993, two fisheries, sardine and bay clam, have moved from undeveloped to developed status. Case studies of these fisheries show that many challenges impact the success of the Developmental Fisheries Program including difficulties in designing and allocating asset rights, establishing operational program guidelines, selecting measurable targets that meet legislative standards for a developed fishery, and financing developmental fisheries management practices. Developmental fisheries strategies used in other regions and countries are summarized. Recommendations are made for improving Oregon’s Developmental Fishery Program including establishing clear objectives and timelines for the Program and identifying appropriate renewal requirements for permits and other developmental incentives on a fishery-by-fishery basis. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Rights-based fisheries management; Developmental fisheries; Commercial development incentives
1. Introduction The profitable and sustainable development of underutilized marine fisheries requires four interrelated actions. First, there must be collection of sufficient biological information to set sustainable harvest levels and to manage the impacts of harvest on associated and dependent species and ecosystems. Second, a market must exist or be developed for the harvest that returns a revenue stream greater than the costs of harvest. Third, there must be harvesters and processors willing to invest time, effort and money in the development of the fishery and its markets. And fourth, there must be an institutional framework that supports the sustainable economic and ecological development of the fishery consistent with meeting regional or national objectives. Corresponding author.
E-mail address:
[email protected] (M. Harte). 0308-597X/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2007.11.005
Many governments have subsidized the development of under exploited fisheries [1]. Government subsidies are recognized as encouraging over-exploitation and overcapitalization of fisheries [2]. Successfully initiating and completing the actions necessary to develop underutilized fisheries without using government subsidies is a significant challenge. It is also a challenge in nations, states, or provinces with scarce fisheries management resources. One approach is to harness market forces. By developing appropriate institutional and market incentives, fisherman and processors will be encouraged to invest in the requisite technology, science, and management necessary to meet management responsibilities. Economic, social and biological outcomes will generally be greater if the incentives encourage fishery participants to take a long-term view of their investment in the fishery. This asset-based approach will also encourage harvesters and processors to undertake value added activities such as biological research and market development and drive sustainable development of
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underexploited fisheries resources with minimal state investment [3–5]. Key to successful asset-based management is giving the fisherman and processors who invest in the development of the fishery long-term access. Unless there is potential for long-term profits, rational individuals and firms will not invest in the development of a fishery if others can ‘‘free-ride’’ on their work and investment. Although the general principles of asset-based investment are well understood, implementing them for undeveloped fisheries lacking institutional experience is daunting. Rather than being a source of new economic and social benefits these fisheries can under-perform and be a drain on management resources. Their failure can undermine development of other fisheries and result in the perception that underutilized fisheries are unsustainable and pose insurmountable economic and political hurdles. A program embodying many of these issues is the Oregon Developmental Fisheries Program (DFP) instituted by the Oregon legislature in 1993 [6]. Its purpose is to provide a management system for the sustainable commercial exploitation of Oregon’s undeveloped fishery resources and to encourage entrepreneurship by fishery participants. The purpose of the DFP was widely supported by Oregon’s small scale fishermen, its mandated requirements were considered sound, and in principle its existence was expected to benefit Oregon’s commercial fisheries and coastal communities. Since the Program’s inception, two fisheries, the Oregon bay clam and Pacific sardine, have transitioned from the developmental program into ‘‘developed’’ fisheries. As two recent fisheries to ‘‘graduate’’ from the DFP, studies of the bay clam and sardine developmental fisheries highlight the DFP’s strengths, weaknesses, and challenges in implementing asset-based management. This review provides a basis for improving the program so that it can better realize its potential. Other US jurisdictions and nations implementing, or planning to implement developmental fishery programs, may also learn lessons from the Oregon experience. The following sections of this paper describe Oregon’s DFP, explore its strengths and weaknesses using bay clams and sardines as case examples, and identify strategies for improvement with reference to successful developmental fishery programs in other regions and countries. 2. Overview of the Developmental Fisheries Program Oregon’s DFP was established to manage underutilized fish and shellfish stocks. Currently, 92 species/stocks are included in the program [6]. Twelve species are listed as Category A species including Pacific hagfish, swordfish, and box crab. These ‘‘A’’ species are considered to have the most potential for a viable fishery. Oregon Administrative Rule (OAR) 635-006-0850 defines species in category ‘‘A’’ as underutilized, not currently actively managed off Oregon under another state or federal
management plan, and have the potential to be economically viable. Species in category ‘‘A’’ have permit and gear limitations established by the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission (OFWC) annually. Species in category ‘‘B’’ are underutilized, are not currently under another state or federal management plan, and have not shown the potential to be a viable fishery. Species in category ‘‘B’’ may be upgraded to the ‘‘A’’ category upon application to the Board and approval by the Commission during the annual review. The objective of the DFP is to move a fishery from developmental status to developed status. OAR 635-0060810 states that a ‘‘developed fishery’’ is a ‘‘fishery where the level of participation, catch, and effort indicate the fishery has approached optimum sustained yield and/or there is sufficient biological and fishery information (harvest methods, gear types, output markets) to develop a long-term management plan for the species’’. The DFP ensures pioneering fishermen have some investment protection by capping the number of available developmental permits. The DFP Board consists of a broad range of commercial industry stakeholders (e.g., harvesters, processors, and State agency personnel) who provide developmental fishery management recommendations to the OFWC. The DFP aims to achieve a cooperative management approach with industry. A primary objective is to provide management expertise and resources to assist developmental permit holders in return for their help in the collection of biological and market information necessary to determine the viability of a developmental fishery. DFP permit holders benefit from both commercial harvests of the developmental resource and the potential opportunity to be grandfathered into more secure property rights should the fishery be declared a developed fishery. After a fishery is placed in Category ‘‘A’’ of the DFP, fishermen apply to the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) for Developmental Fishery Permits. The DFP Board establishes a limited number of non-transferable permits based on consideration of the fishery’s historical landings, past participation, and fishermen’s requests for developmental permits as stated in OAR 635-006-0880. Fishermen are charged a small annual fee for holding these permits. If the number of applicants exceeds the number of available developmental permits, a lottery is held. Applicants must also obtain individual commercial fishing and/or boat licenses. The OFWC must determine one of five things in order to remove a fish stock from the Developmental Fisheries List (OAR 635-006-0840): 1. the fishery qualifies as a ‘‘developed fishery’’ (as defined in OAR 635-006-0810); 2. the fish stock is harvested beyond its optimal sustained yield; 3. the species fished is considered threatened or endangered by the State or Federal government;
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4. the commercial fishery potentially leads to unreasonable habitat degradation, bycatch, or gear conflicts; or 5. the harvest leads to excessive user group conflicts.
3. Developmental Fisheries Program case studies: bay clams and sardines Two Oregon developmental fisheries, bay clams and Pacific sardine, transitioned from the DFP to developed, limited entry status in late 2005. Case studies of these fisheries are developed to demonstrate whether the DFP’s management framework helped these fisheries achieve their sustainable economic potential, and to identify areas for improving the DFP. 3.1. Bay clam developmental fishery In 1996, the Oregon commercial bay clam fishery was one of the first fisheries to enter the DFP. A total of 15 permit holders harvest five commercial bay clam species from estuaries along Oregon’s coast. The species harvested are the gaper or empire (Tresus capax), cockle (Clinocardium nuttalli), littleneck (Venerupis staminea), softshell (Mya arenaria), and butter (Saxidomus giganteus) clams. Commercial harvests of bay clams date back to at least 1941 [8]. The mid-1990s saw a major change in harvesting practices with the introduction of dive gear and the authorization of mechanical harvest in two larger bays, Tillamook and Coos Bays. These innovations substantially increased commercial harvests in estuarine subtidal areas. Since 1996, subtidal landings have averaged 98.5% of the commercial bay clam harvest in Oregon [9,10]. Oregon’s only state-wide comprehensive study of estuarine subtidal bay clam stocks occurred in the 1970s [8]. In the mid-1990s, Golden et al. [11] conducted a comprehensive follow-up biological inventory of Tillamook Bay’s intertidal and subtidal benthic invertebrates, and ODFW surveyed a portion of Coos Bay’s subtidal area to obtain data as a basis for raising harvest quotas in that bay in 2004 [7]. Other than these scientific surveys, annual commercial harvests provide the majority of knowledge about the contemporary bay clam resource. Permit holders believe that bay clam resource abundances could sustain higher harvests [12,13]. Annual landings and associated revenues remain low and are unable to supply full-time incomes for the 15 harvesters. The major Oregon bay clam markets are for bait and feed for aquarium use. A human consumption market, which could command a higher price per pound for local bay clams, has yet to be developed for most Oregon bay clams [12]. Similar bay clam species are exploited for seafood consumption in other parts of the United States including Washington State. In 2004, the Coastal Oregon Marine Experiement Station commissioned a study to explore management constraints and opportunities of the Oregon bay clam
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industry. The study found that implementation of effective DFP management strategies could promote the ecological viability and economic potential of the fishery [14]. Some scenarios demonstrate that industry harvests and revenues could be far greater than current levels. The study also found that water quality testing and bay user conflicts may limit industry and economic expansion. For example, harvest of bay clams for human consumption requires more stringent water quality monitoring than bait harvests, and additional commercial harvesting areas may impinge on other bay uses (e.g., oyster lease sites). By 2005 clam harvesters were presenting draft proposals to the DFP Board for moving the fishery to developed status. Other than being transferable and hence valuable, the license conditions sought for the developed fishery were similar to those of developmental permits. Fishermen asked that developmental permit holders be given priority allocation of the developed permits. In November 2005, the DFP Board made the recommendation that the bay clam fishery be removed from the developmental fishery list to the OFWC. The fishery received developed status at the end of 2005 despite many unresolved management issues. In addition fishermen received only a ‘‘weak asset’’ permit with limited transferability for example, for vessel loss or business failure (OAR 635-006-1095). The Commission may consider full transferability at a future date [7,15]. The DFP’s absence of operational guidelines and an indeterminate time frame did little to encourage research to obtain biological and fishery information. Information is not available for determining optimum yield and effort levels, and for developing a long-term management plan as required by OAR 635-006-0870. The DFP did not work with the industry to set detailed objectives nor consider a suitable time frame to meet developmental targets. Investment in scientific data collection and market research (e.g., exploring an Oregon human consumption market) was insufficient to encourage management changes including updating harvest quotas and allowing mechanical harvesting in additional bays. Some entrepreneurial industry members regularly offered to help the DFP collect biological data through surveys during their harvests, but the DFP had no program to conduct stock assessments, particularly assessments that could use industry data [12,13,16]. ODFW could have used the opportunity to investigate innovative methods that would involve the industry in data gathering and help defray costs of biological surveys. Limited state funding for the DFP and low industry revenues were inadequate for supporting traditional research and developing cooperative research strategies. The DFP’s promise of secure harvest rights to successful pioneers did attract some entrepreneurial fishermen into the program. However, many of the other industry members were not inclined to invest in fishery development once they received their developmental permits. The DFP did not attach developmental requirements to permits nor stipulate any responsibilities that would move the industry
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forward. Only two of the 15 bay clam permit holders consistently exceeded qualifying annual landings for permits [7,16]. The problems encountered by the bay clam industry during its time in the DFP are still present in the developed fishery. The considerable economic potential of the fishery remains unrealized. The decision of the DFP Board and OFWC to classify the bay clam fishery as developed was potentially at odds with legislative criteria that require developmental fisheries to meet a set of scientific and management standards before transitioning to developed status. Nevertheless, bay clam fisherman had strongly argued for developed status so that their licenses would become transferable. ODFW and the DFB seemed content to respond favorably to this request given its support by developmental fishery permit holders. Table 1 compares the state of the bay clam fishery when it was removed from the developmental fisheries list in 2005 to the characteristics of a developed fishery in Oregon. These characteristics are derived from the: legal definition of a developed fishery; management objectives for a developmental fishery when in the DFP [6]; and from the general licensing framework for developed, limited entry fisheries in Oregon. Significantly, no long-term management plan has been developed for bay clams and there is insufficient biological data to determine optimal yield. Compared to permits in other developed fisheries, bay clam permits are significantly constrained in their transferability. This ‘‘developed’’ fishery is operated without any major markets for human
Table 1 Bay clams and meeting Oregon’s developed fishery standards Characteristics of a developed fishery
Bay clam status in 2005
Stock assessments are periodic and consistent; stock abundances are estimated with reasonable confidence and monitored for changes over time
Stock assessments are out-dated, spatially and temporally patchy, are highly uncertain and are not monitored for change over time
Harvest levels are at, or near, optimal yield
Insufficient data exists to determine optimal yield
Harvest programs (e.g., season, gear, size limits, by-catch restrictions, and closed areas) are established
There is no comprehensive harvest strategy or management plan for the fishery
Industry is an active participant in research and management
Management bodies did not involve industry in research and management
Markets are well established
Markets for bait are established. There is no established human consumption market
Permits are transferable
Permits are not transferable
The fishery is guided by a longterm management plan
No long-term management plan has been prepared
consumption, has low revenues compared to similar fisheries in Washington State, and has little biological information to establish its potential for growth in harvests or to ensure its sustainability. Innovative fisherman wishing to use mechanical harvesters more widely cannot employ this technology because of insufficient information about the impacts of this harvesting method on estuarine ecosystems. Incentives for fishermen to develop the fishery during its time in the DFP were virtually non-existent and remain so now that it is a developed fishery. 3.2. Sardine developmental fishery The abundance of Pacific sardines (Sardinops sagax) off the west coast of the US fluctuates markedly with environmental conditions associated with the California current large marine ecosystem [17]. Sardines supported the largest fishery in the western hemisphere during the 1930s and 1940s, with landings along the entire west coast in British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California, and Mexico. The fishery declined, beginning in the mid 1940s, and landings ceased in the Northwest in 1948 and remained low in California until stocks began to rebuild in the late 1970s and 1980s [17,18]. Small numbers of sardine were landed into Oregon in 1995 and a directed commercial fishery began in 1999 [19]. In 2004 landings of sardine in Oregon reached 36,000 metric tonnes, second only to Pacific whiting in volume [20] and fourth in value at $4.9 million [21]. With the rapid development of a fishery last exploited in 1947, ODFW needed to manage the possible reemergence of a large-scale commercial fishery. The best place to ‘‘fit’’ sardines into the management framework was deemed to be the DFP. In 1999 the fishery entered the DFP and 15 developmental fisheries permits were issued [19,22]. The number of permits issued was arbitrary and was not based on federal harvest allocation, interest expressed by potential participants, or economic analysis. Rather, the number of permits issued was based on the typical numbers of permits issued initially to other species managed under the DFP. By arbitrarily limiting the number of initial permits, the Developmental Fishery Board may have inadvertently hindered rather than helped the growth of the fishery. ODFW chose not to base minimum landing information from average landings in the California sardine fishery. Instead the requirements were adopted based on requirements for other species under the DFP. Many fishers awarded developmental permits appeared to be ‘‘speculating’’ by just meeting the low renewal requirements and qualifying as a preferential rights holder so that if and when the fishery became a state limited entry fishery, permits could be sold at significant value. Over the next few years there were several requests to amend the regulations for the sardine fishery. The first came in 2000 when a request was made to the Developmental Fishery Board to increase the number of available
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developmental permits and also increase the landing requirements for renewal of permits [22]. Token landings by many permit holders proved frustrating to some processors who were having difficulty getting enough volume to supply their markets. The Developmental Fisheries Board added an additional five permits but chose not to increase the renewal requirements. Because the new permits were in high demand and a lottery system was used to issue the additional permits, the permits did not necessarily go to the fishers who planned to actively develop the fishery. In 2001, after expanding the number of permits from 15 to 20, seven of the 18 vessels in the fishery landed 90% of the catch. Six vessels landed one catch sufficient to meet permit renewal requirements [22]. The total catch was some 29% of the 2001 northern allocation under the FMP [19], indicating that the DFP for sardines was perhaps unnecessarily limiting new entrants who could have more successfully exploited the fishery and developed new international markets. Different representatives from industry continued to ask that the fishery regulations be altered or that the fishery be considered for a state limited entry fishery [23]. The decision to develop options for moving the fishery into a limited entry program was driven by a subset of industry representatives and supported by the Department of Fish & Wildlife [23]. A subcommittee including members of the Developmental Fisheries Board as well as other stakeholders was formed in February 2005 to explore moving sardine to a limited entry fishery. The first public meeting of this subcommittee occurred in March 2005. By mid-2005 there was little doubt that substantial growth had occurred in the fishery. Following the 2005 season, holders of 19 of the 20 developmental fishing permits landed some 45,000 metric tonnes delivered to 10 processors. Most of the fish landed was processed into bait for the Japanese longline fishery. In December 2005 the OFWC voted to move sardine from Developmental Fishery status into a state limited entry fishery. Initially, 20 limited entry permits were issued to individuals or companies that met one of the following three criteria: (1) the permit holder lawfully made landings of sardines into Oregon in 2003 and 2004 and landed a total of at least 500 metric tonnes; (2) the permit holder made 35 deliveries in any one year from 2000 through 2004; or, (3) the permit holder made a total of 100 deliveries of sardines into Oregon in 2000 through 2004 (OAR 635-006-1035). These criteria, however, excluded six fishermen who were holding DFP’s in 2005. These fishermen did not own purse seine vessels capable of fishing sardine or were occupied with other fisheries during the sardine season. To retain their involvement in the fishery they hired six vessels to catch sardines to ‘‘prove up’’ their permits. By failing to land sardines themselves, an interpretation of developmental fisheries rules by state officials prevented the six fishers from meeting the qualifying criteria but did allow the vessels they hired to meet those same criteria [24]. The excluded fishermen subsequently submitted a proposal to the OFWC
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Table 2 Sardine fishery status in 1999 and 2006 compared to conditions for a developed fishery Characteristics of a developed fishery
Sardine fishery status in 1999
Sardine fishery status in 2006
Stock assessments are periodic and consistent; stock abundances are estimated with reasonable confidence and monitored for changes over time
Yes
Yes
Harvest levels are at, or near, optimal yield
In California, but not in the northern area sardine fishery
Yes
Harvest programs (e.g., season, gear, size limits, bycatch restrictions, and closed areas) are established
No
Yes
Industry is an active participant in research and management
No
No
Markets are established
Yes, but uncertain and variable
Yes, but uncertain and variable
Permits are transferable
No (condition of DFP)
Yes
The fishery is guided by a long-term management plan
No state plan, Federal FMP
No state plan, federal FMP
to issue an additional six permits for the limited entry fishery [25]. ODFW staff recommended against the additional permits based on their analysis that 20 permits were appropriate given resource availability and fleet capacity. The Commission, however, voted unanimously to issue the permits, resulting in a state limited entry program with 26 transferable permits for the sardine fishery [26]. It is questionable whether the sardine fishery should have been listed as a developmental fishery in 1999. The only characteristic of a developed fishery that was not met in 1999 was that harvest was not near or at the fisheries optimal yield (Table 2). All other characteristics for a developed fishery were met, or could have been met, if managed as a limited entry fishery in 1999. That the definition of a developmental fishery had to be modified so that sardines could be listed as a developmental fishery supports this view. Once the sardine fishery was placed in the DFP, the lack of clear guidelines for developing the fishery coupled with undefined timelines and rent seeking behavior on the part of some participants hindered the development of the fishery. 4. Areas for improvement in the Developmental Fisheries Program The DFP has been successful in taking two fisheries from developmental status to developed limited access permit
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fisheries. Far less clear, however, is how well the DFP performed in carrying out the four actions discussed in the introduction, which are necessary to efficiently develop an underexploited fishery. First, in both fisheries there were fishermen and harvesters willing to invest in the development of the fishery. At the same time both fisheries suffered issues with free riders, indicating that DFP created incentives for free riding which undermined the fundamental incentive for industry investment needed to support the development of the fisheries. Second, in the case of the bay clams, insufficient biological information has been collected to establish stock biomasses, growth rates, and estimate of fisheries optimal yield. The annual stock assessment for sardines meets this condition but would have been carried out by the federal government irrespective of the fishery’s developmental status at the state level. Third, a market for sardines already existed because of the established California sardine fishery. Increasing the number of developmental permits in 2000 does appear to have given processors confidence to establish facilities locally in Oregon. In contrast to sardines, no new markets or even a sufficient existing market for bay clams have been developed, despite work to show a substantial human consumption market. Overall, an examination of the sardine and clam developmental fisheries suggests that their ‘‘graduation’’ to developed fishery status is at least in part due to ‘‘grade inflation’’ on the part of state agencies. This demonstrates lack of institutional experience and a failure to develop coherent institutional processes (the fourth action) necessary to support a developmental fishery program. At least six areas for improvement of the DFP can be identified. These should be addressed before existing category ‘‘A’’ developmental fisheries are classified as developed or new species are added to the category ‘‘A’’ developmental fishery list. First the DFP has undefined operational guidelines and methods. The DFP has a defined legislative framework but lacks the operational guidelines necessary to take fisheries through the developmental process effectively and efficiently. Additionally, DFP fails to require ODFW and the Developmental Fisheries Board to establish specific program goals and objectives or set targets against which progress towards developed status can be benchmarked. Second there is an indeterminate program time frame. The DFP does not set a defined limit for moving a fishery from developing to developed status. Without a mandatory time period, developmental fisheries management can become moribund and participants feel disempowered within the DFP process. Third the DFP has inadequate funding and resource support. The DFP faces many operational limitations due to its small budget. ODFW is responsible for a large number of marine conservation and fisheries management issues. Agency funding must be prioritized, and currently the DFP is low on the list of funding priorities.
Fourth, the DFP provides few actual incentives for fishermen to pursue developmental activities. Before fishermen invest in equipment and permits they require assurances from ODFW that their investments will be secure once a fishery is removed from the developmental fishery list. DFP permits do not require the holder to aid with science collection or make a significant investment in the economic development of the fishery. In the case of sardines, very small minimal landing requirements for the renewal of permits saw some fisherman speculating on windfall gains when the fishery gained developed status. In both clam and sardine fisheries, some developmental permit holders became free riders. They met their annual qualifying landings but undertook no developmental work. They expected others to take the initiative to develop the fishery while they were awarded limited entry access rights to the fishery when it transitioned to a developed fishery. This is in contradiction to one of the objectives of the DFP to limit participants and provide an incentive for experimentation and information gathering by safeguarding the investment of those who explore new ideas [6]. Fifth, there appears to be a desire to move fisheries to developed, limited entry status irrespective of whether the conditions for developed status have been met. The decisions to move the Oregon bay clam and sardine fisheries to developed status may be inconsistent with legislative criteria that require fisheries to meet a set of scientific and management standards before transitioning to developed status. Failure to address fundamental management issues before exiting the DFP hobbles economic efficiency and innovation because of limited scientific information and management planning. Sixth, careful consideration should be given to the best form of privileges and responsibilities to promote assetbased fisheries development. Fisheries listed on category ‘‘A’’ of the DFP have relatively weak access privileges associated with them since they are of limited duration and are non-tradable. Once a fishery is classified as developed, fishermen receive stronger limited entry rights that are in many cases transferable and therefore more valuable. Yet the lack of exclusivity, e.g., a guaranteed share of the total catch, of limited entry licenses means that innovators can find their returns eroded by the race for the fish among licensed fisheries participants. Dedicated access programs using Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), community quotas, or territorial rights for fishing instruments should be considered as part of the state’s toolbox for encouraging the development of underexploited fisheries [4]. 5. Improving Oregon’s Developmental Fisheries Program: policy approaches of other states and countries Formal DFPs such as Oregon’s are not widely documented in the literature. However, at least two programs from Alaska and the Falkland Islands contain procedures and operational principles that can provide guidance for DFPs similar to that found in Oregon.
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5.1. Defining operational guidelines and timelines The importance of clear program guidance and timelines cannot be understated. Clear and measurable targets are essential for tracking a program’s progress and judging when a fishery is ready to be considered developed. The DFP should develop and implement a program protocol that defines steps or phases within the program and includes a set timeline with possible sunset provisions as well as measurable targets, such as the preparation of a fishery management plan. Fisheries within the DFP must have defined program objectives that reflect the specific circumstances of the fishery. An example of well defined program objectives and timelines are the exploratory and developmental fisheries policies of the Falkland Islands [27]. Exploratory fisheries are those that are underexploited in biological terms. In a new or exploratory fishery, access rights are allocated in the first instance to the Falkland Islands fishing company or companies that undertake the exploratory fishing. An exploratory license is issued for a period of between one and three years. The Director of Fisheries places whatever catch or effort restrictions he or she believes necessary to conserve the stock or mitigate impacts on seabirds, marine mammals, associated and dependent species and benthic communities. On expiration of the exploratory license the company applies for the exploratory catch to be allocated as full fishing rights, in this case ITQ. The Director of Fishery then determines a total allowable effort or catch for the fishery based on catch data collected during the exploratory fishing. The company, subject to quota aggregation limits, is awarded its share of the catch or effort as ITQ. The Government owns any unallocated effort and has the right to sell those rights to other Falkland Islands fishing companies after first offering the company with the exploratory license first right of refusal on the purchase of unallocated rights. The first right of refusal is subject to quota aggregation limits. The developmental fishery policy differs from the exploratory policy in that it applies to fisheries that although fully exploited biologically have little or no Falkland Islands involvement. The developmental policy is designed to encourage the ‘‘Falklandization’’ of local fisheries. In undeveloped fisheries a Provisional Quota (PQ) right rather than a full ITQ right is created. PQ is non-transferable and exists for up to 5 years. It is awarded to companies that put forward a business plan to establish a local seafood operation that will meet ownership criteria for fully transferable ITQ at the end of the five year period. To be eligible to hold ITQ, a company must be 100% owned by Falkland Islanders, demonstrate that it is in effective control of the rights it holds, is actively involved in the seafood business and is making a return commensurate with other companies holding a similar ITQ portfolio [27,28]. Companies that do not meet the criteria for converting PQ to ITQ within the 5-year period may apply for a further period but this will be in competition with
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other eligible applicants. Companies already eligible to hold ITQ will take priority in the allocation of any unassigned rights in a fishery thus by passing the PQ stage. 5.2. Sufficient funding and support Without adequate resources (money, materials, and/or people) effective implementation of a developmental fishery policy is difficult. The Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation (AFDF) aided the very successful development of Alaska’s multi-billion dollar surimi industry using grants from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These funds allowed AFDF to reduce the risk of industry participation in the surimi project by fronting the industry harvest equipment and purchasing industry product. AFDF then sold the product to Asian markets for returns that actually generated income on the grants. All profits were then allocated back to the project. Once the surimi industry was firmly established, AFDF left its intermediary position. By removing the monetary risk associated with industry development, AFDF recruited a sound group of industry pioneers who have since developed the AFDF project into an extremely successful industry. For developmental organizations that lack sufficient funding, such as the DFP, Deputy Director of the AFDF, James Browning [29] suggests the formation of partnerships, particularly university collaborations, as a means to meet research needs cost-effectively. AFDF frequently collaborates with Alaskan universities and graduate students to defray costs and strengthen research. In the absence of sufficient funding fewer fisheries should be listed as category ‘‘A’’ developmental fisheries in Oregon and those that are should be encouraged to work with sources of private capital, such as community development banks, if the fishermen themselves do not have access to capital. Industry responsibility for fishery research and management costs, or ‘‘cost recovery’’, is increasingly common in fisheries management regimes of many countries [30–36] and should be considered an option for Oregon’s developmental fisheries. Cost recovery is generally required in response to creating wealth-generating privileges and property rights in the fishery [37]. Contributions to management costs could be made proportional to industry revenues. This would give the management agency an incentive for early upfront investment in scientific and management research that would be recouped if the economic potential of a fishery is realized. 5.3. Creating incentives for fishery development In fisheries management, appropriate rights-based incentives can be used to motivate industry members to meet goals and carry out particular practices. Browning [29] warns about the use of a ‘‘one size fits all’’ rights-based incentive strategy, such as that of awarding secure property rights to successful pioneers as used by the DFP. Every
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fishery case is unique with a diversity of stakeholder interests, thus incentives should relate accordingly. New Zealand uses harvest incentives to encourage biological data collection in some fisheries considered to be under-exploited and for which there is insufficient information to estimate a sustainable yield. A higher ‘‘exploratory total allowable catch’’ is set in exchange for detailed catch records from fishermen [38]. The conditions of Adaptive Management Programs (AMPs) require that the monitoring program have an expectation that information obtained will provide means to monitor changes in stock status, or assist the development of a quantitative index of abundance to monitor stock status on an on-going basis. The overriding expectation is that information obtained over 5 years will provide an assessment of stock status relative to the biomass that provides the maximum sustainable yield and estimates of sustainable yield. If fishermen fail to maintain sufficient data collection activity or the harvest levels are found to be unsustainable during or at the end of the five-year period, a lower precautionary catch limit is to be set by New Zealand’s fisheries management agency. A reduction of quota for nonparticipation is a collective penalty and results in reduced harvest allowance for both complying and non-complying fishermen. The problem of free riders in the Oregon sardine and bay clam developmental fisheries demonstrates the need for developmental permits to be issued on a basis that gives weight to both fishery wide development goals and demonstrated commitments from individual developmental license holders. Only when and if clearly articulated fishery wide goals are met should a fishery be declared developed. The allocation of individual licenses (or some other marketable privilege or right) in the developed fishery should depend on having met individual commitments that were the basis for allocating developmental permits in the first place. This is the basis of the Falkland Islands exploratory and developmental fisheries policies. 5.4. Management flexibility, adaptability, and improvisation Partnerships to achieve creative, cost-effective management can address constraints such as limited research funding. For a partnership to succeed, participants must adapt to each other’s interests and capabilities. The DFP should provide for adaptability and improvisation in either fishery-wide developmental plans or the practices of individual developmental license holders. Marketing is an area where improvisation and adaptation is especially important. Consumers respond to creativity, and marketers must adapt to the tastes of their target audience for maximized sales. The AFDF hosts seafood contests and fairs as a means to attract industry participation in marketing and increase publicity for the organization and its affiliated industries. Browning [29] suggests that the Oregon DFP promote their fisheries and seafood at local festivals or create seafood tasting contests
to establish markets, educate the public, and gather program support. A sustainable fishery can gather even more marketing power if it receives an eco-label certification from an organization like the Marine Stewardship Council, which is something sought by AFDF fisheries [29]. Oregon’s commercial fishermen, often in partnership with ODFW, are carrying out many of these activities for Oregon’s developed fisheries. Consideration should be given to making such activities a part of the DFP where appropriate. 5.5. The benefits of a neutral intermediary agency Within a developmental fishery program, autonomy from government and industry provides scope to selfregulate and gain stakeholder support from a position of neutrality. Browning [29] believes that AFDF’s independent, intermediary placement as a non-governmental and non-profit organization among regulatory agencies, industries, processors, and manufacturers is a significant contributor to its success. AFDF is not constrained by the short-term interests of government or industry. A nongovernmental developmental program in Oregon may prove more responsive to pioneer interests. There was an equivalent to the AFDF for west coast fisheries, the West Coast Fisheries Development Foundation. This organization ceased operation in the early 1990s. Any new nongovernmental developmental fisheries initiative would need to have a clear legislative mandate and a source of funding from state and federal agencies and/or cost recovery. 6. Summary and conclusion The Oregon Legislature formed the Developmental Fisheries Program (DFP) to encourage the commercial exploration and development of state managed undeveloped fishery resources. By national and international standards this is an ambitious plan covering over 90 species. The Program continues to have widespread support among Oregon’s small-scale fishermen. Limited funding and undefined program objectives are significant program limitations. Frustration with slow progress has increased pressure to soften the criteria for transition from a developmental to a developed fishery, but this has raised concerns that weak access rights and a limited management framework will stifle long-term efficiency, economic innovation, and perhaps the ecological sustainability of a fishery. In the case of the Oregon bay clam fishery, considerable fishery revenue may remain unrealized because the economic and ecological potential of the fishery was not established during its time in the DFP. In the case of sardines it is far from clear whether or not the DFP helped the development of the fishery. Most of Oregon’s remaining developmental fisheries are small-scale fisheries, yet their management can be complex and does not necessarily require less work and resources than management of larger fisheries. Frequently, state and
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private revenues from small-scale fisheries cannot cover fishery management costs. Thus, creative and cooperative management systems are essential to the success of smallscale fisheries developmental programs. At the very least the DFP should be structured to incorporate the concurrent design of science and management plans. Before any fishery is included in Category A of the DFP there should be an estimate of the cost of managing a fishery within the program and meeting market and biological data needs. For DFP to be effective, a set of fishery goals and measurable objectives that show when a fishery has reached developed status must be defined and agreed upon by both the DFP and the industry. Prior to this step, the DFP should have defined milestones to measure the annual progress of a fishery as it moves from a developmental to developed status. The basis for initial allocation of developmental permits, conditions for renewal of developmental permits and rules for converting developmental permits to limit access fisheries licenses should be designed to promote the economic development of a fishery. Consideration should be given to fishery wide requirements but also to basing initial allocation, permit renewal requirements and license allocations in the developed fishery on ‘‘fishery-bid plans’’ developed by individual fishers and the subsequent achievement of the benchmarks established in these fishery-bid plans. At a minimum, development responsibilities should be assigned to every developmental permit. Higher qualifying landings and fewer available permits would create greater competition between fishermen and be a driver of resource and industry development Encouraging the creation of an association of developmental fishery fishermen could provide an opportunity for fishermen to discuss developmental issues such as biological information needs and market development outside of the formal Developmental Fisheries Board meetings. These discussions would allow fishermen to address issues prior to DFP meetings and prepare to articulate their ideas or concerns to the Board. The Oregon Developmental Fishery Program has the potential to bring many of Oregon’s under-exploited marine species to the market in a profitable and sustainable way. Review of the bay clam and sardines fisheries, indicates that the DFP is not reaching its potential. Establishing clear objectives and timelines and identifying appropriate renewal requirements for permits and other developmental incentives on a fishery-by-fishery basis is a small but necessary step for the Program.
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