Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion I-IV: Hume\'s Argument from Design

'What is Cleanthes' strongest argument in favour of Natural Religion? How successful is Philo's response to it?'.

This essay will focus upon the Argument from Design presented by the fictional Cleanthes within Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Building upon the original, Cleanthes offers various versions of his argument in response to sceptic objections. The scope of this essay will be the original Argument from Design and the counter-arguments opposing it. Initially, I will begin by explaining the argument, and discussing the reasons for which it is the strongest of those proposed. I will then critically assess the argument, to show that it is neither valid nor sound. Subsequently, I will engage with the objections that arise from Philo's argumentation in Part V, and consider their refutation through Ockham's Razor. Finally, I will conclude that the objections given are more powerful than the original argument, and therefore that the Argument from Design is unsuccessful in defending Natural Religion.

Natural Religion is concerned with inferring the existence and nature of God on the basis of observations regarding the natural world. However, the Dialogues[…], concern themselves solely with the nature of God, as his existence is considered a "self-evident truth". In sections II-VIII, Cleanthes attempts to defend Natural Religion using a posteriori argumentation, involving "at least one premise whose justification essentially appeals to some sort of empirical fact or experience". This is his Argument from Design, which is an argument from analogy; its reasoning cites experienced similarities between two systems in support of the conclusion that further similarity exists. Specifically, Cleanthes' argument from analogy is teleological in nature, insofar as it claims that the natural world exhibits forms of end-directed design, and therefore presupposes an intelligent designer. He begins with a premise asserting that: (1) the natural world displays empirical qualities, namely, that order (especially "the adapting of means to ends") is inherent throughout nature. This is illustrated by his likening of nature to a machine, which is divisible into infinite lesser machines. He continues with the second premise asserting that: (2) such order "resembles exactly, though it much exceeds" the order inherent within products of human design. The third premise claims that: (3) since the effects of both nature and human production are equivalent, through rules of analogy we can infer that their causes are also equivalent. Through inference, the fourth premise is reached such that: (4) since human products are caused by intelligent design, the cause of nature must also be intelligent design, though "of much larger faculties". This leads to Cleanthes' conclusion that the cause of nature- God- possesses a nature similar to "human mind and intelligence".

This argument appears more powerful than the subsequent versions put forward as counter-arguments to Philo's problematising, as it is based more so upon analogical reasoning than the arguments regarding the 'Voice from the Sky' and the 'Natural Library', both of which tend more towards the rhetorical force of examples. The second argument presents itself as 'irregular', through illustrative examples and the dependance on the emotive force of such in order to bolster Cleanthes' intended conclusion. The weakness of this argument lies in its reliance upon feeling over reasoning, in so far as Cleanthes claims the illustrations provided appeal to human instinct and override subsequent skepticism. For this reason, I believe that the first argument from design presented is stronger than those following, as it is founded primarily upon reason and analogy.

An analogical argument is a form of inductive reasoning; the conclusion does logically support the premises, however the premises do not solely support the conclusion. Though it may not be considered deductively valid or sound, it may maintain force as an analogical argument depending on the strength of the analogy itself - and here lies the failing point of Cleanthes' argument from design. As Philo points out in his rebuttal, there are two main concerns which greatly weaken the analogical reasoning: the departure from analogues of exact similarity, and the lack of empirical knowledge regarding the two cases. Initially, the astronomical difference between proposing a house as the effect of builders, and that of the entire universe as the effect of an intelligent designer, greatly weakens Cleanthes' case. Furthermore, even if Cleanthes was to claim that, as ordered effects, both warrant a cause of similar nature - this could not be proven by experience. Witnessing a bruise upon someone's back, for example, does not lead to the absolute conclusion that this was caused by a fist. A chair, an object thrown from a distance- these are all plausible causes. In the same way, to state that nature's order is proof of intelligent design does not presuppose necessarily an intelligent designer. The second weak-point of this analogy is the accountability of parts for a whole. Our experience of the universe is not only restricted due to its singular nature, but it is also completely separate from knowledge of its whole. To infer one from the other actually constitutes a lack of reason. The vagueness and uncertainty, therefore, of Cleanthes' analogy constitutes the argument from design very weak.

The objections stated above substantiate the weakness of the analogical reasoning central to the Argument from Design. Philo, however, continues his attack upon the argument in Part V by affirming that not only do the premises weakly support the given conclusion, but that they support alternative conclusions more strongly. His first objection targets Cleanthes' reliance on empirical causal relations. According to such reasoning, Philo claims, the argument cannot define God according to classical theism, as "the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect…is not infinite". Empirical effects being finite, to our knowledge, disallows God from being infinite in nature. Gods existence as a 'perfect' being is also shadowed by doubt, as our experience doesn't allow us to deduce whether our world is perfect, the product of failed attempts, or even the effect of a single deity. Here begins Philo's master argument. Here, he integrates Cleanthes' empirical law, this time focusing on the fundamental premise of "like effects prove like causes". In this way, the most plausible conclusion he presents is that of multiple deities. Several deities combining in the creation of the world more closely resembles human production, which is made up "a great number of men". The argument from design in itself cannot prove the unity of a Deity. Furthermore, man himself is mortal and reproduces himself through copulation, and if one is to assume similarities between man and God, then this allows for the hypothesis of Theogony as well as a perfect 'Anthropomorphite'. With these examples, Philo begins to attack the plausability of Cleanthes' conclusion. He attains that though the premises themselves may be true, insofar as the universe is a product of design, one cannot use this as verification for the nature or multitude of the designer/s. This concession on part of the premises is taken as a victory for Cleanthes, who maintains that the truth of the premises still provide sufficient foundation for his conclusion. He could possibly continue his defence by Ockham's Razor, attaining that "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily". However, the weak plausibility of the outcome has been exemplified in such a way that Philo could refute the Argument from Design by reductio ad absurdum, insofar as the logical reasoning tying the argument together is weak enough to allow a plethora of ridiculous conclusions to arise from the given premises. He proceeds to do just this, in the following dialogues.

In this essay I have critically analysed Cleanthes' Argument from Design, in order to conclude that it is victim to a weak analogy. The causal and analogical reasoning are not strong enough to plausibly support the given conclusion. Furthermore, I have discussed some of the objections put forward by Philo in Part V, as well as a hypothetical reply on part of Cleanthes in favour of his original conclusion. However, I have finally concluded that not only is the Argument from Design logically flawed, but that it is formulated in a way that allows for absurd conclusions. Consequently, I believe that the Argument from Design has been successfully refuted.
















BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. http://www.davidhume.org/texts/dnr.html
2. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-theology/#PosArg
3. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-analogy/#AnaArg
3. http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html














http://www.davidhume.org/texts/dnr.html : KS 142
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-theology/#PosArg
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-analogy/#AnaArg
http://www.davidhume.org/texts/dnr.html : KS 144
Ibid: KS 144
Ibid: KS 144
Ibid: KS 144
Ibid: KS 149
Ibid: KS 167
Ibid: KS 171
Ibid: KS 168
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/General/occam.html