No. 8904 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM RESERVE REQUIREMENTS: 1959-BB--A NOTE Joseph H. Haslat Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Scott E. Hei n* Texas Tech University and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas March 1989
Research Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (
[email protected])
Ho. 8904 FEDEMLRESERVE RESERVE REQUIREilEilTS: SYSTEI4 1959-88--A l{oTE JosephH. Haslagt Federal ReserveBank of Dallas and Scott E. Hein* Texas Tech University and Federal ReserveBank of Dallas l{arch 1989
* The views expressedin this artjcle are so1e1ythose of the authors, and should not be attributed to either TexasTechUniversity, the Federal ReserveBankof Dallas, or the FederalReserveSystem.
Over the last thirty years, the FederalReserveSystemhas changedboth the range of deposit classifications against which reservesmust be held, and the level of reserve requirementratios on numerous occasjons. For example,with passageof the MonetaryControl Act in 1990, the Federal Reservesystemwas given authorltJ to levy reserve requirementsagainst the reservable deposits held at all depository jnstjtutions that offer transactions deposits. Prior to lg80, the FederalReserve,sjurisdiction was limited to member conmerci al banks. In addition, the range of deposits against which reserve requirementratios are set was also changed'in 1990. tinfortunately, such changesmakecomparisons betweenaggregatereserve requirementstructures extrernelycomplex. Indeed, Judgingwhetherreserve requirementchangeshavebeenraised or lowered,on net, is difficult,
even
for professionally trained econonj sts.l/ T h e p u r p o s eo f t h i s n o t e j s t w o - f o l d . F i r s t , w e d e s c r i b ea s i n p l e summary neasureof changesjn the reserve requirenentsset by the Federal Reservesystem. }lith this summary statistic,
it is possible to characterize
the effective path of reserve requirernents over the past thirty years. In particular, the effects of nodificatjons to the reserve reouirement structure introduced by the MonetaryControl Act of 19g0 have been puzzling. cacy and winningham (1982) and roma (1988)naintain that reserve requirementswere' on net, raised by the Monetarycontrol Act.
The evidence
presentedin this paper, however,suggeststhat reserve requirementshave fal I en. The secondaim of this paper is to djscuss the relationshio between changesin the reserve requirementstructure and the Federal Reservers holdings of Treasurydebt. Note that the adjustedmonetarybase direc y
reflects all Federal Reservepolicy actions. Thus, for a given level of the adjusted monetarybase, the effects of a changein reserve requirenentq.are counteredthrough the use.of the other tools of the Federal Reserve. Ooen market operatio-nsare one way in the Federal Reservecould offset the effects of changes-in reserve requirements. Indeed,openrnarketoperations are the tool most frequently used to conductmonetarypolicy, but these transactions involve the Federal Reserve'sholdings of rreasury securities. changesin reserve requirementscould have implications for the amountof Federal government debt held by the monetaryauthority.
specificaliy, the
coordination of changesin reserve requirementsand the rising Federal b u d g e td e f i c i t s a r e d i s c u s s e d .
I.
Tho
(l'
Louis ReserveAdjustment of Chanqesin
T a b l e 1 p r o v i d e sa l i s t o f r e s e r v a b r ed e p o s i t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s a n d t h e different reserve requirementratios for two years: 1979and 19gg. The 1978reserve requirementstructure, which predatedthe Monetarycontrol Act of 1980 (hereafter UMCA"),appljed to nenber_ banksonly. In contrast, the reserve requirementstructure in l98B appl.iedto alI depository institutlons that offer transactions deposits. Thus, the two structures presentedin Table t highl ight one key feature of MCA;the Federal Reserve systemadninisters reserve requirementpolicies to a greatiy expandedset of i n s ti t u t i o n s . 2 / There are three factors lrhich rnakeit impossibleto infer the direct.ion of changein aggregatereserve requirementratios frorn 197gand 19BB p r e s e n t e di n T a b l e 1 . F i r s t , a s T a b l e I i n d i c a t e s , t h e r e s e r v er e q u i r e m e n t ratio which app.liedto nenberbankswith net demand aeposits''iSvetsLetween
$ 0 a n d $ 4 1 - 5m i l l i o n w e r e l o w e r e df r o m 1 9 7 8r e v e l s . T a b l e 1 a 1 s o s h o w s , however,that the reserve requirementratios applied to net demand deposit l e v e l s f o r d e p o s . i tl e v e l s b e t w e e $ n 4 1 . 5r n i l l i o n a n d $ 1 0 0n j l l i o n w e r e raised. Unfortunately, without jnformation on the size of deposits for which reserve requirementsare higher and for those with lower reserve requirenents' it is impossibreverify whetheraggregatereserve requirenenf,s were effectively loweredor raised on net demand deposits from 197gand 1988. Secondly,the direction of changefor sometypes of reservable deposits were raised whereasother types were possibly rowered. Evenif the reserve requirenentsfor nernberbankswere, on net, rower in lggg than in 197g, the Federal Reserveunambiguousry raised the rates on eurocurrencyaccounts. Thirdly, even if ratios courd be compared directly for nemberbanks, MCAestablished the Federal Reservesystemas the sole administrator of reserve requirementsfor depository i nst'ituti ons offeri ng transact.ions accounts. This feature meantthat non-menber depository institutions were subject to the sane reserve requirementstructure as member banks. |Jhile non-nember depository institutions generally faced h.igherreserve requirenents after MCA,the net effect on member banksand, therefore. on the systemas a whore, is indeterminate. Thus, the r97g and 19ggreserve requirementstructures showthat drawinginferencesbase on a time series of the ratios is i ncornprehensible. The Federal ReserveBankof St. Louls (hereafter referred to as ,rSt. Louis"), however,does calculate an aggregatemeasureof reserve requirementeffects.
This measure,referred to as the reserve adjustment
magn.itude (uRAl4"),is then combined with the sourcebase to obtain its
measureof the adjustedmonetarybase. MM reflects changesin reserve requirementsset by the FederalReserveSystem. In doing so, RAMprov.ides dollar measuresof changesin reserve requirementratios. ' T o i l l u s t r a t e h o wR A Mi s c a l c u l a t e d , suppose that there is a vector of deposits in existence, Dt, aga.instwhich a vector of reserve ratios, 11, is applied (t denotestime).
Today'srequired reserves, then, are represented
by the following expression:
(1) ri 01. Suppose,further, that the reserve requjrementstructure during the base,, p e r i o d i s g i v e n b y t h e v e c t o r 1 6 . T h u s ,f o r t h e s a n ed e p o s i t c r a s s i f i c a t i o n 'in (1), the e x p r e s s i o nf o r S t . L o u j s R A Mi s q j v e n b v : (2)
RAMI=
(rO - rt), Dt .
The RAMcomponent of the st. Louis base representsthe difference between what total required reserveswould havebeen if the baseperiod reserve requirementstructure, 16 , had beenin place today. Thus, RAMmeasuresthe dollar amountby which required reservesdiffer under today's reserve requirenent structure and that which was in prace during the base period. RAMprovides an aggregatedollar index of the total amountof reserves .absorbedor freed" by reserve requirement ratio changes. To illustrate, supposeall reserve requirenentratios are reducedso that r0 < rt.
lljth
lower reserve requirementratios, equation (2) indicates that RAMwould be positive and therefore, reflects the dollar amountof reserves .freed" by incorporating this newreserve requirementstructure.
Increasesin reserve
requirenent rat.ios, on the other hand, wouldresult .in a negative RAl4,
indicating an absorptionof reserves. RAM,therefore, provides qual.itat.ive infornation about the direction of changein reserve requirements.
2. Movements in RAU1959-88
_:, ,
.rr ,
The reserve adjustmentmagnitude(RAl,l)provides informatjon on -,
,
aggregatereserve requirementsas a result of changesin reserve requirement ratios from somegiven base period. Chart I tracks the level of RAl4from 1959through 1988, accordingto the nost recent estimatesprovided by the Federal ReserveBankof St. Louis. The present neasurereflects a 1976-90 base period for reserve requirementratios.f/ The tjme path of RAMdisplayed in Chart I indicates two main results. F i r s t , R A Mi s r o u g h l y$ 1 4 b i l l i o n h i g h e r j n l 9 g 7 t h a n i t w a s i n L g S g . ! / This indicates that reserve requirementshave, on net, fallen over the last thirty years. Supposethat reserve requirenentshad not beenchangedsince 1959. This supposition jmpljes that RAFI equals zero, ano nence, source base equals adjusted monetarybase. l.lith reserve requirementsunchanged, the source basemust compensate for the quantity of reserveswhich would otherwjse had been "freed'r throughreserve requirements. Thus, in iggg. the source basewould have to increase about $14 billion to be eoual to the adjusted monetarybase. Secondly,the path of RAMover the 1959-88Deriod is consjstent wjth changesin reserve requirenentsoccurring in waves,which reflect the major changesjn the reserve requirementstructure that took effect dur.ingthjs period. Between1959and 1980, 14 najor changesin reserve requ.irenents were implemented.Over the period 1959-1965,only two such changeswere implemented,Chart L showsthat RAl.lgeneralty increaseddur"j.0g.the.first
half of the 1960s. Thus, over the period 1959-65,the data suggestthat reserve requirementswere effectively lowered. Beginningin 1966, changesin reserve requirenentsoccuffed more frequently., -Indeed,except for 1971, the reserve requirenent structure v,ras changedeach year between1966 and 1978. As Chart I indicates, RA!,| g e n e r a l l yd e c l i n e dd u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7w4h i c h j n d i c a t e s t h a t h i g h e r reserve requirementswere levied on rnember banks. Beginningin 1974, however,a series of reduct'ionsjn reserve requirernentratios were initiated.
R A Mr o s e d u r i n g t h e l a s t h a l f o f t h e 1 9 7 0 s ,t h u s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t
reserves had been " f reed.,,Q/ The 1981-88period 'is consideredseparatelybecausethe frequent changesin reserve requirementsexper.ienced dur.ingthis period were the product of l'lCA. Provisjonswere included jn l'lCAwhich allowed for the changesin reserve requirementsto be phased-Jn. Therewere two separate phase-in schedulesfor the changesjn reserve requirements:members banks $/ereprovided a phase-in period of four years while and the transition period for non-menber institutions was e'ight years.Z/ During the four years in which member banksreserve requirementswere being phased-in, RAM increasednearly $10 billion.
Thus, during the period whereboth nenbers
and non-members were experiencingreserve requirementChanges,the evidence suggeststhat a net decreasein reserve requirementshad taken place. During the 1984-88period, only the changesin reserve requirenents for non-nember depository institutions contjnuedto be phased-jn. RAMfel l s l i g h t l y d u r i n g t h j s p e r i o d , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a s l i g h t i n c r e a s ej n r e s e r v e r e q u i r e m e n th s a d o c c u f f e d . O v e r a l l , R A Mh a s i n c r e a s e ds i n c e . l g g 0w h i c h i s consistent with aggregatereserve requirementsbeing effectively-lowered.oue
to MCA.
3. Effects of the l4onetaryControl Act of l-980 Whatwas the sourceof the substantial changesin reserve requirements i n t h e 1 9 8 0 s ? I n t e r e s t i n g l y , t h e s ec h a n g e b s ear little
direct relationship
to explicit nonetarypolicy actions. In fact, the reserve requirement schedulecurrently in place was set by the U.S. Congress,not the Federal ReserveSystem. Congress,with the passageof MCA,nade two important changesin reserve requirementsfor depository jnstitutions. 3 . 1 T w oP r i n c i p l e E l e m e n t os f M C A First, Congressimposeduniversal reserve requirementson al 1 depository institutjons offering transactions deposits. Prior to the MCA, n o n - m e m bdeer p o s i t o r yi n s t i t u t i o n s ( i n c l u d i n g s a v i n g sa n d l o a n a s s o c i a t i o n s , nutual savings banksand credit unions) were subject to a variety of reserve requirementsschedulesset primarjly dt the state level , and not by the F e d e r a lR e s e r v e . 8 / M C Ao u t l i n e d a " p h a s e - i n "s c h e d u l ew h e r e i nr e s e r v e requirementratios were gradually increasedfor those institutions previously not under Federal Reserveguidelines. The MCAallowed the Fed to set reserve requjrementsfor all these institutions.
Althoughthe Federal
Reservewas given this discretion, it did not chooseto use these pohrers. Second,the MCAeffectively provided for reductions jn reserve requirementratios for member banks. Again, a phase-in period was outlined. Reserverequirementratios for these institutions were to be gradual.ly phaseddownover the period 1980to 1987. For example,reserve requirement ratios on transaction deposits were as high as 16 L/4%for large menber banks in 1979, By the end of the phase-in, these requirementswere,.reduced
to 12%. The Federal ReserveSystemwas agajn gjven the ability to alter t h i s s c h e d u l e ,b u t d e c i d e dt o s t a y t h e f o u r - y e a rt r a n s i t j o n p l a n s p e l l e d o u t in MCA. In summary, the MCAput in place two countervailing forces acting on effective reserve requirenentratios for all depository institutions. Systemreserve requirementratios were phased-up,from a baseof zero, for non-member depository institutions that offered transactjon accounts. At the sane time, reserve requirenentratios were phased-dolrn for nemberbanKs. 3 . 2 T h e r r N e t "D i r e c t i o n o f t h e E f f e c t s There seemsto be someconfusionabout the net effects of these two forces. Tona, for example,writes that ,,while lowering the reserve requirementsfaced by Fedmember banks, the act raised the reserve requirenentsfor other banksby enoughto increasethe overall reserve burden."9/ This statementsuggeststhat the net effect was an increase jn required reserves ratios for all depository .institutions combjned. A quick glance at Chart 1 indicates, however,that as far as the final effects of the Act are concerned,this conclusionis inaccurate. The substantial rise i n t h e l e v e l o f R A Mb, e g i n n i n gi n l a t e 1 9 8 1 ,s- u g g e s t sa n e t r e d u c t i o ni n effective required reservesfor all depos'itoryinstitutjons combjned. The lower reserve requirement ratios for rnember banks had more of an effect on aggregaterequired reservesthan the irnpositionof higher reserve r e q u i r e m e nrta t i o s f o r a l l n o n - m e n b d ee r p o s i t o r yi n s t i t u t i o n s . T h i s i s becausemember banksare the larger depository institutions in our financial system. Consequently,the level of required reserves freed for larger member banksmorethan offset the level of reserves absorbedby imposing higher reserve requirenenton non-member banks.
.+.
T h e MonetaryContro'l Act and SomeImplications for FederalGovernnent Deficits As indicated, the st. Louis RAMmeasuresuggeststhat the most sizeable
changesin reserve requirementratios over the past thirty years occurred in t h e e a r l y 1 9 8 0 s . T h e s ec h a n g e rse s u l t e d j n s i z e a b l er e d u c t i o n si n effective reserve requirementsfor the bankingsystem. coincident with reserve requirementratio changeswere sizeable changesin the Federai Reserve'sbalancesheet. In the face or
rl net reserve requirement
reductions reflecting rising leve.lsof RAMbetweenearly 19g2and early 1984, the Federal Reservehad to reducethe sourcebase by about $10 billion from what it would havebeenhad reserve requirementsnot been changed. That is, in order to offset the phased-inreductions in reserve requirementratios, legislated by congress,the Federal Reservewas forced t o s e l l a p p r o x i m a t e l$y 1 0 b i l l i o n o f i t s g o v e r n n e nste c u r i t y p o r t f o l i o t h a t it could have kept had the pre-Monetary Control Act level of reserve requirementratios beenmaintained.l0/ It is interesting to note that th.is change'forced on the Federal Reserve,occurredat nearly the sametime that the U.S. Treasurywas increasing its aggregateborrowing, in responseto a growing federa'l government budgetdeficit.
If net reserve requirementshad
not been loweredover the period, the FederalReservecould have held abour $ 1 0 b i l l i o n m o r eo f t l - s - g o v e r n m e n d te b t , w i t h o u t i n c r e a s i n gt h e a d j u s t e d nonetary base or the moneysupply. The irony of these events is that at the sametime the Treasurywas forced to increaseits boffowingthroughthe issuanceof government securities' the McAput in place forces that necessitatedthat the Federai Reservereduce its holdings of government securities belowwhat they would have beenhad the act not beenpassed.
Sumnary The St. Louis reserve adjustmentmagnitude(RAM)can be used to gauge the aggregateeffects of periodic changesin reserve requirementsthrough .
tjme.
In general, movements in RAMthroughtine suggeststhat reserve
requirenents havedeclined from their 1959levels.
Judgingmonetarypolicy
on the basis of past reserve requirementpolicy actions undertakenwould indicate an expansionarytendency. Most recently, reserve requirenentratio changeswere introducedwith the l'lonetary control Act of 1980. The RAMmeasureindicates that the system effectively loweredreserve requirementratios, as a result of the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The MonetaryControl Act also had irnplications for F e d e r a lR e s e r v e r a s b i l j t y t o r r n o n e t i z eT, 'r e a s u r yd e b t . T h e n e t r e d u c t i o nj n reserve requirementsin the early 19g0'smeantthat the FederalReservedid not acquire as manygovernment securities as it would have, had MCAnot beenpassed. Interestingly enough,reserverequirementratio reductions were enactedat roughly the sametime as the federal budgetdeficit increase. The expansionary nonetarypolicy effects of lowering reserve requirementratios inhibjted the Federal Reservefrom buying Treasury securities at the rate they would havew.ithoutthe MonetaryControl Act.
IO
FOOTNOTES The authors wjsh to acknowledge Mike Cox, Alton Gjlbert, Rik Hafer, EvanKoenig, Cara Lown,KenRobinsonand DanThorntonfor helpful comments at various stages in the development of this paper. The usual c a v e a ta. p p 1 i e s .
1.
As testimonyto this fact, we cite Toma's(1988) cla.imthat ,'Although the (MonetaryControl) Act loweredreserve requirementsfor members of the Fed and raised then for nonnenbers, on balancethe reserve requirementburdenincreased"(emphasis,ours).l,leprovide evidence later in the paper v{hichsuggeststhat the reserve requirementburden was actually reducedfor al'l depository institutions combined.
2.
santoni (1985) also recognizedthe probiemsintroducedby the Monetary Controi Act of 1980in comparingreserve requirenent structures pre_ and post-1980.
3.
The St. Louis adjustmentpresently has selected 19Z6-90as the base period. SeeGilbert (1987) for a descrjptjon of the most recent revision in the procedureadoptedby St. Louis to estimate RAl4. I s s u e s i n v o l v e di n s e r e c t i n gt h e b a s ep e r i o d a r e d i s c u s s e ds e p a r a t e l y i n G j l b e r t ( 1 9 8 0 )a n d T a t o m( 1 9 8 0 ) .
4-
.levers N o t et h a t t h e l e v e l o f R A M wilr refrect deposit shifts, as well as djfferent reserve requirementratios, as long as present reserve requirementratios are different from those of the base period. 11
Considerthe RAMfor two djfferent period. both with the samelevel of r e s e r v er e q u i r e n e n rt a t i o s , r L = y Z . R a mf o r p e r i o d 1 w i 1 l b e ( 1 6 11)' Dl.
R a nf o r p e r i o d 2 w i l l b e ( r p - 1 1 ) , 0 2 . T h u s ,w h i l e 1 1 = r Z ,
RAMI= q4Mtas long as Dl - 02. 0eposit gro!/th, for example,will lead to a larger RAMwhenevertoday's reserve requi rernentstructure is lower than that of the baseper.iod. In this way, RAlrl does not follow a pure step-function pattern, changingonly \^rhen reserve requ.irement ratios change. Rather, RAMalso changesas deposit levels shift, or as depos'itsare shifted from one reservableaccountto another, reflecting differences in required reserves across deposits.
5.
0ver the period 1959to 1988.the FederalReserveincreasedtheir g o v e r n m e nste c u r i t i e s h o l d i n g sb y r o u g h l y$ 2 0 0b i l l i o n .
If reserve
requirementratjos had remainedat their 1959levels, the Federal Reservewould have had to increasetheir government securjties holdings b y $ 2 1 4b i l l i o n t o a c h i e v et h e s a m ei n c r e a s ei n t h e a d j u s t e dm o n e t a r y b a s e . I n o t h e r w o r d s ,t h e F e d e r a lR e s e r v ec o u l d h a v ej n c r e a s e di t , s holdings of governrnent securities by about 7%, if reserve requirernent ratios had not beenloweredover the period.
6.
Table 1 also indicates brief per.iodswhereRAMexhibits abeffant b e h a v i o r . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e s h a r pu p s w i n gi n R A M w h i c ho c c u r r e di n 1 9 7 2r e f l e c t s t h e b a s i c c o r n p o n e nwt sh i c ha r e u s e d i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n . ln L972, reserve requirementswere no longer applied to reserve city banksor country banks. Rather, the newstructure was basedsolely on the size of deposits. This re-structuring was phased-jnover several
12
months,and reserve requirementsappearto haveeffectively fal len briefly,
A'lso contributing to the increase in MM was the depos.it
outflow which occured at this tinre. Other things being equal, n e g a t i v ed e p o s i t g r o w t hw i l l r e s u l t i n R A M, ' c h a n g i ndgi r e c t i o n . ' ,
The
sharp reduction in RAMwhich occuffed in the late 1970sreflects negatjve deposit f1ows. Reserverequirementswere not changedbetween 1978and 1980so that deposit outflows due to high market interest rates explainth'is aberat ion.
1.
See McNeill (1980) for a nore completedescription of the transition provis.ionsin MCAas they applied to nembercommercialbanksand nonm e m b ef ri n a n cai l i n s t i t u t i o n s .
8.
State reserve requirementratios haveno effect on the RAMconponentof the monetarybase.
9.
Toma'spoint regarding the overall effect of the MonetaryControl Act of 1980on reserve requirementsrestates the position taken by Cacyand llinningham. The view that reserve requjrementswere raised on net for a l 1 d e p o s i t o r yi n s t i t u t i o n s m a yh a v ei n i t i a l l y b e e nt r u e . 1982, RAMfell.
F r o m1 9 8 0t o
The final effects measured by RAM,however,suggest
that reserve requirementwere, on net, loweredby MCA.
10, See Haslagand Hein (1989) for evidenceconcerningthe coordination of monetarypolicy tools,
Haslagand Hein report that the source base and
RAMare negatively (and significantly) correlated over the per.iod1959-
13
88, indicating that the FederalReservewas coordjnating policy .
act i ons.
L4
REFERENCES ,,Reserve Cacy, J. A., and Scott Wjnnjngham, Requirements under the DepositoryInstjtutions Deregulationand l.,ionetary control Act of 1gg0.,' vol .e pp. 68-81. KansasCity: Federat SSgS!--fgJEC!41&licy, KeserveBankof Kansascity, 1992. G i l b e r t , R . A . l t o n . " R e v i s i o no f t h e S t . L o u i s F e d e r a lR e s e r v e , A s djusted Tglelary Base," Federal ReserveBankof St. Louis Review(Decimber 1 9 8 0 ) :3 - 1 0 . . "A Revision in the MonetaryBase,',FederalReserveBankof St. Loujs Review(August/Septernber l9g7j: 2a_29. Hasldg, JosephH,, and Scott E. Hein, r'Reserve Requirements, the Monetary Baseand Economic Actlvityr,, FederalReserveBankof Dillas Economic R e v i e w ,( M a r c h1 9 8 9 ) : 1 -1 6 . M c N e i l l , c h a r l e s R . , w i t h D e n i s eM . R e c h t e r" T h eD e p o s i t o r yI n s t i t u t i o n s Deregulationand MonetaryControl Act of lgg0,i' Federil Reserve --------Bulietjn 66 (June 1980): 444-53 santoni, G- J. 'rrhe Monetarycontror Act, ReserveTaxesand the stock prices of Commercial Banks,',FederalReserveBankof St. Louis Review ( J u n e / J u l y1 9 8 5 ) , 1 2 - 2 0 . Tatom,John A. I'Issues in Measuringan AdjustedMonetaryBase,,'Federal ReserveBankof St. Louis Review(Deiember1980): it_Zg.' Toma,Mark. "The Role of the FederalReservein ReserveRecuirement Regulation." The Cato Journal. (l,linter 1988), 701-18.
15
T a b l e 1 - R e s e r v eR e q u i r e m e not sf DepositoryInstitutions for Selectedyears 1 9 8 8 :A p p l i e dt o A l ' l D e p o s i t o r yI n s t i t u t i o n s Net transactjons accounts $ 0 - $ 4 0 . 5r n i t l i o n M o r et h a n $ 4 0 . 5m i l l i o n
percent of deposits 3 L2
Net personal time deposits By original maturity Less than 1 1/2 years I 1/2 years or more E u r o c u r r e n cIyj a b i I i t i e s Al I types 19/8: Applied to Member BanksOnly Net -$6 Demand
- Sz
7
$2 - $10 $10 - 5166 $100 - $400 over $400 -T i n e
I
r/2
1 1 3/4 12 3 / 4 16 L / 4
S a vn i gs other time: $0 - $5, naturingin 30 days to 179 days 180 days to 4 years over 4 years O v e r$ 5 , m a t u r . i n g ln 30 days to 179 days 179 days to 4 years over 4 years
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