How does empathy work?

Professors: Dr. Maurits van der Molen & Dr. Helle Larsen Tutors: Madelief Buijs & Lisa van der Heijden Nine Adler

SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Interdisciplinary Assignment How does empathy work? Understanding empathic response. Comparison of the felt responsibility hypothesis and the compassion/empathic distress theory.

Introduction Studying empathy is a difficult subject. While most researchers agree on the definition of empathy, it usually harder to limit the application of this definition and furthermore to understand how and why empathy happens. There is no doubt it remains a fascinating characteristic of human behavior, when present it is the definition of our humanity, when it is absent, the justification of human cruelty. Hoffman (1981), a pioneer in this subject has defined empathy as a “tendency to become aroused by and vicariously experience the emotion of others” (Shaffer, 2009). Many models have tried to encompass the functioning of empathy. We are going to focus on two separate contradictory models: felt responsibility hypothesis described in the book (Shaffer, 2009) and compassion and empathic distress theory (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). These two models are interesting because they both focus on immediate feelings of distress. Before addressing their contradictions and oppositions, we must first thoroughly describe both models to have a better understanding and a global vision of empathy. Then we may compare and contrast them in order to find out the core difference and reflect on future integration of it in the models or elaborate a separate model.

I.

Description

a) The felt responsibility hypothesis The felt responsibility hypothesis described by Shaffer (2009) shows the close dynamics between empathy and altruism. According to this model, empathy promotes altruistic behavior by accentuating the importance of altruistic norms, which induce a sense of moral obligation to help others. The model starts by describing an initial source of distress produced by a person. There are two ways to react to this distress:



1

either the sympathetic distress or the self-focused distress. Hoffman (2000) has described similar concepts: sympathetic empathic arousal when we experience positive feelings by empathizing and self-oriented distress when we experience negative feelings by empathizing. Self-oriented distress is supposed to inhibit altruism. This model actually adds more explaining to these two opposite reactions by describing individual differences associated to them. People who are capable of sympathetic distress are people who have “well developed empathic and role-taking abilities”. On the other hand, people who are more prone to self-focused distress are “low empathizers” and have poor role-taking abilities. The model explains that it is our moral principles, which raise a sense of obligation and responsibility to act, and therefore induces prosocial behavior. Yet, if we ignore this responsibility, we end up feeling guilty. If this guilt is strong enough, we may actually end up acting in a prosocial way.

b) The compassion and empathic distress theory Singer and Klimecki (2014) have a slightly different understanding of empathy. To them, other people’s emotions arouse empathy in us. Our reaction to these emotions depend whether positive or negative depend on the social context, our emotion regulation abilities, our mood and our personal past experiences. Empathy is associated to suffering with the person while compassion “feeling for and feeling with the other”. Compassion is characterized by a “strong motivation to improve the other’s wellbeing”. Therefore there are two separates and distinct empathic responses to suffering: empathic distress (personal distress) and compassion (empathic concern). Empathy in itself just describes one’s capacity to actually “resonate” to others’



2

emotions. Empathic distress truly describes aversion to the situation because of overwhelming harmful feelings due to impaired empathizing.

II.

Discussion

a) Similarities Focusing on the similarities between both models, it is possible to apply a approach and avoidance perspective. Empathic distress and self-focused distress are associated to avoidance while compassion and sympathetic distress are associated to approach. Although it is obvious, it seems important to stress that both models offer a binary set of solutions with one associated to a positive outcome and one associated to a negative outcome. Also both models state that compassion and sympathetic distress lead to more prosocial behaviors than empathic distress and self-focused distress.

b) Differences and limitations There are much more differences between these two models than similarities, and that is what makes the comparison much more interesting. The felt responsibility hypothesis focuses more on a social model while the compassion empathic distress theory focuses more on an emotion regulation model. Yet Singer and Klimecki (2014) incorporate a social dimension to their model while Shaffer does not incorporate an emotional dimension. Discussing this responsibility and guilt duality one could wonder to what extent does ignored responsibility always lead to guilt. This would hardly be applicable to several populations like people who suffer from autism or antisocial personality disorder. Furthermore, to what extent does guilt actually trigger prosocial behavior? Clearly this model does not take in consideration fight, flight and freeze reactions. High levels of anxiety towards the source of distress could even



3

accentuate flight reactions. Also the compassion/empathic distress model includes health concerns and long-term effects.

Conclusion In conclusion, we see the elaboration of an empathy reaction model is a difficult task, principally due to different approaches possible. The felt responsibility hypothesis, even though it is arguable, offers a good insight into social context influences while incorporating moral values. The compassion/empathic distress theory offers an affective perspective. Often, it is the simplest models that seem the most efficient and that therefore become the most popular. Both models, with their defects and qualities offer better understanding of empathic responses and hopefully, future authors will have the ability to design such simple and effective models while encompassing both perspectives: social and affective. One way to solve this conflict could be to offer a third empathic answer alternative. The large consensus on positive reaction (whether it is compassion or sympathetic distress) shows there is not much improvement to be done. When it comes the negative reaction, it might be interesting to differentiate different contexts and situations. If we try to merge the two models together we can understand there are two different mindsets that may very well apply to different situations. The felt responsibility hypothesis directly appeals to our moral sense and our personal principles. This could apply to social contexts where the person has the possibility to act selfishly (eg: not helping someone who has just fallen because you are late to work). The compassion/empathic distress appeals more to emotionally overwhelming situations where the person is not apt to overcome this sensation (eg: not helping your sibling who has a nosebleed because blood terrifies you). Again, model designing is a difficult task, yet too often confined to a binary



4

setting that may limit models. May be it is time to see empathic reactions as depending of social context and individual differences rather than applying and positive and negative filter.



5

References Singer, T., & Klimecki, O. M. (2014). Empathy and compassion. Current Biology, 24(18), R875-R878. Hoffman, M. L. (1981). Is altruism part of human nature?. Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 40(1), 121. Shaffer, D. (2009). Social and personality development. Cengage Learning. Chicago

Models: The felt responsibility hypothesis

(Image source: http://images.slideplayer.com/14/4191382/slides/slide_31.jpg ) The compassion/empathic distress theory



6

(Image source: Singer and Klimecki, 2014)



7