Imperialism and Hispanidad: Ramiro de Maeztu’s British sources

"Imperialism and Hispanidad: Ramiro de Maeztu's British sources"
David Jiménez Torres

Thank you all for coming. My paper will explore the notion of Hispanidad as developed by the Spanish journalist and essayist Ramiro de Maeztu, and will explore possible influences in his development of this idea. These influences will then lead me to re-examine some of the existing scholarship on this idea of Hispanidad, and on Maeztu's figure overall. And I would like to explain from the beginning that I have no grounding whatsoever in postcolonial studies; my stumbling into the material I will discuss today was quite accidental as I was researching British influences on Maeztu for my PhD dissertation. So if anyone who has better grounding in this area has any feedback on the arguments of this paper, I would be very grateful for it.
So, I'll start by providing a brief overview of Maeztu to get us situated. Maeztu had first obtained fame as a radical journalist and essayist in Spain in the late 1890s, particularly through his book of essays Hacia otra España, published in 1899. In this book, Maeztu mixed Nietzschean and socialist ideas with the proposals put forward by the Spanish regeracionistas of the previous generation, in order to call for a wholesale renovation of Spanish society, one which would allow the country to fully enter the modern, industrial, materialistic world. Having made a name for himself in this way, Maeztu was sent to London in 1905 as foreign correspondent for a number of Spanish papers. He would retain this post for 15 years, a period during which his ideas underwent an important transformation that brought him ever closer to Catholicism and conservatism. This evolution was mostly due to the influence of British syndicalist and Catholic figures of the time like A. R. Orage, T. E. Hulme, Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton, many of whom he met and had strong relationships with. In 1919 he finally returned to Spain, and his journalistic and essayistic work over the following years was marked by a defence of Spanish political, social and religious traditions.
This conservatism was mirrored by his political behaviour during these years: in 1923 Maeztu welcomed the establishment of a military dictatorship under general Primo de Rivera, considering it Spain's only defence against 'revolution'. He was named by Primo de Rivera to the committee charged with drafting a new national constitution, and he was eventually designated Spanish ambassador to Argentina in 1928. Upon the fall of the dictator and the proclamation of the Second Republic, Maeztu founded the cultural society Acción española and became involved in right-wing politics as a deputy in the national parliament. This culminated with the publication in 1934 of what is probably his best-known work, the long essay Defensa de la Hispanidad. To date, this work has had at least nine different editions by various publishers, the most recent one having been issued in 2011, and each of these editions has had numerous reprintings. It influenced Spanish attitudes towards the country's former colonies during the middle decades of the twentieth century, and was particularly important to the discourse of the Franco regime and its presentation of Spain's imperial past.
So, what does Maeztu argue in Defensa de la Hispanidad? The book could be summarized as a vindication of the process, the values and the legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Americas. According to Maeztu, Spain's colonial project during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was at its heart a missionary effort, one which fulfilled the Catholic promise of extending the possibility of salvation to all of mankind. In his opinion, all Spaniards of this time, from Philip II to the lowliest missionary, had been imbued with a transcendent sense of mission that encouraged them to mix with the natives of the lands they conquered and to treat them with the greatest benevolence possible. The goal of the Spanish colonialist project had not been to exploit the natives of the Americas, but to incorporate them into the Catholic community and into the developed world. It was to this project, and to the resulting shape given to the cultures of Spain and the Latin American nations, that Maeztu gave the name Hispanidad. Maeztu further argued that this moment of spiritual and political plenitude began to fade in the eighteenth century, when Spain lost faith in its own tradition and started absorbing the materialistic and rationalistic ideas that were being produced elsewhere in Europe. The infiltration of Spain by foreign ideas led to its loss of power and to the independence of the Latin American colonies, which stopped believing in the common project when they saw that the madre patria had stopped believing in it also. In this way, Maeztu vindicated a Spanish tradition that was co-substantial with Catholicism, with religious humanism, with philosophical idealism, and with a powerful monarchical system. He further argued that neither Spain nor the Latin American nations would ever achieve plenitude in the modern world unless they embraced that identity once more. Hispanidad is therefore, in Maeztu's presentation, an identity, it is a set of characteristics ascribed to a pan-national self that must be manifested in the actions of a number of individual, national selves.
Traditionalist as all this might sound, I am going to argue that Defensa de la Hispanidad is indebted in many ways to a variety of British sources. But before getting to the question of sources, it will be helpful to analyse Defensa de la Hispanidad to understand what type of text we are dealing with. Most scholarly treatment of the concept of Hispanidad has labelled it a displaced imperialism, a type of Spanish overcompensation, whereby the loss of a political and economic empire would have been replaced by notions of cultural empire. Thus, the idea of Hispanidad would force the old colonies to remain bound to Spain, albeit in a cultural rather than political form. In this account, Spanish efforts to construct an ideal of brotherhood amongst the Spanish-speaking nations of the world are viewed as a surreptitious way to continue asserting control over Latin America. In this vein, Isidro Sepúlveda (2005: 162) has argued that "la hispanidad es en realidad un intento de retrotraer el papel de España a una etapa donde existía una situación privilegiada y de dominio; políticamente con respecto a América, socialmente por una división entre directores de la comunidad y el resto de ella". Focalizing the discussion on Maeztu, José Luis Abellán (1973: 157) wrote of the "voluntad imperial" of Defensa de la Hispanidad, and Alistair Hennessy (2000: 106) claimed that Maeztu's project represented a "surrogate imperialism".
This interpretation tends to be supported by the standard account of when it was that Maeztu developed his idea of Hispanidad. The consensus among commentators has been that this happened during his years as Spanish ambassador to Argentina. This interpretation hinges primarily on the fact that Maeztu published Defensa de la Hispanidad just a couple of years after returning from his post there, and also on his assertion that he had first heard the term Hispanidad from a clergyman whom he had met in Argentina during his tenure as ambassador. Maeztu also gave a number of lectures during his time in Argentina which afterwards became chapters in Defensa de la Hispanidad. So for these commentators, it would make sense for Maeztu to develop this surrogate, surreptitious imperialism when he was acting as ambassador for the Spanish government in a Latin American nation; Hispanidad would, in this account, be operating as a sort of disingenuous and soft-power diplomatic tool.
These interpretations, however, run counter to the statements made by Maeztu himself about the meaning and aims of his ideas. Towards the end of Defensa de la Hispanidad he asserted the following:
A mí no me gusta la palabra Imperio, que se ha echado a volar en estos años. No tengo el menor interés en que empleados de Madrid vuelvan a recaudar tributos en América. Lo que digo es que los pueblos criollos están empeñados en una lucha de vida o muerte con el bolchevismo, de una parte, y con el imperialismo económico extranjero, de la otra, y que si han de salir victoriosos, han de volver a los principios comunes de la Hispanidad. (Maeztu 2005: 223)
Indeed, Maeztu explicitly denied that he was proposing anything near a new imperialism. His notion of cultural affinity did not necessitate political unity, quite the opposite. In his interpretation, the decadence of the Spanish Empire had begun the moment that it stopped believing in a transcendent mission, the mission to spread the Catholic faith and culture, and focused solely on being a political and economic body; in other words, when it stopped being a missionary, cultural effort and turned into an Empire. In Maeztu's mind, therefore, cultural unity did not preclude political diversity. He wrote that it was "esencial subrayar la pluralidad que el concepto de Hispanidad lleva implícito, porque nada haría tanto daño a nuestra idea del Nuevo Mundo como darle un tinte de imperialismo" (Hispanidad 12 October 1935). And he argued that the resurrection of the Hispanidad could only be carried out if the Latin American republics "se nacionaliza[n] aún más de lo que están. Los argentinos han de ser más argentinos; los chilenos, más chilenos; los cubanos, más cubanos" (Maeztu 2005: 223).
Now, one might well argue that Maeztu's project was imperialist even if he did not think it was (although I suspect that, in order to support this, we would have to be working with a fairly loose definition of what 'imperialism' means). But it is true that Maeztu does praise a certain colonial project, that of Catholic Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and he does so precisely for how successful it was, as it managed to, according to him, "asimilarse a su propia civilización cuantas razas de color sometió" (Maeztu 2005: 83). Maeztu also rejects the idea that Latin American identity might lie outside the process of mestizaje that began in the sixteenth century. In the passage I just quoted from, on the necessity for Argentines, Chileans and Cubans to become more nationalistic, Maeztu goes on to argue that "no lo conseguirán si no son al mismo tiempo más hispánicos, porque la Argentina y Chile y Cuba son sus tierras, pero la Hispanidad es su común espíritu" (Maeztu 2005: 223). In this context he explicitly denies the validity of indigenismo; his Catholicism and his dislike of Rousseau make him reject the idea that indigenous people might have been better off before Spanish colonization than after. So, while Maeztu is not trying to re-establish imperialism, he also does not condemn the imperialism that did happen; in fact he finds it admirable and a great source of pride for Spain. There is therefore a certain hybridity in his attitude, a certain ambivalence about the fact of Empire that, in my mind, defies conventional labels of "imperialist" or "anti-imperialist". And for the rest of this paper, I will argue that this ambivalence betrays an indebtedness to contemporary British debates about Empire.
In order to prove this hypothesis let us turn to three articles Maeztu published between September 1911 and January 1912 in the Spanish weekly Nuevo Mundo. In the first one, entitled "Americanismo", Maeztu addresses the possibility that the United States would extend its economic and political influence over Latin America. Maeztu asserts that this development would be "un desastre para la humanidad" (NM 14 September 1911). For, as he claims, both North Americans and Britons (he refers to them, without differentiation, as anglosajones) are imbued with a racist approach to colonization, they are not filled with a transcendent sense of mission but rather are only motivated by the prospect of material gain. And so, the anglosajones, according to Maeztu, feel no need to mix with the natives of their colonies, or to allow them to participate in the running of said colonies, which would mean that their influence over Latin America would be purely material and negative in the long run. In Maeztu's presentation, every anglosajón colony is and always will be governed through an apartheid structure. And this in turn proves "la inmensa superioridad de la colonización española en América sobre la colonización anglosajona. En Colombia, en Venezuela, en Centro-América, en Méjico, en el Brasil [...] se ha llegado a realizar la fusión de las razas humanas y se ha resuelto hace cuatro siglos el problema que hace bambolearse la civilización sajona". Maeztu concludes that "esta es la obra gloriosa e inmortal del genio de España. España ha hecho posible en América la unidad material del género humano, como Israel y Grecia hicieron posible su unidad ideal".
This article was followed a few months later by two others that explicitly developed its arguments. In them, Maeztu decried the lack of affective and intellectual bonds between the Spanish-speaking nations of the world. He went on to affirm that these bonds and the resulting unity should exist, as both Spaniards and Latin Americans need it in order to "poder cumplir nuestros destinos". He then described a project of pan-Hispanic brotherhood which seems to be primarily cultural: its goal, according to Maeztu, will be to allow the Spanish-speaking peoples to "cumplir con su deber supremo de dar su cuño especial a la cultura humana, enriqueciéndola con una cultura hispánica que sea superior, en su momento, a la de otras razas". But at the same time, Maeztu argues that his project will also allow both Spain and the Latin American republics to "evitar que los norteamericanos extiendan su dominio en Hispano-América, y los franceses, ingleses y alemanes su dominio en España". This emphasis on guaranteeing the autonomy of Spanish-speaking nations also precludes the re-establishment of the old Spanish Empire. [SLIDE] As Maeztu argues: "no se trata, naturalmente, de reconstituir imperios coloniales, ni de colocar las más débiles de las naciones hispano-parlantes bajo la tutela de las más fuertes. Todo movimiento de fraternidad, de solidaridad, ha de tener por base la confirmación y aún el fortalecimiento de cada una de las nacionalidades que hablan nuestro idioma".
A number of considerations stand out from these articles. The first is just how much Maeztu's vision of the Spanish Empire of the past and of pan-Hispanic identity in the present and future is formulated in direct opposition to those of the anglosajones. It is not just that, in his mind, Hispanic brotherhood was necessary in order to defend Latin America from the United States, and Spain from the rest of Europe. Rather, the actual identity of this new Hispanic bloc is defined as a binary opposite to the anglosajón bloc. Where the English-speaking nations are materialistic, the Spanish-speaking ones are idealistic; where the former are imbued with a racist approach to empire, the latter are motivated by an egalitarian desire to mix with one another. Maeztu will pursue this reasoning in Defensa de la Hispanidad, where he will compare the case of India with that of the Philippines, claiming that Britons have focused only on economically exploiting India, whereas Spaniards took care to 'lift' the Philippines out of their 'savage' ways: "comparad la India con las Filipinas y ahí está, en elocuente contraste, la diferencia entre nuestro método, que postula que los demás pueblos pueden y deben ser como nosotros; y el inglés, de libertad, que a primera vista parece generoso, pero que, en realidad, se funda en el absoluto desprecio del pueblo dominador al dominado" (94). In this way, we see that Maeztu's claim in Defensa de la Hispanidad that there is a "secular conflicto entre la Hispanidad y los pueblos anglosajones" is not merely addressing the historical enmity between Spain and Britain, or the historical encroachment of the United States in Latin America (Maeztu 2005: 126). Rather, the enmity between anglosajones and hispanos is one of warring philosophies and diametrically opposed approaches to life and to the world.
But as you can see, I keep drawing links between the ideas expressed in these articles from the 1910s and those published in Defensa de la Hispanidad in the 1930s, which brings us to the second, and most important, consideration regarding these articles. And that is that the main arguments of Defensa de la Hispanidad are already present in them. We have the vindication of Spain's colonial project in Latin America, with the emphasis on the altruism and generosity of the colonizers, as well as their supposed commitment to ontological equality amongst human beings. We also have the notion of a cultural brotherhood that results from the uniqueness of Spanish-speaking peoples in their opposition to the materialism of other nations. And lastly, we have the clear assertion that this movement of cultural affinity would exclude the establishment (or re-establishment) of political dominance of any of the parties over the others. In fact, the only feature of Defensa de la Hispanidad that is absent in these earlier articles is the vindication of the monarchy. Otherwise, this is the Hispanidad, even if Maeztu isn't using this term yet, and even if he isn't placing as much emphasis on the shared religion as he is on the shared language. And so, we have a severe questioning of the standard account of when Maeztu developed his ideas of Hispanidad. The three articles of 1911—1912 clearly show that Maeztu's ideas regarding the type of relations that should be established amongst the Spanish-speaking nations of the world preceded his experiences in Argentina by almost fifteen years. Which brings us to the question of why. Why did Maeztu develop these ideas in London in the 1910s, and why did he seem to do it with such an eye placed on British colonial history and practices?
There is one quick way to answer that question. Some of you may have been reminded, while hearing about Maeztu's ideas, of José Enrique Rodó's Ariel; and rightly so. We know that, at some point during his London years, Maeztu became friends with one of Rodó's intellectual disciples, the Peruvian Francisco García Calderón. Their relationship was intense enough for Calderón to devote a chapter of his 1909 book Profesores de idealismo to Maeztu. We might imagine that Calderón introduced Maeztu to some of the arielista notions that appear in the three articles we have been examining, such as Latin America as a unified cultural sphere rather than as a group of independent nation-states, and idealism as the main aspect of that shared culture; after all, they form the backbone of the book García Calderón was writing at that time, and which would come out in 1912 under the title La creación de un continente. Moreover, it was probably Calderón who alerted Maeztu to the publication in London of Hispania, a Spanish-language cultural magazine devoted to propagating the ideas of pan-Hispanism. Maeztu refers in his articles to this new journal, arguing that it shows how his "idea no se piensa tan solo entre los españoles de la peninsula, [sino] que también es objeto de meditaciones por parte de los hispanoamericanos". In other words, the existence of a group of Latin American authors who were propagating the same ideals as him demonstrated his own argument that pan-Hispanic brotherhood was not a Spanish surrogate imperialism.
But although I think there is a lot of work that could be done on Maeztu's contacts with the arielistas, I don't think that this contact fully explains the genesis of his notion of Hispanidad. Maeztu would, after all, be highly critical throughout his career of what he considered Rodó's political naiveté and disregard for economics. And his contact with García Calderón might not necessarily have been motivated by Calderón introducing Maeztu to new ideas, but rather because they found they both coincided in their ideas on pan-Hispanic affinity. So rather than attributing the genesis of the Hispanidad to the arielista connecton, I think it is important for us to notice that talk of empire was everywhere in the Edwardian society that Maeztu was reporting on for the Spanish press. The Boer War of 1899 to 1902, with its highly dubious moral justifications, had brought issues of empire to the fore in Britain, and they would remain there over the coming decades due to the growing opposition to British rule in Ireland and India. This situation spurred a number of progressive authors and groups to develop critiques of imperialism, like the economist A. J. Hobson, like the Fabian Society, and like the Labour leaders Keir Hardie, H.M. Hyndman and Ramsay MacDonald. But conservatives were also engaged in this debate, due to the poor performance of British troops during the Boer War and the threat posed by a rising Germany. Conservative intellectuals Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton denounced British actions in South Africa in the Speaker magazine, claiming that the nation had allowed itself to become the puppet of international business interests; and Conservative politician Joseph Chamberlain put forward a number of ambitious measures for tariff reform, on which the 1906 elections were mostly fought. Chamberlain wanted Britain to abandon the policy of general free trade and adopt one of 'Imperial Preference', where it would establish free-trade agreements only with its colonies and dominions. This policy was intended to develop the relationship between Britain and its Empire, from one of rule and imposition to one of partnership and reciprocal advantage. And all of this critical mass of dissatisfaction with the existing imperial model eventually led to some very visible moves at the highest level of government, namely the Imperial conference of 1926, the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and the Ottawa Commonwealth Conference of 1932.
But going back to the first decade of the century, what is interesting about these Edwardian criticisms of the existing British imperial model and of the proposals for its reform is a certain ambivalence we can detect in them. As Porter (2008: xxx) has argued, for figures like Shaw, Hobson, Chesterton and Chamberlain, "the true alternative to 'imperialism' was not 'anti-imperialism', but had to be something else". After all, the 'scramble for Africa' had shown that the world was full of sovereign nations or international companies who were all too willing to swoop into any territory that might be abandoned by the traditional colonial power; and here I think that a Spaniard would have had the precedent of the War of 1898 very present indeed. This predatory view of international relations highlighted that an all-out anti-imperialism would be irresponsible, as imperial domination was a fact of world politics; it was just a question of which nations or companies governed where. In this kind of thinking, Porter (ibid., xxxvi) claims, it was evident that "'imperialism' did not stop just because empires seemed to". And the scale of war in a fully industrialized world showed that the old imperial nations could no longer depend on themselves to ensure survival against other powers, something which the First World War would soon demonstrate. Evolutionary theories regarding the unstoppable march of modernity only reinforced this type of thinking, negating the possibility that natives of colonized lands might not benefit from contact with European modernity, albeit in a much more benign form than they had hitherto known. The question, then, was to reshape imperialism so that it would be mutually advantageous to colonizer and colonized.
In this vein, George Bernard Shaw's pamphlet Fabianism and the Empire envisioned the creation of a socialist empire, in the Fabian understanding of socialism as the efficient and humane management of a society. Shaw even wrote of establishing a 'partnership' between the races contained within the Empire, and Sidney Webb, another prominent Fabian, would later speak of replacing the Empire with a 'Commonwealth' of nations. It was a rhetoric that brought them close to Chamberlain's proposals regarding tariff reform and Imperial Preference, although the Fabians were more concerned with an administrative rather than an economic restructuring of the Empire. As for A.J. Hobson, his well-known book Imperialism: A Study did not argue a substantially different position. His critique of the original motivations for Empire was scathing, famously influencing Lenin's own interpretation of capitalist imperialism; but he also argued against the retreat of States from their colonies, as this would just pave the way for irresponsible international firms to take over. He also argued that foreign intervention was justified in order to put the resources of an 'un-civilized' nation to use for the greater good of humanity, going on to explicitly justify colonialism in Africa. In his mind, a considerate imperialism that was mindful of the specificities of each native culture was acceptable, as long as it contributed to the 'protection, education and self-development' of the 'lower races'.
Now, there is no doubt that Maeztu paid attention to these Edwardian debates about the British imperial model. After all, the first issue he was asked to cover as London correspondent for the Spanish press was precisely Chamberlain's tariff reform, as it threatened Spanish business interests. And Maeztu would have been very interested in issues of colonialism anyway, having first made his fame as one of the few opponents of the Spanish military response to the last of the Cuban insurgencies. Moreover, we know from his journalism that he paid very close attention to all the figures that have just been mentioned: Chesterton, Belloc, Shaw, Hardie, Hyndman, MacDonald, and Hobson. He seems to have been primarily interested in their proposals for social and political reform within Britain; but it strikes one as impossible that he would have remained unaware of their proposals regarding imperial reform, given how central they were to the British debates of the time.
This helps us understand how it can be that some of their attitudes towards Empire can be present in the three articles we have already seen, and in Defensa de la Hispanidad. For both Maeztu and the Edwardians believed that a mutually beneficial partnership could be established between peoples that had originally been brought together by an imperialist project. Now, it was clear to Maeztu that the British proposals for that partnership were insufficient, given that they did not rest on a shared cultural basis but on the promise of material gain. But Maeztu believed with the Edwardians that such a partnership would be desirable, and would strengthen the position of each individual member while also, somehow, respecting their autonomy. We can thus see why the same ambivalence underlies all of these proposals: for if imperialism can foster mutually advantageous partnerships, then imperialism itself (past or present) cannot be wholly rejected. Moreover, we can conclude that the extremely negative picture that these authors painted of the origins and the characteristics of British imperialism was taken on board by Maeztu when he was drawing up the idea of a Spanish imperialism that had been entirely different from that of the anglosajones. While Shaw, Hobson, Chamberlain et al did not talk about the supposedly racist approach of Britain to colonialism, they did underscore that material profit was the only motivation Britain had had to undertake the creation of its Empire; something that, as we have seen, Maeztu takes on board in Defensa de la Hispanidad, in order to present Spanish imperialism as a much more benign alternative to the British one. And so, perhaps paradoxically, the negative presentation of British approaches to Empire that underlies Maeztu's proposals seems directly derived from British sources that were critical of their own country's imperialism. I say paradoxically but perhaps I shouldn't, because one might be reminded here of how much the accounts of Spaniards fray Bartolomé de las Casas and Antonio Pérez had contributed in the 16th century to creating the leyenda negra about Spanish Empire that Maeztu was now working so hard to undo, posing an alternative, British Black Legend, derived from British sources.
So, to conclude, what consequences does this influence of Edwardian debates about Empire on Maeztu's notion of Hispanidad have? Firstly, it has bearing on our understanding of the notion of Hispanidad, both as it was developed by Maeztu and in terms of its later development throughout the twentieth century. Rather than understanding it as a specifically Spanish ideological product, resulting from the nostalgia for Empire after the War of 1898, we should consider it in a broader European frame of rethinking imperial models (past, present and future) in the early twentieth century. The emphasis placed within this new thinking on developing empires into partnerships seems particularly important.
Secondly, this has important consequences for our understanding of Maeztu's ideological evolution. Scholarship on Maeztu has long been dominated by the notion that, once he returned to Spain in the 1920s, British political and philosophical discourse stopped exerting an influence over his ideas. One of his associates in Acción española would assert during the Francoist years that, upon his return from London, Maeztu managed to "curar radicalmente su enfermedad anglosajona" (Lequerica 1952: 12). Though recent scholars are less keen to utilize this language, they too take Maeztu's traditionalism and his defence of the Spanish imperial past as proof of his having severed all ties with Britain. Alistair Hennessy has even commented that Maeztu's traditionalism shows that "in the end his English roots proved to be very shallow" (Hennessy 2000: 114). The influence of Menéndez Pelayo's notion of Spanish identity as fundamentally Catholic, is frequently cited as fundamental to the evolution of Maeztu's later views; or, when international influences are factored in, Maeztu is seen as someone inserted within the framework of interwar Continental reactionary thought, as exemplified by Charles Maurras's Action française, Mussolini's fascism or Germany's emerging national socialism. But what we have just seen shows us that the flagship idea of Maeztu's traditionalist phase, the concept of Hispanidad, was developed during his London years, and, moreover, that it was decisively influenced by British debates and figures of the time. This shows that we need to develop a new paradigm in our understanding of Maeztu, where we accept that the influences of his London years stayed with him, in many ways, for the rest of his life. And it also gives us a sense of the subtle ways in which cultural encounters can play out beyond the basic experience of somebody going to a place that is not their own and then deciding to return home from it. Maeztu stated in his last book that "hace treinta años por estos días que fui a Inglaterra, y esto es probablemente el suceso más importante de mi vida" (Maeztu 1958: 68). The genesis of his idea of Hispanidad shows us the complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways in which this was the case.
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