Indonesia as a Middle Power

Indonesia as a Middle Power

By Irsyad Iskandar

The central research question is how Indonesia, as a middle power, pursues its objectives on the international stage and what difference it makes to regional and global affairs. 

This core question can be broken down in seven more specific sets:
How do these countries perceive their international role? What does this imply for their future trajectories as middle powers?
The definition I shall be attributing to the term middle power will be partially taken from Giovanni Botero in that it is a state that "has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from other," however, does not have the military and economic capacity to be a principal power. Since they don't have the reach of a principal power, they tend to pragmatically try to solve international issues multi-laterally in an attempt to combine the power of many states in order to achieve the best outcome for themselves. This also means that they are fully-independent unlike smaller states who must rely on others for protection, however, they are still vulnerable to subjugation and/or predation by a great power.
Due to this, middle powers are heavily-invested in ensuring that there is an effective international system or framework to act as a potential counter-balance towards principal states that could potentially become hegemonic in the absence of any such framework. In essence, an international system that regulates the conduct of states is to a middle power an existential matter. Examples of where middle powers created strong international frameworks have been Richelieu's France and the Peace of Westphalia, Metternich's Austrian Empire and the Holy Alliance, as well as Indonesia's involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement which collectivized the political capital of middle and smaller states in order to limit the influence of the superpowers.
When it comes to Indonesia, it must balance its need to grow the economy through budding relationships with potential economic partners (China, US, ect.) and its need to ensure that its national security and sovereignty remain intact. Indonesia has been largely successful with this policy when it comes to Saudi Arabia, as it has increased trade with the country while at the same time, has had the will to withdraw diplomatic staff when the integrity of Indonesian citizens were threatened. However, questions closer to home in regards to China and the greater ASEAN region are more difficult to confront. On one hand, every nation within ASEAN requires China as a partner in order to grow economically, however they recognize China as a potential threat. Indonesia isn't as entangled in the confused China-SEA as the Philippines and Vietnam (who have territorial disputes and considerable bi-lateral economic trade), however, the country must recognize that the integrity of other countries within ASEAN ultimately decide Indonesia's flexibility in the international realm.


What are the opportunities and constraints, whether domestic or external, facing their foreign policy?
The opportunities and constraints of a middle power depends largely on each state's situation. In some cases, a middle power may have the opportunity to one-day achieve the status of a great power, if the demographic and economic conditions are right for it. Examples of where middle powers gradually climbed to the top of the ladder are Great Britain and France in the 17th and 18th centuries, Germany with Bismarck in the 19th century, the United States in the 19th and early 20th century, as well as China in the late 20th and 21st centuries.
However, other middle powers are largely stuck due to the fact that their demographic and economic potential has essentially reached its maximum and has very limited areas of growth; such as Sweden, Italy, and potentially Malaysia.
Indonesia doesn't have the capacity to become a great power, however, it certainly has the demographic and economic capability to become a great power. Indonesia is by far the most important regional player in South East Asia, as it is the country with the largest amount of territory, the largest population, and the biggest economy. Considering the fact that ASEAN is 41 percent larger than Europe with a population that is larger than the EU (roughly 600 million to 500 million). Indonesia's domestic success will ultimately play a major role in its international destiny. Should it be able to achieve a higher level of industrialization, improve infrastructure, and effectively reform its institutions, it would no doubt be sitting as the principal power in South-East Asia instead of being the leading nation. However, if Indonesia wishes to seek this future, it must also keep in mind that other growing powers such as China are already trying to take advantage of the fact that there are many smaller and relatively weaker states (in comparison to itself) to its south. Its primary objective in the international realm must therefore be to keep the independence and integrity of ASEAN and its individual nations intact in order to secure its own growth and its future as a principal power in the international realm.
What is their threat perception and what implications does that carry for their engagement in providing regional and global security?
Bridging from my answer to the second question, what is probably the greatest geopolitical threat to Indonesia's ambitions of becoming a principal power would be China. Indonesia must keep in mind that while its position as the leading nation in ASEAN will no doubt remain into the future, it must understand that should the integrity and independence of the individual nations in ASEAN be compromised, it would greatly limit the Indonesia's capacity to move freely in the international sphere. Historically, whenever a great power has a jumble of smaller and weaker states on its frontier, the great power would eventually have hegemon status over the region if the individual states do not band together to counter-balance the great power. This happened with France and the assortment of duchies and independent cities in Germany and Italy during the French Revolutionary Wars, as well as Germany in regards to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the other newly-minted Eastern European nations in the run-up to World War Two.
Therefore, in order to protect its own security interests, Indonesia is inherently interested in created an ASEAN that is more compact economically and (if the perceived threat from China comes to a boil) militarily, and partner itself with other regional powers such as Japan, the US, Australia, and potentially India.
What is the nature of their relationship with major powers, both in Asia and beyond? What degree of autonomy do these middle powers seek and retain in their foreign and security policies?
Indonesia's relationship with the major powers is complicated at best, and this is evident from the fact that Indonesians believe that their greatest ally is the United States, and their greatest enemy is the United States. I will list here what I believe are the great powers in Asia: China, Japan, and the United States.
First and foremost, I will discuss Indonesia's relationship with Japan. Indonesia's relationship with Japan is the least complicated and probably the most beneficial relationship that Indonesia has with a great power. This is due to the fact that Japan has no military ambitions (it is specifically stated in its constitution that it does not have the power to declare war) and has similar geopolitical interests in that they want to ensure the independence of East Asian and South East Asian states and thwart any potential hegemonic ambitions by China.
Secondly, Indonesia's relationship with China is the most complex, but if used correctly, could be even more beneficial than Indonesia's no-strings-attached relationship with Japan. While China is Indonesia's most significant geopolitical threat, it is also the country that could most benefit Indonesia economically. Indeed bi-lateral trade between the two countries grew from 3.6 billion dollars to 36.1 billion dollars between the years 2003 and 2010, and it can only grow from there. It is clear that there are many upsides to a strong relationship with China, however, due to the many aspects and dimensions that are imbued in the relations between the two countries, it is a relationship that could potentially become far too complicated and chaotic for Indonesia to handle by itself. Therefore, forging strong partnerships with other powers both regional and global must be the backbone that reinforces a stable and beneficial relationship with China.
Finally, the United States' pivot to Asia means that the region will be the focus of the US's foreign policy agenda. As mentioned earlier, the Indonesian people have a generally mixed opinion on the US, with the populace being divided on whether it constitutes as a great ally or a great threat. While the influx of military personnel and equipment into the region by any great power tends to be greeted with suspicion, in the case of the United States, the focus should be more or less on the nation's grand strategy, as it has had troops stationed in the region for many decades previously. There is no doubt that the United States seeks to shore up its allies in the region as well as use its political and military might to counter-act China's potential hegemonic ambitions and promote stability. On face value the geopolitical interests are more-or-less aligned with Indonesia's in that it serves to aid the cause to preserve the integrity and independence of the nations of Asia. However, it should be acknowledged that an increasingly militarized zone in the Pacific region would multiply the chances of the break-out of war, which at the end of the day, is counter to the interests of everyone involved. Indonesia should welcome the involvement of the United States in regional affairs as it essentially equalizes the balance of power in East and South East Asia, and eases the burden on ASEAN and makes Indonesia's relationship with China somewhat easier to manage. However, the potential cons simply make it more important that Indonesia, in its current capacity as a middle power, to act as a mediator and press for peace and stability.
What is their contribution to regional cooperation and institution-building?
Indonesia has had a long history of creating regional cooperatives and institutions. It had a hand in the creation of the Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s and 60s, partnered in the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and built ASEAN. These forums and organizations made the region more stable as it made the geopolitical calculations of the great powers more complex due to the fact that they became more inter-connected economically and politically through these forums (specifically the latter two). It also meant that the smaller and weaker nations would be able to collectivize their resources and present themselves as a (more-or-less) united front when dealing with great powers (the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN specifically). These organizations lends much to the fact that Indonesia enjoys the status of being the most important regional power in South East Asia.
What is their approach and contribution to global governance and to the reform/innovation of cooperative frameworks? What issues and norms have they sought to promote on the international agenda and with what results? 
Going on from the previous question, the forums and organizations previously mentioned (Non-Aligned movement, APEC, and ASEAN) made the region more stable as it made the geopolitical calculations of the great powers more complex due to the fact that they became more inter-connected economically and politically through these forums (specifically the latter two). It also meant that the smaller and weaker nations would be able to collectivize their resources and present themselves as a (more-or-less) united front when dealing with great powers (the Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN specifically). These organizations lends much to the fact that Indonesia enjoys the status of being the most important regional power in South East Asia.
Essentially, the creation of these international organizations was what was expected of Indonesia as a middle power; promoting the existence and creation of a strong international system that would regulate the conduct of nations.
Based on the above, what prospects for partnering with the EU to improve prospects for stability and development at the regional level, address joint challenges and strengthen global governance?
Partnering with another great power (in this case an organization which represents a collection of independent states) and including it at the table of regional affairs would seek to only further stability and development. Furthermore, considering the EU is further removed from Asia and the complicated and at times convoluted interests and relationships, it is a rather low-risk partnership (geopolitically) with a potentially high reward (economically).


http://eherald.alp.org.au/articles/0906/natp28-01.php
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-4-how-asians-view-each-other/
http://www.iisd.org/tkn/pdf/indonesia_china_relations.pdf