Iran’s nuclear program: a diplomatic challenge

Iran’s  nuclear  program:  a  diplomatic  challenge     Diplomacy  is  once  again  proving  itself  to  be  the  best  option  in  dealing  with  Iran’s   nuclear  program.  There  are  many  reasons  to  justify  this  claim;  two  are  central:     First,   the   political   atmosphere   in   Iran   has   changed.   This   is   the   first   time   since   President  Mohammad  Khatami  took  office  that  Iran  has  opened  up  to  the  west,   seeking  to  negotiate.  This  development  has  internal  reasons,  too:  with  sanctions   imposed  on  Iran,  its  economy  is  under  significant  pressure.  In  order  to  maintain   its   legitimacy   after   the   catastrophic   2008   election,   the   Iranian   government   has   no  other  option  but  to  demonstrate  progress  to  its  people.       Second,  from  the  West’s  side  of  the  story,  one  can  see  that,  despite  the  fact  that   there   is   a   huge   division   in   USA   between   the   Democrats   and   Republicans,   they   know  that  a  military  strike  is  not  a  viable  option.  The  US  cannot  afford  another   war;   it   is   in   the   West’s   and   the   US’   best   interest   to   negotiate,   despite   three   decades   of   Iranian   resistance   and   hostility.   They   are   aware   that   Iran   still   is   the   fourth   largest   oil   exporter   and   plays   an   important   role   in   the   Middle   East,   in   terms  of  geopolitical  concerns.       This  essay  provides  a  chronological  overview  of  Iran’s  nuclear  program  followed   by   a   more   detailed   explanation   of   two   core   arguments   which   suggest   that   the   diplomacy   now   has   an   opportunity   to   be   effective   in   resolving   this   situation.   Counter  arguments  which  suggest  that  negotiations  are  useless  and  diplomacy  is   not   the   best   bet   are   considered,   after   which   a   conclusion   is   drawn   and   a  

Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     prediction  is  made  regarding  the  future  of  the  ongoing  talks,  despite  the  matter   still  evolving  and  providing  new  challenges  and  surprises  nearly  daily.       Iran’s   nuclear   program   has   had   a   roller-­‐coaster   history   with   many   ups   and   downs.  Cancelled  after  the  1979  revolution  in  Iran,  the  program  was  resurrected   late   during   the   ten-­‐year   war   which   Iran   fought   to   a   stalemate   with   Iraq.   Iran   felt   that   it   required   a   deterrent   and   defense   to   Iraq’s   repeated   use   of   chemical   weapons  and  other  such  “surprises”.i     Iran   portrays   the   international   pressure   to   suspend   its   uranium   enrichment   activities  as  outside  interference  intended  to  keep  Iran  lagging  in  such  endeavors   and  depriving  it  of  rights  permitted  under  the  Nuclear  Non-­‐Proliferation  Treaty.   Utilizing   such   characterizations   and   appeals   to   nationalism,   Tehran   has   effectively   parlayed   the   prolonged   crisis   to   encourage   enthusiasm   and   support   for  the  regime  and  to  keep  the  revolutionary  fervor  stoked  and  mobilized.  In  this   profound   sense,   the   nuclear   issue   has   become   the   hallmark   and   the   political   reason  for  existence  of  the  regime  itself.     Overviewii   Iran’s   nuclear   program   is   a   major   political   issue   both   within   Iran   and   between   Iran  and  the  international  community  arrayed  against  it.  This  is  the  case  despite   the  fact  that  the  details  of  the  program  have  been  kept  mostly  secret.  Iran  touts   the   program   as   a   path   to   acquire   peaceful   nuclear   energy,   which   is   required   by   a   population   which   has   doubled   since   the   1979   revolution.   The   theocrat   leadership   insists   that   it   is   not   developing   a   capability   to   produce   nuclear  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     weapons.   Such   denials   are   doubted   because,   at   the   same   time,   the   Iranian   leadership   boasts   about   Iran’s   advancing   uranium   enrichment   capabilities,   which  can  be  used  to  develop  weapons.     So   long   as   Russia   provides   fuel   for   the   reactor   which   it   built   in   Bushehr,   Iran   does  not  require  its  own  enrichment  capability.  However,  Russia  may  become  an   unreliable  supplier  at  some  time  in  the  future.  Iran  contends  that  it  possesses  the   right  to  enrich  uranium  because  it  is  a  signatory  to  the  Nuclear  Non-­‐Proliferation   Treaty   (NPT).   Since   it   will   be   required   to   construct   more   reactors,   it   wishes   to   assure   a   reliable   supply   of   fuel   which   is   not   dependent   upon   foreign   nations   which  may  have  their  own  agendas.       Beginning   in   2002,   international   distrust   regarding   Iran’s   intentions   has   been   exacerbated  by  revelations  that  Iran  has  built  secret  facilities  which  contain  the   capability   to   supply   a   nuclear   weapons   program.   Since   the   Islamic   Republic   of   Iran   admitted   that   such   facilities   do,   indeed,   exist,   only   after   such   revelations   have  gained  credibility,  the  distrust  has  become  overwhelming.  Iran  has  still  not   provided   full   details   which   are   acceptable   to   the   International   Atomic   Energy   Agency,  as  required  by  the  NPT.     It  is  generally  felt  that  Iran  has  been  working  toward  a  secret  nuclear  capability   for  several  reasons,  ranging  from  its  experience  during  the  Iran-­‐Iraq  War  to  the   fact  of  geography  that  five  of  the  nine  acknowledged  nuclear  powers  in  the  world   are  on  Iran’s  borders,  or  within  easy  striking  distance.  Although  exact  details  are   difficult  to  ascertain,  Iran  appears  to  be  following  a  strategy  of  nuclear  hedging:  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     maintaining   the   option   of   developing   a   nuclear   weapons   program,   while   remaining  within  the  strictures  of  the  NPT.       The  revelations  about  Iran’s  secret  facilities  from  2002  to  2009  and  the  resultant   pressure   –   most   notably,   economic   sanctions   –   have   created   a   major   political   issue   in   Iran   regarding   its   nuclear   ambitions.   Following   disputed   presidential   elections   in   2009   which   featured   Mahmoud   Ahmadinejad,   Iran’s   internal   politics   pit   the   hardline   regime   against   conservatives   and   the   Green   Movement   opposition,  in  respect  of  the  nuclear  program.     Program’s  evolutioniii   The  Iran  nuclear  program  began  as  an  attempt  to  become  self-­‐reliant  in  energy   and   technology   during   the   1980s.   Finding   itself   increasingly   isolated   as   it   struggled  to  acquire  arms  to  fight  the  war  with  Iraq,  which  was  the  Middle  East’s   bloodiest   modern   conflict   and   in   which   Iraq   used   chemical   weapons   and   had   a   reputed  nuclear  weapons  program,  the  Iran  nuclear  program’s  direction  toward   weapons  capability  was  one  significant  result  of  this  experience  as  the  program   was   widened   to   include   the   capability   to   manufacture   weapons-­‐grade   uranium   and   the   ability   to   develop   systems   which   could   deliver   the   nuclear   weapons   to   the  enemy.     Iran  has  long  pursued  nuclear  technology  as  a  key  to  industrial  development  and   as  a  means  of  reasserting  its  position  as  a  center  of  scientific  advances.  The  Iran   nuclear  program  is  considered  by  some  to  also  have  been  a  conduit  of  the  Islamic   revolution’s   continued   need   for   legitimacy,   driven   by   Iran’s   nationalistic   desire  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     to   gain   respect   in   the   international   community.   The   theocracy   appears   to   have   hardened   its   stance   in   response   to   the   perception   that   the   international   community   is   denying   Iran   the   right   it   has   to   pursue   this   technology,   discriminating   against   Iran   despite   the   fact   that   –   unlike   Israel,   Pakistan   and   India   –   Iran   has   signed   the   global   treaty   on   non-­‐proliferation.   The   regime   in   Tehran  sees  the  attempted  dictates  of  the  international  community  as  an  attack   on   a   founding   principle   of   the   revolution,   which   is   asserting   Iran’s   independence   from  outside  influence  and  intervention.     Nuclear  politicsiv   Iran’s   nuclear   program   unfolded   in   the   context   of   the   internal   and   external   politics  described  above.  Since  the  1979  revolution,  Iran’s  political  elite  has  been   divided   over   how   the   theocracy   should   evolve   and   what   international   role   it   should   pursue.   Consensus   has   not   been   achieved   and   the   country   remains   divided   regarding   hot-­‐button   political   issues   surrounding   independence,   self-­‐ reliance   and   social   justice.   The   most   vexing   differences   revolve   around   the   question  of  whether  Iran  should  continue  as  a   revolutionary   state   willing   to   defy   the  world,  or  whether  it  should  soften  the  rhetoric  and   actions  to  become  a  state   which  respects  and  abides  by  international  norms.  The  debate  over  the  nuclear   program  is  representative  of  these  opposing  directions.     During   the   nuclear   program’s   incipient   period,   there   was   general   consensus   among   the   political   elite   about   the   need   for   the   program   and   Iran’s   right   to   pursue   it.   However,   the   consensus   appeared   to   be   crumbling   as   early   as   2005.   Rival  factions  in  Iran’s  complicated  political  structure  began  to  question  the  costs  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     of  the  program  and  its  criticality  to  Iran’s  development.  At  this  point,  the  nuclear   program  became  an  internal  political  issue.     The   nuclear   program   initially   had   the   support   of   the   broader   public,   due   to   its   goal   of   energy   independence   and   other   scientific   initiatives.   Much   of   the   program’s   public   support   emanated   from   the   regime’s   portrayal   of   it   as   an   assertion  of  Iran’s  rights  despite  foreign  interference  and  bullying.  However,  the   program   has   not   been   detailed   to   the   extent   that   there   can   be   properly   informed     public   political   debate   and   consideration   of   its   true   direction,   costs   and   effects   upon  other  issues  within  Iran  and  vis  a  vis  Iran  and  the  international  community.     Why  is  diplomacy  the  best  bet?       In   this   case,   we   see   clearly   a   shift   in   that   diplomacy   is   occurring   in   the   open   media   from   both   sides,   taking   place   on   a   multilateral   basis   involving   various   countries.   It   appears   to   be   working   because   we   can   see   that   the   power   is   not   solely   political   in   the   hands   of   the   elites   but,   rather,   professional   diplomats   are   working  together  to  solve  such  a  challenging  case,  one  of  the  more  vexing  in  the   history  of  diplomacy.  v     As   postulated   in   the   introduction   to   this   essay,   it   appears   that   diplomacy   is   working  and  that  the  reasons  emanate  from  both  sides  of  the  table:     Let   us   begin   with   Iran.   What   has   brought   Iran   to   the   table?   First,   Iran   owes   its   progress  in  the  negotiations  to  newly  elected  President  Hassan  Rouhani,  who  has  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     promised   the   people   to   bring   an   end   to   Iran’s   isolation   from   the   international   arena.    This  is  due  to  the  consequences  of  the  Green  Revolution  in  2008,  which   led   the   Iranian   public   to   turn   away   from   the   regime,   putting   its   legitimacy   into   question.  Then-­‐President  Ahmadinejad,  as  well  as  the  Supreme  leader  Ayatollah   Ali  Khamenei,  were  too  conservative  in  their  approach  to  US  President  Obama’s   offer.   Their   failed   diplomatic   moves   caused   crushing   sanctions   to   be   brought   upon  Iran,  hurting  its  economy.  Rouhani  is  the  first  President  of  Iran  to  actually   have   a   one-­‐on-­‐one   conversation   with   a   US   President   since   1979,   when   President   Mohammad  Khatami,  who  attempted  to  take  steps  to  build  a  bridge  between  Iran   and  the  rest  of  the  world  with  his  so-­‐called  “cultural  exchange”  campaign.  vi     Dr.   Mohammad   Javad   Zarif,   the   Iranian   Foreign   Minister,   has   done   a   great   job,   attending   many   talks   and   negotiating   directly   with   the   P5+1   countries,   including   the   US,   UK,   France,   China,   Russia   and   Germany,   and   leading   the   Geneva   negotiations  personally.     What  exactly  bothers  Iran,  causing  it  to  seek  talks?  Sanctions  obviously  proved  to   be   strong   enough:   as   a   result   of   those   sanctions   over   the   past   seven   years,   Iran’s   currency  has  been  devalued,  there  has  been  a  massive  inflation  in  the  domestic   market   and   oil   revenues   have   plummeted.   Economically   exhausted,   Iran   now   realizes   that   it   must   relax   its   hard-­‐core   politics   towards   the   West   and   the   US   if   it   wants   relief.   Iran   is   more   serious   now   than   it   was   in   the   talks   15   months   ago.   As   a   result,   we   can   see   that   diplomatic   efforts   combined   with   as   international   sanctions  have  been  effective.vii  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     On  the  West  and  US  side,  we  can  see  that  diplomacy  is  at  work,  too.  US  President   Obama’s   letter   to   Iran’s   Supreme   Leader   represents   the   first   communication   between  leaders  of  the  two  nations  which  have  not  interacted  directly  for  more   than  three  decades.  Obama  persistently  exhorted  the  Supreme  Leader  to  not  to   miss  out  on  this  historic  moment.viii     President   Obama   has   clarified   that,   despite   the   fact   that   the   US   objective   is   “to   prevent   Iran   from   obtaining   nuclear   weapons,”   it   does   not   mean   that   the   US   would   take   military   measures   to   do   so.   For   the   West   and   the   US,   diplomacy   regarding   Iran’s   nuclear   program   is   not   about   eliminating,   but   rather   it   is   focused  upon  bounding.  Critics  argue  that  the  talks  (i.e.,  the  interim  agreement)   can   be   used   to   Iran’s   advantage   with   a   narrative   to   claim   to   the   rest   of   the   world   that   Iran   stood   up   for   its   rights.   President   Obama’s   response   to   those   critics   is   rather   fascinating:   he   responded,   ”We   cannot   close   the   door   on   diplomacy."   He   added  that  “Tough  talk  and  bluster  may  be  the  easy  thing  to  do  politically,  but  it's   not  the  right  thing  to  do  for  our  security."ix     Moreover,   as   postulated   in   the   introduction,   the   US   cannot   afford   another   military  intervention  after  the  catastrophe  it  has  made  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.   The   US   knows   well   that   war   is   costly;   with   its   current   economic   situation   and   its   military   already   stretched   thin,   it   cannot   initiate   another   conflict.   For   decades   the  West  and  the  US  has  had  a  massive  interest  in  Middle  East  for  its  supply  of   oil;  with  Iran  being  the  fourth  largest  oil  exporter,  the  West  is  better  off  finding   agreement  rather  than  initiating  offensive  military  actions.    

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     Iran’s   geopolitical   situation   makes   it   important   for   many   reasons   but   one   in   particular   is   the   emergence   of   the   extremist   Islamic   State,   about   which   the   US,   the  West  and  Iran  share  interest  in  stopping,  adding  to  the  a  high  stakes  hinging   on  the  outcome  of  diplomacy.x     Counter  arguments  to  diplomacy:  why  and  why  not  Iran  should  have  access   to  atomic  bomb?   If  diplomacy  fails,  then  what?  Iran  can  argue  that  it  has  the  right  to  access  atomic   bombs  for  the  following  reasons:     Very   unstable   neighbouring   countries   surround   Iran,   including   Iraq,   Afghanistan   and   Pakistan,   all   of   which   have   ongoing   ethnic   and   political   challenges.   From   International  Relations  theory  comes  the  concept  of  balance  of  power  and,  from   a  Realist  point  of  view,  once  your  opponent  arms  itself,  you’d  better  do  so  –  even   stronger  –  to  defend  your  territory.  xi     More  importantly,  Iran  sees  potential  threat  to  its  security  from  India,  Pakistan,   Israel   and   Russia,   all   of   which   are   nuclear   powers   –   and   Russia   is   Iran’s   sole   supplier   of   nuclear   fuel.   It   is   no   wonder   why   Iran   would   question   as   double   standards   the   American   approach   towards   India,   Pakistan   and   Israel,   as   compared  with  Iran.  Above  all,  Iran  knows  full  well  that  it  is  vulnerable  because   Israel  produces  some  200  undeclared  nuclear  warheads.  Tel  Aviv  has  frequently   threatened   to   lunch   a   military   strike   against   Iran.   (The   fact   that   the   alleged   purpose   of   such   a   strike   is   said   to   be   to   disable   Iran’s   nuclear   potential   makes   this  pretty  much  a  chicken-­‐and-­‐egg  conundrum.)xii  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge       On   the   other   side,   the   West   and   especially   the   US   can   argue   the   following   five   reasons   (A)xiii  and,   hence,   be   cynical   about   Iran’s   having   access   to   a   nuclear   warhead:     First,   it   is   Iran,   a   country   which   the   US   lists   as   a   sponsor   of   terrorism   in   addition   to   being   an   enemy   of   Israel.   Joe   Lieberman,   a   former   US   Senator,   calls   Iran   “an   enemy”.   He   asserts,   “There   is   American   blood   on   Iranian   hands,”   by   which   he   refers  to  the  bombing  of  the  US  embassy  and  the  US  Marines  barracks  in  Beirut   by  Hezbollah-­‐backed  by  Iranians  in  1983.     Israel’s   Prime   Minister   Benjamin   Netanyahu,   who   believes   the   “interim”   agreement  is  a  “historic  mistake”,  insists  that  Israel  is  committed  to  preventing   Iran   from   obtaining   nuclear   weapons   and,   in   diplomacy,   what   he   actually   is   doing  is  threatening  a  pre-­‐emptive  military  strike  on  Iranian  nuclear  facilities  if   Israel  believes  that  Tehran  becomes  capable  of  building  an  atomic  bomb.       Second,  both  Republicans  and  Democrats  argue  against  easing  the  sanctions  on   Iran.   Lindsey   Graham,   a   Republican   Senator   from   North   Carolina,   argues   that   "The  sanctions  actually  worked  but  this  interim  deal  gives  the  Iranians  $7  billion   in  cash  and  leaves  in  place  one  of  the  most  sophisticated  enrichment  programs   around.”  What  seems  to  be  the  case  here  is  that  Senators,  such  as  Sen.  Graham,   are  worried  that  Iran  might  be  using  the  talks  and  negotiations  as  a  cover-­‐up  to   save  time  whilst  advancing  uranium  enrichment.    

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     The  third  argument  is  that,  despite  the  fact  that  Iran  has  long  been  insisting  on   its   nuclear   ambition   to   be   a   peaceful   one,   it   is   gaining   legitimacy   for   its   ambition   which,  according  to  Sen.  Graham,  should  be  interpreted  as  “You  are  insisting  on   your  right  to  enrich.  Given  your  behavior,  you  have  abandoned  that  right.”     The   fourth   argument   put   forward   against   Iran   is   that   the   interim   agreement   gives   Iran   legitimacy   as   a   key   player   in   Middle   East,   as   the   west   is   worried   about   the   Sunni-­‐Shiite   rift   in   the   Muslim   world.   Countries   such   as   Saudi   Arabia   with   its   Sunni   population   are   worried   that   Iran’s   access   to   nuclear   armament   would   mean   its   support   for   Shiite-­‐affiliated   terrorist   groups.   A   Saudi   Arabian   official   reported  that  "Many  in  Saudi  Arabia  worry  that  Iran  is  not  being  sincere,  and  the   worry  during  the  negotiations  was  that  any  deal  reached  would  mean  Iran  would   widen  their  influence  in  the  region  –  in  countries  like  Lebanon  and  Bahrain  –  and   become  a  bigger  threat."       Finally,  US  concern  would  once  again  be  Israel.  Rallying  around  the  slogan  that   the  enemy  of  Israel  is  the  US’  enemy,  several  states  in  the  US  faced  pressure  from   Jewish   constituencies   who   want   the   US   government   to   back   Israel.   This   important   because   US   President   Obama’s   diplomacy   faces   challenges   when   a   Democrat  such  as  New  York  Sen.  Chuck  Schumer,  who  is  close  to  Obama,  makes   it  clear  that  Democrats  share  concerns  with  Israel  and  see  diplomacy  as  a  useless   tool.   If   anything   at   all,   US   politicians   who   disagree   would   say   that   all   the   talks   will   provide   is   in   Iran’s   favor   and   not   the   West’s   and,   to   be   specific,   the   US’.   A   Virginia  Republican,  Eric  Cantor  (who  was  defeated  in  the  most  recent  elections   but,  until  then,  was  a  Republican  leader  in  the  US  House  of  Representatives)  says,  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     “Iran   should   have   to   irreversibly   dismantle   its   nuclear   stockpiles   and   not   be   allowed  to  continue  enrichment.  And  I  think  this  deal  falls  short  on  all  of  those   fronts,   and   I   think   it   bodes   very,   very   ominously   for   the   region,   and   in   fact,   US   security."1     Conclusion   Drawing   a   premature   conclusion   over   a   matter   still   ongoing   is   a   perilous   undertaking.   However,   one   may   engage   in   cautious   prognostication.   I   strongly   believe   that   diplomacy   is   at   one   of   it   brightest   moments   today   with   respect   to   this  challenge,  evidenced  by  US  Secretary  of  State  John  Kerry  wanting  this  to  be   his  legacy.    What  needs  to  occur  as  a  result  of  these  ongoing  talks  is  not  regime   change   in   Iran   –   whether   through   the   support   of   opposition   groups   or   through   military   action.   The   optimal   approach   should   be   to   entice   Iran   with   the   prospect   of  integrating  itself  into  the  international  community  and  to  support  its  access  to   the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  while  lifting  the  sanctions  further  to  show   Iran  that  its  sovereignty  is  being  respected.  xiv     Granted,  this  sounds  quite  idealistic.  With  President  Obama’s  term  coming  to  an   end   and   not   being   certain   what   sort   of   politician   will   succeed   him,   we   are   left   only   with   the   concept   which   has   been   embodied   in   the   statements   of   the   US                                                                                                                   1  Please  referrer  to  A  for  citation      

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     National   Security   Council   (NSS)   since   2002.   NSS   holds   the   view   that   “all   real   power  and  freedom  of  action  must  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  USA.”       The  US  insists  that  it  is  exercising  its  rights  under  NPT,  by  the  same  token  that   Iran  argues  that  it  is  within  its  rights  to  enrich  uranium.  Interestingly,  both  of  the   countries   are   quite   religious   and   nationalistic;   one   wonders   what   the   future   holds  once  Obama  leaves  office  and  diplomacy  loses  its  effectiveness  in  the  game   of  power  between  these  countries?  Will  it  still  be  possible  to  reach  an  agreement   between  these  two  very  opposed  countries?  xv     One   hopes   that   the   leaders   and   professional   diplomats   on   both   sides   have   in   mind   the   same   questions,   and   so   will   endeavor   to   finalize   and   ratify   an   agreement   before   US   President   Obama   leaves   office.   We   will   all   prefer   to   have   the   issue   resolved   and   peace   assured,   rather   than   learning   the   answers   to   the   above   questions,   the   hard   way.   If   such   can   be   achieved,   it   will   be   a   triumphant   moment  for  diplomacy.            

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge     Bibliography                                                                                                                   i  Chubin,   Shahram.   "The   Iran   Primer."   The   Politics   of   Iran's   Nuclear   Program.   UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTE  OF  PEACE,  n.d.  Web.  25  Jan.  2015.     ii  Chubin,   Shahram.   "The   Iran   Primer."   The   Politics   of   Iran's   Nuclear   Program.   UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTE  OF  PEACE,  n.d.  Web.  25  Jan.  2015.     iii  Chubin,   Shahram.   "The   Iran   Primer."   The   Politics   of   Iran's   Nuclear   Program.   UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTE  OF  PEACE,  n.d.  Web.  25  Jan.  2015.     iv  Chubin,   Shahram.   "The   Iran   Primer."   The   Politics   of   Iran's   Nuclear   Program.   UNITED  STATES  INSTITUTE  OF  PEACE,  n.d.  Web.  25  Jan.  2015.     v  Rūḥānī,  Ḥasan.  Amnīyat-­‐i  Millī  Va  Dīplumāsī-­‐i  Hastahʹī.  Tehran:  Centre  of   Strategic  Research,  2014.  Print:50-­‐53.     vi  Tarock,  Adam.  "Iran's  Nuclear  Programme  and  the  West."  Third  World   Quarterly  27.4  (2006):  647-­‐48.     vii  Kimball,  Daryl  G.  "FOCUS:  Iran  Nuclear  Diplomacy:  Still  the  Best  Option."  Arms   Control  Today  42.4  (2012):  4.  JSTOR.  Web.  25  Jan.  2015.     viii  Litwak,  Robert  S.  "In  Making  a  Nuclear  Deal,  a  Winning  Argument  for  Iran."   Washington  Wire.  N.p.,  16  Nov.  2014.  Web.  26  Jan.  2015.   .     ix  Litwak,  Robert  S.  "In  Making  a  Nuclear  Deal,  a  Winning  Argument  for  Iran."   Washington  Wire.  N.p.,  16  Nov.  2014.  Web.  26  Jan.  2015.   .     x  Rūḥānī,  Ḥasan.  Amnīyat-­‐i  Millī  Va  Dīplumāsī-­‐i  Hastahʹī.  Tehran:  Centre  of   Strategic  Research,  2014.  Print:  208-­‐220.     xi  Barzegar,  Kayhan.  "The  Paradox  of  Iran's  Nuclear  Consensus."  World  Policy   Journal  26.3  (2009):  25.     xii  Barzegar,  Kayhan.  "The  Paradox  of  Iran's  Nuclear  Consensus."  World  Policy   Journal  26.3  (2009):  25.     xiii  Cohen,  T.  (2015).  5  reasons  diverse  critics  oppose  Iran  nuclear  deal  -­‐  CNN.com.   [online]  CNN.  Available  at:  http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/25/politics/iran-­‐ deal-­‐opponents-­‐5-­‐things/  [Accessed  26  Jan.  2015].     xiv  Tarock,  A.  (2006).  Iran's  nuclear  programme  and  the  west.  Third  World   Quarterly,  27(4),  pp.645-­‐664.  

 

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Mojdeh  Khast  –  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program:  a  Diplomatic  Challenge                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 xv  Tarock,  A.  (2006).  Iran's  nuclear  programme  and  the  west.  Third  World   Quarterly,  27(4),  pp.645-­‐664.       Further  readings:       Foreignaffairs.com,  (2015).  Why  Iran  Should  Get  the  Bomb  |  Foreign  Affairs.   [online]  Available  at:  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-­‐ n-­‐waltz/why-­‐iran-­‐should-­‐get-­‐the-­‐bomb  [Accessed  26  Jan.  2015].     Iran's  Nuclear  Program.  (2005).  The  American  Journal  of  International  Law,   99(1),  p.270.     Jstor.org,  (2015).  JSTOR:  Arms  Control  Today,  Vol.  40,  No.  9  (NOVEMBER  2010),   pp.  47-­‐48.  [online]  Available  at:   http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/23628900?sid=21105699691293&uid =3739560&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256  [Accessed  26  Jan.  2015].     Jstor.org,  (2015).  JSTOR:  Arms  Control  Today,  Vol.  35,  No.  1  (JANUARY/FEBRUARY   2005),  pp.  30-­‐31.  [online]  Available  at:   http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/23627408?sid=21105699691293&uid =2&uid=3739560&uid=4&uid=3739256  [Accessed  26  Jan.  2015].     Kenyon,  P.  (2015).  [online]  Available  at:  http://The  Key  Sticking  Points  In  The   Iranian  Nuclear  Talks  [Accessed  26  Jan.  2015].    

 

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