Is Hume a Skeptic or a Cautious Naturalist?

1

Is Hume a Skeptic or a Cautious Naturalist? Is there an essential connection between an Ought statement and an Is statement?

Shahram Arshadnejad Philosophy Department Claremont Graduate University June 4, 2015

2

Answering the question of whether Hume was a skeptic or a cautious naturalist requires us to know about Hume’s position against traditional dogmatic metaphysics. Hume rejects the old metaphysics and denies any a priori knowledge. Instead, he launches his enquiry on an empirical basis. Thus, he is mainly a skeptic, since empiricism naturally leads to skepticism1. To Hume every proposition needs to be cross-examined. The truth-value is not a predetermined fact. I will argue that Hume’s position on causes as contingent philosophical relations is a direct result of his skepticism and exemplifies it. At the same time, Hume is a naturalist. To him everything begins with nature. Being a naturalist does not entail the rejection of skepticism. He holds both positions, as valid. The origin of “idea” and “sense impression” describes Hume’s ontological naturalism, since he attempts to provide a scope of understanding based on the knowledge of objects in nature. This however, convinces Hume of the skeptical knowledge of nature, as well. Talking about the missing shade of blue for instance, predicates the uncertainty of knowledge about nature derived by senses. Concerning “Hume’s law”2, I will argue that it is the direct result of Hume’s system in his enquiry manifesting the inability of deriving an ‘Ought’ statement from an ‘Is’ statement.

A brief history of skepticism The history of skepticism dates back to a Greek philosopher named Pyrrho, 360 BC – 270 BC. He is credited as being the first skeptic philosopher, although there are no extant writings. The school of Pyrrhonism was established in his honor three centuries after his death. It is said that he travelled East, accompanying Alexander the Great’s expedition. He was exposed to the Indian philosophy and to the Persian (Magi) philosophy.3 The most outstanding aspect of Eastern philosophy is the claim of unsustainability of our perception of world, because world itself is not static. It is the ever-changing phenomenon. This knowledge about world moves us naturally towards skepticism. According to the oriental

1

. I could argue that in the ancient world, the empirical knowledge depended mainly on sense perception. The scientific revolution in 17th century gave man new methods and new tools to make better judgments in his scientific enquiry. The dominant sentiment of skepticism was about the disapproval of any theories or postulates. If disapproval of a theory failed, then it is accepted as a law. Even in the Aristotelian worldview, the empiricism was derived from the sense impression. The observation of nature led to some postulates or theories. However, at that time, the general human tendency was towards absolutism (beliefs on certain notions beyond any doubt). The absolutism was viewed as a metaphysical object, seeking for the approval of gods, or at least refusing to be adversarial or controversial to any holy establishment. Myth was the ultimate knowledge. Therefore, the scientific observation based on Aristotelian tradition led to Ptolemaic view of the world, which itself became the official doctrine of the Church. That false postulate of the world had an empirical basis, but it was manipulated for the absolute notion of the sovereign idealism. The result was the ruling theocracy over the philosophy of nature and ethics. In conclusion, the Aristotelian empirical enquiry turned into the scholastic view of the world refuting its initial empirical approach of enquiry. 2 . R. M. Hare, Hume’s dilemma about the inability of deriving an ‘ought’ statement from an ‘is’ statement. 3 . http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrho

3 philosophies, there is no certainty.4 It appears that Pyrrho’s exposure to oriental thought was profound and shaped his mind not to trust his own vision of world, leaving the possibilities of other perspectives over the same phenomenon. Today the main source we have about Pyrrho’s philosophy is through the book Outlines of Pyrrhonism, written by the Greek physician Sextus Empiricus. The proper course of the sage, said Pyrrho, is to ask himself three questions. Firstly, we must ask what things are and how they are constituted. Secondly, we ask how we are related to these things. Thirdly, we ask what ought to be our attitude towards them. Pyrrho's answer was that things are indistinguishable, unmeasurable, undecidable, and no more this than that, or both this and that and neither this nor that. He concluded that human senses transmit neither truth nor lie. Humanity cannot know the inner substance of things, only how things appear. Pyrrhonism seems extreme. We should not consider Hume as a true Pyrrhonist since his skepticism is not extreme. By all that has been said the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit [Abstract, 27]. Hume believes that human understating is limited, because there is no certainty in regard to the causes of knowledge. If we accept knowledge is the result of reasoning, and reasoning the result of habit, which in its own right it is the product of observation, sense impressions and impression of reflections, then we could claim that Hume’s skepticism was not extreme.

On Skepticism Skepticism is a matter of the methods of gaining knowledge and how it would be or could be trusted. How is knowledge justified? It is not just enough to have a true belief. One must also have good reasons for that belief.

. The negation of any ‘truth’ is possible and equally valid. ‘Fact’ as an epistemological object (entity) is not recognized in the oriental philosophy the same way as in the Western tradition. Therefore, the kind of skepticism is also different. This may cause confusions between ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ recognition in the oriental perspective. 4

4 Skepticism is the process of validating or not validating a statement or a proposal. It requires being analytical, because it assesses and calculates the data in any statements. The nature of data requires verification. This leads to the factuality of data and Hume derives that from nature. Skepticism requires reasoning before accepting or rejecting any statement or any proposal. A central part of his program is the profoundly anti-metaphysical aim of abandoning the a priori search for theoretical explanations that supposedly give us insight into the ultimate nature of reality, replacing these “hypothes[es], which can never be made intelligible” with an empirical, descriptive inquiry that answers questions about “the science of human nature” in the only way they can be intelligibly answered.5 The validity of truth needs to be discovered and confirmed through reasoning, not simply accepted as a dogma or as a preconceived a priori.

On Naturalism The philosophical perspective of the term indicates that every proposition is valid as long as it is based on natural properties and natural causes, not fictitious or supernatural ones. There is nothing beyond the realm of nature. All objects of enquiry in nature have natural properties, which are subject for enquiry and investigation. There is no appreciation of natural objects without their properties.

Hume’s Skepticism Hume builds his new philosophy on human nature. This requires him to develop a new foundation of knowledge and perception. This leads him to refute the old-fashioned idealism in philosophy based on metaphysics, which is nothing more than preconceived ideas. Metaphysics was an established authority. This old metaphysics in fact had nothing to do with Hume’s project to devise a method of enquiry about human nature. From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasoning of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature [T. Intro. 3].

5

. Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

5 Hume looked at experience and empirical methods for knowledge. He used experience as the method for truth-value checking based on natural facts, which are taken from natural properties. In the Abstract Hume writes, “He proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner and promises to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience [Abstract 2].” Hume believes that all reasoning about matters of fact is founded on the relation of cause and effect and yet knowledge of the relation of cause and effect is not a priori, but arises entirely from experience. He develops an objective view of human reasoning. Hume in ‘Enquiry IV’ explains the Objects of Human Reason. They are divided in two kinds, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. We use these two distinct mechanisms in our enquiry about world. There is certainty in the relation of ideas, since they do not rely on experience; and matters of fact are contingent, because they are based on experience. Clearly, the second branch of Hume’s fork (matters of fact) feeds his skepticism. Robert Fogelin’s6 critique of Hume’s skepticism is important. Fogelin does not look at Hume’s theory of morals in this regard; rather he is concerned what skepticism amounts to with respect to reason and the senses, as the first question in his investigation, “Empiricism can lead to a mild version of skepticism if we insist (perhaps incorrectly) that knowledge must involve certainty, and then further insist (perhaps incorrectly) that empirical claims that go beyond reports of immediate experience always fall short of certainty.”7 There is a clue to the nature of Hume’s skepticism in the sentence that immediately follows Hume’s claim that the foundation of philosophy in the Treatise is very skeptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. This uncertainty in human understanding about the matters of fact results in doubt, so is there a sense of probability in all human inferences concerning matters of fact.

Hume’s Morals Hume’s skepticism has a profound impact on his morals. He writes about passions and their mastery over reason. However, what Hare calls “Hume’s Law” is the direct impact and the result of his skepticism, Fogelin calls it fallibilism or mild skepticism. The passions are not valued, justified, or rejected by reason. Reasoning considered as a matter of fact (as objects of human reason), does not tell us anything about vice or virtue of a passionate act. Therefore, we cannot use reason and conclude any ‘Ought’ statement is derived from an ‘Is’ statement. Knowing the fact that the nature 6 7

. Fogelin, Robert, Hume’s Skepticism, Cambridge Collections Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009. . ibid. p.2

6 of our reasoning is contingent, it is in sharp contrast with passions, which are the results of impressions of reflections.

Hume’s Naturalism Hume is a naturalist, because he refutes a priori knowledge. He does not accept any unexperienced knowledge. His main corpus of knowledge is based on experience. Naturalism relies on empirical investigation, because everything needs to be examined and any postulate or theory can be proven false if not based on natural properties. Empiricism and naturalism are the foundations of Hume’s philosophy. Perception is the result of the two kinds of impressions. There are sense impressions (leading to pain or pleasure) and impressions of reflection (leading to passions). There is a hierarchy among the impressions. According to Hume, our perception originates in sense impressions. Ideas take shape after the cognition of sense impressions produces copies in our minds, which are originated, empirically. The “copy principle” is the first principle in Hume’s system. Once ideas—the objects of knowledge—are present in perception, the mind associates ideas according to the three basic principles: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. Then, the constant conjunction of ideas results in the attribution of necessity to the connection of certain ideas namely causes and effects. Norman Kemp Smith8 claims that despite Hume’s acceptance of Berkeley’s argument in denying the existence of the material world, he was not lost in the quagmire of subjective idealism. Kemp Smith believes in the establishment of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature. This is possible by the subordination of reason to feeling and instinct as the determining factor in Hume’s philosophy. The assumption of the existence of body is a natural belief. Belief never rests on reason or insight. It appears that naturalism is considered objective. “All reasoning may be divided into two kinds, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence [EHU. iv. ii.].” Hume provides us the distinct division of reasoning. On the one hand lie the relations of ideas and on the other is there matter of fact and existence. This is only plausible through Hume’s objective view on naturalism. Adamson gives us a new, but not conflicting perspective to Kemp Smith’s interpretation. 8

. Kemp Smith, Norman, The Naturalism of Hume (I), MIND A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, No. 54. April 1905, p. 150.

7 The first kind of reasoning is analytic. Since the relations discovered are involved in the ideas compared, being such as cannot be changed without change in the ideas, their truth is guaranteed by the law of non-contradiction. The relations thus revealed are those of resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality and proportions in quantity or number; and as the mathematical sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic involve only such relations, they are rendered possible by such discursive analytical thinking. As the second, synthetic form of reasoning embraces all knowledge outside mathematics (for even the present testimony of sense and the records of memory involve synthetic principles.) This is important and Hume constantly equates it with reason in general. There is no room in our mind for the synthetic operation. What is called necessity of reason, if it does not mean the impossibility because contradictoriness of the opposite has no objective significance; it is merely the expression for a tendency in mind; it is only subjective: ‘necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in the object.9 However, the existence of necessity in the mind does not resolve the Hume’s Law dilemma. The necessity of deriving an ‘Ought’ as the effect from an ‘Is’ as the cause, is not resolved. Following Adamson’s argument, the synthetic reasoning could not be utilized to connect an ‘Ought’ statement to an ‘Is’ statement, subsequently, because the relations of ideas such as resemblance or degrees in quality or quantity do not apply in this case. There is no resemblance between an ‘Ought’ statement and an ‘Is’ statement. There is no contiguity, nor cause and effect relationship, among the two statements. Simply put, they are disconnected.

Conclusion Hume begins his philosophy by rejecting traditional dogmatic metaphysics. That means he did not value the preconceived knowledge as a priori. Therefore, his knowledge of human nature is empirical. Empiricism leads him to skepticism, because the objects of human reason are either matters of fact or relations of ideas. Therefore, for him to observe the world objectively he needs to consider probability in his reasoning. Thus, the contrariety of any reasoning or any knowledge can 9

. Adamson, Development of Modern Philosophy, i., pp. 143-144.

8 be valid. Concerning naturalism, Hume relies on his empirical account in his philosophy. He extends his empiricism to nature. The natural properties are the values, which are perceived through sense impressions. Kemp Smith regards Hume’s naturalism objective. Since the nature of Hume’s skepticism and naturalism is empirical, both live together in harmony. Henceforth, Hume’s skepticism, his moral system detects the ‘Hume’s Law’ as the dilemma in which there is not a clear way to derive an ‘Ought’ statement from an ‘Is’ statement. There is no objective connection between ‘Ought’ and ‘Is.’ These two statements are objectively disconnected. The ‘Is’ statement cannot be considered as the ‘cause’ for the ‘Ought’ statement. It is quite difficult to conceive any connection between an ‘Is’ statement and an ‘Ought’ statement, because an ought statement is about empirical reasoning. It is a matter of fact. An ‘Is’ statement however, is the result of impression of reflection in the mind as expressed as passions. The necessity of the causal relation is missing between the two kinds of statements. As Adamson explains about synthetic reasoning, it is merely an expression for a tendency in the mind. Necessity does not exist in the object of enquiry. Considering an ‘Ought’ statement as an object of human reason derived from an ‘Is’ statement, as the relation of ideas is not plausible.

Bibliography 1) Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, OXFORD University Press, 2000. 2) Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, OXFORD University Press, 1999. 3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrho 4) Fogelin, Robert, Hume’s Skepticism, Cambridge Collections Online © Cambridge University Press, 2009. 5) Kemp Smith, Norman, The Naturalism of Hume (I), MIND A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, No. 54. April 1905. 6) Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .