Is Naturalized Epistemology possible?

Page !1 of !9 Jack R. Willis PHIL 240 April 8th 2016 53445152 Topic 8: Why Should Epistemology be Naturalized? In Quine’s famed paper of “Epistemology Naturalized”, he argues that epistemology is contained within the empirical or natural sciences, particularly empirical psychology. In this paper, will divide this paper into two sections, the first section reconstruct Quine’s argument in the paper, Quine’s interpretation of science, and what are the implications does this project ultimately have on epistemology. The second section will outline general criticism and the limitations that Quine’s epistemology faces. Section 1: Quine’s argument and Epistemic fallout With the beginning sentence Quine’s famed paper, he states that: “Epistemology is concerned with the foundations of science.”(Quine, 502). From there he outlines the history and failure of the project of reducing mathematics to logic and failure of the logical positivists epistemic mission. He cites Gödel theorem as a proof of this failure (503) and from there relates to how natural knowledge is to be based on sense experience (503) and further explains that this reasoning goes all the way back to David Hume himself (503). This account of treating the world as a logical contract of sense experience or sense data was the goal of Bertrand Russell and that of Carnap (504). Focusing on Carnap in particular, if his mission was successful then it would have grounded the whole of sentences about reality into terms of observation, logic, and set theory but Quine argues that just couching sentences in these terms does not prove from

Page !2 of !9 observing the sentences by logic or set theory (504) and because of this failure, Quine argues that “to endow the truths of nature with the full authority of immediate experience was as forlorn a hope as hoping to endow the truths of mathematics with the potential obviousness of elementary logic.”(505) Expanding on the point, Quine notes that Carnap’s project was that of a “rational reconstruction” which if it was accomplished, would construct any “physicalist discourse in terms of sensory experience, logic, and set theory”(505) but for Quine, why should there be this creative reconstruction, why not rely upon psychology and see how this construction Carnap is not concerned about process(505). This criticism continues throughout the paper with Carnap being the main target and the opponent Quine is reacting to. Quine's project is played out as a alternative to the goals that Carnap wants for knowledge but for Quine, psychology offers a better key to reconstructing “that links science with experience” and that it is better “how science is in fact developed and learned than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect”(506). In the end, Quine argues that “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology, and hence of natural science”(508). With that Quine’s position somewhat established, what does he mean when he states and argues that epistemology falls within the chapter of psychology and therefore falls under the chapter of natural science? This can be answered simply by explaining Quine’s view of science. In Susan Haack’s paper “The Two Faces of Quine’s Naturalism”, she argues that Quine’s naturalism is not defined a what she calls a “scientistic naturalism” which involve a strict and revision of traditional epistemological problems (Haack, 336), something that Quine is not attempting to do. For Haack, Quine is described as a “moderate naturalist” where he does not

Page !3 of !9 want to disavow epistemology, but put its inquiry under the scope of empirical psychology (336). The reason for Quine being in this described camp is a consequence of what Haack called Quine’s gradualism, which is the thesis that “philosophy is essentially like, [and] is continuous with, empirical inquiry generally… [and] highlights the similarity in method and purpose between philosophy and natural science”(339). She notes that Quine’s uses the term “Science” in two one: the first being “SCIENCE” where the meaning is broad and refers to general empirical beliefs (such as common sense, social sciences, history, mathematics, and etc. (339) and “science” which is defined in a narrower reference only to natural science (339). In the end, Quine’s places philosophy with broader scope of SCIENCE where it is so to speak on the same boat and not some a priori groundwork to place science on (341). In summary, Haack argues that for Quine, Science is a self-conscious common sense but differs in degree of “methodolgocial sophistication” (340). This avoids the claim that Quine’s epistemology is scientistic because it does reduce epistemic topics to a mere discussion of facts describe through natural science but rather ties epistemic concerns to the concerns about natural science, particularly psychology and linguistics. Alongside with psychology, linguistics is an important factor in Quine’s epistemology. Around the conclusion of his “Epistemology Naturalized”, he brings up the concept of observation sentence/s being the cornerstone for semantics (Quine, 510) and that epistemology merges not only with psychology but also with linguistics (510). To illustrate more on this point, Peter Hylton article on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 on Quine. Hylton notes that “Quine treats knowledge as embodied in a language” (Hylton, Section 4.1) and that they are Due to a lack of page numbers of citation, the author name will be presented first with the section number of source shown. Example: (“Hylton, section 3.2”) 1

Page !4 of !9 observable and subject to scientific inquiry and they are “Observation sentence are the starting point for our acquisition of knowledge”(Hylton, Section 4.2). This is evident within Quine’s paper when he discuss language and describes observation sentences as “the sentences on which all members of the community will agree under uniform stimulation” (Quine, 509) and that this position avoids what Quine calls “epistemological nihilism” which he prescribes to Polányi, Kuhn, and Russell Hanson and avoid cultural relativism(Quine, 510) and just flat out states that “observation sentences are the repository of evidence for scientific hypotheses”(Quine, 510). Coupled with psychology and language, Quine’s epistemology is naturalized is established and outlined. With the aid of Haack and Hylton’s interpretation, Quine position of science, psychology, language and its role in epistemology is laid down and established. Now on to the criticism of Quine’s view. Section 2: Criticism and Limitation of Quine’s epistemology Upon release of the essay, there have been many noted responses to Quine’s epistemology. Overall, there seems to be two major (or the most powerful) objections to Quine’s naturalistic approach, the 1st) objection is that Quine’s strips away any concern over epistemic normativity and the 2nd) Quine’s position is self defeating (Rysiew, Section 3.1)2. The bases for the first objection is based on the idea that justification is central to any epistemic notions and that the notion of justification bridges the gap between mere true belief and knowledge (if not Gettier is taken into account) and that justification is the focus of epistemic normativity. It is argued that within Quine’s theory, justification is not evident and even does away with such as notion, this is an interpretation given by Jaegwon Kim (Rysiew, Section 3.1) and he argues that Like the citation from Hylton, there is a lack of page numbers so the final part will be in sections rather then page. 2

Page !5 of !9 because Quine removes justification from the equation and epistemic normativity is then erased and since, if we follow the premises are true in this argument and than Quine’s epistemology is not epistemology per se and therefore has a debunked account of knowledge. The second most famed objection follows a similar argument but uses Quine’s argument against a priori knowledge against his project. The argument goes that if we follow Quine and reject a priori knowledge which the traditional epistemology presupposes, then naturalism must not be a “armchair philosophy” type of epistemology (Rysiew, Section 3.1). The self-defeating argument goes is that if (like in the normative argument), justification is rejected but justification or certain epistemic intuitions must be given for grounding, and therefore Quine’s project is self-defeating because it tries to prove its legitimacy by a notion, namely a priori knowledge or justification, which is clearly rejects and seeks to purge out of epistemology. There are replies to these two arguments but both have one common link, that within Quine’s epistemology, he rejects justification and therefore can not touch upon epistemic questions of normativity, like in the normative argument and foundation for its own reason of being, like in the self-defeating argument. To begin by giving arguments against these objections, we have to show that within Quine’s program, there is room for justification in a naturalized component rather then in the older traditional component of a priori foundation. Like it was mention before in Haack, Quine is a moderate rather then a scientistic naturalist and seeks not purge normative concerns in epistemology, but to naturalize these questions in the first place so as to not allow any room for a priori foundations. If Quine wanted to reduce epistemic concerns to discussion on facts described by natural science, which Haack shows is not the case. There is also within Quine’s essay where he rejects what is he calls epistemological nihilism, which is

Page !6 of !9 probably reject normative epistemic concerns altogether and Quine ties his analysis of language and observation sentences to concerns about intersubjectivity within a community of language speakers and what they ought to argue upon in their language but also what they should follow from the evidence provided by scientific observations of these sentences, hence the name “observational sentences” which fall under the gave and methodology of scientific inquiry and is inter-subject. There is one great flaw the present writer see in Quine’s epistemology neither attacks the project on the bases that it lacks normative epistemic concerns, but attacks the means which Quine uses to answers these concerns in the first place. These objections are aimed at Quine’s wrongheaded approach to both language and to psychology, the linchpins of his epistemology as presented. Going back to the Hylton article, it is noted that Quine has more detailed and speculative of how cognitive language is even possible and this does not hinder his account of observation sentences (Hylton, Section 4.3). It seems that Quine does not have an account for cognition but I longer and abstract notion of observational sentences which at least tries to account and describes language in a holistic approach that is learned through “short leaps of analogy”(Hylton, Section 4.3). This approach is attacked by linguistic, Noam Chomsky, which details Quine’s “narrow Humean theory of language acquisition” (Chomsky, 53) which if were true, hold that knowledge of a language should be represented as a network of what Chomsky calls, “linguistic forms” which is a approximation of sentences and what they associated with within a given and certain stimulus conditions (Chomsky, 53). Even thou Quine is a professed rebel against classical empiricism, Chomsky argues that Quine maintains a classical empiricist assumption about how

Page !7 of !9 language is learned and attaches Quine’s theory to B.F. Skinner’s behaviourism (Chomsky, 55-56). According to Chomsky, Quine’s view on language is regarded “as a finite network of associated sentences, some associated also to stimuli, [and] since this is just the structure that would arise from two postulated mechanisms of language learning with substantive content” (Chomsky 56-57) and a “complex dispositions of verbal behaviour” (Chomsky, 57). This view contradicts the truism within the field linguistics that language is an infinite set of sentences (Chomsky, 57) and Chomsky argues that “learning of sentences” is a intelligible notion (Chomsky, 64) because general statements about language or even common sense theories Quine preposes have no concept prior of language or of common sense available prior to the training within a given language and that the argument Quine assumes “central empirical assumptions which may or may not be true, but for which Quine does not seem to regard evidence as necessary” (Chomsky, 63). If Chomsky’s argument is true, the Quine’s view on language assumes empirical assumptions not yet proven by evidence and atlas under his theory where “epistemology remains entered as always on evidence, and meaning remains entered as always on verification; and evidence is verification”(Quine, 511). If that statement is right and Chomsky’s criticism holds, what verification is there in Quine’s interpretation on language? I will now turn to Quine’s psychology and question its legitimacy. For this, I will attack on the main backdrop to Quine’s psychology, that of behaviourism. To be a behaviourist, you need to be committed to three ideas: 1) “Psychology is the science of behavior. Psychology is not the science of mind -- as something other or different from behavior”, 2) “Behavior can be described and explained without making ultimate reference to mental events or to internal psychological processes. The sources of behavior are external (in the environment), not internal

Page !8 of !9 (in the mind, in the head)”, and 3) “In the course of theory development in psychology, if, somehow, mental terms or concepts are deployed in describing or explaining behavior, then either (a) these terms or concepts should be eliminated and replaced by behavioral terms or (b) they can and should be translated or paraphrased into behavioral concepts” (Graham, Section 1). For the sake of matching and making sure there is no unfair criticism, Quine as points in the essay does confirm or illustrates psychology along these lines, especially with he rejection of abstract mental concepts such as mathematics, logic, and set theory he found in Russell and Carnap and emphasis on empirical data. However, with Quine committing himself to the three Behaviourist ideas listed above, his epistemology is also prey to the many critics of Behaviourism, especially the critics brought about during the 1960’s, with again one of the lead drivers being Chomsky. Chomsky charged behaviourism with modes of language learning could not explain facts about language acquisition and how young child learn language at rapid pace (Graham, section 7). Now Quine tries to explain this through the leaps of analogy, but the detail is speculative and not grounded on evidence or goes into detail about the pace which a child learns a language. Another major problem with Behaviourism is when mental concepts are rejected, you in the end reject the concept of “qualia” and lead to the possibility of a zombie where there plan old behaviour but no sense of feelings such as pain (Graham, section 7). Although in the case for Quine, he could reject such arguments as mere thought experiments and not able to be actualized, but that is not even close to being a full and substantive reply to the objections. So should epistemology be naturalized? Quine bravely and boldly argues for such a case and does with taking into account normative and epistemic questions through the lens of

Page !9 of !9 psychology and linguistics. However, Quine’s own interpretations, in particularly his incomplete views on language and his outdated and problematic psychological behaviourism put leads him to conclusions that are time opposed to empirical evidence or just has no real ability to explain phenomenon. If epistemology should be naturalized in any way, it should be less dogmatic and not weighed down by assumptions of old interpretations of scientific fields. Work Cited

- Quine, W.V. “Epistemology Naturalized”. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, 3rd edition (2003). Pages 502 - 511. Published: Oxford University Press.

- Haack, Susan.“The Two Faces of Quine's Naturalism”. Synthese, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Mar., 1993), pp. 335-356. Published: Springer. URL = http://www.jstor.org/stable/20117751

- Hylton, Peter. "Willard van Orman Quine”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = .

- Rysiew, Patrick. "Naturalism in Epistemology”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = .

- Chomsky, Noam. “Quine’s Empirical Assumptions”. Word and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine. Davidson, Donald and Hintikka, Jaakko (ed). URL = http:// isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1188233.files/Chomsky.pdf

- Graham, George. “Behaviorism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).URL = .