Is Realism Amoral?

Is Realism Amoral?1

The tradition of realism within international relations is so prolific that its fundamental presentation of anarchy as the backdrop for international politics, with states as the primary actors, has become an inescapable reality for theorists. Regardless of approach or position taken, every theory must grapple with realism’s pervasive legacy. As such, and given realism’s seemingly cynical framing of international relations as being all about the pursuit of power over others and the survival of the state within an anarchic system, it should come as little surprise that one way to summarize the numerous criticisms of realism is with the twin accusations, “Realism is an amoral and bellicose doctrine.” This essay seeks to refute these charges by demonstrating that the morality of realism has hitherto been improperly represented through Kant’s language of ethics, instead of the classical tradition of virtue from which realism, starting with Morgenthau, draws. Only by starting with virtue ethics can the morality of classical realism, and through this all realism, be understood. This misinterpretation is partly the fault of Morgenthau, who by simple historical chronology wrote within the consequences of Kant’s legacy, and is further complicated by his partial adoption and reapplication of Kant’s duty ethics. In his argument against consequentialism, which he linked to positivism through their shared empirical-utilitarian method, and faced with Aristotelianism’s declined intellectual standing, Morgenthau mixed the language of Kant’s deontological ethics with the classical language of virtue ethics that informs classical realism’s morality. This is not to deny Morgenthau’s usage of Kant, as virtue and deontological ethics are not exclusive, but rather to argue that any examination of classical realism’s morality needs to be done through a strict Aristotelian lens. Though this essay’s focus is the defense of all realism against the aforementioned charges, its reliance on Morgenthau is not a rhetorical choice, but an intellectual necessity. Classical realism stands apart from the herd of IR theories as one of the few that does not shirk behind a veil of quantifiable systems and positivist science to avoid normative issues, nor does it attempt to separate the moral and political spheres (Morgenthau, 1945; 2005). Rather, it is an explicitly normative theory of international relations. Given that neorealism presents itself as redeeming classical realism from the criticism of not being scientific, perhaps the association of amoral with any theory should be considered an accolade (Ashley, 1984, pp.229-232). However, although neorealists and other scientific theories often engage in normative judgements, strict scientific empiricism cannot provide plausible moral judgements (Percy, 2000, pp.85-126; pp. 199-262). Here, breadth of analysis must be sacrificed on the altar of word count for the blessing of critical depth. This argument will begin by conceding the charge that realism is bellicose to better focus on the question of morality. This choice is not random, for the charge that realism is bellicose inherently contains the criticism that to be bellicose is wrong, which is a normative issue. The amoral aspect must be dealt with first. 1

Written October 2014 for coursework in the Msc International Relations program at the University of Edinburgh. All rights reserved to the author.

To begin this defense, the meaning of the criticism amoral must be ascertained. One might easily indict realism as immoral and bellicose, as these are complementary, but the dual charges of amoral and bellicose are self-defeating, for while the former can be either a subjective or objective claim, the latter is explicitly normative (see above), and therefore is necessarily subjective. If amoral is used as an objective claim, it is immediately disproven by the central role of morality within classical realism. The subjective usage is equally troublesome. One may very well on moral grounds accuse a theory of being amoral, but the rhetorical pulpit of morality requires a clear normative delineation between that which is moral/good, and that which is immoral/bad. Thus, if the charge amoral is subjective, then it is being made within a context that requires a moral judgement on all objects, including the object amoral, which is then necessarily associated with being good or, more commonly, bad. Therefore, the charge, “Realism is amoral and bellicose,” uses amoral subjectively; when paired with bellicose, clearly the real criticism is not that realism is amoral, but that realism is immoral. Now the true refutation may begin, for by proving realism’s morality, the charge of bellicosity will also be refuted, as most of the martial behavior that previously drew such criticism is redefined in a moral context. The Aristotelian morality of classical realism starts with Morgenthau’s “Six Principles” (2005). In the tradition of the Ancients, the first two principles establish the existence of universals that have their roots in human nature and focus the theory on statesmen. By focusing on individuals, the theory can assume a minimum standard of rational behavior. This allows for Morgenthau’s fourth principle, that prudence is the supreme virtue of politics, which reinforces realism’s assumption of rationality. Here Morgenthau draws directly from Plato and Thucydides, for whom prudence is the manifestation of moderation, a virtue of the soul whereby the logos has triumphed over the thymos and lower appetites (Ligon, 2013). Thus the prudent statesman is a wise and rational statesman, who can be trusted to act virtuously. This permanently fixes morality as realism’s center. Morgenthau takes this moral argument further. For Plato (1991, s.430d), moderation is similar to justice, and justice is presented as a knowledge, a virtue that is done for its own sake. As justice is both a central condition of political virtue and fundamentally concerned with political (social) relations, it becomes a central part of morality (Kosman, 2007, p.118). Therefore, moral virtue is intricately linked to political virtue and involves a knowledge of what is just. These traits are manifest in the statesman. This point has led to the criticism that justice is a relative virtue (Molloy, 2009, p.102), but such criticism misses the classical meaning of virtue (arete), that, “A virtue...[is] a quality that an entity has that enables it to perform its function well” (Kosman, 2007, p.120). For classical realism, the arete of the statesman is prudence, which is to say that a good statesman is just and acts morally. This seems to create a problem, for Morgenthau has turned his statesman into a modern form of Plato’s idealized philosopher-king (Pin-Fat, 2005, p.231). Even if such an individual could exist, a philosopher-king for every state simultaneously is impossible. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s statesmen are of the aristocratic age and cannot exist in modern times (Churchill, 1925). While some statesmen will be prudent, others will lack such virtue.

Yet rather than constituting a flaw for classical realism, this problem of human frailty reveals the true genius of classical realism’s balance of power mechanics. Just as the arete of the statesman is prudence, the virtue and morality of international relations is the balance of power. Again, Morgenthau draws from virtue ethics, for as Plato reveals, “The originating principle of a political organization...[is] that anything will count as a virtue...if it makes that system of organization work well”(Kosman, 2007, p.123). The balance of power mechanic accounts for both the pragmatism of statesmen and the fact that statesmen will not always act in the most rational way, something that is especially true in a democratic age in which popular passions directly influence foreign policy. In turn, this harnesses the objective interests of the state, Morgenthau’s third principle, into realism’s moral context. This morality comes from Morgenthau’s (1945) theories of lesser evil and the Aristotelian idea of “the shock of wonderment” (Pin-Fat, 2005, p.220), and is part of classical realism’s attempt to refute the modern raison d'état argument. Morgenthau (1945, pp.10-13) refutes the arguments of both consequentialism and Kant’s means-end theory in favor of an understanding that (1) all political actions are still individual actions and thus subject to the same ethical standards, and (2) human imperfection creates an inevitability of evil in the translation of thought to action, an effect magnified by scale in politics. The statesman “cannot hope to be good but must be content with not being evil” (Morgenthau, 1945, p.13). In a world that obligates the rational state to seek power, Morgenthau (1945, pp.15-17) applies and confines Kant’s (2011) understanding of duty to the nation-state and mixes it with a statesman’s Aristotelian pragmatism to create a balance of power mechanism that simultaneously acknowledges and limits the evils of power-politics. Through this fusion, the criticism of realism’s immorality is fully negated. Furthermore, martial behavior previously criticized as bellicose is understood to be defensive and a necessary precaution, not jingoistic. The adoption of the balance of power mechanic by classical realism’s heirs, including neorealism, endows all realist theories with a minimal component of virtue ethics. In conclusion, by examining classical realism’s virtue ethics foundation, this essay reveals that the true morality of realism lies in its basic acceptance of irreparable human inequity, and its subsequent attempt, through the balance of power, to best minimize the chance for evil to be perpetuated on a large scale. By accepting the inevitability of evil as a starting point, realism is able to control it, creating morality from immorality.

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