Islam: Modernity\'s Paradox

McCabe 1



Islam: Modernity's Paradox
The past five centuries have been dominated by a capitalistic, patriarchal, Christian-centric, Euro-centric, colonial war system that has been the foundation of the so-called "West", and the development of Western notions of "modernity." This time frame is based on a very specific historical turning point – the year 1492. Despite the fact that dividing up long historical processes can be problematic, it is necessary to use what Stuart Hall describes as historical generalizations "which cover long periods of time and pick out the broad patterns." This approach of looking at broad patterns and using historical generalizations is necessary when analyzing the past five centuries of this aforementioned problematic system, and its solidification in the minds and bodies of individuals and societies. Speaking of Hall, in his work Modernity he actually attributes the main turning point prior to 1492 – specifically to the Portuguese explorations of the African coast in 1430 – but it seems that the issue stretches even earlier than that if one considers the implications of the so-called Reconquista, and the immediate militaristic, "Christian" motivated response to the Islamic presence in Europe even as far back as their initial presence in the Iberian Peninsula in 711. But considering the fall of Granada to the Crown of Castile and Aragon in 1492, and the first expeditions of Columbus occurring in that same year, which undoubtedly marks a turning point into the beginnings of a global phenomenon, the year seems to be a rational date to look to according to Hall's tactic of historical generalization. This date marks the beginning of the rise of one of the first truly global empires, and represents the first real instance of the aforementioned dominant system, and marks the path to today's understanding of so-called "modernity." The Spanish crown and their tactics of domination are the essence of the "West," but it is necessary to consider the role that Islam played in the Spanish, "Christian" understanding of domination and notions of the "other." The repercussions of these notions led to five centuries of Western dominance over the "other" – in regards to those colonized and the victims of Western domination – but it also led to five centuries of the notion of Islam being the epitome of the "anti-West," and thus the epitome of anti-modernity. This is in no way means to overlook or disregard the many victims of Western dominance and colonialism. It is more so meant to direct attention to the importance of understanding the role that Islam originally played in the gestation, solidification, and justifications of the residual destructive patterns of Western domination and colonialism. Yes, Christendom was threatened by other groups in Europe at the time, but Islam is particularly important because it served as one of the largest threats due to its flourishing and its speedy growth. The irony of such a notion rests in a historical understanding of that role. Not only was Islam a major factor involved in the development of Western notions of "modernity," in terms of the epistemological appropriations and other contributions taken from it through the Spanish Inquisition and the "Reconquista," but it also plays a major role in maintaining the status-quo of "modernity" according to the West, by serving as an ideal enemy to it. This created notion stems back to the tension between Islam and Christianity, and the threat of Islam to Christendom – a state ideology that in many ways transformed into the "West." In order to understand this argument, it is important to establish how such a transformation occurred by means of defining "modernity" and "the West," by analyzing the historical role that Islam played in the unification of Europe under Christendom, and finally by analyzing the current tension between Islam and the Western definition of Modernity within the past century, such as the effects of that tension on the rise of Kemalism, and its role in the Iranian revolution.
It is often assumed the terms "Westernization" and "Modernization" can be used interchangeably, and can be defined as one, but it is important to note that there is a clear distinction between the two terms. Despite the differences between the two, they tend to be more similar than not, and while the differences will be discussed, the similarities and the implications of both terms developed along the same historical path. What is meant by this is that those ideas and aspects that are conjured up by the use of both terms – the intersections between "Western" and "Modern" – are rooted in the same bloody history. It is important to note that neither of these terms could have developed without an assumption of the "other" – in this case "other" referring to the opposite to Western and Modern – as well as a sense of superiority and inferiority. Hall insinuates this idea by noting the functions of the concept of "the West." To summarize Hall's points, it functions as a means to classify and categorize societies, it conjures up images of the differences between those societies, it provides a model of comparison (the supposedly superior model), and it provides a criteria of evaluation against which other societies are ranked and compared. Prior to the so-called Reconquista, there was no unity within what is now established as Europe, and certainly no notion of "the West," but due in particular to the threat that Islam posed, Europe unified under the banner of Christendom and the earliest notion of "the West" was born. As Hall states: "The challenge from Islam was an important factor in hammering Western Europe and the idea of 'the West' into shape." The "discovery" of the Americas served to solidify this Western unity and bring focus to the differences between "the West and the rest." Over time these differences dilated and the idea of "the West" and Western superiority became a crucial "universal criterion" for the basis of the Enlightenment – noted today as the turning point into "modernity." The following three centuries of conquest after that turning point – justified behind a façade of "evangelization, philanthropic enterprise… a desire to push back the frontiers of ignorance, disease, and tyranny… a project undertaken for the greater glory of God… an attempt to extend the rule of law," despite the hypocritical evil and destructive means that were implemented in order to reach these supposed ends – very quickly transformed into the pinnacle of progress, or "modernity." This is not to say that these ends were not actually incentive in some way, but the issue of conquest and colonialism goes much deeper. Although this most definitely was the case, the role of Christianity, as well as Christendom was a major factor involved in the Reconquista and the fear of the supposed Islamic threat.
The large flourishing Islamic civilization in the Iberian Peninsula posed a threat to Christendom because it was both growing rapidly and prospering in a way that very well may have caused uneasiness and even jealousy within Christendom. Although this seems to be a vast assumption, there is no doubt that the Islamic civilization in Andalusia was rich and tempting to onlookers – particularly to a monarchy closely tied to the Catholic church, and a diocese in Toledo that prided itself on the accumulation of wealth. The factor of wealth comes into play here, and even the foundation of a pattern that would follow through the centuries of conquest with the incentive of riches. But Andalusia was not just rich in wealth and beauty; it was also rich in its epistemic qualities. The library of Cordoba – which had long since succumbed to destruction at the hands of conquistadores prior to 1492 – contained over 500,000 works; a number that put the second largest library in Europe at the time – touting less than 1,000 books – to shame. The topic of wealth and epistemology are being mentioned here not only due to the clear connection between the actions taken against Islamic civilization and later colonial motives, but also to discuss those actions taken by the Spanish crown that led to the appropriation of Islamic civilization's achievements and progress, and to a long-lasting pattern of obscurantism and "epistemicide" – all of which played a major role in the Enlightenment and the path into Western domination and "modernity."
Despite the Spanish crown's blatant interest in wealth, which became increasingly apparent as more territories succumbed to their colonial projects of domination, Christianity remained as one of the main justifying driving forces for conquest – even if that meant to literally enrich their empire with wealth from their colonized territories, and by means of encomiendas for the supposed sake of Christendom. If any doubt comes to mind regarding the role of Christianity during the Spanish Inquisition, it is important to consider the actions of Bishop Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros, who ordered the burning of Arabic books and manuscripts in Granada and the forced conversion of the Moors in the name of Christianity, and the fact that he was very close to the Spanish crown – given the position of Archdiocese of Toledo. Cisneros is being used here in order to drive the point home – that Christianity was the foundational ideology of the Spanish crown, and a major force behind Spanish colonial projects and actions. And what is also important to note here is the fact that the Spanish crown was not alone in its Christian ideologies in Europe – and a reminder once again that Europe was in fact unified under Christendom. The suppression of knowledge, and the obscurantist actions of Cisneros and the Spanish monarchy were clearly being used as a means to quash the Islamic civilization that they were conquering, as well as to take control of that civilization's epistemic history for the sake of benefitting their own society. And ultimately who did all of this knowledge benefit? It benefitted "the West," and it played a major role in leading Europe into the Enlightenment, all the while suppressing the Islamic role in the production and transmittance of much of that knowledge. The entire concept and notion of "the West" stems from this Europe that was just described, so therefore the notion that Islam serves in many ways as the "anti-West" and thus anti-modern, is very accurate and is firmly rooted within medieval conflicts between Christendom and the Islamic world.
Although the Enlightenment has been mentioned as a period that is usually referenced in regards to the way that it served modernity and "progress", the fact that it was also a turning point that marked a major division between modernity and religiosity needs to be understood in order to see the way that current understandings of "the West" and "modernity" tie directly back to Christendom. While Modernization Theory arose in the "West" following the Second World War, the principles alluded to within the theory had been understood by colonizers since even the first instance of settler colonialism in Granada. The forceful imposition of religious, economic, political, and militaristic ideologies by the colonizers upon the colonized clearly illustrates this. Modernization theory states that a country needs to get rid of their traditions in order to develop. In many ways, the medieval Spanish notion that the Native Americans were sub-humans due to their lack of Christianity and their "foreign" traditions and civilizations is theoretically similar. It is the basis of the ideas of superiority and inferiority, and the inability to accept differences that both Modernization theory and the medieval "Western" view of the natives share. As Edward Sa'id says speaking about orientalism: "the essence of orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority." Prior to the enlightenment, this "superiority" rested largely on religious notions – particularly the idea of Christian superiority. The debate between Juan Ginés de Sepulveda and Bartolomé de las Casas in Spain in the presence of Emperor Charles V, which spanned over the course of the fifteenth century, was entirely based on determining whether or not Native Americans were in fact human, or something less due to their "lack of civilization" and more importantly their lack of Christianity. Although Las Casas emphasized the Native's faculty of reason – a quality attributed to "the West," and therefore extremely controversial at the time to be used in conjunction with the Natives – he did not disagree with the necessity of Christianizing the Natives.
With the Enlightenment came a major shift away from Christianity, into a secular mentality, established by the Enlightenment thinker René Descartes, that "challenged Christendom's authority of knowledge," thus challenging Christianity, and religion in general. The "other" was now no longer inferior due to their lack of Christianity, but instead due to their epistemic and societal differences when weighed against the "criterion" of "the West," and more importantly the survival of their religious ideals – which completely contradicted the newfound Western secularization. The "West" had had a change of heart in terms of their relationship with God and religion, and therefore the rest of the world needed to follow suit in order to be taken seriously. This is the epitome of a superiority complex, and marks the solidification of Western dominance and the belief that the West was the "core" in which all "peripheries" could be weighed against. The transformation spoken of earlier linking the notion of the secular "West" back to medieval Christendom can be attributed largely to this Cartesian philosophy. The Europe that was once unified under Christendom had now transformed into a Europe unified under an "epistemic solipsism" which maintained the superiority complex that had developed through Christianity, minus the religiosity. These "Western" ideals became the measurement of "modernity," and came full-circle to haunt Islam and disunite the Muslim world.
As the distinction between Islam and "the West" began to become more apparent in the centuries following the Enlightenment, despite Islam's role in and suppressed contributions to the development of that "West," political leaders in Muslim countries faced a false dilemma – rise to the occasion, or deteriorate. The recognition of this supposed dilemma stemmed from an "internalized colonization," where many people in the Muslim world began to buy into the false discourse that had been fed to them for half a millennium. Whether it was physical colonization by Western powers, or intellectual colonization by Western powers, the Muslim world was ultimately brought to fragmentation and disunity as a result. According to the Western discourse, "the only legitimate political entity is the Nation State," and according to Salmon Sayyid, that discourse was in direct conflict with the notion of an Islamic political authority, or a Caliphate. Overcoming this conflict, and a desire to maintain legitimacy in a world dominated by Western ideologies and expectations, was the motive behind Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's abolition of the last Caliphate in the world in Turkey in the early twentieth century. The concept of a Caliphate was established in Islam directly after the Prophet Muhammad's death, and served as the main source of authority within Islamic societies, but more importantly cohesion within the Islamic world from that point until its abolishment by Ataturk, despite occasional hiccups along the way. But Ataturk's issues with Islam went much deeper than his abolishment of the Caliphate. The extreme actions that he took in order to separate Islam from the Turkish identity, as well as from the Turkish political sphere, became a standard that was copied by political leaders throughout the Muslim world. This ultimately led to complete disunity within the Muslim world. The term "Kemalism" is used in reference to this phenomenon.
Ataturk's hostility towards his nation's Islamic roots, and thus the measures he took in order to attempt to reform Turkey sans-religion, was not just in a national interest founded upon seeking legitimacy within the global Western system, it was more so due to the fact that he recognized that according to the Western, "modern" discourse, Islam was "anti-Western" in almost every way. As Sayyid states: "here lies the antagonism within Kemalism between the West and Islam. But this antagonism did not simply rest on the assumption that an aspect of Islam such as a Caliphate was incompatible with Western notions of political legitimacy, it went much deeper, into the historical antagonism between Christendom and Islamic civilization. These foundations are not entirely obvious at first glance, and to Ataturk, Islam and the caliphate were both "a laughing stock in the eyes of the civilized world" where people "enjoy the blessings of science" – all the while he failed to recognize, or at least acknowledge the Islamic contribution to that "Western" science. Considering Ataturk's extreme, "Western" fundamentalist approach to "modernization," one might assume that leaders in the Muslim world, who were boasting their Islamic roots, would have been in an uproar. Although some were, such as King Faud of Egypt and the leaders of the Khalifat Movement in India – who both attempted to re-establish the Caliphate – the fact of the matter is that the concept of the nation-state had already plagued and divided up the Muslim world, and for that reason "modernization" truly was the only option for political legitimacy under the guile of the "West." "In the choice between modernity… and Islam… the rulers of the leading Muslim state chose modernity," and from that point forward Kemalism became the name of the game for political leaders in the Muslim world.
But not all of the Muslim world's population was so naïve and quick to jump ship, despite the many efforts of Western powers to force Westernization upon them. While an overwhelming majority of political leaders may have bought into the Western discourse and attempted to compromise between their longstanding religious traditions and all-out Kemalism, the majority of their populations still held strong to their faith and outwardly opposed their government's newfound ideologies and "apologist" stance towards Western powers, despite the consequences. And there definitely were consequences – most apparent being the shift of Islam from a national identity into an entirely "private sphere." In the case of Iran, the overwhelming majority of the population was opposed to Shah Reza Khan's Kemalist ideologies, particularly his suppression of Islam into a private sphere, and his attempts to completely secularize, and therefore "modernize" the country. Things became messy due to the tension between an anti-Kemalist population and a pro-Kemalist government. Western powers were well aware of the problems that would be posed were they to turn a blind eye to the overthrow of a Kemalist, "Western" political authority within Iran – which was the only way that they could get Iran to serve in their own interests (i.e. oil) – so once again the colonialist mentality drove "the West" to action, and led to the rise of the puppet Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and, in turn, the rise of "Islamism." In Sayyid's book A Fundamental Fear, he argues that Islamism was much more than simply a response to the political atmosphere in Iran in the late 1970s, as well as even more than a direct response to Kemalism. While it was both of those things, it was more so recognition of the Western dominance that had been taking its toll on Islam since the Reconquista. While the term "Islamism" and "Islamist" have come to conjure up negative connotations – and maybe partially rightly-so due to the many times that those who claim to "Islamism" take irrational, ineffective actions against "the West" – Sayyid does not use term in reference to those individuals. Sayyid is much more interested in "Islamism" as a response to "the West" and Euro-centrism more generally. If the state of Iran leading up to the revolution is understood, Sayyid's use of the term "Islamism" can also be understood more clearly in terms of its response to "the West."
In the book Occidentosis by Jalal Al-i Ahmad, a very vivid description of the state of Iran in the 1960s is presented. The book is useful in this sense, but more so in the simple fact that it had an extremely powerful effect on the Iranian population at the time, and caused the "ideological ferment that ultimately led to revolution," according to Hamid Alghar. Taking this into consideration, the critique of Western dominance and Kemalism that is prevalent throughout the book, serves as means of recognizing those Western notions of "modernity" that were being so vehemently opposed during the revolution, as well as the "Islamist" goals and prerogatives of overcoming "Westernization." As a side note, the economic implications of this "Westernization" also plays a major role in the Iranian Revolution – considering the role of oil – but those implications are only parts of a whole, and encompassed within the notion of "the West." Returning to Stuart Hall, "by 'Western' we mean… a society that is developed, industrialized, urbanized, capitalist, secular, and modern." In the very first chapter of Occidentosis Ahmad distinguishes between the "occident" and the "orient," and places Iran in the latter, as well as lays out the colonial aspirations of Western powers and the way that Iran had succumbed to those powers. But Ahmad makes a very important point in this chapter regarding the resistance of the people of Iran due to their Islamic traditions. Ahmad states: "in encountering us, the West not only attacked this [our] Islamic totality… but strived to hasten the dissolution from within of a totality only apparently unified." Ahmad's statement both insinuates and condemns the effects of Westernization on Islam, but more importantly hints back at the "internalized colonization" that was spoken of earlier – readily apparent within Kemalism. But if Iran was to overcome this Western domination in the revolution, and if "Western" meant the exact same thing as "modern," how would Iran move forward without either "re-establishing 'traditional' agrarian societies" or just "modernizing," which would ultimately entail "Westernization" anyway?
Sayyid very thoroughly tackles this question of the differentiation between "modern" and "Western," which is an important issue to look at when attempting to understand Islam's role as "anti-Western." If it is concluded that Islam is in fact "anti-Western," which does seem to be the case at hand thus far based on the presented definitions of "the West," then is it also fair to say that Islam is also "anti-Modern?" According to Sayyid it is not an accurate dichotomy, but amongst his academic peers there is some contention to that assertion. Following the rise of Kemalism, the notion would not have seemed possible to consider an Islamic country, or a nation-state with a large Muslim population rather, to have been modern without being Western. From a Western perspective, Ataturk had successfully brought cohesion between Islamic civilization and "modernity" – by of course doing away with the Islamic aspect. But either way, the Islamic world was falling nation by nation into the Western trap, leading to the complete demise of any notion of Islam within the political sphere. This is until the Iranian Revolution threw the hypocrisy of Kemalism right back into the face of the political leaders who had fallen into the trap. As Sayyid argues: "One way of examining… the conflict between modernity and its others, is to focus on the figure of Khomeini," as well as the Iranian Revolution. While Sayyid is correct to use the Iranian Revolution as a "serious setback" for Kemalism, he does mistakenly state that it "marks the end of Kemalism," which is in fact far from the truth considering current affairs. But the Iranian Revolution marks even more than simply a conflict with Kemalism; it more importantly marks the conflict between Islam and "the West." In terms of the supposed conflict between Islam and "modernity," Sayyid presents differing arguments on the matter, but insinuates: "modernity is something that cannot be escaped," and poses the question of multiple variations of "modernity." The interesting thing about this argument is that it implies that "the West," and the "Western" notion of modernity remains stagnant and completely tied to itself, whereas the notion of "modernity" encompasses a much broader understanding of the concept. Based on this notion, it is safe to argue that Islam is in fact modern, yet not tied to the "Western" notions of "modernity," and therefore not in any way "anti-modern," but in many ways "anti-Western." Khomeini was successful in his approach to making this distinction, and the Iranian Revolution represents this success in action. Sayyid argues that the Iranian Revolution "de-centered the West," and that while "Kemalism was founded on the equivalence between modernity and the West," the Iranian Revolution spoke "from another centre, outside the orbit of the West." The deconstruction of the paradigm that equates "modernity" to "Western" allows Islam to attempt to flourish again as it once did, as a truly modern civilization – before it was robbed of its identity by force or by false discourse.
Westernization caused Muslim political leaders to completely forget, deny, or belittle their own rich history, and to buy into a false discourse that had been founded on an idea of Western superiority, "progress," and "modernity," which directly stems out of the fact that Islamic civilization, particularly in medieval Spain, was the pinnacle of these qualities. In order for the Spanish crown to overcome their own recognized inferiority, they needed to essentially rob Islamic civilization of its rich attributes, and claim them for, and attribute them entirely to themselves. By recognizing Islamic Civilization as a legitimate, contemporary, parallel-modernity, "the West" would in essence be admitting to their hypocrisy. Unfortunately, due to this, Islam is characterized as the "anti-West" by "the West," even in the 21st century, and the status quo remains the same. In order to fully understand the contemporary state of events and tensions between "the West" and Islam, understanding the importance of the historical turning point in 1492 is crucial, as is understanding what was taken, how it was taken, and why it was taken. The depiction of Islam as "anti-Western" serves the interest of "the West" by representing a civilization characterized by qualities that supposedly come into direct conflict with "Western" ideals – whether they be the civilization's religious traditions or epistemological traditions for example. But these notions of conflict are quite clearly unfounded, for if "the West" were honest with itself, it would recognize the role that Islam played in the formation of "Western" characteristics, even if that role meant representing the enemy which brought unity to "the West" (and still does), or if it meant the epistemological and physical contributions that "the West" claimed as their own and contributed to the foundation of contemporary "Western" civilization following the Middle Ages.





















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Stuart Hall, Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996), 189.
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