Moral Judgment Development across Cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg

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Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500 www.elsevier.com/locate/dr

Moral judgment development across cultures: Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims John C. Gibbs

a,*

, Karen S. Basinger b, Rebecca L. Grime c, John R. Snarey d

a Psychology Department, The Ohio State University, 1835 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210, USA College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Urbana University, 579 College Way, Urbana, OH 43078, USA Psychology Department, Washington & Jefferson College, 60 South Lincoln Street, Washington, PA 15301, USA d Psychology Department, Emory University, 532 Kilgo Circle, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA b

c

Received 26 November 2006; revised 26 April 2007 Available online 2 August 2007

Abstract This article revisits Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental claims that stages of moral judgment, facilitative processes of social perspective-taking, and moral values are commonly identifiable across cultures. Snarey [Snarey, J. (1985). The cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 202–232] examined Kohlberg’s claims in a survey of 45 cross-cultural studies in 27 countries that used Kohlberg’s dilemma method of stage assessment (the Moral Judgment Interview, MJI [Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment: Vol. 1. Theoretical foundations and research validation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press]). Snarey’s review identified a basic stage trend but also the cultural specificity of Kohlberg’s highest stages. As a remedy, Snarey proposed a culturally inclusive elaboration of the highest stages. Another proposed model [Gibbs, J. C. (2003). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg and Hoffman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage] argued for maturity in the basic moral judgment stage trend. Gibbs’ revisionist model has been associated with an alternative (dilemma-free) assessment method (the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form, SRM-SF [Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral maturity: Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum]). Snarey’s and Gibbs’s revisionist models are compared and used as frameworks for interpreting not only the MJI findings but also newer SRMSF findings from 75 cross-cultural studies conducted in 23 countries. Despite continuing questions

*

Corresponding author. Fax: +1 614 292 4357. E-mail address: [email protected] (J.C. Gibbs).

0273-2297/$ - see front matter Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.001

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for research, multimethod convergence is found for common moral values, basic moral judgment stage development, and related social perspective-taking across cultural groups. Ó 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Kohlberg, Lawrence; Moral development; Moral values; Stages of moral judgment; Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short Form; Social perspective-taking; Social behavior; Cross-cultural research

Introduction Children, as they become adolescents and adults, grow beyond the superficial in moral judgment. This thesis is at first blush modest, yet upon consideration provokes questions and controversy. Are some moral judgments really more superficial or less adequate than others? Is growth toward increasingly mature moral judgment defined by basic qualitative changes or stages? Does one stage follow another in some regular sequence? Does moral judgment develop through social interaction, and with reference to common moral values? Finally, and most important for this review: Is moral judgment development basically the same across diverse cultural groups? Perhaps no developmental psychologist has advanced the thesis of moral judgment development across cultures more boldly and extensively than did Lawrence Kohlberg. His ‘‘choice of topics’’ in the 1960s, namely, moral development, ‘‘made him something of an ‘odd duck’ within American psychology. . . .No up-to-date social scientist, acquainted with [the relativism of] psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and cultural anthropology, used such words at all.’’ Yet the development of moral judgment ‘‘is, after all, a very substantial aspect of human psychology’’ (Brown & Herrnstein, 1978, pp. 307). With his challenge to moral relativism, advancement of a cognitive developmental approach to morality, dilemma-based assessment method, six-stage model, and universality claims, Kohlberg eventually became one of the most frequently cited names in the social and behavioral sciences (Haggbloom et al., 2000). His stage theory of moral development continues to be represented in virtually every contemporary developmental psychology textbook. This article investigates moral judgment development across cultures. Our aim is to revisit with a relatively new assessment method Kohlberg’s generic claim that, in principle, there is a cross-cultural universality to the development of moral judgment as well as to social perspective-taking processes and moral values. Although Kohlberg posited distinct moral judgment stages that develop mainly through social interaction and perspective-taking, he began partly by identifying stable moral judgment trends that ‘‘reflect cognitive development’’ (Kohlberg, 1964, p. 398). A broad cognitive developmental approach In the broadest sense, a cognitive developmental approach to morality would seem unobjectionable. Is not growth beyond the superficial in moral understanding integral to growth beyond the superficial in cognition generally? John Flavell and colleagues (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002; cf. Gibbs, 2003) have for many years emphasized that ‘‘both social and nonsocial cognitive development tend to proceed from surface appearances’’ or ‘‘salient features of the here-and-now,’’ to ‘‘the construction of an inferred underlying

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reality’’ (p. 181). In this holistic or ‘‘domain-general’’ tradition (Sokol & Chandler, 2004, p. 160), Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg (1964, 1984), and other developmentalists interested in morality have identified young children’s characteristic tendency to conflate morality with salient here-and-now features of size, power, impressive appearances and outcomes, or egocentric desires (e.g., a certain distribution of goods may be considered fair because ‘‘the biggest should get the most,’’ or because ‘‘I want it,’’ Damon, 1977, pp. 78–79). The ‘‘pull of the present’’ attenuates as children increasingly coordinate and ‘‘integrate over time and events’’ in their social and nonsocial worlds (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 180). Generally correlative to nonsocial cognitive development, then, is social cognitive growth beyond the superficial (e.g., Walker, 1980). A mature interpersonal understanding (of trust, mutuality, and other intangible bases of the right or good) tends to emerge and differentiate from references to surface appearances or instrumental considerations. In self-reports of social conflict, for example, an age trend toward more mature psychological understanding and moral evaluation can be discerned. Preschoolers’ (relative to older children’s and adolescents’) accounts of having been hurt or having hurt another person ‘‘lack depth’’ and tend to be ‘‘utterly behavioral,’’ featuring simple acts of physical harm (e.g., ‘‘Um, Jack hit me. And he also, he also kicked me’’) (Wainryb, Brehl, & Matwin, 2005, p. 54). In contrast, older children and adolescents are increasingly likely to coordinate or shift perspectives, to refer to subtle mental states or emotions such as intentions, and to describe violations of trust (Wainryb et al., 2005, pp. 43–54; cf. Carpendale, 2000). In this age trend, the key phrase of the quoted statement from Flavell and colleagues is ‘‘tend to proceed’’ (emphasis added). The superficiality of young children’s moral judgment is a characteristic tendency of thought (Siegler, 1996a), not a strict incapacity. It would be inaccurate to imply ‘‘that young children never make inferences about unperceived states of affairs or that older children never base conclusions on superficial appearances’’ (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 141). Indeed, appeals to authority or punishment scarcely appear in preschoolers’ prosocial reasoning (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006); nor do egocentric biases appear in their narratives of having hurt others (Wainryb et al., 2005; but cf. Arsenio, Gold, & Adams, 2006). Preschoolers may be remarkably sophisticated in their understanding of the moral domain (see Moral judgment in childhood section). Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach Beyond the age-related cognitive trends, Kohlberg (1971, 1984) formulated a cognitive developmental approach that delineated a distinct place for moral judgment, for facilitative social interaction, and for clear stage sequence. These tenets of Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach have empirical implications. Moral development as a distinct, unitary domain of development. For Kohlberg, moral judgment—consisting of reasons or justifications for decisions or values that pertain to just or benevolent social action (e.g., Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Gibbs, 2003)—is not merely integral to social and nonsocial cognitive development, but rather is a distinct, unitary domain with a parallel trajectory in its own right. As Kohlberg (1971) moved beyond a broad cognitive developmental approach, he asserted that ‘‘moral development is its own sequential process, rather than the reflection of cognitive development in a slightly different content’’ (p. 187). In this respect, Kohlberg became more a domain-specific than a domain-general or ‘‘unity’’ theorist of moral justifications and values (but cf. Sokol & Chandler, 2004). Although moral judgment development should relate to intelli-

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gence and cognitive development, moral judgment should in any culture define its own distinct and homogeneous domain. An empirical implication—which we will review—is that moral reasons or justifications should yield a single factor in factor analyses across cultures. A final empirical implication to be reviewed is that the moral values to which the justifications refer should be relevant to diverse cultures. Social perspective-taking opportunities. Kohlberg argued that, although generic perspectival coordination and working memory may be relevant to moral development, the perspective-taking process facilitating moral growth is distinctly social (Gibbs, 2003). Taking and keeping in mind the perspectives of other persons is uniquely complex, not least because the social ‘‘object’’ can be a subject, i.e., may take its own perspective as well as the perspective of the perspective-taker (Damon, 1988; Flavell et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1981; Selman, 1980). Beyond Piaget’s (1932/1965) emphasis on peer interaction, Kohlberg argued that opportunities to take the perspectives of other persons, roles, groups, and institutions in society should stimulate moral reflection and development. Of particular relevance to this review will be the consequent expectation that moral judgment maturity should correlate with age, education, higher socioeconomic status, urban (versus rural) settings, and community participation, insofar as these variables index the affordance and accumulation of diverse social experiences and perspective-taking opportunities through social participation (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983). In this connection, we will be particularly interested in correlations of moral judgment maturity with self-reported social perspective-taking opportunities and in cross-cultural studies of moral judgment developmental delay among delinquents. An intriguing alternative possibility (also consistent with such correlations) is that diverse social experiences foster the development of more adequate psychological (e.g., representational) understandings or ‘‘theories’’ of mind (one’s own and others’), which then make possible the moral judgment gains (e.g., Lalonde & Chandler, 2002; Wainryb & Brehl, 2006). Stage and invariant sequence. Kohlberg anticipated that, with the proper discernment of structure in content, a dominant pattern or framework would cohere in a person’s moral judgment. Kohlberg based his expectation in Piagetian theory, although the extent to which Piagetian theory claims concurrence in the emergence of a stage is controversial (Brainerd, 1978, 1979; Carpendale, 2000; Chapman, 1988; Lourenco & Macado, 1996). In any event, Kohlberg anticipated that (with proper criteria) a new ‘‘stage’’ would signify not just a qualitatively new tendency of thought in a rough age trend, but a highly coherent framework that would ‘‘hang together’’ as such in an individual’s moral judgment. Once the stage structures were precisely identified, not only would moral judgment be unitary, but each moral judgment stage would follow the next in a clearly invariant sequence. Invariant sequence is a fundamental criterion of the stage construct in Piagetian theory, as indicated in seminal critiques by Charles Brainerd (1978, 1979). Findings bearing upon stage and invariant sequence are discussed in a subsequent section. Revisiting Kohlberg’s universality claims The testable implications of Kohlberg’s domain-specific cognitive developmental approach to moral growth have attracted extensive research attention. This article will review findings pertaining to these implications as part of a larger theoretical and empirical revisiting of Kohlberg’s universality claims for moral development. In particular, this

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article revisits Kohlberg’s universality claims for moral judgment stage development, moral values, and social perspective-taking processes in the two-decade aftermath of a landmark cross-cultural review of his work by John Snarey (1985). Was Kohlberg’s generic claim correct, that moral understanding grows in systematic ways beyond the superficial across a diversity of cultural contexts? What of his universality claims for moral values and for facilitative social perspective-taking processes? What issues remain unresolved or underexplored? Kohlberg’s universality claims will be revisited through a review of 75 cross-cultural moral judgment studies using an assessment measure alternative to Kohlberg’s (see Basinger, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1995; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992). Adequate consideration of Kohlberg’s universality claims requires some understanding of their context. Accordingly, before we review the cross-cultural studies, we will devote extensive attention to background considerations of Kohlberg’s work, the emergence of revisionist models, and related methodological developments in the assessment of moral judgment. Revisionist models Almost all individuals in all cultures use the same . . . basic moral categories, concepts, principles, [and values], and . . . all individuals in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of gross stages of development, though they vary in rate and terminal point of development. . . .[given differential] opportunities for role-taking. (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 176, 183) As noted, Kohlberg emphatically advanced the thesis that moral judgment develops in basically the same way across cultures. Beyond the broad point that morality relates to cognitive development, Kohlberg’s domain-specific cognitive developmental approach championed moral judgment (including moral values) as a distinct, unitary domain, and moral judgment development as a socially facilitated sequence of stages. Kohlberg applied his generic claim—that moral judgment in all cultures develops in the same order or sequence—specifically to his six-stage model of moral judgment. This section narrates the early history of Kohlberg’s evolving cognitive developmental approach and stage model, including the problems that led to certain revisionist models. His longitudinal and cross-cultural research yielded empirical support but also anomalies and limitations. In response, Kohlberg made certain refinements and qualifications with reference to his six-stage model. Among other responses were revisionist models proposed by Snarey (1985; Snarey & Keljo, 1991) and Gibbs (1977, 1979, 2003). Gibbs’s model entailed an alternative assessment method that has been used extensively in cross-cultural research. This early history will provide the background needed for an informed review of the cross-cultural empirical literature entailing use of this alternative assessment method. Background In an autobiographical reflection on his intellectual career, Kohlberg provided the background for the revisionist stage models (his own and others’) that were to emerge. In a 1985 lecture in Japan, Kohlberg (1991/1985) recounted the history of his moral judgment stages in the context of his ‘‘personal search for universal morality’’:

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My views . . .were based on John Dewey’s philosophy of development and his writings concerning the impulsive, group-conforming, and reflective stages of moral development. The first empirical work to pursue this direction was taken by the great Swiss psychologist, Jean Piaget, in 1932. . . .Using dilemmas created by philosophers or novelists [in my 1958 dissertation], I was struck by the fact that adolescents had distinctive patterns of thinking which were coherent and were their own, just as Piaget had seen distinctive patterns of thinking in younger children. In my dissertation I tentatively characterized these patterns as qualitative stages and added three stages to those formulated by Piaget. When I completed my dissertation I was well aware that by describing [eighty-four] American boys, aged ten to sixteen, I had not created a universal theory. The stages had to meet criteria [such as invariant sequence] . . .The first step . . .was to follow up my original subjects. . . .The longitudinal study has led to refinement and revision in the description and scoring of the stages.. . .Coordinate with [this] follow-up study was checking my doubts about whether the stages were really universal in non-Western cultures. . . .The final stages have been found to be rare. (pp. 14–15) Kohlberg’s empirical starting point in the late 1950’s, then, was the work of Jean Piaget. Kohlberg (1964, 1984) saw in Piaget’s (1932/1965) classic Moral Judgment of the Child the potential for establishing, by discerning structure in content, a universal moral development model. Piaget had identified age trends, reflecting successive stages or phases of moral judgment among children and youth, that might be standard across cultural groups, social classes, genders, ethnic statuses, and cohorts. Could a distinct domain of structural stages be identified? Insofar as each stage prepares the foundation for the next, established stages would be sequential and progressively adequate,1 with the highest stage defining the most mature or competent understanding. The stage sequence would be standard or uniform (the invariant sequence criterion), with neither skipping (foundational stages cannot be bypassed) nor regression (competence once constructed cannot ordinarily be lost). Cultural and other social factors would not alter the developmental sequence, although differential social perspective-taking opportunities might influence a given child’s rate of stage development and whether that child progresses through the full range. The established stage model of moral judgment development, then, would be standard or uniform across diverse cultures. To promote the cross-cultural applicability of Piaget’s developmental findings, Kohlberg revised and expanded on Piaget’s moral judgment work. Kohlberg’s early work (Kohlberg, 1964) critically reviewed the various aspects of moral judgment studied by Piaget and identified as promising for an established stage model those qualitative age trends that were stable across social or cultural contexts and reflected general cognitive development. Like Piaget, Kohlberg clinically interviewed his participants, probing the reasons or justifications for their decisions and evaluations of moral values. Whereas Piaget’s participants had responded to pairs of contrasting stories, however, Kohlberg’s participants responded to standardized hypothetical dilemmas, which Kohlberg argued would be more likely to elicit spontaneous, authentic reasoning (see Table 1). Whereas Piaget studied boys and girls aged 6–13, Kohlberg in his dissertation extended the age range to include 161

Kohlberg (1971) advanced a philosophical argument for his moral judgment stages as prescriptive and progressively adequate, in contrast to relativistic positions.

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Table 1 Three moral judgment assessment techniques A story pair used by Piaget (1932/1965)

A moral dilemma used by Kohlberg (1958)

A. A little boy who is called John is in his room. He is called to dinner. He goes into the dining room. But behind the door there was a chair, and on the chair there was a tray with fifteen cups on it. John couldn’t have known that there was all this behind the door. He goes in, the door knocks against the tray, bang go the fifteen cups and they all get broken! B. Once there was a little boy whose name was Henry. One day when his mother was out he tried to get some jam out of the cupboard. He climbed up on a chair and stretched out his arm. But the jam was too high up and he couldn’t reach it and have any. But while he was trying to get it he knocked over a cup. The cup fell down and broke. 1. Are these children equally naughty? 2. Which of the two is naughtier, and why?

In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. There was one drug the doctors thought might save her. A druggist in the same town had discovered it, but he was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick women’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together half of what it cost. The druggist refused to sell it cheaper or let Heinz pay later. So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? Why or why not? (paraphrased from Colby et al., 1983, p.77) The Heinz Dilemma is the first of three dilemmas in Form A (the Moral Judgment Interview [MJI] has Forms A, B, and C). Sample questions: 1. Should Heinz steal the drug? Why or why not? 2. If Heinz doesn’t love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Why or why not? 3. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger? Why or why not? 4. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another’s life? Why or why not? 5. Should people try to do everything they can to obey the law? Why or why not? Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished? [Sample questions following a dilemma concerning a father’s promise to his son:] Is it important to keep a promise? Why or why not? Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don’t know well and probably won’t see again? Why or why not?

[Interviewers are advised to begin by having the child repeat the stories. The opening two questions become ‘‘the occasion for a conversation more or less elaborate according to the child’s reaction’’ (p.123).]

Social Reflection Questionnaire (Gibbs et al., 1992) 1. Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to friends? Circle one: very important important not important WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT IMPORTANT NOT IMPORTANT (whichever one you circled)? [The same format is used for the remaining questions] 2. What about keeping a promise to anyone? How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, even to someone they hardly know? 3. How about keeping a promise to a child? How important is it for a parent to keep promises, if they can, to their children? 4. In general, how important is it for people to tell the truth? 5. Think about when you’ve helped your mother and father. How important is it for children to help their parents? 6. Let’s say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you’re the only person who can save him or her. How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a friend? 7. What about saving the life of anyone? How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a stranger? 8. How important is it for a person to live even if that person doesn’t want to? 9. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people? 10. How important is it for people to obey the law? 11. How important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail?

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year-olds (although he initially studied only males). He subsequently supplemented his longitudinal sample with cross-sectional samples of males and females. As he noted in his 1985 recollection, Kohlberg ‘‘tentatively characterized’’ three distinctive patterns in adolescents’ moral judgment as stages. He added them to the childhood phases already formulated by Piaget to comprise a six-stage model with domain-specific and universalist claims for moral development. Kohlberg’s six-stage formulation drew particular inspiration from the writings of John Dewey (Bergman, 2006; Gibbs, 2006a). As Kohlberg (1991/1985) also recalled, he based the direction of his Piagetian empirical work on Dewey’s posited typology of impulsive, group-conforming, and reflective levels of moral development (Dewey & Tufts, 1908). Kohlberg (1969) termed these levels preconventional, conventional, and postconventional, and assimilated his six stages to this framework. Nested within the preconventional level of childhood were Stages 1 (‘‘punishment and obedience;’’ cf. Piaget’s ‘‘heteronomy’’) and 2 (‘‘pragmatic and instrumental;’’ cf. Piaget’s ‘‘reciprocity as a fact’’). Nested within the conventional level (normally emergent by the adolescent years) were Stages 3 (interpersonal relationships; cf. Piaget’s ‘‘reciprocity as an ideal’’) and 4 (societal order). The postconventional level (initially defined as already evident in adolescence in some cases) was seen as encompassing Stages 5 (social contract) and 6 (universal ethical principles). This level is particularly interesting in its Deweyan linkage of reflection with maturity: Truly mature moral judgment—universal principles, theories, or philosophies—is thought to emerge as the individual moves beyond the group-conforming level to reflect upon the conventions (norms, customs, rules) of one’s society or group. Kohlberg and others subjected his six-stage cognitive developmental model to longitudinal and cross-cultural scrutiny. After completing his dissertation in 1958, Kohlberg along with colleagues conducted longitudinal research to investigate the invariant sequence of the stages. In the 1960s, he also conducted several pilot cross-cultural studies to investigate whether the stages and dilemma values ‘‘were really universal in non-Western cultures’’ (see his recollection quoted above). The dilemma values (e.g., life, affiliation, property, law, legal justice, contract, and truth) pertained to prescriptively just and benevolent social action (cf. broader value typologies developed by Rokeach, 1973, and Schwartz, 1994). Kohlberg’s longitudinal study. Kohlberg’s longitudinal study (Colby et al., 1983) was conducted from 1956 through 1976. The study consisted of follow-up interviews every 3–4 years with his original dissertation sample of American boys aged 10, 13, and 16 years. Most of the original sample of 84 were interviewed at least three times (10 were interviewed all six times), leaving a final longitudinal sample of 58 men. The interview instrument, the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), featured Kohlberg’s moral dilemmas or ‘‘value conflicts’’ (p. 9). Associated probe questions (e.g., ‘‘Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another’s life? Why or why not?’’) were used to assess participants’ reasoning concerning the decision issues and values entailed in the dilemmas (as illustrated by the Heinz dilemma from Form A of the MJI; see Table 1). The MJI dilemma assessment method encompassed, in addition to the dilemma-based interview, a stage scoring manual and scoring system. Results from the Colby et al. (1983) USA longitudinal study generally supported (despite an anomaly; see below) the empirically testable aspects of Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and stage model. Consistent with the tenet that moral judgment relates to cognition were correlations between moral judgment maturity and intelligence

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(IQ). That moral judgment is nonetheless a unitary domain in its own right was suggested by findings of a single factor in factor analyses. That each stage is empirically coherent was suggested by findings of low stage mixture (although these findings were later criticized as an artifact of MJI scoring algorithms; see Krebs, Vermuelen, Carpendale, & Denton, 1991). Finally, consistent with the tenet that social participation figures importantly into moral judgment development were correlations with age, socioeconomic status, and education. Yet the longitudinal results also initially yielded an anomaly: apparent regression in moral judgment, i.e., a violation of invariant sequence. Approximately 20% of the longitudinal participants regressed from ostensibly principled moral judgment in late high school to much lower scores by the second or third year of college (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). This anomaly led, as Kohlberg recollected, ‘‘to refinement and revision in the description and scoring of the stages’’ (see Table 2). These refinements were designed to restore invariant sequence and in general ‘‘to construct a more adequate assessment instrument’’ (Colby et al., 1983, p. 6). The refinements were effected with seven longitudinal ‘‘construction cases,’’ then cross-validated with the remainder of the sample. The final scoring system was termed MJI Standard Issue Scoring (Colby et al., 1987). The refinements did restore invariant sequence (cf. Walker, 1988), but they also generated ‘‘a fairly radical change in age norms’’ (Colby et al., 1983, p. 67). Of particular relevance to subsequent revisionist models was the fact that the criteria especially for the highest stages became ‘‘more stringent’’ (p. 67). Moral justifications of high school students previously scored Stage 5 or 6 were reinterpreted as at the ‘‘member of society’’ or conventional level, albeit with an intuitive or ‘‘Type B’’ understanding of interpersonal or societal moral ideals (‘‘Type A’’ moral judgments were more embedded in interpersonal or societal conventions or social conformity). True Stage 5 and Stage 6 moral judgments were reinterpreted as entailing ‘‘natural’’ (as distinct from professional) philosophy (Kohlberg, 1973a) and as ‘‘defining a moral theory and justifying basic moral terms or principles from a standpoint outside [or prior to] that of a member of a constituted society’’ (Kohlberg, 1973b, p.192). The refined definition for Stage 6 ‘‘came from the writings of a small elite sample, elite in the sense of its formal [ethical] philosophical training and in the sense of its ability for and commitment to moral leadership’’ (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 270, emphasis added). Stages 5 and 6 were no longer seen before adulthood and became infrequent even among adults: 16% evidenced ‘‘at least the 4/5 transition’’ and very few evidenced mainly or wholly Stage 5. Stage 6 became so infrequent that it was omitted as a distinct stage from the scoring manual (possible Stage 6 responses were assimilated to Stage 5) (Colby et al., 1983, p. 69). Even in the dissertation sample (Kohlberg, 1958), the postconventional stages had been less than common; now they were rare. Intriguingly, the very refinements that restored invariant sequence in the longitudinal data also diminished the prospect of support for the full range of stages as universally evident. The highest stages were not simply ‘‘found’’ (as Kohlberg recollected) but more precisely were refined to be rare. Kohlberg’s cross-cultural studies. In the 1960s, Kohlberg conducted small-scale studies in semi-literate peasant villages of Mexico, Taiwan, and Turkey to assess the universality of his evolving stage model (see Snarey, 1985). Despite the use of less stringent dilemmabased scoring methods in these early studies, ‘‘Stages 5 and 6 [were] totally absent’’ in the village data (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 383). Kohlberg had never claimed universality for the rate

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or final level of his six stages, only for the invariance of their sequence during development. Some developmental delay or less than full development might be expected, for example, for individuals growing up in social environments that were less conducive to social role participation, that is, afforded fewer opportunities for social-perspective-taking. Progress even to the fourth stage required ‘‘enlarged’’ or expanded social perspective-taking in university or complex work settings (Edwards, 1978; Kohlberg, 1984, p. 428; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b). Yet, as Kohlberg recollected, he had undertaken his own early cross-cultural studies precisely to determine ‘‘whether the stages were really universal in non-Western cultures.’’ The total absence of the highest third of his stage typology in non-Western or peasant village cultures, if confirmed, would represent a serious challenge. As Snarey (1985) put it, All types of cultural groups (e.g., Western versus non-Western, urban versus folk) must demonstrate all levels of moral reasoning in Kohlberg’s model to establish its universality. The failure to find a particular stage in all studies of a particular type of cultural group could indicate that the stage is culture specific. (p. 204) Kohlberg’s (moderately) revisionist model This emergent challenge to stage universality from Kohlberg’s own longitudinal and early cross-cultural research, reinforced by Snarey’s (1981, 1982, 1983, 1984) on-going cross-cultural research reviews, prompted Kohlberg (1981, 1991/1985, 1986) to qualify his universality stage claim (critiqued in Snarey’s 1985 published review; see below). In effect, Kohlberg proposed his own (moderately) revisionist model. He acknowledged that the post-conventional or principled level of Stages 5 and 6 is not universal across all cultural groups—indeed, as noted, he even suspended Stage 6 from the scoring manual in part because of its rarity—but defended this state of affairs. Kohlberg (1981) suggested that the principled level is specific to cultures with sufficient ‘‘cognitive and social complexity’’ and breadth of ‘‘social unit’’ (e.g., from tribe to nation) (p. 129). Socially ‘‘complex’’ cultures afforded individuals the opportunity to participate ‘‘in the secondary institutions of law, government, and perhaps, work’’ (Kohlberg, 1984, p. 77; cf. Edwards, 1975). As noted, Kohlberg had always acknowledged in principle that the terminal point or final level would vary as a function of the perspective-taking opportunities afforded by particular social environments. Now he (Kohlberg, 1981) asked: Is not a culture less rich or expanded in social perspective-taking in some sense a less complex culture? Of course, ‘‘a culture cannot be located at a single stage, and the individual’s moral stage cannot be derived directly from his or her culture’s [modal] stage’’ (p. 129; cf. Wainryb, 2006). Nonetheless, Kohlberg suggested that individuals in less ‘‘complex’’ cultures—such as, perhaps, the semi-literate peasant villages he had studied—would generally not be expected to reach the highest stages. Kohlberg even speculated that his stage model corresponded ‘‘to a progression in cultural history,’’ in terms of which village cultures were less evolved insofar as they were prereflective: My findings that the two highest stages are absent in preliterate or semiliterate village culture also suggests a mild doctrine of social evolutionism, such as was elaborated in

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the classic work by Hobhouse in 1906. . . .Principled thinking appeared first in human history in the period 600–400 B.C., when universal human ideals and rational criticism of customary morality developed in Greece, Palestine, India, and China. (cf. Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 128, 378, 383) Despite his defense of principled moral reflection as a selective and culminative product of human history, we will see that—especially following Snarey’s (1985) review—Kohlberg (1986) considered expanding the principles of his highest stages. Snarey’s review Snarey’s (1985) review accepted in principle the viability of Kohlberg’s search for universal morality as well as his cognitive developmental approach. In the main, Snarey’s aim was to assess the evidence for or against the empirically testable assumptions implied by Kohlberg’s universality claims. These claims, Snarey noted, implied that the dilemma-based moral interview adequately captures universal moral concerns and values across cultures. Also implied was that the stage sequence would be upheld and the full range of stages would be evident to some extent in every type of culture (e.g., folk vs. urban; non-Western vs. Western). Finally, all instances of genuine moral reasoning in all cultures should be classifiable in terms of Kohlberg’s stages or stage transitions. To assess the empirically testable implications of Kohlberg’s universality stage claim, Snarey began by ascertaining and reporting the methodological details (regarding sample size, translation, dilemma adaptation, interview procedures, and means and ranges of scores; Gielen, 1991) of Kohlberg’s early small-scale cross-cultural studies. He included that information within a comprehensive survey of 45 studies (conducted within 27 countries or regions) of Kohlberg’s moral judgment stage model. Snarey noted the particular scoring method used in each study and placed greater weight upon studies that used the relatively more recent method (Moral Judgment Interview [MJI] Standard Issue Scoring; Colby et al., 1987). He also noted ways in which the moral dilemmas and questions were adapted and translated for use in different cultures. With regard to the universality of the conflicts and values of Kohlberg’s dilemma method, Snarey noted that for studies in most of the non-English-speaking countries, the dilemmas and questions (and sometimes the manual) had been translated into the appropriate indigenous language. Many researchers also converted the dilemmas to functionally equivalent situations (e.g., converting the famous Heinz dilemma to a situation in which a husband would need to steal food, not a drug, to save his dying wife). Some researchers reported that respondents had little or no difficulty in understanding the dilemmas and questions. Most researchers, however, did not comment on issues of translation or ecological applicability (but cf. Dien, 1982). Vine (1986) cautioned: Great care is needed in adapting an instrument so subtle as the MJI for valid use in test-alien cultures. . . .It seems clear that translating and otherwise adapting dilemmas, interviewing, and scoring responses, must all be done by persons intimately familiar with the cultures being tested. . . .Testing may fail to do justice to the subjects’ actual competence in moral reasoning [if the dilemmas] do not tap [subjects’ predominant concerns]. (pp. 435–436)

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Snarey recommended that ‘‘future researchers pay closer attention to’’ the question of whether the dilemma method and associated moral values are broadly applicable (1985, p. 215). What little evidence that did exist did not contradict Kohlberg’s cross-cultural claim for the moral values entailed in his method. With respect to Kohlberg’s stage model, Snarey (1985) found partial support for Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and universality claims. Stage 1 to Stage 4 were in evidence virtually universally when one took into consideration the age range and sample size of the population under study. Further, most cross-cultural studies reported positive associations between moral judgment stage and age, urban (versus folk) status, and upper (versus working) social class. Finally, the review found that ‘‘all folk [or village] cultural groups failed to exhibit any [Stage 5] postconventional reasoning’’ (p. 226). Kohlberg interpreted these latter findings as simply supporting the cognitive developmental expectation of a relationship between social perspective-taking experiences and moral judgment development. Snarey, however, interpreted the findings as also indicating an association between moral judgment maturity and social privilege. This association, as well as the complete failure to find postconventional reasoning (as defined by Kohlberg) in a particular type of cultural group, led Snarey to suggest a degree of cultural partiality. Finally, the study’s report included examples of arguably postconventional or principled reasoning among judgments in cross-cultural interviews that Kohlberg’s scoring system had relegated to an ‘‘unscorable’’ or wastebasket category. The cumulative weight of these findings, for Snarey, implied a need for model revision. Snarey’s revisionist model: A pluralist–inclusionist elaboration for Stage 5 Snarey (1985) did not agree with Kohlberg that cultural groups in which some members used postconventional reasoning (Stage 5 or Stage 6) were necessarily more complex or advanced cultures. Snarey objected to Kohlberg’s social evolutionism, pointing to anthropological evidence that economically and technologically simple cultures can be complex in many ways (e.g., in language and belief systems) and that members of these cultures, even without the experience of higher education, can ‘‘reason about their customs and norms rather than blindly conforming to them’’ (p. 227). Accordingly, while a given society may differ in terms of the ‘‘proportion of its population reasoning at the higher stages, every type of culture is capable of supporting higher stage reasoning’’ (p. 228). The differences between Kohlberg and Snarey lay in the perception of the postconventional stages. Where Kohlberg saw the summit of social evolution, Snarey sees a particular philosophical tradition and, thus, a problem of monocultural bias. To remedy the problem, Snarey called for greater cultural breadth in Kohlberg’s stage typology and scoring manual. The model proposed by Snarey is philosophically pluralistic and culturally inclusive (see Table 2): The stage definitions are incomplete, especially for Stage 5 [the highest stage included in the scoring manual]. Although Kohlberg’s preconventional and conventional stages are well based on empirical operative judgments rather than on philosophical ethical systems, this is only weakly true of the postconventional stages. Descriptions of higher stage reasoning are primarily based upon Kant, Rawls, and other Western philosophers. Of course, a system of philosophy

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Table 2 Moral judgment development across cultures: Three revisionist models Revisionist model

Kohlberg’s refined stage model

Snarey’s pluralist– inclusionist stage model

Gibbs’s two-phase model

Revision

Empirical suspension of Stage 6a; Stage 5 as culturally specific product of social evolution

Highest ‘‘stages’’ as part of existential phase; existential phase overlaps with standard phase of immature and mature stages

Implication for assessment method

Assimilation of possible Stage 6 responses into Stage 5 justifications in scoring manual; retention of dilemma method

Acceptance of Stage 6 suspension; rejection of social evolutionism; elaboration of Stage 5 to include other cultural philosophies Elaboration of Stage 5 justifications in scoring manual; provisional retention of dilemma method

Stage typology

Three levels Preconventional level: Stage 1. Punishment and obedience Stage 2. Instrumental purpose and exchange Conventional level: Stage 3. Interpersonal accord and conformity Stage 4. Societal accord and system maintenance Postconventional level: Stage 5 (and 6). Social contract, universal ethical principles

a b

Three levels Preconventional level: Stage 1. Punishment and obedience Stage 2. Instrumental purpose and exchange Conventional level: Stage 3. Interpersonal accord and conformity Stage 4. Societal accord and system maintenance Postconventional level: Stage 5 (and 6). Principled moral judgment encompassing a plurality of conceptions of justice and care, including non-Western philosophical systems

Redesigned manual for scoring immature and mature standard stages; possible supplementation with moral philosophiesb; new assessment method (non-dilemma) Two phases Standard development phase Immature level: Stage 1. Centrations on salient features such as size or power Stage 2. Pragmatic exchanges or concrete moral reciprocity Mature level: Stage 3. Mutualities or ideal moral reciprocity Stage 4. Systems. Expansion of mutualities into complex social systems Existential development phase Philosophical reflection on ethics, meaning of life

Subsequently recast and partially reinstated as ideal philosophical endstate (Kohlberg et al., 1990). Following from Snarey.

common to the entire world does not exist, and the integration of all existing systems is not feasible. Thus, it is not surprising that Kohlberg’s postconventional stage descriptions are incomplete. The stage model and scoring manual, nevertheless, should draw examples of reasoning at the higher stages from a wider range of cultural world views. . . .The cross-cultural elaboration of postconventional principles could, I believe, reveal Stage 5 to be a more common empirical phenomenon. (Snarey, 1985, pp. 228–229) In support of his proposal, Snarey (1985; cf. 1995) noted a certain pattern among instances in the cross-cultural research of genuine yet problematic moral judgment, that is, ethical justifications not readily classifiable in terms of any of the Kohlbergian stages.

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The Standard Issue Scoring system and manual had the greatest difficulty with the ‘‘collective or communalistic principled reasoning’’ of village or communitarian cultures (p. 226; cf. Baek, 2002). As an example, Snarey cited the reasoning of a 50-year-old man from a communitarian culture (India). To justify an evaluation favoring Heinz’s stealing the drug to save the life even of a pet animal (an optional MJI question), the respondent appealed to ‘‘the unity of all life’’: The right use of the drug is to administer it to the needy. There is some difference, of course—human life is more evolved and hence of greater importance in the scheme of nature—but an animal’s life is not altogether bereft of importance. . . . Life is known, understood and felt by everyone. It is [just] a matter of fact whether it is manifest in man or animal. The basic unity of life and its importance cannot be denied. . . . All of life, human or nonhuman, is divine, sacred, and a manifestation of the Supreme reality. . . . Spiritual consciousness. . . . should propel one towards recognising the unity of all life rather than selecting victims that are powerless. It is only in very special conditions that life survives and evolves to the standards known to us. (Vasudev, 1983, pp. 7–8, cited in Snarey, 1985, p. 223; cf. Vasudev & Hummel, 1987, p. 115) Had the manual included such examples of non-Western philosophies or worldviews for postconventional reasoning, Snarey argues, postconventional or principled stage reasoning would have been seen to be more common. Kohlberg was persuaded, at least generally, of this point by the mid-1980s. He acknowledged that ‘‘general principles at Stage 6 may be one or several,’’ including not only ‘‘universal human care or agape’’ but also other principles such as ‘‘maximum quality of life’’ (Kohlberg, 1986, p. 497). Nonetheless, Snarey’s suggestion was not implemented by Kohlberg and colleagues. The Standard Issue Scoring Manual, already in press, was published in 1987 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Colby et al., 1987) without Snarey’s proposed cross-cultural elaborations for Stage 5. Other responses Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s were not, of course, the only possible responses to the longbrewing problem of rarity and cultural specificity at the highest stages. Other responses entailed proposals that went beyond the suspension of Stage 6 or the elaboration of Stage 5. Some critics argued that, despite some cross-cultural commonalities, the attempt to assess greater or less moral adequacy among individuals in and across various cultures was untenable. For these theorists (in the main, cultural psychologists, e.g., Shweder, 1984; Shweder et al., 2006; Simpson, 1974; cf. J. G. Miller, 2006), the very notion of moral judgment development across cultures, of progressive moral adequacy in some non-relative sense, was suspect. Carolyn Edwards’ (1975, 1985, 1986) response was sympathetic to both relativistic and developmental positions. In developmental terms, she referred to ‘‘the transition from tribal to civilized society’’ as entailing the differentiation of social control functions into separate institutions and hence a need for ‘‘more complex and differentiated’’ moral judgment such as Stage 4 (see below). She cautioned, however, that ‘‘‘higher’ is not necessarily better.’’ Rather than endorsing social evolutionism, Edwards emphasized a functionalist or anthropological perspective: Life tasks

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in different kinds of environments entail different ‘‘cognitive requirements’’ for effective functioning (1975, p. 525). Gibbs’s revisionist model: Two phases of life-span moral judgment development Gibbs’s (1977, 1979, 2003) response to the problem of non-universality of the highest stages can be compared (and contrasted) with the above perspectives. Like Snarey, Gibbs subscribes to a broad as well as (with qualifications) a domain-specific cognitive developmental approach to morality. Gibbs’ perspective, however, is more univocally developmental (vs. functionalist) than Edwards’ perspective and more revisionist than Snarey’s. Indeed, Gibbs went beyond Snarey and even Edwards in proposing a more fundamental, Piaget-based revamping of Kohlberg’s stage model. Gibbs (2006b) argues that Kohlberg should not have retained Dewey’s three-level typology, especially in light of the challenges to that typology from Kohlberg’s own longitudinal and cross-cultural data. As Kohlberg recollected, his work was based not only on Piaget’s research but also on Dewey’s writings concerning three developmental levels. Although Piaget (1932/1965) in his Moral Judgment of the Child made no reference to Dewey, Dewey’s linkage of reflection to maturity is not inconsistent with Piaget’s emphasis on reflective abstraction as in the construction from pragmatic or tit-for-tat (‘‘short-sighted justice’’) to ideal (‘‘do as you would be done by’’) moral reciprocity: The child’s concern with reciprocity leads [him or her] beyond . . . short-sighted justice. . . . The child begins by simply practicing reciprocity, in itself not so easy a thing as one might think. Then, once one has grown accustomed to this form of equilibrium in his action, his behavior is altered from within, its form reacting, as it were, upon its content. What is regarded as just is no longer merely reciprocal action, but primarily behavior that admits of indefinitely sustained reciprocity. The motto ‘‘Do as you would be done by,’’ thus comes to replace the conception of crude equality. The child sets forgiveness above revenge, not out of weakness, but because ‘‘there is no end’’ to revenge (a boy of 10). . . . In ethics, reciprocity implies a purification of the deeper trend of conduct, guiding it . . . to . . . the more refined forms of justice. (pp. 323–324) Although Dewey’s association of reflection with maturity was helpful, his view of basic moral judgment stage maturity in terms of philosophical reflection (in Gibbs’ view) was not. According to Gibbs, Kohlberg’s longitudinal data fit Piaget’s empirical work much better than it did Dewey’s three-level typology. Indeed, Gibbs argues that Kohlberg should have discarded Dewey’s preconventional–conventional–postconventional typology, not least because its emphasis on philosophical reflection encouraged a rarification of the construct of basic moral judgment maturity. Recall that, in the service of restoring invariant sequence, Kohlberg stretched the ‘‘conventional level’’ or ‘‘member of society’’ level to assimilate various ‘‘principled-sounding’’ (and formerly ‘‘Stage 5’’ or ‘‘Stage 6’’) moral justifications such as ‘‘trust is the basis for relationships’’ for the importance of keeping promises and ‘‘the value of human life is more important than society’s need for law in this case’’ for the decision that Heinz should steal a drug or food to save his wife’s life. After this downward assimilation, all that remained to represent the fifth stage was theoretically and philosophically sophisticated discourse, classifiable by justifications

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such as ‘‘the right to life supersedes or transcends the right to property’’ (Colby et al., 1987, p. 53). As noted, such discourse was typically not seen until the adult years, if ever. To replace the Deweyan preconventional–conventional–postconventional typology, Gibbs proposed a model of life-span moral judgment development consisting of overlapping standard and existential phases (see Table 2). Gibbs’ emphasis was on the primary phase of standard or invariant stages. Although moral judgment in both phases entails growth beyond the superficial, development in the standard (mainly pre-adult) phase is more uniform and relates more consistently to general cognitive development. Although Gibbs largely shares Kohlberg’s specific cognitive developmental expectations concerning the moral domain, social perspective-taking, and stage sequence, Gibbs argues that the stage mixture seen elsewhere in cognitive development (Brainerd, 1978, 1979) is also evident in moral judgment development, clouding somewhat the picture of invariant sequence (Gibbs, 2003). Despite this stage mixture, moral judgment in the standard phase can generally be seen to progress with age from immature (Stage 1, centrations on or overattention to salient features; Stage 2, pragmatic or instrumental exchanges) to mature (Stage 3, mutualities or ideal moral reciprocity; and Stage 4, social systems) levels (see Table 2). Within the mature level of standard stage development, Gibbs adopted Edwards’ (1975, 1986) argument that Kohlberg was right in principle, if not in specifics, to associate moral judgment maturity with societal complexity. Stage 3 mutualities may represent moral judgment maturity sufficient for ‘‘the traditional and isolated peasant village.’’ Although the village culture may be in certain respects complex and its members reflective (as Snarey argued), such a face-to-face, familiar community may not need the ‘‘formal and elaborate legal mechanisms’’ and standards required for dispute resolution and social equilibrium in a more heterogeneous or pluralistic ‘‘complex society such as a modern national state’’ (Edwards, 1975, p. 511, 525). For the latter societies, Edwards suggested, the mature level may entail reasoning at Stage 4 or higher (p. 511). Despite the emphasis on standard development, moral maturity in the fullest sense in Gibbs’ model is not only standard but also existential. Although Gibbs objected to Snarey’s acceptance of Kohlberg’s stage designation of moral philosophical principles, he agrees with Snarey that philosophical reflections or worldviews, e.g., the Indian adult’s ethical and spiritual reflection cited earlier, are cross-culturally pervasive. Beyond thinking about the deeper meaning of exchanges, ‘‘the mature thinker’’ in any culture ‘‘may think about all manner of abstract ideas and ideals in such areas as morality, religion, and politics’’ (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 182), even about existential concerns such as the meaning of life. Life-span moral judgment development across cultures should encompass existential inquiry: Contractarian and Kantian philosophies should be seen not as postconventional, final stages in an invariant sequence but rather as products of hypothetical reflection on normative ethics, stemming from the morality of one or another of the basic moral judgment stages. Adults who contemplate their morality and formulate ethical principles have not thereby constructed a new Piagetian stage. They have, however, engaged in a developmental process of existential inquiry with personal relevance for ethical living. (Gibbs, 2003, p. 7)

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Snarey sees the diverse ethical formulations within Gibbs’s existential phase as stagerelevant philosophical voices, many of which are missing from Kohlberg’s fifth stage. An alternative (dilemma-free) assessment method In the early history of Kohlbergian research as it culminated in certain theoretical issues and revisionist models, a serious limitation can be noted: All of the moral judgment data were obtained through a single research instrument, namely, Kohlberg’s dilemma-based assessment method. As Snarey (1985) and others cautioned, the cross-cultural use of moral dilemmas entails potential problems. More generally, the state of our methodology in the social and behavioral sciences is such that the exclusive reliance on any single method is often fraught with peril. Accordingly, a pervasive emphasis in contemporary psychological research is on the use of multimethod strategies (Brewer & Hunter, 2006). Hence the need to expand the research focus to consider cross-cultural studies of moral judgment development that collectively entail the use of multiple assessment methods. As noted, Snarey (1985) recommended that future researchers study more closely the cross-cultural validity of the conflicts and values entailed in Kohlberg’s standard dilemma interview, the MJI. If Kohlberg’s dilemma issues and values lack ecological validity for a given culture, then even adapted standard dilemmas might not elicit respondents’ optimal competence, or for that matter, that culture’s indigenous moral issues, judgments, and values. Dien (1982) argued that the Heinz dilemma in particular (whether drugs or food are at stake) was inappropriate to the collectivist culture of a Chinese village (see also Boyes & Walker, 1988). The alternative strategy of generating dilemmas idiosyncratic to a particular culture (e.g., White, 1983), although ‘‘admirable’’ in some respects, generates problems of nonstandardization (Snarey, 1985, p. 215). Preempting the issue of whether to use adapted standard or non-standard indigenous dilemmas is the strategy of not using dilemmas at all. The use of any reliable and valid alternative assessment method can potentially bolster or diminish conclusions regarding the universality of a given model of moral judgment development and values. Although a nondilemma assessment method may have its own limitations, they would differ at least in part from those of the dilemma method. In the multimethod approach to the study of social phenomena, ‘‘the weakness of any one method can be, at least to some extent, compensated for by the strengths of another’’ (S. A. Miller, 2007, p. 113). Hence, ‘‘conclusions based upon a convergence of evidence from different methods can be held with a greater certainty than can conclusions based on one approach alone’’ (p. 113). In the present application of this point, a conclusion concerning moral judgment development, values, and social processes across cultures drawn from multiple methods (i.e., convergence from a multimethod extension) would be more definitive than a conclusion drawn exclusively from a single method. Besides the MJI, various related production and recognition measures have been developed and used in the United States and other countries (see Gibbs, Basinger, & Grime, 2003). Like the MJI, these measures involve the use of moral dilemmas. One example is a group-administrable equivalent to the MJI, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure (e.g., Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982; Nillson, Crafoord, Hedengren, & Ekehammar, 1991). Other examples include recognition and evaluation (or comprehension and preference) measures such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2006), the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM; e.g., DeHaan, Hanford, Kinlaw, Philler, & Snarey, 1997; Dominguez & Carbonell,

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1993; Gibbs et al., 1984; Van IJzendoorn, 2001), the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure-Short Form (SROM-SF; e.g., Basinger & Gibbs, 1987; Beem, Brugman, Host, & Tavecchio, 2004; Bore, Munro, Kerridge, & Powis, 2005), the Moral Judgment Test (e.g., Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Lind, 2005), and the Padua Moral Judgment Scale (e.g., Comunian, 2004; Comunian, Sarada, & Morita, 2005). Most prominent among these recognition/preference measures has been the DIT (see especially Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, 2006). Reviews of 15 cross-cultural DIT studies have shown that, across North American, European, and East Asian societies (with less clarity for Arab and Caribbean societies), preference for postconventional, principled, or philosophically reflective considerations increases with advancing age and education (Gielen & Markoulis, 2001; Naito, Lin, & Gielen, 2001). Given the availability of these cross-cultural reviews pertaining to the most prominent recognition/preference measure (the DIT), this article focuses on the hitherto unreviewed cross-cultural research literature pertaining to an alternative production measure. Recognition and production measures entail differing strengths and weaknesses. For example, whereas recognition measures permit greater ease of scoring, production measures permit the possibility of discovering novel modes of reflection in various cultures. Among production measures other than the MJI, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) has been used in at least 75 moral judgment studies in 23 countries (see below). In contrast to other assessment methods (recognition or production), the SRM-SF is unique in that it does not entail the use of moral dilemmas, stories, or other vignettes. Accordingly, research studies that use the SRM-SF may provide the basis for an alternative examination, across methods and cultures, of moral judgment development, values, and social processes. Description of the SRM-SF will provide an explanatory context necessary for the research review to follow. Description of the SRM-SF Derived from the MJI and a related dilemma-based method (the Sociomoral Reflection Method [SRM], Gibbs et al., 1982), the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF) is a dilemma-free production measure consisting of a questionnaire, scoring manual, and self-training materials for achieving reliable, valid, and accurate stage scoring (Gibbs et al., 1992; see studies under United States in Table 3). The SRM-SF questions were written at a fourth-grade reading level and the questionnaire was designed for group administration (with instructions to the administrator to check for protocol completion and scorability). It has been group-administered to children as young as 8 or 9 (some researchers have orally administered the questions to individual children as young as 5 or 6; Gibbs et al., 1992; Snarey & Keljo, 1994). The questionnaire contains 11 items that elicit evaluations and justifications (see Table 1). Respondents evaluate the importance of the main ‘‘issues, values, or institutions’’ that (according to Kohlberg) comprise the core of morality and ‘‘are found in every society and culture,’’ such as contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice (cf. Kohlberg, 1984, pp. 189–190, 309; cf. Maccoby, 1980, pp. 297–299). In place of MJI dilemmas, concrete suggestions introduce the values those dilemmas encompass (e.g., to introduce contract and truth, question 1: ‘‘Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours;’’ to introduce affiliation and life, question 6: ‘‘Let’s say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you’re the only person who can save him or her’’). The suggestions lead into general moral evaluation

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Table 3 Cross-cultural SRM-SF reliability and validity resultsa Study

Reliability Interrater

Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant) Other Armenia

Jeshmaridian and NR Babakhanyan (2005)

NR

Putnins (1997)

NR

NR

Stevenson et al. (2004)

r = .93

NR

Al-Falaij (1991)

NR

NR

Moral judgment correlated with age; urban mean higher than rural Australia Victim Awareness intervention promoted delinquents’ moral judgment Moral judgment higher and criminal sentiments lower in nonoffender adults, but no difference in criminal sentiments between delayed and nondelayed offenders Bahrain Non-delinquent moral judgment mean higher than delinquent Belgium

Day and Naedts (1995) r = .87–.97

NR

Garrod et al. (2004)

NR

NR

Vlassev (1998)

r = .88

NR

Binfet (2004)

r = .83

NR

Dibiase (2002)

NR

NR

Krivel-Zacks (1995)

r = .95

NR

Raynauld et al. (1999)

r = .81

NR

Lee (2001)

NR

NR

Brusten (2003)

r = .85

Palmer and Begum (2006)

r = .99

Moral judgment higher per grade, age group Bosnia Moral judgment higher in older groups; crossnational comparison (Bosnia, USA) Bulgaria Moral judgment correlated with relationship adjustment Canada Sociomoral intervention promoted moral judgment Sociomoral intervention promoted moral judgment, social skills; moral judgment correlated with social, anger management skills Sociomoral intervention promoted moral judgment, social skills, conduct; moral judgment correlated with prosocial behavior, inversely with academic misconduct Sociomoral intervention promoted moral judgment China

Line missing

England Factor analysis (one factor, small secondary factor) Cronbach’s alpha = .87

Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent mean; moral judgment higher per grade Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent; moral judgment higher per age group

Moral judgment did not correlate with provictim attitudes or self-reported aggression among offenders (continued on next page)

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Table 3 (continued) Study

Reliability Interrater

Palmer and (1996) Palmer and (1997) Palmer and (1998) Palmer and (1999) Palmer and (2000)

Hollin

NR

NR

Hollin

NR

NR

Hollin

NR

NR

Hollin

r = .98

NR

Hollin

NR

NR

Palmer and Hollin (2001)

NR

NR

Tarry and Emler (2007) r = .97

Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant) Other Moral judgment correlated inversely with delinquency for females Modal moral judgment correlated inversely with maternal rejection Non-delinquent moral judgment mean higher than delinquent Moral judgment not correlated with social skills Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent; moral judgment correlated with attribution of prosocial intent in non-delinquents, inversely with antisocial severity in delinquents Moral judgment correlated inversely with selfreported delinquency, attachment; correlated with SES and age Moral judgment correlated with age but not self-reported delinquency

NR

Stadler et al. (2007)

NR

Germany Factor analysis (one factor, small secondary factor); Cronbach’s alpha = .73 NR

Ferguson and Cairns (1996) Ferguson and Cairns (2002) Ferguson et al. (1994)

r = .89

NR

r = .90

NR

r = .90

Ferguson et al. (2001)

r = .89

Cronbach’s alphas = .64–.79; test–retest r = .91 NR

Comunian and Gielen (1995) Comunian and Gielen (2000)

r = .82–.85

Krettenauer and Becker r = .82 (2001)

Non-delinquents’ moral judgment mean higher than delinquent; moral judgment higher in older group, correlated inversely with right-wing extremist ideology Non-conduct disordered participants’ moral judgment higher than conduct-disordered participants’ moral judgment; moral judgment correlated with with inhibitory control

Ireland

r = .89–.93 r = .90–.97

Comunian and Gielen (2006)

Line missing

r = NR

Italy Cronbach’s alpha = .79, .80 Cronbach’s alpha = .90 Cronbach’s alpha = .88 NR

Moral judgment higher in older group, lowviolent neighborhood Moral judgment urban mean higher than town Concurrent validity (with SROM) r = .71; moral judgment correlated with age Cross-national comparison (Nigeria, Northern Ireland) Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for older group, community volunteers Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for older group, community volunteers Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher for nondrug abusers Moral judgment (stage, Type) gains correlated with social perspective-taking; sociomoral intervention promoted moral judgment, social perspective-taking

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Table 3 (continued) Study

Reliability Interrater

Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant) Other

Gielen et al. (1994)

r = .98

Cronbach’s alpha = .86; test–retest r = .83

Mizuno (1999) Takaki (2001)

r = NR r = .83

NR NR

Wasanga (2004)

r = .90

Kenya Cronbach’s alpha = .97

Chu (1999)

n/ab

NR

Brugman and Aleva (2004) Brugman et al. (1999)

r = .84–.94

Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher per grade, age group; cross-national comparison (Italy, USA)

Japan Cross-national comparison (Japan, USA) Moral judgment (stage, Type) higher per grade, age group Moral judgment higher per grade, age group; urban mean higher than rural

Malaysia

r = .94

Moral education promoted moral judgment; moral judgment correlated with academic achievement

Netherlands Cronbach’s alpha = .66 NR

Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent; not correlated with social desirability Concurrent validity (with SROM-SF) r = .43; Moral judgment higher than school-related practical reasoning; Moral judgment correlated with age in delinquents and non-delinquents; moral judgment did not uniquely predict delinquent behavior Sociomoral intervention did not promote moral judgment; moral judgment correlated with age and intelligence but not with low cognitive distortion; not correlated with social desirability

Leenders and Brugman r = .81 (2005)

NR

Nas et al. (2005)

r = .80

Cronbach’s alpha = .64

Ferguson et al. (2001)

r = .89

NR

Hauer (2001)

r = .88–.89

Russia Cronbach’s alpha = .69

Moral judgment higher per grade, age; correlated with Life Meaning Index

Al-Ghamdi (1994)

r = NR

Saudi Arabia NR

Moral judgment not correlated with ego level

Ferguson and Cairns (2002)

r = .90

NR

Larden et al. (2006)

r = .82

NR

Nigeria Cross-national comparison (Nigeria, Northern Ireland)

Scotland Urban moral judgment mean higher than town Sweden

Line missing

Non-delinquents’ and females’ moral judgment mean higher; moral judgment correlated positively with empathy, negatively with cognitive distortion (continued on next page)

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Table 3 (continued) Study

Reliability Interrater

Chen and Hsieh (2001) r = .87

Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant) Other

Taiwan Cronbach’s alpha = .69

Lin, Q. Q. (1999) Lin, W. Y. (1995)

r = .80 r = .84

NR Cronbach’s alpha = .70;

Tang (2004)

r = .92

Cronbach’s alpha = .77; test–retest r = .43

Barriga et al. (2001)

r = .81

Basinger et al. (1995)

r = .94–.99

Bock (2006)

r = .88–.93

Factor analysis (one factor); Cronbach’s alphas = .57–.93; test–retest r = .61–.88 NR

Chang (2001)

NR

NR

DeVargas (1999)

NR

NR

Garrod et al. (2004) Getty (1996)

NR r = .81

NR NR

Greenberg (2002)

r = .84

Greene (1997)

NR

Cronbach’s alpha = .90 NR

Gregg et al. (1994)

r = .88–.99

NR

Grime (2005)

r = .97

NR

Hubbs-Tait et al. (2006)

r = .96

NR

Humphries et al. (2000) Krcmar and Valkenburg (1999) Leeman et al. (1993)

80–90% global agreement r = NR

NR

Line missing

r = .92

United States NR

Cronbach’s alpha = .66 NR

Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent; moral judgment correlated with academic performance; not correlated with social desirability Concurrent validity (with MJI) r = .78 Concurrent validity (with DIT) r = .49; correlated with age; negatively correlated with social desirability Moral judgment mean higher in older group

Moral judgment correlated inversely with antisocial behavior, self-serving cognitive distortions Concurrent validity (with MJI) r = .46; nondelinquent moral judgment mean higher than delinquent; moral judgment correlated with age, SES, verbal intelligence; not correlated with social desirability Moral judgment related to moral theme comprehension, grade Nonpsychopathic mean higher among offenders; moral judgment correlated inversely with psychopathy Character education promoted moral judgment Moral judgment mean higher in older group Moral judgment higher for high goalorientation in girls Higher moral judgment related to less theft for companies with ethics programs Service learning did not promote moral judgment, Non-delinquent mean higher than delinquent mean Verbal ability, friendship perspective-taking predicted moral judgment Moral judgment correlated with positive parenting attitudes, one psychosocial subscale (ego identity) but not another (intimacy) Moral judgment higher per grade, correlated with communalism and empathy for boys Moral judgment correlated with disapproval of TV violence Sociomoral intervention did not promote moral judgment but moral judgment correlated inversely with recidivism (12 mos.)

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Table 3 (continued) Study

Reliability Interrater

Validity (concurrent, construct, discriminant)

Other

Mason and Gibbs (1993a, 1993b) McInerney (1995)

r = .99

NR

r = .92

NR

Oliver, J. M. (2003)

r = .81

Cronbach’s alpha = .67

Oliver, K. A. (1993)

r = .96

NR

Peterson (2001)

r = .84–.93

NR

Ritz (1996)

NR

NR

Rose (2005)

r = .97

NR

Schonfeld et al. (2005)

r = .98

NR

Travis et al. (2004)

r > .80c

NR

Van IJzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995) Van Someren (2000)

NR

NR

r = .97

NR

Woods and Jagers (2003)

60% exact global

NR

Moral judgment correlated with social perspective-taking Moral judgment correlated inversely with misconduct General moral judgment correlated with computer-use moral judgment, but the latter less mature Moral judgment correlated with closeness of relationships Moral judgment mean higher for nonoffenders Moral judgment higher per grade, correlated inversely with misconduct Moral judgment correlated with age, planning, problem-solving skills but did not differentiate ADHD children with income controlled Moral judgment higher for juveniles not exposed prenatally to alcohol; moral judgment did not uniquely predict delinquent behavior; moral judgment correlated with age, verbal intelligence, cognitive inhibition; did not correlate with social desirability Moral judgment higher for adults with Transcendental Meditation experience; moral judgment correlated with inner orientation, lower anxiety, emotional stability Moral judgment type (B) higher in adults with secure attachment representations Moral judgment correlated with age, GPA; supplement proposed for scoring moral reasoning with religious content Moral judgment correlated with communalism, caring affect, and spirituality

Note: NR indicates information not reported. a Sample sizes and participant descriptions provided in Tables 4 and 6. b Protocol stage scores based on multiple-choice selections. c Travis et al. (2004) reported that ‘‘the scorers met the requirements for reliability in scoring’’ (p. 413).

questions, e.g., ‘‘How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a friend? Circle one: Very Important/Important/Not Important.’’ Respondents then explain or justify their evaluation (see Table 1). This briefer, non-dilemma strategy for assessing moral judgment and values may offer certain advantages relative to the dilemma-based MJI. Snarey and Keljo (1994) noted that the lead-in statements serve to ‘‘stimulate reflective thought’’ (p. 184). Hart (1993) observed that many of the more fruitful questions on the MJI are similar to those on the SRM-SF and do not pertain to the specifics of the dilemmas at all. Consequently, the decision to omit dilemmas from the SRM-SF appears to be wise. (p. 431)

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Although omitting the dilemmas preempts issues of dilemma translation, potential translation and relevance issues remain, of course, even with the briefer stimuli. Gibbs et al. (1992) argued that using open statements rather than specific dilemmas promotes ecological validity: As the lead-ins are considered, participants implicitly supply the appropriate situational content for keeping promises and other moral values in terms of the contexts of their daily lives and their culture’s meaning systems (J. G. Miller, 2006). Respondents also bring to the task their psychological understanding of such social actions (e.g., Brown & Herrnstein, 1978, pp. 336–338; Wainryb et al., 2005). Allowing for the respondents’ context of interpretation through the reduction of ‘‘particular words, facts, or information [as in a dilemma]’’ may promote more valid comparability of response data across studies (Damon, 1977, pp. 57–58). As the importance of the associated values is evaluated, respondents are presumably stimulated to reflect and so are primed to respond to the ‘‘why’’ questions that follow. The cultural relevance of Kohlbergian moral values at least in the United States (where most of the initial research concerning the SRM-SF was conducted) is suggested by the fact that the values are typically evaluated as either important or very important. In one USA study, at least 90% of both delinquents and nondelinquents evaluated most of the values as either important or very important (Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; cf. Palmer & Hollin, 1998). Another indicator that the values are relevant to many cultural groups may be the low protocol attrition rate, as discussed later. Moral judgment stage scoring pertains to participants’ justifications for the importance of the values. Questions 1 through 4 elicit evaluations and justifications pertaining to contract and truth; questions 5 and 6 to affiliation; questions 7 and 8 to life; questions 9 and 10 to property and law; and question 11 to legal justice (see Table 1). Protocol justifications are matched with stage-indicative justifications (classified by stage aspect) in the SRM-SF scoring manual. The highest stage rating is entered for each item, and the average stage rating across the 11 items constitutes the overall protocol score (Gibbs et al., 1992). Protocol stage scores are sometimes reported in terms of global stage, which may involve either a differentiation of major and minor stages, e.g., 3(2) or 2(3), resulting in a 10-point scale, or a simpler transition designation, e.g., 2/3, resulting in a 7-point scale. Global stage is derived from Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), a continuous variable ranging from 100 (a protocol yielding exclusively Stage 1 ratings; 126–174 = transition 1/2; 175–225 = Stage 2; etc.) to 400 (a protocol yielding exclusively Stage 4 ratings). For SRM-SF protocols to be usable, stage ratings must be obtained for justification responses to at least 7 of the 11 items. Group administrators of the SRM-SF are instructed to check protocols as they are collected for completion and scorability (to the extent feasible). A moral judgment can be defined as a justified or reasoned moral decision or value concerning just and/or benevolent social action (see Gibbs, 2003; cf. Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). Assuming the stage typology and scoring manual are adequately universal, any genuine and reasonably clear justification or reasoning should be scorable for stage or transition. The SRM-SF scoring manual describes categories of spurious or pseudo-justifications (e.g., repeat evaluations, tautologies, fragments, ‘‘word salads,’’ and comments). Even a genuine justification may be problematic or unscorable if it is excessively ambiguous, defined in the scoring rules as matching at more than three adjacent levels (e.g., transition 1/2 to Stage 3). Very young and/or marginally literate participants are at risk for submitting unusable (incomplete and excessively ambiguous) protocols.

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Attrition rates are indirectly relevant to the universality question concerning moral values and judgments. Attrition for SRM-SF protocols was generally under 10% (Basinger et al., 1995). Although a given sample may have a high attrition rate for ordinary methodological reasons (poor test administration, participant literacy problems, etc.), consistently high attrition rates in samples from a given culture should be investigated. It is possible that an unusable protocol’s justifications are excessively vague or perfunctory because the values they serve are not evaluated as important in that culture (the value evaluations typically are not reported but should be checked where attrition rates are consistently high). Alternatively, the justifications of an unusable protocol may not be ambiguous at all. Perhaps the protocol moral judgments are adequately clear and genuine, but are ‘‘problematic’’ only because the stage typology and scoring manual do not represent them. Using the SRM-SF outside the United States The SRM-SF has been used to measure moral judgment development in at least 752 research studies. This data base may enable us to revisit, two decades after Snarey’s review, Kohlberg’s generic claim that cross-culturally general moral judgment stages, values, and social processes are identifiable, as well as his specific claim for his particular stage model. SRM-SF instrumentation issues are less complex than those faced by Snarey. For example, whereas Snarey had to identify and evaluate distinct MJI scoring systems among the studies he reviewed, the SRM-SF entails a single scoring system (although several researchers did make certain adaptations, described later). Using the SRM-SF as part of a multimethod reexamination of Kohlberg’s universality claims presupposes the adequacy of the SRM-SF data base as well as the SRM-SF itself. The 2007 SRM-SF data base should be sufficiently large and diverse, and the SRM-SF should evidence adequate translatability, reliability, attrition rates (approximately 10% or lower), and validity in other countries. Cultural diversity of the data base. A cross-cultural data base should be adequate in terms of research volume as well as the diversity of cultures sampled. Snarey started his 1985 review by asking whether moral development research using the MJI dilemma method had ‘‘been conducted in a sufficiently wide range of sociocultural settings to jeopardize adequately the claim’’ of universality (p. 203). To assess the cultural diversity of his data base, Snarey classified the studies by the criteria of whether the populations sampled were: (a) Western or Westernized (vs. non-Western) and/or (b) urban (vs. tribal or village). Although the preponderance of his MJI data sets were from urban or Westernized societies (e.g., Canada, Germany, India), 10 of the 45 sampled populations were tribal or village and (arguably) non-Western (e.g., Alaskan Eskimos, Guatemalan villagers, rural Kenyan villagers). The present SRM-SF data base (75 studies in 23 countries) is comparable to Snarey’s MJI data base (45 studies in 27 countries) in research volume, although slightly less diverse in terms of variations in cultural complexity. Nevertheless, by Snarey’s criteria, the present data base is still diverse. Although many of the SRM-SF samples are urban and Western2 The 2007 SRM-SF data base entails 75 substantive studies, but technically totals at least 78 studies. Two pairs of studies (Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b; and Stevenson, Hall, & Innes, 2003, 2004) each share an identical sample and hence are counted as only two studies. A study by Garmon, Basinger, Gregg, and Gibbs (1996) also entailed secondary data analysis. Rutten et al. (in press) utilized the SRM-SF for construct validation purposes but did not publish SRM-SF descriptive statistics.

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ized, some are nonurban (rural communities in Armenia, Kenya, Nigeria), and others are outside Western Europe and North America (namely, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, and Russia in Eastern Europe; Sweden in Northwest Europe; China, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan in Asia; Kenya and Nigeria in Africa; and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East). Hence, the range of sociocultural settings in the present data base is sufficiently wide to allow a test of universality claims. Additional comparisons are noteworthy. In terms of nationality, 9 countries are represented in both Snarey’s MJI data base and the present SRM-SF data base: Canada, China, England, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Taiwan, and USA. Represented in Snarey’s but not the present review are 19 countries or cultural groups: Alaskan Eskimo, Bahamas, Finland, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Mexico, New Guinea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Thailand, Turkey, Yucatan, and Zambia. Finally, the present data base includes 14 countries that were not part of the Snarey review: Armenia, Australia, Bahrain, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, and Sweden. An important caveat should be noted. Whereas 7 of the 45 studies reviewed by Snarey were longitudinal (and the remainder cross-sectional), all of the 75 studies in the present review are cross-sectional. One referent for the question of universal stages is invariant sequence: Is the same order of stage succession evident in other cultures? As Snarey (1985) explained—and as must be emphasized—this question is best addressed on the basis of patterns seen in longitudinal studies of stage development. Hence, Snarey was in a stronger position for investigating this aspect of the universal stage claim. Snarey also examined possible irregularities among the cross-sectional studies (e.g., absence of an intermediate stage in a range of stages) that would suggest invariant sequence violations such as stage skipping. Snarey’s longitudinal and cross-sectional data were consistent with the claim of standard consecutive sequence of stages, as are the cross-sectional data in the present survey. Suitability for cross-cultural research. Cross-cultural suitability issues pertain to translatability, reliability, and validity. Each of these criteria will be addressed below (another criterion, protocol attrition, will be discussed in the next section). Translatability. Because the SRM-SF questionnaire is briefer than the MJI interview (see Table 1), translation (needed in many of the studies) was less demanding. The questionnaire has been successfully translated into Arabic, Bahasa Malaysian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Dutch, Eastern Armenian, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Kikamba, Kiswahili, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, and Swedish. Researchers in Armenia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and Taiwan used a back-translation procedure to ensure accuracy. In Germany, Krettenauer and Becker (2001) chose to translate and administer only 8 of the 11 questionnaire items to streamline data collection (items 3, 5, and 8 were judged to be non-essential). In Belgium (Day & Naedts, 1995), the Netherlands (Zwart-Woudstra, Meijer, Fintelman, & Van IJzendoorn, 1993), and Taiwan (W.Y. Lin, 1995; Tang, 2004), not only the questionnaire but also the scoring manual were translated (into French, Dutch, and Chinese, respectively). Because Krettenauer and Becker (2001) found that a number of his German respondents appealed in their justifications to stage-indicative folk sayings, they supplemented the manual with these sayings (illustrated in Table 5). Reliability. Cross-cultural researchers contributing to the present data base addressed questions of instrument reliability. Snarey focused on reports of the MJI scoring system’s

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interrater reliability, which were generally acceptable (interrater reliability was reported in 31 of the 47 studies comprising Snarey’s data base). Similarly, the interrater reliability coefficients as reported in 53 of the 75 studies comprising the present data base were all at or above .80 (the minimum acceptable; Basinger et al., 1995) (see Table 3). Ideally, interrater reliability information would be available for all of the studies in the data bases; but at least no systematic deviation from the general pattern of results is evident for the subset of studies not reporting interrater reliability. Several researchers used teams of raters and reported a range of interrater reliability results. Interrater reliability coefficient ranges reported in Belgium (Day & Naedts, 1995), the Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva, 2004), Russia (Hauer, 2001), and the USA (Peterson, 2001) were somewhat lower (r = .84 to r = .97) but still comparable to the range (r = .94 to r = .99) reported by Basinger et al. (1995) for a team of undergraduate, graduate, and faculty raters. A number of researchers also reported test–retest internal consistency reliability indices such as Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 3). Magnitudes were comparable to those reported in the USA (.57 to .67; .93 for total sample; Basinger et al., 1995) and ranged from .64 (in Northern Ireland; Ferguson, McLernon, & Cairns, 1994) to .90 (in Italy; Comunian & Gielen, 2000). In factor analyses, Basinger et al.’s (1995) USA finding of a single dominant factor was replicated (but with a small secondary factor) in England (Brusten, 2003) and Germany (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). Test–retest reliability levels (using 2–3 week time intervals) reported in Ireland and Italy were comparable to that reported by Basinger et al. (r = .88), although a level reported in Taiwan (r = .70, Chen & Hsieh, 2001) was somewhat lower (see Table 3). Finally, several international studies conducted factor analyses. Although factor analyses may also be considered relevant to questions of internal consistency, such results have particular relevance to theoretical tenets of Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and so are noted in the next section. Validity. Other findings among the cross-cultural studies pertained to questions of concurrent, discriminant, and construct validity. The acceptable USA concurrent validity of the SRM-SF with the MJI was corroborated in Ireland (with the SROM), the Netherlands (marginally with the SROM-SF), and Taiwan (with the MJI and the DIT) (see Table 3). Regarding discriminant validity, consistent with Basinger et al.’s (1995; cf. Schonfeld et al., 2005) USA results, SRM-SF stage scores were found not to correlate positively with social desirability measures in the Netherlands and Taiwan (see Table 3). Cross-cultural results pertaining to the discrimination of delinquents’ moral judgment as developmentally delayed bear substantively upon cognitive developmental claims for the important role of social participation for development and so are reviewed in the next section. Also reviewed in connection with social participation are construct validity results pertaining to the relationship of moral judgment development to theoretical correlates such as age, education, socioeconomic status, urban versus rural environment, and community volunteering; along with studies that directly investigated social perspective-taking through self-report measures (e.g., Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Grime, 2005; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b). Several ad hoc findings among the cross-cultural studies are relevant to construct validity. Moral judgment maturity as measured by the SRM-SF was found to correlate with experiencing life as meaningful (Hauer, 2001), sense of spirituality (Woods & Jagers, 2003), attribution of prosocial intent (Palmer & Hollin, 2000), and positive parenting attitudes (Hubbs-Tait et al., 2006). Particularly intriguing—and worthy of systematic

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research—are findings of a relationship between moral judgment maturity and variables pertaining to self-regulation, self-control, or ego strength (cognitive inhibition, Schonfeld, Mattson, & Riley, 2005, and Stadler et al., 2007; emotional stability, Travis, Arenander, & DuBois, 2004; planning and problem-solving skills, Rose, 2005; goal orientation for females, Getty, 1996). Moral Type B was found to correlate with age and community volunteering or related experiences (Comunian & Gielen, 2000, 2006). Results and discussion Given evidence for the adequacy of the SRM-SF and the 2007 SRM-SF data base, it should be worthwhile to revisit with this alternative assessment method Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and universality claims. Some Kohlbergian cognitive developmental tenets have received cross-cultural attention only with this newer data base. One such tenet is that moral judgment is a unitary and distinct factor in its own right. This tenet was supported in USA factor analyses using the MJI (Colby et al., 1983; cf. Cortese, 1989) but was not addressed in cross-cultural MJI studies (Snarey, 1985). The USA finding of a single factor loading for MJI justifications was replicated using the SRM-SF in the USA (Basinger et al., 1995). In cross-cultural studies, the finding of a single dominant factor (but with a small secondary factor) was replicated in England (Brusten, 2003) and Germany (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). Fortunately, most of the research questions posed by Kohlberg’s approach and claims have been investigated with studies that collectively span the two methods. Do the prior (MJI-based) and more recent (SRM-SF-based) results converge to yield a coherent picture of moral development? This section presents and discusses the cross-cultural results, beginning with the question of universal moral values. Moral values across cultures Kohlberg (1984) claimed that the conflicts and values entailed in his dilemma method were universal. Because the SRM-SF method does not use moral dilemmas, findings using the SRM-SF cannot address the question of applicability of the value conflicts depicted in the MJI dilemmas and probe questions. The SRM-SF method does, however, require ratings of the importance of the values entailed in those conflicts. Although Kohlberg (1984) simply referred to those values as the ‘‘issues, values, or moral institutions found in every culture’’ (p. 189), their universality is an empirical question. The SRM-SF values of contract, truth, affiliation, life, property, law, and legal justice were derived from the dilemmas and probe questions of the MJI. Respondent ratings of these values are obtained but not ordinarily reported. Where they have been reported (by Palmer & Hollin, 1998, in England; by Kohlberg, 1958, in Armenia; by Tang, 2004, in Taiwan; by Wasanga, 2004, in Kenya), the findings generally replicate Gregg et al.’s (1994) USA finding of high (above 90% selecting ‘‘important’’ or ‘‘very important’’) valuation. The main exceptions occurred for adolescent offenders and younger respondents, but even among these participants lower percentages were found only for certain items, e.g., keeping a promise to someone you hardly know. Also relevant to evaluating value universality is attrition rate. As noted, high protocol attrition rates in a study could indirectly reflect a number of factors, including low value ratings by the respondents. Attrition rate was reported by some but not all of the research-

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ers in the 2007 SRM-SF data base. In some cases, we were able to contact the researcher and obtain this information. Ultimately, attrition rate information was obtained for 23 of the 75 studies in the data base. Protocol attrition rates were acceptably low, i.e., around or below 10%, in Armenia, Bosnia, Canada, England (most studies), Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, Scotland, Taiwan, and most of the USA studies. Exceptions were attributed to marginal literacy (Leenders & Brugman, 2005), insufficient time for protocol completion (Getty, 1996; Hauer, personal communication, June 10, 2005), and use of an unorthodox, across-item scoring procedure (Brusten, 2003). Most important for the present purpose, none of the researchers linked cases of protocol attrition to low value ratings (or, for that matter, to unclassifiably novel moral judgment).3 Our 2007 data base, then, permits us to visit anew Kohlberg’s universality claim concerning moral values. Snarey noted some researchers’ comments that the Kohlbergian value conflicts or (adapted) dilemmas seemed to be considered relevant by the respondents in their sample, and the general absence of reports to the contrary (but cf. Dien, 1982). Many researchers did not comment on the issue one way or the other. Our data are similarly partial but also consistent with Kohlberg’s claim of value universality. Value ratings where reported are high, and procotol attrition where reported is not attributed to low value ratings. Although partial, the anecdotal and evaluation information that we do have from researchers is consistent with the value universality claim. Given the incomplete nature of these data, more systematic attention should be accorded the question of value universality in future research (cf. Siddle-Walker & Snarey, 2004). Moral judgment stage development across cultures Kohlberg’s main universality claim pertained to basic moral judgment development. Are stages of moral judgment commonly identifiable across different assessment methods and diverse cultures? Tables 4 and 6 summarize results of SRM-SF studies pertaining to the stage universality question. We present both an overview table (Table 4) and a table (Table 6) consisting of stage means and ranges for specific age periods. In the latter table, the samples from the various cultures are rank-ordered by mean stage (operationalized in terms of SRMS score rather than global stage). Presentation of stage range was somewhat problematic given that many of the studies reported standard deviations (SDs) or range of age subgroup means but not the range of individual moral judgment scores. For the sake of uniformity, we decided to define moral judgment range in terms of SD from the mean and global stage level. The lower and upper boundaries of the moral judgment range were defined by the global stage level of the SRMSs at 1 and +1 SDs, respectively. In the relatively few cases where SDs were not available but subgroup means or individual scores were available, we used those numbers for the range instead. Basic moral judgment development across cultures can be described in terms of the general age periods of childhood, adolescence, and the adult years. Our results stem from a multimethod extension (Brewer & Hunter, 2006); that is, they represent commonalities in the results from the differing methods used in the 1985 and the present data bases. 3 Van Someren (2000) suggested supplementation of the SRM-SF scoring manual to permit more adequate assessment of moral justifications with religious content. Van Someren’s proposed ‘‘religiously sensitive’’ criteria utilized the developmental stage framework of the existing scoring manual.

Study

Jeshmaridian and Babakhanyan (2005)

472

Table 4 Cross-cultural studies of moral judgment development using the SRM-SF Sample

n

Armenia Urban and rural students and adults

Age range (mean) in years

Global stage mean

Global stage range

3

1/2–4a

38 99 94

14–18 (16.5) (31.2) (26.9)

2 3 3/4

1/2–2/3 3–3/4 3–3/4

30 30

17–18 (17.7) 14–19 (16.8)

3 2/3

3–3/4 2/3–3

12–24

2/3

2–3b

40

8–12 (10.0)

2

1/2–2/3

163c

19–73 (29.8)

3

3–3/4

49 45 47 53

10–13 10–12 10–13 10–13

2/3 2 2/3 2/3

NR NR NR 2–2/3

10 10

13–15 13–15

2/3 2

NR NR

117 149 147 59

14–16 14–16 14–17 18–21

2/3 2/3 2 2/3

2/3–3 2–3 2–3 2–2/3

Australia Putnins (1997) Stevenson et al. (2004)

Delinquents (one female) Male and female adult offenders University students

Al-Falaij (1991)

Male high school students Delinquents

Bahrain

Day and Naedts (1995)

Belgium Primary and secondary school students and adults

Garrod et al. (2004)

Urban primary school students

Vlassev (1998)

Adults in romantic relationshipsc

194

Bosnia Bulgaria Canada Binfet (2004) DiBiase (2002) Krivel-Zacks (1995) Raynauld et al. (1999)

Urban middle school students Urban middle school students Urban middle school students 5th and 6th grade students

Lee (2001)

Non-delinquents Delinquents

(11.6) (11.0) (11.7) (11.5)

China

Brusten (2003)

Palmer and Begum (2006)

England Female high school students Male high school students Delinquents Delinquents and early adult offenders

(15.1) (15.5) (15.9) (19.5)

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13–61

105

Palmer and Hollin (1996) Palmer and Hollin (1997) Palmer and Hollin (1998)

Palmer and Hollin (1999) Palmer and Hollin (2000)

Krettenauer and Becker (2001) Stadler et al. (2007)

Ferguson and Cairns (1996) Ferguson and Cairns (2002) Ferguson et al. (1994)

Ferguson et al. (2001) Comunian and Gielen (1995) Comunian and Gielen (2000)

Comunian and Gielen (2006) Gielen et al. (1994)

64 65 210 122 126 42 77 97 94 789

18–25 (19.5) 18–27 (21.0) 13–22 (17.9) 13.22 (17.6) 13–21 (17.4) 13–17 (16.0) 12–24 (17.4) 13–21 (18.2) 12–18 (15.7) 12.15 (13.0)

3/4 3+d 3 3 2/3 2/3 3 2 3 2/3

3–3/4 NRd 2/2–3/4 2/3–3/4 2–3 2–3 2/3–3 2–2/3 2/3–3 2–3

309 39 13

14–16 (15.6) 14–17 (16.1) 9–15 (12.8)

2/3 2/3 2/3

2/2–3 2–3 2–3

13

9–15 (12.7)

2/3

2–2/3

Ireland Primary school students Secondary school students Northern Ireland adolescents Republic of Ireland adolescents Primary school students (Study 1) Primary school students (Study 2) Secondary school students (Study 2) Primary and secondary school students (Study 3) Northern Ireland primary school students

96 325 219 239 28 84 85 119 48

10–11 14–15 14–15 14–15 NR 10–11 14–15 14–19 (16.0) 10–11

2 3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2 2/3 2/3 2

2–2/3 2/3–3 2/3–3 2/3–3 2–2/3 NR NR 2/3–3 2–2/3

Italy Adolescent and adult volunteers Adolescent and adult non-volunteers Adolescent volunteers Adolescent non-volunteers Male adults (non-drug abusers) Male adults (drug abusers) Graduate students 6th grade through university students and adults

154 131 49 60 60 60 120 313

(25.8) (25.5) 15–21 15–21 27–33 26–32 22–26 10–35

3/4 2/3 3 3 3/4 3 3 3

NR NR 3–3/4 3 3–3/4 3–3/4 3–3/4 2–3/4b

Germany High school students Male high school offenders Children and adolescents without Conduct Disorder (CD) Children and adolescents with CD

(17.9) (17.5) (29.2) (30.1) (24.1) (18.5)

473

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Palmer and Hollin (2001) Tarry and Emler (2007)

University students University students Female high school and university students Male high school and university students Delinquents and early adult offenders Delinquents Male high school and university students Delinquents and early adult offenders Middle and high school students Middle school students

474

Table 4 (continued) Study

Sample

n

Age range (mean) in years

Global stage mean

Global stage range

Japan High school Japanese students 4th grade through university students

22 320

16–18 (17.1) 10–20 (15.7)

3 2/3

NR 2–3/4

Wasanga (2004)

Kenya Primary and secondary school students

313

8–19 (14.2)

2

1/2–3/4a

600

16 (16)

3e

2–4e

81 64 120 216 108

(15.1) (16.5) 13–17 (NR) 12–17 (14.3) 12–21 (16.8)

2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3

2–3 2–2/3 2/3–3 2–2/3 2–2/3

37

10–11

2

1/2–2

419

(15.6)

3

3–3/4

60

20–26

3/4

3–4a

157

14–15

2/3

2/3–3

29 29 29 29

13–18 13–18 13–18 13–18

2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3

2/3–3 2/3–3/4 2–2/3 2–3

67 45

14–18 14–18

NR NR

NR NR

Chu (1999)e

Malaysia High school students of Chinese and Indian ethnicity Netherlands

Brugman and Aleva (2004) Brugman et al. (1999) Leenders and Brugman (2005) Nas et al. (2005)

Non-delinquents Delinquents Secondary school students Secondary school students Delinquents

Ferguson et al. (2002)

Primary school students

Hauer (2001)

High school students

Al-Ghamdi (1994)

Saudi Arabia Upper-division university students

Ferguson and Cairns (2002)

Middle school students

Larden et al. (2006)

Non-delinquents Female non-delinquents Delinquents Female delinquents

Chen and Hsieh (2001)

Non-delinquents (gender NR) Delinquents (gender NR)

Nigeria Russia

Scotland Sweden (15.5) (16.0) (15.6) (16.2)

Taiwan

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Mizuno (1999) Takaki (2001)

Lin, Q. Q. (1999) Lin, W. Y. (1995) Tang (2004)

Grime (2005) Hubbs-Tait et al. (2006) Humphries et al. (2000) Krcmar and Valkenburg (1999) Leeman et al. (1993) Mason and Gibbs (1993a, 1993b) McInerney (1995) Oliver, J. M. (2003) Oliver, K. A. (1993) Peterson (2001) Ritz (1996) Rose (2005) Schonfeld et al. (2005) Travis et al. (2004)

91 181 384 211 90 61 37 276 270 52 86 89 77 71 337 199 90 156 57 153 221 146 91 29 20 g 258 31 31 27 29 9 20

9–12 9–22 (14.6)

2 3

2–2/3 NR

11–15

2/3

2–3/4a

16–19 (18.2) 8–81 (20.6) 10–18 (11.6) 18–24 (20.6) NR 7–12 (9.4) 11–14 (11.8) (28.4) (25.4) 13–19 (15.7) 13–18 (15.9) 13–19 (16.1) 13–18 (16.6) 11–18 (13.9) 19–46 (29.1) (12.0) 5–12 15–18 (16.0) 17–39 (20.8) NR 12–14 17–54 (26.6) (41.7) (34.5) 12–15 (13.7) 10–18 10–18 10–18 (13.8) 10–18 (13.2) (39.7)

3 3 2/3 3 2 2 2/3 3f NR 2/3 2/3 3 2/3 2/3 3 2 NR 2/3 3/4 2/3 2/3 3/4 3 3/4 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 NR

3–3/4 2–3/4b 2–2/3 2/3–3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–3 NR NR 2/3–3 2–2/3 2/3–3 2–3 2/3–3 2/3–3/4 1/2–2/3 NR 2–3 3–3/4 2–2/3 NR 3–3/4 2/3–3 3/4–4 2/3–3 2/3–3 2–3 2–2/3 2–3 3

(44.5)

NR

3/4 (continued on next page)

475

United States University students 4th grade through university students and adults 4th to 8th grade students Male adult offenders (incarcerated) 5th grade students Primary school students Middle school students Male and female adults University students Male high school students Delinquents Female high school students Female delinquents Secondary school students Head Start mothers 5th and 8th grade African–American students Children Male delinquents Freshmen and senior university students 7th grade students 7th and 8th grade students University students Male adult offenders (self-report) University students Middle school studentsg Children and adolescents without ADHD Children and adolescents with ADHD Juveniles with prenatal alcohol exposure Non-exposed juveniles Adults without transcendental meditation (TM) experience Adults with TM experience

450 326

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Barriga et al. (2001) Basinger et al. (1995) Bock (2006) Chang (2001) DeVargas (1999) Garrod et al. (2004) Getty (1996) Greenberg (2002) Greene (1997) Gregg et al. (1994)

Urban high school and university students Urban primary, high school, and university students Primary and secondary school students

476

Study Van IJzendoorn and Zwart-Woudstra (1995) Van Someren (2000) Woods and Jagers (2003)

Sample University students 6th–12th grade students 8th grade African–American students

n

Age range (mean) in years

Global stage mean

Global stage range

47

18–22 (19.5)

3/4

3–4a

180 50

12–19 (15.2) 13–14 (13.4)

2/3 2/3

2/3–3 NR

Notes: NR, information not reported. Students include males and females unless otherwise indicated. Delinquents, CD participants, and offenders are male unless otherwise indicated. Stage scores are presented using the 7-point global scale. Global stage range is estimated on the basis of ±1 SD unless otherwise indicated. a Range based on individual protocol score (total sample SDs not provided). b Range based on age-graded subgroup means (total sample SDs not provided). c The instrument was translated into Bulgarian and administered in Bulgaria to 29 of the participants. The remaining participants were Canadians tested in Canada. Results (not affected by nationality) were reported only for the entire sample. d SRM-SF means and SDs not reported. ‘‘All respondents had a global stage of 3 or above’’ (Palmer & Hollin, 1998, p. 195). e Protocol stage scores based on multiple-choice selections. Participants matched each of their SRM-SF item justification responses to a closest option provided in the questionnaire. f 67.4% ‘‘conventional, with the remaining participants classified as preconventional’’ (p. 992). g Included 62 students identified by school counselor as ‘‘having problems with behavior and emotions in the academic setting’’ (Ritz, 1996, p. 49).

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Table 4 (continued)

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

477

Table 5 Examples of German extensions of the SRM-SF scoring manual Original response (German)

English translationa

Value

Stage: aspect

Vertrauen mißbrauchen

You would abuse other peoples’ trust

Contract & truth

3: 1a

weil es zum Anstand geho¨rt

This is part of decent behavior

Contract & truth

3: 3b

andere wu¨rden mir Vorwu¨rfe machen

Other people would blame you

Contract & truth

2/3: 6a

ein Mann ein Wort

A man, a word

Contract & truth

Unscorable

weil sonst eine Klage wegen unterlassener Hilfeleistung folgt

You will be accused if you don’t help

Life

1/2: 1a

es ist selbstversta¨ndlich, ein Leben zu retten

It goes without saying to save other people’s life

Life, affiliation

3: 3d marginal

jedes Leben za¨hlt

Each life counts

Life, affiliation

3: 5 marginal

Lu¨gen haben kurze Beine

Lies have short legs

Property & law

2: 6b

Ehrlich wa¨hrt am la¨ngsten

Honesty lasts longer than anything else

Property & law

3: 3c

Das geho¨rt sich nicht

It is not proper behavior

Property & law

3: 3b marginal

a

Some responses are difficult to translate insofar as they are indigenous German expressions or proverbs.

Moral judgment in childhood. According to the developmental expectations of original Piagetian as well as revisionist models (Table 2), much moral reasoning produced in late childhood (approximately ages 9–11) is still characterized by pragmatic considerations or quid pro quo exchanges that serve the individual (Stage 2). Kohlberg’s theory predicts as a secondary tendency (declining from early childhood) appeals to salient features such as size, power, immediate status, unilateral relations, physical damage, and punitive consequences (Stage 1). Gibbs (2003) stressed that the level of moral judgment associated with childhood is immature and superficial insofar as that which is moral in a mature sense tends to be confused with the pragmatic and instrumental (Stage 2) or the physical or momentary (Stage 1). Often not grasped in childhood are the mutualistic and other intangible bases for relationships and society. In Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s models, this level is termed preconventional. The data bases support these developmental expectations. The 1985 MJI and 2007 SRM-SF studies of 9- to 11-year-olds both included the USA, where Stage 2 predominated (207 MJI mean, 215 SRM-SF mean). Stage 2 also predominated among children in Turkey (MJI) as well as Japan, Italy, and Ireland (SRM-SF). Stage 1 reasoning was more prominent among village or lower class children in Turkey, Bahamas, or India (MJI), and in Bosnia, Kenya, and Nigeria4 (SRM-SF). Stage 1 characterized the mean protocol reasoning in only one of the MJI samples (Tibetan village children in India) and in none of the SRM-SF samples.

4

Ferguson, Willis, and Tilley (2001) attributed the Nigerian sample’s apparent developmental delay to external authority responses scored as Stage 1.

478

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

Table 6 Cross-cultural samples in rank order by mean sociomoral reflection maturity score, grouped by age Sample/age range (mean) in years Middle adulthood (approx. 40–50 years old) USA (Travis et al.), adults with transcendental meditation (TM) experience/(44.5) USA (Basinger et al.), university parents/(50.1) USA (Travis et al.), adults without TM experience/(39.7) USA (Peterson), offenders/(41.7) Young adulthood (approx. 20–35 years old) USA (Peterson), university students/(34.5) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), adult volunteers/(33.9) USA (Van IJzendoorn & Zwart-Woudstra), university students/18–22 (19.5) Australia (Stevenson et al.), university students/(26.9) USA (Oliver, K. A.), university students/17–54 (26.6) USA (Mason & Gibbs), university students/17–39 (20.8) Saudi Arabia, upper-division university students/20–26 (22.5) Italy (Gielen et al.), university students/(22.6) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), male adults (non-drug abusers)/27–33 (29.2) England (Palmer & Hollin ’96), university students/18–25 (19.5) Bulgaria, adults in romantic relationships/19–73 (29.8) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’06), graduate students/22–26 (24.2) Belgium, university and vocational students/21–24 Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), male adults (drug abusers)/26–32 (30.1) Australia (Stevenson et al.), male and female offenders/(31.2) Japan (Takaki), university students/(19.8) USA (Hubbs-Tait et al.), Head Start mothers/19–46 (29.1) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), adult non-volunteers/(34.6) USA (Chang), male and female offenders/18–24 (20.1) Italy (Gielen et al.), adults (8th grade max.)/(22.5) England (Palmer & Begum), young adult offenders/18–21 (19.5) Late adolescence (approx. 16–19 years old) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), volunteers (16.) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), volunteers/15–21 (17.9) Japan (Mizuno), high school students/16–18 (17.1) Bahrain, male high school students/17–18 (17.7) USA (Basinger et al.), university students/(19.2) Russia, high school students/(15.6) USA (Barriga et al. ’01), university students/16–19 (18.2) England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), female secondary and university students/13–22 (17.9) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’00), non-volunteers/15–21 (17.5) Italy (Gielen et al.), 10th graders/(15.4) USA (Basinger et al.), high school students/(17.3) Belgium, secondary school students/18–20 Sweden, female non-delinquents/13–18 (16.0) Japan (Takaki), 11th graders/(16.8) USA (Gregg et al.), female high school students/13–19 (16.1) England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), male secondary and university students/13–22 (17.6) USA (Grime), high school students/15–17 (16.2)

n

Global stage range

M

20

NR

357

58 9 29

3/4 3 2/3–3

350 310 289

20 154 47

3/4–4 NR 3–3/4

372 359 344

94 91 153 60 133 60

3–3/4 3–3/4 3–3/4 3–4a NR 3–3/4

340 337 335 333 331 330

64 163 120 57 60 99 80 199 63 90 38 59

3–3/4 3–3/4 3–3/4 NR 3–3/4 3–3/4 2/3–3/4 2/3–3/4 NR 2/3–3 NR 2–2/3

327 325 322 311 309 307 300 300 299 276 269 235

70 49 22 30 72 419 181 210

NR 3–3/4 NR 3–3/4 3–3/4 NR 3–3/4 2/3–3/4

329 328 320 313 312 311 305 304

60 38 89 37 29 95 77 122

3 NR 2/3–3 NR 2/3–3/4 2/3–3 2/3–3 2/3–3/4

303 298 296 292 291 289 289 286

2/3–3

285

77

J.C. Gibbs et al. / Developmental Review 27 (2007) 443–500

479

Table 6 (continued) Sample/age range (mean) in years

n

England (Palmer & Hollin ’01), middle and high school students/12–18 (15.7) Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 3), secondary school students/16–19 (17.3) England (Palmer & Hollin ’00), male high school students/12–24 (17.4) USA (Gregg et al.), male high school students/13–19 (15.7) Sweden, non-delinquents/13–18 (15.6) Germany (Stadler et al.), participants without CD (matched)/9–15 (12.8) England (Brusten), male high school students/14–16 (15.5) England (Brusten), female high school students/14–16 (15.1) Germany (Krettenauer & Becker), high school students/14–16 (15.6) Sweden, female delinquents/13–18 (16.0) Bahrain, delinquents/14–19 (16.8) USA (Gregg et al.), female delinquents/13–18 (16.6) Kenya, high school students/17–19 England (Palmer & Hollin ’00)/delinquents/13–21 (18.2) Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva), nondelinquents/(15.1) Italy (Comunian & Gielen ’95), non-volunteers/(16.0) England (Palmer & Hollin ’98), delinquents/13–21 (17.4) Belgium, secondary school students/15–17 England (Palmer & Hollin ’99), delinquents/13–17 (16.0) Germany (Krettenauer & Becker), delinquents/14–17 (15.6) Netherlands (Nas et al.), delinquents/12–21 (16.8) USA (Gregg et al.), delinquents/13–18 (15.9) USA (Leeman et al.), delinquents/15–18 (16.0) Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva), delinquents/(16.5) Netherlands (Nas et al.), delinquents/12–21 (16.8) Sweden, delinquents/13–18 (15.5) Germany (Stadler et al.), participants with CD/9–15 (12.7) England (Brusten), delinquents/14–17 (15.9) Australia (Putnins), delinquents (1 female)/14–18 (16.5)

94

2/3–3

281

61

2/3–3

281

77 86 29 14 149 117 309 29 30 71 94 97 81 131 126 52 42 39 108 89 57 64 108 29 13 147 38

2/3–3 2/3 2/3–3 2–3 2–3 2/3–3 2/3–3 2–3 2/3–3 2–3 2–3 2–2/3 2–3 NR 2–3 NR 2–3 2–3 2–3 2–2/3 2–3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 1/2–2/3

279 272 266 265 264 262 261 256 254 254 250 249 249 247 247 244 243 243 243 243 243 241 241 228 226 223 211

45 52 46 325 45 219 85 47 258 239 260 180 62 74 49 146 157 29

NR NR 2/3–3 2/3–3 NR 2/3–3 NR NR 2/3–3 2/3–3 2/3–3 2/3–3 2–3 2/3–3 NR NR 2/3–3 2–3

292 291 279 278 272 269 269 268 268 267 267 265 264 260 257 256 255 255

Early/middle adolescence (approx. 12–15 years) Taiwan (Tang), 7th and 8th grade students/13–14 Italy (Gielen et al.), 9th grade students/(14.4) Japan (Takaki), 6th grade students/(12.4) Ireland (Ferguson & Cairns ’96), secondary school students/14–15 Taiwan (Tang), 5th and 6th grade students/11–12 Ireland (Northern; Ferguson & Cairns ’02), adolescents/14–15 Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 2), secondary school students/14–15 Canada (Krivel-Zacks), 6th and 7th grade students/10–13 (11.7) USA (Ritz), middle school students (62 problem-referred)/12–15 (13.7) Ireland (Republic of; Ferguson & Cairns ’02), adolescents/14–15 USA (Grime), middle school students/12–14 (13.2) USA (Van Someren), 6th–12th grade students/12–19 (15.2) Japan (Takaki), 8th grade students/(14.3) USA (Basinger et al.), 8th grade students/(14.1) Canada (Binfet), urban middle school students/10–13 (11.6) USA (Oliver, J. M.), 7th and 8th grade students/12–14 Scotland, middle school students/14–15 USA (Schonfeld et al.), juveniles (no prenatal alcohol exposure)/10–18 (13.2)

Global stage range

M

(continued on next page)

480

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Table 6 (continued) Sample/age range (mean) in years China, non-delinquents/13–15 USA (Woods & Jagers)/8th grade African–American students/13–14 (13.4) England (Tarry & Emler), middle school students/12–15 (13.0) USA (Getty), 6th graders/11–14 (11.8) Netherlands (Leenders & Brugman), secondary school students/12–17 (14.3) USA (Basinger et al.), 6th graders/(12.1) USA (Bock), 4th–8th grade students/10–18 (11.6) Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 3), primary school students/14–15 (14.7) Canada (Raynauld et al.), at-risk 5th and 6th grade students/10–13 (11.5) Bosnia, primary school students/11–12 (11.8) Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 1), primary school students/NR USA (McInerny), 7th grade students/NR USA (Schonfeld et al.), juveniles with prenatal alcohol exposure/10–18 (13.8) Belgium, primary school students/12–14 USA (Humphries et al.), 5th and 8th grade African–American students/(12.0) Kenya, middle school students/14–16 Kenya, middle school students/11–13 China, delinquents/13–15 Late childhood (approx. 9–11 years old) USA (Garrod et al.), primary school students/11–12 (11.4) Japan (Takaki), 4th graders/(10.3) Taiwan (Lin, Q.Q.), primary school students/9–12 Ireland (Ferguson et al. ’94, Study 2), primary school students/10–11 Italy (Gielen et al.), 6th graders/(11.2) Ireland (Northern; Ferguson et al. ’01), primary school students/10–11 Ireland (Ferguson & Cairns ’96), primary school students/10–11 USA (Basinger et al.), 4th graders/(10.1) Canada (DiBiase), 5th graders/10–12 (11.0) USA (DeVargas), 5th grade students/NR USA (Garrod et al.), primary school students/7–9 (7.8) Nigeria, primary school students/10–11 Kenya, primary school students/8–10 Bosnia, primary school students/7–9 (8.1)

n

Global stage range

M

10 50 789 276 216

NR 2–3 2–3 2–3 2–2/3

251 245 242 240 237

43 211 58 53 23 28 221 27

2–2/3 2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3

237 235 235 233 230 230 228 228

48 90

NR 1/2–2/3

223 207

67 83 10

1/2–2/3 1/2–2 NR

191 185 182

17 37 450 84 52 48 96 48 45 61 20 37 69 18

2–2/3 2–3 2–2/3 NR NR 2–2/3 2–2/3 2–2/3 NR 2–2/3 1/2–2/3 1/2–2 1/2–2 1/2

243 239 225 223 223 222 221 215 209 209b 196 181 179 164

Notes: NR indicates information (SDs, subgroup means, individual scores) not reported. Students include both genders unless otherwise indicated. Delinquents or offenders are male unless otherwise specified. Stage scores are presented using the 7–point global scale. Global stage range is estimated on the basis of ±1 SD (total sample SDs provided in the majority of the studies unless otherwise indicated). a Range based on individual protocol score (total sample SDs not provided). b This mean should possibly be classified under Early/middle adolescence. Mean age of the primary school students was not reported in the study.

Presumably, Stage 1 would dominate if moral judgment were to be assessed for children younger than 9 or 10. Although the MJI, the SRM-SF, and other instruments in the Kohlbergian tradition are designed to allow investigation of moral judgment across a broad age range, few are well-suited for research with young children. Decades ago, Damon (1977) observed that Kohlberg’s dilemmas were ‘‘clearly foreign to the lives of children’’ (p. 39).

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The SRM-SF questions are somewhat more relevant to the lives of children, because children are familiar with keeping promises to friends, helping parents, not taking things that belong to others, and so forth—although the SRM-SF, too, includes more advanced questions pertaining to values of life, law, and legal justice. What if the SRM-SF were used with younger children? Would Stage 1 reasoning in fact predominate? Although the SRM-SF questionnaire is not particularly suited for the world of young children and its reading level is fourth-grade, it can be administered to a younger child as an individual oral interview. Eight-year-olds (including a few seven- and nineyear-olds) interviewed in the USA and Bosnia averaged Stage 2 and transition 1/2, respectively (Garrod et al., 2004; see Tables 4 and 6). For children younger than eight years, only incidental data are available. Snarey and Keljo (1994) reported that ‘‘a kindergarten student we interviewed . . . gave scorable answers to 10 of the 11 questions with remarkable ease’’ (p. 184), although they did not indicate the stage level of the kindergartener’s answers. A 5-year-old boy interviewed by the first author (Gibbs) gave scorable answers to 10 of the 11 questions. His SRMS was 145, represented in 10-point global stage terms as 1(2), i.e., major Stage 1/minor Stage 2. To convey some sense of young children’s responses to the SRM-SF, we present the interview: 1. [keeping promises to friends] Important. Question: Why is that important? Answer: It would be nice [Stage 1: Aspect 4b], you should keep what you said. 2. [keeping promises to someone you hardly know] Don’t know. Not important. Q: And why is that not important? A: Because it’s just a promise, it’s not something big like a big thing [Stage 1: Aspect 2]. 3. [parents keeping promises to children.] Very important. Q: So why is it very important for parents to keep promises to children? A: Because if they don’t, the children are not going to like the parents [Stage 2: Aspect 6b]. 4. [telling the truth] Very important. Q: And why is that very important? A: Very, very important because [if you don’t], you are going to get in trouble [transition 1/2: Aspect 2c]. 5. [children helping their parents] Very important. Q: Why is that very important? A: Because maybe they are hurt. . . . they take care of you and if you don’t help them and they die, you won’t have anyone to take care of you [Stage 2: Aspect 5b]. 6. [saving the life of a friend] Very important. Q: And why is saving the life of a friend very important? A: Because you like him and you don’t want him to die [Stage 2: Aspect 4a]. 7. [saving the life of a stranger.] Not important. Q: Why isn’t it important to save the life of a stranger? A: Because it’s a stranger, it’s not your friend [Stage 1: Aspect 2]. 8. [to live even if that person doesn’t want to.] Not important Q: And why isn’t it important for a person to live if that person doesn’t want to? A: Because he doesn’t want to [marginal5 Stage 2; Aspect 4a].

5

This response merely follows the interviewer’s lead, and accordingly may reflect a momentary preference (Stage 1; see Gibbs, 2003).

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9. [people not to take things that belong to other people] Very important Q: And why is that very important? A: Because they get put in jail if they don’t [Stage 1: Aspect 5]. 10. [people obeying the law] Very important. Q: So why is it very important for people to obey the law? A: Because it’s the law. Everybody should obey the law [unscorable]. 11. [judges sending people who break the law to jail] Very important. Q: Why is it very important for judges to do that? A: Because the judge may get put in prison if they don’t obey the order. Someone orders them to do that job [Stage 1: Aspects 5, 3]. With its appeals to simple needs or preferences, tangible features (a promise is not ‘‘big, like a big thing’’), and one-way relations with punitive consequences (‘‘the judge may get put in prison if they don’t obey the order [given by someone to put people who break the law in jail]’’), this case is consistent with age trend expectations. It also raises a question as to the meaning of the stage construct (beyond its use as a referent for qualitative change) in the cognitive developmental approach (cf. Brainerd, 1978, 1979). The 5-year-old’s reasoning is in fact predominantly Stage 1, but not totally. Why not? If a stage is a structured whole, as Kohlberg sought to establish and as suggested in some experimental research (e.g., by Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001), then should not a 5-year-old’s moral reasoning be consistently Stage 1? It is possible that refinements in the MJI and SRM-SF scoring manuals would render more consistent stage protocol ratings (it is certainly true that the scoring manuals can be improved). It is also possible, however, that Kohlberg’s aim to identify empirically coherent stage structures for Stage 1 and beyond was not entirely successful. Precisely because of developmental variability even within a single interview, Piaget (1965/1932) refrained from referring to his modes of moral judgment as ‘‘stages,’’ recommending instead the concept of overlapping ‘‘phases’’ (p. 317). Damon (1980) found in a 2-year longitudinal study that distributive justice stage development was ‘‘gradual, mixed, and uneven’’ (p. 1017). Siegler (1996a, 1996b; cf. Chapman, 1988; Colby et al., 1983; Flavell et al., 2002; Rest, 1979) suggested that the stage construct can be salvaged if stages were regarded merely as characteristic tendencies and if each new stage were conceptualized not as a step but rather as a beginning new ‘‘wave’’ that overlaps previous waves in the waxings and wanings of developmental advance. It is likely that generic standard measures such as the MJI or SRM-SF, although useful for identifying broad, basic cross-cultural age trends, fall short of what is needed for more intensive exploration of reasoning at particular age periods or in particular cultural contexts. Some of the child-oriented research (such as that generated by Selman’s [1980; cf. 2003] social perspective-taking stories) corroborate Kohlberg’s basic four stages. Aligning ‘‘tolerably well’’ with Kohlberg’s ‘‘general progression’’ (Lapsley, 2006, p. 53) are the developmental levels suggested by data from Damon’s (1977) distributive justice tasks featuring tangible goods such as bracelets or candy bars, and Eisenberg’s (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg et al., 2006) child-friendly stories concerning prosocial behavior. Nonetheless, these research literatures also identify precocities in childhood moral reasoning not suggested by Stage 1. The social domain research of Turiel and colleagues (e.g., Nucci, 2006; Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2006a, 2006b; Turiel & Smetana, 1998) has identified an apparent sophistication in young children’s understanding of moral as distinct from conventional and personal matters (but cf. Fowler, 1998, 2007; Glassman & Zan, 1995; Lour-

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enco, 2003; J. G. Miller, 2006; Rest et al., 1999). In general, however, ‘‘vulnerability to salient features of the here-and-now’’ is broadly evident in young children’s social and nonsocial cognition (Flavell et al., 2002, p. 181) and is evident as well as a characteristic tendency (Siegler, 1996b) in young children’s moral reasoning (i.e., as Stage 1). Moral judgment in adolescence. In the years from late childhood into early adolescence, a crucial qualitative advance seems to take place in many young persons’ moral judgment. As we have seen, this qualitative transition has been variously characterized as a shift from concrete to ideal moral reciprocity (Piaget), from preconventional-level Stage 2 instrumental purpose to conventional-level, Stage 3 interpersonal accord (Kohlberg or Snarey), or from immature-level Stage 2 pragmatic exchanges to mature-level Stage 3 mutualities and equities (Piaget or Gibbs). Gibbs stresses that the emergence of mutualistic moral understanding, although sometimes embedded in social conventions (Kohlberg’s Moral Type A), nonetheless represents a basic achievement of moral maturity in its own right for interpersonal relationships. It is an achievement that, given adequate social perspective-taking experiences (Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Grime, 2005) and cognitive advances such as formal operations (Moshman, 1998), should become clearly evident by early adolescence. Again, our review corroborates this expectation. Stage 3 already makes an appearance in the stage ranges of some late childhood samples, but generally gains prominence (sometimes even full-stage prominence) during early adolescence. In the 1985 MJI data base, Stage 3 was prominent in the moral reasoning of young adolescents in the Kibbutz, Taiwan, and the USA (upper middle-class). In the 2007 SRM-SF data base as shown in Table 6, Stage 3 is prominent (as at least a major global stage, 3[2]) among early adolescents in Canada, China, Ireland (Northern, Republic of), Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Scotland, Taiwan, and in one USA study (Schonfeld et al., 2005). By late adolescence, Stage 3 normally becomes the mean global moral judgment stage. In the 1985 MJI data base, this was the case in India (upper middle class), Israel (uppermiddle class, Kibbutz working class), Taiwan, and USA. In the 2007 SRM-SF data base as shown (Table 6), Stage 3 is the mean for older mainstream adolescents in Bahrain, Belgium, England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998, 2000, 2001), Ireland, Italy (most samples), Japan, Russia, Sweden, and the USA. The main exceptions are delinquent or adjudicated late adolescents, discussed below. Older adolescents (at least in national states) may also begin to extend their Stage 3 mutualistic understanding to grasp the importance of agreed-upon standards and institutions for the common good. In a USA study of developmental transitions in the concept of law, Adelson, Green, and O’Neil (1969) used semi-structured interviews based on a ‘‘desert island’’ situation (‘‘Imagine that a thousand people move to an island in the Pacific, and set about building a community de novo. They are confronted by the tasks of forming a government and of developing laws and other modes of communal regulation,’’ p. 327) to compare the understandings of early adolescents (ages 11–13) and late adolescents (ages 15–18). As with the MJI or SRM-SF moral judgment results, the preadolescents’ or early adolescents’ reasoning concerning the purpose of laws tended to be more concrete and pragmatic. For example, an 11-year-old responded: ‘‘Well, [they’d have laws] so everybody won’t fight and they have certain laws so they won’t go around breaking windows and stuff and getting away with it.’’ In contrast, reasoning in late adolescence tended to be more abstract and ideal, e.g., an 18-year-old’s response: ‘‘Well, the main purpose [of the laws] would be just to set up a standard of behavior for people, for society living together so that they can live peacefully and in harmony with each other’’ (p. 328). With reference

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to effects of the absence of law, older adolescents appealed not only to outer misconduct but also to more subtle or intangible effects upon inner feelings and character (e.g., personal confusion, anomie, and a dwindling of moral sense and capacity). This beginning movement from interpersonal to societal frames of reference in late adolescence is represented theoretically in moral judgment models as movement from Stage 3 to Stage 4. In Kohlberg’s and Snarey’s models, this movement is from ‘‘interpersonal accord and conformity’’ (Kohlbergian Stage 3) to ‘‘societal accord in system maintenance’’ (Kohlbergian Stage 4) within the conventional level. Gibbs recasts Stages 3 and Stage 4 as already mature in their appreciation of the intangible bases of relationships and society. The Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning may not be conformity- or maintenance-oriented when the orientation is Type B or field-independent (Gibbs et al., 1986). The data bases generally corroborate the cognitive developmental expectation for moral judgment development in adolescence. In the MJI data base, although most late adolescents’ reasoning was predominantly Stage 3, transition 3/4 made a strong secondary showing (it was the mean stage for 66.5% of 18-year-olds in Taiwan). In the SRM-SF data base, transition 3/4 marked at least the upper range of late adolescents’ moral judgment in Bahrain, England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998), and Italy (community service volunteers). Indeed, transition 3/4 was the mean moral judgment stage vicinity evidenced by the Italian volunteer sample. The volunteers provided help through charitable Catholic institutions to needy individuals such as Bosnian refugees as well as the elderly, ill, and/or handicapped (Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000). That community service is associated with greater use of transition 3/4 and Stage 4 is consistent with cognitive developmental hypotheses regarding the developmental impact of such ‘‘enlarged’’ social perspective-taking opportunities (Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Edwards, 1978, 1985, 1986; Kohlberg, 1984; cf. Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006), as will be discussed below. Moral judgment in adulthood. If Stage 3 gains in prominence during adolescence, the same may be said for transition 3/4 or Stage 4 during the adult years. In the MJI data base, transition 3/4 is the most frequent level used among adults in India (upper middle class), Kibbutz, Taiwan, and USA, although it is not seen among adults in rural Kenya or Turkey. Stage 4 also makes a strong showing, and in fact is the modal stage in a USA upper middle class sample. Stages 3 and 4 remain mixed in the SRM-SF data base, but transition 3/4 or Stage 4 defined the upper (+1 SD) range for 15 of the 19 adult samples where range was reported (three exceptions were adult offender samples: Chang, 2001; Palmer & Begum, 2006; and Peterson, 2001). Higher education appears to be particularly important for moral judgment development in the adult years, perhaps because of the opportunity it typically affords for expanded social perspective-taking. The mean stage of adults in Italy having no more than an 8th grade education was transition 2/3 (SRMS = 269) and of USA Head Start mothers (23% of whom had not completed secondary school and only 4% of whom had attended or completed college) was Stage 3 (SRMS = 300). In contrast, adult university students in Australia, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the USA evidenced mean SRMS scores in the transition 3/4 range (university students in Japan and a mixed sample in Belgium were the only exceptions). Mason and Gibbs (1993a, 1993b) as well as Comunian and Gielen (2006) found that the extent of university students’ moral judgment maturity beyond Stage 3 was correlated with their agreement on social perspective-taking items such as ‘‘I have encountered and become friends with other students or co-workers of different ethnic or cultural backgrounds (for example, a student from another country),’’ ‘‘I have been

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involved in a group or organization where it was necessary for me to deal with various points of view,’’ and ‘‘I have learned just how culturally varied the world is since coming to college’’ (cf. Edwards, 1975, 1978; Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981). Comunian and Gielen (2006) found that a sociomoral intervention promoted both expanded social perspective-taking and moral judgment beyond Stage 3, but they did not investigate whether social perspective-taking mediated the gains in moral judgment. Research is needed to address this question. As adolescents or adults in university or complex work settings increasingly experience and seek to coordinate diverse viewpoints, they may not only increasingly appreciate the need for agreed-upon standards (Stage 4), but may also move beyond Stage 4 to reflect upon the customs and norms of their society, indeed, of morality or life itself. In Needleman’s (1982) overstatement, ‘‘man cannot live without philosophy’’ (p. 3). In ethics, metaethical reflection may lead for a time to an ‘‘unbridled relativism’’ (Boyes & Chandler, 1992, p. 285) that Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) referred to as a transitional 4 1/2. In Kohlberg’s theory, adults (especially those with philosophical training) may achieve a postconventional or principled philosophical level of theoretical discourse on the bases for moral values, a Stage 5 and perhaps a Stage 6. In Snarey’s pluralist–inclusionist stage model, this level in the theory and scoring manual must be broadened beyond the Western traditions of Kant or Rawls. In Gibbs’ two-phase model, this level pertains to a fundamentally new phase of human development, an existential inquiry that reflects moral judgment maturity in the fullest sense and transcends stages and stage scoring manuals (morally relevant existential reflection could be profitably included in the manual, albeit as examples of poststandard quests for existential insight rather than as a stage). Social perspective-taking across cultures We have referred to cross-cultural evidence consistent with the emphasis in Kohlberg’s cognitive development approach on social interaction, social participation, and, in particular, social perspective-taking opportunities as facilitative of moral judgment development. Noted earlier were Italian studies (Comunian & Gielen, 1995, 2000, 2006) that found relations between community service volunteering or related communitarian experiences and greater use of transition 3/4 and Stage 4. USA (e.g., Colby et al., 1983) findings relating moral judgment maturity to index variables such as age, education, socioeconomic status, urban settings, and community service volunteering were corroborated in Snarey’s cross-cultural MJI review as well as in the present data base (Table 3). For example, positive correlations with chronological age (indexing social experiential as well as maturational variables; Rutter, 1989) were generally reported in studies where the samples entailed a range of ages. The relationship of moral judgment stage with SES level was replicated in an Armenian study (Jeshmaridian & Babakhanyan, 2005). Urban samples evidenced more mature moral judgment compared with rural samples in Armenia (Jeshmaridian & Babakhanyan, 2005) as well as Ireland and Scotland (Ferguson & Cairns, 2002). Studies in Belgium, England, Italy, Japan,6 Kenya, Malaysia, Taiwan and USA 6

The reversal in SRMS means between the sixth and eighth grades in the Takaki (2001) study (see Table 6) was not significant overall, but was significant for boys. Takaki speculated that ‘‘certain problems in Japanese education’’ created an ‘‘antipathy’’ and temporary regression in morality among mid-adolescent Japanese boys (p. 541).

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comparing students at different educational levels all found significant differences favoring higher education. Researchers in Canada (Krivel-Zacks, 1995), Malaysia (Chu, 1999), the Netherlands (Brugman & Aleva, 2004), Taiwan (Chen & Hsieh, 2001) and USA (Van Someren, 2000) reported positive correlations with academic achievement. It should also be noted that moral judgment correlated with intelligence in the USA (Basinger et al., 1995; Grime, 2005; Schonfeld et al., 2005) and the Netherlands (Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2005). Particularly helpful are studies that relate moral judgment maturity directly to selfreports of social participation and perspective-taking. Studies (Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b) relating transition 3/4 and Stage 4 to self-reported experiences of exposure to and interaction with culturally diverse individuals or groups in university or complex work settings were described above. Grime (2005; cf. Sedikides, 1989) found that adolescents’ self-reported general and friendship perspective-taking correlated with their use of interpersonally mature (Stage 3) moral judgment even after controlling for verbal intelligence. Also relevant to the role of social perspective-taking is the investigation of groups that might be expected to be developmentally delayed in moral judgment due to diminished social perspective-taking opportunities. A number of researchers investigated whether the SRM-SF discriminated delinquents or juvenile offenders from a non-offending comparison group (of equivalent chronological age in most studies, with verbal intelligence and/or SES controlled in some studies). Moral judgment developmental delay among delinquents relative to their comparison groups was evident in all countries where it was studied, namely, Australia, Bahrain, China, England, Germany, the Netherlands,7 Sweden, Taiwan, and the USA (see Table 6; cf. Stams et al., 2006; see related discussion below). A USA study (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993) found that delinquents higher in moral judgment were less likely to recidivate at 12 months following release. Among adult offenders, Chang (2001) found that moral judgment correlated inversely with psychopathy. Inclusion of social perspective-taking measures would be helpful in future studies of individuals evidencing various categories of antisocial behavior; particularly helpful would be intervention studies in which the relationship of social perspective-taking gains and other mediators to outcome variables is evaluated. Some cross-cultural research yielded a mixed picture concerning areas of moral judgment delay and facilitative social processes or outcomes. Adult offenders were less mature overall (e.g., no substantial transition 3/4) in moral judgment (Palmer & Begum, 2006; Peterson, 2001; Stevenson, Hall, & Innes, 2004), but were developmentally delayed (transition 2/3 or lower) mainly in the value areas of property, law, and legal justice (Peterson, 2001). These moral value areas make sense as the areas of delay that can be expected for offenders. Adolescent offenders are delayed in these areas as well. Unlike adult offenders, however, adolescent offenders are also delayed in most other areas (see Gregg et al., 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998; Ritz, 1996). Moral judgment generally correlated inversely with parent-, teacher-, or self-reported antisocial behavior in the USA (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; McInerney, 1995; Ritz, 1996; but cf. Schonfeld et al., 2005) and Canada (Krivel-Zacks, 1995), but not consistently in England (Palmer & Hollin, 2000, 2001; cf. Brusten, Stams, & Gibbs, 2007; Emler & Tarry, 2007; Tarry & Emler, 2007),

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The difference in the Brugman and Aleva (2004) study became non-significant when participants from ‘‘a highrisk urban area’’ were added to the comparison group (p. 325).

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and not in the Netherlands (Leenders & Brugman, 2005). Moral judgment inconsistently related to antisocial attitudes, self-serving cognitive distortions, or anti-outgroup ideology: inverse relationships were found in Germany (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001), Sweden (Larden, Melin, Holst, & Langstrom, 2006), the USA (Barriga et al., 2001), and Australia (among moral judgment delayed and nondelayed adult offenders relative to adult nonoffenders; Stevenson et al., 2004), but not in England (among adult offenders, Palmer & Begum, 2006), or the Netherlands (Nas et al., 2005). Various sociomoral interventions promoted moral judgment in Canada (Binfet, 2004; DiBiase, 2002; Krivel-Zacks, 1995; Raynauld, Larivee, & Dionne, 1999), Italy (Comunian & Gielen, 2006), and Australia (Putnins, 1997) but not consistently in the USA (DeVargas, 1999; but cf. Greene, 1997; Leeman et al., 1993) or the Netherlands (Nas et al., 2005). Although moral judgment as measured by the SRM-SF generally related to psychosocial maturity, friendship quality, empathy, or relationship adjustment in Bulgaria (Vlassev, 1998), Sweden (Larden et al., 2006), and the USA (Getty, 1996; Grime, 2005; Hubbs-Tait et al., 2006; Humphries, Parker, & Jagers, 2000; and K. A. Oliver, 1993), the relation was not found in Bahrain (AlFalaij, 1991) or Saudi Arabia (Al-Ghamdi, 1994). Finally, moral judgment correlated with social skills in some studies (DiBiase, 2002; Krivel-Zacks, 1995) but not in others (Leeman et al., 1993; Nas et al., 2005; Palmer & Hollin, 1999). Research is needed to investigate these relationships and account for the inconsistencies. Meta-analyses of the effect size of the impact of sociomoral interventions upon moral judgment development and conduct, for example, may be feasible as additional intervention studies become available. Gender differences. Differential social perspective-taking opportunities have been related to the question of gender differences in moral judgment orientation and stage. Females tend to use more care-related concerns in their moral justifications (Garmon et al., 1996; Jaffe & Hyde, 2000). This finding is consistent with Gilligan’s (1982) claims for a ‘‘feminine voice’’ of responsible caring in moral judgment. Contradicting Gilligan’s claim of a stage scoring bias against females, however, have been findings that early-adolescent females reach Stage 3 as their dominant stage sooner than do early-adolescent males, even with verbal intelligence controlled (Garmon et al., 1996; Silberman & Snarey, 1993; Walker, 1984). This early-adolescent moral judgment precociousness favoring females coincides with higher levels of general and friendship perspective-taking experiences, which suggests that the Stage 3 moral judgment gain may be attributable to more extensive opportunities to interrelate and reflect upon social perspectives (Grime, 2005). It should be noted that gender differences in moral judgment stage, where they are found at all in our cross-cultural data bases, tend to favor females, at least in the 2007 data base. Many studies in both the 1985 and 2007 data bases included both genders in their samples and investigated the question of gender differences. Consistent with previous studies, the cross-cultural data support gender differences with reference to moral orientation more than moral judgment stage. Replicating Garmon et al.’s (1996) and others’ studies in the USA (see Jaffe & Hyde, 2000), Gielen, Comunian, and Antoni (1994) in Italy found that females use more care-related concerns than do males in their moral justifications. In the 2007 SRMSF data base, a moral judgment stage difference favoring females (at least in early to mid adolescence) was found in Armenia, Belgium, Canada (Raynauld et al., 1999), Germany, Japan (Takaki, 2001), Sweden, and Malaysia—but not in Australia (Stevenson et al., 2004), Bosnia, Kenya, Russia, Scotland (Ferguson & Cairns, 2002), or the Netherlands (Leenders & Brugman, 2005). Results were mixed in England (Palmer & Hollin, 1998; but cf. Brusten, 2003),

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Italy (Comunian & Antoni, 1993; Comunian & Gielen, 1995; but cf. Comunian & Gielen, 2006), Taiwan (W. Y. Lin, 1995; but cf. Tang, 2004), and the USA (Bock, 2006; Ritz, 1996; Schonfeld et al., 2005; but cf. Garmon et al., 1996; Getty, 1996; Humphries et al., 2000; J. M. Oliver, 2003). In the 1985 MJI data base, Snarey (1985; cf. Walker, 1984, 2006) found few gender stage differences in either direction. He reported that only 2 out of 14 MJI studies examining the question found a difference (one in Germany favoring females in Stage 3 usage, another in England favoring males). Conclusions Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach and stage model were used in this review to study, across different assessment methods, moral judgment development across cultures. Kohlberg claimed that there is a universality to moral growth beyond the superficial as well as to facilitating social perspective-taking processes and moral values. Identifying that which is universal and basic in human development is of central importance for developmental psychology and beyond. In light of basic humanity and maturity, legitimate issues of ethical principle can be distinguished from enmity attributable to ideological differences or superficial differences of language, appearance, and custom (Spelke & Newport, 1998). This study reviewed Kohlberg’s universality claims with research that collectively used MJI and SRM-SF moral judgment measures. Comprising Snarey’s (1985) MJI data base were 45 studies conducted in 27 countries. Comprising the present SRM-SF data base are 75 studies conducted in 23 countries. Collective inclusion of the different (dilemma and non-dilemma) methods made possible not only a replication (or non-replication) but, more importantly, a multimethod extension (Brewer & Hunter, 2006) in the study of the moral universality question. The 42 countries collectively surveyed in the reviews range from Guatamala to Germany, from India to Italy, from New Guinea to Nigeria. Our collective survey using the multimethod extension provided some consensus—more precisely, some convergent evidence across methods—but also revealed some continuing controversies and the need for further research (using both production and recognition measures) regarding basic moral values, stages, and social processes. Moral values Although the question of the universality of values continues to need research attention, persons around the world do seem to understand and appreciate values such as life, affiliation, contract or truth, and property or law, whether they encounter those values in a dilemma (MJI) or are asked about them directly (SRM-SF). Otherwise the (adapted) dilemmas would have provoked greater puzzlement and the values ratings greater protocol attrition. Of course, the moral values studied in Kohlbergian assessment measures are not necessarily exhaustive of the moral value domain; other moral values may be more relevant in particular cultural contexts. Moral judgment stages Kohlberg’s main generic claim for moral universality was that moral judgment develops in systematic ways across cultures. In the years from late childhood into early adolescence,

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a qualitative shift from instrumental (Stage 2) to mutualistic (Stage 3) moral judgment was robust enough to manifest across different methods of assessment and diverse cultures. This shift has been characterized as a transition from concrete to ideal or ‘‘do as you would be done by’’ moral reciprocity by Piaget (1932/1965), from the preconventional to the conventional level by Kohlberg (1984) or Snarey (1985), and from the immature to the mature level of standard development by Gibbs (2003). The shift typically occurs somewhat earlier for females and much later (if at all) for delinquents, findings that may relate to differential social perspective-taking opportunities (see below). The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 lies at the heart of moral judgment development and is evident, then, across cultures and methods. Less consensus and more controversy tend to characterize the border regions of moral judgment stage development. In the lower region, the moral judgment of early childhood is characterized not only by Stage 2 but also to some extent by Stage 1, the stage of appeals to salient features of social life such as size, power, appearances, and physical damage or punitive consequences. Stage 1 superficiality does appear to be a characteristic tendency (Siegler, 1996b) of the moral judgment of young children. Yet the Stage 1 characterization does not account for the precocities of preschoolers’ sociomoral reasoning, as found through the extensive child-adapted research of Damon, Eisenberg, Turiel, and others. Future research and theory must come to terms with these contrasting aspects of moral judgment in early childhood. Controversy also surrounds to some extent the upper border of the core stage trend. Not particularly controversial is the observation that moral judgment expands in social scope during late adolescence in many countries, according to both data bases. In stage terms, this expansion can be characterized as a broadening of the intangible bases of moral decisions and value to include the functional bases for a complex society (Stage 4). Cognate research on the concept of law (Adelson et al., 1969) documented in a USA sample an increasing appreciation in the late adolescent years of the need for agreed-upon standards and institutions for the common good. This development is found especially among adolescents or adults engaged in community service activities or in university or complex work settings, perhaps reflecting the role of social perspective-taking opportunities (see below). What of development beyond the fourth stage? Among the revisionists, Gibbs agrees with Snarey on the importance of incorporating moral principles or philosophy into the investigation of moral judgment maturity in the fullest sense. Gibbs (2003) argues, however, that philosophical or meta-ethical discourse should be interpreted not as a fifth stage but rather as part of a profoundly reflective or existential phase of human development. Isawa’s (2001) use of the Heinz dilemma to explore the greater emphasis among Japanese (relative to American) adult respondents on ‘‘the connected aspect of human existence’’ (p. 79), for example, would be seen by Snarey as exploring the cultural elaboration of a postconventional stage and by Gibbs as exploring (in the main) an existential insight. Further refinement of the Snarey and Gibbs models may promote new research including experimental hypothesis testing, and accordingly the accumulation of a greater preponderance of evidence for one or the other of the models. Social perspective-taking opportunities A variety of evidence across the data bases is consistent with the cognitive developmental expectation that moral judgment stage development is facilitated by social perspectivetaking opportunities. Moral judgment maturity was found to correlate with putative

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indices of extensiveness, breadth, and/or diversity of social experience (age, socioeconomic status or social class, and education) in Kohlberg’s longitudinal study (Colby et al., 1983) as well as in the cross-cultural data bases. The 1985 and 2007 data bases also found correlations of moral judgment maturity with urbanization or urban (versus rural) settings. The higher prevalence of transition 3/4 or Stage 4 moral judgment among late adolescents or adults in volunteer community service or in university or complex work settings was noted above. Diminished social perspective-taking opportunities may be a factor helping to account for the developmentally delayed moral judgment of juvenile delinquents or conduct-disordered adolescents, many of whom have home backgrounds characterized by erratic discipline, abuse, and neglect (Kazdin, 1995). Cross-cultural studies comparing the moral judgment of delinquents and non-delinquents spanned eight countries (Bahrain, China, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Taiwan, and USA) in the 2007 SRM-SF data base. Strikingly, among 45 late adolescent samples in the data base, all 17 delinquent samples were below average, indeed, were among the 20 lowest ranked in their age bracket. Meta-analyses indicate that the developmental delay evident among late-adolescent delinquents remains even after taking into account correlates and moderators such as IQ, SES, and incarceration (Nelson, Smith, & Dodd, 1990; Stams et al., 2006). Directly relevant to the posited facilitative role of social perspective-taking opportunities are studies (in the 2007 SRM-SF data base) that included self-report measures of social participation and perspective-taking. Adolescents who reported more general and friendship perspective-taking experiences were more mature in moral judgment even after verbal intelligence was controlled for; such experiences may mediate the precocious advent of Stage 3 among girls in late childhood or early adolescence. Social perspective-taking may facilitate moral judgment development among older adolescents as well. That social experiential processes are critical to the university contribution is suggested by correlations between advanced moral judgment and agreement among college students with items such as, ‘‘I have learned just how culturally varied the world is since coming to college’’ (Comunian & Gielen, 2006; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b). Intriguingly, most of the above evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that such diverse social experiences foster the development of more adequate psychological understandings or ‘‘theories’’ of mind (one’s own and others’), and that it is the person’s theory of mind that then undergirds the moral judgment gain (e.g., Wainryb & Brehl, 2006; Lalonde & Chandler, 2002). Developmental researchers and theorists are increasingly attending to issues and interfaces between the theory of mind and sociomoral developmental literatures (Baird & Sokol, 2004). Future research should investigate and comparatively evaluate social perspective-taking and theory of mind depictions of social developmental process. Moral judgment and social behavior Personological and situational variables influence the relationship between moral judgment and social behavior. Decades ago, Brown and Herrnstein (1978) proposed ‘‘that an intervening variable is required’’ between moral judgment stage and social behavior, namely, how the individual on the basis of that stage conceptualizes ‘‘the specific action in context’’ (p. 336). Similarly, Blasi (1980) called for attention to how moral judgment ‘‘is applied to a concrete situation to invest it with moral meaning’’ (p. 40). Possible vari-

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ables that should continue to be studied include moral identity or moral self-relevance (the degree to which morality is central to one’s sense of self; see, e.g., Gibbs, 2003), self-serving cognitive distortions, e.g., blaming others (e.g., Barriga et al., 2001; cf. Tisak, Tisak, & Goldstein, 2006), empathy (e.g.., Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; McCrady et al., in press), executive skills, social skills (which have not consistently related to moral judgment maturity), and situational variables (e.g., Brugman & Aleva, 2004; Greenberg, 2002). Inclusion of such variables in sociomoral intervention programs could promote the programs’ behavioral effectiveness (e.g., DiBiase, Gibbs, & Potter, 2005). Situational influences merit particular attention. The regressive effects on social behavior of situational factors such as prison conditions has long been noted (Gibbs, 2006b). Other situational or sociocultural factors supportive of the judgment–action relationship should also be studied. Particularly intriguing was Greenberg’s (2002) experimental study of developmental and situational influences on employee theft. In contrast to employees evidencing immature or ‘‘preconventional’’ moral judgment, employees more mature in moral judgment refrained from pilfering company funds—but only when the mature employees were from companies with an ethics program in place. Greenberg concluded that the relationship between mature moral judgment and responsible social behavior requires salient social support. Final Comment Although Kohlberg died in 1987, and approaches to moral development have since proliferated (e.g., Dawson & Gabrielian, 2003; Gibbs, 2006b; Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Krebs & Denton, 2005, 2006; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Shweder et al., 2006; Tappan, 2006; Turiel, 2006b), cognitive developmental research and theory continue to grow. The areas of consensus indicate progress in the cognitive developmental contribution to our understanding of moral judgment development and behavior across cultures; evidently, moral development is not entirely relative to particular cultures and socialization practices. Areas of controversy and inconsistency reflect continued vitality as well as the opportunity for advances through systematic research. As Kohlberg recognized, beyond the broad cognitive developmental approach of age-related trends, his specific stage model and claim for moral judgment development across cultures require qualification and revision. Nonetheless, as Snarey (1985) concluded, ‘‘the significant shortcomings of Kohlberg’s work should not overshadow its remarkable achievements’’ (p. 229). Our review bolsters the conclusion that Kohlberg was in principle correct regarding the universality of basic moral judgment development, moral values, and related social perspective-taking processes across cultures. Acknowledgments This article originated in a symposium paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2005, August). We are grateful for the contributions of many people. We especially thank MaryLou Arnold, Daan Brugman, Kate Brusten, Tan Bee Chu, Anne Colby, AnnaLaura Comunian, Jane Cottrell, Ann-Marie DiBiase, James Day, Carolyn Edwards, Neil Ferguson, Andrew Garrod, Jon Gibbs, Valerie Gibbs, Uwe Gielen, Helen Haste, Josie Hauer, Charles Helwig, Jennifer Kuehn, Laura Hubbs-Tait, Ray Hummel, Samvel Jeshmaridian, Tobias

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