Pakistan\'s Madrassas (Work in progress)

Heather Woolf
POLS 3430r
Dr. Banerjee
December 8, 2014
Madrassas: Islamic Schools in Pakistan
Education in Pakistan and how success is measured is based on literacy rates, which show varying reports. Estimates regarding literacy rates range undependably from a low of twenty-three percent to as high as forty-nine percent, with the latter being reported by the Pakistani government's data Beginning with Pakistan's independence in the mid-twentieth century, the country exists predominantly governed as a military dictatorship with a series of coups, a civil war and corruption that arguably makes all Pakistani governmental efforts a facade. Although, madrassas, or Islamic schools, theoretically are relevant as a means of teaching children who reside in an Islamic state. They are increasingly coming under attack for reportedly being "schools of hate" with little to no governmental control over the curriculum, which purportedly "offer[s] only religious instruction, ignoring math, science, and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern society." Moreover, Pakistan's Ministry of Education "has never [had] any centralized database of madrasas in Pakistan…" Given that these schools are generating Muslim extremists who "preach jihad without understanding the concept:...an inner striving to purify the self [sic]-with guerrilla warfare", instead of preparing children to compete in a globalized economy, then one must question why parents are sending their children to madrassas at all?
Understanding the Purpose and History of Madrassas in Pakistan
Madrassas in Pakistan varied little from other types of schools within the country prior to the late 1970's. Secular and Islamic studies remained part of the curriculum until General Zia ul-Haq staged a military coup in July 1977. Zia being a devout Muslim began to promote Islamic militarism while the region attempted to recover from civil war. The impact of external politics of the Middle East broughtdrastic change to the Zia led Pakistan, predominantly due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While Zia refused a "…2-year $400 million package of economic and military assistance…" from then United States President, Jimmy Carter, Zia soonthereafter reached an economic aid agreement in 1980 with newly elected President Ronald Reagan that satisfied both nations publically.
However, secretly, during the Carter administration there began to be an alliance forging between Pakistan and the United States. Mounting pressure from the United States called on Pakistan to end its nuclear program in 1979. Creating the misapprehension of antagonism, covert aid funneled into the region, including Pakistan and Afghanistan, during 1978 and 1979. This aid came in the form of CIA military training and financial support.
Throughout most of the 1980's, Pakistan existed under miliary rule. Saudi Arabian oil funds were building thousands of new schools to promote "ultraconservative…Wahabism version of Islam." Pakistan would soon be sending children to these schools in massive numbers ranging from an estimated 7,000 students in the late 1970's to over two million by 2004. Purportedly, madrassas began to re-emerge increasingly throughout the 1980's as a way to manipulate the future of South Asia, particularly Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP)region
Similarly, political forces within Pakistan began to use the ever-increasing number of madrassas as ways of structuring the education of young Pakistani boys in order to institute the values of religious philosophies and political lines. This method proved to be particularly effective in the Northwest Frontier Provience (NWFP) along the Afghan border. Years of war and mounting political tensions between the Shi'a Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the predominantly Sunni doctrine of Deobandism made the NWFP fertile ground for ultraconservative madrassas by "exploiting sectarian differences and [using] militant sectarian groups for their short-term benefit." Meanwhile, the United States is also fostering this growth of this radically conservative and effective Islamic army by sending billions of U.S. dollars in aid to institute Al Queda.
Curriculum and Geographically Differences of Pakistan's Madrassas
Madrassas curriculum often varies throughout Pakistan, but two element are constant: "the Qu'ran…, and [sic] the Sunnah (wise sayings and acts of the Prophet Muhammad)." Madrassas receive funding from private sources, particularly Midde Eastern oil-rich countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Likewise, local political activists and charitible contributions by individuals provide funding for madrassa creation. Political motivation is a driving force behind establishing a madrass's curriculum and funding. Ali Riaz writes, "…most of the madrassahs are affiliated with one of the five national boards (wafaq)." Three-fifth's of the boards are Sunni and the majority of these there are conservative Muslims. According to Harvard's Jessica Stern, "What began as an indiginous, secular movement for independence has become…an Islamist crusade…". Geographically, the majority of madrassas are established in the NWPF and Punjab regions, who often are connected, according to Stern, with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other militant islamic groups who provide resources. (However, Stern does acknowledge these madrassas additionally derive moderate funding from the Pakistan government.)
These groups oversee and have progressively sought to change the focus of the madrassa curriculum from interpretation of the Qu'ran to rote memorization. Moreover, ancient texts used in these madrassas, derived from Arabic and Persian languages, are for memorization purposes only, not "as a living language". The purpose is to prevent comprehension of the text with only a few exceptions, where an "Arabicized" Urdu is used. Explaining linguistically why in the some regions of the NWFP, rather than using the national language of Urdu, students are taught in Pasto or Sindhi.
The Pakistani government resources are too strained by spending on national defense to supervise texts utilized. Considering that Pakistan spending on education at its height equaled approximately $255 million USD, compared to the 1998 budget for defense beging about $61 billion USD, is understandable how Stern concludes, "In trying to save money…Pakistan is pursuing a path that is likely disastrous in the long run, allowing a culture of violence to take root."
Why Would Parent's Choose a Madrassa Education?
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States by terrorists associated with Muslim extremists, it important to look at why Pakistan's parents,specifically those living in the NWFP, would choose schools that seemingly promote militant Islamic education. Problems seemingly arise for these families as derivitives arising from poverty, ignorance, fear, and cultural perceptions about gender. Simply stated, parents who are impoverished and lacking formal education themselves are ignorant of the potential problems of jihadist indoctrination, are most likely to enroll their children in madrassas who provide a free education as well as supply room and board free of charge.
However, Fair points out that Stern erred in her 2000 article by visiting only "key madrasas associated with the Deobandi interpretive school of Islam-madrasas that have long ties to jihad-while not appreciating the variation in [schools] across Pakistan and…different religious interpretations." In other words, these schools that are described by Stern and others are most frequently located in the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, nearest the Afghanistan border, that have the strongest ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Therefore, it would appear that some of Pakistan's parents are choosing to send their children to learn to be terrorists who ultimately intend to murder American and Pakistani service members who fight in the "War on Terror". But, is this the intended choice? Perhaps not. One report states, "…most of the madrassas, many of which lie in the wilderness of the north-western Pakistan, are moderate and provide education and shelter for poorer students."
Nonetheless, it is conceded to be an ongoing problem chiefly in this region according to most sources. In an attempt to reform the push towards militant Islam, plans and some laws have been enacted since 2001 to combat the problem such as having "all madrassas register with the government, expand their curricula, disclose their financial resources, seek permission for admitting foreign students, and stop sending students to militant training camps."

The Problem with Empirical Research and Impact on Subsequent Findings

It should be noted that many madrassas do not register with the government despite the 2001 legislation. Consequently, until better data collection methods are implemented, empirical research is limited. In viewing the various information, I have applied two studies which supply empirical data. Additionally, I have relied upon various expert opinions in an attempt to provide the least amount of bias concerning each of the following questions (see later) on why parents choose madrassa educations. Another reason for applying secondary data is due to the contradictory data found in both empirical studies. Neither study evaluated the impact of parental education in making educational decisions for their children.
The first study applied data supplied by secondary sources and the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government allegedly has previously provided overly optimistic and/or erroneous data. The second study applied only government documents: two census reports and the "Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS)". This report further points out, ""None of the secondary sources used verifiable data sources or established statistical methodologies."


Does Poverty Impact Parent's Educational Choices?
Both empirical studies provide differing results. The first study, by Tariq Rahman, finds that madrassas do attract the poorest students who are frequently rural, and students come from the "working class". Competition to enter schools are overwhelming at many madrassas, with one example given in which Rahman quotes, "Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces." Furthermore, the "welfare" provided by madrassas in Pakistan have a profound impact on the lives of students and will remain an integral part of the society as poverty increases.
The second study, financed by the World Bank, lists a host of empirical flaws within their study, but state, "…we accept these flawed estimates…However, under a more demanding empirical lens, they fail to hold up. The reality is unrelated to conventional wisdom." All information asserted is directly oppositional to each question regarding poverty, extremism, and social attitudes towards women.
Poverty is the most common explanation for parents to send children to Islamic schools according to NWFP education minister, Muhammad Atif. In this region, the "per capita income is US$900 a year" compared to the "national average of [US]$1380 [per year]" if one is able to obtain gainful employment. Even so, it is interesting to take notice of the fact, according to some sources, approximately half of the children living in tribal areas are not even enrolled in a school of any type.
Sometimes this may be due in part to parental abandonment and death. Following floods and an "earthquake in October 2005", many children were abandoned while others were orphaned from the natural disasters or parents who served as martyrs, leaving many children nowhere else to go besides a madrassa. Despite some reports that enrollments are low, from 1988 to 2002, Rahman reported an increase in student enrollment over four years at the Deobandi madrassas from 1779 students to "over 7000 in number".
Still, some parents are hesitant to enroll them because the job prospects are so dismal. Yet, many madrassas do provide job placement, despite the fact that these positions are frequently as teachers and/or religious leaders, which neither typically provide wages beyond the working class. One father sends his two children to the Dar-ul-Uloom-Haqqania madrassa despite its notorious reputation for having educated some of the uppermost leaders of the Taliban in Kabul because he finds his "options limited' amid "terrorism, closed factories, and dwindling agricultural earnings". With madrassas offering to provide all of the necessities for food, clothing, housing, and education, it is difficult to see why parents would not at least attempt to provide some level of education, particularly for girls who are the least likely to receive any education elsewhere.

Do Cultural Perceptions Regarding Gender Position Madrassas as Girls' Only Educational Opportunity?
While many girls may come from financially sound families, it is their brothers that will be most likely to achieve and English medium education, primarily due to cultural beliefs. Reportedly, "Elders from the community also say that there is a perception that girls who pursue religious educations have better marriage prospects". This is likely due to the impact of poverty when "mother[s] can assume that some…children will die of disease if not war… [therefore making] it easier to donate a son to what she feels is a just and holy cause." Girls taught militant Islam in madrassas are better indoctrinated to see a martyred child as having fulfilled their "spiritual duty".
However, "Of six million students, 35 percent are female, while more thatn 1.2 million school-age girls do not attend schools according to UNICEF and Care International." In neighboring Afghanistan, the female literacy rate is only 12.6 percent. Gender is still an issue in gaining an education in strongly Islamic governed states. This is particularly the case in the borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, some girls are even given scholarships to colleges such as the Islamabad Model Girls College.
In other countries, such as India and Nepal, this tradition is changing to enable girls to attend madrassas and learn how to operate Microsoft software in order to become employable all the way up to advanced degrees such as medicine. For now, Pakistan continues the tradition of inequality, but other studies suggest this is changing as more girls are allowed to enroll in any school, be it public, private, or a madrassa.
Are Parents Lacking Formal Education Themselves?
C. Christine Fair suggests that parental choice in determining where children go for their education is largely based on those that show the most intellectual potential, thereby, negating that poverty or gender are factors. Rahman, to a degree supports this claim, concurring with Fair that it is typical for students to attend a madrassa in combination with either a public or a private school.
Nevertheless, information on parent's educational levels are only able to be discerned from statistical data that may imply the previous generation's access to education. For those who have lived for generations in the war-torn NWFP, it is likely that their educational choices are based more on traditional values as is seen in making choices to send girls to school. Stated simply, parents are likely choosing the same kind of education they received for their children. However, more research needs to be found in order to make any conclusive hypothesis on the subject.

Are Parents Ignorant of the Potential Problems of Jihadist Indoctrination?
In determining how much parents are aware of Jihadist indoctrination in madrassas, Rahman's study shows that there is evidence that parents are aware of radical Muslim ideologies. For example, the impoverished father who sent his two children to Dar-ul-Uloom Haqquania, it is common knowledge that many of its alumni are leaders in the Afghani Taliban. Additionally, despite madrassa teacher's and administration claims to the contrary, sectarian contradictions are seen in circulated texts and syllabi. One syllabus from 2002 shows the Jamait-i-Islami criticizing Western countries "political and economic ideas" as well as the West's influence on "liberty and individualism on Muslim societies.
Shapiro and Fair even concedes to some degree this point when it is written, "…using violence in support of political goals"… must be cared about by the individual and "makes sense as a way to achieve those goals…" And while they do not look at the supply side for militancy, it is further acquiesced, "…that militant organizations cannot engage in meaningful levels of violence without some measure of popular support…" This popular support is most likely coming from parents with extremist viewpoints. Thus, it is logical to assert that parents have chosen madrassas as a form of tribute to their beliefs and feelings of obligation to the war against "infidels".
Conclusion
While the vast majority of madrassas in Pakistan are not likely to be "factories for terrorists", it is possible in the NWFP region that they are frequently "schools of hate", particularly those associated the Deobandi wing of Islamic ideology. Poverty places parents in a position in which their options are limited if they disagree with the religious teaching in many cases. For these families, the few opportunities provided for employment practically force them to offer their children the very best they have to give and this is the madrassa. Parents' personal beliefs and education factor into these decisions, especially where females are concerned in order to give them a variety of options, regardless of how other cultures might judge these alternatives. Over time, warfare, poverty, cultural values, and little funding for education by the Pakistani government seems to have positioned the NWFP as a steady supplier of terrorist who will continue to wage war on those who oppose their political and/or religious views.












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(Thomas, 2006, p. 123)
Madrassa/madrasa/madrasah-Spelling varies among authors. For the purposes of this paper, the author will use "madrassa" unless otherwise quoted.
(Fair, 2012)

(Hilali, 2002, p. 293)
(Ibid., p. 292)
(Ibid.)
(Ibid. p. 294)
(Context of 'January 23, 1980: Invasion of Afghanistan Leads to Build Up of US Forces in Persian Gulf', n.d.)
(Ibid.)
(Kapisthalam, 2004)
(Thomas, 2006)
(Kapisthalam, 2004)
For the purposes of this paper, I will continue to utilize the former title, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), rather than its newer title "Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, (KPK)" (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2014)
(Riaz, 2008, p. 80)
(Kapisthalam, 2004)
(Riaz, 2008)
(ibid.)
(Thomas, 2006, p. 122)
(Kapisthalam, 2004)
(Riaz, 2008, p. 79)
(Ibid., 79-80)
(Thomas, 2006, p. 120), (Riaz, 2008, p. 80)
(Stern, Pakistan's Jihad Culture, 2000, p. 118), (Riaz, 2008, pp. 80-82)
(Stern, 2000, p. 118)
(Riaz, 2008, pp. 80-82)
(Ibid., 85,90)
(Ibid., 90)
(Thomas, 2006, p. 5), (Stern, Pakistan's Jihad Culture, 2000, pp. 115,125)
(Thomas, 2006, p. 122)
(Alderink, 2008)
(The Herald (Glasgow), 2006)
(Stern, Pakistan's Jihad Culture, 2000), (The Herald (Glasgow), 2006)
(Rahman, 2010, p. 311)
(Ibid., p.308, 311)
(Ibid., p.308, 311)
(Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2012)
(Ibid.)
(Rahman, 2010, p. 312)
(Ibid.)
(Ibid.)
(Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2012)
(Yusufzai, 2013)
(Ibid.)
(Ibid.)
(Haider, 2014)
(Ibid.)
(Rahman, 2010)
(Yusufzai, 2013)
(Rahman, 2010, p. 312)
(Yusufzai, 2013)
(Stern, Pakistan's Jihad Culture 2000)
(Baseerat, 2011)
Ibid.
(Stern, 2000)
(Stern, 2000)
(Afghanistan: Taliban forces students out of schools into madrasas, 2009)
(Ibid.)
(AFP, 2014)
(Baseerat, 2011), (Toppa, 2014)
(Fair, 2012, p. 137)
(Fair, 2012, p. 136)
(Rahman, 2010, p. 312)
(Ibid.)
(Ibid.)
(Shapiro & Fair, 2009-2010)
(Ibid.)
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