Phainomena as Witnesses EE I.6 Paper.pdf
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PH A I N O M E NA A S WI TNESSES AND EX A M P L E S : TH E ME THODOLOGY OF E U DE MI AN E THICS 1. 6 JO S EPH K ARBO W S K I
A ’s philosophical methodology has received a great deal of attention recently. Scholars have begun to question some of the commonplaces about Aristotelian methodology that were inspired by Owen’s influential work on the topic. One of these concerns the scope of the famous endoxic method described at NE . , b–. Owen maintained that that passage gives a representative description of Aristotle’s philosophical methodology, whose ‘data are for the most part the materials . . . of dialectic, and its problems are accordingly . . . conceptual puzzles’. Importantly, this proposal is not meant to imply that Aristotle employs the endoxic method in every single one of his treatises. Owen carefully restricts that method to philosophical treatises, like the Nicomachean Ethics and Physics, and distinguishes it from the empirical method employed in, for example, the De caelo. However, even this more © Joseph Karbowski A version of this paper was presented at the Junior Faculty Ancient Philosophy Workshop at Northwestern University organized by David Ebrey. I thank the participants of the workshop for their constructive feedback and encouragement, especially my commentator, Agnes Callard. I would also like to thank Dorothea Frede, Brad Inwood, Sean Kelsey, and an anonymous referee for their penetrating written comments. See G. E. L. Owen, ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’ [‘Tithenai’], in S. Mansion (ed.), Aristote et les problèmes de méthode: communications présentées au Symposium Aristotelicum tenu à Louvain du août au er septembre (Louvain, ), –; repr. in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy (Ithaca, NY, ), –. Ibid. . Owen’s characterization of the NE . method as ‘dialectical’ is controversial. Although that method proceeds from ἔνδοξα, Aristotle himself never calls it ‘dialectical’, and it is unclear whether it employs any of the strategies for dialectical discussions described in the Topics. For these reasons, I will continue to refer to the NE . method as the ‘endoxic’ method and forgo any reference to it as ‘dialectical’; cf. D. Frede, ‘The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not’ [‘Mystique’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), – at –. Owen, ‘Tithenai’, . Owen identifies philosophical treatises as those in which Aristotle is doing ‘conceptual analysis’, but this problematically attributes to Aris-
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modest thesis has come under fire from recent work on the methodology of the textbook philosophical treatises. For instance, careful studies of the enquiries into happiness and character virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have persuasively shown that the endoxic method is not their governing methodology; and these conclusions have been reinforced by Dorothea Frede’s recent contribution to the debate, which argues, more generally, that the endoxic method is a rara avis in the Aristotelian corpus, whose use is more or less confined to NE . –. Frede’s wide-ranging and impressive study says very little about the Eudemian Ethics (EE). This is understandable, as the literature to which she is reacting focuses primarily on the NE. However, the methodology of the EE is a topic well worthy of examination for at least two reasons. First, the EE is a serious treatise of moral philosophy by a rare philosophical talent. Therefore, both its doctrines and its methodology deserve consideration in their own right, quite apart from developmental questions about the treatise’s relation to the NE and compositional questions about the origin of the so-called common books. Second, many scholars maintain that the totle an anachronistic conception of philosophy; cf. J. M. Cooper, ‘Nicomachean Ethics VII. –: Introduction, Method, Puzzles’ [‘Introduction’], in C. Natali (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII (Oxford, ), – at n. . See C. Natali, ‘Rhetorical and Scientific Aspects of the Nicomachean Ethics’, Phronesis, (), –; id., ‘Posterior Analytics and the Definition of Happiness in NE I’, Phronesis, (), –; G. Salmieri, ‘Aristotle’s Non“Dialectical” Methodology in the Nicomachean Ethics’, Ancient Philosophy, (), –. Marco Zingano argues that the earlier books of the NE are nondialectical, while those of the EE are dialectical: see M. Zingano, ‘Aristotle and the Problems of Method in Ethics’ [‘Problems’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), –. For a reservation about Zingano’s characterization of the EE, see n. below. See Frede, ‘Mystique’. Frede briefly argues against the application of the endoxic method in EE . and . (‘Mystique’, n. ). However, she does not discuss at any length the rich set of methodological remarks in EE . . Compare the apt remarks of Inwood and Woolf: ‘[The EE] clearly demands our attention as a discussion of fundamental human values written by one of the great philosophers of the western tradition’ (B. Inwood and R. Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Cambridge, ), viii). The current paper neither makes nor depends upon any substantive views about the developmental relation between the NE and the EE or the original home of the common books. For convenience I will refer to the common books by their place in the Nicomachean Ethics. Emphatically, this is not to deny the difficulty of these questions or the value of the work done on them by scholars such as Harlfinger, Rowe, Kenny, et al.; see D. Harlfinger, ‘Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik’, in P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger (eds.), Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik
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endoxic method, or a close approximation of it, is described in EE . , the treatise’s central methodological chapter: There are passages elsewhere in the EE that present and discuss the method for ethics . . . in ways linked closely in language and substance to what we find in NE . : see EE . , . . (Cooper, ‘Introduction’, n. ) The methodology described here [at EE . = NE . , b–] is the one announced in Book I, b–, and these early chapters of Book VI offer the most substantial implementation of it. (A. Kenny, Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics (Oxford, ), ; cf. )
Thus, in addition to being of interest in its own right, the EE’s central methodological chapter is worth examining for the light it promises to shine upon the scope of the endoxic method. In particular, a careful study of that chapter will either confirm the dominant scholarly interpretation of EE . , which considers it another locus of the endoxic method, or it will lend further support to recent sceptics about Owen’s view, who believe that that method is more or less confined to NE . –. In this paper I undertake a detailed examination of the philosophical method described in EE . . For convenience I will refer to this method as ‘the Eudemian method’, but this locution should not be taken to imply that it is the only method used in the EE. The focus of the current paper is the method of EE . . I aim to understand the structure of that method and to determine whether it is indeed as similar to the endoxic method as scholars suppose. I will argue that close scrutiny of Aristotle’s description of the Eudemian method and his employment of it in the enquiry into happiness in [Untersuchungen] (Berlin, ), –; A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relation between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford, ); C. J. Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle’s Thought [Development] (Cambridge, ); and, most recently, O. Primavesi, ‘Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum’, Philologus, (), –. However, whether the EE was composed before or after the NE, and whether or not it originally housed the common books, the method described in EE . merits close attention. See also F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik, übersetzt und kommentiert [Eudemische Ethik] (Berlin, ), ; L. Jost, ‘Eudemian Ethical Method’, in J. P. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, iv. Aristotle’s Ethics [Ethics] (Albany, NY, ), –; P. Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle (New Brunswick, ), n. ; Zingano, ‘Problems’, –. Inwood and Woolf compare (‘cf.’) the EE . and endoxic methods in their recent translation, which suggests that they view them as at least comparable: see Inwood and Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, xxiii, .
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EE . –. reveals that that method is in fact substantially different from the endoxic method of NE . . Briefly, whereas the Eudemian method aims to discover explanatory definitions of ethical topics by constructing complex deductive arguments which draw on the phainomena for support and illustration, the endoxic method seeks truth about ethical matters by purging endoxa of their epistemic shortcomings via aporetic investigation. D. J. Allan famously compared the Eudemian method to the ‘mathematical pattern of deduction’ exhibited by Euclid’s Elements. However, I will conclude by suggesting that it is more accurately viewed as an application of the ‘rational’ (kata ton logon) mode of argumentation found throughout the Aristotelian corpus. . The enquiry into happiness in EE . –. The first six chapters of the EE constitute an introduction to the treatise and its main topic, viz. happiness. In the last of these, EE . , Aristotle describes the methodology that he plans to observe in the subsequent investigation. We will examine that important chapter in the next section. This section offers an overview of Aristotle’s enquiry into happiness in EE . –. . Those chapters are of special interest to the current project, because they can help illuminate the method described in EE . . Aristotle explicitly indicates that his enquiry into happiness is governed by the Eudemian method (EE . , b; . , a–). Consequently, EE . –. can serve both as a source of information about the Eudemian method and also as a constraint upon our interpretation of that method. A major virtue of the interpretation developed below is that it offers an account of the Eudemian method that conforms to Aristotle’s actual procedure in EE . –. . Aristotle begins EE . with a statement of his aim: to discover more clearly what happiness is, starting from initially unclear claims about it (EE . , a–). He observes that it is generally agreed that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods (a–), and this claim serves as his point of departure. In the rest of the chapter Aristotle proceeds to refine this remark. Since happiness may be achievable by beings superior to humans, See D. J. Allan, ‘Quasi-Mathematical Method in the Eudemian Ethics’ [‘QuasiMathematical’], in S. Mansion (ed.), Aristote et les problèmes de méthode (Louvain, ), –. I discuss his proposal in sect. .
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he stresses that he is concerned with human happiness, not that pertaining to the gods (a–). This leads him to distinguish what can be achieved by human action from what cannot (and what can be achieved by superhuman action) (a–). The sort of happiness he has in mind falls under the former category. Consequently, Aristotle concludes that human happiness is the best of the goods achievable by human action (a–). In EE . Aristotle subsequently examines ‘what the best is’ and ‘in how many ways it is said’ (EE . , b). He canvasses three main views of the best good in the chapter: (i) the best good is the Form of the Good; (ii) it is the ‘common’ good; and (iii) it is the goal of all that is achievable by human action. The details of the chapter and of the various criticisms Aristotle levels against the first two views are subject to dispute. However, its general thrust is relatively straightforward. In addition to being first among goods and the cause of the goodness of other goods, Aristotle presumes that the best good must also be achievable in action (cf. EE . , a–). The Form of the Good garners attention because, as the Platonists understand it, it meets the first two criteria: it is first among things and is the cause of the goodness by virtue of its presence (παρουσία: b–, –). Nonetheless, as Aristotle laments repeatedly in the chapter, it is unattainable in action (b–; a; b–), and so cannot be the best good. The candidate championed by the second view, the ‘common’ good, suffers the same shortcoming. According to Aristotle, it is not achievable in action (b–, –), and so it is not the best good either. At EE . , b, λέγεται ποσαχῶς either anticipates (a) the three different views about the best good in the chapter (the Form of the Good, the common good, or the good qua end of action) or (b) the homonymy of goodness/being mentioned at b– and again at b–. Interpretation (b) is more natural, given Aristotle’s tendency to use the phrase λέγεται ποσαχῶς/πολλαχῶς to signal homonymy. However, against it is the fact that the remark at b is referring to how many ways the best good (τὸ ἄριστον), not the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), is said. For this reason I prefer interpretation (a), though nothing major in this paper hangs on it. The common good (τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν) is similar to the Form of the Good in that it is a univocal property from which all good things derive their goodness. However, unlike the Form of the Good, which is ‘separate from the things that participate in it’ (EE . , b–), it inheres in them, which explains why it is ‘changing’ (b). For detailed discussion of EE . see D. J. Allan, ‘Aristotle’s Criticisms of Platonic Doctrine concerning Goodness and the Good’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (–), –; Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, –; M. J. Woods, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII, nd edn. (Oxford, ), –.
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The only view whose candidate meets all of the relevant criteria for the best good is the third one (b–). The best good qua goal of all achievable goods is itself achievable; goals are among the items achievable by human action (cf. EE . , a–). It is also the first among achievable goods and the cause of the goodness of the things that are pursued for its sake (b–). Thus, Aristotle concludes that happiness is the best human good in so far as it is the end of all achievable goods (b–). His next order of business is to determine what this best good qua ultimate end is (b–). Making a ‘fresh start’ on the investigation, Aristotle begins EE . by dividing human goods into goods of the soul and ‘external’ goods (EE . , b). He argues that the former are more choiceworthy than the latter, because wisdom, pleasure, and virtue—the three main candidates for happiness mentioned at EE . , a–b—are found in the soul, and everyone considers the goal to be one or some combination of these (b–). This move permits Aristotle to focus upon psychic goods in his search for the best human good/happiness. After distinguishing psychic goods into states/capacities and activities/processes (b–), he assumes that a virtue is the best disposition, state, or capacity of anything that has a use or function (b–). Aristotle supports The point of the observation at EE . , b–, that no one explains why health or any other starting-point is good is unclear, though it may be intended to confirm that the best good qua end is first among goods; see Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, –. The final line of EE . is notoriously obscure. Instead of directly claiming that the next order of business is to examine what the best good qua end of human action is, Aristotle says that ‘we must examine how many the best good (sc. is)’ (σκεπτέον ποσαχῶς τὸ ἄριστον πάντων: EE . , b). Scholars have proposed various emendations to make this remark more intelligible, e.g. reading πῶς for ποσαχῶς, adding καί after ποσαχῶς, adding λέγεται after πάντων, etc. Woods even goes so far as to suggest that the line is spurious (Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII, ). Nonetheless, we can make sense of Aristotle’s point without resorting to any of these emendations. By asking how many things constitute the best good, Aristotle is essentially asking what the best good is (cf. the connection between what the virtues are and how many they are at NE . , a–). However, this form of the question (‘How many . . .?’) leaves it open that multiple things may have a claim to be the best good, or that it is constituted by a number of different first-order goods. This presumably reflects the fact that, at this intermediate stage in the investigation, Aristotle does not want to beg the question against the reputable sources who identify happiness with virtue, wisdom, and pleasure, or some combination of these items (EE . , a–b). Aristotle points out that this division can also be found in the ‘exoteric’ works (EE . , b–), but the reference is uncertain.
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the previous account of virtue inductively by appeal to well-known functional items such as cloaks, boats, and houses, and then applies the relevant thesis to the soul, since it has a function (a). This implies that psychic virtue is the best state or capacity of the soul. However, as Aristotle apparently realizes, he cannot yet conclude that it is happiness or the best good of the soul tout court, since in principle the activity of psychic virtue may be even better than psychic virtue itself. Indeed, the subsequent axiological remarks in the chapter support this very conclusion. Aristotle assumes (ἐχέτω) that the value of a state’s function correlates with the value of the state itself, i.e. that a better state has a better function (a–), and that a thing’s function is its end (a). These assumptions entail that the function of a state is better than the state itself (a). For, by definition, the function is an end, and an end in a domain is the best thing for the sake of which everything else is chosen (a–). But, Aristotle points out, functions come in two main types: products over and above the employment of the state, e.g. houses and health, and the employment of the state itself, e.g. seeing and contemplating (a– ). Thus, when a thing’s employment is its function the employment of the state is better than the state itself (or its mere possession) (a–). This conclusion proves relevant to the soul. For, Aristotle assumes (ἔστω), its function is to make something alive, which is an employment (a–). And since the function of a thing and its virtue are similar, except that the function of a thing’s virtue is to perform the relevant function well (a–), the function of the virtue of the soul must be living well. This, i.e. the function/employment of psychic virtue, Aristotle concludes, is happiness, the best of human goods (a–). Immediately after drawing this conclusion, Aristotle offers a summary of the preceding argument: This strategy is an instance of Aristotle’s technical mode of argument by example. This claim is stipulated without any support, but other theses introduced by similar ‘posit’ vocabulary are argued for in the chapter; see sect. below. Kenny translates ἔστω . . . ποιεῖν as ‘let us postulate’ (Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics, ; cf. ). However, ‘postulate’ is a rather strained translation of ποιεῖν, and in any case is unnecessary because ἔστω by itself suffices to introduce assumptions or posits. The more natural reading of ποιεῖν is also preferable because Aristotle believes that the soul itself is not the subject of psychological attributes (including living) but is rather the causal principle that makes the body alive: see DA . , a–b. My translations of the Eudemian Ethics, including NE (= EE ), follow Inwood
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This conclusion is clear from what we have laid down, namely that happiness is the best thing, the ends are in the soul and the best of goods, and the things in the soul are either a state or an activity. So since the activity is better than the disposition, and the best activity belongs to the best state, it is clear from what has been laid down that the activity of the soul’s virtue is the best thing. And the best thing is also happiness. Happiness, then, is the activity of the good soul. (EE . , a–)
This summary can be represented as follows: () Happiness is the best human good and an end achievable in action. () Goods/ends in the soul are best among human goods. () Therefore, happiness must be a good (the best good) in the soul. () Goods in the soul are either states or activities. () Activities are better than states, and the best activity is correlated with the best state. () Therefore, happiness must be the best activity in the soul, the one correlated with the best state. () The best state of the soul is its excellence. () Therefore, happiness is the activity of the good, i.e. excellent, soul. Immediately following this summary Aristotle adds an important qualification. Since happiness is complete, it must be the activity of a complete life in accordance with complete virtue (a–). In what is essentially an appendix to the investigation Aristotle confirms his definition of happiness, citing ‘beliefs held by all of us’ (τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν) as his witnesses (marturia) (a–). He mentions three such beliefs with which his definition harmonizes: (a) that happiness is the same as living well and doing well; (b) that both life and action are employments and activities; and (c) that one cannot be happy for a single day, as a child, or at every stage of life (b–). After mentioning Solon’s remark with approval, Aristotle then turns to a brief discussion of praise and encomia. He observes that praise and encomia are given for deeds and Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, though I also consult Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik; Kenny, Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics; and Woods, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII. For discussion of the nature of the ‘witnesses’ and ‘examples’ in EE . –. see sect. (c) below.
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and that we tend to judge the quality of a person from their deeds (b–). Aristotle then rather abruptly asks why happiness is praised and answers that it is because other things are praised because of it (by promoting it or being part of it) (b–). His final order of business, before turning to discussion of the soul and its virtue(s), involves showing how the foregoing helps to resolve a puzzle about why good people are no better off than bad ones for half of their lives (a–). The reason, he explains, is that sleep involves the soul’s idleness (b–).
. The Eudemian method In the portion of the text previously summarized, Aristotle is avowedly implementing the methodology described in EE . . I shall now examine that chapter with a view to gaining deeper insight into the structure of the relevant method. EE . contains a number of methodological remarks, but we may fruitfully begin by examining its opening lines: [] In all these matters we must try to seek conviction through arguments, using the phainomena as witnesses and examples. [] The best situation is that everyone be in manifest agreement with what we are going to say; failing that, that everyone should in some fashion agree, as they will do when they have had their minds changed. [] Each person has some affinity with the truth, and it is from this that one must prove one’s case on these issues in one way or another. [] If we start from what is truly but not clearly spoken, clarity will be won as we make progress, continually substituting what is more intelligible [sc. by nature] for what is usually spoken of confusedly. (EE . , b–)
The first sentence [] is a preliminary description of the scope (‘all these matters’), aim (‘conviction’), and argumentative strategy (‘argument using the phainomena as witnesses and examples’) of the method. The second sentence [] explains why (γάρ) Aristotle is seeking conviction via arguments that appeal to the phainomena, viz. because doing so will help him secure the widest (manifest or These remarks presumably provide additional confirmation that happiness involves the use or employment of virtue, not merely the possession of it; cf. NE . , b–a; . , b–. This remark highlights and reinforces happiness’s status as the best human good and the cause of the goodness of the other things; cf. NE . , b–a.
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qualified) agreement possible; and the third sentence [] in turn explains why (γάρ) people will in fact agree when they have had their minds changed, viz. because each person has some natural affinity for the truth. The fourth sentence [] offers information about the epistemic status of the relevant starting-points (they are ‘true but unclear’ claims) and an additional remark about procedure (‘substituting what is more intelligible for what is usually spoken of confusedly’). These are by no means the last words about methodology in EE . , but they are important. For they indicate that Aristotle has particular views about the proper aims, argumentative strategy, and starting-points of ethical enquiry, and they inform us about what those views are. I believe that the norms about proper procedure for ethical enquiry articulated in this passage (and the rest of EE . ) comprise a methodology which differs substantively from the endoxic method of NE . . The remainder of this section paints a more detailed picture of the Eudemian method, drawing both upon Aristotle’s description of it in EE . and upon his procedure in EE . –. . Below I shall discuss the Eudemian method’s aim(s), argumentative strategy, and starting-points/phainomena. (a) The Eudemian method: cognitive aim(s) In EE . Aristotle claims to be seeking rational conviction (πίστις) about ethical matters (EE . , b–). His account of these matters will most certainly have to be convincing to him, but he is also clear that it will need to be something with which all human beings either manifestly or qualifiedly (‘in some fashion’) Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Aristotle’s Methods of Ethics’ [‘Methods’], Revue internationale de la philosophie, (), – at –; Woods, Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics: Books I, II, and VIII, . Walzer/Mingay have suggested that we replace ὧν at EE . , b, with οὗ, but the emendation lacks manuscript support. Barnes suggests that ὧν refers all the way back to τοῖς φαινομένοις at b– (‘Methods’, ). This construal is not impossible, but a closer and more natural antecedent of ὧν is οἰκεῖόν τι (‘some affinity . . .’) in the preceding clause: see Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, ; Inwood and Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, ; Kenny, Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics, . This interpretation is not precluded by the fact that ὧν is plural. The affinity for truth naturally invites the plural because Aristotle believes it to be possessed by every human being. In the Rhetoric πίστις designates the rhetorical modes of persuasion, but in philosophical contexts it often signifies rational conviction intimately associated with belief (δόξα): see DA . , a–; cf. the entry on πίστις in H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, ), a–b.
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b
agree ( –). Aristotle ostensibly cares about general agreement because (γάρ) he believes that humans have a natural affinity for the truth (b–; cf. Rhet. . , a–). According to him, humans by nature are rational animals with cognitive faculties whose function (ergon) is discerning the truth (NE ., a); and while this does not entail that everything we believe will be true, it does imply that we at least have an innate disposition for the truth and that we will rarely be entirely or radically mistaken (Metaph. α , a–b). Consequently, Aristotle supposes that an account that fails to secure at least qualified agreement from the bulk of mankind must be mistaken. This last observation reveals that Aristotle’s concern with general agreement in EE . is subordinate to a concern for truth. That is to say, he is seeking a generally convincing account of ethical matters because he thinks that proposals that do not have that feature are unlikely to be true. Truth, however, is not Aristotle’s ultimate cognitive aim in the EE. In the sequel to the previously quoted passage he clarifies that he has even greater cognitive ambitions: In every field of enquiry, arguments made philosophically differ from those made non-philosophically. Hence one should not, even when it comes to ‘Qualified’ (τρόπον τινα) agreement is a form of agreement which, Aristotle says, will be produced or achieved ‘after their minds have been changed’ (μεταβιβαζόμενοι) (EE . , b–). The relatively rare verb μεταβιβάζειν tends to pick out a process of mental conversion in which some of an interlocutor’s beliefs, those which ‘do not seem to us to have been well said’, are replaced by other, better beliefs (Top. . , a–; cf. R. Smith, ‘Dialectic and Method in Aristotle’, in M. Sim (ed.), From Puzzles to Principles? Essays on Aristotle’s Dialectic [Puzzles] (Lanham, Md., ), – at –). In order to achieve this conversion the speaker argues dialectically with the interlocutor (Top. . , a–), showing how the novel, less faulty beliefs follow from other beliefs accepted by the latter. This observation suggests that qualified agreement involves someone being committed to believing something, or at least finding it plausible, because it follows from other beliefs held by the person in question, albeit in a non-obvious way. The process of mental conversion aims to make that commitment clear by showing that the relevant belief follows from the individual’s other beliefs. This explains why Aristotle appeals to majority beliefs as some of his evidence in the EE and why he stresses that his definition of happiness harmonizes with ‘things we all believe’ at EE . , a–b. However, we must not exaggerate the significance of this observation and conclude, with Zingano, that the Eudemian method is ‘dialectical’ (see Zingano, ‘Problems’, ). For Aristotle is clear that agreement with generally held beliefs is only a necessary condition of adequacy for his ethical principles. In keeping with the avowed philosophical (or ‘scientific’) nature of the investigation, Aristotle additionally expects his principles to have an explanatory status (EE . , b–), which dialectical definitions do not have. I say ‘cognitive’ aim, because the ultimate aim of the EE, just like the NE, is action (πρᾶξις), i.e. to help us achieve virtue and happiness, not merely to know what they are (EE . , a–; . , b–).
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politics, regard as superfluous the kind of study that makes clear not only what something is [τὸ τί] but also its cause [τὸ διὰ τί]. For this is the philosophical approach in every field of enquiry. (EE . , b–)
In this passage Aristotle indicates that his approach in the treatise is robustly ‘philosophical’. This sort of study, he says, is one that has causal or explanatory aspirations: it seeks to know ‘the why’ (τὸ διὰ τί). However, in so far as it also aims to know the ‘what’ (τὸ τί) it has definitional ambitions too, and these are intimately connected to its explanatory ones. For, according to Aristotle, ‘the what it is [τί ἐστι] and the why it is [τὸ διά τί ἔστι] are the same’ (Post. An. . , a–, –): the essence of an item consists in the causally fundamental features that underwrite and explain its other (derivative) necessary features. Accordingly, properly philosophical definitions have an explanatory or causal status and differ from ‘dialectical’ ones that do not (DA . , b–a; cf. Top. . , a–; a ff.). Consequently, the definition of happiness sought by Aristotle must likewise have an explanatory status, and in particular be capable of explaining the various nonexplanatory features associated with it, e.g. why happiness is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing. Contrast this remark with the claim at NE . , b–, that there is no need for the why (διότι) if the facts (τὸ ὅτι) are already clear. This seems to be an important methodological difference, but the matter needs further scrutiny; cf. Inwood and Woolf, Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics, xxiii. Margueritte’s emendation of τι to ὅτι is unnecessary: see Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, –. From the beginning, the EE is pitched as a treatise that seeks to define or say what happiness, virtue, wisdom, and pleasure are: see EE . , a–; . , a–b. The remark at EE . , b–, adds a further constraint that adequate philosophical definitions must satisfy, viz. that they must be causal or explanatory. Aristotle’s view of the interconnection between definition and demonstration/ explanation is illuminatingly discussed in D. Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence [Essence] (Oxford, ). For further discussion of the difference between scientific or philosophical definitions and dialectical definitions see Charles, Essence, –. Cf. Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, . Gigon endorses a more deflationary interpretation of the ‘cause’ mentioned at b, emphasizing that the EE is explanatory only in so far as it aims to describe the ultimate goal of action, viz. happiness, and the means to achieving it: see O. Gigon, ‘Das Prooimion der Eudemischen Ethik’ [‘Prooimion’], in Moraux and Harlfinger (eds.), Untersuchungen, – at . Those are undoubtedly aims of the treatise, and they explain why ethics is a practical discipline. However, this deflationary interpretation ultimately fails to do justice to the philosophical nature of the EE. For, as Aristotle acknowledges at EE . , b–, it is possible to give philosophical and non-philosophical treatment of the same issues. Consequently, philosophical and non-philosophical treatments
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These considerations strongly suggest that Aristotle conceives the EE as an attempt to discover the first principles of a demonstrative science of ethics/politics along the lines of the Posterior Analytics. These first principles are substantive definitions of happiness, character virtue, etc., which explain why these items have their derivative necessary features. Importantly, in the EE Aristotle does not explicitly present ethical demonstrations (ἀποδείξεις) that use his preferred definitions as premisses; he is only working towards the first principles, not proceeding demonstratively from them in the treatise (cf. EE . , b–). Nonetheless, since he believes that properly philosophical and scientific explanations take the form of demonstrations from first principles, it is apropos to describe the explanations to which he is alluding at EE . (b–) as demonstrations. Let us now consider the argumentative strategy that the Eudemian method prescribes for the discovery of the relevant principles. (b) The Eudemian method: argumentative strategy Since the EE is a philosophical treatise, it is understandable that Aristotle would aim to secure conviction through rational argumentation (διὰ τῶν λόγων: EE . , b–; cf. a–). However, he is adamant that not just any kind of arguments have a cannot be distinguished by their topics alone. Instead, they must be distinguished by the manner in which they treat of the relevant topic (causally or non-causally), which favours the interpretation defended in the body of the paper. Importantly, this ‘scientific’ interpretation of the ethical theory is not incompatible with the ultimate practical orientation of the treatise. Unlike the NE, the EE does not contain any remarks about ethical (im)precision or the fluctuation of ethical subjects: see C. Bobonich, ‘Aristotle’s Ethical Treatises’, in R. Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, ), – at –; Rowe, Development, –; and in any case, the imprecision seemingly impacts upon the application of the principles to particular cases/actions, not the search for the principles itself. Moreover, Aristotle explicitly admits that practical wisdom (φρόνησις) involves knowledge of both ethical universals and particulars (NE . , b– ; cf. NE . , b–). Consequently, a demonstrative science of ethics can contribute to moral education by offering causal insight into the relevant ethical universals, even if this general insight must be supplemented with practical perception (and a state of character) in order to promote good action reliably; cf. C. D. C. Reeve, Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., ), –. In Aristotle an appeal to logos/logoi is often contrasted with an appeal to perception or sense experience: see MA , a–; Meteor. . , b–; De iuv. , a–; Pol. . , a, ; cf. Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, ; D. Henry, ‘Optimality Reasoning in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology’ [‘Optimality’], Oxford
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place in philosophical enquiry. In the second half of EE . Aristotle indicates that proper philosophical arguments should be appropriate (οἰκεῖοι) to the subject-matter (b–a); clearly distinguish the premisses of the arguments from what they purport to establish (a–); attend appropriately to the phainomena (a–); and of course have true premisses (a– ). These conditions are intended to prevent fallacious, sophistical arguments from infecting wholesome philosophical enquiry, and Aristotle goes to great pains to meet them in his enquiry into happiness. Consider again the argument by which Aristotle arrives at his substantive definition of happiness in EE . : () Happiness is the best human good and an end achievable in action. () Goods/ends in the soul are best among human goods. () Therefore, happiness must be a good (the best good) in the soul. () Goods in the soul are either states or activities. () Activities are better than states, and the best activity is correlated with the best state. () Therefore, happiness must be the best activity in the soul, the one correlated with the best state. () The best state of the soul is its excellence. () Therefore, happiness is the activity of the good, i.e. excellent, soul. This is not a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), which uses the fundamental explanatory definition of happiness to explain one of its derivative features. Instead, it is an argument that proceeds towards such a causal principle, i.e. has it as its conclusion. Notice that this Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), – at . Bolton interprets this mode of argument as dialectical (R. Bolton, ‘Two Standards for Inquiry in Aristotle’s De caelo’ [‘Standards’], in A. C. Bowen and C. Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De caelo (Leiden, ), –). However, I dispute this interpretation in J. Karbowski, ‘Empirical Eulogos Argumentation in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals III. ’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, (), –. I discuss this distinction and what it suggests about the Eudemian method in sect. . This is nicely emphasized in Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, –; cf. Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, –. For this reason, it is similar in its structure to the sort of arguments called ‘syllogisms of the that [τὸ ὅτι]’ by Aristotle in Post. An. . . However, this argument is not a ‘syllogism’ in the technical sense, because it has more than two premisses.
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argument meets all of the conditions of good philosophical arguments mentioned above. It is a valid argument, whose premisses are clearly distinguished from the conclusion that follows from (ἐκ) them. Its premisses are appropriate to the subject-matter. For they include claims about happiness, the soul, its virtue and constituents, which squarely fall within the domain of ethics. Moreover, its premisses are also true claims in agreement with the relevant phainomena. This is ensured by Aristotle’s use of the phainomena as the ‘witnesses’ and ‘examples’ of these premisses. I will discuss this aspect of his procedure shortly. First, let us reflect more generally upon the structure of the previous argument. Aristotle’s central argument for happiness in EE . –. has a complex deductive structure. Its premisses include a preliminary ‘unclear’ definition of happiness and additional theses about the soul, virtue, etc., and its conclusion is a ‘clearer’ definition of happiness. The movement in this argument is depicted by Aristotle’s claim that we must continually substitute or replace ‘what is customarily spoken of confusingly’ with ‘what is more intelligible [sc. by nature]’ (EE . , b–). In accordance with standard Aristotelian doctrine, philosophical enquiry proceeds from what is familiar to us to what is familiar by nature, and it aims to make what is familiar by nature familiar to us (Top. . , b–a; Phys. . , a–; Metaph. Ζ , b–). Aristotle follows this general path in his enquiry into happiness in EE . –. . He begins from an initially agreed-upon definition of happiness (as the best human good) in EE . ; proceeds to refine it in EE . ; and then, from this refined definition and additional theses about the soul and its virtue, deduces a further definition of happiness that is clearer by nature. A number of argumentative strategies are invoked to establish the premisses of the aforementioned argument. Aristotle arrives at the first premiss by reflective clarification of a generally accepted definition of happiness (EE . –). He supports the second by appeal Aristotle’s advancement through a variety of definitional stages, beginning from a preliminary ‘unclear (by nature)’ definition of happiness and ultimately discovering a clearer, causal definition, bears a striking similarity to the ‘scientific’ procedure described in the second book of the Posterior Analytics. For discussion of the latter method, which duly stresses its progression through a variety of definitional stages, see R. Bolton, ‘Definition and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Generation of Animals’, in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge, ), – at –; Charles, Essence, chs. –.
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to the popular works and universal agreement (EE . , b–). The fourth premiss is an assumption which he thinks is obvious or unobjectionable (EE . , b–), and the fifth premiss is established by an argument that appeals to the connection between a thing’s function (ergon) and end (telos) (EE . , a–). Finally, the seventh premiss of the argument is established by induction (ἐπαγωγή) from particular craft examples (EE . , b– a). This last argumentative strategy deserves a closer look, because induction from craft examples is a recurring argumentative strategy in the EE: . . . let it be assumed further, concerning virtue, that it is the best disposition or state or capacity of each of the things that have some use or function. This is clear from induction, since we consider things to be this way in all cases. For example, a cloak has a virtue, since it has a function and use, and its best state is its virtue. The same applies to a boat and a house, and so on, and hence to the soul, since it has a function. (EE . , b–a)
In this passage Aristotle inductively establishes a general thesis about virtue—that it is the best state or disposition of a thing that has a use or function—by appeal to cloaks, boats, and houses, and then applies it to the soul because it has a function too. This argument is what Aristotle elsewhere calls an example (paradeigma): it draws a novel conclusion about a particular ‘target’ subject (the soul) via the application of a generalization that has antecedently been established by appeal to other items similar to the ‘target’ (Pr. An. . , b–a; Rhet. . , b–). Aristotle sometimes describes argument by example as a kind of induction (e.g. at Post. An. . , a–), because its first step involves inductively supporting a generalization; but in his more precise moments he is careful to distinguish it from induction, because examples proceed ‘from the particular to the particular’, while induction proceeds ‘from the particular to the universal’ (Rhet. . , b–; Pr. An. . , a–). This passage is the only occurrence of the technical mode of argument by example in the first two books of the EE, whereby Aristotle both establishes a generalization and applies it to a novel ‘target’ case. More frequently, he cites particular examples from the For further discussion of this mode of argumentation see J. Allen, Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence (Oxford, ), –.
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crafts as inductive support for certain generalizations without subsequently applying them to other particulars (EE . , a; . , b). Although this strategy only corresponds to the first ‘inductive’ stage of the technical mode of argument by example, we may nonetheless consider the particular items that he invokes as ‘examples’ (paradeigmata). For they are intended to be familiar items that constitute evidence for certain generalizations by being obvious or uncontroversial instances of them, and Aristotle typically introduces them with ‘for example’ (οἷον). In fact, the occurrence of οἷον is so frequent in EE . –. that it is hard to doubt that Aristotle conceives of examples as a key part of his method. This presumption is confirmed by the first lines of EE . . For in them Aristotle claims to be seeking conviction through arguments ‘using the phainomena as witnesses and examples’ (b–). Scholars who discuss the Eudemian method seldom draw attention to the ‘witness’ and ‘example’ qualifications here, but their presence suggests that they are important for Aristotle. In particular, by labelling the phainomena ‘witnesses’ he is most likely indicating that they will have an evidential role in the subsequent enquiry; and by calling them ‘examples’ (paradeigmata) he is ostensibly specifying another important role (or pair of roles) the phainomena will play. See EE . , a; . , b, ; a; b; . , a, , , ; a. Dirlmeier offers some brief remarks about the terms μαρτύριον and παράδειγμα in his commentary (Eudemische Ethik, ). However, Kullmann is the only scholar who pays more than lip service to the use of witnesses and examples in the EE: W. Kullmann, Wissenschaft und Methode: Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft (Berlin, ), –. He rightly identifies the subsequent confirmation of the definition of happiness via harmonization with ἔνδοξα at EE . , a–b, as an instance of this strategy. But even he seems to underestimate how often Aristotle uses φαινόμενα as witnesses and examples in EE . –. . For Kullmann mentions only EE . , a–b, as the corresponding passage where this strategy is employed. By contrast, if the current interpretation is correct, Aristotle uses φαινόμενα as witnesses and/or examples whenever he provides evidence for or illustrates the premisses of his central argument in EE . –. . The testimony of witnesses was one of the main types of evidence used in legal contexts: see D. C. Mirhady, ‘Athens’ Democratic Witnesses’, Phoenix, (), –. But the term was appropriated by philosophers to refer to their central evidence for a thesis or conclusion; cf. Plato, Gorg. – . We can distinguish two roles that examples play in EE . –. : () an evidential role in which they serve to support or establish important theses (EE . , b; b; . , a, ; a) and () a non-evidential role in which they merely serve to illustrate antecedently plausible theses (EE . , a; b; a; . , a, ). Admittedly, the line between these two uses is sometimes blurred, and it is unclear how sharply Aristotle himself distinguished them. However, what
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Just to be clear, Aristotle does not directly derive his clearer, causal definition of happiness from the phainomena themselves. That conclusion is established by a complex argument (logos), whose individual premisses are supported and/or illustrated by appeal to the phainomena. The phainomena support the premisses, which, in turn, support the conclusion/clearer definition of happiness. Let us briefly take stock. The current project takes very seriously Aristotle’s claim to be proceeding via arguments that use the phainomena as witnesses and examples in EE . . On the interpretation defended above, Aristotle establishes his ‘clearer’ definition of happiness by constructing a deductive argument (logos) whose premisses contain a preliminary, ‘unclear’ definition of it and additional theses about the soul, virtue, etc. These premisses are established by a variety of strategies that invoke the phainomena, including induction based upon examples from the crafts. Aristotle proceeds in this way, constructing arguments using the phainomena as witnesses and examples, primarily in order to prevent sophistical, fallacious reasoning from derailing his attempt to discover the explanatory first principles of ethics. (c) The Eudemian method: starting-points/phainomena As we saw above, the Eudemian method involves the use of deductive arguments whose premisses are supported by appeal to the phainomena. But what sorts of claim function as the phainomena relative to this methodology? One would labour in vain to find an explicit answer to this question in EE . . The most Aristotle says about these phainomena in that chapter is that they are his witnesses and examples; he never substantively describes the types of claim that are to play these roles. In order to answer the previous question we must take an indirect approach and examine the types of claim that actually serve as witnesses and examples in EE . –. . Most scholars suppose that the phainomena to which Aristotle is referring in EE . are endoxa. This proposal is partly correct, because Aristotle uses some beliefs that seem to be endoxa as ‘witis most important for the current project is that the use of examples is an integral part of the Eudemian method. See Barnes, ‘Methods’, –; Cooper, ‘Introduction’, n. ; Dirlmeier, Eudemische Ethik, ; Kenny, Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics, ; Simpson, The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, –; Zingano, ‘Problems’, –. By contrast, Gigon argues that they are empirical facts (‘Prooimion’, ).
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nesses’ in EE –. For instance, in EE . he assumes that happiness is the best human good on the strength of its generally accepted status (a–), and in EE . he corroborates his definition of happiness by showing how it harmonizes with ‘beliefs we all share’ (τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν: a). (Aristotle explicitly refers to the latter as ‘witnesses’.) However, we must be careful not to assume either that just any endoxa serve as phainomena in these contexts or that they are the only sort of phainomena in EE –. I shall start with the first cautionary note. The endoxa that play an evidential role in the EE . –. are not idiosyncratic beliefs of particular wise individuals, but rather those that have achieved universal or near universal acceptance. Importantly, this is not to deny that beliefs held by particular wise individuals have a role to play in the enquiry into happiness; they do, but they do not function as evidence for or illustrations of important theses. Universally held beliefs are special among endoxa There is room to doubt that the generally held beliefs upon which Aristotle relies in the EE are ἔνδοξα because he never characterizes them as such. If that view were right, it would only strengthen my case for distinguishing the Eudemian method from the endoxic method. However, Aristotle’s way of referring to the generally accepted beliefs at a (τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν) is nearly identical to his description of the first set of endoxic beliefs at Top. . , b– (τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν). Therefore, it is quite likely that Aristotle would have considered universally held beliefs to be ἔνδοξα in the EE. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. At EE . , b–, Aristotle does refer back to the particular endoxic beliefs about happiness consisting in virtue, wisdom, and pleasure from EE . as evidence that the goods of the soul are more choiceworthy than those outside of it. However, the evidential force of that observation derives specifically from the fact that those reputable sources collectively agree that happiness is some psychic good (though they may differ about what the particular psychic good in question is). Sometimes beliefs of particular wise individuals serve as instructive, albeit mistaken, foils for Aristotle’s views. This is true of the poet’s belief about happiness at the beginning of the treatise (EE . , a–) and the views about the best good criticized in EE . . These ‘foil’ ἔνδοξα clearly do not serve as evidence or illustrations; Aristotle rejects them as false. But nor do the beliefs about happiness at EE . , a–b, or the related beliefs about the happy life mentioned at EE . , a–. Aristotle mentions these beliefs primarily because they point to three items that might (εἴη ἄν) constitute happiness: wisdom, virtue, and pleasure (EE . , a); he does not construe these beliefs as definitive evidence that happiness does in fact consist in wisdom, virtue, or pleasure. Indeed, he avowedly devotes the rest of the treatise to examining what these three items are and whether they or their activities are part of the good life (EE . , a–b). Naturally, Aristotle would have no good reason to further investigate these candidates if he thought these beliefs were entirely erroneous, but we must nonetheless distinguish the ‘agenda-setting’ role that these ἔνδοξα have from the evidential role played by generally accepted beliefs elsewhere in the treatise.
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and suitable for use as evidence in philosophical discussions, because they are most likely to be true; universal agreement is, for Aristotle, a sign of truth (NE . , b–a). However, the same is not true, in his opinion, about acceptance by the wise. Aristotle can be highly critical of his predecessors and often has little problem rejecting their views (Post. An. . , a–; Phys. . , a–; DA . , b–a). He does tend to assume that the fact that a belief is held by one of his wise predecessors is a reason to examine it and even to think that there is some truth in it; but he also supposes that it will often be false or problematic in some way (DA . , b– ; NE . , b–). Consequently, while such ‘qualified truths’ may have non-trivial roles to play in philosophical enquiry, their epistemic status renders them less fit for use as evidence than their universally accepted counterparts. Although universally held endoxa are among the phainomena used by Aristotle as witnesses and examples, they are by no means his only source of ethical data. Occasionally he invokes what we can (or cannot) directly observe (ὁρῶμεν) as support for certain theses (EE . , b–; . , a–), but his most common source of evidence and examples is ordinary life experience. Throughout EE – Aristotle frequently appeals to facts about well-known crafts and their products as support for certain theses. For instance, as we saw above, he establishes that the soul has a virtue which is its best state on the basis of its similarity to other functional items, such as boats, houses, etc. (EE . , b–a); and he also shows that psychic virtue is brought about by the best actions and produces the best functions and affections of the soul by considering exercise and health (EE . , a–). Admittedly, these remarks are likely to be believed by almost everybody, but it is important to note that Aristotle does not introduce them as commonly held beliefs in the relevant contexts. He never says, for example, that ‘some say’ (τι Just to be clear, I do not mean to rule out the possibility that some universally held beliefs may be false or in need of refinement. The claim is that universal assent is strong, though ultimately defeasible, evidence for the truth of a belief, according to Aristotle. Another way to put this point would be to say that ἔνδοξα as a whole are not ‘facts’ (τὸ ὅτι); cf. Frede, ‘Mystique’, –. However, importantly, this does not preclude a privileged subset of ἔνδοξα, viz. the most important or authoritative ones, which presumably include beliefs accepted by everyone, from being unqualifiedly true. For further discussion of the respective epistemic statuses of different types of ἔνδοξα see R. Bolton, ‘The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic’, in Sim (ed.), Puzzles, – at –. For further references see n. above.
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νές φασιν) or that ‘it is agreed’ (ὁμολογεῖται) that boats, houses, etc. have virtues that constitute their best states; he simply asserts that fact, expecting it to be something that is obvious enough from our experience with these items. This suggests that even if these craft examples happen to be endoxa—which I am not denying—Aristotle is not primarily interested in them for that reason or under that description, i.e. in so far as they are endoxa, but rather because they are truths familiar to us from our own personal experience with these items. The foregoing reveals that the data that serve as phainomena for the Eudemian method are a heterogeneous lot, including endoxa, empirical observations, and information garnered from ordinary life experience. In spite of their differences, these various claims are suitable for use as starting-points for philosophical enquiry because they are all true claims that we have ready access to, i.e. they are all ‘familiar to us’. However, their status as things familiar to us goes hand in glove with their lack of clarity by nature. This is what Aristotle is conveying when he describes the phainomena as ‘things said truly but unclearly’ (EE . , b–). The relevant claims are unclear or confused by nature, because they do not perspicuously describe the fundamental causal essences of happiness, virtue, etc.; but they are nonetheless relevant for the discovery of their essences (EE . , a–). Ultimately, Aristotle’s enquiry into happiness in EE . –. follows the same path as any other enquiry into principles, i.e. from what is familiar to us to what is familiar by nature (EE . , b–), but it does so in a distinctive way: by constructing an argument whose conclusion is a ‘clearer (by nature)’ definition of happiness and whose premisses are supported and illustrated by ‘unclear (by nature)’ phainomena originating from universal agreement, empirical observation, and ordinary life experience.
σαφές and ἀσαφές are connected with the distinction between what is familiar (γνώριμον) to us and what is familiar by nature at Phys. . , a–; DA . , a–. Aristotle even identifies what is clear to us with what is ‘confused’ (συνκεχυμένα) at Phys. . , a–; cf. EE . , b–. The comparison with knowing that health is the best disposition of the body or that Coriscus is the swarthiest man in the marketplace at EE . , a–, suggests that the φαινόμενα do not necessarily lack semantic clarity. For the problem he identifies with those claims is not that they are ambiguous, vague, etc., but that they fail to state ‘what each of these is’ (EE . , a).
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As mentioned at the outset of the paper, the Eudemian method is often identified with, or closely compared to, the endoxic method of NE . . Though there are some superficial similarities between those two methods, e.g. their use of phainomena, they prove to be far more different upon closer inspection. In this section I examine the endoxic method with a view to discerning precisely how and where it differs from the philosophical method outlined in EE . . Aristotle describes the endoxic method in the following familiar passage of NE . : As in the other cases, we must set down the phainomena and, after first puzzling through them, we must establish all the endoxa about these conditions or, if not all then most of them and the most important ones. We will have done a sufficient job at this if the difficulties are dissolved and the endoxa remain. (NE . , b–)
The method prescribed here has a specific structure. It is a threestep procedure which involves: () setting out the appearances, i.e. endoxa, about the subject under investigation; () raising puzzles (aporiai) about the relevant endoxa; and () solving the puzzles in an attempt to salvage all, most, or the most important endoxa. Let me say more about each of these stages while contrasting them with what we find in EE . . The first stage of endoxic enquiry involves setting out (τιθέναι) the phainomena about the subject of investigation. Aristotle performs this initial task at the end of NE . . In that part of the chapter he describes a number of beliefs about lack of control (ἀκρατία), selfcontrol (ἐγκράτεια), etc. held by both the majority of human beings and the wise: [] Self-control and toughness [καρτερία] are thought to be excellent and praiseworthy traits, while [] lack of self-control and softness [μαλακία] are base and blameworthy; [] the same person is self-controlled and inclined to stand by his reasoning, and also [] it is the same person who lacks selfcontrol and abandons his reasoning. [] The uncontrolled man knows that what he does is base but does it because of passion, while [] the self I accept the standard interpretation of ‘setting out the φαινόμενα’ which construes it as the first stage of the method, discharged at the end of NE . ; see Barnes, ‘Methods’, –. For an alternative interpretation of that procedure which extends it to the subsequent clarification of the φαινόμενα see Frede, ‘Mystique’, –.
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controlled man knows that his appetites are base and, because of reason, does not follow those appetites. People say [] that the temperate man is self-controlled and tough; [] some say that all men of the latter sort are temperate, while [] others do not. [] Some say indiscriminately that the undisciplined man is uncontrolled and the uncontrolled the undisciplined, while [] others say they are different. Sometimes [] people say that the wise man cannot be uncontrolled, but sometimes [] they say that there are people who, despite being wise and clever, are uncontrolled. Furthermore, [] people are said to be uncontrolled with respect to spirit and honour and profit. Anyway, this is what is said. (NE . , b–)
This passage contains fourteen endoxa about self-control and its opposite. Among other things, they offer various views about the moral status of these states, their relations to temperance, toughness, and practical wisdom, the epistemic states of uncontrolled and self-controlled agents, and the scope of self-control and its lack. These beliefs function as a preliminary repository of information about these states whose epistemic shortcomings will be diagnosed and removed in the following chapters. Aristotle’s description of the endoxic method and the previous passage in which he sets out the phainomena confirm that (nonparadoxical) endoxa are the phainomena for the endoxic method. This constitutes one similarity to the Eudemian method. For, as we saw earlier, the phainomena of the latter method include some endoxa. However, unlike the phainomena of the endoxic method, the Eudemian method’s phainomena include only generally accepted endoxa, and, moreover, they are not restricted to endoxa; other types of information serve as ‘witnesses’ and ‘examples’ for the Eudemian method as well. Another crucial difference between the phainomena of these two methods is that they play different roles in their respective enquiries. The phainomena of the Eudemian method primarily serve either to illustrate or provide evidential support for the premisses of the central argument by which Aristotle deductively establishes his My numbering differs from that found in Cooper, ‘Introduction’, and Frede, ‘Mystique’, because I assume that ἔνδοξα are individuated by their contents. Cooper is correct that, strictly speaking, τὰ φαινόμενα and the complete set of ἔνδοξα about lack of control are not coextensive because Socrates’ denial of the phenomenon is an ἔνδοξον which is not included in the catalogue at NE . , b– (Cooper, ‘Introduction’, –). However, he overlooks the fact that the φαινόμενα are a subset of the ἔνδοξα about lack of control, viz. the non-paradoxical ones: see R. Bolton, ‘Aristotle on the Objectivity of Ethics’, in Anton and Preus (eds.), Ethics, – at –; cf. Frede, ‘Mystique’, .
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‘clearer’ definition of happiness in EE . . By contrast, the phainomena of the endoxic method serve as the raw materials out of which a more refined theory of the subject under investigation is constructed. Aristotle never indicates that the endoxa described in NE . serve as witnesses or examples of any kind. Indeed, it would be surprising if he did. For some of those beliefs contradict one another, and so they are hardly in a position to constitute evidence of any kind. Instead, the endoxic method diagnoses and attempts to eliminate the various flaws inherent in the endoxa. As Aristotle says, it will be successful if the puzzles are resolved and the endoxa are left standing, presumably in a ‘purified’ state (NE . , b–). The second stage of endoxic enquiry involves raising puzzles about the endoxa set out in the first stage. In NE . Aristotle raises six puzzles concerning the various beliefs about endoxa described at the end of the previous chapter: () In what sense, if any, does the uncontrolled person ‘know’ that he is doing wrong? (b–) () What is the relation between temperance and self-control? (a–) () What sort of judgement do controlled and uncontrolled agents abide by and fail to abide by respectively? All of them? Or only correct judgements? (a–) () What is the relation between practical wisdom, virtue, and lack of control? Can we call a man virtuous if he performs the right action because he is ignorant and uncontrolled, and so acts contrary to the wrong opinions? (a–) () What is worse, lack of control or self-indulgence? (a– b ) () If lack of control and self-control are concerned with a wide variety of items, which sort is the proper or unqualified version? (b–) Aristotle crafted these puzzles carefully. Each of them is associated with at least one endoxon in NE . , and each endoxon in NE . is associated with at least one puzzle in NE . . This second, puzzle-raising stage is an integral, indispensable step in endoxic Frede maintains that the six puzzles raised in NE . do not cover all of the ἔνδοξα set out in NE . (‘Mystique’, , –). I disagree. The first puzzle relates to the fifth and sixth ([]–[]) ἔνδοξα in NE . , viz. those about the state of the uncontrolled/self-controlled agent during action. Aristotle’s exposition also touches upon issues raised in the twelfth and thirteenth ([]–[]) ἔνδοξα on the list, be-
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enquiry. For the puzzles raised in this part of the enquiry clearly identify inconsistencies, vagueness, ambiguity, etc. in the initial endoxa so that they can be eliminated in the third and final stage of enquiry. This essential aporetic slant to the endoxic method constitutes another substantial difference between it and the Eudemian method. In contrast to the former method, puzzle-raising is not an integral part of the latter method. The Eudemian method is essentially deductive; it arrives at its ‘clearer’ definitions of ethical subjects by constructing deductive arguments, using the phainomena as witnesses and examples for its premisses, not by raising and solving puzzles. Aristotle never says that clarity about happiness must be reached by means of puzzles in EE . ; the word ‘puzzle’ (aporia) or the corresponding verb is not even mentioned in that chapter. He does mention certain questions about happiness in EE . , but only to point out that they will be resolved after a satisfactory definition of it has been discovered (EE . , a–). True to his word, Aristotle returns to these questions only in the ‘appendix’ to EE . , when he is corroborating his antecedently established definition of happiness (EE . , b–); he does not discover that definition by solving any puzzles or aporiai about happiness. The third and final stage of endoxic enquiry involves solving the cause he asks whether practical wisdom is the state that is overcome in uncontrolled behaviour (NE . , a). The second puzzle is concerned with the issue of the relation between temperance and self-control, which arises in the seventh to ninth ([]–[]) ἔνδοξα. Aristotle’s elaboration of that puzzle also asks whether self-control is ever a bad state (NE . , a–), which is relevant to the first [] ἔνδοξον of NE . . The third puzzle relates to the third and fourth ([]–[]) ἔνδοξα of NE . . Those beliefs claim that the self-controlled agent abides by certain conclusions of reasoning, while the uncontrolled agent abandons them, and the puzzle asks what opinions/conclusions are in question. The fourth puzzle raises an issue about the relation between virtue and lack of control that has implications for the second, twelfth, and thirteenth ([], []–[]) ἔνδοξα. The fifth puzzle concerns the respective values of lack of control and self-indulgence, and it also indirectly raises an issue about the identity of the two states. Thus, that puzzle involves issues raised by the second, tenth, and eleventh ([], []–[]) ἔνδοξα of NE . . Finally, the sixth puzzle is exclusively concerned with the very last ([]) ἔνδοξον of NE . , which concerns the scope of lack of control.
See Barnes, ‘Methods’, –. In discovering the definition of happiness Aristotle is solving a question about what happiness is (cf. EE . , a–). However, this sort of general definitional question is quite different from the puzzles about lack of control and self-control raised in NE . , which concern specific aspects or features of those states.
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puzzles identified in the second stage. This part of the investigation is carried out in NE . –. The goal of this stage is, of course, to solve the relevant puzzles (NE . , b–), but Aristotle also indicates that this must be done in a way that salvages as many of the initial endoxa as possible (NE . , b–). To be sure, he leaves room for the rejection of some of the initial endoxa (NE . , b– ). In fact, he ends up rejecting the seventh ([]), eighth ([]), tenth ([]), and thirteenth ([]) endoxa from NE . . But notice that he does so only at the final stage of enquiry, after he has developed a theory of the subject which harmonizes with most of the initial endoxa. This is an important observation, because it reveals that the approach to endoxa taken in endoxic enquiry is different from that which Aristotle frequently takes to the beliefs of his predecessors at the outset of his treatises, e.g. the De anima, Physics, Metaphysics, etc. The latter investigations are primarily ‘destructive’; in them Aristotle offers (what he takes to be) conclusive reasons to reject the relevant beliefs. By contrast, his attitude towards endoxa in endoxic enquiry is ‘constructive’; he is trying to diagnose and solve various puzzles about the initial endoxa that prevent them from wholly disclosing the truth about the subject under investigation. Indeed, the resulting theory about the relevant subject is constituted by the set of ‘purified’ endoxa that survive aporetic scrutiny. Admittedly, there is some preliminary refinement of an endoxon at the outset of Aristotle’s enquiry into happiness in EE . –; that is how he reaches his conception of happiness as the best good qua end of things achievable by human action. However, that procedure accounts for only one premiss of the central argument, viz. its first one; the others are established by the various strategies described earlier. Unlike the endoxic method, the Eudemian method does not construe ethical enquiry centrally or exclusively as a process of clarifying and refining endoxa; the word ‘endoxon’ is not even NE . is concerned with the first puzzle about the ‘knowledge’ of the uncontrolled agent. NE . – discuss the difference between unqualified lack of control and its qualified counterparts, i.e. the sixth puzzle. NE . takes up the fifth puzzle and its issue about the (putative) incurability of lack of control. Most of NE . examines whether self-control and lack of control are concerned with any and every kind of judgement or only correct judgements, i.e. the third puzzle. That same chapter ends with a brief consideration of the relation between control and temperance, which pertains to the second puzzle. And the beginning of NE . appears to deal with the fourth puzzle through an examination of whether the practically wise agent, who also possesses virtue (NE . , a–), can be uncontrolled. See Frede, ‘Mystique’, –. See Barnes, ‘Methods’, .
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mentioned in that chapter (or in the rest of EE – for that matter). Nor is it the latter method’s aim or goal to salvage as many of the endoxa about happiness as possible. In EE . Aristotle does set as a constraint upon his ethical definitions that they be things with which everyone either manifestly or qualifiedly agrees (b– ). This constraint explains why he confirms that his definition of happiness harmonizes with generally accepted endoxa in EE . (see n. above). But it is only a necessary condition of adequacy for ethical definitions in EE . . Aristotle is explicit in that chapter that he is ultimately searching for causal or explanatory definitions, and this requirement is distinct from—and more important than— the former (consistency with general endoxa) constraint from the point of view of the Eudemian method (EE . , b–). Consequently, the latter’s explanatory ambitions also prove to be very different from the endoxa-salvaging ones of the endoxic method. If the foregoing is correct, the methods described in EE . and NE . have many more differences than similarities. Their key differences can be summarized as follows: (a) The phainomena for the Eudemian method are not restricted to endoxa, and the endoxa that they include are only generally accepted beliefs. The phainomena of the endoxic method are restricted to endoxa, and they include both generally accepted beliefs and (non-paradoxical) beliefs of the wise. (b) Phainomena play different roles in EE . (witnesses and examples) and NE . (raw data in need of ‘refinement’ or ‘purification’). (c) The Eudemian method deduces its central conclusions from complex arguments whose premisses have been established and/or illustrated by appeal to the phainomena. The endoxic method’s central conclusions are reached aporetically, by raising and solving puzzles about the phainomena. (d) The Eudemian method aims to discover causal or explanatory definitions of ethical topics. Such definitions must also be things with which everyone can at least qualifiedly agree, but that is only a necessary condition of adequacy, not the ul In principle, it is possible for an application of the endoxic method to yield explanatory definitions. However, because explanation-seeking is not an essential part of that method—the search for causes is not built into the endoxic method, as it is in the Eudemian method—it would be an accident only if it yielded explanatory definitions.
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These differences are not trivial or superficial; they pertain to three of the most important facets of ethical enquiry: its startingpoints (phainomena), cognitive aims, and argumentative strategy. For this reason we must resist the temptation to identify, or even closely compare, the Eudemian method with the endoxic method of NE . .
. Posits in EE . –. One important aspect of Aristotle’s procedure in his enquiry into happiness has yet to be discussed. Though he does not explicitly draw attention to this strategy in EE . , Aristotle frequently posits theses in EE . –. . D. J. Allan famously argued that Aristotle’s use of posits in EE – bears a striking resemblance to Euclid’s procedure in the Elements and consequently concluded that the former is employing a ‘mathematical pattern of deduction’ in the EE. Although Plato indicates that the method of hypothesis in the Meno is modelled after geometrical analysis (Meno – ), there are strong reasons to doubt that Aristotle consciously modelled his use of posits in the EE upon their employment in mathematics. First, mathematicians assume the truth of their principles ‘as if ὑποκείσθω: EE . , b; ὑπέκειτο: EE . , a; ὑποκείμενον: EE . , a; ἐχέτω: EE . , a; ἔστω: EE . , a, ; λέγωμεν: EE . , a; θετέον: EE . , a. In what follows I will refer to the claims that get set down as ‘posits’ and the activity of introducing them as ‘positing’. I prefer this more neutral terminology to ‘hypotheses’ and ‘hypothesizing’, which may give the misleading impression that what is set down is entirely tentative or a matter of conjecture. Allan, ‘Quasi-Mathematical’. The aspect of Euclid’s procedure which Allan has in mind is ‘the grouping of the requisite assumptions at the beginning’, i.e. Euclid’s exposition of his definitions, postulates, and common notions at the start of the Elements: see Allan, ‘Quasi-Mathematical’, n. . The structure of geometrical analysis and its influence on Plato is helpfully discussed in S. Menn, ‘Plato and the Method of Analysis’, Phronesis, (), –.
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they knew them’ (ὡς εἰδότες: Rep. , ), and this procedure is intended to excuse them from the need to defend those principles in their current context. By contrast, though Aristotle does posit some of his theses without argument or defence in EE . –. (EE . , a–; . , b–), he argues for others (EE . , a–; . , b–); and this sets his procedure apart from that of the mathematicians. Second, what mathematicians assume at the outset of their discussions are their first principles, and they use them to prove the derivative theorems of the discipline or to solve construction problems. However, the posits in EE . –. are not ethical first principles; they are claims clearer to us from which Aristotle deduces an ethical first principle, viz. the causal definition of happiness. Third, and finally, there is nothing in the text that would indicate that Aristotle’s use of posits, or his ‘proof’ strategy more generally, in the EE is inspired by any mathematical procedure. He does briefly discuss mathematical hypotheses at EE . , b–, but those ‘unchanging origins’ serve primarily as a foil for the practical origins in which he is mainly interested in that context (EE . , b–a); there is no indication in that passage that the mathematical use of hypotheses is exerting an influence upon his procedure there or anywhere else in the EE. Since Aristotle is usually quite explicit when his methodology has some mathematical origin or analogue (Pr. An. . , a–; PA . , b–; cf. NE . , b–), his silence is evidence that his use of posits in the EE was not directly and consciously inspired by their use in mathematics. If Aristotle did not use posits in the EE because he was consciously employing a mathematical procedure in the treatise, then why did he deploy them? What purpose does the use of posits serve in EE . –. ? To answer this question, we must return to the Note that this does not mean that their first principles cannot be defended, only that their defence is not part of mathematics itself; see M. Burnyeat, ‘Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul’, Proceedings of the British Academy, (), – at –, –. Aristotle is not proceeding from ethical first principles in the EE; he is working towards them (EE . , b–). For this reason, if any mathematical procedure is likely to have inspired his method in the EE, it would have been the method of analysis, which is used for the discovery of the elements of geometrical proofs. (Allan exhibits no awareness of the difference between analysis and synthesis.) Aristotle famously compares practical deliberation to geometrical analysis at NE . , b– , but there is no such comparison of his methodology to analysis in the EE. So, the text offers no evidence that Aristotle used geometrical analysis as a model for his procedure in the EE.
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end of EE . . Aristotle’s cautionary remarks at EE . , b– a, betray a serious concern to prevent fallacious, sophistical reasoning from sidetracking his well-intentioned philosophical investigation. One of the pieces of advice given in that portion of the text is to distinguish the premisses of our arguments from their conclusions (EE . , a–). This is important because it will help us ensure that our arguments are valid, and that they are relying upon true premisses appropriate to the subject-matter (EE . , a–). My suggestion is that the use of posits in EE . –. is motivated by Aristotle’s desire to follow his own advice at the end of EE . . By setting down and flagging his central premisses as posits in EE . –. , Aristotle can clearly keep them separate from the substantive conclusion that he is inferring from them (cf. EE . , a–; . , b–), which, in turn, will help him ensure that his argument lives up to the high standards of philosophical enquiry. Though this interpretation is difficult to confirm, it is worth taking seriously because it implies that Aristotle held himself to the philosophical standards described at the end of EE . ; he did not mention them only to ignore them when he set out to discover the nature of happiness for himself in EE . –. .
. The ‘rational’ approach of the Eudemian method So far, we have been focusing upon what the Eudemian method is not. In conclusion, I would like to say something more positive about the type of procedure that it is. A hint is offered by Aristotle’s claim to be seeking ‘conviction through rational arguments’ (πίστιν διὰ λόγων) in the very first lines of EE . (b–), though I can only outline the interpretation here. Frequently, when Aristotle describes a thesis as ‘clear’ by appeal to logos or claims to be seeking conviction by logos/logoi, he is signalling the implementation of a specific mode of argumentation. This ‘rational’ (kata ton logon) mode of argument is usually contrasted with an ‘empirical’ or ‘perceptual’ (kata tēn aisthēsin) mode which establishes a thesis in terms of its ability to explain, or otherwise harmonize with, specific empirical data. Although See n. above. Aristotle tends to signal the rational mode of argument using various prepositions (including κατά, ἐκ, ἐπί, and διά)+λόγος. Conviction (πίστις) arising ‘in the case of perception’ (ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως) is explicitly contrasted with
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nothing precludes rational arguments from seeking empirical support for individual premisses, they differ from their empirical counterparts because they establish the relevant theses by deducing them from a number of general claims or principles. The following passage helpfully illustrates the difference between these two modes of argument: Furthermore, it is evident in the case of the facts [ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων] at least that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for an overly populated city-state to be well governed. At any rate, among those that are held to be nobly governed, we see none that fails to restrict the size of its population. This is also clear through the conviction of rational arguments [διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως]. For law is a kind of organization, and good government must of necessity be good organization. But an excessively large number of things cannot share in organization. For that would be a task for a divine power, the sort that holds the entire universe together. (Pol. . , a–)
In this passage Aristotle first undertakes to establish that an overly populated polis cannot be well governed empirically (ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων), by appeal to the fact that we have never seen (ὁρῶμεν) a wellgoverned polis that fails to restrict the size of its population. He then proceeds to support this same conclusion ‘through the conviction of rational arguments’ (διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως: a). The rational argument contained in this passage can be represented as follows: () () () () ()
Law is a type of order. Good government possesses good laws. Therefore, good government must be well-ordered. Excessively large things cannot share in good order. Therefore, a well-governed polis must limit the size of its population.
The structure of this argument bears a striking similarity to that of the central argument in EE . . In this case, the conclusion is a substantive thesis about the population of a well-governed polis, while in the latter case it is a clearer definition of happiness; but both that ‘in the case of rational argument’ (ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου) at Phys. . , a–; cf. Pol. . , a (quoted below). Cf. Henry, ‘Optimality’, . The connection between arguing from λόγος/λόγοι and arguing generally (καθόλου) is most explicit at GA . , b–. My translation of the Politics follows C. D. C. Reeve, Aristotle: Politics (Indianapolis, ), with minor modifications.
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arguments essentially establish their respective theses by deducing them from general claims or principles appropriate to their subjectmatters (general views about law, good government, and order, on the one hand, and general views about the soul, its constituents, and their relative values, on the other). The structural similarity between the central argument for happiness in EE . and the rational argument in Pol. . , combined with certain signposts in EE . (b–; a–), suggests that the Eudemian method constitutes a systematic deployment of the rational mode of argumentation, one designed to meet the various norms of proper philosophical arguments and to help Aristotle achieve causal definitions of ethical topics. This proposal needs further development, not least because the ‘rational’ mode of argumentation itself remains in need of further scrutiny. But I submit that it is likely to be less of a distortion of the procedure of EE – than the typical strategy of reading those books in the light of the endoxic method of NE . . University of Notre Dame
BIB L IO G RA PHY Allan, D. J., ‘Aristotle’s Criticisms of Platonic Doctrine concerning Goodness and the Good’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (–), –. Allan, D. J., ‘Quasi-Mathematical Method in the Eudemian Ethics’ [‘QuasiMathematical’], in S. Mansion (ed.), Aristote et les problèmes de méthode (Louvain, ), –. Allen, J., Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence (Oxford, ). Anton, J. P., and Preus, A. (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, iv. Aristotle’s Ethics [Ethics] (Albany, NY, ). Barnes, J., ‘Aristotle’s Methods of Ethics’ [‘Methods’], Revue internationale de la philosophie, (), –. Bobonich, C., ‘Aristotle’s Ethical Treatises’, in R. Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, ), –. Bolton, R., ‘Aristotle on the Objectivity of Ethics’, in Anton and Preus (eds.), Ethics, –. Bolton, R., ‘Definition and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Generation of Animals’, in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology (Cambridge, ), –.
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Bolton, R., ‘The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic’, in Sim (ed.), Puzzles, –. Bolton, R., ‘Two Standards for Inquiry in Aristotle’s De caelo’ [‘Standards’], in A. C. Bowen and C. Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De caelo (Leiden, ), –. Bonitz, H., Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, ). Burnyeat, M., ‘Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul’, Proceedings of the British Academy, (), –. Charles, D., Aristotle on Meaning and Essence [Essence] (Oxford, ). Cooper, J. M., ‘Nicomachean Ethics VII. –: Introduction, Method, Puzzles’ [‘Introduction’], in C. Natali (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII (Oxford, ), –. Dirlmeier, F., Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik, übersetzt und kommentiert [Eudemische Ethik] (Berlin, ). Frede, D., ‘The Endoxon Mystique: What Endoxa Are and What They Are Not’ [‘Mystique’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), –. Gigon, O., ‘Das Prooimion der Eudemischen Ethik’ [‘Prooimion’], in Moraux and Harlfinger (eds.), Untersuchungen, –. Harlfinger, D., ‘Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik’, in Moraux and Harlfinger (eds.), Untersuchungen, –. Henry, D., ‘Optimality Reasoning in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology’ [‘Optimality’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (), –. Inwood, B., and Woolf, R., Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics (Cambridge, ). Jost, L., ‘Eudemian Ethical Method’, in Anton and Preus (eds.), Ethics, –. Karbowski, J., ‘Empirical Eulogos Argumentation in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals III. ’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, (), –. Kenny, A., Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics (Oxford, ). Kenny, A., The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relation between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford, ). Kullmann, W., Wissenschaft und Methode: Interpretationen zur aristotelischen Theorie der Naturwissenschaft (Berlin, ). Menn, S., ‘Plato and the Method of Analysis’, Phronesis, (), –. Mirhady, D. C., ‘Athens’ Democratic Witnesses’, Phoenix, (), –. Moraux, P., and Harlfinger, D. (eds.), Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik [Untersuchungen] (Berlin, ). Natali, C., ‘Posterior Analytics and the Definition of Happiness in NE I’, Phronesis, (), –.
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