Piaget\'s epistemic subject: A reply to shayer

JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING

VOL. 32, NO. 9, PP. 1003-1005 (1995)

Piaget’s Epistemic Subject: A Reply to Shayer Mansoor Niaz Chemistry Department, Universidad de Oriente, Apartado Postal 90, Cumana, Estado Sucre. 6101A Venezuela

According to Shayer (1993), “The epistemic subject-a notion feeble from its outset, . . . only appeared in Piaget’s writings after the disgraceful episode in which Vinh-Bang’s evidence (Inhelder, 1962, p. 21) apparently showing that the decalage was greater than the signal for concrete operations, was suppressed . . .” (p. 815). The issue of when the term epistemic subject was first coined, I would leave to the historians. In this commentary I would like to show that the epistemologic construct underlying the “epistemic subject,” viz., “. . . under ideal conditions, every individual, that is, psychological subject, could perhaps attain the level of competence exemplified by the epistemic subject” (Niaz, 1991b, p. 570), was present in Piaget’s epistemology from the very beginning. With remarkable foresight, Piaget (1918) at the age of 20 had outlined his epistemology in the following terms: “Every real organization is in an unstable equilibrium, but by the very fact of its existence, it tends toward a total equilibrium which is an ideal organization, just as a crystal misshaped by the rock which encloses it tends toward a perfect form . . . it has to do simply with laws, called ideal because their realization is deferred on account of the obstacle created by other laws. And, around this so simple relation between the real organizations of life and their ideal organization all the human disciplines have come to be crystalized” (pp. 96-99; reproduced in Chapman, 1988, p. 20). For Chapman (1988) these reflections represent “. . . the origins of Piaget’s professional identity” (p. 25). Again, as early as 1942, the mature Piaget had this to say: “. . . the evolution of individual thought is closely enmeshed in collective systems of knowledge, especially in those great systems of rational collaboration which deductive and experimental science has produced. The genetic theory of knowledge must therefore reach out into an historico-critical analysis of scientific thought, and also into genetic logic. For instance, to understand the evolution of the idea of space in the mind of a child, it is not enough to know how this idea is first born. One must also determine how the so-called ‘displacement groups’ which form it follow one another in succession from the motor level to that of the most abstract conceptions . . .” (Piaget, 1942, pp. 409410). Once again, long before 1962, Piaget in 1947 delineated the important distinction between the psychological and the epistemic subjects (however, without naming them): “. . . the psychologist studies the way in which the actual equilibrium of actions and operations is constituted, while the logician analyses the same equilibrium in its ideal form, i.e., as it would be if it were completely realised, and as it is imposed on the mind as a norm” (Piaget, 1950, p. 18; original work published 1947). 6 1995 by the National Association for Research in Science Teaching Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

CCC 0022-4308195109 1003-03

I004

NIAZ

Galileo to Newton: Piaget to Pascual-Leone Shayer considers Piaget to be only the Galileo of cognitive development, and points out: “The appropriate model is that of the genotype in relation to the phenotype in question. Much of Niaz’s argument would read better, as indeed that of Pascual-Leone’s already is, if presented in these terms” (p. 8 IS). Over 16 years ago, Shayer ( I 979, pp. 274-275) was skeptical of PascualLeone’s position. Thus, although his present position is a welcome change, it does not seem to go far enough to recognize the “progressive problemshift” (Lakatos, 1970) between the theories of Piaget and Pascual-Leone. As space limitations do not permit an exhaustive treatment of the subject, interested readers are referred to the following literature: Niaz (1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994); Niaz & Logie (1993). In contrast to Shayer’s psychological interpretation of Piaget, it appears that recent literature supports an epistemologic interpretation (cf. Chapman, 1988; Kitchener, 1987, 1993; Rowell, 1989). References Chapman, M. ( 1988). Constructive evolution: Origins and development of Piuget’s thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inhelder, B. (1962). Some aspects of Piaget’s genetic approach to cognition. Monographs of the Society for Reseurch in Child Development, 27, 19-34. Kitchener, R.F. ( 1987). Genetic epistemology, equilibration and the rationality of scientific change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 18, 339-366. Kitchener, R.F. ( 1993). Piaget’s epistemic subject and science education: Epistemological versus psychological issues. Science and Education, 2 , 137- 148. Lakatos, I . (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Niaz, M. ( 1990). Does Newton’s falling apple require an explanation? Antecedent variables in cognitive development: Controversy and resolution. Perceptuul and Motor Skills, 70, 755758. Niaz, M. ( 199 la). Correlates of formal operational reasoning: A neo-Piagetian analysis. Journal of Research in Science Teuching, 2 8 , 19-40. Niaz, M. (1991b). Role of the epistemic subject in Piaget’s genetic epistemology and its importance for science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 28, 569-580. Niaz, M. ( 1992). From Piaget’s epistemic subject to Pascual-Leone’s metasubject: Epistemic transition in the constructivist-rationalist theory of cognitive development. International Journul qf Psychology, 27, 443-457. Niaz, M. ( 1993a). “Progressive problemshifts” between different research programs in science education: A Lakatosian perspective. Jourtiul of Research in Science Teuching, 30, 757-765. Niaz, M. (1993b). Competing research programs in science education: A Lakatosian interpretation. Interchange, 24. I8 I - 190. Niaz, M. (1994). Pascual-Leone’s theory of constructive operators as an explanatory construct in cognitive development and science achievement. Educational Psychology, 14, 23-43. Niaz, M . , & Logie, R.H. (1993). Working memory, mental capacity, and science education: Towards an understanding of the “working memory overload hypothesis.” Oxford Review of Educ’utiotl, 19, 51 1-525. Piaget, J. (1918). Recherche. Lausanne: La Concorde.

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

I005

Piaget, J. (1942). Intellectual evolution. In R.N. Aushen (Ed.), Science and Man (pp. 409422). New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. Piaget, J. (1950). The psychology of intelligence. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1947). Rowell, J.A. (1989). Piagetian epistemology: Equilibration and the teaching of science. Synthese, 80, 141-162. Shayer, M. (1979). Has Piaget's construct of formal operational thinking any utility? British Journal of Educational Psychology, 49, 265-276. Shayer, M. (1993). Piaget: Only the Galileo of cognitive development'? Comment on Niaz and Lawson on genetic epistemology. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30, 815-818. Accepted December 29, 1994