PRC\'s nuclear capabilites

ARMS CONTRONL AND DISARMAMENT

PRC’s current nuclear stockpile size, nuclear infrastructure, fissile material stocks, ballistic missile program and ballistic missile defense program. Make sure to properly distinguish types and ranges of particular weapons in your arsenal.

DELAVEAU Maxence

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Chinese leaders, acknowledging the process of American and Soviet military modernization, sought to modernize their forces, seen as overdue. The nuclear forces seem to have been given a special attention in the modernization program. After the First Gulf War, Beijing took conscience that the People’s Liberation Army 1 (PLA) modernisation was inevitable. In order to catch up, China’s defence industry resource and investment prioritized missile and space systems programs2. However, this “long march toward the modernization”3 has harmful effects on the international security. China is, currently, the only Permanent Security Council member (P5) which does not report its nuclear weapons capacity. While the others P5 are reducing their nuclear stockpile, PRC is increasing its number of nuclear warheads 4 . Nevertheless, official documents are not available due to the Beijing's occult policy, and there is a lack of information around the Chinese military nuclear capability. Many Think Tanks and Research Institutes have published on this issue, but it remains estimations of the real Chinese nuclear forces. Presently, the problem is not to know if China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, but at what stage PLA is. Studying the triad - ground-toground missiles, nuclear bombers and nuclear submarines5 - should allow us to understand the Chinese potential in the military nuclear issue. Even though there are many scientific papers and Officials foreign analysis about PRC nuclear capabilities, the lack of information allows only making assumptions. The following data and numbers could be incorrect or approximates. The results in the table are an average of the numerous and contradictory studies. However, all the sources agree on the fact that researching Chinese nuclear weapons storage is difficult given the almost complete official secrecy that surrounds China’s nuclear forces. Moreover, as is the case with other nuclear-armed states, Western governments say very little about what they know 6789 . The reason why Beijing does not share information about its nuclear stockpile is because Chinese leaders want to keep the element of surprise against United States and Russia in case of open conflict10. It is estimated that China has an active arsenal between 19011 and 1 80012 warheads.

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The most interest division of the PLA is the Second Artillery Corps in charge of the missile and nuclear weapons in the Army 2 Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p.47 3 De WILDE d’ESTAMEL Tanguy, STRUYE de SWIELANDE Tanguy, La Chine sur la scène internationale, Vers une puissance responsable ?, P.I.E Peter Lang, Brussels, 2012, p. 413 4 ZAJEC Olivier, Les ambitions de Pékin bousculent la donne spatiale et nucléaire, Le Monde Diplomatique, Mai 2013, pp. 4-5 5 See the tables pp. 4-7 6 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S. Global Nuclear Inventory, 1945-2013, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 75, p. 3 7 SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet, CSIS, 2010, p.3 8 Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p.13 9 See the bibliography 10 Global Fissile Material Repot 2013, Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament, IPFM, p56 11 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S., Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 79, 2013, p.3 12 KARBER Philipp, China’s Underground Great Wall: Challenge for Nuclear Arms Control, 2011 University of Georgetown, unclassified version, p. 14

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Concerning its fissile material stockpile, China has not already made an official declaration that it has ended the production of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium 13 . Nevertheless, it is established that production of HEU ended in 1987 and the plutonium one in 1990 14 . The Chinese stockpile of fissile material is estimated at 16±4 tons of HEU and 1.8±0.5 tons of weapon-grade plutonium 15 16 , enough to produce between 450 and 600 warheads. The development of the Chinese nuclear strategy has to be considered under Beijing’s foreign policy. Indeed, the enlargement of the “String of Pearls”, in the South Chinese Sea and the Indian Ocean, provides strategic positions for the nuclear Chinese submarines. Naval bases 17 permit the supplying and the dispersion for the PLA Navy (PLAN) around the seas 18 . Moreover; the Underground Great Wall construction by the Second Artillery Corps has worried the international community19. This infrastructure aims to allow a second strike in case of nuclear aggression. The Underground Great Wall constitutes a secure 5 000 km web of galleries dug in the Hebei Mountains. The Second Artillery Corps could stock 3 000 warheads to a depth of several hundreds of meters20. The following tables have been realized with information provided in scientific papers and policy memos, notably from the United States department of security. Nonetheless, there are no official Chinese documents to prove the PLA’s real strength. Collected figures below are averages and estimates made from found sources:

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Accessed on http://fissilematerials.org/countries/china.html Arms control and Proliferation profile, China accessed on http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile 15 Accessed on http://fissilematerials.org/countries/china.html 16 ZAJEC Olivier, Les ambitions de Pékin bousculent la donne spatiale et nucléaire, Le Monde Diplomatique, Mai 2013, pp. 4-5 17 See annex II for an example of naval base 18 China develop its navy in order to have a “blue fleet” for 2020 19 Revelead by the Kabber’s report, the building of this nuclear infrastructure began in 1995. 20 KARBER Philipp, China’s Underground Great Wall: Challenge for Nuclear Arms Control, 2011 University of Georgetown, unclassified version. 14

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PLAN is part of the Beijing’s Grand Strategy21. The evolution of the Chinese Navy from a Green Fleet to a Blue Fleet will allow a capacity of projection as important as the United States. The nuclear submarines are the first priority of the PLAN modernization program. Because they cannot be spotted by satellites and they have access to many bases thanks to the String of Pearl22, SSBNs are powerful instruments for the Chinese naval strategy. SSBNs (PLAN’s vectors)23 Type

Units

Deployed

SLBM

Missile Launcher Tubes

Xia-Class (Type 092)

1

1987

JL-1

12

Jin-Class (Type 094)

324

2007

JL-1 or JL-2

12 to 1625

≈2020

JL-3 or JL-2

24

Tang Class (Type 096)26 In development

SLBMs (Missile)27 Nuclear Capacity

MIRV28

≈2 150

≈250 kT

No

2013

≈7 500

≈20, 90 150 kT or 1 MT

1 to 829

≈2020

≈11 000

?

Type

Units

Deployed Range (km)

JL-1

12

1986

JL-2

< 36

JL-330

In development

1 to 8

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JISI, W., China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2. 2011 22 De WILDE d’ESTAMEL Tanguy, STRUYE de SWIELANDE Tanguy, La Chine sur la scène internationale, Vers une puissance responsable ?, P.I.E Peter Lang, Brussels, 2012, p.415 23 SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet, CSIS, 2010, pp.2-17 24 Beijing would like to have 5 nuclear Type 094 in 2020, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p.92 25 Modifications had been done on Jin-Class to carry more missiles, Status of World Nuclear Forces Early-2013, Nuclear Information Project, Accessed on www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html. 26 GERTZ Bill, Red tide, China deploy a new class of strategic missile submarine accessed from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/23/china-deploy-new-strategic-missile-classsubmarine/?page=all 27 BRAD Robert, China and Ballistic Missile Defense, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003. 28 There is a controversy, is China able to “MIRV” a nuclear missile? The MIRV colon on its table is a supposition according to the chapter MIRV or not MIRV in SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet 29 SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet, CSIS, 2010, p.9 30 SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet, CSIS, 2010, p.14

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With the J-20, a fifth generation fighter, PLAAF will be one of the most technological Air Force in the World. Even if the PLAAF seems to be a less priority than PLAN or SAC, it remains an important player in the South East Asian strategic game.

Aircraft (PLAAF’s vectors)31 Type

Units

Deployed

Nuclear Warhead

Capacity

Xian H-6 (B-6)

≈ 15032

1959

CJ-20

1

J-2033

In development

/

?

Possible

Cruise missile Type CJ-2034

Units

Deployed

?

2009

Range

Nuclear Capacity

MIRV

≈2 500

350 kT

No

The Second Artillery Corps (SAC) is in charge of the most of China’s conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles forces 35 . The SAC had been one of the main objectives 36 of the PLA’s capacities modernisation. Ballistic Missile Defense System and Nuclear weapons are in the centre of the transformation of the Army. Ballistic Missile Defense37 Type

Units

Group

Range (km)

SA-20 PMU2

?

SAM38

1 000

CSA-9

?

SAM

500

SC-19

?

ASAT- EKV39

Exo-atmospheric

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The Rise of the Air Power, Grand Strategy Security and analysis, September 2013, p 3 Only the H-6H and H-6M are able to carry a nuclear weapon 33 New furtive aircraft based on the US F-35 and F-22, it could be able to launch nuclear missile. 34 Nuclear version of the CJ-10, adapted for aircraft: Sword -20 cruise missiles loaded on to H-6M bombers, Global Military 2009. 35 CHASE Michael S., ERICKSON Andrew S., The conventional Missile Capabilities of the China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting, Asian Security, 8: 2, 2012, pp.115-137 36 PLAN is the other main branch of the modernization program. 37 BRAD Robert, China and Ballistic Missile Defense, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003, p. 60 38 Surface to Air Missile 39 Anti-Satellite Weapons and Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle Weapon 32

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Ballistic missile (Second Artillery Corps' missiles)40 Type

Units41

Group

Deployed

Range (km)42

Nuclear Capacity

MIRV

DF-3A

≈ 10

IRBM

1971

≈ 3 000

700 to 3 000

no

DF-4

≈ 12

IRBM

1976

≈5500

≈ 3 300 kT

no

DF-5A

≈ 20

ICBM

1981

≈ 13 000

≈ 4 MT

no

IRBM

1990

≈ 600

350 to 500 kT

no

43

DF-15

< 100

DF-21

≈ 80

IRBM

1991

≈ 2 500

≈ 200 to 500 kT

no

DF-31

≈ 10

ICBM

2006

7 000 to 8 000

20, 90 150 kT or 1 MT

3 to 8

DF-31A

≈ 20

ICBM

2007

≈ 7 500

20 to 150 kT

3 to 8

DF-41

/

ICBM

In development

≈ 15 000

20 to 250 kT or 1MT

8

1991

≈ 4 000

90 kT

no

DH-10

100 to 20044 SLCM

CF-1

?

SRBM

1993

≈ 400

≈ 10 kT

no

CF-2

?

SRBM

1998

≈ 400

≈ 10 kT

no

Destroying an old weather satellite FY-1C with an interceptor SC-19, in January 2007, demonstrates that Beijing has the ability to strike in space. Even if China is officially opposed to the militarization of space, PRC shows a clear desire to challenge American hegemony in this domain. Including in case of conflict, where, given the spatial dependence increasingly proven by the modern armies, prevent the opponent to have access to space constitutes a priority. Space and nuclear are two issues very close in China. It could conduct to a new generation of nuclear weapons.

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KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S., Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 79, 2013, p. 3 41 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S. Global Nuclear Inventory, 1945-2013, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 75, p. 6 42 See Annex III 43 There are more than 1 100 DF-15 deployed, especially in direction of Taiwan, but they are not all nuclear. 44 Nobody knows how many nuclear DH-10 Beijing had engaged according to KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S. Global Nuclear Inventory, 1945-2013, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 75, p. 5

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RESOURCES

Scientific papers: BRAD Robert, China and Ballistic Missile Defense, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2003, p. 60 CHASE Michael S., ERICKSON Andrew S., The conventional Missile Capabilities of the China’s Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting, Asian Security, 8: 2, 2012, p.24 JISI, W., China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2. 2011 KARBER Philipp, China’s Underground Great Wall: Challenge for Nuclear Arms Control, 2011 University of Georgetown, unclassified version, p.357 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S. Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 96 No. 6, August 2014, p. 14 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S. Global Nuclear Inventory, 1945-2013, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 75, p. 8 KRISTENSEN Hans M. and NORRIS Robert S., Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69: 79, 2013, p. 8 SKYPEK Thomas M., China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China's SSBN Fleet, CSIS, 2010, p.17 The Rise of the Air Power, Grand Strategy Security and analysis, September 2013, p.4 ZAJEC Olivier, Les ambitions de Pékin bousculent la donne spatiale et nucléaire, Le Monde Diplomatique, Mai 2013, pp. 4-5

Books: De WILDE d’ESTAMEL Tanguy, STRUYE de SWIELANDE Tanguy, La Chine sur la scène internationale, Vers une puissance responsable ?, P.I.E Peter Lang, Brussels, 2012, p. 512 FISHER, R., China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, Westport, Praeger Security, 2010, p. 344 MUELLER John, Atomic obsession, Nuclear Alarmist from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University press, 2010, p.319

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Official Sources: Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China 2013, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p.92 Global Fissile Material Repot 2013, Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament, IPFM, p.130

Websites: Status of World Nuclear Forces Early-2013, Nuclear Information Project, Accessed on www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html. Gregory Kulacki, « Congressional commission issues puzzling recommendations on Chinese nuclear forces », Union of Concerned Scientists, November 2012. Accessed on

http://allthingsnuclear.org/congressional-commission-issues-puzzling-recommendations-onchinese-nuclear-forces/ Accessed on http://fissilematerials.org/countries/china.html Arms control and Proliferation profile, China accessed on http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/chinaprofile http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/PRCFacilities_static.shtml GERTZ Bill, Red tide, China deploy a new class of strategic missile submarine accessed on http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/23/china-deploy-new-strategic-missile-classsubmarine/?page=all

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Annexes Annex I: The modernization of the PLA from 2004 to 2008. Category Surface forces Submarine forces Air forces

Forces considered as “modern” in 2004 (%) 7% > 10% 10%

Forces considered as “modern” in 2008 25% 46% 20%

Source, IISS Military Balance, IISS, London, 2011

Annex II: Sanya naval base in Hainan (PRC), the first Pearl of the String

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Annex III: Chinese Nuclear missiles range

STRUYE de SWIELANDE Tanguy, China and World Politics, Louvain-la-Neuve : Université Catholique de Louvain, 2013, p.124

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